Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000 (612-632) Strategic Environmental Planning and Uncertainty: A Cross-National .. Comparison of Green Plans in hdustmhed Countries Martin Janicke and Helge Jorgens Uncertainty is a distinct feature of environmental policy and environmental issues. This article explores the potential of strategic and comprehensive environmental planning for dealing with these uncertainties. First, four types of uncertainty and their specific impacts on environmental policy are distinguished. Strategic environmental planning could be a promising approach f o r dealing with these uncertainties. Based on an empirical analysis of national environmental policy plans and sustainability strategies i n Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development countries, this article comes to the conclusion that although only few of the existing green plans fully explore the theoretical potential of this new approach to environmental policymaking, it has proven an effective mechanism to deal with and reduce at least some of the uncertainties with which environmental policymakers are confronted. The greatest potential of strategic planning lies i n increasing the political system's capacity to deal with those problems of long-term environmental degradation, which in spite of the past successes of environmental protection remain largely unsolved. Uncertainty is often regarded as a distinct feature of environmental policy, and environmental issues are frequently described as particularly "wicked" or "messy" prob1ems.l This article explores the potential of long-term environmental planning to provide a better basis for dealing with the uncertainties in environmental policymaking. Environmental policy has to take into account four aspects of uncertainty, if it is to be successful: 1. Uncertainty of prognosis about environmental changes and their possible negative impacts.2 This first dimension deals with the uncertainty about the future of environmental circumstances and the possible negative consequences of those circumstances for society. It is rooted in a lack of understanding of environmental processes as biophysical systems and also a lack of understanding of social processes both as drivers of environmental change and as receivers of a changed environment (Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 1996, p. 4). This uncertainty may lead to the overestimation as well as underestimation of environmental problems. Paradoxically, the potential danger of overestimating environmental problems has received most attention within political and scientific debates, while the dangers of underestimating the negative effects of environmental degradation have largely been omitted. 2. Political uncertainty about the need f o r action regarding long-term problems still invisible to the general public. Parliamentary democracies (and mass media) are very apt for policy learning from bad experience (as in the examples of visible air and water pollution). However, the political perception of long-term, slowly accumulating environmental degradation (such as soil and 612 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens groundwater pollution, loss of species, and climate change) is structurally constrained. Problems that cannot be directly perceived and experienced by the public therefore depend heavily on scientific prognosis and a different institutional mechanism of agenda setting and policy formulation. The remarkable accomplishments of environmental policy in areas of highly visible environmental problems have led to a paradox of “self-defeating environmental policy success”: the general impression that environmental problems have been satisfactorily solved weakens the political recognition of the less-visible unsolved problems. 3. Uncertainty about the environmental, social, and economic consequences of policy decisions and nondecisions. Policy science generally assumes uncertainty about the impacts of regulation (quite contrary to simplistic neoclassical models of top-down g~vernance).~This insecurity is stressed even more by environmental policy experts than by experts in other fields of public policymaking. Bressers, for example, argues that “despite the omnipresence of uncertainty, there is a sort of ‘taboo’on decision-making under uncertainty” (1997, p. 291; see also Arentsen, Bressers, and O’Toole, in this volume). Generally, the need to justify action is seen as more important than the need to justify inactivity. 4. Uncertainty of environmental pioneers about the chances and risks of innovative behavior. Innovations are the most important source of ecological improvements. Policy innovations can stimulate technological innovations, but innovators run a high risk. Proactive environmental policy therefore has to deal with improving the conditions for technological innovators by providing stable and calculable conditions for investment in better technology. Clear policy goals, time frames, or early information about future policy actions are important to reduce such uncertainty. These dimensions of uncertainties in environmental policymaking are in line with the distinction made by Arentsen et al. (2000); while the first and second category relate to uncertainties about environmental problems and their perception, the third and fourth aspects concern uncertainties about political strategies to deal with these problems. Thereby the fourth aspect, concerning uncertainties of ecological pioneers about the risks and chances of innovative action, introduces a perspective that has not received much attention in this debate. It is, however, of great importance within the context of sustainable development of which the integration of economic development and environmental protection is a key aspect. Suggestions of how to deal with the uncertainties in environmental policymaking outlined above include such concepts as “increased flexibility,” “decentralization,” “participation” and “self-regulation,” “applying the precautionary principle,” or “strengthening the role of science in policymaking” (cf. Bressers, 1997, p. 292). Still more important may be the existence of highly legitimized or broadly accepted long-term policy goals (Janicke, 1996a, b). The central hypothesis of this paper is that strategic environmental policy planning represents a way of dealing with the uncertainties of environmental policymaking as it widely incorporates the aforementioned concepts. While leaving behind the traditional “command-and-controltechnique of administrative regulation” (Weale, 1992, p. 27Fbased largely on detailed prescriptions of the cleanup technologies to be applied-it introduces an integrated and strategic environmental policy that sets clear environmental goals and time schedules, but leaves greater freedom for target groups as to the concrete way of reaching these goals. The following sections give a broad overview of this new and rapidly diffusing approach to environmental policy in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and at the supranational level of 613 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 the European Union (EU).4 After presenting selected examples of existing green plans, three categories of analysis will be introduced (the quality of the formulated goals, the extent of participation and integration in the planning process, and the degree of institutionalization of the plan) in order to systematize the widely differing national approaches to strategic environmental planning. Following this, a preliminary evaluation of three national strategies will be made. The last section draws some tentative conclusions with regard to the central hypothesis. The Diffusion of Strategic Environmental Policy Planning The rise of the concept of sustainable development, from the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), has been accompanied in most industrialized countries by a gradual change in environmental policymaking. The policy innovation resulting from the sustainability debate lies in the emphasis placed on setting long-term goals on a broad political and societal basis, the integration