Harne, Distinguishing Theory from Practice, habitus, scientiae and musical cognition in the Speculum musicae copy

Distinguishing Theory from Practice: Habitus, Scientia
and Musical Cognition in the Speculum Musicae
George Harne
The College of Saint Mary Magdalen
A complex epistemology exists at the center, and just below the surface, of scholastic
musical thinking in the later Middle Ages, an epistemology presupposed rather than
explicitly expressed. Though a Pythagorean emphasis—through its Boethian variations—remained prominent within medieval writings on music, an Aristotelian understanding of the human soul as the animating source of human existence, sensing, and
knowing became an integral part of how writers on music understood their subject
and its species.1 The distinction between two species in particular, music theorica and
musica practica, rested upon this understanding.
Since medieval authors believed that, at the most fundamental level, all knowledge
implies a cognitive network of relations constituted by a knower, an object known, and
an act of knowing from which knowledge results, these authors would have presupposed such a network when considering a particular type of knowledge such as musica.
Jacobus (b. ca. 1260, d. after 1330), when defining the discipline of musica in his Speculum musicae, uses terms such as habitus, facultas, and scientia that make more explicit his
own understanding of musical cognition.2 By clarifying the meaning of key terms
within Jacobus’ account and the relations between these terms, it becomes possible to
articulate the cognitive foundation that supports the Speculum musicae. The language
1
The permeation of scholastic and musical thought by Aristotelian philosophy during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries is treated most thoroughly in Rico 2010.
2
Within contemporary sociology, Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) articulated an extremely influential account
of habitus, leading to the term’s reintroduction to musical discourse. For Bourdieu’s account, see Bourdieu 1977,
72-95, 159-197. Cf. Carvalho, 2000 and Duncan 2004, 291. The late medieval understanding of the term will be
treated below.
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suggesting this foundation, when considered alongside the language used in other
treatises, also implicates an Aristotelian understanding of human cognition among the
authors of other late-medieval (and even some late-antique) sources devoted to musica.
Though of interest in itself, Jacobus’ epistemology also served as a source for his
ultimate rejection of the ars nova: his epistemology shaped his understanding of the
distinction between musica theorica, musica practica and their respective ends. This understanding in turn led to his judgment against the innovations of the new art.
That judgment, and its sources in the distinction between theory and practice, has
been treated in detail in a previous study.3 By taking the reader to the foundations of
the judgment against the ars nova—foundations within the cognitive powers of the
soul—this study also aims to show how attending to the non-musical, and apparently
peripheral, content of a musical treatise can illuminate the explicitly musical content
of a treatise.
***
Although the term scientia had been a part of descriptions of music since late anti­quity,
its contextualization by Jacobus and others through the use of complementary terms
such as facultas and habitus indicates a shift in the meaning of the term and its epistemological context.4 This changed meaning is perhaps clearest in the opening chapters
of the Speculum musicae. There, Jacobus defines musica in terms that remain faithful to
the Boethian tradition while also implying the human soul and the faculties of cognition.5
3
Harne 2010.
4
For the use of scientia and facultas by Engelbert of Admont, see 2.6 in Appendix 2.
5
For the definition by Boethius “Armonica est facultas differentias acutorum et gravium sonorum sensu ac
ratione perpendens”—see Boethius 1867, 352 and Boethius 1989, 163. Within the notes to his translation, Bower
takes up the significance of Boethius’ use of the terms “facultas” and “harmonica.” Whereas as Boethius had used the
term “harmonica,” Jacobus employs “musica.” The conceptual implications of Jacobus’ use of musica rather than
harmonica is treated in greater detail in the following note.
Concerning the origins and early history of “scientia,” see Erickson 1995, 33 n. 2. As a simple synonym for
“knowledge,” no Aristotelian connotations need to be assumed, and such an assumption would seem to be inappropriate for most treatises on music throughout most of the Middle Ages. (Cf. Gushee’s observation that “. . .
certain philosophic and speculative attitudes by no means apply to the entire epoch, e.g., the Aristotelian concept
of music as ‘scientia.’” Gushee 1973, 373.
