Oedipus Complex Dissolution: Whose Genitalia Matter?

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2022, 82, (426–455)
2022 Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis 0002-9548/22
www.palgrave.com/journals
Article
WHOSE GENITALIA ARE INVOLVED IN THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS?
Rachel Karniol1
This paper addresses the issue of whose genitalia are involved in the dissolution of the castration complex in boys. Freud and his followers suggested several different possibilities which
are elaborated herein, and these alternative models are discussed from the perspective of
psychological research regarding children’s emergent gender identity and their awareness of
genital differences. The reviewed data show that contrary to Freudian theory, preschool children’s emergent gender identity is not dependent on their awareness of genital differences.
However, preschoolers with younger siblings, primarily opposite gender ones, evidence greater
understanding of genital differences, as Freud suggested. The discussion emphasizes the
importance of children’s family constellation and their awareness of self-other similarity and
dissimilarity in the development of their gender identity.
KEY WORDS: Castration anxiety in boys; dissolution of Oedipus complex; self –
other genital comparison; family constellation
https://doi.org/10.1057/s11231-022-09347-w
There is a theoretical conundrum that has not been adequately addressed in
the psychoanalytic literature regarding the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex in boys. The conundrum concerns whose nude genitalia initiate
the dissolution process. Specifically, there are several alternatives that have
been discussed by Freud and others without sufficient attention as to the
possible implications of the differences between them. These differences are
important because of the diverse cognitive processes implicated in each
alternative and the developmental timeline of these cognitive processes in
early versus middle childhood. As I elaborate, depending on whether
exposure to the genitalia of female children, female adults, one’s female
siblings, or one’s mother, is deemed critical for the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex, each type of exposure necessitates fundamentally
Rachel Karniol, PhD, Researcher, author, Professor Emerita of Social Development, School of
Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel.
Address correspondence to Dr. Rachel Karniol, School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv
University, Ramat Aviv, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel.
E-mail: [email protected]
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
427
different cognitive and inferential processes to set in motion castration
anxiety. Extant research suggests that the timeline for the emergence of
these cognitive and inferential processes does not parallel the Freudian
timeline for the onset of castration anxiety and the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex.
Against this backdrop, the current paper outlines Freud’s conceptualization of castration anxiety, addresses the alternative developmental models
explicitly or implicitly suggested by Freud and his followers, reviews the
state of knowledge of psychological research in this domain, and attempts
to resolve the above conundrum in light of the reviewed data.
THE ONSET OF CASTRATION ANXIETY
The castration complex was viewed by Freud as the critical psychic
mechanism that boys develop to cope with their discovery of anatomical
differences between the sexes—the presence of a penis in males and its
absence in females. There are four steps implicated in Freud’s discussion of
the emergence of the castration complex in boys. The first step involves
boy’s initial conviction as to the universal possession of a penis. As Freud
writes ‘‘they start out with the assumption that the same genital organ (the
male one) is possessed by both sexes …’’ (1914, p. 55). So, boys generalize
from their own possession of a penis to all human beings having a penis, as
voiced by a preschooler who exclaimed, ‘‘Everybody has a penis, only girls
wear barrettes’’ (Bem, 1993, p. 149). That is, visible differences between
boys and girls—clothes, hair styles, and hair accessories—are used to
differentiate between them when anatomies are deemed to be identical.
The second step involves a real or imagined threat to the integrity of one’s
penis. Thus, Freud cites Little Hans’ mother warning him about masturbating at age 3-1/2, ‘‘If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A. to cut off your
widdler’’ (Freud, 1909, pp. 7–8), a threat apparently common among
mothers and nurses in response to child masturbation (Freud, 1917).
Although such threats of castration are voiced by women, castration itself is
attributed to men: fathers, doctors, etc., with fear of the father as the
potential castrating agent setting castration anxiety in motion. This is
important because the father figure is ‘‘the basis for normal masculinity’’
(Lampl-DeGroot, 1952) and identification with the potential castrating
agent is integral to the dissolution process and the emergence of the
superego. In fact, the father must loom in the boy’s mind as both a rival for
the mother’s love and as a model for masculinity (Olesker, 2003).
In the third step, the sight of the naked female body induces awareness of
anatomical differences between the sexes. Freud believed that pre-phallic
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development was essentially the same for both sexes and their development
only diverges after the child’s emergent awareness of the anatomical
distinction between the sexes (Person & Ovesey, 1983). According to Freud,
this awareness is shocking because, first, it undermines the assumption that
anatomically everyone is the same, spurring the recognition that ‘‘everyone
is not like me.’’ Second, female genitalia are viewed as missing the male
appendage, with the penis having been ‘‘cut off,’’ reflecting the idea that
girls and women have likely been castrated. Freud (1938a) stipulates that
upon ‘‘the sight of the absence of a penis in females,’’ the boy ‘‘experiences
the greatest trauma of his life’’ (p. 155). In fact, about 10% of boys aged 5 to
11 reported that when they first saw girls’ genitals they thought it had been
‘‘cut off’’ (Conn, 1940; see also Levy, 1940). Hence, it is the implicit
comparison of the male anatomy with the female genitals ‘‘which creates
the fear of being sadistically robbed of the penis’’ (Abraham, 1974, p 70; cf.
Lowenstein, 1950).
Circumcision ceremonies may well contribute to this fear. In Jewish
homes, male children are circumcised on their 8th day, a ceremony Freud
attended at 18 months when his younger brother was circumcised. Freud
(1913) suggested that Jewish children equate this ceremony with castration2
(p. 53). In fact, Jacobs (2015) reports of a child who developed phobic
reactions (i.e., refusal to urinate) subsequent to another 3-year-old informing
him that the ceremony they were attending was focused on the newborn’s
penis being cut. The unique association of circumcision with baby boys was
well noted by a 71-month-old Israeli Jewish girl with a baby brother who
said that a girl could not become a boy because she cannot be circumcised
(Karniol, 2009).
In the critical fourth step, the threat of castration and the perception of
females as castrated merge, requiring boys to engage in psychological
‘‘work’’ to avoid this catastrophic possibility and develop a healthy gender
role identity. As a consequence, the Oedipus complex ‘‘is not simply
repressed, it is literally smashed to pieces by the shock of threatened
castration…. the super-ego has become its heir’’ (Freud, 1925, p. 257), and
the ‘‘guardian of memories of the threat and agent in its possible
reactualization’’ (Santamarı́a, 2018; but see Lebovici, 1982; Zepf & Zepf,
2010).