of environmental policy objectives into other policy areas (intersectoral integration), a cooperative target group policy, and the mobilization of additional decentralized societal capacities. The most visible expression of this development is the broad diffusion and adoption of strategic and integrative environmental planning at the national level. Environmental planning of the new “Agenda 21” type is not simply another “instrument” of environmental policy, but a comprehensive strategy; a permanent process of learning, setting goals, formulating, and implementing measures. A large number of industrialized countries have already introduced some kind of national environmental policy planning, among them about two-thirds of OECD countries (Dalal-Clayton, 1996; Janicke, Carius, & Jorgens, 1997; Janicke & Weidner, 1997a; Johnson, 1997; Jorgens, 1996; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1995B; Regional Environmental Center (REC), 1996; see Table 1). The same is true of many developing countries (Lampietti & Subramanian, 1995; Schemmel, 1998; Wood, 1997). Moreover, Table 1 Green Plans in OECD Countries and in the EUa Country Green Plan (official name) Denmark Action Plan for Environment and Development; 1988 1995 Nature and Environment Policy Plan; Sectoral Action Plans, e.g., Energy 2000lEnergy 21 1990196 Government Bill 1988 Enviro ‘93 1991 1993 Towards Sustainable Development in Sweden (Government Bill) Environmental Policy for a Sustainable Sweden 1998 (Swedish Government’s Bill 1997198) Report to the Storting No. 46 (Environment and Development) 1988/89 Report to the Storting No. 13 1992193 Report to the Storting No. 58 (Environmental Policy for 1996197 a Sustainable Development Sweden Norway 614 Year Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens Table 1 (Continued) Green Plans in OECD Countries and in the EU Country Green Plan (official name) Netherlands National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) NEPP plus NEPP 2 NEPP 3 Finland Sustainable Development and Finland, Finnish Action for Sustainable Development Finnish Government Program for Sustainable Development United This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy Kingdom Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable Development for the United Kingdom Canada Canada’s Green Plan for a Healthy Environment Guide to Green Government France National Plan for the Environment/Green Plan Mexico 1990-94 National Program for Environmental Protection 1995-2000 National Program for Environmental Protection South Korea Medium-Term Plan for the Environment, 1992-96 Korea’s Green Vision 21 Medium-Term Plan for the Environment, 1997-2001 New Resource Management Act Zealand Environment 2010 Strategy Poland National Environmental Policy National Environmental Action Program Czeck Rainbow Program Republic State Environment Policy Hungary Short and Medium-Term Environmental Action Plan Hungarian Environmental Protection Program Australia National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development I 3 Fifth Environmental Action Program “Toward Sustainability” Austria National Environmental Plan (Nationaler Umweltplan) Japan The Basic Environmental Plan Action Plan for Greening Government Operations Portugal National Environmental Policy Plan Switzerland Strategy for Sustainable Development in Switzerland Ireland Sustainable Development-A Strategy for Ireland Luxembourg National Plan for Sustainable Development Belgium Draft Plan for Sustainable Development 2000-2003 Germany Sustainable Development in Germany Year 1989 1990 1993 1997 1990 1995 1998 1990 1994 1999 1990 1995 1990 1990 1995 1991 1995 1997 1991 1995 1991 1995 1991 1995 1991 1997 1992 1992 1995 1995 1995 1995 1997 1997 1998 2000 Planned this diffusion shows some parallels t o the rapid spread of general concepts of strategic planning and new public management (Berry, 1994; Damkowski & Precht, 1995; O E C D , 1993). Roughly four types of long-term strategy can be distinguished: (a) general environmental policy plans (Netherlands, South Korea, Austria, Japan, Portugal, Canada, France, EU); (b) national strategies for sustainable development (UK, Ireland, Finland, New Zealand, Australia); (c) formalized policy statements 615 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 with-at least in the medium term-significant environmental targets, where these are linked to a mechanism for regular environmental reporting (Sweden, Norway); and (d) strong sectoral and regional plans within a general national environmental framework (Denmark, Switzerland). Although different in detail, these four types of strategic environmental planning all stress-at least on paper, i.e., in the official planning document-the importance of medium- and long-term goal setting, the participation of target groups as well as societal organizations and the greater public, and the integration of environmental aspects into the decisionmaking process of other, predominantly economic, policy areas. Environmental Policy as Strategic and Cooperative Planning Country Experiences This section presents an empirical overview of selected environmental policy plans at the national level. The Netherlands Particular attention has been paid to the description and analysis of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP). The first environmental policy plan of 1989 included a detailed statistical description of the environmental situation and its foreseeable development. It is unique in its wide range of binding goals and objectives with clear time frames as well as in the extent of societal mobilization that accompanied its development. Its preliminary results were evaluated in the second environmental policy plan (NEPP 2, 1993), and its goals were partly revised. In 1997, the third NEPP was finalized. It proposes inter alia a package of new green taxes. The Dutch approach to environmental planning-which has had a legal basis since 1993-contains an institutionalized mechanism for evaluation and revision. Another important feature of the Dutch environmental policy plan is the underlying system of decentralized planning at the local and provincial levels, but also at the level of industrial target groups through negotiated agreements (covenants). In particular, the covenants with industry represent a highly developed form of social technology and are some of the central innovations of the new planning approach. In this respect, the Netherlands has clearly been setting the pace in global environmental policy learning (cf. Janicke & Weidner, I997b). The existing system of negotiated agreements with industry is impressive, even if (as recent evaluations show) the quality of the different agreements varies widely (Tweede Kamer der Staaten General, 1995). Denmark The Danish government passed an Action Plan for Environment and Development as early as 1988. In spite of the growing importance of the comprehensive Environmental Protection Report (1995) for integrated environmental planning, the strengths of Danish planning lie at the sectoral level. Most important is the "Energy 2000" plan, which was introduced in 1990 and revised in 1996 ("Energy 21"). The plan includes targets of a 20% reduction in C02 emissions (1988-2005), a 15% decrease in energy consumption by 2030, and an increase in the use of renewable energy, to constitute one-third of total energy supply by 2030. A broad network of organizations and institutions is responsible for the evaluation of energy savings. Other important sectoral plans include the Environment and Traffic Action Plan, the Aquatic Environment Plan, and 616 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens especially a system of national land and regional planning that has a strong emphasis on environmental protection and conservation of natural resources. Even the Danish Ministry of Defense has its own environmental action plan (Christiansen & Lundqvist, 1996, p. 343). Sweden The Swedish planning approach since 1988 consists of regular parliamentary target setting combined with periodic reporting. Particularly relevant is the "Enviro '93" strategy, which was prepared