When a medieval author employed “scientia” in a treatise on music, that author may simply be parroting
the traditional definition of music. Yet as one approaches treatises written within a late medieval scholastic milieu,
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Est autem musica, secundum Boethium quinto Musicae suae libro, facultas harmonica acutorum sonorum graviumque concordiam perpendens, idest scientia, qua quis
potens est faciliter acutorum sonorum graviumque simul collatorum perpendere concordiam et, de ea, qualis sit, iudicare. Scientia enim, cum sit habitus, facilitatem dat in
actu suo.6
Music is (according to Boethius in book five of his Musica), the harmonic faculty [facultas] considering the concord of high and low sounds, that is a knowledge [scientia],
by which someone is able to ponder with facility the harmony of simultaneous high
and low sounds and, about these things, is equipped to judge. Indeed, knowledge
[scientia], since it is a habitus, grants facility in the activity proper to it.
Having begun with a modified version of Boethius’ definition of musica, Jacobus contextualizes this definition through a series of terms that he associated with musica either as synonyms or as species of a genus: he describes musica as a type of “knowledge” [scientia] which is itself a type of habitus.7
But what is a habitus? According to Jacobus, a habitus “grants facility in the activity
proper to it.” In this description, the activity would be—at its most basic level—that
of the soul “considering the concord of high and low sounds” through the human
powers of cognition. By means of this activity, the soul would utilize the senses in the
reception of sonic phenomena and then transform the content of that perception
within the soul, enabling it to make informed judgments. Thus, musica, understood in
terms of scientia and habitus, would have been recognized as a modification of the soul
that “grants facility in [the soul’s] activity,” particularly the activity of its cognitive powers.
the likelihood increases that a given appearance of “scientia” in a treatise will connote Aristotelian cognition. It is
also possible that late-medieval readers will read an Aristotelian understanding of “scientia” into passages where it
was not originally intended. The careful coordination of terms such as “habitus” and “facultas” with “scientia” will
indicate that an author probably understands “scientia” within an Aristotelian context.
6
Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.2 (p. 14). Where Jacobus gave “concordiam” in this definition, Boethius gave “differentias.” “Armonica est facultas differentias acutorum et gravium sonorum sensu ac ratione perpendens.” Boethius
1867, 352. Another, perhaps more important substitution occurred when Jacobus substituted “musica” for “harmonica,” making “harmonica” the modifier of “facultas.” Cf. Boethius 1989, 162, n. 1; Boethius 1989, 163 nn. 3-4.
Concerning the discipline of “harmonics” and its relation to “musica” see Mathiesen 1976, 3-17; Barker
2000, 4-13; Ciconia 1993, 1.2 (54-57 with note 3 [“De duabus musicis”]); Solomon 1990, 71-72; Fast 1996, 179-83.
7
Concerning the relation between “scientia” and “science,” see Torrell 2003, 7-8. Cf. Aquinas 2002, 327
(commentary on the “sed contra”); Pasnau 2002, 406 n. 8; MacDonald 1993, 162, 164, 183-85, 188-89 n. 13, 194 n.
71; Balensuela 1994, 141 with n. 25; and Sachs’ glossary in Aristotle 2001, 207-8 (s.v., “intellect” and “knowledge”),
212 (s.v., “wisdom”).
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Had Jacobus provided only this expanded articulation of Boethius’ definition of
music, his coordination of “scientia” and “habitus” would have at most implied that he
had adopted an Aristotelian model of cognition. Not surprisingly—given the scope
and philosophical ambition of the Speculum—Jacobus offers another definition that
makes his cognitive model explicit.
Ideo musica, generaliter sumpta, describi vel definiri potest aliter sic, ut vult Robertus
in libro De Ortu Scientiarum: Musica est scientialis animae perfectio, quoad cognitionem armonicae modulationis rerum . . . Ponitur hoc loco generis, quod musica est
animae perfectio, non quaecumque, sed scientialis, . . . convenit in genere cum ceteris
scientiis, quae omnes animam, intellectu mediante, perficiunt.8
Therefore music, taken generally, can be described or defined another way, as Robertus [Kilwardby] maintains in the book De ortu scientiarum: “Music is a perfection of the
soul (a perfection pertaining to scientia) as it relates to the cognition of the harmonic
modulation of things.” . . . In this passage [musica] is posited as belonging to a genus:
“music is the perfection of the soul,” not of just any kind of perfection, but [one]
pertaining to scientia . . . [and] it combines in a genus with other scientiae which all perfect the soul through the medium of the intellect.
