es - European Parliament

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
2014 - 2019
Committee on Budgetary Control
10.9.2014
WORKING DOCUMENT
on European Court of Auditors Special Report No 2/2014 (2013 Discharge)
"Are Preferential Trade Arrangements adequately managed?"
Committee on Budgetary Control
Rapporteur: Bart Staes
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Introduction
Preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) are an essential instrument of EU trade policy and
allow trading partners to grant preferential terms in the context of their trade with each other.
PTAs can be either reciprocal or unilateral. The former reduce tariff barriers with the
objective of increasing trade, economic growth, employment and consumer benefits for both
parties. Through unilateral arrangements, the EU grants preference without reciprocity with
the objective of providing developing countries tariff-free access to the EU market, thereby
contributing to poverty eradication and to promoting sustainable development in developing
countries.
End 2013, 39 PTAs cover trade between the EU and 180 countries and territories were in
force. In 2011, the value of goods imported in the EU under these agreements amounted to
more than € 242 billion, representing 14% of EU imports.
According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, common commercial policy is the
exclusive competence of the Union and the procedure for establishing PTAs is set out in its
Articles 206 and 207. The Commission is responsible for negotiating preferential trade
arrangements, assessing and evaluating their economic, social and environmental impacts and
supervising their implementation by Member States and partner countries. The Member
States’ customs authorities bear the main responsibility for overseeing the EU’s international
trade by implementing measures to safeguard the financial interests of the EU and to protect it
from unfair or illegal trading practices, while encouraging legitimate trade. The authorities of
the beneficiary/partner countries are responsible for checking that the arrangements are
adhered.
The effects of PTAs by the Commission are assessed through two types of ex ante
assessments used to support decision-making in trade matters i.e. impact assessments (IAs)
and sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) conducted by external consultants and used as a
policy tool for an ex ante assessment of the economic, social and environmental implications
of a trade negotiation. Interim and ex post evaluations are also carried out to assess the actual
impacts of the PTAs as a result of their implementation.
Supervision and controls on PTAs rest with the customs authorities of the Member States, the
authorities of the beneficiary countries and the Commission which jointly manage PTAs and
cooperate to ensure that the conditions required to benefit from the preferential treatment are
met thereby protecting the EU's financial interests from losses due to import of goods under
PTAs not entitled to preferential tariff treatment.
Audit Scope and Objectives
The objective of the Court’s audit was twofold:

to evaluate whether the Commission has appropriately assessed the economic effects
of PTAs;

to assess whether the controls thereon are effective in ensuring that imports cannot
wrongly benefit from a preferential tariff, resulting in the loss of EU revenue.
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The Court examined the ex-ante and ex post evaluations carried out by, or on behalf of, the
Commission of the economic effects foreseen or realised. To this end the Court analysed the
documentation available at the Commission in respect of a sample of 44 PTAs, notably any
IA reports, SIA studies, ex post evaluations and the arrangements for future monitoring.
Particular attention was paid to how the Commission ensured the robustness of data sources
used in these evaluations. The Court also verified whether ex post evaluations show that the
PTAs are delivering their intended benefits and examined as well the effectiveness of the
supervision arrangements and of the controls performed on PTAs by the competent authorities
in five Member States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), their control
strategies and risk management, the functioning of administrative cooperation arrangements
and their procedures for the recovery of any traditional own resources (TOR) due.
Commission's prior evaluation, ex post monitoring function in the beneficiary countries,
supervisory and control activities on PTAs were also assessed.
Court's Findings and Observations
The assessment of the economic effects of PTAs
The Court found that the Commission has not appropriately assessed all the economic effects
of PTAs. Indeed the Court stated that impact assessment or ex ante evaluations were not
always carried out (only for 7 of the 13 PTAS where there was a legal requirement or a formal
commitment to do so). Likewise, SIAs were only prepared for 5 of the 28 PTAs and interim
and ex post evaluation for 16 out of 27 PTAs. In addition, the revenue foregone i.e. the
revenue that the EU forfeits due to the tariff preferences granted to beneficiary/partner
countries of PTAs was only estimated for the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)1 but
not in SIAs.
The Court's work also revealed that the various assessments contained inaccuracies, were not
always useful or comprehensive and based on robust methods and reliable data.
