OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF c hapter 40 NATIVE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY adam arola It is a popular contention, articulated by thinkers as disparate as Aristotle and Enrique Dussel, that only organized, urban societies permit the practice of philosophy. A class of people who we would call philosophers—those who consider why the world is the way it is—can only emerge within a social setting that permits sufficient leisure for some people to move away from the basic human labors of acquiring food and shelter. In asking whether or not there is such a thing as American Indian philosophy, many people are thus inclined to look for a class of people within traditional native cultures who exhibit this kind of sustained and organized questioning. Nearly every indigenous culture throughout the world has something resembling a class of what Westerners would want to call religious leaders. The tlamatinime within Nahuatl culture or the midewiwin within Ojibwe Anishinaabe culture are just two examples. In both cases these segments of the population were (and are in the case of the Ojibwe) responsible for ceremonial practice, for interpreting dreams, and for helping people through the trials and tribulations of their lives via articulating the place of any individual lives within the structural whole that is the cosmos. Even Miguel León-Portilla, a scholar sympathetic to the brilliance and peculiarity of Nahuatl culture, refuses to ever fully characterize the tlamatinime as philosophers. Instead, scholars are often criticized for daring to categorize such thinkers as philosophers, and quite often this critique is leveled precisely because the segment of the population that is responsible for this practice either have recourse to forms of language (poetry, song, prayer) that are considered nonphilosophical or explicitly articulate and interpret the world through the cosmological framework of their culture, which often includes references to deities and other spiritual entities. Accordingly, such people could be said to articulate the ramifications of what it GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 554 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 555 means to have the philosophy that they do without ever really questioning the validity and soundness of their “worldview.” Thus, Western scholars often grant that pre-Columbian (and even post-Columbian) indigenous populations had religious traditions, beliefs, and practices that may have even resembled theology; many scholars, however, resist calling such intellectual practices philosophy. One of the most pernicious tendencies in engaging indigenous populations is the tendency to seek the primitive, the primal, the unadulterated, the pre-Columbian. To ask whether or not American Indian populations did philosophy is to forego asking the question of whether or not American Indian populations do philosophy, today. Such a tendency is often accompanied by a desire to lambast and critique contemporary indigenous populations for betraying their authentic Indian roots and steering toward syncretism. This tendency to seek out the authentically native is a voyeuristic and damaging fantasy perpetrated by much of the West from those who would call Indians primitive barbarians to those acolytes of Carlos Castañeda who would hope to find an authentic medicine man to help them find their spirit animal while smoking peyote. In both cases, the voices of indigenous populations are silenced. The outsider who approaches assumes the authority to tell Indian populations what it would mean for them to be authentically indigenous. While I do not assert that one has nothing to learn from looking back at records of pre-Columbian ceremonial practices, or from attempting to derive the ontological implications of traditional Indian stories, or from reading a brilliant text such as Neihardt’s Black Elk Speaks, I take a different tack in introducing Native American philosophy here. I will introduce the central thinkers of contemporary American Indian philosophy by discussing concerns including, but not limited to, the nature of experience, meaning, truth, the status of the individual and community, and finally issues concerning sovereignty. The impossibility of carving up the intellectual traditions of contemporary Native scholars in North America into neat and tidy disciplines must be kept in mind. The first hallmark of American Indian philosophy is the commitment to the belief that all things are related—and this belief is not simply an ontological claim, but rather an intellectual and ethical maxim. Experience and Truth The work of V. F. Cordova provides an account of how truth is conceptualized within Native American philosophy. Cordova died in 2003, but a collection of her essays and poems was published in 2007 under the title, How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V.F. Cordova. In this text, Cordova never develops any kind of overt doctrine of “how it is”; rather, she exhibits a univocal comportment of questioning. She does not seek to rest in the stasis of an answer that could respond to the question of “how is it?”