Michael Saward

ustivi
h y
ed
work
sot
ay
v
e need to
seaitatrs
actual
gu
e
remost
a
ion u first at
ii
has a prLaflou and curious sort of claim
w iuc
ii mit a c’ank u Iarionshg \ll 1 hase done in this chapter, of course, is
we an ‘otenti H go 1w thee than the existing work. I do not
sh’ ‘w
tc mat calk show why we )ught to do so, or precisely how we should do
y cle’
s’ rIm rhat exist g work tins Ii mIs does not mean that those
sk I now take
ted lhrs is
not ‘litly
n
if
the rde
r. i that n pi
elections, tatlIr
vi ipping the represer tative claim
.
work on the theors
of political representation leaves us with a range ot important issues to
deal with. A good deal of existing usage is, among other things, too statu
ii
and inflexibk, dryly taxonon ic, too exclusively built around I
at d somewhat two thmensiona in that the chara
legitirr a
o
rep e tee tate ‘ii to b’ ‘ixeu or unprobier rat c in this ch’i
ad it i
osi i e r od’ el rhorate and defend
o
in
rk introduced n passing it Ch plc
aim Ira n
rei ese t 0
tI rough wI eh to nalyze political representat
prim r 1
packing th notion of thr representative clan we can begin to a oh
key limits of existing approaches, viewing representation in a theoretiealI
more rounded and empirically rich way by taking on board, for example,
its constitutive, boundary-crossing, dynamic, and ubiquitous character.
Picking up the key “remainder” points from Chapter 1 in particular, the
discussion here and in Chapter 3 focuses on how the representatixe claim
framework (a) helps to illuminate how the definition of representation
derives iltrin tely from events notably elams and not ftxed s
n
tional o esci e, md how the ways in which representation is do
e
i
the
o
in
reinforces
(or
becomes);
what
(h)
it
is
to and onclitions
m truetedness” f representation(s) ( ) bri ag s’ t
the fact
c t
symboli and cultural aspects of representation to bear on ti
relilterpretati
fruitful
the
fosters
politi al r”pr ‘sentation; (d)
bows
dard typologies of representational roles as resources for claims, (
the sheer sariabiity of the phenomenon of representation; (ft expresses
how by its nature representation is less “contained,” for example, within
the nation-state, than is conmionly assumed; and (g) stresses the erfor
inative, “staged” side of representation as well as its more conventionally
institutional side.
In Chapter 1 1 argued that despite its strengths
recent
‘
siupp1?ie
tin
reprcst i1atnv
Alapping the representative
rIain
F u1 tins Impa to show that these moses are both genuine advances on
hr s, inn lit implicatise in the sense that each advance
r
hn
id cons F in
ii sohei
here is
n
Is, an
nnp in
prt
S p
c/ann
about the subjects proffered to them by others’ claims Each ot tlic
elements making up a representative claim in principle is explored ii
thi chapter, and t w varied links between hese elenien
r iscusse
It is rucial 5 otc and as I h pe to demonstrate entirely ight
t. sq i se itatiss. slams (and therefore political representatn
x
in thi abstrac. form, can cover a wide di ersity of ass
ing
ía niliar binary I stinctions, in principle I overs formal nd inlori
electoral and non-electoral, and democratic and undemocratic claims
(amongst others I consider in detail in Chapter 3 key lines of sariatioii
of representative claims). To get a sense of this definition’s wide applica
bility, it is helpful to consider briefly some basic examples of representatis
ci ims fitting this schema:
,
RIiFNI \LIVF Cl
M
