Nationalism, ideological identification and solidarity

Nationalism, ideological identification and solidarity: the
attitudinal sphere
By Enric Martínez-Herrera (CEPC) and Inés Calzada (CSIC)
c/e: [email protected]
Versión 11/11/09
NB: DRAFT/BORRADOR
Comments most welcome
For citation queries, please ask at the e/m above
Presentation at CANS meeting. Brussels, 12-13 November 2009
1
Nationalism, ideological identification and solidarity: the attitudinal
sphere1
Enric Martínez-Herrera (CEPC) and Inés Calzada (CSIC)
Are nationalists progressive? Which nationalists are progressive and which are not?
During the last decade and a half some prominent political theorists have advanced an
attractive blend of nationalism with social-democratic and liberal ideas. One of their
most appealing yet not unproblematic or uncontroversial claims is that national
identification contributes to strengthen solidarity and support for re-distributive policies.
Notwithstanding conceptual and theoretical difficulties to match progressive and
nationalist tenets, however, different kinds of empirical evidence show that, more often
than not, nationalism is right-wing. In this paper we assess the relationship between
national identification, on the one hand, and left-right self-identification and economic
solidarity, on the other hand.
The analysis of the relationship between national identification and attitudes
towards solidarity and redistribution allows us to go beyond citizens’ perception of
themselves as progressive or conservative. Individuals’ self-perceptions as progressive
or conservative may well be flawed by their perceptions of the social desirability of
these political labels in their socio-political milieu. In this sense, the study of the
attitudes towards solidarity and redistribution affords the possibility not to take for
granted individuals generic ideological self-placements and to test their solidarity in
different instances of support to redistribution. In addition to it, this study compares the
orientation towards ideological identification and solidarity at different instances of
nationalism. In particular, by regarding Spanish, Catalan and Galician nationalisms, it
weights the solidarity credentials of both statewide nationalism and minority
nationalism.
1
The attitudinal data stem from a survey conducted in May 2009 in
This communication and the social survey it is based upon have been produced within the frame of the
project “Citizenship after the Nation State?” (CANS), supported by Spain’s Ministry of Science and
Innovation (SEJ2007-30242-E/SOCI) and the European Science Foundation.
2
representative samples of citizen’s living in three Spanish autonomous regions –
Catalonia, Galicia and Castilla-La Mancha.
The paper begins by engaging different claims according to which nationalism
has beneficent effects on solidarity and redistribution and by specifying some widely
accepted definitions of the concepts “nationalism”, “national identification” and “left
and right”. In particular, it pays attention to some basic postulates of the so-called
“liberal nationalism” stream in contemporary political theory. The paper then turns to
empirically analyze the relationship between individuals’ national identifications and
their identifications with the generic labels “left and right” on a widely used linear scale.
Next the paper evaluates more specific solidarity attitudes – solidarity towards people in
need, irrespective of their geographical location; and, subsequently, solidarity between
different regions of the same country.
Solidarity, redistribution and “good nationalism” – theoretical claims
The intellectual reputation of nationalism since World War II has been quite bad.
Nationalism has not only spurred the mass wars that occurred since the end of
nineteenth century – in which tens of millions of men and women would die – but also
genocide, mass deportation and other mass crimes committed in both wartime and
peacetime from the Modern age.
Although the struggles of the 1950-60s de-
colonization movements partially enhanced its reputation, this improvement soon
vanished again because of nationalist violence in many of the new and old states. The
1990s witnessed, however, a two-fold scenario of intellectual revisiting and debate on
the subject.
On the one hand, a nationalist revival – including increasing racism
towards international migrants and their offspring – in Western Europe and, overall,
civil wars in former Yugoslavia revived fears about nationalism. On the other, a wave
of political thought has made the case that nationalism has a virtuous side.
Some authors claim that nationalism not only justifies and generates zero-sum
game conflict between groups but also that it can foster genuine cooperation within
them. They claim that liberalism it not only compatible with liberal values but also that
it helps attain goals of social justice pursued by left liberalism and social-democracy.
One of their key theoretical assumptions is that nationalism and the resulting national
identity foster citizens’ solidarity and support for national re-distributive policies. By
3
making this claim, they have managed to theoretically bring together two current
concerns in political and social theory – the rediscovery of the community and changes
in welfare stare regimes.
Unfortunately, though, there has been little systematic
empirical evidence to support this claim, so this paper aims at empirically testing it –
the aim of this study is to empirically evaluate it.
During the last decade and a half, there have been different theoretical attempts
to revisit nationalism, looking back for some lost communitarian or republican ethical
tenets compatible with liberal values and institutions. These attempts have taken place
against the background of a rediscovery of community in political science and
sociology during the 1990s – some of the most celebrated books of that decade were
about social trust and social capital (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Putnam 1993, 2000). The
theoretical production of “liberal-nationalists” such as Yael Tamir and David Miller, has
gone quite further – they have sought to rescue the community by means of nationalism
and national identification. A common theme shared by the most prominent proponents
of liberal nationalism is, to borrow Tamir’s (1993) words, “distributive justice.”
“Liberal-nationalists” sympathise with nationalism while maintaining some form of
liberal stance, and they contend that national identification is necessary for safeguarding
citizens’ solidarity at the national level.
Moreover, changes of the welfare state since the late 1970s have raised much
concern in Western Europe, and Tamir and Miller put national identification to the fore
as an potential remedy. Welfare state and national identification seem to influence each
other in a non-recursive, reciprocal manner. On the one hand, the state has used the
welfare system to gain loyalty and a sense of national solidarity from citizens
(Hobsbawm, 1992; Keating, 2001; McEwen, 2002; Moreno and McEwen, 2005). On
the other, however, it is often argued that social consent towards distributive and
redistributive policies has one of its stronger bases in national identification. Certainly,
it has also been expected that support for redistribution could flow from a universalistic
sense of justice – regardless of national borders – but this alternative seems to be less in
vogue these days.