Even though the use of the impact assessment tool has increased, the review of IAs showed
that only the IA on the GSP regulation included a comprehensive analysis of economic
impacts for beneficiary countries based on robust data sources and there was a need to better
defined monitoring indicators and actions to measure the effectiveness and to strengthen the
linkage to fraud and customs duties evasion to better check the GSP's vulnerability to fraud.
For SIAs, the model used for quantifying the impacts (the General Equilibrium modelling CGE) used insufficiently verified statistical data for consistency and reliability including the
risk to lead to wrong conclusions in the SIAs. Timeliness and completeness of economic
sectors assessed in SIAs are other elements that must be ensured to be useful for negotiators.
As regards interim or ex post evaluations, the Court noted some weaknesses concerning their
completeness since the analysis of economic impacts was limited to trade flows without any
sectorial analysis.
For the GSP, mixed results were shown by the interim evaluation insofar the policy has not
1
For the 2006-2009 period, the impact (revenue foregone) on the EU budget amounted 8.6 billion euro
amounting nearly 14% of the customs duties collected in that period.
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yet fully delivered its intended benefits notably the increase export diversification, economic
growth or sustainable development in developing countries.
The controls and supervision on PTAs
The controls performed by the competent authorities (Member States, beneficiary/partner
countries and the Commission) as well as the management of the administrative cooperation
should ensure the correct implementation of PTAs, thereby protecting legitimate economic
and financial interests. The Court reviewed the overall control strategy and risk management
applied to PTAs by customs authorities and identified some weaknesses in customs controls
applied leading to potential losses to the EU budget.
The main weaknesses identified by the Court consist in manual, complex and time consuming
interventions required in order to assess the results of the risk profiles, the low number of new
local risk profile introduced in the control system in 2011-2012, the fact that the criteria of
preferential origin was taken into account in combination with others and was not a priority in
the risk management system and the absence or acceptance of copies of the movement and
origin certificates by customs authorities instead of using only originals when they perform
documentary checks on imports under PTAs. According to the extrapolation of the errors
found in its sample of 2009, the Court has estimated the amount of duties at stake in these
Member States to be 655 million euro1 (or 6% of the gross amount of import duties collected
in the 5 Member States in 2009).
Shortcomings were also identified by the Court in the management of the administrative
cooperation2 by the authorities of the Member States. The review showed that Member states
authorities have not started post-clearance recovery of the debt when the tariff preferential
treatment received by beneficiary countries was unjustified.
Following mutual assistance communications issued by OLAF in Member States when
operations appear to constitute breaches of PTA provisions, the audit found too that certain
Member States have not introduced the relevant information into their risk management
systems. The Court identified two cases, amounting to over 2 million euro, where Member
States have not reacted promptly to OLAF reports dedicated to origin investigations that may
lead them to identify imports that may not be entitled to preferential tariff treatment and to
proceed to the recovery of the customs debt.
With regard to the Commission’s supervision of Member States and beneficiary/partner
countries in respect of PTAs, shortcomings have been addressed. The Commission should
evaluate the continuing capacity of the country benefiting from preferential treatment to
administer the arrangement and the related rules and procedures on a risk basis. The Court
noted that the Commission has made prior evaluation only in respect of a limited number of
partner countries and has not conducted monitoring visits to the countries benefiting from
preferential treatment to check the correct implementation of the scheme as it should be. The
Court then verified whether a periodical reporting system by beneficiary countries on their
1
The breakdown by Member States of this amount is the following: up of 167 million euro in respect of
Germany, 176 million euro for France and 312 million euro in respect of the United Kingdom.
2
Administrative cooperation requests are sent by Member states' authorities to partner countries in case of
reasonable doubts about the preferential tariff treatment they receive.
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management and control of preferential origin has been set up in GSP countries and found
that this was not the case.
Difficulties were also identified in the chain of communication of the necessary information
under administrative cooperation between the Member States, the beneficiary countries and
the Commission notably for getting good quality and timely information from partner
countries. To verify the effectiveness of OLAF’s role in the protection of the financial
interests of the EU concerning PTAs1, the Court reviewed a sample of 10 preferential origin
investigations and stated that, except for one investigation, OLAF was successful in
demonstrating that the imported goods were not eligible for preferential tariff measures but
the financial follow-up of these investigations was not enough effective.
