THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS

The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics
Author(s): John R. Silber
Source: Ethics, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Apr., 1963), pp. 179-197
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS'
JOHN R. SILBER
he must have been touched obvious reason of all. As his first reason
Beck notes that a commentary is "not
LI. dedicatedto H. J. Paton, that so absolutely indispensable"(p. vii) for
exacting master of Kantian studies, his this Critiqueas for others. The second
A Commentary
on Kant'sCritiqueof Prac- Critique,he suggests, "hasfew of the stytical Reason, Lewis White Beck has fit- listic difficulties and philosophical obtingly and handsomelyhonoredPaton by scurities of the other Critiques"(p. vii).
so doing. Beck's Commentaryis one of The second reason for the neglect of
the few genuinely important books on the Critiqueof Practical Reason lies in
Kant's ethics and the best book on the "the understandable preference that
subject to appearsince Paton's Categori- many readers have for the Foundations
cal Imperativein 1946. It will be read of the Metaphysicsof Morals" (p. vii).
thoughtfully and perennially by those After studying the Foundationsreaders
who wish to master Kant's thought, and supposethat they have an understanding
it cannot be ignored by anyone who of Kant's ethics and neglect the larger,
wishes to avoid the risks of error and more complex work. Furthermore,Beck
of belated discovery of what is already suggests that "the absenceof a commenknown. Although one may (and I think tary is a sign, in part an effect but permust) object to some of Beck's interpre- haps in part also a cause, of the neglect
tations, much of the materialin this book of the Critique" (p. vii).
is simply the last word on the subject.
Now there is obviously one other reaWithout retracting any of the high son-and to my mind the compellingone
praise just given, I wish to consider in -for the reluctance of philosophers to
this discussion,first, some of the limita- write a commentary on the second Critions inherent in any commentary on tique.The second Critiquedoes not occuKant's second Critique;second, some of py the position of unique importancefor
the particular strengths and weaknesses the understandingof Kant's ethics that
of this one; and, third, at considerable the first Critiquehas for the understandlength the Commentary's
one major fault ing of Kant's metaphysics.The best pos-the absence of a view of the wholesible commentaryon the Critiqueof Pracand a suggestionfor its correction.2
tical Reason (and Beck's may very well
be it) could not possibly provide a definiI
tive account of Kant's ethics either in
In the Foreword to his Commentary, whole or in part. The concept of obligaBeck remarks on what seems to be the tion and the structureof imperativesare
strangelack of commentarieson the Cri- most extensively discussed, not in the
tique of Practical Reason. By way of ex- second Critique,but in the Foundations;
planation he offers two reasons and sug- the idea of respect is expounded most
gests a third while overlookingthe most effectively (according to Kant himself)
ALTHOUGH
AL~ with uncommondaringwhenhe
179
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180
ETHICS
in Book I of the ReligionwithintheLimits by-line commentary. For example, his
of ReasonAlone; the conceptsof freedom persistenteffortsto make sense of Kant's
and will were developed gradually by charts and diagrams are generally reKant, and he did not offerany systematic warding;especiallyso is his extendeddisdiscussion of them prior to the Religion cussion of Kant's bafflingTable of Cateand the Metaphysicsof Morals.Even the gories of Freedom. And Beck nearly alone concept that receives its greatest ways succeeds in supplying the historielaboration in the second Critique-the cal information to clarify passages that
concept of the good, including the high- would otherwise remain obscure. Alest good-is considered at great length though chaptersi and iv are replete with
in the final third of the first Critique,in examples of Beck's historical thoroughthe third Critique,in the Metaphysicsof ness, his detective work on how the secMorals,in the Religion,in the Anthropol- ond Critique got its name is particularly
ogy, and in several essays. The second impressive.Beck's Commentary is definiCritique is of such limited value as a tive in placing the Critique of Practical
single source of information on Kant's Reason in the contexts of Kant's philoethics that scholars have not been so sophical developmentand his relation to
much concernedto comment on it as to his critics and disciples. Beck has thus
make use of it in the systematic discus- made good use of all the possibilities
sion of Kant's ethical theory; they have availableto him within the genreof comquite properlyquestioned the value of a mentary, and in an Index of Passages
commentary restricted to the second Cited the fruits of his labor are made
Critiquealone. While Beck's Commentary readily available to the reader.
is doubtlesslythe best on the subject and
Were Beck's book merely a commendefinitive with regardto many points in tary on Kant's second Critique, I should
the Critiqueof Practical Reason, it does insist that all of the limitations on its
not provide a definitive account of the significance and usefulness to which I
basic doctrinesof Kantian ethics, granted have referredapply. In fairnessto Beck,
that it throws valuable light on many of however, it must be noted that a large
them. Beck's Commentaryis not so im- part of his Commentaryis devoted to sysportant for Kantian studies as the com- tematic discussionof issuesin Kant's ethmentarieson the first Critiqueby Vaihin- ics. Thus, for example,he begins chapter
ger, Kemp Smith, and Paton. This is not xi by saying: "Discussions of freedom
because Beck has shortcomingseither as are so frequent in Kant's works that the
a Kant scholar or philosopher but be- full compass of the concept and its atcause the secondCritiquecan never occu- tendant problems cannot well be surpy the position of authority for Kant's veyed in a running commentaryon pasethics that the first Critiqueoccupies for sages taken seriatim" (p. 176). There
his epistemology and metaphysics. This follows an extensive discussion of the
factor, I submit, is the basic reason for concepts of freedom and will in which
the "neglect" of the second Critiqueby Beck makes excellent use of his vast
commentators.
knowledge of almost everything Kant
has written or that has been written
II
about him. And this more or less systemIt cannot be denied, however, that atic approach is also followed in chapBeck makes a convincing case for line- ters xii through xiv in the discussion of
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
the problemof moral incentives, and the
dialectic and postulates of pure practical
reason. These systematically developed
parts of the Commentary
are, I think, the
ones of greatest interest and value for
those already familiarwith Kant's writings. Beck is at his philosophical and
scholarlybest when he rangesover all of
Kant's writings in searchof the likeliest
interpretationsof his views.
I do not agree, however, with all of
Beck's interpretations. I think his account of the concepts of freedom and
will, for example, is daring and imaginative but not sufficientlythoroughor comprehensiveto bring all of Kant's diverse
sayings about these conceptsinto systematic order. Beck gives me the impression of having just come upon, rather
than havingthoroughlyworkedout, some
exciting new ideas on freedom and will.
While Beck speaksof a "free,i.e. autonomous, Wille" which determines a "free,
i.e. spontaneous, Willkiir" (pp. 198 and
202), Kant says, "Der Wille ... kann
weder frei noch unfrei genannt werden.
... Nur die Willkur also kann frei ge-
nannt werden."3Severalobjectionsmust
be raised against Beck's interpretation.
It will not do to say that Wille, which
does not act, is autonomous.It is neither
autonomousnor heteronomous.Wille is
that aspect or function of will that supplies the law of the will itself. Wille is
creative by supplying the law; choice in
accordancewith that law, however, not
the provision of the law, is autonomous.
Hence, it is the will in action-Willkiirthat is either autonomous or heteronomous. Wille, as practical reason, is free
only in the sensethat reason,as judgment
and imagination,is free:it has spontaneity.4 We are on safe groundand have better textual support when we hold that
Willkiir may be either autonomous or
heteronomous(both being modes or free-
181
dom) depending upon whether Willkiir
acts in accordancewith the law of Wille.