Critical to the developmental sequence above, then, is exposure to nude
female genitalia. But whose nude genitalia? As I elaborate below, there are
multiple possibilities, each involving different cognitive processes, inferential processes, and generalizations. The puzzle here is that the ability to
generalize, and particularly, generalize from self to others, is limited in early
childhood; yet this ability is critical for the child’s development of a model
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
429
of genital differences and the subsequent onset castration anxiety, to which I
now turn.
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF NUDE GENITALIA IN THE ONSET OF CASTRATION
ANXIETY
In classical psychoanalytic theory, different discussions implicate the nude
genitalia of different individuals or categories of individuals as critical to the
onset of castration anxiety. The first and most simple model (Figure 1,
Model A) involves the male child becoming aware of his mother’s lack of a
penis following exposure to her genitalia. Building on Ferenczi’s (1923)
discussion of the myth of Medusa, Freud discussed the importance of the
sight of the mother’s genitals saying that when the boy ‘‘catches sight of the
female genitals, probably those of an adult, surrounded by hair, and
essentially those of his mother’’ (Freud, 1941, p. 69), this energizes the onset
of castration anxiety. The mother’s genitalia per se is similarly underlined in
Fenichel’s (1944) discussion of ‘‘the terrifying sight of the female (maternal)
genitalia’’ (p. 128), and in discussions of fetishism (e.g., Bak, 1953; Findlay,
1992) and voyeurism (e.g., Róheim, 1945), with these theorists emphasizing
that the mother’s genitalia are of focus.
Freud saw his mother as the critical individual. In a letter to Fliess, Freud
(1897, p. 268) refers to his mother’s nude body, saying ‘‘there must have
been an opportunity of seeing her nudam,’’ likely when on a train with his
Figure 1:
Model A. Boy realizes his mother has no penis.
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pregnant mother. Aarons (1975) suggests that because the mother is the
original love object, ‘‘what is traumatically disturbing is the detection of the
mother’s imperfection’’ (p. 201), (i.e., seeing her nude genitalia). Some (e.g.,
Aarons, 1975; Basch, 1981; Jones, 1933) have argued that the boy
temporarily needs to believe that his mother does possess a penis since
such a belief provides ‘‘reassurance that no castration has taken place’’
(Jones, 1933, p. 14). Based on his conversations with Freud, Brunswick
(1940) suggests that the perception of the mother as castrated by the father is
crucial and that ‘‘with the final recognition of the mother’s castration and
the possibility of his own at the hands of the father, the Oedipus complex of
the little boy is destroyed’’ (p. 299). In this view, then, the comparative sight
of the mother’s genitalia is critical. Note that this simple model does not
require categorization of the mother as female nor any generalization
regarding the genitalia of other females. The comparison is of the mother’s
genitalia relative to the child’s own genitalia, and viewing the mother’s
genitalia as missing the relevant appendage. Moreover, in this model, selflabeling as male is unnecessary for castration anxiety to emerge.
A second possibility, shown in Figure 2 as Model B, involves exposure to
the genitalia of another female adult (e.g., referred to as a governess by Freud),
without exposure to the mother’s genitalia. This more sophisticated model
involves generalization from one female adult to another female adult,
namely the mother, by invoking the category of female to infer the similarity
between them. That is, the model requires generalization from one female
adult to the species of females, and to one’s mother, and need not necessarily
involve the child’s own self-labeling as male. Yet this type of generalization is
quite difficult for preschool children who do not tend to generalize across
non-identical exemplars of a category with multiple features (Krascum &
Andrews, 1993). Freud implicated Model B (cf. Fenichel, 1931, p. 420) in
discussing his governess till the age of 3, saying ‘‘She was my instructress in
sexual matters’’ (Freud, 1897, Letter to Fliess, October 4, 1897, p. 269). But
Figure 2:
Model B. Boy realizes governess has no penis, generalizes this to all women,
including his mother.
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
431
Freud did not discuss generalization from the governess to his mother, nor to
the category of female adults.
A third possibility, shown in Figure 3 as Model C, involves the male child
becoming aware of genital differences after being exposed to the genitalia of
a female sibling or a female peer. As in Model A, this awareness does not
require generalization regarding the genitalia of adult females, nor does it
require the child to categorize his female sibling or female peer as being in
the same category as adult females. As in Model A, the comparison involves
the female sibling’s genitalia relative to the child’s own genitalia. Again, it is
unclear whether this model requires the child to self-label as male or only to
view himself as possessing different genitalia than his sister or female peer.
In Freud’s early writings, this model features prominently, with Freud
focusing on the early belief in the universality of one’s own genitalia, and
subsequent exposure to the anatomical ‘‘distinction between the sexes’’
(Freud, 1914, p. 54). Freud proposed that the boy compares himself directly
with his female sibling, and that due to the absence of a penis ‘‘in a creature
so like himself,’’ the ‘‘loss of his own penis becomes imaginable, and the
threat of castration achieves its delayed effect’’ (Freud, 1924a, p. 175).
Yet Freud argues that at first, neither the threat of castration by itself nor
the sight of the female genitals by itself, are sufficient to induce a change,
because potentially, ‘‘what was missing would yet make its appearance: she
would grow one (a penis) later’’ (Freud, 1938b, p. 276). In fact, Little Hans,
seeing his newborn sister being bathed, remarked that ‘‘her widdler’s still
quite small…when she grows up it’ll get bigger’’ (1909, p. 11). It is only
when the threat of castration, the memory of the female sibling’s absent
genitalia and the valued appendage are jointly present in his mind, that ‘‘the
Figure 3:
Model C. Boy realizes his baby sister has no penis.
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reality of the danger of castration’’ (Freud, 1938b, p. 276) impacts the boy’s
psychological world.