ill hO us k uk at what exactly is going on when representative
I no
iains an iiiade What s in this claim? It begins with the familiar idea
miii ition n individual or a collective stands thr, speaks for,
t at in is
an
n an olj c
)ect st
tlisi,
i word
i art
)
I IF
it
silo
I
is
1
nk°
v
ii
F
is
he
Ca 0
sentl
oak
c ti
i ci
ferent’ (
e pohticiar i sakes
ci called
vhich is
hi g it
iii nell Is
sub,ect’ ss iii stands h,r n object, thc object i his idea of
his unstitus net ‘gon 1, hard-working folk” fin example rather than
t[ic 15 hire 0, wlsicl li uP the other things the onstjtuency is, or might
his nerds, -ii I Ii is, an “audience” which receives the claims
\il
Ilierefo
crc ire different
‘mu es tF
is
Fr cr s
u
ker
ive
object r hi cnt
a n
ft kng
‘cc
i
e
ci
is
sn
d out ide
icj
or
in
s
icc 1
I- spi c IH his to so the ci mci s f the rcpi escntati c claim appear
,O Or ‘i a linear miatif n. I lowever, it is better understood as a circular
rclution, Cii example, audiences aie not simply passive recipients of
es iliax inaL counterclaims about themselves as subjects, or
lairns
,
-
“I
\ 1
stars Is
to JO (
iii
rtha’r
4’
I ,,IC’ (I
that is
Fr
orw’i
to a r ‘frr
h
WI and is ( Ifs red
ccr(
—
1
Ii MP nake offers hiniselforhersdf subject) a 1 i n dim
ns ituc w n rests (thje o) to that constituen y (a id u.
rcfc rent is ti i tual, flesh and blood people of the -o is uener
object invol ‘s a selective portrayal of constituencs inter ‘sts.
2. lhe Liberal Party (maker) offers itself (subject) as standing for tis
interests of the “family” (object) to the electorate (audience),
3 Marx (maker) offered the working class (subject) as the symbol of revo
lutionary hope (object) to the would-he members of that elms (audience
4 A itiglobahzation demonstrators (makers set up themselve and
velU iits subjects) as repiesentatives of the oppressed
id in
lized (c I ject o Western governments (audience)
t u
I less, we hays a variety of claims. Whether they involve dc’ oral poh
or not, they incorporate a symbolic dimension; being elected does not taks
away the need to make symbolic claims, it merely establishes a particular
frame within which tlie claims are made (a frame that often has a serious
impact on tile plausibility of the claim, as we see in Chapter 6 in part icu
lar) Note too that claims can be cast as long term (as in the Ma
example), or short term (for instance, the Liberal Party mmgh l e iiurs
a pragmatis and temporary electoral strategy in its family-b i d ci i i
They can incorporate a wide variety of ii dividual and c fleet e as
and i volve a great diversity of types of claims and aud ci c addres
I hese examples help to demonstrate how that s andy flows troni a
suitably abstract starting point, and also as a by--product to show how
:
Mappi rig the represen tat i vt’ cia i to
iif)?csi’tlkflhle c attn
a rush o ,iarniaiivs iudgmem about Igitimatc or democratic
escntat i in :an help to op n our eves to that variety.
a ann to represent or to know what
rpres ntat is Lnm
Hit or something It is a iaim; it may or
lafto tt of
ci sJt
s the extent to wr wh
how we might
Li h r iuhn
0 i n(
I o an
t Ow
ip in I
ild c
II
partic
iple,
r s
n
ntr
m n
t I y
1 y ) t 5
ght
i
thence, wh i
lireeled i
L
of if s
rot H n d p ox watt r dispersed or self aware or
’he in .1 d, t might onk consist of me. In other
1
p
ior itt
lilms iog bw mdlv \\htlgenstuinian thinking, a “family” of
hat ommId ‘easorihh be taken as contriouting content to the general
mLtcrent. Putting it schiematiciy, I could
tiist a
ii e i.