It can be misleading, moreover, to say
that Wille determines Willkiir. Willkiir
is the faculty of choice and is self-determining either in accordancewith, or in
opposition to, Wille; the agency of determinationis on the side of Willkiir.Admittedly this objectionmust be qualified
by the fact that Wille and Willkiir are
not separate entities but concepts derived by analysis of volition. Beck makes
this point very well (p. 203). For some
reason,however,Beck findsit noteworthy
that, in discussingWilleandWillkiir,Kant
"does not often succeed in keeping discussion of one of them from interrupting
discussion of the other" (p. 177). But
isn't this preciselywhat we shouldexpect
if Willeand Willkiiraremerelyabstracted
functions of a unitary volition?
Beck's interpretationof Willkiiralone
is very confusedif not contradictory.On
the one hand, Beck insists that whether
Willkiirfulfils the demandsof the law or
not (a) "it is a free will" (p. 203). On
the other, Beck states, "Willkiirmay or
may not be free, accordingto the kind of
law it puts into the maxim or the degree
to which the maxim and not the momentary representationof the object determines the action" (p. 178). If Willkiir
(b) "gives way to the importunities of
sense," then, accordingto Beck, it is (c)
"a will in name only, really being an
arbitriumbrutum"(p. 203). I find justification only for quotation (a). In direct
oppositionto quotations (b) and (c) Kant
says: "The human will is certainly an
arbitriirmsensitivum,not, however, bruturnbut liberum.For sensibility does not
necessitate its action. There is in man a
power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses."5Paton has rightly commented: "If we look at Kant carefully,
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182
ETHICS
we shall see that human arbitriumor
choiceis neverpathologicallydetermined
or necessitated by sensuous motives: it
is always merely affected or influenced,
and this is the main reason why it is
called arbitriumliberumor free choice."6
It is erroneous to suppose that Willkiir
by "giving way to the importunities of
sense" is transformedinto an arbitrium
brutum.Free choicemust remain,according to Kant, even when the moral law
is violated. The Willkiirmay giveway to
the importunitiesof sense; but it is not
takenaway. Willkiir,when following inclinations rather than reason, is guilty,
but this would not be possible unless it
were also free.
The most seriousfault I find in Beck's
discussionof freedomand will is his failure to considerthe concept of Gesinnung.
This concept provides the basis for degrees of moral achievement and for the
continuity of moral responsibilitywhereby an individual has responsibility for
his many temporallydiscreetacts of volition. Without this Kant's theory of volition is totally inadequate to the facts
of moral experience.Because my own interpretation of Kant's concepts of freedom and will is in print, however, I shall
not extend this discussionof these points.
The reader who wishes to pursue the
matter further may see the sections on
Wille, Willkiir, and Disposition (Gesinnung) in my essay "The Ethical Importance of Kant's Religion."7
Turning to a point of far less importance, I question whether the analogue
of the CopernicanRevolution in the second Critiqueis to be found, as Beck believes, in the conceptionof law as a product of freedom (p. 179). The Copernican
Revolution of the first Critiqueconsists
in the recognition of the knower's contribution to the knowledge of objects.
Instead of vainly striving to assure the
conformityof our ideas to objects, Kant
argued that we should rather concern
ourselves with the necessary conditions
of experienceto which objects must conform if they are to be known. In the second Critiquethe CopernicanRevolution
consists in the discovery that the object
of moral volition-the good-is determined by the will of the moral agent and
that the good does not determinethe will
of the moral agent. To be sure, it is by
referenceto the moral law that the will
freely determinesthe object of volition.
But the point of the CopernicanRevolution when applied to moral philosophyis
that the moral object, the good, must
conformto the conditionsof moral volition just as the theoretical object must
conform to the conditions of knowing.
Beck is surely to be congratulatedon
chaptersviii and x, in which he organizes
and comments upon large segments of
the second Critiquein terms of "a metaphysical deductionof the morallaw" followed by a "transcendentaldeductionof
pure practical reason." In two of the
most illuminating chapters in the Commentary Beck contributes substantially
and with great originality to our understanding of the various methods Kant
employedin the argumentsof the second
Critique.
Although generally sympathetic to
Kant's position, Beck wears no man's
collar, and on several occasions subjects
Kant's views to withering criticism. His
demonstration of the arbitrary way in
which Kant sometimeslabeledand thereby libeled other philosophers is both
amusing and devastating (p. 104).
For the most part I find myself in
agreementwith Beck's criticismsof Kant.
But his discussion and criticism of the
concept of the highest good seem to be
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
fundamentally in error. Whereas Beck
usually makes a sustained effort to determinewhat Kant is trying to say before
criticizinghis views, he seems impatient
and dogmatic in his insistence that the
concept of the highest good "is not important in Kant's philosophy for any
practical consequencesit might have, for
it has none except those drawn from the
concept of bonumsupremum"(p. 245).
Apparently, Beck believes that the concept of the highest good adds nothing to
the concept of moral perfection. "What
am I to do?" he asks, when "I do all in
my power ... to promote the highest
good" (p. 244). And he answers, I "simply act out of respect for the law, which
I already knew. I can do absolutely
nothing toward apportioning happiness
in accordancewith desert" (pp. 244-45).
In one sense, of course,action to promote
the highest good does not go beyond the
requirementsof the law for it is a requirement of the law. But in another
sense it does go beyond the law which,
as mere form of volition, says nothing
about what specificallyis to be done in
a concrete situation. And it is obvious,
Beck's denial notwithstanding, that in
rearing children, serving on juries, and
gradingpapersone tries to do and actually can do something"aboutapportioning
happiness in accordance with desert."
(It is the obviousness of this point that
bothers me; Beck must have taken this
point into consideration, though I do
not see how.)
I shall not attempt a full rebuttal of
Beck's position on the concept of the
highest good here; rather I propose to
demonstratehis mistake by showingconstructively in Section III the way in
which the concept of the highest good,
while followingfrom the morallaw, adds
content to the abstract form of the cate-
183
gorical imperativeand gives directionto
moralvolition. If this much canbe shown,
the importanceof the concept to Kant's
ethics will also have been shown.
III
Kant insisted that a careful delineation of the parts or details of a theory is
only the first step in a responsible inquiry. "But still another thing must be
attended to," he added, "which is of
a more philosophical and architectonic
character. It is to grasp correctly the
idea of the whole, and then to see all
those parts in their reciprocalinterrelations, in the light of their derivationfrom
the concept of the whole."8The idea of
the whole of the second Critiquein terms
of which we might see the interrelation
of all the parts is the one thing that
Beck's Commentarydoes not provide.
This lack is its only seriousfault and calls
for a sustained attempt at correction.
Unless I am mistaken, Kant's doctrine
of the good (of which the concept of the
highest good is the central part) is that
which binds together the various parts
of the second Critique.I suspect that it
was Beck's failure to consider Kant's
doctrine of the good systematically that
prevented him from seeing its importance as the unifying theme of the second
Critiqueand distorted his interpretation
of the concept of the highest good.
A. The centralityof thegoodin the Critique of Practical Reason.-It is easy to
overlookthe centrality of the doctrineof
the good in the second Critique. Like
Schopenhauer,we may be so greatly influenced by the Foundationswith its focus directed almost exclusively on the
purely formal aspects of ethics that the
startling shift of emphasisand organization in the second Critique is scarcely
noticed.9 Or like Beck, we may be to
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184
ETHICS
some extent preoccupiedwith the formal
schemes of organization, the section titles, and the rubrics of the second Critique.If we look beyond the titles to examine what Kant has actually written
about in the secondCritique,the centrality of the theory of the good becomes
apparent.