—a desire Cordova frequently aligns with Euro-American GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 555 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF 556 recent trends in global philosophy philosophical and scientific tendencies. She explains, “The Euro-American conducts his attempts to understand his world on the assumption that there are definitive explanations to be discovered . . . there will be one universal—all encompassing—and absolute—beyond question—Truth” (Cordova 2007, 69). Such a conception of truth can only be borne out of a conception of the world as static, unchanging. Nevertheless, Cordova exhibits constancy in her philosophical comportment. Confronted with any concept, Cordova argues that philosophy happens when one asks, “In what sort of world would this concept make sense?” (Cordova 2007, 56). The answer points toward a matrix, which she defines as a “view, or description [that] consists of three very basic items: a description of the world, a description of what it is to be human in that world, and a description of the role of humans in that world. . . . [T]he matrix forms a foundation upon which all else is explained” (Cordova 2007, 61). According to Cordova, most of the time we live unaware of the matrix that enables us to engage the world as we do. For Cordova, a matrix is most often exposed when two conflicting conceptual frameworks come into contact with one another; she exhibits this fact most clearly in her own autobiographical writings, explaining how she always found herself in the midst of multiple matrices. This encounter with the limits of our knowledge, the ungrounded foundations of our explanatory frameworks, is where we confront the fact of the matrix. Cordova argues that this happens more often for indigenous folks in colonial circumstances than for the colonizers, as indigenous populations are constantly confronted with not only another matrix, but a matrix that dominates how all conversation and discourse must take place—a theme to which we return in discussing sovereignty. As there is hegemony of Euro-American belief systems in North America, it is rare that people who encounter the world via the matrix of the West need account for their beliefs. This fact, more than anything, motivates Cordova’s writing. Taking stock of the rise of multiculturalism, she writes, “While the Native American, as an artifact, is undergoing a resurgence of popularity, the Native American as he actually exists is ignored” (Cordova 2007, 163). Cordova’s exposure of the matrix that underpins Euro-American knowledge systems, in effect, exposes the particularity, peculiarity, and relativity of Western claims of universality. In turn, this creates space for contemporary indigenous voices to speak for themselves. Contrary to many Western philosophical tendencies, which take their root in Platonistic understandings of truth as pure presence, pure stability, and immutability, Cordova argues that stability in the native world is about knowing how to ensure that consistency can be found amidst complexity. This task will always be circumstantial, environmental, and ongoing. “Each perspective, in its own environment, or circumstances, will be ‘true’ or ‘valid’—in that environment, in those circumstances. . . . He does not assume the ‘incorrectness’ of the other’s perspective when it does not coincide with his own” (Cordova 2007, 71). For Cordova, the nature of indigenous matrices is rooted in the ontology that undergirds them: the combined emphasis on monism and the diversity and specificity of creations GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 556 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 557 implies that not only are practices particular to places, but also all practices are instantiations of and simultaneously responses to the univocity of being named variously “‘nilch’i’ by the Navajo, ‘najoji’ by the Blackfoot, ‘usen’ by the Apache, ‘manitou’ by the Ojibway” (Cordova 2007, 104). Cordova thus argues that there is no universal Truth, while maintaining that certain referential frameworks are appropriate to situated manifestations of “the unidentifiable is” (Cordova 2007, 107). The Western model fails from the beginning by assuming that infinite complexity can be subsumed under one template. This claim—that there are truths that could be categorized as universal within a particular matrix but that are not universal tout court insofar as what is manifests itself in particular places and sites—may strike a reader as odd and even paradoxical. Yet it is a claim that resonates with even more emphatic claims made by other indigenous philosophers. Both Brian Yazzie Burkhart and Vine Deloria Jr. argue that one of the fundamental characteristics of indigenous conceptions of experience is that there is no distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary. What this claim amounts to is that an indigenous comportment is essentially phenomenological. An indigenous comportment toward what is must perpetually attend to the fact that the manner in which what is shows itself will be multifarious and unpredictable. Any attempt to fully conceptualize how things will appear to us prior to our experience of them will place undue limits upon the presencing of things. J. Irving Hallowell recounts a conversation with an old Ojibwe man regarding the capacity of stones and other apparently inanimate objects to speak to humans. Noting that stones “are grammatically animate,” he recounts that he “once asked an old man: Are all stones we see about us here alive? He reflected a long while and then replied, ‘No! But some are” (Tedlock and Tedlock 1992, 147). Deloria, Burkhart and others (including Lee Hester) would not necessarily interpret this assertion to mean that this old man had actually spoken to a stone before, but rather that he would not close off the possibility that he could learn something from interacting with a stone. If we approach the stone as an inanimate object in advance, assuming that it is nothing but a mute object that sits in front of us, at our disposal to use as we will, we will never encounter a stone as anything more than such a mute object. And if we were hypothetically to have an encounter with any kind of object that we encountered as anomalous with regard to the expectations imposed upon experience by our matrix, Burkhart and Deloria argue that we will cast such an experience aside and ignore it. An indigenous manner of conceptualizing experience would perpetually attend to the way in which things show themselves to us, attempting to broach the world as something that can never exhibit anomalies, precisely because anything and everything is possible. The previous paragraph’s account does not, however, resolve the apparent paradox of Cordova’s assertion. In order to