Through his adoption and explanation of Kilwardby’s definition of musica, Jacobus
removes any doubt about the role of the soul in his understanding of musical cognition and its foundation of the conception of musica as a habitus and a scientia.
The nature of the soul within Jacobus’ musical understanding becomes clearer in
book one—in his discussion of musica humana—when he offers a definition of the
soul itself: “the soul is the first actuality of a physical, organic body having the potential for life.”9 This definition, articulated in the language of the university, further con-
8
Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.2 (p. 15). Jacobus’ definition becomes more intelligible in light of Kilwardby’s more
expansive definition: “The subject [of musical knowledge] is harmonic number or things in harmonically-proportioned combination. Cognition of such things and of such a number is the purpose, specifically, the perfection of
the speculative part of the soul through the cognition of such a thing. Definition: it is a part of speculative knowledge (which perfects the cognitive faculty)—pertaining to the cognition of harmonic modulation or of whatever
sort of things have been combined with one another by harmonic modulation”. [Subiectum enim est numerus
armonicus vel res armonica proportione coaptate. Finis, talium rerum et talis numeri cognitio, sive perfectio partis
animae speculativae per cognitonem huiuscemodi. Definitio, pars scientiae speculativae humani aspectus perfectiva
quoad cognitionem harmonicae modulationis vel quarumcumque rerum harmonica modulatione invicem coaptatarum.] Kilwardby 1976, 53. See also Grossmann 1924, 8-9.
9
Anima autem est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis . . . Jacobus 1955-1973,
1.14 (p. 51).
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firms that Jacobus had adopted the scholastic and Aristotelian understanding of the
soul.
Additional support for this interpretation appears in Jacobus’ quotation of Aristotle’s De anima, using the same Latin translation employed by Thomas Aquinas and
others. In line fifteen of the prologue to Book 1 of the Speculum, Jacobus states “Vivere enim viventibus est esse,” [“but for living things, existing is living”], a quotation
of “vivere autem viventibus est esse” from William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of
Aristotle’s De anima.10
Given the importance of the soul to Jacobus’ understanding of musica as a scientia
and a habitus, the larger medieval understanding of the soul and its role in cognition
warrants a careful examination. In addition to shedding light on the musical epistemology that the Speculum musicae presupposes, a consideration of the soul, its faculties, and
their role in musical cognition can clarify passages in other treatises on music: a sample
of twenty loci from a variety of treatises that employ the language of medieval epistemology may be found in the second appendix of this study.
The first step toward recuperating the late medieval concept of the soul—and by
extension the cognitive basis of the late medieval understanding of musica as a discipline—will be the reintegration of an entity that has been sundered by the disciplines
of modernity: the anima, or soul, which classical philosophers and the Middle Ages
understood as a unity has been divided.11 Today, “philosophers tend to equate soul and
mind,” while theologians tend to “equate soul and spirit.”12 In order to grasp the
meaning and musical significance of Jacobus’ understanding of musica as a scientia, a
careful reconstruction of the late medieval understanding of soul must be undertaken.
10
Aquinas 1984, 2.7 (p. 95). Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.1 (p. 8). Other musici also cited De anima: passages from
Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250-1331) and Marchetto of Padua (fl. 1305-1319), are given Appendix 2 (2.7, 2.17,
2.19).
11
But did modernity merely re-divide (though along different lines) what had previously existed separately
for Homer and the pre-Socratics? See Peters 1967, s.v. “psyche” and Urmson 1990, s.v. “psukhê.” Concerning
Descartes’ understanding of the relationships between the mind, the soul and the body, see: Descartes 1993, 8-10,
17-24, 47-59 and Soffer 1984, 57-68. For a book length study concerning the final stages of the Aristotelian scientia
de anima in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (with attention to the reconsideration of the Aristotelian soul by some recent psychologists), see Des Chene, 2000.
12
The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, s.v., “soul.”