Kant opens the second Critiquewith
his proof that the experienceof obligation cannot be accountedfor nor the distinction between virtue and happiness
maintained unless the concept of the
good is derivedfromthe morallaw rather
than the reverse.10The theoremsof pure
practical reason present Kant's conclusions on this basic issue.
In chapter ii, "The Concept of an
Object of Pure Practical Reason," Kant
developsthe implicationsof his first chapter. Realizingthat every act of will must
have an object and denying that ethics
can be grounded on any object defined
prior to the law as an object of the will,
Kant is compelledto determinean object
for the will by means of the law itself.
That is why he is concernedin this chapter with the nature of the good as the
object of pure practical reason. Knowing
also that the object of pure practical
reason fails to meet the need of the will
for a materialobject in the act of volition
as long as it lacks sensibleinterpretation,
Kant offersan interpretationof it in terms
of the sensible world. In the section of
chapterii entitled "Ofthe Typic of Pure
Practical Judgment," Kant attempts to
show that the concepts of good and evil
can determine definite sensible objects
for the will-objects involving happiness
in proportionto virtue. They can do this,
however,only after they themselveshave
been determinedby reasonas the a priori
objects of the will. Kant hopes in this
way to have succeeded in providing a
genuine material object (the good) for
the act of volition without having defined
it prior to the concept of law.
Chapter iii concernsthe incentives of
the will and attempts to prove that the
good, as the object of the will, does not
determinethe will to action by virtue of
its material but by virtue of its form.
The will, it is argued, is still self-determined, and it is obligated to seek any
particularobject in question only by referenceto the law whichlegislatesin terms
of specific content provided by sensibility. Any pleasure that the will feels in
regard to an object to which it is obligated is found, therefore,to follow as the
effect of the law and not to precede the
law as the cause of its influence.Chapter
iii, thus, exhibitsthe consistencyand mutual support of the views presented in
chapters i and ii.
In Book II of Part I, entitled "The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason," Kant
faces the problem of unifying the elements of virtue and happinessin the concept of the highest good. Having ruled
out the good as the materialobject of the
will definedpriorto the law, Kant, nonetheless, must restore this object of volition subsequent to the establishment of
the law. Since the will must have an object,1"failure to re-establishthe good in
this fashionwould leave the will without
directionsin the performanceof its duty.
The law by itself defines the moral good
as virtue; sensibility, for its part, provides happiness as the natural good.12
But the law, in need of the material of
sensibility, cannot avail itself of the material of the natural good apart from the
re-establishmentof the unity of the good.
In this unity the sensible material of
happiness must be caught up in the
formalityof the law without the sacrifice
of the purity of the law. In orderto offer
a unitary, though material, interpretation of the object of pure practical rea-
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
son, Kant introducesthe concept of the
highest good. In so doing, Kant is confronted by an apparent antinomy that
threatens the possibility of the concept
of the highest good. Since happinessand
virtue are heterogeneousconcepts, they
cannot be united analytically in the concept of the highest good. Hence, they
must be united synthetically. Now since
the highest good is the practical object
of the will-an object that the will must
produce through its actions-the unity
of happinessandvirtue in the highestgood
must be causally derived. Either happiness must be the cause of virtue or virtue
the cause of happiness. Either alternative, however, seems impossible:the former because happinesscannot cause virtue, and the latter because the effects of
willing dependnot only on the intention
of the will but also upon the support of
the natural world. Kant resolves this
antinomy by showing that the latter alternative is not really impossible but,
rather, is capable merely of partial, contingent fulfilmentapart fromsupplementary mediation by God. The postulates
of pure practical reason are offered to
insure the possibility of the latter alternative and, thereby, the possibility of the
concept of the highest good.
In Part II of the second Critiquethe
methodology of pure practical reason is
discussed. In this context the incentives
of pure practical reason are once again
examined.This time, however, they are
discussed from the standpoint of their
effective employment in moral edification, that is, in the production of good
actions, rather than (as in chap. iii of
Part I, Book I) from the standpoint of
the theoretical difficulties involved in
their very existence.
There can be no question, then, of the
overwhelmingimportanceof the good in
the Critiqueof PracticalReason.The dis-
185
cussion of the good in its various aspects
as the object of pure practical reason
providesthe unifying theme for the work
as a whole. Comparativelyspeaking,concepts of duty and the categoricalimperative assume minor roles in the discussion
although they are fundamental components of the total theory of the good as
it is presented.
By presenting an extensive discussion
of the good in the second Critique,Kant
relates himself unequivocallyto the classical traditionin ethics. His theory of the
good shows clearly both his conformity
to, and his departurefrom,the traditional points of view. He reversedtraditional
procedureby establishingfirst the moral
law and then deriving the good from
it. This initial opposition to traditional
thought led to yet another-the assertion
of the heterogeneity of the good."3This
duality of the good confrontedKant with
a grave problem: that of providing for
the unity of these components. Fortunately, in addition to this problem,there
was the problemof determiningthe good
as the materialobject of the will by reference to the demand of the moral law.
Searchingfor the solutionto both of these
problems at once made Kant's problem
easier, and he found his solution in the
concept of the highest good as the synthesis of the dual aspects of the good.
Kant thereby reaffirmedthe importance
of this traditional concept to ethical
thought by making, albeit in a new and
different manner, the concept of the
highest good the object of the will.
But the mere existence of the concept
of the highest good as the object of the
will is not impressiveuntil it can be given
sufficientcontent to guide moralvolition.
In the next three subsections I shall
trace systematicallyKant's development
of this concept toward this end.
B. Perfection(themoralgood)as a corn-
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186
ETHICS
ponentof thehighestgood.-In full accord
with ethical tradition, Kant repeatedly
insisted that every volition must have an
object.'4He argued, further, that if the
categoricalimperativeis to have meaning
the will must be bound with necessity to
an object that is definedby practicalreason, that is, by reference to the moral
law. If some object of sensibility (however refined)were acceptedby the will as
the good and made into the object of
volition, the will would not stand under
a categorical obligation. Its relation to
any particular object would be conditioned in two ways: first, by the success
or failureof the act to achieve the object
held to be good, and second, by the relation of the will to the object, which would
be throughdesireand,hence,eitherwould
be contingent upon the continuation of
the feeling binding the object and the
will together or would be determinedby
natural causation. Since in categorical
obligation, however, there must be an
unconditionalrelation of the free will to
the object, the object to which the will is
obligated must be of unconditioned
worth. But the only unconditionalobject
that can be relatednecessarilyto the will
without conditioning the will and destroying its freedom is the good will itself."5The good will, therefore, is itself
the object of the will, and in its act of
volition it wills nothing moreor less than
its own perfection(freewilling) as an end
which is also a duty.'6
Kant believesthat in this way material
is added to the law, and an object is
determinedby purepracticalreason.The
law not only insists that for every act
of volition there must be an object, thereby stating a formaldemandfor a material
component in ethics; the law now also
projects a materialobject for itself in the
form of the embodimentof the law in a
good will. The will, at the behest of the
moral law, projects for itself the good as
an end which is also a duty. And this end
toward which the will must strive is its
own moral perfection. The will, that is,
must seek to attain virtue. Thus far I
am in complete agreement, I believe,
with Beck. He acknowledgesthe significance of this much of the concept of the
highest good, that is, the supremegood.
This conception of the object of pure
practical reason is, however, not an object for volition with material content.
We know now that the will must seek
to attain its own perfection, its virtue.