H
stinct e
esileS
La n
r
s. sO
I
i
p rson
woup m
tint
1
i
UNL)FRLYING P[IRSPI’Cl’IVES: REPRiShxTA I IrON
AS PRFSENCE ANI) AS F\’ENl
Representat n may well have o ore meaning male
in some Sen
tat is literally absent (e.g., as Hanna
ontra 1
a
e F at it is the rendering of s I cHin
r tost
e al
understa iding polithal repiesentati ii
lb say ti t ‘r presentation means this, ointing
or prac 1
r t the most interesting or importan p
represent i o
It is less about pinning down meaning
,
Hi”
it mime
rmml
wsibmlit’
odw
m(
thu
i as
I as pr our
ler1saa ems a
whir h form tI
os 5 of cci
‘coon
i
I
ii
)lOi
on) It
mepreseni
ejiresentatien as mini.
ehlectual and e iltura]
i etmally
ii as a fac
n elicit
atively
,‘ckftori
1
iwhih
tdei a
i uncle lyi ig 1 w of
claim mak w dec yes
i spec
ii
mt to n a
more abort
i
how meanings are generated and contested; or, again, how sonte lung
absent is rendered as present. How is the impression of prescnLe ten
structed, defended, and contested? What determines the success 01 faiiurc
of the effort to construct such an impression? in short, the how ather than
the what questions are the ones that are pressing, net Least at a rime hen
traditional modes of political representation are facing serious challcnce
and new or
merging. Further, it is common N slide from ii
i
“representation i cans this to ‘representation is en bodied in ti
uth n rid i tF one’ to ti ink that rep ‘esentat em h s a
loeatee p w ice ii the w irld most often in tern e I if e
craNe
ii
It is i t the fact, not the nalloyed presene
ii presenta
ought to be asserted, hut rallier representation as a set ot practi
iF
events
and in particular of claims, claims to be representan’. e. Buor
fleshing out further the idea of the representative claim, I explore s nue
deeper roots of time claim based approach
the underlying cent mast
between presence and event perspectives.
The presence approach centers upon providing a suitable detinitmom mit
this term in ( rder to pm down its meaning. Advocair $ of, or iii se
otherwise w Irk within, the presence ipproacf offer st ip dative dcl i
s
of rep esentatto i A stipulative definition is One th it is o
denot tion with d stinetive analytical or empirical ad intages I
presence perspective, we riced at accurate and agreed share I ii
meaning ‘hould ideally he settled prior to in ocatior of the m.
analysis e I v tried social and political invocatior
‘
1 mns
in time tIne
udmne ‘1 i
could
nature
am P tHat hit p
thin limits e.g n >rsentaent
!ìç’ sdi
10 imase pit lerent ‘su
5 ict cling e
ut whit tog, in I dlustiatittg the representativt claim and its
t
term tic ome 1 this book. As part of the foundation of this
.mymI
ye that wi exp etc what assumptions lie
iH h at ‘his
P. mm
Pu
something
Pitkin an
pow t
—
A/lapping the representatn’c claim
pulatse e huition
idut ed I y Is ocates at the
ass I
as
rq
lien
s wt
X sE
s for
11
c
n
dir
t
n
lick
dul
I ni
if a 1
ture
Land n
for,
en.
Hip I(5 it his or I
constitu ncy is
thus a rcprcsentatsac and tiw social fau involved is representation.
lit. pat seine per spet.’twe holds that representation can he singularly
ogniied a present in the world, hilly present to us
rid susan I iguoisk
i oc
in its
hateve
t, c un
‘ific p I al contr
rsies
a
I I
11
Of
lit Is a
e c
ci
at
I
t
r,
ci tn r a)
e pri
of u
des, si
Ln $
“dde
and
tee”;
n si Lit at is ass I
se nc,
tst itesi iii electoral processes’ (c a
s urrcs ut pent e
where reformers of political
Philisps I
s’flj5jisiTi can taha the rendering preScilt of
by ar X sufficiently
in thi is
orung ali i it s ‘strue ii nip poser sing institutions;
air
1)
nse
pici
silk.
2000
6 7).
a Yc
s
hea ii is mt
1
pie
Ii
was
ed 1
and i
sho
) ely
ide r lyr
ii
nse at
tern
Ihus idir stipulal Sc dehnitn is is not a straightforward business, of
cans
I eiiutatssc meanings in a dicnonarv, for example, cannot easily
‘c’s ‘I,, axe f sr , ,aative nit snings within and a russ cultures and
nue t
the I
lit.