by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. It includes programs for significant target sectors such as Industry, Energy, Traffic, and Agriculture. More than 100 concrete targets with different time frames have been formulated; for instance, phasing out the use of chlorinated solvents (by 1995), of mercury (by 2000), and of lead (no deadline). New goals were introduced in 1997 by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, including a 20% reduction of C 0 2 emissions by the year 2020, and again in 1998 in the Swedish government's Bill (Environmental Policy for a Sustainable Sweden. Regular reports are published on the implementation of the targets. As in Denmark and the Netherlands, the planning approach is closely connected with a comprehensive green tax reform (1991). The government's EcoCycle Commission has recently proposed a strategy for cutting resource use to one-tenth of today's levels within the next 25 to 50 years. Following a government initiative, all of the 288 Swedish local authorities have started work on a local Agenda 21. Canada In Canada, the Green Plan for a Healthy Environment was decided upon in 1990. Its centerpiece was the integration of environmental goals into other policy fields and the wide participation of citizens and organizations in the process of goal setting; more than 10,000 people participated in the (admittedly somewhat hurried) consultation process. The plan provided for six main fields of action, ranging from traditional air pollution control and species protection to promotion of the use of renewable resources. It covered a period of 5 (later 6) years with a total budget of $3 million. After a change in government in 1993, the Green Plan lost much of its importance and was de facto abandoned until 1996. However, Canada is trying to maintain a strategic approach to environmental policy. In 1995 the Canadian government published the Guide to Green Government, which introduces the drafting of sustainable development strategies-including regular reports-by all federal departments and sets up a Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development who evaluates these reports. As most government departments have prepared their first departmental strategies, this approach promises to become an important mechanism for integrating environmental concerns into the activities of all relevant departments. AUStria The Austrian National Environmental Plan (NUP) of 1995 is of interest because of its differentiated description of problems, targets, and the measures to be taken. Although a number of societal actors participated in its drafting, public awareness of the NUP has been very slight. The groundwork for the plan had been laid in 1992, the year of the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro. Its core elements are-largely qualitative-long-term environmental goals as well as plans for reducing the use of nonrenewable resources and for the minimization of 617 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 material flows. A 20% reduction of C02 emissions by the year 2005 (relative to 1988 levels) is among the most ambitious targets of the plan. In 1997, 2 years after its publication, the NUP was presented to and adopted by Parliament in an effort to give a boost to the somewhat moribund plan. J- In 1995, the Japanese government passed its Basic Environment Plan. Following Agenda 21, a broad range of rather vague targets has been formulated, and tasks are assigned to all relevant organizations and institutions. The plan represents a policy-monitoring tool in that it refers in detail to already existing environmental policy targets and measures. Implementation of the Basic Plan will take place mainly at the local and company level. By the end of 1995, there were 46 local environmental and climate protection plans. Monitoring of the implementation of the Basic Environment Plan takes place within the framework of the already established yearly environmental reports. For this purpose, the White Book on the Environment was restructured in 1996 in order to follow the systematic of the Basic Environment Plan (Foljanty-Jost, 2000). A special Action Plan for Greening Government Operations has been formulated on the basis of the Basic Environment Plan, and includes 37 targets, 11 of which are quantitative. With this action plan, the Japanese government intends to set a good example to other sectors of society. A second national environmental policy plan is currently under preparation that will take further the strategic approach adopted in 1995. SOuthKoma South Korea may be one of the most interesting cases. The country has a long tradition of economic planning. This has led to enormous industrial growth, but also to equally significant environmental damage. In the course of South Korea's transition to democracy after 1987, planning was extended to include environmental protection. Since 1987 Korea has had medium-term (5 years) and long-term (10 years) environmental plans. The first medium-term plan of 1987 was formulated just before the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 and had already concrete, budgeted targets. The goals of the second medium-term plan of 1991 included doubling the proportion of effluent water treated, a radical increase in the amount of waste treated, a clear improvement in the air quality in Seoul, and an increase to 10% in the proportion of protected areas. During its first 2 years, costs for the plan were estimated at more than 1%of GNP. The importance of participation is broadly stressed, but does not, in reality, play an important role in the Korean planning process. However, the plan must be agreed upon by the relevant administrative authorities and the heads of towns and provinces. The Basic Environmental Policy Act of 1990 formulates clear criteria for the Comprehensive Long-term Plan for the Preservation of the Environment. The present long-term plan-"Green Vision 21 "-contains precise goals for different areas, and its costs are budgeted. The slogan "From a model country of economic growth to a model country of environmental preservation" is at the heart of this apparently ambitious governmental strategy. Some Empirical Characteristics of Msting Green Plans Frequently, green plans represent merely a first step towards a coherent strategy for sustainable development and are limited to the description of problems 618 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens and options, with general statements of intent. In order to classify green plans, this article proposes three categories for analysis: (a) the accuracy and relevance of environmental goals; (b) the degree of participation in and integration of the planning process; and (c) the extent of institutionalization of the plan. While public participation in environmental decisionmaking processes-the second category-has often been advocated as a promising strategy for reducing ecological uncertainties (cf. the analysis of the Dutch target group policy in Arentsen et al., in this volume), the importance of the first category, strategic goal setting, has received less attention. However, this seems to be essential to overcome the obvious uncertainties connected to the choice of specific policy instruments. Under conditions of uncertainty, the rational choice ideal that underlies the still-dominant instrumentalist approach in environmental policy (Janicke, 1996b) loses its ground. As Noel (1992, p. 7) argues, “uncertainty cannot be r e d u d to probability,” and therefore the mere gathering of additional information to support a decision does not solve the problem (see also Thiele, in this volume). As policy outcomes cannot be predicted precisely, a functional equivalent to the assessment of outcomes in order to support political decisions becomes necessary: “If judgement is dubious or impossible, a rational response to an unpredictable future requires a commitment to act but a dispassion to the consequences; uncertainty requires the emphasis to be put on motives rather than the end” (Fitzgibbons, 1988, p. 84, cited in Noel, 1992, p. 9). In this context, the aptness of basic environmental goals and