understand how and why she is justified in asserting the relative universality of truth claims within indigenous matrices, it helps to appreciate the affinity between a pragmatist’s account of truth and that which is often advocated for by many Native American thinkers. While running the risk of engaging in an act of essentializing, Deloria’s pan-Indian tendencies lead GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 557 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF 558 recent trends in global philosophy him to be quite emphatic that for “the indigenous mind,” truth is tantamount to function. Something is believed to be true if it is verified by experience to have sufficient explanatory power to enable a person to accomplish tasks. Scott Pratt has extensively traced this account of truth and its affinity to pragmatism in his Native Pragmatism. He argues that many of the major trends of American philosophy are borne of interactions between Europeans and American Indians. The otherwise idealist tendencies of late-nineteenth-century American philosophy were mitigated by border encounters between whites from the Northeast and the Haudenosaunee confederation. This argument points to the shared tendency in the pragmatic tradition and the indigenous philosophical traditions of North America to have a conception of truth that is both universally applicable but also eminently revisable; for any account of truth qua function can be communicated as the best thing to believe, the best way to accomplish a task, that we know so far. But openness to the possibility that experience may show us superior ways to accomplish a task indicates that this conception of truth is always understood to be flexible and at the mercy of what is shown in experience. Gregory Cajete further vindicates this claim in his Native Science, arguing that indigenous knowledge practices at both the ontological level and the practical level—that is, planting crops, building irrigation systems—are always based on a process of trial and error. Indigenous populations learn from what has succeeded and modify the way in which they conceive of the world to accord with results, always aware that there is more to be learned from experience, all the while maintaining a full awareness that anything understood as true or appropriate to believe in any given moment is always transient and revisable through further experience and further dialogue with the world. It is this openness toward the perpetual transformation of one’s views that delineates indigenous thinking from many—but certainly not all—philosophical tendencies one may encounter throughout the world. The Community and the Individual Yet this account raises the question of what kinds of experiences and interactions are things from which we can learn. To fully understand what could count as an experience from which one could learn, we must first discuss how exactly it is that indigenous thinkers conceptualize identity. Without an account of how the identity of a knower, or a thing to be known, is conceived, there is no way to arrive at an understanding of what would count as an epistemic experience. While it is fair to say that the array of indigenous philosophers present within North America would not completely agree about how to conceive of identity, I will offer an account that I believe captures the most basic sense and convictions held by indigenous thinkers. First and foremost, we must understand that identity is not understood as something that is given to anything in isolation. Scott Lyons claims GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 558 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 559 in his article “Rhetorical Sovereignty” that Indian cultural understandings of what it means to be a political human being are very different from this model of ipseity and self-determination. The individual self does not have primacy as in the Kantian tradition, wherein the state is a collective of already mini-sovereigns, individuals, who get together and form the nation-state. Lyons rejects this view for a concept of a nation-people. A people here is defined as “a group of human beings united together by history, language, culture, or some combination therein—a community joined in union for common purpose: the survival and flourishing of the people itself” (Lyons 2000, 454). Thus, the status of the individual takes a backseat. Within indigenous communities one often hears the adage, “we are all related.” For Deloria, Lyons, Sandy Grande, Cajete, and many others, truth and identity are terms best understood through how we conceive of our relatives—I refer to it as relational identity: the identity of any particular entity in the world can never be discovered by distilling the essence out of a particular object such that one could arrive at an eternal eidos that shines out of this particular encapsulation; rather, identity emerges through the constant act of relating. Deloria describes this as follows: “everything in the natural world has relationships with every other thing and the total set of relationships make up the world as we experience it” (Deloria 1999, 34). That is to say, the essence of any particular thing is what it is only insofar as it relates to what it is not. If this is the case, and the identity—insofar as this is understood as something that one seeks in epistemic inquiry—of a particular bird is sought, the only way in which to come to know “what” this bird is is to understand the web of relations in which it participates in a particular place at a particular time. In other words, to know the bird means to know the “personality” of the bird insofar as it plays a part in a structure that is larger than the body of the bird itself. This, then, necessitates that one has an understanding of the causal nexus that the bird participates in to make the web of relations to which it belongs behave the way it does. Knowing the particular bird, then, would mean knowing what the bird