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Defining the Soul
In the first book of the Speculum musicae, Jacobus defined the soul using the language
of the schools: “the soul is the first actuality of a physical, organic body having the
potential for life.”13 Jacobus’ definition of “soul” owes debts to both Aristotle and
early Christianity and depends upon an understanding of the anima that found an extensive exposition in the works of Thomas Aquinas.14 As the modern reader seeks to
grasp Jacobus’ understanding of the soul, two of Aquinas’ works—the Summa theologiae and his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’—provide valuable guidance.15
Aristotle had called the soul [psukhê] “that by which in the primary sense we live
and perceive and think things through . . . a sort of articulation and form, and not an
underlying material.”16 He illustrated the function of the soul using the eye and its
activity: “For if the eye were an animal, the soul of it would be its sight, since this is
the thinghood [“substance,” ousia] of an eye as it is disclosed in speech (and the [physical] eye is the material of sight); if its sight were left out it would no longer be an eye,
13
Anima autem est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis . . . Jacobus 1955-1973,
1.14 (p. 51).
14
Pasnau 1997, 11; Dod 1982; Lohr 1982; Wittmann 1987; Owens 1993, 38-59; and Aertsen 1993, 12-37.
15
Karen Desmond has made significant contributions to our understanding of the philosophical and
intellectual contexts in which Jacobus worked: Desmond 2009. For the larger scholastic context, see Rico 2005
and Tanay 1999, 21-22; Yudkin 1990, 178-89; Pinegar 1991; Haines and Dewitt 2008, 4-98; Fladt 1987; Wittmann,
1987; and Ilnitchi 2005.
16
Aristotle De anima 414a13-14. Aristotle 2001, 87. In De anima, Aristotle characterized “soul” in three
ways: first there is “the form of a natural body which potentially has life;” second, “the first actuality of a natural
body which potentially has life” (412a27-28); and third “the first actuality of a body which has organs” (412b5-6),
Everson 1995, 173.
As noted above, there is an explicit link between the Latin translation of Aristotle’s De anima employed by
Thomas Aquinas—i.e., the translation by William of Moerbeke (ca. 1215-1286)—and the prologue to Book 1 of
the Speculum musicae. At 415b13, the translation of Aristotle reads, “vivere autem viventibus est esse” [“but for living
things, existing is living”] and this statement is given by Jacobus of Liège in line fifteen of the prologue to Book 1,
“Vivere enim viventibus est esse,” (with a different postpositive coordinating conjunction, reflecting a different
context). Aquinas 1984, 2.7 (p. 95); Aquinas 1999, 2.7 (p. 163). Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.1 (p. 8). Such a definition was
common currency among Parisian scholastics and its use by Jacobus of Liège does not demonstrate his direct
contact with the work of Aquinas.
For a brief introduction to the issues involved in Aquinas’ “puzzling version of the mind-body problem”
and its articulation in terms of form and material (which is comparable, in its broad outlines, to the version held by
Jacobus of Liège) see Aquinas 2002, xvii-xviii.
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except ambiguously, in the same way as a stone eye or a painted one.”17 For Aristotle
“the soul of a thing is its shape, appearance, pattern of reaction, and . . . its way of
changing over time and acting, in fact, all the properties that make it the kind of thing
it is.”18
Although Aristotle distinguished the material of the body from the animating activity of the soul, his investigation of the soul neither anticipated a Cartesian separation of the mind from the body nor presupposed the circumscribed concerns of
modern psychology.19
The subject matter of Aristotelian ‘psychology’ . . . is demarcated in a quite different
way from that studied by the contemporary psychologist. While the latter focuses on
conscious and intentional states, Aristotle is rather concerned to give an account of
all those activities which are characteristic of living things . . . . What determines the
scope of [Aristotle’s] psychology is not the recognition of a distinction to be drawn
between the mental and the physical, but rather that between the living and the dead.
Since the states and events which concern the contemporary psychologist are indeed
characteristic of living creatures, they will also interest the Aristotelian psychologist—
but so, however, will growth and nutrition. A theory which includes, and requires, an
explanation of the behaviour of plants cannot be straightforwardly classed as a psychological theory.20
Aquinas, rearticulating Aristotle’s definition, described the soul as “the first thing
through which we live, although we live through soul and body. Therefore soul is the
form of a living body.”21 (The fourteenth-century author Johannes Vetulus echoed
Aristotle and Aquinas in calling the soul a “substantial form.” See locus 2.15 in Appendix 2). In later writings, Aquinas expanded this explanation, describing the soul as “the
first principle of life in the things that are alive around us. For we say that living things
17
Aristotle 2001, 83.