principles to provide guidance for political decisionmaking has been brought forward. Brown (in this volume) points out, for example, that policymakers may embrace overarching principles such as the precautionary principle “to provide guidance for their policy choices and to justify those choices to interested parties and the public at large.” While especially in situations of uncertainty it may be difficult or even impossible to integrate divergent opinions about, for example, the seriousness of environmental problems or the expected impacts of specific environmental policy instruments, it has proven to be easier to agree on a desired quality of the natural environment without prescribing in detail the instruments to be applied. This flexibility of means allows, among other things, for learning processes both at the level of target groups and policymakers and is able to weaken the resistance of polluting sectors (for a broad overview of the advantages of goal setting combined with a greater flexibility as to the concrete means of reaching these goals, see Janicke, 1996b). While overarching principles provide a general direction and justification for environmental decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty and thus can be formulated in general terms, goals have to be more precise as to the description of a desired state of the environment if they are to stimulate effective environmental protection as well as innovation and learning processes. The key question will be whether goals are quantified and a concrete time frame is given. Finally, the extent of institutionalization of the environmental planning process is important in order to reduce uncertainties of environmental target groups about future policy decisions by creating a more stable basis for environmental policymaking and rendering it more calculable. As will be argued below, the effective institutionalization of a national planning process may help to firmly establish environmental goals and principles on the national political agenda and this make them less vulnerable to changing political majorities and the periodic up-and-down of public attention. 619 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 Accuracy and Relevance of Environmental Gacls Does the plan include concrete quantitative targets, or do they remain vague? Does the plan ignore important national environmental problems? Ate the goals realistic, i.e., are they scientifically based, and does the plan take into account the political system's and the target groups' capacity to achieve these goals, or does it formulate goals without regard to existing political and societal capacities for environmental protection? The majority of green plans in industrialized countries set a wide variety of general goals but few concrete quantitative targets. The British White Paper "This Common Inheritance" of 1990, for example, contained some 350 mostly vague commitments. Wilkinson (1997a, p. 91) criticizes the White Paper in that "(t)here were few quantitative targets, deadlines, firm commitments or new initiatives-apart from institutional ones. Instead the White Paper was littered with promises to 'review', 'consider', 'examine' and 'study further'. Most of the 350 commitments it contained re-iterated existing policy." The green plans of Japan, Finland, or Austria follow a similar pattern. Quantitative targets combined with accurate time frames and a detailed description of the measures to be taken are rare in these plans. If they occur, they usually refer to existing national or international obligations. This is the case, for example, in the 20% reduction of C02 emissions foreseen in the Austrian plan-a target that had already been announced in the previous Austrian government energy reports of 1990 and 1993 (OsterreichischeBundesregierung, 1995, p. 20). In Japan, the annex to the Basic Environment Plan includes an extensive list of already existing environmental goals and standards (Foljanty-Jost, 2000). And the Finnish Action for Sustainable Development summarizes among other things existing targets for C02 and SO2 reduction and the phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). There are, however, examples of specific, relevant targets and concrete, but flexible, measures for implementation. Here, the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan, with over 200 quantitative targets and corresponding measures such as covenants with the principal polluting industries, is the most prominent example (see Bennett, 1997; Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997; van Kampen, 1997; Weale, 1992). But with regard to the clarity of its goals, the South Korean Medium Term Plan for the Preservation of the Environment does not lie too far behind (Nam, 1997). Table 2 illustrates some of the main targets of the Dutch NEPP. The Swedish approach to comprehensive environmental goal setting is another example of relevant, quantitative goals with clear time frames-without, however, a central planning document, relying more on parliamentary target setting within a broad framework. Finally, the Fifth Environmental Action Program of the European Union distinguishes 10 priority themes of environmental protection and formulates a large number of targets with corresponding measures (often based on voluntary or negotiated action) and time frames. Canada might be placed somewhere between these two groups of countries. The Green Plan of 1990 offered a mix of quantitative and qualitative goals. It included some significant targets, such as a 50% reduction in Canada's generation of waste by the year 2000, a 50% reduction in SO2 emissions in Eastern Canada by 1994, phasing out CFCs by 1997 and other ozone-depleting substances by the year 2000, as well as eliminating the discharge of persistent toxic substances into the environment (Gale, 1997). However, critics have pointed out that most of the proposed measures have only an indirect influence on behavior, and more than half of the initiatives refer to the relatively vague 620 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens instrument of "information development" (Gale, 1997, pp. 107-108; Hoberg & Harrison, 1994). Different degrees of specificity are illustrated by a recent comparative analysis of the goal structure of the Dutch NEPP, the Canadian Green Plan, and the German Draft Program on Sustainable Development. While the NEPP formulates a total of 403 targets, three-fourths of which are quantified and have a concrete time frame, only about one-fourth of the goals formulated in the German Draft Program on Sustainable Development and the Canadian Green Plan at^ quantified (Koll, 1998). Regarding the impact of environmental quality goals formulated in green plans, the Austrian NUP deserves special attention. While remaining generally relatively vague, the NUP has formulated some impressive goals in the area of resource management. Among them is the general goal of a reduction of the total material flow within the Austrian economy, the target of an annual reduction of the use of nonrenewable resources by 2% and by 25% until 2005, and a scaled reduction of the material and energy intensity in the production process up to 90% in 2025 ("factor lo"). A special type of target that figures prominently in the British and French strategies but also in the European Union's Fifth Environmental Action Program (EAP) concerns the creation of new institutions for environmental planning and sustainable development. In the course of implementing the French Green Plan, for example, the environmental administration was thoroughly restructured including the constitution of an autonomous Ministry for the Environment and the creation of a national Environmental Protection Agency (Miiller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 1996). In the United Kingdom, various new government bodies were established, including the UK Round Table on Sustainable Development as well as a Government Panel on Sustainable Development. Similarly, the Irish strategy of 1997 scheduled the creation of a National Sustainable Development Council. In the EU a General Consultative Forum comprising 