The main hypothesis argues that national identification lends support for
national solidarity. It links both variables through a sense of “common good” and
“mutual responsibility”. As a matter of fact, distributive and re-distributive policies
entail an essential, at least latent conflict, since some individuals or social sections must
4
pay the costs of improving the situation of other individuals or sections. Yet these
policies, in special within the frame of a welfare system, often also entail a coordination
problem, insofar as most individuals and sections could be made better-off – especially
in the long-run. Noticeably, though, many individuals or sections could still be tempted
to escape the costs, thus leading to a problem of lack of cooperation.
The argument relating national identification and solidarity goes through the
notions of common good – taking various meanings – and mutual responsibility. The
analogy with the family that some authors put forward (Miller, 1996; Keating, 2001)
can be a useful departure point, since it easily evokes both ideas, and it can be
interpreted from either a strictly egoistic viewpoint or a less egoistic, perhaps even
altruistic one. Yet different meanings of the term “common good” (Dahl, 1989) and a
couple of different understandings of the welfare state (Keating, 2001) must be
considered altogether.
The first two meanings of the term “common good” as applied in relation to
national solidarity are neatly individualistic and selfish. First, common good is seen as
that which is good for all the members of, or a large majority in, a society. Here
national redistribution is understood as a “mutual insurance plan” where reciprocity is
expected, and the fact that this plan exists is likely to benefit most members of the
society (Keating, 2001). Thus, national identification helps coordinate individuals with
a latent shared egoistic interest.
Second, nationwide redistribution can be seen as solely making some sections of
the society better-off, whereas many sections and single members are unlikely to
directly benefit. If the individual believes that she shares a “common interest” (Keating,
2001), “common venture”, “enterprise” or “project” (Taylor, 1996), even “common
fate” with her nation fellow-members – as nationalism often induces individuals to
perceive themselves – then she can still think in egoistic rational terms that she also
benefit from her fellow nationals’ improvement, since she is indirectly affected by their
successes and failures (Tamir, 1993). Thus, “common good” is perceived by the selfish
individual in terms of such an interdependence – some degree of improvement of her
fellow-nationals may also benefit herself.
The third sense of “common good” is no more individualistic, but organicist
instead. A society or nation is seen as an entity with its own autonomous life –
independent to a degree from the individuals forming it – and the common good is
5
referred to as its well-being. Since individuals can perceive a “sense of national interest”
(Brown et al., 1998), now the distributive and re-distributive policies are intended to
keep or improve the well-being of the social organism. Selfish individuals’ calculations
are possible insofar as they believe that the well-being of the organism is also good for
its cells – without denying that non-strictly egoistic sacrifices are possible too.
The analogy with the family also has the connotation that national identification
carries with it a feeling of “mutual responsibility” (Keating, 2001), a “fellow-feeling
and mutual concern” (Parekh, 2002), or a “sense of bonding among the people working
together” (Taylor, 1996). The analogy is of a limited scope, since members of the nation
do not know each other personally, nor do they share most daily life experiences.
However, it is assumed that from the fact of identifying with the same social unit – the
“nation” – individuals identify also with each other with comparable strength, and even
more, they develop an affection for each other. This is indeed a much debatable
assumption (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Abizadeh, 2002), but it works to rhetorically
legitimate the “distributive justice” understanding of re-distributive policies (Tamir,
1993). However, were it true, affection for fellow-nationals would inspire a sense of
moral responsibility, obligation towards them, similar– though less intense – to the
feelings within a Western ideal family.
Therefore, from any of those arguments we should expect that
the stronger the individual identifies with her nation, the more supportive will be
to redistributive policies.
There is little empirical research on this matter. Previous empirical analyses
have grounded on a public opinion survey conducted in England and Scotland – the
1997 British General Election Study (Martínez-Herrera 2004, 2009). This survey had
two main virtues. First, the survey included a large variety of indicators intended to
measure a so-called ‘British national sentiment’ as well as attitudes to the welfare state.
The “British national sentiment” was tapped through a wide array of questions
comprising exclusionary forms of nationalism as well as softer questions on national
identification. In turn, support for the welfare state was tapped through support for
policies of public health, public education and financial assistance to people in need. A
6
second virtue was the fact that Great Britain was the country that David Miller bore in
mind when prising the allegedly progressive virtues of “liberal nationalism”.
As a matter of fact, however, empirical findings disagreed with theoretical
claims.
Even if controlling by important variables as left-right identification and
household income, citizens showing a greater reluctance towards any influence of other
countries in British politics as well as holding an uncritical British pride, and citizens
showing the stronger British identification and stronger wish to keep Great Britain
united, tend to be the least supportive to welfare state schemes. In other words, contrary
to liberal nationalist theoretical expectations, the effects on solidarity of both soft
national identification and tougher nationalist views were found to be negative.
Therefore, Miller’s and Tamir’s hypothesis did not hold in Great Britain. The current
piece research supplies a new test for the hypothesis in a different setting and affords
the possibility to operationalize national identification as referring to both the state
political community and sub-state level national projects.
Basic concepts
Before testing the above-mentioned hypothesis, however, we need a clarification of
what is meant by “national identification” in this literature. First of all, following from
Gellner (1983), it could be agreed that “nationalism” is a “principle of political
legitimacy”. A principle that states that “the political and the national unit should be
congruent”, understanding the “national unit” as defined by ethno-cultural – e.g.
religious and/or linguistic – markers (see also Hechter 2000). This principle underpins
a wide array of phenomena under the label “nationalism”, namely attitudes, doctrines,
movements, and organizational patterns of the world. Second, Gellner emphasizes that
the assumption of this principle has as a consequence a strong concern about the
congruence in ethno-cultural traits between the rulers and the ruled. Therefore, one
important dimension of nationalism as an attitude is a negative orientation towards any
actor considered to be alien to the “nation” – at least, to the extent that such an actor
seeks to intervene in the political realm.