But what does this mean in terms of the
actual intention of the will? The intention of the will can be understood in
merely formalterms, as when one speaks
of a person's having a good moral disposition, for here we are concernedmerely with the intention to follow the law.
Furthermore,this moral dispositionis of
pre-eminent importance in the assessment of a person's character.Nevertheless, in an act of volition one does not
simply will a good disposition. Rather
one expressesa good dispositionby willing something more concrete. If, in consequence, the moral law is to be of any
use to a person in supplying the good
as the materialobject of volition, it must
be more instructive than thus far it has
been shown to be.
Kant himself is well awareof the need
to say more. He is quite ruthless in his
denunciationof the rationalisticethics of
He thinks their
Wolff and Baumgarten."7
first ethical principle, "Fac Bonum et
OmitteMalum,"to be classicin its ineptitude. In regard to this principle Kant
says,
The meaning of the proposition is simply, "it is
good that you should do what is good," which
is tautological. It tells us nothing about what is
good, but merely that we ought to do what we
ought to do."8
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
187
Then raisinghis sights to includethe field develop his reason and understanding,
of ethics in general, he adds,
and thereby to free himself from the
rudenesses
of the state of nature. Still
There is no branch of knowledge which so
abounds in tautological propositions as ethics, we must rememberthat Kant says that
offeringas the answer what was in fact the ques- one is to do all these things so that he
tion."9
shall be worthy of the humanity within
All these activities are carried out
him.
practice
so
folly
of
this
Kant felt the
to virtue. He must develop his
as
means
strongly that he says of some of his colfaculties
to
the point that he can live a
leagues:
moral
life.
He
is categorically obligated
. . . teachers are prone to believe that they have
to
raise
himself
out of the rudenessof nadone everything required of them when their
explanations and indications to their pupils are ture and animality,to becomeinstructed,
as if a medical man told a patient sufferingfrom and to develop his humanity wherebyhe
constipation that he ought to loosen his bowels sets ends for himself, because these atand to perspire freely and digest his food well.
arethe conditionsof his attainThis is just telling him to do what he wants to tainments
ment
of
moral
perfection.
know how to do. Such propositions are tautological rules of decision.20
Kant is obviouslyunwilling,therefore,to
leave the definitionof good as the object
of volition in this indefinitestate.
Can anything more definite be said
about the object towardwhich the moral
person must strive when he seeks his
moralperfection?Kant suggests: "It can
be nothing else than the cultivation of
one's own power (or natural capacity)
and also of one's will (moraldisposition)
to satisfy the requirementof duty in general.'"2'The last part of this explanation
merely repeats that the object of the will
is its own moral perfection; it is, therefore, of no help in addingmaterialsignificance to the object of pure practical reason. The first part, however, seems more
promising. Kant suggests that, in the
cultivation of his powers,man has a duty
to educate and refinehimself to the fullest extent possible. Reason commands
him to fulfil the potentialities of his rational nature so that he shall be worthy
of the humanity that is within him.22At
this point genuinematerialcontentseems
to be added to the object of volition. In
the processof willing his own perfection,
the person now wills to educate himself,
Moral goodness thus lies in the perfection,
not of the faculties, but of the will. But the
functional completeness of all our powers is
required in order that the dictates of the will
should be made operative. Perfection (of the
faculties) therefore, appertains to morality indirectly.23
But if this natural perfection of our pow-
ers is of value merely as a means to the
attainment of moral perfection by providing us with the conditions for living
morallives, then it cannot provide a material object of volition. A person educates himself and develops his humanity
so that the conditionsfor the exerciseof
his will are met. Once these conditions
are met, however,what then does he will
when he wills in a mannerbefitting a man
with a good moral disposition? What
does he will when he seeks moral perfection? An object of moral volition with
material content has not yet been given.
PerhapsKant does not regardthe perfection of one's faculties of mind and
body simply as a means to moral perfection. Perhapshe intends to argue,rather,
that one is obligatedto fulfilone's capacities because they are natural ends whose
fulfilmentis good in itself. We find Kant
saying occasionally that the cultivation
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ETHICS
of the powers of mind, soul, and body is
the end or goal of human existence.24If
this is Kant's view, then he is clearly in
possession of an object of volition with
material content. Under this new interpretation, one no longer wills the perfection of his natural faculties merely as a
means of the exercise of moral volition.
Having attained to the conditionsof moral volition already, one fulfils his duty
and attains moral perfection in part by
striving to fulfil his natural capacities.It
may thus be thoughtthat Kant (following
Aristotle,Wolff,Baumgarten,andothers)
attributes goodness to the perfection
of capacities simply because the perfection of these ends is good in itself.
This interpretation,however,does not
bear up under scutiny; it overlooks the
fact that, for Kant, the good is always
relatedto desire.The naturalgood is that
which satisfies the desires of individuals.
The moral good is that which satisfies
everyone.25Kant insists that "what we
call good [morallygood] must be, in the
judgement of every reasonableman, an
object of the faculty of desire, and the
evil must be, in everyone's eyes, an object of aversion.""In the third Critique,
Kant again insists that goodness,whether natural or moral, involves a reference
to the faculty of desire and a concern
for the real existence of the object that
is regardedas good.27If the object itself
arouses the faculty of desire, then it is
naturally good. If, however, the object
of desire is definedby the moral law and
presented to the faculty of desire as the
object it ought necessarilyto desire,then
the object is morallygood. But unless an
object is related to the faculty of desire
in one way or the other it cannot be good
in either sense. Kant notes no third way
by which an object can be related to the
faculty of desire. The perfectionof capa-
bilities, therefore, cannot be regardedas
good unlessit is either naturallygood, by
being essential to the fulfilmentof sensible needs and inclinations, or morally
good, by being demandedby the moral
law. It cannot be regardedas a third kind
of intrinsicgoodness;for unlessthe moral
law demands it, or sensible desire delights in it, the perfection of natural capacities does not stand in relation to the
faculty of desire at all. And apart from
some relation to the faculty of desire an
object cannot be good.
Kant cannot be interpreted to say,
however, that if one has no desire to develop his capacity to read and if reading
is not essential to the moral life, then
learningto read is not good. Though perhaps not immediately desirable, reading
may be an essential means to the fulfilment of something else which is desired.
Consequently, the cultivation of one's
capacity to read may be naturally good
in accordancewith a maxim of prudence
under the idea of happiness as the total
well-being of the individual.28But the
point is this: if the perfection of natural
capacitiesis to be good in any sense, this
perfection must be desired either indirectly or directly, or it must be a necessary object of the faculty of desire demanded by the moral law.29
Apart frommoralperfection,which we
have already discussed, perfection is related to man as a natural good and,
hence, as the object of desire according
to maximsof happiness.And most of the
talents and skills of which man is capable
are good, if at all, only as natural goods.
Kant's position on this subject is well
summarizedin his refutation of Baumgarten's view that the perfection of all
the natural ends of man is to be included
in the list of duties that we have toward
ourselves.Kant says of Baumgartenand
his theory:
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
He includes in his list all human perfections,
even those which relate to our talents. He speaks
of the perfection of all the powers of the soul.
On this argument logic and all the sciences
which go to perfect the understanding and satisfy our thirst for knowledge would need to be
included; but there is nothing moral in these.
Morality does not tell us what we ought to do
in order to become perfect in the skilled use of
our powers; any such precepts are merely pragmatic, they are rules of prudence for amplifying
our powers because this conduces to our welfare.30
Kant thus insists that unless our powers
and their cultivation are essential to the
fulfilmentof the morallaw, they are good
only as they contributeto the happiness
of man.