IO
S C
St i
Y
f
P
ol
a
o
n t
at u al ed by
0 ter
as
c pt i
a it
evil t
oes no
i pern
ens. It
ems s s •s wla i a un-u stance of the general stipulation
a I. ‘1ur
is a aample, that “ars deeted leg slator is the representative of his or her
astitueiwv” is the I as’us and limit ot political representation rides into
air t’olit
stidics i lie back h the seen i p naturaliiatton of the more
Our
‘r, a
ansi
the
of s h con—
rat ‘bicif
nih
litit.
50
fO
opi
veh I
it in
for et
S I
I ai )H
I’he pren sppruaali, irs debasing representation, importantly defines
it. lcs it is riot
\s ale I, till exanipic, it encourages and enables a specilic
h.
I asnilias
is
.
—
—
type of thinking about political representation: binary thinking Wntings
on pout cal repre ntation at replete with binary dist r ctio
j nial
v ‘us i fort 1, s 11 au thoriied versus democratic ally uthorizc
e
ersus degate, leg tin ate versus illegitimate, and liber 1 vcrsus
lye
Ihese can be useful enough as analytical tools, short of strong ontc logical
claims, but even at that level the consequences of their deployment can be
unfortunate. Consider, for instance, one common equation: legitimate
representation requires formal authorization by others see Figure ‘1,1)
The c nmon hinar distincti ins set out ‘r Figure ) a mid an
of of
c insider t o i
c me haps by a process of natural ‘d s i
a ii
ffect ye y ole i. ut a xistenc
types
and D 11 y voul
ed
out beca at if cont tuafly we cannot look for them, we nay not
hem
(or, if we do, we may downgrade unduly their relevance). ‘Ibis effect, iii
turn, stands to reduce the richness of political representation. I hope to
show, for instance, that inf&mal processes of other-authorized represen
tation (to use this language for the moment) are common, and I real
democritic significance Such distinctions can also ‘idcline in pa ant
ways in vhich hers. are degrees of other authorization, degrees c f
t , etc n Figure 2 1, for example, there arc elements or shadows )
iii
2 and 2 in 1; 3 in 4 and 4 in 1. 1 do not condemn binary reaso sing in
general; much less than that, I want to point out that in cases such as this
one, it can stymie the productiveness of alternative modes, such as rela
tional reasoning.
in suns regarding the presence approach the limited ground
fer
‘nec, and usefulness of the stipulated definition is always in angc of
revelation ‘Where effective revelation occurs, the resulting des tu
a
lion can render the seemingly given as optional. The underlying p
bilk
ty of full presence is a precondition for presence in the key political sense
that representation Xin some way renders Ypresent (despite Y’s absencet.
Recognizing that relation as profoundly unstable is significant.
—
3 Self authodzed
4. Other
authorized
1, Formal
2. Into nat
A
‘3
C
0
Figure 2,1 Representation and binary distinctions
Mapping the representative clu un
tot the wn. ng thing to do,
ut fir
t too I untiy,
ci
ii I
lt
I
ii
wn
an
tha
a w
nice
r hi
ncr sou,
s 1 Ic
the que
d Ic’
me ini t
lb guI s. tng piesen approaches, the author or speaker is positioning
lout ,o herself as an idjudicator ot occut rence
when it is representation,
not ‘Ihis might ul one sensi ol what Bauman (1992) wrote
I hen
“roe
he analy t ‘he
cued t
inteip
a
‘1
II
“Ic
r
h ‘e a
I
II
pi
1
a gt
nccal roach
epic
te bu
in ci
self ai pointed
ioi
t one
cit scha
and svb t Is not legitimate representation. Such
ci t
‘slii anne, clifiers su’.:citantially from efforts to specify the conditions
aidet win Ii repiesentative claims might be accepted as democratically
e 1 hap c
ounat
t
pies
i is
a
ap
‘r h
i th
I to
ci
v
t c
ion its
s
nst
I o
nt, a racti e,
x it
1 i
i ii
ipheated
mvocati i and enact nent.