When Tamir (1993) and Miller (1995) refer to something they call “liberal
nationalism” or “nationality”, they seem to be referring to a different principle. This is
because, albeit they praise a sense of belonging together, they would probably dislike
7
that citizens mistrusted cultural minorities, foreigners and other countries while being
uncritical towards their own “nation”. Rather than to nationalism as defined by Gellner,
they seem to refer to a sense of “national identification”, which other would willingly
call “patriotism” (e.g. Habermas, 1996). To be certain, Miller (1995) seems to be clear
enough that his “nationality” is culturally specific (Abizadeh, 2002), but one could be
prone to think that this is not Tamir’s case (1993).
A second term that may require some definition is that of ideological
identification. The concepts of “left” and “right” supply a structure to the systems of
political orientations in Europe.2
They synthesize the tension between conflicting
values in European societies while integrating a wide number of issues. Inglehart
(1990: 320) admits that, while the main, basic meaning of the left/right dimension
“consists on whether one supports or opposes social change in an equalitarian
direction”, his study reveals that this dimension tends to assimilate most important
issues in the long term. In spite of the crisis of these concepts in their traditional
meaning, this dimension still has full effect, as new values and interests integrate into it.
Whereas ideological identification in terms of left and right is a rather vague and
generic conceptualization, it is very useful in practical terms. The labels allow the
diverse political actors to find one’s way about within the wideness and complexity of
the political universe.
They fulfill cognitive and affective functions in the
understanding and evaluation of actors and policies (Sani 1974; Sani and Sartori 1983).
For Sani and Montero, in Spain the individual “perceives the terms as if they were
related to her/his own value system and, directly or indirectly, with her/his own position
on the [left-right] continuum.” Even though those identifying themselves with the same
position on a left/right axis may differ in some aspects of their political orientations and
general social values, there are empirical reasons to believe that the agreement – i.e.
what they share – prevails. For these authors, the left-right scale is like a “mirror” of
sorts, a mirror that “necessarily reflects an oversimplified and partly distorted image, yet
an image that reveals some interesting aspects of voters’ political composition” (Sani
and Montero 1986: 180-181, our translation).
2
For the concept of structure in mass belief systems, see Converse (1964), Benedicto (1989) and Dalton
(2005).
8
Against the historical backdrop, it is difficult to attach nationalism to either the
label of “right” or the label “left”. There are instances of nationalism related to both
radical (i.e. left-liberal) party families and to conservative party families (Beyme 1986;
Ware 1996). During World War I there was a strong tendency within the socialdemocratic family invoking internationalism and hence opposing any conflagration
between nations.
Yet in the end some social-democratic parties broke the
internationalist tradition and embraced nationalist allegiances. In turn, communist (and
post-communist) parties have often joined nationalist movements – in particular, but not
only, in developing countries during the decolonization phase. Nationalism can be
found in left and right parties and nationalism can refer to overarching political systems
(“state nationalism”) as well as to minority nationalisms – whether they are secessionist
or come to terms with some sort of minority territorial self-government. Hence it is an
empirical open question whether some nationalisms are more inclined to the left or to
the right both in political labeling and discourse and in specific attitudes of solidarity
and support for policies that help to change society in an equalitarian direction –
namely, re-distributive policies.
Data and results
The data analysed here stem from the Spanish contribution to the international
research project “Citizenship after the Nation-State?” (CANS), with the support of the
European Science Foundation and the national governments of Austria, Germany and
Spain, and different regional public agencies of Bretagne, Ille de France (France),
Scotland and Wales (United Kingdom). The aim of the international study is to analyze
hypothetical shifts of citizens’ public engagement and solidarity from the state level to
the regional level.
Nevertheless, some of the survey indicators analyzed here are
specific for Spain. According to the research design for the transnational analyses, the
inquiry comprises a variety of regions selected according to the strength of regional
identity, regional institutional authority and regional economic wealth. The regions
selected for Spain are Catalonia, Galicia and Castile-La Mancha.
Catalonia is a “usual suspect”, well-know for the strength of its regional identity
and self-government institutions and its relative economic affluence as compared to the
Spanish average. Galicia and Castile-La Mancha, in turn, are two of the less rich
regions in the country but differ from each other in that the former has a relatively
9
strong distinctive identity while the latter is representative of the mainstream Spanish
identity. The survey, carried out through computed-assisted telephone interviews
(CATI), includes adult citizens as well as a proportional share of international migrants
that reside in the regions. The fieldwork was carried out in May 2009.
In the next pages we present, in a somewhat sketchy form, different data about
national identification, ideology and solidarity in the three regions under study. We will
start by looking at simple cross-tabs that show the frequencies in each region of the
variables used as indicators of national identification. We will proceed with an analysis
of the relationship between national identification and ideology, and we will finish the
analyses by looking at the relationship between national identification and some
variables that can serve as proxy for economic solidarity.
Relative identifications (with Spain and the region) (bi-polar scale)
In Spain there is a three-decades long tradition of measuring national
identification with a bi-polar scale, which was first used in 1979 and later has travelled
to other countries.
In a context with rival nationalisms (e.g. Catalan vs. Spanish
nationalism), this instrument aims at tapping which national referent citizens feel their
primary loyalties go with.3 The predispositions towards two objects potentially or
actually conflictive with each other are explicitly opposed and hence we can label this
“relative identifications.” Offering the same scale than most previous inquiries, in the
CANS context it reads:
Q5. Were you to choose, which of the following sentences best expresses how do you feel?