Nor can such perfections acquire a
distinct quality of goodness by being
groundedon the command of God. Unless a command of God is itself derived
from the moral law, it is not binding on
the will except by means of threats and
promises that concern the will's happiness. Consequently,the perfectionof talents which God might command would
be demandedeither upon moralgrounds,
and thereforebe morally good, or upon
groundsof sensiblewell-being,and hence
be naturally good.3"Again we see that
perfectiondoes not consitute a third kind
of goodness.
Once it is noted, however, that perfection is good only as a natural or as a
moral good, we see that it does not offer
us a sufficiently determinate object for
moral volition. As a moral good, perfection providesonly preliminaryobjects of
volition in terms of which the will attains
to the conditionsof significantmoral existence. (For example, moral perfection
directs the will to pay attention to the
first signs of an emergingconscience,and
to its nurture.)Once these conditionsare
met, however,moral perfection ceases to
be an instructive object of volition. As
189
a natural good, moreover, perfection is
groundedonly upon prudential maxims;
consequently, it can never be presented
as a necessary object of volition. Kant
has rightly said that there is nothing
moral in this notion of perfection. It
seems, therefore, that bonumsupremum
(virtue) cannot function as a sufficiently
determinate object of moral volition or
provide material content for it.
Before leaving this question we must
note, however, that Kant does not always hold to the position that the perfection of natural capacities cannot provide a necessaryyet concretely determinate object of volition. Unfortunately,
Kant occasionally does make this claim
at the expense of the consistency of his
theory of the good. In the Metaphysics
of Morals,while addressinghimselfto the
duties of a person toward himself, Kant
says that the cultivation of the natural powers of mind, soul, and body-as
means to all sorts of possible ends-is a
duty of man to himself. He must not
permit his talents to rust and atrophy
throughneglect, nor shouldhe be content
to leave his natural capacities undeveloped beyond their condition at birth.
This duty, accordingto Kant, is
not based on consideration of any advantage
which the cultivation of his faculties (for all
sorts of purposes) can procure for him. For this
cultivation might be advantageously dispensed
with in favor of the crudity of natural necessity
(according to Rousseauian principles). Rather, it
is a command of moral-practical reason and a
duty of man toward himself to cultivate his
faculties (of which one may be developed more
than another according to the variety of his
ends) and, from the practical standpoint, to be
a man fitted to the end of his existence.32
In this passage Kant does not urge on
man the cultivation of these powers as
a naturalgood. He admitswith Rousseau
that man might be better off in the rawness of the state of nature. On the other
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ETHICS
hand, we have noted that Kant does not
arguethat the perfectionof all these powers of mind, soul, and body is essential
to moralvolition. These are powers that,
when attained, are of use to man for a
variety of purposes.While some of them
may be of help in living a morallife, not
many of these powers nor a very great
refinementof them can be required for
purposes of morality, because the moral
life can be lived by commen men who
lack such refinements.Kant seems to be
arguing, therefore, that, apart from the
service of these powers to man's wellbeing and/or to his moral development,
their developmentis good and is morally
obligatory. As Kant puts it in this context, "as a rationalbeing he [man]necessarily wills that all his powers should be
developed."33
Kant thus put himself in the position
of advocating precisely the same view of
perfectionwhich he refuted when it was
advancedby Baumgarten.The very same
theory of perfection was rejected again
by Kant in the second Critiqueon the
grounds that it was based upon the determinationof a material object of volition prior to the moral law and consequently was incapable of relating itself
to the will as a duty.84Nevertheless, in
the passages cited in the precedingparagraph,Kant not only introducedthis material concept of perfection into his theory ad hoc; moreover, by insisting that
the attainment of such perfection is a
duty, he contradictedthe central thesis
of the Analytic of the second Critiquein
addition to many explicit statements on
the subject.
Since I am not interested in making
capital of such a contradictionbut hope,
rather, to suggest the systematic unity
of Kant's doctrine of the good, I dismiss
the few isolated passages in which Kant
introduces perfection of capacities as a
third sort of good (that is, as a material
object defined prior to the law that is
nonethelessbinding upon the will) as unintentional lapses back into the rationalistic ethics of Wolff and Baumgarten.35
Hence, in terms of the presentation of
Kant's systematic theory, we remain at
the point arrived at in the discussion of
the moralconcept of perfection.The only
object so far determined for the will is
that of moralperfection. Under the idea
of moralperfection,as an end which is also a duty, a personis obligatedto perfect
only those powers of mind and body that
are essential to the exerciseof moral volition.
C. Happiness (the natural good) as a
componentof the highest good.-At this
point Kant has gone as far as he can from
the side of the law alone in the determination of a materialobject of volition.36He
now confrontsan ethical paradoxat least
as serious as those which confrontedthe
Stoics and Epicureans and Socratesnamely, the paradoxof willing the willing
of nothing. Every action must have an
object or end. That end prescribed by
the moral law is the moral good, which
is the good will itself. Thus the will is
obligated to will willing itself (that is,
moral perfection) as its end. But if the
will is to be good, it must will something
in the act of volition. While the moral
law prescribes the conditions of willing
and sets these conditions before the will
as its object, these conditions cannot be
fulfilleduntil the will itself embodiesthese
conditionsas the form in an actual, concrete volition whose material (while subject to the law) must be acquiredthrough
sensibility, that is, throughthe faculty of
desire. If, therefore, the law is not extended to the condition of man, then the
law cannot provide a material object of
volition, and Kant cannot escape the
paradoxof willing the willing of nothing.
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THE HIGHEST GOOD iN KANT'S ETHICS
Kant's theory is well prepared, of
course,for the extension of reasonto the
conditionsof man since it has its foundation in the human situation. Kant builds
his ethics on the foundation of the experience of obligation, which is the experience, not of a pure rational being,
but of man, a rational-sensible being.
This is the experienceof the heterogeneity
of the good in which both the natural
good as the fulfilment of man's sensible
nature and the moral good as the fulfilment of man's rational nature are presupposed. Having recognizedthe fact of
man's sensibility from the outset-not
only as an essential part of his nature
but also as a condition of the experience
of obligation3-Kant, in keeping with
the foundationsof his theory, can extend
reason beyond the considerationof man
as a merely rational being to the limits
of man as both rational and sensible.
Kant doesnot stop, therefore,with perfection as the sole end which is also a
duty. He insists rather that one is likewise obligated to seek the happiness of
others as a second end which is also a
duty.38Men have happinessas their natural good, and happiness is defined as
that satisfaction taken in the fulfilment
of needs and inclinations.Kant observes:
"To be happy is necessarilythe desireof
every rational but finite being, and thus
it is an unavoidable determinant of its
faculty of desire."39Now as it is applied
in a specific volition, the moral law can
only prescribethe form of its own universality to which material, supplied by
the faculty of desire, must be added.
Since we are finite rationalbeings, we all
have happiness as the object of desire;
hence, we can introduce our own happiness as material content for our volition
if one condition is met-namely, if we
have included within the content and
structureof our volition the happinessof
191
others. We are morally obligated to seek
the happiness of others because we, in
addition to being finite, sensible beings,
who naturally and invariably seek our
own happiness, are also rational beings,
who are constrainedto act accordingto
the universal demand of the moral law,
which constrains our will to pursue the
happinessof others as the priorcondition
of the moral right to pursue our own.