18
Swinburne 1998.
19
Everson 1995, 189.
20
Ibid., 168-69.
21
Aquinas 1999, 2.4 (p. 146). “Set anima est primum quo uiuimus, cum tamen uiuamus anima et corpore;
ergo anima est forma corporis uiuentis.” Aquinas 1984, 2.4 (p. 85).
Aquinas’ understanding of and agreement with Aristotle’s philosophy remains contested. For an overview
of these issues, see Pasnau 1999, xviii-xxi and Owens 1993, 38-57. Cf. Kretzmann 1993, 133-36.
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are animate, whereas inanimate things are those without life.”22 Aquinas went on to explain the role of the soul through an analogy: “the soul is . . . ‘the actuality of a physical body with organs’ . . . ‘potentially having life’”23 in the same way that “heat is said
to be the actuality of what is hot, and light the actuality of what is luminous. It is not
that something luminous exists apart from light, but that it is luminous through light.”24
Continuing the “luminous” metaphor, Norman Kretzmann described the soul-body
relation thus: “And so the soul’s involvement with the body is not a case of a spiritual
creature’s using a body as a person might use a lamp. The union of soul and body may
more accurately be thought of as a human soul’s constituting some matter as a living human body, something like the way a quantity of electricity (which needs no bulb or
wire to exist) constitutes some matter as a lighted lamp.”25 With Aristotle’s (and Aquinas’) understanding of the soul in mind, Jacobus’ claim that “the soul is the first actuality of a physical, organic body having the potential for life” becomes both more intelligible in itself but also indicative of the epistemological ground and context upon
which the Speculum musicae depends.26
Powers of the Soul
Though medieval authors could and did speak of the soul in general, discussions of
the soul frequently dealt with its particular parts or powers, sometimes called the “nutritive soul,” “sensitive soul” and “intellective soul.”27 These discussions assist readers
of medieval writings on music for two reasons. First, Jacobus and other writers on
22
Aquinas, ST Ia q. 75 a. 1 co.; Aquinas 2002, 3 (Reply) with commentary, 222. “Anima dicitur esse primum
principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt. Animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes.” All
of the Latin quotations from Aquinas 1888-1906. I have used the electronic version of this edition that is available
at www.corpusthomisticum.org.
23
habentis.”
Aquinas 1888-1906, Ia q. 76 a. 4 ad 1; Aquinas 2002, 35: “Anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam
24
Aquinas 1888-1906, ST Ia q. 76 a. 4 ad 1. Aquinas, 2002: “Calor est actus calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi—
non quod seorsum sit lucidium sine luce, sed quia est lucidum per lucem.”
25
Kretzmann 1993, 136.
26
Anima autem est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis . . . Jacobus 1955-1973,
1.14 (p. 51).
27
Aquinas 1999, 1.1 (p. 11); Aquinas 1984, 1.1 (p. 7).
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music referred to the parts of the soul, particularly in their treatment of musica humana,
and just as frequently assumed a familiarity with the soul and its powers when treating
other aspects of their subject.28 Second, two of these powers—the sensitive and intellective powers—constitute the sources through which musical cognition takes place.
Medieval authors enumerated the powers of the soul in a variety of ways.29 In the
most common enumeration (cited at the beginning of this section), Aquinas followed
Aristotle and set the number of powers at three, each defined according to the way in
which the power functions: the nutritive, the sensitive and the intellective.30 Because
the acquisition and retention of musica within the soul depends upon the sensitive and
intellective powers, and these subsume the nutritive power, each of the three powers
of the soul will be considered briefly.31
Through the nutritive soul, a living being preserves itself, grows and generates others like itself. Aquinas offered this account of the nutritive power.