3
-
I feel Spanish only
-
I feel more Spanish than Basque/Catalan/Galician
This question was first used in 1979 by the opinion poll company DATA, S.A. in the Basque Country,
Catalonia and Galicia (see Lint et al. 1981, 1986; Shabad and Gunther 1982) and since then has been
administrated lots of times by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas and other research teams in
Spain (for the DATA and CIS series, see Martínez-Herrera 2002). Luis Moreno (1986, 1988) introduced
this in the United Kingdom and later it has been applied in Belgium and Canada and, in the context of the
international project CANS, in regions of Austria, France and Germany.
10
-
I feel as much Spanish as Basque/Catalan/Galician
-
I feel more Basque/Catalan/Galician than Spanish
-
I feel Basque/Catalan/Galician only
Table 1. Relative identifications with the region and Spain (bi-polar scales) by region
CastillaLa Mancha
Cataluña
Galicia
Total
Me
siento
únicamente
catalán/castellano-manchego/gallego
1,8
15,7
5,6
7,6
Me siento más catalán/castellanomanchego/gallego que españo
5,0
29,4
25,1
19,8
Me siento tan catalán/castellanomanchego/gallego como españ
53,0
39,2
57,7
50,1
Me siento más español que
catalán/castellano-manchego/galleg
17,5
6,4
6,1
10,0
Me siento únicamente español
20,8
6,7
3,5
10,3
No sabe
0,9
0,7
0,9
0,8
No contesta
1,0
2,0
1,0
1,3
(n)
878
865
888
2631
As we can see in Table 1, Catalonia is the region where more people identify
themselves more with their region than with Spain at large – 45% of Catalonia citizens
feel “only Catalan” or “more Catalan than Spanish.” This percentage is 31% in Galicia
and 7% in Castile-La Mancha. It is worth to note, however, it is not Catalonia but
Galicia where less people feel “only Spanish”, and that in the three regions the largest
percentages are found in the option “as much as Catalan/Castilian-Manchego/Galician
as Spanish.”
Intensity of identifications (mono-polar scales)
Contestation of a national community is not the same that the intensity of the
attachment to another one – the relative identifications scale bears the problem that it
may well mix people strongly rejecting one denomination with people strongly
attaching to the other one, without these two things being necessarily complementary.
For this reason, we also analyze the results of scales tapping the intensity of the
identification with every geographical denomination separately – i.e. mono-polar scales.
The scales of intensity of identification with Spain and with the region stem from these
questions:
11
Q31a. Todos nos sentimos más o menos ligados al lugar donde vivimos, pero muchos nos
sentimos más ligados a unos ámbitos que a otros. Usando una escala del 0 al 10, en la que
0 significa que Ud. se siente “muy poco identificado” y 10 que se siente “muy
identificado”, ¿en qué medida se siente Ud. identificado con [Cataluña/Castilla-La
Mancha/Galicia]?
Q31b. ¿Y en qué medida se siente Ud. identificado con España?
Table 2. Intensity of identification (mono-polar scales) with the region and Spain. Means
comparison by region.
Scales 0-10
Castilla La
Mancha
Cataluña
Galicia
Regional identification
7.18
8.11
8.39
National identification
8.18
5.88
7.50
Table 2 shows the sample means on the mono-polar scales of intensity of the
identification with the country and the region. All differences are statistically
significant. The majority of those living in Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia and Galicia
feel identified both with their region and with Spain. Galicia is the region where people
show the strongest identification with their region (8,4), and Castile-La Mancha is the
area where this scores the lowest (7,2). Identification with Spain is more extensive in
Castile-La Mancha and less so in Catalonia. Castile-La Mancha is also the region with
the strongest score for intensity of Spanish identification (8,2). Even though Galicia
leads the ranking of regional identification, it is worth it to note that this is not translated
into a low identification with the country as a whole.
The Galician case illustrates that the intensity of identification can measure
regional nationalism as much as an ordinary sense of attachment to the region of birth or
residence, without consequences for the loyalty to the Spanish political community.
Hence, in the case of regional nationalism, we need to differentiate Catalan or Galician
national identification from a rather apolitical sense of attachment to the region. For
this reason, in some models we have introduced an interaction term with which we
distinguish the strength of attachment of those that consider that Catalonia or Galicia are
12
nations in their own right from those that label them as regions.4 The interaction term is
based on the following question:
Q32. Which term do you prefer to describe [Catalonia/Galicia]?
-
A nation
-
A region
-
Neither/Other
Relationship between national identification and ideological identification
The association between frequency of religious practice and left-right
identification in Spain is well-known. Religiosity (or its absence) is the most important
predictor of individuals’ self-placement on a left-right continuum (e.g. Díez-Medrano et
al., 1989; Montero and Torcal, 1995). In our models, it is the variable that yields the
strongest effects on this identification. However, the main findings from the models in
Table 3 concern national identification. For one thing, relative identifications attain
statistically significant effects in all three regions. As individuals express to feel more
strongly their Spanish allegiance than the regional one, they also tend to feel more
inclined to the right than to the left.
Next we turn to intensity of identifications with each collective reference. As far
as intensity of Spanish identification is concerned, we find statistically significant
coefficients in all three regions. The sign of the association is always positive, which
means that as people express a stronger Spanish identification they tend to lean more
towards the right than towards the left. As said above, for identification with the
autonomous region we devise an interaction between this identification and the
perception of the autonomous region as either a nation or as a region. This is to help us
distinguish between minority nationalism and ordinary regional identification. The
interaction term attains significant coefficients in Catalonia and Galicia, with negative
signs that mean that Catalan and Galician nationalists tend to perceive themselves as
4
As our research moves ahead, we will include this interaction in all relevant models. We apologize for
this draft not covering all of them yet.