Kant reasonsas follows:
The law that we should further the happiness
of others arises not from the presupposition that
this law is an object of everyone's choice but
from the fact that the form of universality,
which reason requires as condition for giving to
the maxim of self-love [personal happiness] the
objectivity of law, is itself the determining
ground of the will.40
The reason why I ought to promote the happiness of others is not because the realization of
their happiness is of consequence to myself
(whether on account of immediate inclination
or on account of some satisfaction gained indirectly through reason), but solely because a
maxim which excludes this cannot also be present in one and the same volition as a universal
law.4'
As finite, rational,yet sensiblebeings,we
naturally and necessarily desire to seek
our own happiness;yet this is never possible in accordancewith law unless it is
on the condition of our seeking the happiness of others. We do not necessarily
care for others. As far as our own desires
are concerned, we may have contempt
for the welfare of others. But we can
never will an object accordingto a universal maxim unless, in the determination of that maxim, considerationis given to the fulfilment of the happiness of
others.
Now a material object of volition that
can inform and direct the will in the act
of volition is supplied. And yet, remarkably, this material stands under the determinationof law becauseit is a demand
of the law and not of inclinationthat one
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ETHICS
must seek the happiness of others. It is
only the law with its demand of universality that insists one is wrong to desire
others to further his interests (which is
a desireof all men) unless he at the same
time furthers their interests. Unless a
person also wills the interests of others
he has no right,no justificationunderthe
law, for having others will his. But if a
man has no respect for the law and
chooses to disregard its demand, he is
certainly able and even inclined to have
others seek his interest while he totally
disregardstheirs. He may find it is prudent to hand out a favor here and a favor
there in order to get what he wants. In
this case, however, he is bargainingand
gives only in order to receive something
in return. But when he considers his
needs and wants as a sensiblebeing under
the jurisdictionof the law of his rational
nature, he must forego his desires either
to exploit others, or to trade advantageouslywith them,or to ignoretheirneeds
altogether. For he cannot rationally will
the attainment of the natural good for
himself except underthe conditionof his
worthinessto do so-except, that is, under the conditionthat he will the attainment of the natural good universallyaccordingto the demand of the law. Thus
he must seek the happiness of others as
a condition of his worthinessto seek his
own happiness which he in fact desires
to seek. Hence we see that it is not his
concernfor happiness that leads him to
considerthe happiness of others.On the
contrary,his concernfor virtue,thatis, for
the worthinessto be happy, motivateshim
to do so. He pursueshis own moralperfection by pursuingthe happinessof others.
In admitting the content of sensibility
into the maxim of the will, the law does
not resign its claim to determinethe object of the will. It continues to impose
its form upon the materialof the faculty
of desire. As a consequencethe material
object of volition, in spite of its sensible
content, is not defined prior to the law,
but is defined by the law itself. Apart
from the law, any materialof the faculty
of desire is merely a desired end. Only
after the imposition of the form of universality upon the content of desire does
that content (now drastically altered)
become the good as the material object
of moral volition.
D. The unity of perfectionand happiness in the highestgood.-In presenting
our own perfectionand the happinessof
others as distinct ends which are also
duties, Kant clearly approacheshis goal
of the determination of the object of
volition by reference to the law. The
goal is not reached,however,until he can
show the unity of these two ends in a
single object that is a duty. There are
many questionsregardingthe relation of
these ends to one another that are left
unansweredby the statement that one
gives expressionto his moral perfection
by seeking the happiness of others. This
need not be the only way or even a completely satisfactoryway of attaining virtue. For example, since a person recognizes that his own worthinessto be happy
depends upon his seeking the happiness
of others, he must wonder whether his
duty to pursue the happiness of others
is not to some extent conditionedby their
worthinessto receive it. Thus the will is
left in great confusion apart from the
definition of an object that can in some
way unify these two morally necessary
ends. But in reassertingthis need for a
unifiedend or object of volition, we must
keep clearly in mind that we are not discussinga need of the law. The moral law
does not have its foundationin some object, nor is it incomplete as the law of
moralityif it fails to determinean object.
The concernfor the determinationof an
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
object stems from a human need.42It is
the need of the humanwill for an object
in the act of volition that forces Kant to
this considerationof ends and to the extention of the law beyond its own limits
alone to the condition of man.
Once this extension is made, however,
we see that these ends of perfection and
happinessof othersare not to be regarded
as separate and distinct objects of volition. Rather they are united in the duty
"to try to effect with all one's power the
highest good possiblein the world (which
in the totality of the worldjoins together
with purest morality, universal happiness accordingto morality)."43 This obligation-to "makethe highest good possible in the worldyour own final end"44Kant notes,
is a synthetic proposition a priori which is introduced by the moral law. This extension is possible because of the moral law's being taken in
relation to the natural characteristics of man,
that for all his actions he must conceive an end
over and above the law (a characteristic which
makes man an object of experience).45
193
or "complete" or "perfect" (consummcatun) [vollendete].The supreme good "is
the unconditionalcondition,i.e. the condition which is subordinateto no other
(originarium),"48
while the complete or
perfect good is "that whole which is no
part of a yet larger whole of the same
kind (perfectissimum). It is indeedtrue
that "virtue (as the worthiness to be
happy) is the supremeconditionof whatever appears to us to be desirable and
thus of all our pursuit of happiness and
consequentlythat it is the supremegood
[das oberste Gut]."50Nevertheless, Kant
denies that virtue, as the supremegood,
is the entire and perfect good [das ganzeund
vollendeteGut]as the object of the faculty of
desireof rationalfinite beings. In orderto be
this, happinessis also required,and indeednot
in the partialeyes of a personwho makeshimself his end but even in the judgmentof an
impartialreason,whichin generalregardspersons in the worldas ends-in-themselves.5'
It is clear from this that the moral good,
virtue, is by no means the highest good.
It is rather the supremecondition of the
highest good, and, therefore, Kant says
"it is the supremegood [dasobersteGut]."52
But happiness,as the naturalgood, must
be added to virtue in orderto realize the
highest good. For, Kant insists:
Because of man's sensible as well as rational nature, his obligationmust be presented in terms of action in the sensible
world and not merely in terms of the
form of the action itself, as mere autonomy or virtue. The concept of the highest the highest good [das hIchsteGut]means the
good enunciates a unity of the heteroge- whole [dasGanze],the perfectgood [dasvollenneous components of virtue and happi- deteGut]whereinvirtue is always the supreme
ness by means of an extension of the law good[dasobersteGut],beingthe conditionhaving
of man's rationalnature to the needs and no conditionsuperiorto it."
desires of his sensible nature. It enunThe highest good, is, therefore, the
ciates, therefore, a unity of the moral synthesis of the moral good and the natgood and the natural good.
ural good. And since the moral good is
The concept of the highest good, ac- the supreme condition of this unity, we
cording to Kant, "is a synthesisof con- find that in the fulfilment of the highest
cepts,"46and it must never be confused good happinessmust be present in exact
with the "supreme good."47When the proportion to morality. "Inasmuch as
term "highest" [h1chste]is used in the virtue and happinesstogether constitute
phrase "the highest good," it can mean the possessionof the highest good for one
either "supreme" (supremum) [oberste] person,"54as we saw in section B, "and
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ETHICS
happinessin exact proportionto morality
(as the worth of a personand his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that [the
highest good] of a possible world."55An
individualrecognizesa defect in his moral goodness by his transgressionof the
law, and a defect in his natural goodness
by unrequited needs and desires. But a
person recognizesa defect in the highest
good for him in two different wayseither by his failure to attain virtue,
which is the supreme condition of his
highest good as his worthinessto be happy, or by the existenceof a disproportion
between his virtue and happiness. The
highest good of the individual is never
attained so long as he is deficient in virtue. Nevertheless, taking the degree of
his moralattainment for what it is, there
is also a violation of his highest good if
he is not happy in exact proportion to
the degree of his actual virtuous attainment. Under this second criterion for
judgingthe highest good for an individual, the highest good can be lacking either
because of an excess or a deficiency of
happiness in relation to the virtuous attainment of the person in question.