32 persons from business, labor, environment, and local government to give advice on approaches to sustainable development at the European level and an Environmental Policy Review Group comprising representatives of DG XI and national environmental ministries to monitor the implementation of the Fifth EAP were amongst the newly established institutions (Robins, 1996, p. 23 1). These institutional targets are an important element of environmental planning, as they improve the political system's capacity for further strategic environmental policy and strengthen the institutional basis of the planning process (Janicke, 1997). In summary, the actual quality of the goals in most national environmental policy plans has merely initiated a shift towards a more goal-based regulatory approach that draws its legitimization from consensus and actual performance rather than from procedural rationality. While a few countries, particularly the Netherlands, have formulated an impressive set of clear, timed, and also consensual targets, the larger group has recognized the importance of goal setting without, however, going all the way to formulate new and concrete targets that could function as a substitute to the more traditional rule-based regulation. However, in the context of decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty it is important to add that almost all plans explicitly refer to the precautionary principle as a basis for environmental decisionmaking. This may come as no surprise since this general guideline was agreed upon by almost all nations of the world at the 1992 Rio Conference. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that in order to protect the 62 1 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 environment the precautionary principle should be widely applied: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Consequently, most OECD countries have incorporated this principle into their national green plans or sustainability strategies. The Irish Strategy for Sustainable Development, for instance, states (t)he precautionary principle requires that emphasis should be placed on dealing with the causes rather than the results of environmental damage and that, where significant evidence of environmental risk exists, appropriate precautionary action should be taken even in the absence of conclusive scientific proof of causes (Department of the Environment, 1997, p. 27). Similarly, Denmark‘s Nature and Environmental Policy 1995 argues that ”(t)he precautionary principle means that the prioritization of environmental concerns must be based on well-founded documentation, but that nature and the environment should be given the benefit of the doubt” (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1995, p. 11). The clearest statement can be found in the Canadian Guide to Green Government (Environment Canada, 1995): “The precautionary principle recognizes that preventative actions should sometimes be taken in the face of scientific uncertainty, especially where there are threats of serious or irreversible social, economic or ecological damage.” Degree of Integration of and Participation in the Plunning Process The degree of integration concerns the extent to which environmental issues are incorporated into other sectoral policies (interpolicy coordination). An indicator can be found in the level and relevance of consultation and cooperation between the relevant sectoral ministries, especially during the drafting stage. In almost all the countries analyzed, the leading authority in the planning process has been the ministry of environment. Usually, this ministry produced a draft plan that then was discussed with other government departments, and often changed in accordance with the interest constellations within the cabinet. In some cases, however, the relevant ministries were directly and constructively involved in the development of the plan. To some extent, this has been the case in Switzerland, where an interdepartmental commission (IDARio) has taken a leading role in the drafting of the green plan. The most intense cooperation between government departments has taken place in the Netherlands, where four ministries (environment, industry, transport, and agriculture) worked together on the preparation of the NEPP for a period of almost 3 years (van Kampen, 1997, pp. 711). In the United Kingdom, the White Paper “This Common Inheritance” was developed by the Department of Environment in very close cooperation with two interministerial committees, one of which was headed by the prime minister. The final plan was signed by 11 ministers, including those for trade and industry, energy, transport, and agriculture. The second British plan, the UK Sustainability Strategy of 1994, caned the signature of 16 different ministers (Wilkinson, 1997a). Furthermore, a number of countries have introduced through green plans some mechanism for “green“ reporting by nonenvironmental ministries. Norway, for example, which explicitly locates responsibility for external environmental effects within the various sectoral ministries, requires sectoral environmental action plans combined with an annual progress report titled “Environmental 622 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens Profile of The Government and the Environmental State of the Nation." In the United Kingdom so-called "green ministers" have been established inside all government departments, and all departments are required to dedicate a chapter of their yearly reports to environmental matters within their areas of competence. In Canada, the Guide to Green Government of 1995 requires all federal departments to periodically draft sectoral sustainable development strategies. Finally, the EU's Fifth Environmental Action Program introduces Annual Evaluutions of Environmental Pe$ormance to be produced by all Directorate Generals (DGs) and published in the European Commission's annual "Report of the Activities of the European Union" (Wilkinson, 1997b). In addition, it requires the designation of Integration Correspondents in all DGs whose task it is to ensure that "policy proposals and legislative proposals developed in that Directorate-General take account of the environment and of the requirement to contribute towards sustainable patterns of development" (Wilkinson, 1997b, p. 161) and creates a new Integration Unit within DG XI (Environment) consisting of five officials who serve as point of contact for the Integration Correspondents. This category of analysis also covers the extent of societal participation in the planning process. A claim for broad participation can be found in almost all planning documents. However, in reality, participation is usually restricted, if present at all. The Austrian plan, for example, has been criticized for having excluded environmental organizations during the initial drafting process while including trades unions and employer's associations. In addition, media coverage has been very low-key, as the environmental administration showed little effort to publicize the ongoing process (Payer, 1997). In South Korea, the general public has been virtually excluded from the drafting process, and even the Swedish planning process has been characterized as "an internal government process" (Dalal-Clayton, 1996, p. 41). In contrast, the drafting of green plans in Australia and Canada, the second Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP 2), and New Zealand's Resource Management Act, were characterized by a higher level of consultation and participation (Dalal-Clayton, 1996; Johnson, 1997). The comparisons show that integrating environmental aspects into other policy areas has been taken seriously by a number of national planning approaches. Although evaluations of the effectiveness of "green ministers" or sectoral environmental reports are not yet available, it can be argued that these measures may represent an important step towards reaching a basic consensus on common environmental goals and values. At least in the Netherlands, the cooperative formulation of the NEPP has led to a comparatively strong consensus on its goals, and the