13
leaning more towards the left than toward the right [This Table has to be revised as to
include the interaction term].
Table 3. Ideological identification. OLS regression models.
Castilla La Mancha. Regresión lineal
Dep: IDEOLOGIA
Modelo 1
RELIGIOSIDAD
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
PARADO
IDENTIDAD NAC.
IDENTIF. CCAA
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
.4076254 ***
.1468794
-.000705
-.0334186
-.3673279
.2263875 *
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
.4152841 ***
.0683702
-.0004773
-.0080126
-.3355935
.4002843 ***
.0723548
-.0013663
-.001771
-.3111956
-.0007314
2,869
741,000
0.0000
0.1088
0.1015
3,641
762,000
0.0000
0.1017
0.0946
.0870594*
2,971
763,000
0.0000
0.1087
0.1016
Cataluña. Regresión lineal
Dep: IDEOLOGIA
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
.4388664 ***
-.0028743
.0032221
-0,129
.090482
.3840663 ***
-.0380168
.0003731
-.0614817
.0122005
RELIGIOSIDAD
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
PARADO
IDENTIDAD NAC.
IDENTIF. CCAA
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
.3667616 ***
-.0048772
.0028841
-.0484788
.1034527
.5841108 ***
-0,090 *
1,954
760,000
0.0000
0.1611
0.1544
4,293
802,000
0.0000
0.0996
0.0928
14
.1754633 ***
2,626
801,000
0.0000
0.1505
0.1441
Galicia. Regresión lineal
Dep: IDEOLOGIA
Modelo 1
RELIGIOSIDAD
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
PARADO
IDENTIDAD NAC.
IDENTIF. CCAA
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
.4229312 ***
.0370192
.0003468
-0,129 *
.0357911
.5261603 ***
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
.4628119 ***
.0756801
.0027199
-0,137 *
.0494733
.424658 ***
-.0163065
-.0049973
-.1163638
.062865
-.0284381
2,424
743,000
0.0000
0.1290
0.1219
3,845
761,000
0.0000
0.0976
0.0904
.2023437 ***
2,627
759,000
0.0000
0.1344
0.1275
* P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005
In a nutshell, our data show that as people identify themselves more strongly
with the Spanish nation, they tend to identify themselves also with the right rather than
with the left. Conversely, people identifying themselves more strongly with Catalonia
and Galicia and seeing them as nations rather than regions, tend to identify themselves
more with the left rather than with the right.
Nevertheless, as argued above,
individuals’ self-perceptions as progressive or conservative may well be flawed by their
understandings of social desirability concerning these political labels. Because of this,
we shall also test more specific attitudes of solidarity in different instances of support to
redistribution. [Elaborate comments further]
Relationship between national identification and various measures of economic
solidarity
Solidarity to people in need
33a. ¿En qué porcentaje estaría Vd. dispuesto a aumentar los impuestos que Vd. o su familia
pagan actualmente para mejorar la atención a personas necesitadas? Por ejemplo, personas sin
techo, discapacitados, ancianos y el tercer mundo.
15
First of all, there is no statistically significant difference in solidarity towards
people in need across the three regions at the aggregate level, a result that casts doubts
about the existence of a relationship between national identity and economic solidarity.
It is worth it to highlight, in particular, that Catalans show about the same disposition to
increase their taxes than Castilian-Manchegos and Galicians.
Table 4. Increasing interviewee’s taxes to help people in need. Means comparison by region.
Mean
Std.
Err.
(n)
Castilla-La Mancha
11,4
16,4
770
Cataluña
10,2
16,0
799
Galicia
11,3
20,0
826
Total
11,0
17,6
2394
Eta2
0,00
Comunidad Autónoma
ns
In order to study in depth the relationship between national identification and
disposition to increase taxation to help people in need, we built linear regression models
with Q33a as dependent variable, and several other as independents: sex, age, education,
ideology (1-10), unemployed vs. in work, and three different measures of national
identification (Model 1: relative national identification; Model 2: identification with
CCAA; Model 3: identification with Spain). We run different models for each region,
what leaves us with the nine regression models presented in Table 5.
Results of these models show that relative identifications do not attain
significant coefficients in any region. Identification with the region only yields a
significant effect in Castile-La Mancha, which happens to be negative – i.e. the more
identified with this region, the less ready to increase personal or family contributions to
help people in need.
In turn, intensity of identification with Spain only yields a
significant effect in the same region, which is negative again.
Thus national
identifications turn out to be either irrelevant or even counterproductive when solidarity
towards people in need such as homeless, handicapped, elder and developing countries
is at stake.
As a matter of fact, the variables that best predict this solidarity inclination are
age, the level of studies and ideological identification. Young people are more prone to
rise taxes than the old. As expected, left-wing people show more solidarity than right16
wing people. In addition, interestingly enough, people with the lowest educational
attainments in Castile-La Mancha and Catalonia show more inclination to increase taxes
than those with higher levels of education. Although this could be due to the actual
effect of education, this rather suggests a relationship with family income and property
and social class – in this analysis, education seems to work as a proxy to family wealth.5
Table 5. Increasing interviewee’s taxes to help people in need. OLS regression models.
CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGRESIÓN LINEAL.
Dep: ¿Más impuestos?