A variation on the above, shown in Figure 4 as Model D, involves
generalization from one’s sister or female peer to the category of female
children. Freud implicates this model too, saying, ‘‘an accidental sight of the
genitals of a little sister or little playmate provides the occasion’’ for the
boy’s discovery ‘‘that the penis is not a possession which is common to all
creatures that are like himself’’ (Freud, 1923, p. 142). Exposure to little girls
urinating may play a role, as Freud notes, ‘‘in unusually intelligent children,
the observation of girls urinating will even earlier have aroused a suspicion
that there is something different here. For they will have seen a different
posture and heard a different sound’’ (1923, p. 142). This is important
because toilet training in boys emphasizes the function of the penis, with
the contrast requiring the child to come to terms ‘‘with castration in relation
to himself ‘‘ (p. 144). Cognitively, this model entails self-labeling as a boy
and categorization of the female sibling as a member of the female child
category. This type of generalization is posited by Bornstein (1953) who says
that threats of castration ‘‘become effective when the child finally convinces
himself that girls do not possess the organ in which he had taken such a
narcissistic pride’’ (p. 67). In this more sophisticated model, then, the child
has to see himself as an instance of the category of male children and to
categorize his sister or female peer as instances of the category of female
children.
Yet another possibility, shown in Figure 5 as Model E, is similar to the
previous model but includes a further generalization, categorizing the baby
sister or female peer as members of the female category, recognizing that
the absence of a penis is symptomatic of all female bodies, including that of
his mother. This type of generalization is evident in Freud’s discussion of
Little Hans’ desire to see his mother’s and his governess’ genitals, with Freud
Figure 4:
Model D. Boy realizes baby sister has no penis and generalizes this to all girls.
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
433
Figure 5: Model E. Boy realizes baby sister has no penis, categorizes her as female,
generalizes the lack of a penis to all females, including his mother.
proposing that the child be told that ‘‘his mother and all other female beings,
as he could see from Hanna (i.e., his baby sister) had no widdler at all’’
(Freud, 1909, p. 28). Generalization is also relevant in Edgecumbe and
Brugner’s (1975) description of a child of 28 months who repeatedly asked
his father and mother whether they had a penis. He was subsequently able
to generalize, differentiating adults as male or female based on their having,
or lacking, a penis.
Importantly, Freud stipulates that generalization from the sight of the
genitals of a little girl or female sibling to that of mother or of women in
general is not automatic and ‘‘it is only subsequent to this [i.e., the
recognition that little girls do not have a penis—author’s addition] that the
recognition that women are castrated emerges’’ (Freud, 1924b, p. 421). At
first, though, the boy infers that ‘‘it is only unworthy female persons that
have lost their genitals—females who, in all probability, were guilty of
inadmissible impulses [i.e., to masturbate—author’s note] similar to his
own’’ (Freud, 1923, p. 144).
This option, then, invokes the category of female and builds on the
recognition that female babies and little girls grow up to be adult females,
gender stability knowledge that is not generally evident in children prior to
age 4 (Thompson & Bentler, 1973; Eaton, Von Bargen, & Keats, 1981). The
critical aspects of this model, then, include a comparison of the boy’s own
genitalia relative to the little girl’s genitalia, an understanding that female
babies and little girls are included in the female category, and that category
members share the same features. As Gelman, Collman and Maccoby
(1986) showed, such knowledge is only evident in preschool children at
around age 4. Importantly, this model builds on the ability to self-label as
male and to view oneself in contradistinction to the category of females.
The most sophisticated possibility, shown in Figure 6 as Model F, builds
on all the features of Model E but adds the understanding of the unique
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Figure 6:
Model F. Boy realizes baby sister has no penis, categorizes her as female, learns
that women get pregnant and have babies, generalizes the lack of a penis to all females,
including his mother.
aspect of women as bearing children and giving birth. That is, in model F,
the boy understands that little girls not only grow up to be adult women, but
that adult women differ from men not only in their genitalia but also in their
bodily functions. Men do not get pregnant or give birth. Boys acquire the
knowledge that mother is a grown-up girl who can give birth to a baby, can
nurse a baby, and engage in care-taking functions, whereas fathers are
grown-up boys who cannot give birth or nurse a baby but may engage in
some care-taking functions. Hence, this most sophisticated model builds on
the child’s discovery of the origin of babies and that only women give birth
(Freud. 1923, p. 144). Fenichel (1929) suggests that even without exposure
to female genitals, the observation of a pregnancy or birth may be sufficient
to set the process in motion. Importantly, in this model, there is self-labeling
as male, category-based generalizations, and a concomitant understanding
of gender stability and of how men and women differ anatomically.
All six models include the assumption that the male child compares the
female anatomy to his own anatomy, focuses on the absence of the
appendage he values so highly, and consequently experiences castration
anxiety. But as outlined above, the models differ in terms of whose genitalia
is relevant to the emergence of castration anxiety and their implications as
to the kinds of cognitive work that boys have to engage in to experience
castration anxiety. Several of the models build on the acquisition of
concepts like ‘‘big girl/big boy,’’ ‘‘lady/woman/man,’’ and an understanding
of the relation between these concepts, as well as the understanding of
gender as a stable aspect of development (i.e., big girls become
ladies/women, big boys become men). As elaborated above, all six models
are evident in psychoanalytic discussions of the castration complex without
due attention to the cognitive processes implicated in each. In a rare
treatise, Blumberg (1996), poses that it does not matter whose genitalia are
involved, and notes,
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
435
In the oedipal drama, the boy sees the female genitals, assumes that his mother
or sister (or whomever he first encounters undressed [emphasis added]) once had
a penis which has disappeared. He interprets the disappearance as the result of
castration, fears the same fate will befall him, and gives up both his intense
interest in his own genitals and his erotic desire for his mother in order to avoid
this fate (p. 502).
In this context, Galenson and Roiphe (1980) contend that ‘‘genital
difference as a generalization which applies to all males and females
becomes established only gradually over time’’ (p. 824) but they do not
address the cognitive processes required for such generalization to develop.
Several theorists (e.g., Abelin, 1971) have suggested—in contrast to
Freud—that exposure to the father’s nude body and his genitalia results in
unfavorable comparison with the boy’s own genitalia and thereby exacerbates the castration complex. In this view, not only does the child have to
come to grips with the genital differences between the sexes, but he must
also deal psychologically with the apparent immaturity of his own genitalia
relative to that of his father. Although Freud clarifies that Little Hans had
never seen his mother’s, or his father’s, genitals, he remarked ‘‘my widdler
will get bigger as I get bigger’’ (1909, p. 34), suggesting that he understood
penis size differences. Stoller and Wagonfield (1982) contend that when
they see fathers urinate, boys envy and wish to possess their father’s large
penis. This possibility is underlined by a boy of 4 who said, ‘‘I know;
Superman’s power comes from his penis!’’ (Tyson, 1989, p. 1058), clearly
referring to size differences between his own immature genitals and adult
male genitalia (cf., Edgecumbe & Burgner, 1975). To clarify, though, Freud
himself did not address this possibility.
CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF GENITAL DIFFERENCES
All the above models and psychoanalytic views demand awareness of
genital differences between boys and girls, or men and women. Yet research
using diverse methodologies shows that the majority of preschoolers do not
evidence knowledge of genital body parts (e.g., Thackeray & Readdick,
2004), and certainly not at the ages at which Freudian theory stipulates that
such awareness emerges and at which the onset of castration anxiety
occurs.
In an early study (Thompson & Bentler, 1971) using dolls with genitals
superimposed, less than 20% of 4- to 6-year-olds were able to classify the
dolls as male or female on the basis of their genitalia. In a study with
preschoolers, only about a quarter of them were able to construct gendered
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dolls by sticking on body parts, despite knowing correct labels for body
parts and that ‘‘girls don’t have weenies’’ (Senet, 2004). Similarly, whereas
15- to 36-month-old children were able to specify their being boys or girls
and appeared to have gendered representations of their own bodies, they
were unable to indicate which of two anatomical dolls were like boys and
like girls (De Marneffe, 1997). That is, they were unable to generalize to the
category of male and female on the basis of their own bodies. Although one
could fault the above studies for using anatomical dolls, (Boat & Everson,
1988), Trautner, Gervai, and Nemeth (2003), who used photographs of
infants, similarly found that only 50% of 5-year-olds understood that
genitalia define sex and that many children who showed gender constancy
did not evidence genital understanding. Similarly, using figurative drawings
of a boy and a girl, McConaghy (1980) found that Swedish, 4- to 8-year-olds
evidenced little understanding of genitals before age 7, despite more liberal
attitude towards sex in Sweden.
Hence, these studies implicate two independent developmental achievements. The first of these is acquiring a core gender identity, the child’s early
self-identification or self-labeling as ‘‘girl’’ or ‘‘boy’’ (Stoller, 1965, 1968),
which is generally established by age 18 to 36 months. In Stoller’s view, this
early sense of gender identity is the first to develop, primarily because of sex
assignment at birth and parents’ subsequent differentiation of male and
female infants in light of such sex assignment. Hence, core gender identity
precedes the understanding of anatomical differences between the sexes
and allows the child to self-label as boy or girl. Stoller notes that fairly early,
the child recognizes that not everyone belongs to this gender and later,
learns that not everyone possesses male external genitalia. But by the time
these discoveries are made, children’s core gender identity has fully
developed, independently of their genital knowledge.
Later, this core gender identity allows the child to generalize to others of
one’s own gender, and with development, to learn to generalize to adults of
one’s own gender, an ability evident by age 4 (Thompson & Bentler, 1973).
Core gender identity, though, appears to include some understanding of
one’s own body without a concomitant understanding that this defines one’s
gender. In fact, Money and Green (1969) argued that whatever their
anatomy, children generally grow up thinking of themselves unambiguously
as boys or girls, provided they are assigned to one or another gender at birth
and are raised in line with such assignment. In Stoller’s terms, core gender
identity, which is essentially unalterable after about the age of 36 months,
can be established and maintained even when biological sex is ambiguous.
The second developmental achievement is acquisition of an understanding of the unique association between specific genitalia and gender.
Children first associate gender with gender-unique appearance cues and
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
437
behavioral cues (Leinbach & Fagot, 1986) but do not understand the
association with genital differences. Such an understanding does emerge in
some 3- to 5-year-olds, who when shown colored, nude photographs of
children, responded to the question, ‘‘How do you know it’s a [boy] [girl]?’’,
answered, ‘‘because he has a willy’’ and ‘‘because she doesn’t have a willy’’
(Lloyd & Stroyan, 1994). In fact, though, only about a quarter of the children
at these ages gave such responses, underlining that understanding of genital
differences emerges relatively late in children’s development.
In fact, Coates (1997) concludes that the fundamental premise of
traditional psychoanalytic theory, that the perception of genital difference
drives children to cognize their own gender, is inaccurate. But whereas
Coates (1997) concludes that there is no universal fixed order for these two
developments, the experimental data seem to accord with the developmental primacy of core gender identity. Such primacy is strikingly evident in
the words of a child who when asked to tell which of two photos is the boy
and which is the girl, answers: ‘‘I don’t know, they don’t have their clothes
on’’ (Coates, 1997). That is, stereotypical cues that are associated with
gender are used by children earlier than are anatomical cues that are used
later to uniquely define someone as male or female.
In fact, although most children know their own gender by the age of two
(Gordon, Schroeder, & Abrams, 1990), before the age of 5 to 6, children
believe they belong to a given gender because of external appearance such
as hair length, clothes, or behavior, and prior to that age, ‘‘most children
have not acquired the domain specific knowledge that gender categorization is determined by genitals and that this categorization overrides all other
cultural differences’’ (Schrut, 1994, p. 14). In fact, only about half of 6-yearolds associate genitalia uniquely with individuals of a given sex (Gordon
et al., 1990). In some studies, genital knowledge does not precede the
acquisition of gender constancy, a finding that is contrary to many
theoretical analyses, including that of Bem (1979). Moreover, Trautner,
Gervai, and Nemeth (2003) found that gender constancy for self was
unrelated to children’s genital knowledge. In a study with Swedish 3- to
10-year-olds, McConaghy (1979) identified two independent factors in
gender constancy: one reflecting gender constancy in the face of changes in
appearance, and the other, reflecting understanding of the genital basis of
gender identity. These two factors exhibited the properties of a Guttman
scale3, with genital knowledge emerging later in development.
In research with German preschoolers aged 2 to 6 (Volbert, 2000),
children did not generally evidence understanding of genital differences
before age 5 to 6, except when shown drawings of unclothed individuals.
Rather, children referred to clothing and hair as differentiating the two
genders. In a similar study with Dutch children, the majority of children
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were unable to say what made them male or female and alluded to their hair
and sports abilities (Brilleslijper-Kater & Baartman, 2000). The same pattern
emerges in American children who do not appear to know what makes
them a boy or a girl before age 7, with a boy stating, ‘‘I am a boy because I
have boy hair’’ and a girl exclaiming ‘‘I know I am a girl because my mom
named me a girl’’ (Gordon et al, 1990, p. 37–38). In an early study by Levin,
Balistrieri, and Schukit (1972), even 7-year-olds who were able to
discriminate drawings of males and females according to their genitalia,
were unable to maintain gender constancy when hair or clothing were
added as gender cues.
