Cultivating Votes in Rural Chile

Cultivating Votes in Rural Chile
Couyoumdjian, Juan Pablo; Londregan, John Benedict
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY
vol. 37, n°3, pp. 355-388
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00051.x
Fecha de publicación: AUG 2012
Resumen
In Chile's two-member legislative districts we show there are two groups of swing voters, one group
for the first seat won by the governing coalition, another for the second. We build a model that
allows us to identify the relative prevalence of these voters across communities. Using data on the
allocation of discretionary agricultural loans, we find that communities with relatively many voters
pivotal for the first seat receive more loans than they otherwise would have, but we find no
systematic advantage for districts that are pivotal for the second seat.
Palabras clave
KeyWords Plus: PORK-BARREL; REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS; PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION; BUYING SUPERMAJORITIES; INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION; ELECTORALCOLLEGE; GOVERNMENT; ELECTIONS; ECONOMY; EXPENDITURES