Oncethe highest good is recognizedby
an individualas his obligation, he recognizes that an integral part of his attainment of virtue consists in his striving
after the attainment of a proportionbetween his happinessand his virtue. Thus,
if he recognizesthat he is not worthy of
the happinesshe enjoys, he may find that
he is morally obligated, in terms of the
supreme good, to renounce this happiness. The criminalwho turns himself in
can be seen to pursue both the moral
good and the highest good for he establishes that proportionbetween his virtue
and his happinesswhich is demandedby
the highest good and by the moral good,
as its supreme condition. In the act of
turninghimself in, the criminalincreases
his worthinessto be happy in the future,
albeit perhaps insufficiently to permit
a suspended sentence. Another man, of
course, may lack happiness commensurate with his virtue. Such a man, in striving to attain the highest good, has an
indirect duty to increase his own happiness.56
It is not morally possible, of course,
for this man, in the name of his duty to
promotethe highest good, to compromise
his virtue in order to increasehis happiness or in orderto make it commensurate
with his virtue. Because the attainment
of virtue is the supremecondition of the
highest good, to compromiseone's virtue
-regardless of the disparityof happiness
to virtue-involves acting contrary to
one's duty to promote the highest good.
By the slightest compromiseof his virtue,
the erstwhilevirtuousman may find himself no happier than before; but he will
certainlyfind himselfless than worthy of
whatever happiness he does have. The
virtuous but unhappy man must simply
recognize that the moral law does not
promise happiness but only the worthiness of it. Since he has acquired a right
to happiness,he must recognizethat the
unhappiness in his life is an affront to
reason.As a rationalbeing he must strive
to remedy it. Failing this, the virtuous
man may have a rational faith that this
affront will be remediedby God. But as
a virtuous man in pursuit of the attainment of the highest good, he must be
prepared to endure steadfastly in his
virtue without benefit of the happiness
which he deserves.57
These observations pertain merely to
the idea of the highestgood for individual
persons. When we generalize this basic
conception of the relation of virtue to
happinessto include the totality of finite
rational beings, we attain to the idea of
the highest good possible in the world,
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
an idea in terms of which the happiness
of all finite rational beings is sought under the sole limitation of their worthiness
to be happy. Thus under the idea of the
highest good, one is not merelyconcerned
to achieve virtue and to seek happiness
proportionateto virtue in his own life;
he is obligated in addition to strive for
the realizationof happinessin proportion
to virtue in the lives of all men. Furthermore, he is to strive for this goal with
the realizationthat it is likewisethe obligatory goal of all men's efforts. Although
this task is God-likein dimension,it does
not totally transcend the powers of citizens and legislators.
There are many tantalizing questions
concerningthe nature of the highest good
and its function in Kant's ethics that
cannot be resolved or even consideredin
a discussion of this scope. Nevertheless,
a few conclusionsof importance for the
interpretationof Kant's second Critique
and his system of ethics can be drawn.
First, the concept of the highest good is
of central importance in Kant's ethics.
Kant recognizedthat the concept of the
good-as a material, determinateobject
of volition-is necessaryin order to give
concrete direction to moral volition. He
likewise recognized that the good must
be determined by the moral law if it is
to be categoricallyobligatoryon the will.
Therefore,he soughtto provide,by means
of the applicationof the morallaw to the
condition of man, material content for
the good as this necessaryobject. Second,
in attempting to provide material content for the good, Kant showedthat mor-
195
al perfection is an end which is also a
duty. Moral perfection, however, does
not provide a sufficiently determinate
content for the good. Therefore, and
third, Kant demonstratedthat the happiness of others is an end which is also
a duty. Fourth, in recognitionof the difficulty of determining the relation of
these two ends as duties, Kant proposed
to unify perfectionand happinessin one
material object determinedformally by
the moral law as applied to the material
of human desire.The unitary, necessary,
material object of volition thus determined is the highest good. Kant's second
Critique and technical theory must be
interpretedin light of these four conclusions if they are to be correctly understood.
Much more remains to be said about
the concept of the highest good, and
many of the criticisms raised against it
by Beck are doubtlesslysound;nevertheless, the basic importanceof the concept
of the highest good, both for ethical practice and for the understandingof the second Critique, cannot be denied. Beck's
failure,in my opinion, to accordthe concept of the highest good its proper significance does not compromise in any
serious way, however, the merits of his
Commentary.It is a book "which would
necessarilybe desired by a rational man
whose reason controlledhis desires or at
least controlledthe choicehe madeamong
his desiderata" (p. 138). This means, as
any Kant scholar can tell you, the book
is good!
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS
NOTES
1. A discussion of A Commentaryon Kant's Critique of Practical Reason by Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. xvi+
308. Page numbers cited in parentheses in the text
refer to this work.
2. In order to simplify references I have abbreviated the titles of the books cited as shown below.
I have usually cited both the German text and an
English translation (in parentheses). Unless otherwise indicated translations are my own.
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196
ETHICS
KgS, Kant's gesammelteSchriften, ed. K6niglich
Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
A, Anthropologie,KgS, Vol. VII
Gr, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in
KgS, Vol. IV
KdpV, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in KgS,
Vol. V
KdrV, Kritik derreinen Vernunft,in KgS, Vol. III
KdU, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in KgS, Vol. V
MdS, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in KgS, Vol. VI
Rel, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzender blossen
Vernunft, im KgS, Vol. VI
Theorie und Praxis, Ober den Gemeinspruch:Das
mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur
die Praxis, in KgS, Vol. VIII
ViiE, Eine Vorlesung Kants iber Ethik, ed. Paul
Menzer
Abbott, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and
Other Writings on the Theory of Ethics, trans. T. K.
Abbott
Beck, Critique of Practical Reason and OtherWritings in Moral Philosophy, trans. L. W. Beck
CoAJ, Critiqueof A estheticJudgement, trans. J. C.
Meredith
Greene, Religion within the Limits of Reason
Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and H. Hudson
Kemp Smith, A Translation of Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith
LoE, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield
Paton, The Moral Law or Kant's Groundworkof
the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton
3. MdS, p. 226.
4. KdrV, A97, B130-32, B180-81, B561-63, passim.
5. Ibid., A534, B562.
6. H. J. Paton, The CategoricalImperative (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1946), p. 215.
7. This essay is a part of the Introduction to the
second edition of the Greene and Hudson translation
of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,
published by Harper & Bros., and Open Court.;
8. KdpV, pp. 10-11 (Beck, p. 124).
9. The only difference that Schopenhauer noticed
between the Foundations and the second Critique
was an increase in garrulity and diffusion of thought.
Thus he writes: "The Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft contains in its essentials the same material as
the above mentioned Grundlegung; only the latter
has a more concise and rigorous form, while in the
former the subject is handled with greater prolixity,
interspersed with digressions, and even padded with
some pieces of moral rhetoric to heighten the impression (A. Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, trans.
A. B. Bullock [New York: Macmillan Co., 19151),
p. 26.
10. KdpV, Part I, chap. i.
11. Ibid., pp. 34, 35 (Beck, pp. 143, 146).
12. The distinction between the natural good and
the moral good follows Kant's usage quite closely.
He says, for example, in theAnthropologie,pp. 277 ff.,
"Die beiden Arten des Gutes [sind] has physische
und moralische." The physical good is found to be
happiness and the moral good is found to be virtue.