subsequent integration of target groups into their implementation has reduced resistance and led to a "cooperative-and at times even positive-attitude of many industrial organizations" (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 119). With social participation, the picture is different: in spite of claims to openness in planning, in reality participation seems to be a rather difficult task. In most cases, NGOs and other societal groups are limited to consultation about draft documents prepared by the responsible ministry, and feedback from participants in these consultations is, at best, inadequately integrated in the final plan. Extent of Institutionalizationof the Green Plan With regard to the long-term goal of sustainable development and respective targets and measures, the extent to which a green plan is institutionalized may well be the most important condition for successful 623 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 environmental planning. The OECD points out that the question of institutionalization becomes important as the time frames for planning for sustainable development extend beyond terms of office and legislative periods (OECD, 1995b, p. 19). A strong institutionalization could make the difference between programmatic declarations issued by one government only to be discarded by its successor, as has been the case with the Canadian or Portuguese green plans, and genuine long-term strategies. Questions raised by institutionalization include: Does the plan have a legal or legislative basis, e.g., in a national environmental framework law or through a binding parliamentary decision, or is it merely a cabinet decision or a government statement of intent? Has a responsible, appropriate institution been established or designated to coordinate the planning process? Does the plan provide for regular, obligatory reports and evaluation of its progress? And, does it include a finance scheme? Currently, only five green plans have a legal basis, i.e. the development of a green plan is regulated by law. This is the case in the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Portugal. Interestingly, in the Netherlands the legal institutionalization of the planning process did not take place until 4 years after the publication of the first NEPP (Bennett, 1997). The Danish and Austrian plans, as well as the Swedish and Norwegian approaches, have been given a legislative basis through a binding parliamentary decision. In a large group of countries, including Australia, Canada, Finland, and the United Kingdom, green plans lack such a legal or legislative basis and are thus more likely to stand and fall along with the particular government in office. Provisions for regular reports on the progress of the planning process exist in most countries, but there are important differences in the quality of these reports. In the Netherlands, long-term environmental goals are "achieved through ...specific measures that are formulated every four years in operational plans and implemented through annual rolling programs" (Bennett, 1997, p. 78). The process thus provides for strongly institutionalized periodic opportunities to evaluate results and to adapt targets and measures if necessary. A remarkable feature of the UK strategy is that it foresees yearly reports on its implementation. In 1997, the sixth annual report was published, reviewing in detail more than 600 targets and measures (Wilkinson, 1997a). Furthermore, the aforementioned inclusion of environmental sections in the annual reports of all government departments constitutes an important institutional mechanism. Similar mechanisms for "green" reporting by other ministries have been introduced in Canada, Norway, and Ireland. The British plan, with its strong emphasis on institutional innovation, is also among the few approaches that have established particular national authorities responsible for continuing strategic action. These administrative bodies are the Ministerial Committee on the Environment of 1992 and the Government Panel on Sustainable Development of 1994. More than a decade after the development of the first national environmental policy plans, this approach has experienced a remarkable diffusion throughout industrialized and developing countries, and equally important, this strategic approach has in many countries become a central and stable part of environmental policymaking. Moreover, a number of countries-such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden or Norway-have already developed one or more successors to their initial strategies. 624 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens Early Evaluations of Existing Plans Three plans have already been evaluated in terms of implementation and goal attair~ment.~ While these preliminary evaluations cannot deliver a conclusive judgment on the environmental effectiveness of strategic planning, they do highlight some important instances of policy-learning during the planning process. TheNetherkruh Recent evaluations of the Dutch planning approach for 1995 show that while no target was met precisely (which may be due to the "soft" instruments applied), many targets were exceeded (van Kampen, 1997; Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, [RIVM], 1994). Among the targets that have not been reached, C02 and NOx emissions (relating to the environmental themes Table 2 Environmental Trends in the Netherlands 1985-90, 1990-95, and NEPP Targets for 1995 (%) Theme/Substance Climate changeKO2 Acidification so2 NOX NH3 Eutrophication Nitrogen Phosphorus Diffusion surface waters Copper Lead Zinc Cadmium Chromium Diffusion air Copper Cadmium Chromium Fluorides Lead Sources: 1985-90 +13 1990-95 +6.8 NEPP 1995 Target 0 -20 0 -16 -29 -10 -28 -15 -27 -18 -3 -24 -26 -65 -50 -50 4-7 -13 -19 -3 -33 -3 -47 -2 1 -90 -77 -50 -70 -50 -70 -50 +7 -25 0 +12 -75 -3 -25 -18 -18 -89 -50 -33 -50 -50 -70 Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene , 1994; van Kampen, 1997. of climate change and acidification, respectively) stand out clearly. However, about half the'targets set for 1995 have actually been realized, among them emissions of SO2 (acidification), phosphor (eutrophication), cadmium and chromium (surface water), and lead or dioxins (air). What seems to be still more important is that-compared with the pre-NEPP period from 1985 to 1990-nearly all trends have improved, and some have even been reversed between 1990 and 1995 (see Table 2). 625 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 southhk~ The evaluation of the second Korean medium-term plan for 1995 shows that some targets had been too ambitious (e.g., the treatment rates for sewage and solid wastes), while others-especially concentrations of SO2 in the city of Seoul-had already been met by 1996. Although actual developments generally fall short of the targets formulated in the medium-term plan, South Korea (like the Netherlands) is experiencing remarkably positive trends in many areas of environmental protection. Of course, the impact of the acute financial crisis that hit Korea at the end of 1997 and the change of government on the country’s environmental performance remains to be seen. Sweden In 1996, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) presented a review of the 167 environmental objectives previously approved by the Riksdag. One hundred of them were difficult to assess or have not been evaluated in detail. Nonetheless, of the 67 clearly formulated objectives, 46 have been achieved or will be achieved within the stated time frame, while 21 targets will probably not be realized (SEPA, 1997). As in the Netherlands and South Korea, the SO2 target was met earlier than planned, while the NOx target was only partially achieved. The 50% reduction target for pesticide use was reached in 1990, but the additional reduction of 50% could not be fully achieved in 1995. With the introduction of new goals in 1997 and 1998, some of the former targets (e. g., for C02 and NOx emissions) have now been more stringently formulated. Evaluation A general impression of planning initiatives in these countries would suggest: 1. None of the targets formulated in the national environmental strategies has been met precisely. However, while some targets have not been reached, others have been exceeded. 