Minds & Machines (2009) 19:279–282
DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9142-x
Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy,
Psychology and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, 384, $19.95,
ISBN-10: 0195138929, ISBN-13: 978-0195138924
Susan Stuart
Published online: 12 March 2009
Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
The opening statement in the Preface of this fascinating book refers to how the
understanding of the self and others, the identification of ‘‘the feelings, thoughts,
and designs that compose our own daily lives and those of our neighbors, lovers,
and foes’’ (p. vii), is a perennial problem in the philosophy of mind. Goldman’s aim
in Simulating Minds is twofold: (i) to provide a summary and review of the
‘mindreading’ work since a trio of papers in the 1980s (Robert Gordon 1986, Jane
Heal 1986, and Goldman 1989) presented an alternative, in the form of simulation
theory, to the functionalist and ‘theory–theory’ accounts that were then prevalent,
and (ii) to present his own form of simulation theory or simulationism.
There are 11 rich chapters. The first offers some philosophical and scientific
background to our capacity to mentalize, and from there the next four chapters take
us through a conceptualization of simulation theory, an account of the rather heavily
metaphysical rationality theory, the child-scientist or theory–theory account, and an
amended form of theory–theory specified as the modularity theory.
It is with simulation theory that Goldman has the greatest sympathy, so it is
merely introduced and conceptualized as straightforwardly plausible in Chap. 2.
Rationality theory fails on three rather fundamental counts: third-person attribution,
first-person attribution, and because it only deals with propositional attitudes, and is,
thus, ruled out of any further serious consideration by page 67. The child-scientist or
theory–theory account claims that action depends on guidance afforded by the
innate causal principles of folk psychology, but it is not so much that which sinks it
but the fact that it must account for the shift from the non-representational
conception of belief in the 3 year-old, who has a conceptual deficit and is unable to
pass the false belief test, to the representational conceptual capacity of the 4 yearold. As Goldman says it is this ‘‘claim which has become a lightning rod for
S. Stuart (&)
Humanities Advanced Technology and Information Institute, University of Glasgow,
11 University Gardens, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
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controversy in the field’’ (p. 71) and the chapter concentrates on an examination of
the empirical literature to see if the claim for such a conceptual transition is borne
out. Ultimately it is not and the child-scientist account is taken no further. Derived
from studies of autism and mindreading deficits the modular-nativist form of
theory–theory suggests that there is a special module devoted to mentalizing that
can, under certain circumstances, be knocked out. Goldman first questions the
modularity of the theory of mind module (ToMM) and then examines the case made
by this version of theory–theory for the attribution of mental states being based on
inferential reasoning. Having weakened its case for modularity by showing that one
of its major proponents, Alan Leslie, is only committed to a sort of semimodularism, he then shows that the modularity thesis does not rule out the
possibility that simulation, and not theoretical inference, is running the show. I have
to admit that I couldn’t but agree with Goldman’s very persuasive reasoning and
concurred wholeheartedly with his conclusion: ‘‘In short, the attitudes do not seem
to exhaust the mental categories with which the folk mentalize. Hence, even if
theory of mind—understood as the capacity to cognize the attitudes—were
underpinned by a module, it wouldn’t follow that the capacity to cognize mental
states in general is underpinned by modules.’’ (p. 109)
Chapters 6 and 7 present and defend the hybrid third-person simulation
attribution approach favoured by Goldman. It’s a blend of simulation theory and
theory–theory with an emphasis on simulation, and it takes simulation theory as a
scientific hypothesis, attempting to address four particular questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
How do people mindread others—that is, attribute mental states to them?
How do people mindread themselves?
How is the mindreading capacity, or skill, acquired?
What are the contents of people’s concepts of mental states? How do they
conceive the difference between belief and desire, anger and disgust?