Nam prima eius operatio est nutritio, per quam saluatur aliquid ut est; secunda autem
et perfectior est augmentum, quo aliquid proficit in maiorem perfectionem et secundum quantitatem et secundum uirtutem; tercia autem perfectissima et finalis est generatio per quam aliquid iam quasi in se ipso perfectum existens alteri esse et perfectionem tradit.32
Its first operation is nutrition, through which something is preserved as it is. Its second and more complete operation is growth, by which something develops a greater
completeness, both with respect to its size and with respect to its capacities. Third
comes generation, the most complete and the final operation, through which something already existing as complete in itself imparts existence and completeness to
another.33
28
See Appendix 2
29
Cf. Aquinas 1999, 1.14 (p. 110); Aquinas 1984, 1.14 (p. 64); Aquinas 1999, 2.3 (p. 140); Aquinas 1984, 2.3
(p. 81); Aquinas 1999, 2.3 (p. 137); and Aquinas 1984, 2.3 (p. 79).
30
Aquinas 1999, 110. “Quia uel secundum modum operandi et sic sunt tres potencie anime . . . uegetabilis,
sensibilis et intellectualis. . . .” Aquinas 1984, 64.
31
Kretzmann 1993, 131.
32
Aquinas 1984, 2.9 (p. 106).
33
Aquinas 1999, 2.9 (p. 183).
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For plants, the nutritive soul “is their soul, while in animals it is part of their soul.”34
(Magister Lambertus—i.e., Jacobus’ [Ps.]-Aristotle—referred in his Tractatus de musica
to the third operation of the nutritive power, also known as the vegetabilis anima, as the
virtus vegetiva).35
Through the sensory soul (or sensory power of the soul), which includes the powers of the nutritive soul, animals and humans interact with the world through sensory
cognition. (See loci by Boethius, Engelbert of Admont, Johannes de Grocheio, and
Marchetto of Padua in Appendix 2).36 This occurs in two general ways: through the
external senses and through the internal senses. The external senses consist of sight,
hearing, smell, taste and touch37 while the internal senses include, among other powers,
memory, imagination (phantasia), and “common sense” (the last of which Engelbert of
Admont referred to in his De musica; see Appendix 1 and 2).38
Just as the sensitive soul includes the nutritive soul, so the intellective soul includes
the powers of the sensitive and nutritive souls that logically precede it. Jacobus, in his
account of musica humana, correlated the development of the individual human being
with each type of soul, a development that culminates in a fully developed body integrated with an intellective soul. According to Jacobus
Anima autem humana inter formas corpori unibiles censetur perfectissima. Ideo requirit corpus melius dispositum et organizatum quam cetera viventia . . . Tandem tamen habet debitam dispositionem vita hominis, quia dispositio, quae sufficiebat ad
vitam plantae et ad vitam animalis, non sufficit ad vitam hominis, quae est per animam
intellectivam, qua sumus, movemur, vivimus, sentimus et intelligimus.39
34
Ibid., “Deinde cum dicit: Quoniam autem a fine etc., diffinit ipsam primam animam, que dicitur anima
uegetabilis, que quidem in plantis est anima, in animalibus autem pars anime.” Aquinas 1984, 2.9 (pp. 105-6).
35
See Appendix 2 (2.5) and the preceding note. Boethius 1906, 135-38 [1.01.04 and 1.01.12]; Boethius
1929, 70-72.
36
In particular, loci 2.2, 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.18 of Appendix 2. Following Aristotle’s division of the soul
in his Nicomachean Ethics—which itself followed the division in Plato’s Republic—Boethius also divided the soul
into rational and irrational parts. See locus 2.1 in Appendix 2 and n. 41 (p. 10) in Boethius 1989.
37
Aquinas, 1888-1906, ST, Ia q. 78 a. 3; Aquinas 2002, 82-84 and 287-88.
38
Ibid., a. 4; Aquinas 2002, 84-87, 288-91. Concerning “common sense,” see 2.9 in Appendix 2.
39
Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.14 (p. 51).
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And the human soul, among the forms that can be united to a body, is considered the
most perfect. Therefore it requires a better disposed and organized body than other
living things . . . Finally, however, human life possesses the proper disposition, because the disposition which suffices for the life of a plant or an animal does not suffice for the life of a human being, which is through the intellective soul, by which we
have our being, move, live, feel and understand.