McConaghy (1980) argues that this developmental sequence, which
appears across countries, may well be the result of the fact that the
association between anatomy and gender is socially-controlled. That is, the
fact that there are two types of genitals, that they are uniquely associated
with a given sex, and that gender is assigned on the basis of genitals, is not
an integral part of children’s early gender socialization in most cultures and
parents admit to being reluctant to share this knowledge with their children
(Geasler, Dannison, & Edlund, 1995).
Furthermore, studies that have examined children’s knowledge regarding
conception and birth generally show that prior to age 7, few children have
an understanding of the origin of babies (e.g., Bernstein & Cowan, 1975;
Goldman & Goldman, 1982), or the relation between genitals and birth
(e.g., Caron & Ahlgrim, 2012; Koch, 1980). On the other hand, children
who have been sexually-abused evidence greater understanding of the
origin of babies, are more likely to discuss genital body parts, and to include
genitals in their drawings (Hibbard, Roghmann, & Hoekelman, 1987;
Hibbard & Hartman, 1990). They also evidence more sexualized play with
anatomic dolls (August & Foreman, 1989; Jampole & Webber, 1987; White,
Strom, Santilli & Halpin, 1986). So, it may well be that in clinical
populations, as were many of Freud’s patients, children are sensitized to
differences between male and female genitalia and do experience some of
these developmental processes earlier and differently than non-clinical
populations.
THE ROLE OF ATTACHMENT PROCESSES
The above suggests that families may play an important role in the
development of the Oedipus complex, the onset of castration anxiety, and
the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Specifically, as Solnit (1983) and
others (e.g., Agger, 1988) have argued, children’s developmental level and
the nature of the parent-child relationship form two major intersecting axes.
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
439
When the Oedipal complex is conceptualized as ‘‘a family complex’’
(e.g., Smadja, 2011; Young-Bruehl, 2009), then ‘‘factors operating in family
life, such as the role of authority of the parents, seclusion of the family, size
of the family, sexual prohibitions, and the like’’ (Horney, 1939, p. 84), as
well as parental attitudes, likely all play critical roles in its emergence. In
fact, Shane, Shane and Gales (1997) conclude that, ‘‘the Oedipus complex
is not a universal organizer of development but rather it is dependent on its
emergence on experiences within the family constellation’’ (p. 179). Horney
(1933, 1939) argued that the Oedipus complex is nonexistent under some
cultural conditions and that ‘‘this particular emotional pattern in the
relations between parents and children, arises only under certain cultural
conditions’’ (1933, p. 223), namely in patriarchal societies (e.g., Smadja,
2011).
In fact, the development of relational psychoanalysis and of selfpsychology has re-focused attention on the potential impact of adverse
childhood environments for the clinical understanding of castration anxiety
(e.g., Taylor, 2016). In Mitchell’s (1988) model, the trauma associated with
castration anxiety is attributed to a lack of secure attachment relationships
that do not offer sufficient empathic mirroring and fail to foster a sense of
security. Kohut (1984) also argued that castration anxiety is a secondary
symptom rather than a causal factor in neurotic symptomatology. He
posited that being raised by psychologically-healthy parents who provide
adequate empathic mirroring minimizes castration anxiety and that parents
who do not create a responsive affective environment vis à vis the child
create a traumatic atmosphere that induces a high degree of castration
anxiety. More generally, Kleeman (1971) concluded that ‘‘the ego functions
concerned with the development of body image, reality testing, and the
sense of self are crucial for the sense of gender identity,’’ and that the latter
‘‘cannot proceed normally without healthy object relationships’’ (p. 117). In
this context, Roiphe and Galenson (1972) suggested that although some
children develop moderate to severe castration anxiety after exposure to the
anatomical difference between the sexes, such reactions only develop in
children whose early experiences interfere with the acquisition of a
stable body image. Thus, the field of psychoanalysis has now embraced
attachment processes (e.g., Coates & Wolfe, 1995; Tyson, 1986) as the
crucial factor in children’s psychical life, recognizing the importance of
early events in the child’s life as critical to how castration anxiety and the
Oedipal complex are experienced and resolved.
In particular, infant research has honed in on the mother-infant
relationship, emphasizing the kind of attachment relationships that develop
(e.g., Zamanian, 2011), with a special focus on the mother’s ability to read
the child’s signals, and how this impacts the child’s emotional life and
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ability to negotiate the world. As Lamp-DeGroot (1952) noted, disturbances
of the first mother-child relations can impede the child’s normal development and since each stage contains residues of earlier developmental
stages, such disturbances can have major, lifelong repercussions. In
particular, Greenacre (1953) emphasized the importance of the first 18
months for boys’ gender identity, noting that disturbances in the motherchild relationship and possibly, exposure to the sight of female genitals, may
predispose boys to severe castration anxiety in later stages of development.
Thus, research has focused our attention on the importance of the boy’s
earliest relationship with his mother, her ability to read his signals, and the
emotional synchrony that allows for a secure attachment relationship with
the mother to develop (e.g., Stern, 1985). There is some clinical evidence
that children whose attachment is anxious and disorganized have a more
difficult time negotiating the world and that children who have not
experienced sensitive caretaking, relative to securely-attached children, are
likely to experience and resolve the Oedipus complex and castration
anxiety very differently.
Yet Freud saw castration anxiety as an integral and universal aspect of
children’s development rather than as being unique to children with
negative attachment experiences. And as Diamond and Blatt (2007)
contend, attachment is not independent of other spheres of development.