Chapter 8 is rather tentative, because of the complexity and relative infancy of
the fields, in its examination of ontogeny, autism, empathy and evolution. I won’t go
into any detail about this particular chapter but I will say here that I was surprised to
see no mention of, for example, Thompson (1999, 2001) and Zahavi (1996, 1997,
1999) in the context of empathy studies. Chapter 9 shifts the emphasis to selfattribution and how we recognise our own mental states, which cannot, of course, be
done using a simulation theory. In Chap. 10 Goldman deals with mental state
concepts, but I, for one, would have liked to see this chapter come earlier in the
book, perhaps even at the outset to bring some clarity of agreed conceptualization
into my reading of the earlier chapters. The final chapter is a stroll—a term the
author himself uses—through mimicry, fantasy, fiction and morality: ‘‘the warp and
woof of social life’’ (p. 276); it is ‘‘a small sample of the enormous range of human
experience that can be adequately understood only with attention to the mind’s
habits of interpersonal simulation’’ (p. 302).
So, let’s turn to Goldman’s hybrid ‘cooperation’ theory which he frames ‘‘in
terms of ST versus simulation-neglecting TT’’ (p. 46). His aim is to realign the
debate so that (i) theory–theory must demonstrate that, if there is a theory, it isn’t
just there to make simulation possible, and (ii) simulation theory no longer has to
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provide conclusive proof that theory implementation doesn’t occur. In claiming that
‘‘There is nothing wrong in supposing that mindreading is executed at the personal
level by simulation, which is in turn implemented at the subpersonal level by an
underlying theory’’ (p. 33), Goldman is determined to focus on a more positive view
of simulation theory, one that asserts (a) the hypothesized role of pretend states, and
(b) the hypothesized use of mechanisms of the same kind employed by the target
(the person of whom you are thinking) to make a decision, rather than focussing on
what it denies, that is, that any folk psychological laws have a place in simulation.
He presents his case in two parts, the first dealing with simulation in the context
of low level mindreading, for example, the attribution of emotions to someone based
(mainly) on their facial expression, and the second with simulation in high level
mindreading contexts, that is, those contexts in which we try to put ourselves in
another’s shoes and propositional attitudes are involved, or elements of the process
are subject to voluntary control, or there is some aspect that is available to
consciousness. The evidence for the former comes from consideration of
neuroscientific findings (all of which is wonderfully readable and informative),
while evidence for the latter is drawn from a mixture of empirical and theoretical
science.
Goldman’s knowledge and drawing together of the field is impressive and there is
certainly a great deal to be learned from his book, but there is also a neglect of other
important alternatives to the two dominant theories of social cognition. There is, for
example, nothing at all on the direct perceptual account (Gallagher 2001, 2004,
2006, 2008), which is phenomenological in flavour and which proposes a nonsimulationist interpretation of, for example, the neuroscience of mirror neurons and
the mirror system. It may be that this work seems just too new on the horizon for
inclusion in Goldman’s text but Francisco Varela’s germinal work on enactive
cognition has been guiding theorists in this direction for almost the last two decades,
and new perspectives are appearing all the time (Sparaci 2008).
References
Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or interaction?. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 8(5–7), 83–107.
Gallagher, S. (2004). Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative
to theory of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11(3), 199–217.
Gallagher, S. (2006). The narrative alternative to theory of mind. In R. Menary (ed.), Radical enactivism:
Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative (pp. 223–229). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition,
17(2), 535–543.
Sparaci, L. (2008). Embodying gestures: The social orienting model and the study of early gestures in
autism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 203–223.
Thompson, E. (1999). Empathy and the affective mind-brain: The importance of affective neuroscience
for understanding everyday mind-reading, Project Description, McDonnell Project in the Philosophy
and the Neurosciences.
Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 1–32.
Zahavi, D. (1996). Husserl’s intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy. Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology, 27, 228–245.
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Zahavi, D. (1997). Horizontal intentionality and transcendental intersubjectivity. Tijdschrift Voor
Filosofie, 59, 304–321.
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity. A phenomenological investigation. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press.
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