The Potentiality and Actuality of Music in the Soul
It is within the third power of the soul, i.e., the intellective power, that Aquinas located
the “theoretical intellect” and the “practical intellect.”40 Jacobus, in turn, presupposed
these powers in his distinction between musica theorica and musica practica.
The operation of both of these types of intellect—in relation to music or any
other scientia—depends on the soul existing in three interrelated states of potentiality
and actuality: (1) a condition of pure potentiality, (2) a condition that is simultaneously actual and potential, and (3) a condition of pure actuality.41 Musica, as it was understood by Jacobus, existed within the soul as one of these latter two states: it could
be a condition that is simultaneously actual and potential or it could be a condition of
pure actuality.
These various conditions of potentiality and actuality can be illustrated by considering the power of sight. First, one could say that an animal that has just been conceived has the power of sight in pure potentiality. Second, once the animal has eyes
that function—even though the animal may be closing its eyes while sleeping—it has
the power of seeing in actuality. This inactive power is actual in relation to its prior
condition of pure potentiality (having just been conceived), but potential in relation to
the third stage: pure actuality. This third stage occurs when the animal is awake, with
its eyes open, while it is actively employing its powers of sight.
One may, in turn, speak of three conditions of the intellective soul involving potentiality and actuality (each of which will be used to illustrate the acquisition of musica as a scientia below). First, the human being who does not know something and is
yet capable of that knowledge is said to be knowing in pure potentiality. This is the
first condition of the intellective soul, the condition of the “potential knower.” The
40
Aquinas 1999, 2.33 (p. 233); Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.14 (p. 53).
41
Ibid., 2.11 (pp. 190-93).
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human being enters the second condition when this person acquires knowledge, thereby becoming an “actual knower,” but does not employ this knowledge at a given moment by engaging in the activity of knowing. In this condition, the intellective soul is
in a kind of middle state. The person possessing a soul in this condition is said to know
actually in relation to the prior condition of pure potentiality while at the same time
being in a state of potentiality in relation to fully actualized intellectual cognition. The
intellective soul enters the third condition, that of the “fully knowing knower,” when
it takes up the knowledge it possesses and engages in an act of knowing. Aquinas illustrates these three conditions of the intellective soul using the discipline of grammar:
Et dicit quod uno modo dicitur aliquid . . . sciens, quia habet naturalem potenciam ad
sciendum, sicut homo dicitur esse de numero sciencium et habencium scienciam, in
quantum habet naturam ad sciendum et ad habendum habitum sciencie; secundo
modo dicitur aliquid quod sciat, sicut dicimus habentem habitum alicuius sciencie,
puta gramatice, esse iam scientem. . . . secundus autem, scilicet qui habet habitum
sciencie, dicitur potens quia cum uult potest considerare . . . tercius autem, qui iam
considerat, est in actu et iste est qui proprie et perfecte scit ea que sunt alicuius artis,
puta hanc litteram A, quod pertinet ad gramaticam . . . Horum igitur trium, ultimus
est in actu tantum, primus in potencia tantum, secundum autem in actu respectu primi
et in potencia respectu tercii.42
And he [i.e., Aristotle] says that in one way, something is called knowing . . . because
it has a natural potential for knowing. In this way, a human being is said to be among
the things that know and have knowledge inasmuch as that person has a nature suited
for knowing and having dispositional knowledge (habitum sciencie). In a second way,
something is said to know in the way we say that someone having some dispositional
knowledge—e.g., knowledge of grammar—is now knowing . . . The second, however—namely, the one that has dispositional knowledge—is said to have the potential
because, whenever he wishes, he can consider [a thing] . . . But the third, the one that
is considering now, is in actuality. This is the one that properly and fully knows things
concerning an art—this letter A, for instance, which pertains to grammar . . . So of
these three, the last is entirely actualized and the first is entirely potential, whereas the
second is actualized relative to the first and potential relative to the third.43
42
Aquinas 1984, 2.11 (pp. 110-11).
43
Aquinas 1999, 2.11 (pp. 191-92).
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39
In the preceding quotation, Aquinas described the first condition as being one in
which a person is capable of possessing dispositional knowledge (habitum sciencie) and
the second stage as the actual possession of such dispositional knowledge. Here, Aquinas’ general account of knowledge in the soul intersects with Jacobus’ explicit definition of musica, both of which include terms—habitus and scientia, along with facultas—
that will be considered below.