Moreover, the use of preventive and reactive measures to protect the financial interests of the
EU by the Commission and Member States has to be improved by using precautionary and
safeguard measures such as suspension of preferences according to the anti-fraud clause and
the management of administrative errors clause introduced in the PTAs, especially in case of
unsatisfactory control, bad administrative cooperation, administrative errors by the
beneficiary party or fraud.
Concerning the legal provisions of the PTAs, the Court observed that PTAs did not contain
sufficient safeguards to protect the financial interests of the EU, in particular when complex
cumulation rules of origin were at stake, certain beneficiary countries lacking of
administrative capacity to manage them. More, an increased use of self-certification by means
of invoice declaration to certify origin would present advantages from the own resources point
of view even though the use of certificates of origin and movement certificates is still
widespread. Finally, it was observed that the EU's position in reciprocal FTAs did not
adequately protect its financial interests.
Summary of the Commission and European External Action Service Replies
The Commission underlined that the economic gains associated with trade liberalisation are
well known in the entire economic literature available and specified that since 1999 all major
multilateral/bilateral trade negotiations have been accompanied by a SIA. Moreover, since
2010, with one exception, all important trade negotiations have been also preceded by an IA.
To perform SIAs, the Commission indicated that different modelling techniques were used,
mainly General Equilibrium modelling (CGE), and drawn on data from Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) database which is widely accepted worldwide by virtually all
similar international organisations such as the WTO, World Bank, OECD, UN, IMF. To date,
these are the best available tools to best quantify the economic impact of trade policy changes.
For the timeliness of SIAs, the Commission has committed to launch them no later than 6
months after the start of negotiations to ensure they can usefully feed into the negotiating.
Eurostat is now systematically invited to the steering groups monitoring SIAs and the
Commission is seeking to intensify cooperation on the quality of statistical data sources
within an on-going update of the service-level agreement between DG Trade and Eurostat.
1
In addition to mutual assistance communications, OLAF carries out origin investigations to ascertain, in
cooperation with the competent authorities, whether goods imported into the EU are indeed eligible for
preferential tariff measures.
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While the Commission accepted the Court's observation on the mixed results on GSP, the
Commission considered the GSP as only one of the elements contributing to the full delivery
of intended benefits and stated that the new GSP regulation, entered into force on 1 January
2014, has made substantial reforms with a view to better targeting the countries most in need.
As regards control activities, the Commission will further evaluate in which particular cases
the usefulness of risk profiles and how they should be implemented in the area of rules of
origin under PTAs. In the course of its inspections in recent years, the Commission has placed
a special focus on the effectiveness of the Member States’ risk management systems and
control strategies. The Commission will continue to encourage Member States to take all
appropriate precautionary measures upon receipt of MA communications.
The evaluation of the capacity of a beneficiary country is an integral part of the negotiation
process with each partner. It is not, however, reflected in a formal evaluation report. The
Commission will include an assessment of this capacity in the formal scoping exercises that
precede new negotiations.
With regard to monitoring visits, the Commission acted within the framework of the existing
legal basis and in line with the respective provisions of the reciprocal trade arrangements
approved by the Council and the Member States and, as appropriate, the European Parliament.
However, a Commission action plan on monitoring of preferential rules of origin has been
elaborated, under which visits to a beneficiary country are one of the suggested activities. The
action plan will cover both unilateral arrangements such as GSP and bilateral agreements with
partner countries.
Since 2001, the Commission has proposed that all EU preferential trade regimes include the
possibility of temporary withdrawal of preferences in the event of particular problems with
the management of the preferences and/or other significant breaches of customs legislation or
non-cooperation. The Commission considered that these safeguards have proved to be
sufficient and will continue to propose their inclusion in all future preferential trade
arrangements. At the end of 2013, the possibility of temporary withdrawal of preferences was
already included in four autonomous arrangements (including GSP) covering almost 200
countries and preferential agreements with more than 30 countries.
The Commission will continue to provide Member States’ competent authorities with all
necessary information to facilitate their recovery actions and will continue promoting the
replacement of origin and movement certificates with exporters’ self-certification.