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
IDEOLOGIA
PARADO
IDENTIDAD
NACIONAL
IDENTIF, CCAA
IDENTIF, ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
5
1,8046
-0,1489 ***
-0,7977
-0,3763
-1,5250
0,6034
Modelo 3
1,4277
-0,1331 ***
-1,0304 *
-0,3663
-0,5109
1,3734
-0,1316 ***
-0,7911
-0,3091
-0,2215
-0,8031 ***
17,8567
662
0,001
0,0337
0,0249
26,2763
679
0
0,0464
0,0379
-0,8656 ***
26,5117
677
0
0,0451
0,0366
From sociological research in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s, we know that education tends to
correlate with left-right identification when controlling by income. We also know that, at the same time,
education and income tend to correlate moderately. The CANS questionnaire, however, does not include
any question on income as to isolate this from educational attainments. Hence our interpretation that
formal education is working here as a proxy to family affluence.
17
CATALUÑA
Dep: ¿Más impuestos?
Modelo 1
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
IDEOLOGIA
PARADO
IDENTIDAD
NACIONAL
IDENTIF, CCAA
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
2,2920
-0,1119 ***
-0,9447 *
-0,6865 *
0,1103
0,0298
Modelo 3
2,0679
-0,1129 ***
-1,1104 *
-0,7329 *
0,2264
2,1015
-0,1125 ***
-1,1625 *
-0,6643 *
0,3500
-0,0082
18,6480
696
0,0024
0,0291
0,0206
GALICIA
Dep: ¿Más impuestos?
Modelo 1
SEXO
EDAD
ESTUDIOS
IDEOLOGIA
PARADO
IDENTIDAD
NACIONAL
IDENTIF, CCAA
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
(n)
Prob > F
R2
Adj R2
Modelo 2
-2,1317
-0,1703 ***
-0,0111
-0,6049
-1,6099
0,0057
19,9760
730
0,0008
0,0312
0,0231
Modelo 2
-0,1650
20,6607
730
0,0006
0,032
0,024
Modelo 3
-2,0476
-0,1660 ***
0,0497
-0,5930
-1,4546
-1,9223
-0,1562 ***
0,0195
-0,5383
-1,5316
0,0187
25,3932
699
0,0004
0,0353
0,0269
24,5805
716
0,0004
0,0337
0,0255
-0,2800
26,0484
715
0,0003
0,0348
0,0266
Interregional Solidarity
In all three regions, a large majority of citizens favours policies that re-distribute
wealth from poorer to richer areas: 95% of those living in Castile, 91% in Galicia and
71% in Catalonia “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement:
Q28. Money should be transferred from the richer parts of Spain to the poorer parts to
ensure that everyone can have similar levels of public services.6
6
The Spanish questionnaire reads: “Debería transferirse dinero desde las zonas más ricas de España a las
más pobres para asegurar que todo el mundo pueda tener niveles similares de servicios públicos.”
18
A related statement, not referring to public services but just to redistribution (Question
27), attracts a similar level of support. 94% respondents in Castile-La Mancha, 90% in
Galicia and 74% in Catalonia “agree” or “strongly agree” with:
Q27. The Spanish government should step in to even out economic differences between
the different parts of Spain.7
The similarity of the answers to both questions seems to indicate the existence of a
consistent and cross-regional support to a certain degree of territorial redistribution
through the State. We have to point out that this support, though extensive in all three
regions, is higher in Castile and Galicia and lower in Catalonia.
Table 6. Agreement with direct statements about solidarity between different parts of the
country
Money should be transferred from richer parts to poorer parts of Spain to ensure similar public services
Q28
Castilla La Mancha
Cataluña
Galicia
Muy de acuerdo
56.22
29.56
52.22
Bastante de acuerdo
35.00
37.78
33.89
Bastante en desacuerdo
3.78
20.56
5.89
Muy en desacuerdo
0.89
8.11
3.11
Ns/Nc
4.11
4.00
4.89
Total
900
900
900
7
The Spanish questionnaire reads: “El gobierno de España debería intervenir para reducir las diferencias
entre los distintos territorios de España.”
19
Government to even out economic differences between different parts of Spain
Q27
Castilla La Mancha
Cataluña
Galicia
Muy de acuerdo
53.06
31.98
53.21
Bastante de acuerdo
40.92
41.83
36.94
Bastante en desacuerdo
4.39
17.38
6.65
Muy en desacuerdo
1.62
8.81
3.21
(n)
865
863
842
Cramer's V =
0.1973
gamma =
0.0269
ASE= 0.026
In order to measure to what extent national identification and regional solidarity
are associated, we have built ordinal logistic regression models with Q28 as dependent
variable, and several other as independents: sex, age, education, ideology (1-10),
unemployed vs. in work, and three different measures of national identification (Model
1: relative national identifications; Model 2: identification with CCAA; Model 3:
identification with Spain). We run different models for each region, which leaves us
with the nine regression models presented in Table 7.
The bi-polar scale on relative identifications yields a statistically significant
effect in Catalonia and Galicia: a mayor identidad regional en detrimento de la española
es menor el apoyo a transferir dinero desde las zonas más ricas a las más pobres de
España para que todos tengan unos servicios públicos similares. Este efecto es
especialmente pronunciado en Cataluña. En Castilla La Mancha la identidad nacional no
tiene efectos sobre el deseo de realizar dichas transferencias entre territorios.
Si sustituimos en el modelo las relative identifications por la intensidad de la
“identificación con la CCAA” podemos ver que esta variable sólo muestra efecto en
Cataluña, donde quienes más se identifican con Cataluña, más en contra están de las
transferencias entre CCAA.
Finalmente, si incluimos en los modelos la intensidad de la “identificación con
España”, encontramos que esta variable únicamente se asocia significativamente con la
solidaridad interregional en Cataluña y Galicia. En ambos casos, quienes más se
identifican con España son más favorables a reducir las diferencias entre territorios. La
relación es más fuerte en Cataluña que en Galicia, como viene siendo habitual en los
20
anteriores modelos de regresión. Con todo, no deja de ser llamativo que en una región
de inequívoca lealtad española como es Castilla-La Mancha ningún indicador de
identificación nacional tenga capacidad predictiva con respecto a la solidaridad
interterritorial.