eats, where it builds its nest, and what its different songs can tell us about this particular place. But these things are only knowable insofar as we have an understanding of the whole in which the bird participates. Here, then, the universal—or the genus, for example—is eschewed in lieu of knowledge of the network that this bird sustains and that, in turn, sustains the bird. There is a further complication in this account of identity. Given the emphasis upon not only relation but also the act of relating, the nature of any particular thing is perpetually in process and thus perpetually changing. Accordingly, the bird— take a thrush, for example—is never knowable in exactly the same way twice. Therefore, one must be perpetually open and responsive to the manner in which the thrush shows itself at a particular moment in a particular place in order to be confident that one can learn something from, or about, the thrush. We can now see why the account of experience given in the work of Burkhart and Deloria places such a radical emphasis upon the lack of distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary in indigenous conceptions of experience. That which is to be an object can never be encountered as what it is insofar as one attempts to appropriate GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 559 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF 560 recent trends in global philosophy a static object. Only insofar as the matter of experience is encountered in the singular manner of its happening can we have an experience that can teach us something about ourselves and about the world around us. And both of these claims are tantamount to claims of self-knowledge, for knowing oneself within Native American thought necessitates knowing how one is constituted by and simultaneously perpetually constituting the world that one inhabits. With this understanding of identity in mind, we can thus get a handle on the apparent peculiarities of many Native American conceptions of the individual human and their place within a human community. First and foremost, the individual is not simply conceived of as an epiphenomenon of a community. This view that would privilege the tribe over its members may have currency in some circumstances, yet in many cases it is far too simple of a characterization of indigenous conceptions of community. Asserting that indigenous conceptions of identity are community centered whereas Euro-American conceptions of identity are individual centered is an account that too simply accepts the basic coordinates of univocal emergence from a preexisting, static entity, whether that entity happens to be an individual or a community. Within Native conceptions of the individual and the community, these two moments are always reciprocally determining. There is no individual prior to a community, nor is there any community prior to the individual. We cannot conceptualize either half of this supposed opposition without the other. Thinking of ourselves in our sociality, or in our belonging to nature, it would be clear to say that for this indigenous conception of personhood or identity, an individual cannot be said to exist without the “people”—and we see how broadly this must be construed insofar as it includes all of our relationships. Insofar as personhood is extended not only to nonhuman animals, but even to the things of the world that are often considered inanimate, the question of who is to flourish is no longer about individuals within a structure that serves them, but rather the people as a whole. And that people as a whole is thus to be understood as the whole web of existence in which any singular being inheres. And here, we get a sense of how the ontological commitments of Native American philosophy overlap with the political commitments; in fact, I would argue, one cannot make sense of one without the other. Sovereignty This leads us to the final major theme of Native American philosophy: sovereignty. Lyons points out that a native model of sovereignty “is probably best understood as the right of a people to exist and enter into agreements with other peoples for the sole purpose of promoting, not suppressing, local cultures and traditions, even while united by a common political project—in this case, the noble goal of peace GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 560 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 561 between peoples” (Lyons 2000, 456). One need only think about the Haudenosaunee confederation to get a sense of what Lyons is getting at: tribes united for the sake of all of their flourishing, which would seem to require an awareness of their dependence on one another. The Great Law of Peace as established in the 117 Codicils “were,” as Charles Mann puts it, “concerned as much with establishing limits on the great council’s powers as on granting them” (Mann 2006, 372). Interestingly enough, the council that represented the Five Nations—constituted by male sachems chosen by female clan heads within specific tribes—could not declare war, but only negotiate peace treaties. War declaration was left to the particular nationpeople. And within the great council, all decisions had to be unanimous, a step away—it would seem—from representative democracy wherein individuals battle, wage war, within a parliamentary system so as to win a majority (Mann 2006, 372). Respect and reciprocity, not autonomous abuse of power—this is the key moment of political life in indigenous conceptions of community. Nevertheless, in thinkers such as Lyons, Dale Turner, Taiaiake Alfred, and others, we find a complaint about traditional multicultural education in American universities as it bears upon issues of tribal sovereignty. Lyons writes, “Mainstream multiculturalism may focus on the people but typically not the nation and thus isn’t necessarily the practice or honoring of Indian sovereignty” (Lyons 2000, 457). The battle for Indian sovereignty is the battle for political