They propose that from infancy, sexuality and attachment form a bidirectional matrix in which one system influences the other. In their view,
children’s attachment and degree of felt security provide a scaffold for the
development of their sexuality. Drawing on Freud’s (1920) Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, Weinstein (2007) similarly argues for such a bidirectional matrix, positing that attachment relations provide the stability
required for the pleasure principle to become operative. In classical
psychoanalytic theory, the father’s influence only becomes evident in the
3rd or 4th year of the child’s life. Yet fathers play an important role in their
children’s lives much earlier (Lamb, 2013), and the punitive and threatening
role Freud attributed to fathers is far from descriptive of how fathers actually
engage with their infants and toddlers. In a late paper, Winnicott (1969)
writes that ‘‘the baby is likely to make use of the father as a blue-print for his
or her own integration’’ (p. 243), clarifying that the father has a structuring
role in the mind of the baby. Hence, young infants are viewed as engaging
in sophisticated, dyadic and triadic interactions with both their parents (e.g.,
Edgecumbe & Burgner, 1975), suggesting that Oedipal theories need to be
revised to reflect this. Yet the view of families as triads contrasts with Freud’s
view of the family as a more complex, and dynamic, system. Specifically,
Freud saw the family as a system in which siblings, and especially ‘‘the
discovery or the suspicion of the arrival of a new baby,’’ engenders in the
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
441
child ‘‘the fear that he may, as a result of it, cease to be cared for and loved’’
(Freud, 1905, p. 194–195). This underlines Freud’s view of the family as a
dynamic structure which embodies the potential for traumatic experiences,
with parents as both the inducers, and the potential buffers, of such
traumatic experiences.
THE IMPACT OF FAMILY CONSTELLATION
As discussed above, the Oedipal complex is generally portrayed as
emerging within a triadic relationship, ‘‘a universal nuclear family
structure… with a mother-father-son triad at its core’’ (Fuchsman, 2004,
p. 31). But Freud (see Parens, 1988) viewed the development of children’s
sexual theories as emerging within a family constellation in which one or
more siblings play focal, and multiple roles in children’s psychical life. In
fact, Freud claimed that the greatest event of a young child’s life is the birth
of a sibling (1909, p. 10).
But this event is viewed by Freud as a shock to the child’s psychological
system, and when there are multiple births of younger siblings, this shock ‘‘is
repeated with the birth of each new brother and sister’’ (1933, p. 123).
Beyond the shock, though, siblings are woven into the fabric of children’s
lives such that ‘‘when other children appear on the scene the Oedipus
complex is enlarged into a family complex’’ (Freud, 1917, p. 333f.), with the
intricate relationships that develop forming ‘imagos’ of his father, his
mother, his brothers and sisters (Freud, 1914, p. 243), imagos that are laid
down by the time the child is six years old and are represented within the
child’s superego.
Though he seldom referred to his own family, Freud developed his
developmental theory of gender identity in part on his own experiences in a
family with a complex sibling constellation (e.g., Sherwin-White, 2007).
Although the child born immediately after Sigmund was male, this male
child died when Freud was about 24 months old. But the five subsequent
children were all female, born when Freud was between 2 and 8 years old,
with a brother born only when Freud was 10 (Clark, 1980). Hence, during
the time Freud was acquiring his own gender identity, he was surrounded by
younger, female siblings to whose genitalia he may well have been exposed
when they were being diapered and bathed, or when they were toilettrained. As Greenacre (1968) notes, awareness of genital differences
between men and women, and between boys and girls, may occur before
the age of four if parents appear nude in front of the child, or because there
are two children of the opposite sex who, depending on the age gap
between them, may well be changed, bathed, and dressed together on a
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regular basis4. Schuhrke (2000) found that German mothers of singleton
children often shower and bathe with their toddlers, but that when toddlers
have siblings, the children are bathed together. This practice is relatively
common in the U.S. as well (Rosenfeld, Siegel, & Bayley, 1987), but recedes
as children grow older (e.g., ‘‘he used to bathe with his sister but now they
are too big to fit, and I feel they should bathe alone’’, p. 227). Unsurprisingly, mothers who reported that their children had greater exposure to
adult male nudity and to opposite-sex siblings reported that their children
were more likely to use appropriate names for their genitals (Fraley, Nelson,
Wolf & Lozoff, 1991).
Hence, genital awareness may be most likely to emerge in families with
opposite-sex siblings. In fact, from the psychoanalytic perspective, both
relative age and sex of sibling are critical. Specifically, for Freud (1933), it is
the shocking birth of a younger sibling that provides a major impetus for
psychological development, with older siblings not being accorded a
developmental role. In addition, the birth of an opposite-sex sibling was
deemed critical for the development of gender identity because it is the sight
of the genitals of the other sex that sets into motion the patterns of
psychosexual development Freud described. If, as Freud, claimed, the focal
variable is exposure to anatomical differences, exposure to an opposite sex,
but not a same-sex sibling, would serve to set psychosexual development
into motion. In this light, Bem (1979) argued that the understanding of
genital differences as uniquely associated with a given sex is the critical
input for the development of other-gender constancy. Being exposed to
others in terms of their social gender—but not in terms of their biological
sex—delays the acquisition of other-gender constancy. Sex and gender need
to be disentangled and such disentanglement would be fostered by having
an opposite-sex sibling, irrespective of his or her relative age. In line with
this, both Bem (1989) and others (Lloyd & Stroyan, 1994) have found that
children with greater genital knowledge evidence greater gender constancy
for both self and for others, but the role of siblings was not investigated in
this context.
In a study with Israeli Jewish preschoolers, Karniol (2009) found that in
answering whether a portrayed target child could change sex at will,
references to birth sex showed significant interactions with both sibling sex
and relative age. For children with a male sibling, explicit references to birth
sex did not differ by relative age of sibling; for children with a female
sibling, those with an older one were significantly less likely to refer
explicitly to birth sex than those with a younger female sibling. As well, girls
made fewer explicit references to birth sex than boys, with boys referring
more explicitly to birth sex when they had a male sibling. Hence, having a
sibling fosters children’s understanding that sex is a permanent
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
443
characteristic of others that is determined at birth, but both the relative age
and the sex of the sibling are relevant in determining such understanding.
Turning to genital and anatomical differences, parallel to other research,
many children in the study above were unable to provide answers to the
question of how girls and boys differ. But for children who referred
explicitly to birth sex, having a younger sibling was associated with
significantly more references to genital and anatomical differences. This
suggests that as Freud argued, it is children’s experience with the birth and
presence of a younger sibling that contribute to the older child’s gender
development. One may well question why the birth of a younger sibling
would have such an impact. First, to the extent that children are present
when the younger sibling is bathed, diapered, and dressed, they may
become aware of anatomical similarities or differences as compared to self.
Freud (1909) notes this phenomenon, both in his discussion of Little Hans
and in a footnote referring to boys who were present when their newborn
sister was bathed. Hoffman (2010) suggests that boys, in particular,
experience a threat to their bodies when a baby sister is born, and that it
is the presence of an opposite-sex sibling (whether older or younger) that
heightens children’s anxiety about the integrity of their bodies because of
their emergent awareness of anatomical differences.