Together they constitute the highest good (das hdckste Gut) as the moral-physical good (das hdchste
moralisclh-physicheGut). I have deviated from Kant's
terminology only to the extent of substituting the
term "natural" for the term "physical." This alteration seems justified since, for Kant, "happiness"
refers to the satisfaction of all desires, mental and
spiritual as well as physical. Hence, to refer to happiness as the "physical good" seems mistakenly to
restrict its meaning.
13. See my "The Copernican Revolution in Ethics: The Good Re-examined," Kant-Studien, Vol.
LI, No. 1 (October, 1959).
14. KdpV, pp. 34, 35 (Beck, pp. 145, 146).
15. In being related with necessity to free willing
(the good will) as its object, the will is conditioned
only by that which is itself without any condition;
the act of willing which accords with law (and is
thus fully autonomous) is, by virtue of its universality, beyond all conditions.
16. MdS, pp. 385 if. (Abbott, pp. 296 ff.).
17. When Kant lectured on ethics, he used as
his texts two works by A. G. Baumgarten, Initia
philosophiae practicae primae and Ethica philosopizica. The German universities were required by state
law to use textbooks in all courses, which helps to
explain why Kant would use works by Baumgarten
while disagreeing with him so completely (LoE, p.
xi; see F. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant, His Life and
Doctrine, trans. J. E. Creighton, and A. Lefevre
[New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902], Part I,
p. 3).
18. ViYE,p. 31 (LoE, p. 25).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 31 (pp. 25-26). Note also: "A practical proposition is tautological, when no performance
can follow from it" (ibid., p. 177 [p. 141]).
21. MdS, p. 386 (Abbott, p. 297).
22. Ibid.
23. VaE, p. 32 (LoE, p. 26).
24. MdS, pp. 444 ff.; cf. Gr, p. 423 (Paton, p. 90).
25. ViiE, p. 30 (LoE, p. 24).
26. KdpV, pp. 60-61 (Beck, p. 169) (my italics).
Beck's discussion of this point is instructive; see
his Commentary,pp. 138-39.
27. KdU, p. 209 (CoAJ, p. 48).
28. Gr, pp. 415-16 (Paton, p. 83).
29. For this reason I think it is more in keeping
with Kant's thought to stress the two-fold division
of the good into the moral good and the natural
good than to stress the three-fold division into bonitas problematical,bonitas pragmatic, and bonitas
moralis. The lattter division corresponds as Beck
shows to "the three kinds of imperative" (Commentary, p. 131). But both bonitas problematica and
bonitas pragmatic belong to the class of natural
goods.
30. Vi7E, p. 176 (LoE, p. 141).
31. KdpV, p. 41 (Beck, p. 152).
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THE HIGHEST GOOD IN KANT'S ETHICS
32. MdS, pp. 444-45.
33. Gr, p. 423 (Paton, p. 90).
34. KdpV, pp. 40 if. (Beck, pp. 151 ff.).
35. There is no goodness other than moral or
natural goodness on which Kant could ground an
obligation to seek the perfection of one's capacities.
If one were to adapt Kant's theory to include the
cultivation of all powers of mind, soul, and body as
good in a sense neither moral nor natural, one would
have to do so by relating these ends to desire. This
could be done most easily by developing the implications of reason itself as the faculty of desire. Reason
does have ends. It is a practical faculty that seeks
the embodiment of ideas and ideals. The ideas of
the Soul, the World, and Good as well as the ideas
of Freedom, God, and Immortality are among those
ends that reason poses for itself as tasks. The realization of these ideas constitutes the desire of reason,
and, hence, these ideas may be said to be good. Now,
if one were to show that all the powers of mind, soul,
and body were essential to these ends of reason, he
could perhaps present a theory of the goodness of
the perfection of these powers that was distinct
either from moral goodness or natural goodness. The
goodness of this perfection, however, would still be
conditioned by the relative goodness of the ends of
reason. At this point one might have to conclude
that the goodness of any particular end of reason is
subject to final evaluation in terms of the highest
good as the canon of pure reason. From this standpoint, however, all the ideas and ideals of reason are
to be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the
highest good in which moral goodness and natural
goodness are combined, the former providing the
supreme condition of the latter. Consequently, all
the ends of reason, save the highest good itself (as
reason's final goal), would be evaluated in terms of
a concept of the good that simply unified the demands of both the natural good and the moral good.
Thus the perfection of talents would be good either
morally, as means to the attainment of the supreme
condition of the highest good, or naturally, as a part
of the completion of the highest good. We would still
be at a loss, therefore, to point out a third sort of
goodness constituted by the perfection of natural
capacities.
36. One must not make the mistake of supposing
that Kant was opposed to there being a material
object of volition. He knew that there must be one
for moral practice, but he insisted that the obligation
to will a material object could never stem from the
object itself. The obligation stems from the law.
37. KdpV, pp. 31, 91-92 (Beck, pp. 143, 197-98).
Although I do not agree fully with Beck's discussion
of the degrees of purity in Kant's ethical theory, I
find his views singularly instructive (see Commentary, p. 54).
197
38. MdS, pp. 387, 393 if. (Abbott, pp. 298, 303
if.).
39. KdpV, p. 25 (Beck, p. 136); cf. KdpV, pp.
60-61 (Beck, p. 170). See also Gr, p. 415 (Paton,
p. 83): ". . . there is one purpose which they not only
can have, but which we can assume with certainty
that they all do have by a natural necessity-the
purpose, namely, of happiness ... a purpose which
we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be
present in every man because it belongs to his very
being" (my italics from "a purpose" through "being").
40. KdpV, p. 34 (Beck, p. 146).
41. Gr, p. 441 (Paton, p. 109). It is very important to note that this doctrine, though not developed
to any extent in the Foundations, is nonetheless present there. Thus Kant does partially prepare-even
in his formal treatise on ethics-for the material
application of the moral law.
42. Theorie und Praxis, p. 279. The "concept of
duty need have no special purpose as a foundation,
rather another purpose enters for the will of man";
cf. Rel, p. 4 (Greene, p. 4).
43. Theorie und Praxis, p. 279.
44. Rel, p. 7 (Greene, p. 7 n.).
45. Ibid.; cf. Kdp V, pp. I10 if. (Beck, pp. 214 ff.),
and MdS, pp. 384 if. (Abbott, pp. 295 ff.).
46. KdpV, p. 113 (Beck, p. 217).
47. Paton seems to have overlooked this point
for he holds that Kant asserted that the good will
is the highest good. See Paton, op. cit., pp. 41 ff.
48. KdpV, p. 110 (Beck, pp. 214-15).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 110 (p. 215). Kant's italics.
51. Ibid., pp. 110-11 (p. 215). Kant's italics. (See
KdrV, B841 iff. [Kemp Smith, pp. 640 ff.].)
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid. It is important to note that Kemp
Smith mistakenly translated "das h6chste Gut" as
"the supreme good" (KdrV, B842 [Kemp Smith, p.
64]). He thereby contributed to the confusion of
the highest good with the supreme good.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. I hope this discussion at least suggests the
answer to Beck's question, What am I to do to
promote the highest good? (Commentary,p. 244.)
57. For my discussion of the highest good as a
basis for an argument for the existence of God see
"The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good
as the Canon of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy,"
University of Texas Studies in Literature and Lan guage, Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer, 1959), and "Kant's
Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and
Transcendent," Philosophical Review, Vol. LXVIII,
No. 4 (October, 1959).
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