a inc
Iki
ic mug s
hi picscnt moo” is the product ot a performance, both in the sense of a
Uteaticat perhti mance, and more technically in the sense of being perfor
h scay that Butler (1990) claims that “gender” is
-an’ “is g’ Jci ed
Meai
s irnpb
d in mv ition; it volves
i loin
y pi 0
Ic
cx
I tin er tird
enta
no
in
ineand
stior
,
—
‘
availability of notions such as trusteeship or stewardshi” can be i oked
the Ian ant’s idvantage ‘hese resourc. $ are culturally r
i cci
r pertoir
r clan i iaking performances (some of th in
c
vhat Mu. covici (1 )88) ailed “social representations’
There are many points of contrast between the two approaches. Wheic
the presence approach stipulates meaning, the event approach deters it (or
better: deflects it back into the claim-making context). Where the presence
approach posits full presence, the event approach is haunted In neser
s never quite clear where or hov invoc t 1 ot
luite-preser -c(s)
r presci tat o might gain some purchase Where for th Pr
U
p oack Sc i te X stands ft r some I for the event approa th there i
in
that some X, by virtue of some alleged capacity or attribute, can sp ak for
Y to Y, and a wider audience. The presence approach tends to posit a given
subject, where the event approach posits an invoked or summoned sub
jectivity. The presence approach tends to lead to a view of representation
as practiced within a ettled set f institutional domains (elective tes in
particul r), while he event approach is m e open h H un tth
of
what may be regarded as domains or spaces where repiesentath cc. s
This di cussion of the underlying contrast between presence a x’ vent
perspectives has been brief, and the contrast has been quite tightly drawn
I take the discussion no further here; my primary interest lies in tile
politics of tile claim, rather than the conception of the event underpinning
it. However, the character of, and the basis for, this underlying distinction
will continue to inform the analysis throughout the hook
t)
Is
presi
pm te
sy del
eprese t ion” as making
approach,
for example, looks at
cong tha is absent, the event
“Csc t 0)1
Lii mc that git’e the unpresmrn a making present. A political figure who
attempts th is impression or an thserver who points to such an impres
So, a It u ‘sentutiv’ horn is a laim to represent
is
ion
a ci
torn
hat
irIs
1cm
r torn ‘thing.
rtuol
1
1
h
1
gr
to S[
/ by
tule
In
‘cam
5
ph,
rest nm i, nvseh i periornii g lie wIt I delegate, iustec, or gent
Whti the presence approach see as representative roles, the event ap—
groach additn>nalis sees as iesources Oar representative claims; the cultural
WI’
TI-Ill ELEMEN I’S OF TI-IL REPRESENTA1 IVF CLAIM
Because representation is more an event, or a series of events, than a
bounded and clear presence, the world of political representation is a
world of claim-malung rather than the operation of formal inst t i ons
In be u e, the ‘e a e more things in the political world than claii IS t e
a’e &inands, for example. And not all claints are representativ
u is
though nany wifi I even if not explicitly Convent onal accou ts of
political representation often assume that if someone is duly elected to
office, then that person is not only “a representative,” hut that they are
‘t4appzr
La
Va us
rse h is
I t
e, ii hlight d the act
in ertain dcctoiai and partY systems, and indeed in certain national,
uiturI and politic i1 contests sorie socntal groups are overrepresented
‘Ic
al 1
lau
m
‘,a
the
r
‘rr
en d (Cu 1 er
1
n
Iii
ig
us
lyz
;
).
ii nI
gi cc. n I pes, of LOt i espondutce between s oters and elected
repr. sentatne’ H in ano Karps i9 7. Binghani Powell 2004). But there
c pci stent iobii,
niti
slid, f out “tIns P elect d ther fore h or
e
e t t
‘1
I
t
e
ft
at
,
-
In
tlwt in IccIcd w. ,Or is
representatise is stiaightforward and
rca.unaNe ciiou;is, I ot to lide this forr iai, achieved status with their
i p
‘re
it
U
p(
on
hcy
n
nge
i ci
ted
Li
°‘
0(1.
icco’J
cpu.