2. In the Netherlands, where trends could be compared before and after the plan, a significant improvement could be observed, even where the target itself was not met (as in the case of C02 emissions). 3 . In all three countries, failure was clearly reported and led (at least in Sweden and the Netherlands) to reformulation of policy, which usually included stricter measures. The early evaluations do clearly demonstrate the process-orientation of strategic environmental planning. Regular reporting and monitoring has enabled policymakers to react flexibly to unforeseen implementation barriers or changing framework conditions. In Sweden and the Netherlands this has led to an analysis of the causes of not reaching some of the targets formulated in the plan and the subsequent introduction of new or stricter measures. At least in these cases the planning process has clearly induced some form of policy learning that is generally argued to be essential for coping with uncertainties (Arentsen et al., in this volume). Conclusion Most of the green plans examined here could be characterized as pilot 626 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens strategies, which display a number of weaknesses. The quality of their goals is often inadequate because targets are seldom quantified and often vague. Concrete time frames for reaching the targets are the exception. Often green plans remain rather noncommittal, lacking a strong basis in law, an institutionalized obligation of regular progress reports, or mechanisms for evaluating and reformulating the proposed targets and measures. In many cases the potential of green plans for inducing a recurrent process of policy-learning has not been realized. However, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Korea show that such a potential exists. The first steps towards integration of environmental aspects into other policy fields have been taken, but early experience with existing plans proves the difficulty of maintaining some form of sectoral environmental responsibility over a longer period of time. This is especially the case with regard to highly polluting sectors like traffic and transport, energy, building, or agriculture. Most of the plans should thus be considered a first step towards intersectoral communication. In the light of these empirical findings, the initial hypothesis has to be reformulated: How can this new type of strategic environmental planning reduce the uncertainties outlined in the first section of this article or provide an effective tool to cope with them? Uncertainty of Prognosis About Environmental Changes and Their Possible Negative Impacts The most advanced environmental policy plans go hand in hand with an increase of diagnostic capacities including the capacity to communicate this new knowledge base. The scientific description and analysis of environmental changes has been given great weight in many of the plans. The development of the Dutch NEPP, for example, was strongly supported by the publication of the report "Concern for Tomorrow" by the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection, which demonstrated the need for a radical change in environmental policy if sustainable development was to be achieved. Among other findings, the report concluded that emissions of main pollutants like S 0 2 , nitrogen ,and phosphates needed to be reduced by 70 to 90% by the year 2010 (Bennett, 1997, p. 75; Wallace, 1995, p. 44). Furthermore, the comprehensive approach to environmental protection (which covers all sectors of possible environmental degradation) followed in these plans and strategies reduces the danger of underestimating or ignoring significant, but not highly visible, environmental problems. While most of the plans give a high priority to the principle of precaution as a means of dealing with prognostic uncertainties, the quality of the concrete environmental goals formulated in the plans varies greatly. With the exceptions of the Netherlands, Korea, Sweden, Norway, and the EU, national green plans formulate rather vague and mostly qualitative-as opposed to quantitative-goals. While it is easy for all actors to agree on these goals, there is little probability that they will lead to substantive results. In these countries substantive environmental policy will have to continue relying on the more traditional approach of rule-based regulation. On the other hand, the formulation of distinct goals and their communication to the relevant target groups in the Dutch case has proven to reduce the barriers to effective policymaking caused by significant uncertainty (Arentsen et al., in this volume). Finally, the process-orientation of the most advanced national strategies provides periodically recurring opportunities for reexamining and if necessary 627 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 reformulating existing goals and measures as new knowledge on causes and effects becomes available. However, while effective reporting and monitoring systems have been set up in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Korea, and Japan, other countries like Portugal, France, and Austria have so far neglected this important aspect of strategic planning. Political Uncertainty Abed the Need fir Action Regarding LongTerm Problems That Are Still Invisible to the General Public Solutions to problems of the type of "long-term degeneration''-as opposed to the more visible problems of acute danger or (health) risk-cannot rely directly on the resource of political mobilization. They do not result in immediate public awareness and, therefore, require consensus rather than conflict, a consensus that can best be brought about through anticipatory efforts from highly legitimized, competent political and scientific actors in conjunction with participation by target groups and other societal actors in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Environmental policy plans like the Dutch NEPP or Swedish Enviro '93, which give great weight to scientific analysis of problems and possible measures, illustrate this potential of strategic planning to substitute direct experience by anticipatory science and policy. By formulating priorities for action and setting clear goals for a variety of environmental areas the more advanced green plans provide orientation to governmental and societal actors. Here, a strong institutional basis of the plan, including provisions for regular reports and evaluations, but also the quality of the goals play an important role. However, as has been argued above, the empirical evidence shows that not all plans fully explore the potential of scientifically based goal setting. Many plans are still far from formulating clear and quantified goals. Although at first glance this observation suggests that the broad diffusion of a new approach in environmental policy does not necessarily mean the diffusion of best practice, experience teaches that the formal-but not substantive-adoption of a policy innovation may in the long run still lead to substantive outcomes. The rapid diffusion of the formal institution of environmental ministries and agencies in the 1970s, for example, has in the long run led to a significant convergence of environmental policies in industrialized countries (Janicke & Weidner, 1997b; Jorgens, 1996). An important prerequisite for this to happen may be a strong institutionalization of the planning process. Uncertainty About the Environmental, Social, and Economic Consequences of Policy Decisions and Nondeciswns The early evaluation of three medium-term plans confirms the knowledge that there is no exact causal relationship between policy measures and outcomes. However, a general improvement for most targets can be observed in all three cases with positive as well as negative deviations from the actual targets. Taking into account everything we know about policy outcomes, this may be no bad result. Up-to-date, strategic environmental planning with its institutionalized