Recomendaciones del ponente de opinión para una posible inclusión en el informe anual
de aprobación de la gestión de la Comisión
[El Parlamento Europeo]
1. Acoge con satisfacción el informe especial que evalúa la gestión de los regímenes
comerciales preferenciales en el ámbito de la competencia exclusiva de la UE como
una contribución importante al debate político general acerca de las políticas de la
Unión Europea en materia de comercio exterior y desarrollo; toma nota de las
constataciones y recomendaciones efectuadas y formula a continuación sus
observaciones y recomendaciones;
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Observaciones generales
2. Manifiesta una profunda inquietud por el hecho de que la Comisión no haya evaluado
debidamente todos los efectos económicos de los acuerdos comerciales preferenciales
y por el hecho de que no se garantice que la recaudación de ingresos sea completa;
3. Recuerda que es prioritario informar correctamente a los responsables políticos, a las
distintas partes interesadas y a los contribuyentes europeos acerca del gran valor
añadido y de las desventajas de las distintas opciones e hipótesis en el ámbito de la
política comercial;
4. Considera inaceptable que, en algunos casos, falten las evaluaciones del impacto sobre
la sostenibilidad, estén incompletas, se basen en información antigua o no actualizada
y, en otros casos (Chile), estén disponibles solo una vez firmado el acuerdo;
5. Insiste en que, antes de firmar un nuevo acuerdo, debe completarse y publicarse la
correspondiente evaluación del impacto sobre la sostenibilidad;
6. Lamenta que no todos los socios del sistema SPG firmaran los convenios
internacionales sobre derechos humanos y laborales; pide a la Comisión que haga
mayor hincapié en el medio ambiente y la buena gobernanza en los acuerdos
comerciales preferenciales;
7. Desea ser informado sobre las medidas adoptadas por la Comisión sobre la base de las
recomendaciones y observaciones del Parlamento y del Tribunal de Cuentas a más
tardar en octubre de 2015;
Evolución futura
A fin de mejorar la evaluación de los efectos económicos de los acuerdos comerciales
preferenciales, la Comisión debería:
8. A menos que se justifique debidamente, llevar a cabo una evaluación de impacto y una
evaluación del impacto sobre la sostenibilidad para cada acuerdo comercial
preferencial, que presente un análisis exhaustivo, cuantificado y en profundidad de los
efectos económicos esperados, sin olvidar una estimación precisa de los ingresos no
percibidos;
9. Hacer participar sistemáticamente a Eurostat en la evaluación de la calidad de las
fuentes de datos estadísticos utilizados en las evaluaciones del impacto sobre la
sostenibilidad, y garantizar que el análisis se lleve a cabo a su debido tiempo para su
utilización por los negociadores;
10. Llevar a cabo evaluaciones intermedias y a posteriori para determinar el grado en que
los acuerdos comerciales preferenciales que tengan un impacto significativo cumplen
sus objetivos políticos y el modo en que pueden mejorar sus resultados en sectores
económicos clave, incluyendo una estimación de los ingresos no percibidos;
A fin de mejorar la protección de los intereses financieros de la UE, la Comisión debería:
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11. Crear perfiles de riesgo de la UE relativos a los acuerdos comerciales preferenciales
para que los Estados miembros apliquen un enfoque común al análisis de riesgos con
el fin de reducir pérdidas para el presupuesto de la UE;
12. Comprobar que los Estados miembros mejoren la eficacia de sus sistemas de gestión
de riesgos y de su estrategia de control para reducir pérdidas para el presupuesto de la
UE;
13. Instar a los Estados miembros a que adopten medidas preventivas adecuadas cuando
reciban comunicaciones de asistencia mutua;
14. Evaluar y llevar a cabo visitas de supervisión basadas en criterios de riesgo a países
beneficiarios de un trato preferencial, en particular respecto de las normas de origen y
acumulación;
15. Exigir a los Estados miembros que mejoren la calidad de la información que facilitan
respecto de la cooperación administrativa;
16. Mejorar el seguimiento financiero de las investigaciones de la OLAF a fin de evitar
pérdidas para el presupuesto de la UE debido a la caducidad;
17. Reforzar la posición de la UE en acuerdos comerciales preferenciales recíprocos y
recurrir en mayor medida a las medidas preventivas y de salvaguardia, incluyéndolas
en todos los futuros acuerdos comerciales;
18. Insiste en recibir sin dilación una recopilación de los cobros efectuados durante el
periodo 2010-2014;
19. Desea estar informado sobre los resultados de la iniciativa de pacto en Bangladés.
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