Second, the birth of a younger sibling may provide children with an
opportunity to be involved in caretaking functions associated with babies
and thereby, expose them to anatomical differences as well. Although this
issue has not been addressed systematically, Nadelman and Begun (1982)
cite maternal reports that 71% of children in families with a newborn assist
in diapering and dressing infant siblings, and 43% help in bathing the infant.
Moreover, male children with younger female, rather than a male sibling,
evidence more spontaneous care-taking functions when alone with an
infant in a strange situation (Stewart & Marvin, 1984), suggesting that
mothers may involve them more often in infant care. However, crossculturally, girls are more often involved in such functions than boys (e.g.,
Posada, Carbonell, Alzate & Plata, 2004; Weisner, 2001), with this
involvement possibly exposing them more often to anatomical differences
between siblings and engendering comparisons of one’s own anatomy with
that of the younger sibling. In line with this, in their study of 5- to 15-yearold children with at least one younger sibling, Goldman and Goldman
(1982) found that children living with a sibling of the other sex achieved
higher scores on questions concerned with identifying a newborn as male or
female and the differential physical development of boys and girls.
Goldman and Goldman (1983) conclude that ‘‘children exposed to family
living with one or more siblings of the other sex have a built-in sex
education process within their family life, at least where knowledge of sex
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differences is concerned’’ (p. 292). In this light, Dunn and Kendrick (1982)
note that after the birth of a sibling, children make explicit comparisons,
including of genital differences (e.g., ‘‘Hasn’t got a widdly,’’ p. 65). As a
British mother explained about her 4-year-old ‘‘he’s always asking me about
it…who has a tail and who has not…he noticed she was different as soon as
she was born’’ (Newson & Newson, 1968, p. 379). Murphy (1972) cites the
case of a 4-year-old who puzzled over his baby sister’s lack of a ‘‘tinkler,’’
and used a piece of rubber to give his baby doll one. Conn (1940, p. 750)
noted a mother who reported that her 5-year-old daughter who saw her
2-year-old brother undressed, exclaimed: ‘‘Gee, it’s funny. He’s got
something different.’’ These anecdotes underline that exposure to nude
babies leads children to recognize the anatomical similarity or difference
between themselves and the younger sibling. Of course, parents may well
play a role in this understanding. As Kleeman (1971) notes, a little girl who
at 23 months first saw her newborn brother’s genitalia when diapered, was
told ‘‘little boys have different genitals from little girls’’ (p. 123). Further,
having a younger sibling appears to engender the understanding that birth
determines one’s sex and that counter-stereotypic behavior and appearance
cannot impact this basic affiliation without un-natural intervention. Pregnancy often engenders conversations that spur such understanding. For
instance, Gabbard and Wilkinson (1996) cite a pregnant mother’s conversation with her 3-year-old daughter, with the child insisting that the baby
would be a girl. When asked how she would feel if a brother was born
instead, she replied, ‘‘Mommy, if it were a boy, it would be in Daddy’s
tummy!’’ When parents engage in conversations with expectant siblings,
children attain a more accurate understanding of the intimate tie between
birth and gender. As a boy of 76 months with a year-old sibling said
regarding a female target, ‘‘that’s how nature created her….only witches can
change her into a boy’’ (Karniol, 2009, p. 87). Moreover, children with
younger siblings are likely to learn that babies are males and females even
though they do not look like males and female when fully-clothed. The
presence of a baby, who does not look like a little girl or a little boy but is
identified as such by others, allows the child to understand that gender is not
only a social category, but also a biological one. As a savvy 58-month-old
boy with a year-old, male sibling explained, ‘‘that’s how one is born, a girl is
born as a girl and a boy is born is boy. You can get mixed up with babies
that a boy is a girl and girl is a boy. You know by what the parents of the
baby tell you’’ (Karniol, 2009, p. 87). It is the dissociation between how
babies and infants look, and the gendered labels and language used in
referring to them that promotes the older sibling’s understanding of gender
constancy in others.
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
445
The dissociation between babies’ sex and their appearance is also
bridged by the use of gendered pronouns that clarify the sex of the newborn
(e.g., ‘‘Isn’t she cute?’’) and in many languages, by the use of verbs that are
marked for sex, requiring speakers to acknowledge whether they are
speaking of male or female babies. The adoption of cultural cues that mark
babies of each sex (e.g., color codes, jewelry codes) may also foster this
dissociation. In many cultures in which baby attire is not color-coded, baby
girls are distinguished from their male counterparts by having their ears
pierced and gold or diamond studs placed in them. Finally, having a baby
born in the family may facilitate understanding of the immutability of sex
when processes like pregnancy and birth are explained to children by
parents (Holmes, 1995), by reading books relating to the impending birth
(e.g., Sheldon, 2005), and by hospital-provided ‘‘sibling classes’’ that
prepare preschoolers for the new baby. Such preparation (e.g., Kleeman,
1971) provides the child with opportunities to hear about pregnancy and
birth which, being uniquely associated with women, and may promote
understanding of differences between men and women. The arrival of a
younger sibling also provides parents with opportunities to discuss
differences between babies, little boys, and little girls (Dunn & Kendrick,
1982). Hence, children with younger siblings receive an abundance of
gender-related biological information that children with older siblings may
not receive until much later, as evident in a six-year-old girl with a 3-‘year-old brother who said, ‘‘Even if she wanted to be a boy she couldn’t
because she cannot go back into her mother’s tummy and change to come
out a boy’’ (Karniol, 2009 p. 88).
Yet as Volling acknowledges (2005), few studies have addressed the
impact of the psychological transition that children undergo when a
younger sibling is born (for an exception, see Vandell, 1987–1988). In
describing his son’s reaction to the birth of a baby brother, Mendelson
(1990) captured the extensive psychological work that a preschooler
engages in both before, and after, a sibling is born. The current analysis
suggests that the presence of siblings, both younger and older, is a critical
variable that should be considered more thoroughly both theoretically and
empirically, in children’s social development. Importantly, it seems that the
kinds of generic statements that adults make about the distinctive anatomy
of boys and girls may well impact how children learn to generalize in these
domains (cf., Graham, Gelman, & Clarke, 2016). Yet as Butler and
Tomasello (2016) have shown, even a single instance of linguistic labeling
may be sufficient to lead 2- and 3-year-olds to generalize, an issue that has
not been investigated in the context of gender.