processes of reporting and evaluation seems to be the best available mechanism of environmental policy-learning. In this context of permanent and strongly institutionalized evaluation and revision, initial policy failure can effectively foster learning processes and thus reduce uncertainty about the effects of political decisions. Moreover, strategic planning approaches, as could be seen from the above, endorse a broad policy dialogue between stakeholders (policymakers in the 628 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens different sectoral ministries, target groups, proponents of environmental protection) about priorities and necessities in environmental policy. This dialogue may be a relevant contribution to reduce uncertainties about the effects of environmental decisions and nondecisions as it increases the probability of including negative effects that otherwise would be ignored. Last, but not least, fostering a serious dialogue between policymakers and target groups may reduce the (admittedly theoretical) risk of making decisions that bring about severe economic costs and later turn out to be wrong or ineffective in reducing environmentally harmful emissions (problem shifting). Kloepfer (1996, p. 5 8 ) therefore argues that in fields characterized by high environmental insecurity, the softer instruments of dialogue and negotiated agreements may be more adequate than traditional and prescriptive command-and-control measures. Uncertainty of Environmental Pioneers About the Chances and Risks of Innovative Behavior Long-term environmental planning could be an effective mode for handling the dynamic complexity of those conditions supporting innovation. By stressing societal goals, it combines pressure for change with methodological flexibility. It provides long-term orientation and more calculable conditions for innovative investors as it renders environmental policy less dependent on shortterm events. In addition, it intensifies communication and the availability of information. Watzold and Simonis (1997, p. 1 1 ) argue that a policy that encourages integrated technological innovations could be an adequate strategy in situations characterized by high environmental uncertainty. Contrary to end-ofpipe technologies that are aimed at reducing just one specific emission, integrated technologies alter the production process and reduce a wider range of potentially hazardous emissions and material uses. Therefore, they are more apt to put into practice the principle of precaution. Furthermore, the application of integrated environmental protection measures is less dependent on conclusive knowledge about environmental effects of emissions as it brings about positive effects of its own (reducing energy and material input). Hitherto, it has been difficult to create the conditions that foster technological innovations by traditional top-down government intervention (Wallace, 1995). A similar situation may be given for pioneer countries regarding regulatory competition in the environmental field (Andersen & Liefferink, 1997; c.f. HCritier, Knill, & Mingers, 1996; Janicke & Weidner, 1997b). The fact that also at the international level (e.g., Agenda 21; Fifth Environmental Action Program of the European Union; several OECD activities) strategic goal setting has more and more become common practice, increases the security of pioneering countries to find followers at the international level and new markets for their political innovations through processes of international policy harmonization and policy convergence. In conclusion, it is clear that strategic environmental planning, as it has been put into practice in a few industrialized countries and to some extent at the supranational level of the EU, has been an effective mechanism to deal with and reduce some of the uncertainties with which environmental policymakers are confronted. However, the empirical evidence suggests that in many countries a formal adoption has occurred without substantive impacts. But the relatively strong institutionalization of strategic environmental policymaking both at the national (e.g., Japan, Korea, United Kingdom) and international level (Agenda 21 and the subsequent Rio-Process; Fifth Environmental Action Program of the 629 Policy Studies Journal, 28:3 European Union) gives support to the prognosis that the weaknesses of some initial strategies might be ovcrcome in subsequent revisions. Strategic environmental planning has-at least-initiated a global learning process that has not yet come to an end. The greatest potential of strategic planning lies in increasing the political system’s capacity to deal with those problems of long-term environmental degradation that in spite of the past successes of environmental protection remain largely unsolved. It does so by intensifying the elements of flexibility, participation, and self-regulation in cnvironmental policymaking as well as giving more weight to scientific expertise in describing problems and setting priorities. This, as well as the pronounced effort to integrate environmental policy objectives into other policy fields, serves to cncourage necessary learning processes at all levels of the political system and society. Furthermore, the strong emphasis on long-term goal setting turns environmental policy more calculable for economic actors and thus improves the conditions for environmental innovations in products and production processes. The global growth of population, industrial production, and pollution in a limited world will steadily increase the pressure for environmental innovation and the demand for corresponding processes and products. Compared with the extremely insecure development of consumer preferences, environmental policy and economics therefore enjoy a remarkably stable perspective and will not be removed from the political agenda in the near future. *** Martin Janicke is professor of comparative policy and Director of the Environmental Policy Research Unit at the Free University of Berlin. He is also a member of the German Council of Environmental Advisors. Helge Jorgens is research fellow at the Environmental Policy Research Unit of the Free University of Berlin and at the German Council of Environmental Advisors. Notes .- The authors wish to thank the editors of this volume, the reviewers of Policy Studies Journal, as well as James Meadowcroft for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. Arentsen et al. (2000) and Hisschemoller, Groenewegen, Hoppe, and Midden (1997) in this volume; see also Bressers, 1997, p. 289; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996, p. 4; OECD, 1995a. pp. 12-13. See Watzold and Sirnonis (1997) for a detailed typology of uncertainties about the effects of environmental changes. Richard Rose (1993, pp. 13-14) argues that the uncertainties of policy analysis have much more in common with medical diagnosis than with a mechanically predict:ible science (...). Applying medical knowledge to individual patients is an art as well as a science. Success is more or less probable, not certain. (...) (W)hen a doctor makes a prescription, he or she rarely guarantees success; the intention is to have a better than random chance of removing the causes of a complaint. And Hugh Heclo as early as 1974 points to the important role of uncertainty as a catalyst of “political learning.” “Politics finds its sources not only in power, but also in uncertainty (...). Policymaking is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf’ (Heclo, 1974, p. 305). This article focuses on the “old”OECD countries and-as an especially interesting case of strategic environmental planning-South Korea. The new OECD member states-Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Mexico-are not included in the analysis. The Dutch NEPP was evaluated both by the National Institute for the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, 1994) as the official Dutch planning 630 Symposium on Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Janicke/Jorgens institution and hy an independent advisory company (van Kampen, 1997). 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