Cabe señalar que en Castilla La Mancha dos variables correlacionan con la
solidaridad territorial: la edad y los estudios. En ambos casos la relación es positiva: a
mayor edad o más estudios, más apoyo a la solidaridad territorial. En Cataluña y Galicia
estas variables no arrojan efectos significativos.
It is also worth mentioning that left-right identification only predicts support for
this type of redistribution in one out of nine models. This is interesting as it suggests
that, for many people, the fact of not being supportive to solidarity between territories
does not prevent them to feel they are on the left – nor the other way around either.
Hence it seems that for them, generally, solidarity between different parts of the same
country does not belong to their understanding of the concepts left and right. This can
look surprising if considering that, during the last three decades at least, the mainstream
parties of the Spanish left and center-left have considered transfers from the most
economically developed areas of the country to the less developed ones to be part and
parcel of social justice.8 However, the explanation can also lie in the rhetoric of the
parties in the center-right and the right. While the Basque and, especially, the Catalan
center-right parties opposed the doctrine of evening out economic differences between
regions, the Spanish-wide conservatives tended to accept it to the extent that the
financial transfers were sent to regions governed by them, such as Galicia.9
8
In special, the Izquierda Unida (United Left) of Julio Anguita and the social-democratic party (PSOE) of
Felipe González.
9
However, the state-wide conservatives tended to criticize subsidies to the long-duration countryside
unemployed in Andalusia and Extremadura, both regions being ruled by the social-democrats.
21
Table 7. Money should be transferred from richer parts to poorer parts of Spain to ensure
similar public services. Ordinal logit regression.
CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES.
SOLID.
(P28)
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
REGIONAL
SEXO
-.2141533
-.1574812
-.1804644
EDAD
-.0152937**
-.0145375**
-.0143178**
ESTUDIOS
-.1365468*
-.1207529*
-.1169202*
IDEOLOGIA
-.0375952
-.0432627
-.0448914
PARADO
.2914976
.245187
.2394766
IDENTIDAD NAC.
.0301109
IDENTIF. CCAA
-.0048325
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
Number of obs.
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
.0278383
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
723
19.09
0.004
0.0158
744
17.28
0.0083
0.0137
745
16.93
0.0095
0.0134
CATALUÑA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES.
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
SOLID. REGIONAL
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
SEXO
.0300877
-.0493185
.0174587
EDAD
-.0109553*
-.0131663***
-.0073842
ESTUDIOS
.0430013
.1236082*
.0526693
IDEOLOGIA
.0141444
-.0698366*
-.0153899
PARADO
-.3271494
-.2876028
-.3671617
IDENTIDAD NAC.
-.647615***
IDENTIF. CCAA
.2402958***
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
Number of obs.
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
-.1837277***
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
739
101.37
0.0000
0.0537
780
73.20
0.0000
0.0368
779
84.47
0.0000
0.0425
22
GALICIA. REGRESIONES ORDINALES.
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
SOLID. REGIONAL
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
SEXO
.2334918
.1877797
.243642
EDAD
-.0075357
-.0084196
-.0059431
ESTUDIOS
-.0119901
-.0052851
-.0097907
IDEOLOGIA
-.0090536
-.0345877
-.0181022
PARADO
.1275225
.0661187
.0613862
IDENTIDAD NAC.
-.2031408*
IDENTIF. CCAA
-.0489964
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
-.0891863**
Modelo 1
Number of obs.
726
LR chi2(6)
12.29
Prob > chi2
0.0557
Pseudo R2
0.0086
* P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
745
10.38
0.1095
0.0071
743
16.10
0.0132
0.0110
Regresión lineal con INPUESTOSREST como dependiente
33b. (Si P33a <>0) Y de esta cantidad, ¿qué porcentajes le gustaría que se destinasen a personas
necesitadas de su municipio, de Galicia, de España, de Europa y del resto del mundo?
33c. (Si P33a =0) Y de los impuestos que usted ya está pagando, ¿qué porcentajes le gustaría que
se destinasen a personas necesitadas de su municipio, de Galicia, de España, de Europa y del
resto del mundo?
In order to analyse the preferred area for allocating tax money we have build a
new variable named “Impuestosrest”. This variable indicates whether the interviewee
wants to see the tax money spent principally on his/her region, or in Spain at large. The
range of values of this variable goes from -100 (100% of taxes should be spent on the
interviewee’s region) to 100 (100% of taxes should be spent on Spain as a whole). A
value of 0 indicates that the interviewee wants 50% of tax money spent in his/her region
and the other 50% in Spain. As we can see in the following table, mean values for this
variable are negative for Catalonia and Galicia and positive for Castile-La Mancha.
This means that citizens of Castile-La Mancha tend to prefer a distribution of tax money
that benefit all Spanish territories, while citizens of Catalonia and Galicia prioritise their
own regions.
DEPENDIENTE: IMPUESTOSREST = [(%Impuestos a España-%Impuestos a la CCAA)/(
(%Impuestos a España+%Impuestos a la CCAA)]x100
23
Comparación de medias. Distribución del dinero recaudado vía impuestos
Rango (virtual) de la variable: -100/100. -100 = el 100% de los impuestos
recaudados en la CA deben gastarse en la CA; 100 = el 100% de los impuestos
deben gastarse en el resto de España; 0 = 50% a la CA y 50% al resto de
España.[i1]
CCAA
Mean
Std. Err.
[95% Conf.