recognition—and this battle is covered over in lieu of a quasi-cultural voyeurism by the majority of multiculturalists in America. In Dale Turner’s This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy, he articulates precisely this problem. Attempts by tribal governments to interact politically with the Canadian and American governments are nearly always foiled in advance insofar as North American governments conceive of sovereignty and identity in accordance with a liberal political model that is premised upon a variety of quite specific ontological and epistemological commitments. North American governments traditionally misrecognize the variant nature of indigenous conceptions of identity and sovereignty either because they are overdetermined by their own conception of the good life1 or because Native populations are themselves overdetermined by the interpretative framework imposed upon them by the image of Indians in the North American imagination as Deloria would put it. If there is no good-faith effort made to encounter indigenous populations 1. Turner would argue that the Canadian 1969 White Paper is an example of precisely this tendency. The White Paper was a policy document issued by then head of Aboriginal affairs Jean Chretien as an attempt to overturn the policies of the Indian Act—a legislative act that had greatly curtailed the civil rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, subjecting them to land claims and giving them a peculiar status as separate and unequal to other citizens of Canada. In large part, the goal of the White Paper— from Chretien’s perspective—was to eliminate the status of “Aboriginal” as an identity recognized by the Canadian government. Instead, the objective was to assimilate Aboriginal populations into the broader Canadian population, thus making them Canadian citizens first, who just happened to be Aboriginal. As Turner elucidates, many Aboriginal groups responded to the White Paper by insisting that the attempt to assimilate them into a modern, liberal society without attending to the particular understanding of what it means to be a person, to be a citizen, to be sovereign, was tantamount to continued colonization by other means. GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 561 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF 562 recent trends in global philosophy on their own terms, particularly with regards to how they conceive of themselves politically, any attempt at negotiation—whether those negotiations be regarding simple facts of daily life such as hunting rights or about larger issues concerning rights to self-determination—between North American and tribal governments will fail. Within such a circumstance, dialogue is simply not possible. For this reason, Turner advocates for what he calls “word warriors”: An Aboriginal mediator—a word warrior—is an indigenous person who engages the imposed legal and political discourses of the state guided by the belief that the knowledge and skills to be gained by engaging in such discourses are necessary for the survival of all indigenous peoples. (Turner 2007, 92) As he explains, a word warrior must thereby be a person who in a certain sense belongs to both an indigenous community while also being able to speak the language of Euro-American philosophy, law, and politics. The task of such a person, as the above quote indicates, is to mediate between these two worlds—and in fact, insofar as such a person “belongs” anywhere, we may have to say that they belong to this between. Here Turner is respectfully critiquing indigenous thinkers such as Taiaiake Alfred, who explicitly advocate for a kind of separatism wherein indigenous intellectuals carve out and create their own communities, distinct from—and hopefully uninfluenced by—the academic and legal discourse of the Euro-American world. Contrary to Alfred, Turner writes: I am suggesting that instead of carving out their own communities and asserting their intellectual sovereignty within them, Aboriginal intellectuals must develop a community of practitioners within the existing dominant legal and political intellectual communities, while remaining an essential part of a thriving indigenous intellectual community. (Turner 2007, 90) The objective is thus that word warriors will be able to simultaneously sustain and defend the integrity of indigenous life and culture by employing, working on, and working with the intellectual traditions of the West while still being rooted in indigenous culture. Whether or not Turner’s objective is actually realizable is uncertain. Many thinkers such as Gordon Christie and Taiaiake Alfred would likely disagree with Turner’s thesis. For many indigenous thinkers, the desperation over the failure of past attempts to interact with North American governments in a manner that was productive for indigenous populations has proven to be too great an obstacle to overcome with any theoretical apparatus. Yet Turner’s response would certainly be that indigenous populations must press forward, and doing so as mediators, negotiators, and interpreters is the only authentically indigenous manner of doing so. One of the primary ramifications of the claims that I have made thus far is that the conception of experience described above demands that indigenous peoples are perpetually in the process of negotiating with the world around them to be who and what they are. If this is the case, then Turner’s thesis about word warriors would GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 562 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 563 seem to be the most appropriate manner of engaging governments insofar as one wishes to be true to his or her indigeneity. The activity and comportment of those who word warriors encounter in the courthouse, the parliament, or the classroom has just as much of an impact on the nature of the encounter. And to the extent that I am advocating, just as Turner is for a “critical indigenous philosophy,” let us hear