Notably, independently of exposure to female genitalia, castration
anxiety may still emerge in light of warnings regarding punishment for
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masturbation (e.g., ‘‘You shouldn’t play with your thing, else it’ll fall off and
the boy will have a wee-wee instead,’’ Volbert, 2000, p. 21), and
discussions of circumcision as ‘‘cutting it off’’ (e.g., Martin & Torres,
2014). Thus, castration anxiety is likely tied to the way society—and
parents—handle the anatomical differences between males and females. It
may well be that mothers who engender secure attachment relationships
may be able to obviate the trauma associated with the birth of younger
siblings, possibly by providing birth and sex-related information that can
help the expectant sibling cope better with the impending trauma. Notably,
Freud’s own exposure to his many female siblings during the years that
castration anxiety is most profound, was likely highly instrumental to the
development of psychoanalytic theory and in particular, his views regarding
the dissolution of the Oedipal complex in boys.
CONCLUSIONS
The above review has underlined the critical importance of the family
constellation to boys’ emerging awareness of their own, and other people’s,
genitals. Such awareness is critical to Freud’s view of the dissolution of the
Oedipal complex and its aftermath in the development of the superego. The
pattern of development that seems to best capture the processes described
above include the child’s learning to self-label as male and learning to
associate this self-label with the category of boys, a developmental
milestone that appears to be achieved by the age of about 2 to 3, as
evident in children’s ability to differentiate photos of boys and girls by about
29 months (Etaugh, Grinnell & Etaugh, 1989). But prior to age 4, children
use visible, gender-stereotypical cues such as hair and clothing to
differentiate girls and boys, responding at chance level at age 4 when
clothing cues and hair cues conflict (Gelman, Collman & Maccoby, 1986).
At these same ages, they also learn that if one girl has a given gendered
characteristic, another girl is also likely to have it, and vice versa (Gelman,
Collman, & Maccoby, 1986). At the next phase, between the ages of 4 and
6, boys evidence understanding of the fact that they will grow up to be men
and fathers, whereas girls will grow up to be mothers and women
(Thompson & Bentler, 1973). The above developments appear to be
independent of the understanding of genital differences, although via
exposure to genital differences, children learn that genitals—and not
appearances or behaviors—define one’s sex.
Critically, definitive answers as to whose nudity is critical for the
dissolution of the Oedipus complex would require research comparing
singleton boys, boys with younger same-sex siblings, boys with younger
DISSOLUTION OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN BOYS
447
opposite-sex siblings, and boys with both types of older siblings. Moreover,
such research would need to assess children’s exposure to parental nudity,
parental attitudes to their own nudity and to their children’s nudity, as well
as the way parents discuss their children’s genitals with them. In fact,
Horney (1933) underlined the importance of research, saying, ‘‘The final
verdict about the soundness of our theoretical ideas, must be postponed
until we have at our disposal systematic observations of normal children,
carried out by on a large scale by persons trained in psychoanalysis’’ (p.
150). Research (e.g., Geasler, Dannison, & Edlund, 1995; Martin, Baker,
Torres, & Luke, 2010) has shown that many parents are quite uncomfortable in naming and discussing their children’s genitals with their children,
raising the possibility that castration anxiety, if it emerges at all, may well be
how children deal with the discomfort that parents convey to them in
discussing sexual matters. This is an important avenue for future research to
explore.
Finally, the assumption that ‘‘everyone is like me,’’ when faced with the
reality of anatomical differences, racial differences, and other differences
that society deems relevant, restructures children’s self-identity in terms of a
comparison with others, using similarities and differences from others
(McGuire & McGuire, 1988) to define themselves physically, emotionally,
and psychologically. This is a critical aspect of being able to generalize from
self as a boy to the category of boys, to see how one is similar to other boys
and how one differs from other boys, possibly allowing for the emergence of
self-definitions that label oneself as ‘‘a boy locked in a girl’s body’’ and vice
versa (e.g., Ehrensaft, 2009; Fast & Olson, 2018), making Freud’s analysis of
how children face the reality of genital similarities and differences more
important than ever for our understanding of boys’ development.
NOTES
1.. Rachel Karniol, Ph.D, was born in Israel and raised in Canada. She received her B.Sc. in
Psychology from the University of Toronto and her M.A. and Ph.D. in Social Psychology
from the University of Waterloo. Dr. Rachel Karniol is Professor Emerita of Social
Development in the School of Psychological Sciences at Tel Aviv University and has also
taught at the University of Toronto, Princeton University, and Carnegie Mellon University.
Her expertise is at the crossroads of social and developmental psychology, with a focus on
gender development, EQ and empathy development, and the impact of toys and pretend
play. Her research has appeared in the most important journals in psychology and her
book, Social Development as Preference Management: How Infants, Children, and Parents
Get What They Want from one Another was published by Cambridge University Press in
2010. Her research on the impact of wearing a Superman cape on children’s self control
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appeared in the Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology and was discussed in
the Wall Street Journal.
2.. Freud states that he was between 2 and 2‘ years of age but according to his biographers,
this event took place when Freud was 4 (Lewin, 1970). Importantly, though there is some
argument as to whether Freud did, or did not see, his mother’s nude body (e.g., Zepf &
Zepf, 2010; Holt, 2001; Stuart, 2007). Freud’s understanding of and reaction to her
pregnancy has not been addressed.
3.. The Guttman scale consists of a hierarchy of closely related yes – no statements so that
agreement with a given statement implies agreement with all less strongly worded
statements. In this instance, McConaghy (1979) showed that only children who responded
yes to all items regarding gender constancy for appearance, responded correctly to the
items relating to the genital bases of gender.
4.. Studies of children’s understanding of gender and genital knowledge do not generally
address the presence of siblings (e.g., Brilleslijper-Kater & Baartman, 2000; De Marneffe,
1997; McConaghy, 1980; Senet, 2004), nor the relative age of opposite-sex siblings (e.g.,
Levin, Balistrieriu, & Schukit, 1972; for exceptions, see Goldman & Goldman, 1983;
Thompson & Bentler, 1973). Even studies that note the presence of siblings (e.g., Gordon,
Schroeder, & Abrams, 1990; Trautner, Gervai & Németh, 1990; Trautner et al., 2003) do
not account for this variable.
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