Interval]
Castilla La Mancha
Cataluña
Galicia
2,15
-2,07
-1,45
1,26
1,49
1,30
-0,33
-2,36
-1,70
4,62
-1,78
-1,19
Linear regression models with Q33b/c as dependent variable and the same
independent variables included in previous models (Table 8) confirm most of the
findings about inter-territorial solidarity. Intensity of Spanish identification remains
unable to predict this solidarity in Castile-La Mancha. In one model for support for
inter-territorial transfers in Catalonia, people identified with the right support interregional transfers the most. These findings suggest two things. For one, if anything,
inter-territorial transfers seem to be a policy supported by the right rather than by the
left. Spanish national identification solely increases the probability of support for
solidarity across territories in regions in which it is challenged by rival national projects.
24
Table 8. Difference in assistance to regional and statewide people’s in need. OLS regression.
CASTILLA LA MANCHA. REGR. LINEAL
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
SEXO
-2.542.036
-1.421.453
-2.862352
EDAD
-.1663923
-.1595051 -.1720667*
IMPUESTOSR~T
ESTUDIOS
.6992608
.4635496
1.059175
IDEOLOGIA
1.110066
1.3528*
1.270772*
PARADO
-2.497401
-3.228474
-3.262957
IDENTIDAD .NAC
3.312978*
IDENTIF. CCAA
-1.905714***
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
.3962822
-5.513.301
1.755.294
1.644.672
Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3
Number of obs
627
644
643
Prob > F
= 0.0149 = 0.0003 = 0.0447
R-squared
= 0.0251 = 0.0387 = 0.0200
Adj R-squared = 0.0156 = 0.0296 = 0.0108
CATALUÑA. REGR. LINEAL
IMPUESTOSR~T
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
SEXO
-.646032
.0900252
-.7585033
EDAD
-.1169243
.0028474
-.1562014
ESTUDIOS
-1.87126 -3.652.992***
-1.53063
IDEOLOGIA
.7257474
2.469.557***
.8061398
1.61319
1.649.642
1.060912
PARADO
IDENTIDAD NAC.
16.8641***
IDENTIF. CCAA
-5.31072***
IDENTIF. ESPAÑA
_cons
5.778.053***
-54.66699
Modelo 1
Number of obs
24.10772
Modelo 2
-44.4796
Modelo 3
661
693
693
Prob > F
= 0.0000
= 0.0000
= 0.0000
R-squared
= 0.1894
= 0.1040
= 0.1871
Adj R-squared
= 0.1820
= 0.0962
= 0.1800
25
GALICIA. REGR. LINEAL
IMPUESTOSR~T
Modelo 1
Modelo 2
Modelo 3
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
SEXO
-3.123567
-2.114.833
-2.406.194
EDAD
.0250856
.1464995
.0366581
ESTUDIOS
.5202302
.2900946
.4834794
IDEOLOGIA
.2450658
.8101761
.4112595
-1.222239
-1.163.807
-.8867832
PARADO
IDENTIDAD NAC.
8.227.056***
IDENTIF. CCAA
-3.273301***
INDENTIF. ESP
1.216911*
_cons
-36.2465
5.382.293
-24.24533
Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3
Number of obs
632
651
649
Prob > F
= 0.0005 = 0.0002 = 0.3190
R-squared
= 0.0374 = 0.0406 = 0.0108
Adj R-squared = 0.0282 = 0.0317 = 0.0016
* P>Z < 0.05 ** p>Z < 0.005 *** P>Z < 0.005
Discussion and conclusions
Many hopes have been pinned on national identification since the 19th century,
not only by ordinary citizens but also by political elites who have suffused their
discourse with ubiquitous invocations to national feelings. More recently, during the
last decade and a half, a number of political theorists have advanced a sophisticated and
attractive combination of nationalism and liberalism. One of their most appealing
arguments is the suggestion that national identification – as a product of nationalism –
helps secure or regain citizens’ solidarity inclinations – in particular, their support for
redistribution policies and the welfare state. Since this claim is widely extended but
seldom proved, this study has tested empirically it as a falsifiable scientific hypothesis.
Previous research showed that it was untenable for British national identity. The
current piece of research shows that is also untenable for Spanish national identity, for
Catalan national identity and for Galician national identity. In Castile-La Mancha,
Galicia and Catalonia alike a large majority of citizens favour policies that re-distribute
wealth from poorer to richer areas.
Yet as a matter of fact, Spanish national
identification only has a significant positive impact on support for territorial transfers in
26
regions in which rival nationalist projects are on extant – namely, Catalonia and Galicia.
In turn, Catalan and Galician national identifications only predict reluctance to
solidarity between richer and poorer territories and a preference for supporting their
local people in need rather than people in need in Spain at large. Interestingly enough,
this is so in spite of Galicia qualifying as a poor region vis-à-vis the Spanish average.
Furthermore, Catalan and Galician nationalists tend to see themselves as leaning
to the left rather than to the right, while the opposite holds for Spanish nationalists.
This lends credence to the view that Spanish nationalism remains associated to
conservative and traditional political values, parties and political leadership more than
thirty years after the end of Franco’s regime and its Spanish nationalist rhetoric and
paraphernalia. However, when respondents are asked about their inclination to increase
their taxes in order to aid people in need, the expectation of redistributive generosity of
people who feel stronger their national identity becomes doubtful.
Ideological
identification, together with class and age, is the variable that best predicts solidarity
toward people in need. Conversely, measured through different indicators and referring
to the different “nations”, national identifications turn out to be either irrelevant or even
counterproductive. Therefore, as it came up in the case of British nationalism, the
theory does not hold for Spanish national identification. In addition, it is dubious for
Catalan and Galician minority nationalisms. If we are to found the sources of solidarity,
including support for re-distributive policies, social research should rather look
elsewhere – the most plausible candidates being the values of universalism and human
equality.
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