him out. This is what Turner has in mind when advocating for a critical indigenous philosophy. Explaining the approach that word warriors are to take in the academy, he writes: . . . [this] approach makes an investigation of the meaning and praxis of colonialism a central activity of an indigenous intellectual community. The dialogue between indigenous intellectuals and their non-indigenous counterparts created by unpacking colonialism from the history of ideas generates the philosophical battleground for word warriors. This kind of intellectual dialogue can lead us to what I call a “critical indigenous philosophy.” (Turner 2007, 101) To the extent that our encounters with the history of philosophy, for example, can amount to the unpacking of colonialism, we can only be successful to the extent that people have ears to hear what we are saying. Insofar as people continue to carry themselves monologically, our encounter with the history of ideas will be precisely a battleground—a conflict between two opposing sides, one that insists that dialogue can actually happen and thus would hopefully not try to see this dialogue as a battle, and another that insists that all conversation is, in fact, a battle. For most people who comport themselves in accord with the narcissism of monologue, the monologue of the sovereign that is above the law, actually engaging in open, incomplete dialogue—actually negotiating—is unthinkable and impossible. Yet Turner’s vision is for me worth striving for and is consonant with the account of Native American thought that I have presented. Conclusion We have concluded this account with Turner’s writing on sovereignty. Yet this account could have begun and ended with any of the concepts discussed. For indigenous conceptions of sovereignty are wedded to conceptions of the nature of being, which are in turn wedded to conceptions of what it would mean to live well and what it would mean to know; all of these allegedly separable disciplines are what they are only insofar as they are perpetually in the process of relating to one another. The conception of the identity of any particular thing that we discussed earlier must also—and does—apply to the different objects of study broached within indigenous thought. All of the seemingly disparate disciplines are themselves dependent on one another to be what they are. One cannot have a full understanding of any aspect of indigenous thought without attending to all others. And GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 563 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF 564 recent trends in global philosophy it is in this simple fact that we find, perhaps, the most fundamental quality of Native American philosophy. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUGGESTED READINGS Alfred, Taiaiake. (1999) Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto. Don Mills: Oxford University Press. American Indians in Philosophy Newsletter from the American Philosophical Association, edited by Adam Arola. www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/americanindians.aspx Arola, Adam. (2007) “‘A Larger Scheme of Life’: Deloria on Essence and Science (in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy).” American Indians in Philosophy Newsletter from the American Philosophical Association 7, 1. ———. (2008) “Dialogue and Identity: Worries About Word Warriors.” American Indians in Philosophy Newsletter from the American Philosophical Association 8, 2. ———. (2009a) “How It Is: The Native Philosophy of V.F. Cordova.” Canadian Journal of Native Studies. In press. ———. (2009b) “Taking on the Tradition: Sovereignty and Self-Identity.” In Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: A Critical Dialogue, edited by Lorraine Mayer and Sandra Tomsons. Cambridge: Oxford University Press. Cajete, Gregory. (1994) Look To the Mountain: An Ecology of Indigenous Education. Durango, CO: Kivaki Press. ———. (2000) Native Science: Natural Laws of Interdependence. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers. Cordova, V. F. (2007) How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V.F. Cordova, edited by Kathleen Dean Moore, Kurt Peters, Ted Jojola, and Amber Lacy. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press. Deloria, Vine, Jr. (1999) Spirit & Reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr. Reader. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing. ———. (2003) God Is Red: A Native View of Religion. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing. Deloria, Vine, Jr., and Clifford Lytle. (1983) American Indians, American Justice. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. ———. (1984) The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Deloria, Vine, Jr., and Daniel Wildcat. (2001) Power and Place: Indian Education in America. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing. Grande, Sandy. (2004) Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Leon-Portilla, Miguel. (1992) Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Lyons, Scott Richard. (2000) “Rhetorical Sovereignty: What Do American Indians Want from Writing?” CCC 51, 3. Mann, Charles. (2006) 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus. New York: Vintage. Pratt, Scott. (2002) Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. GARFIELD-chapter 40-Page Proof 564 August 10, 2010 4:37 PM OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF native american philosophy 565 Tedlock, Barbara, and Dennis Tedlock. (1992) Teachings from the American Earth: Indian Religion and Philosophy. New York: Liveright Press. Turner, Dale. (2007) This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Waters, Anne. (2004) American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Whitt, Laurie. (1995) “Indigenous People and the Cultural Politics of Knowledge.” In Issues in Native American Cultural Identity, edited by Michele K. Green. New York: Peter Lang. 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