‘1
10
1
it itivcness
so U ugly built ii to the notion of being
and not without sonic reason that consideration of how other
Lou. it R be raprLseIttatisc li rowthd out thus (I argue) reducing
I
yn
ut
(
ep
‘C
C C it t
u
a
dpi
ic
us
hic
gr
variety of
‘H
(
coin, a id rgtnu.ati Os take pail, electoral actors through elective
pro
CLw.,
10(1 other nturs through thei processes Representation is a
in
1’ Ia i in’ ft ‘i i
er tl
i a f t est
lishe by ii itutio tal
‘
S
t
i.
i
the epresentative rlann
interests. In this senK, representation is is mud constitutive is relic ‘tive
of facts about interests and capacities.
6 And it is through the process ot
claim-making that the work of constituting is pursued.
Seen i this ight, n w uld he representative n cludir g an e ected e,
c n fully act v
rese itatioii o he fully representative, acts n .y be
facts, but claims are contestable and contested; there as no churn to be
representative of a certain group that does not leave space h)r its contesta
lion o rejection by the would be audience or constituency, ii by (ther
political act
l’Fi oint s far ‘ithar ‘nough fron observati ii o
toni politics Candidates ompet over the definition of c nstatucncv
interests, and electoral victories of over 70 percent of the popular vote
are rare in established democracies. But still the power of elections as
producing c resentation’ often overshadows this point. Ii haptcr 1,
I x
1 iui it s I
1 IdCLU S tflat bun WI dl can oc clauncu V iii
cLUid
regard to representation on the basis of due election.
The representative claim, then, consists at the most general level of five
Key, interconnecting dimensions maker, subject, object, referent, nid
audience Path as crucial, or so I argue, to a robust, detailed, and ‘Bun i
lating account of the world of representative politics. It is unusual to
bring together all of these dimensions in accounts of representation; this
set encapsulates an effort to bring together certain themes in the history of
the idea that have for a long time been held separate (as noted in he
tntrodnctk n’l I nnw briefly draw cut their kt y attdhutes and ‘ounc 1
‘
“
i1i short Lii cc rcplcscntdtiun as a lad arising from (in particular) due
dopt
Lu
consentional rather than an accurate description.
i r
‘vel
Ho. sly 1
tog i s C
a
lot
ii
ies
many if
h, ,sill cut ncr in a iili ,ther ii cm iplev ways, and will divide as
i as uiuw Wouki-lic lepresentatives, of whatever type, must
of
& wit piLk
ii ch
se. pi pose id tab hate disti tive ‘u d limited
n
r
H
s
i
r
i
S
f latti V
• ii
no
usil tens epr ilL i ear
I enconipas. ig se of
,instltuen(s intere,ts s remote, at best Would-he representatives have to
‘naPe i’lahns, about themselv”s and their would-be constituencies, and use
is i
dci ti y
up
w
our
a be
in i articular
1
ci
a
ui
.1
r
lit
sl
ikir hr th se
‘C’ tioll Is to
o ft
.n
‘
IHE MAKI RS OF REPRESENTATIONS
We saw in Chapter 1 how Pitkins analysis influentially sidelined the
makers of representations (or, representative claims), at least with respect
to their political importance. In other works, the same problem emerges
mm a differe it angle Representation is often seen especially in the w k
I cultural and aesti’ etic theorists, as triangular in conception -- sub cct,
object, and referent.’ But representation does not just happen as the result
a process or by the functioning of familiar (e.g., electoral) institutions;
t is claimed as the key part of someone making it happen tF rough he
iepk yr tent r ex loitation of a wide variety of formal and n or ‘ii