In its broadest terms, a habitus was conceived as a modification of a “substance not
easily changed” (such as the soul) and was “opposed to a mere disposition,” which
changes more easily.44 Such a modification altered the nature or faculty [facultas] of that
to which it belonged “rendering it more prompt to act well or badly.”45 Within the
domain of human cognition, a habitus was defined as an active condition of the soul
“capable of developing by the very use we make of it.”46 Musica, for Jacobus, existed
in the intellective soul as a modification of that soul, giving it a faculty [facultas] or
“operative” tendency.
Jacobus was not the only author to assume his readers’ understanding of “habitus.” Among the writers cited in Appendix 2, both Franco of Cologne and the author
of the Summa musice used the relation between a habitus and its absence—i.e., privation—to illustrate the relation between sound and silence on the one hand and between the tone and the semitone on the other.47
How does the soul achieve this “musical” condition? How does the intellective
soul come to possess the habitus of musica (from which musica speculativa and musica
practica will proceed)? For Aristotle, Aquinas and those who accepted their epistemo­
logy, all knowledge begins with sense experience (see Appendix 1 and locus 2.14 in
Appendix 2).48
44
Deferrari 1948, s.v. “habitus.”
45
Ibid.
46
On the relation between “habitus” and “habit,” see Torrell 2003, 264; Aristotle 2002, 201-3 (s.v., “active
condition,” “being at work,” and “contemplation”), 206 (s.v., “habit”); Pasnau and Shields 2004, 229 and 240 n.
10. See also Shanley’s excellent commentary in Aquinas 2006, 160 (“reply”).
47
See 2.3. and 2.4 in Appendix 2.
48
Peters 1967, s.v. “episteme;” Aristotle 1984, 132 [81a38-b9]; Aquinas 1999, 3.11 (p. 376); Aquinas 1984,
(3.11 in Pasnau; 3.5 in Gauthier) (p. 227); Aquinas 2006, 14 and commentary 172-73; Aquinas 1888-1906, ST Ia q.
1 a. 9 co. Cf. Pasnau 1996, 195-219; Boethius 1906, 1.11 (pp. 164-65, 166) and Boethius 1929, 1.11 (pp. 96-97).
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In chapter fourteen of the first book of the Speculum, Jacobus concurred with
Aristotle and Aquinas:
Etiam anima, quamdiu corpori coniuncta est, in operibus intellectus ex virtutibus
dependet sensitivis, quae sibi ministrant species, quia, quantum ad naturalem animae
coniunctae intellectionem, quod est in intellectu, prius fuit in sensu, et intelligentem
oportet fantasmata speculari.49
Furthermore, the soul, as long as it is conjoined to the body, depends upon the powers of the senses for the works of intellect, the species of which [sensitive powers]
serve it [i.e., the intellect], because as far as the natural intellect of the conjoined soul
is concerned, that which is in the intellect was first in the senses, and the intelligence
is required to consider appearances within the phantasia [fantasmata].50
This process can be illustrated through the example of how one might learn about the
nature of the octave. Thus, one would begin by listening to an octave. The sound of
this octave (rather than its mathematical proportion or the instrument producing the
octave) would become the object of hearing by altering the sense of hearing.51
Aquinas described this alteration as “the receiving of a sensible form”52 or
“immutation.”53 When this occurs, many of the particularities of the sounding octave
are retained, but certain qualities are set aside as the external sense organs receive the
“raw forms from the environment” through various media (e.g., air or water).54 By
analogy, when taking a photograph certain visible properties of the object to be photographed are received in the lens (though not yet committed to photographic paper
or stored in the camera’s memory). The lens might receive the object’s color and relationship to surrounding objects—things properly disposed to vision by being visible,
i.e., the proper material conditions—while omitting other particularities (e.g., the
49
Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.14 (p. 53).
50
The significance of the terms “species” and “phantasmata” will be considered below.
51
Aquinas 1999, 186, n. 1; Pasnau 2000, 27-40; and Pasnau 1999, 309-24; Barker 2000, 11; Aquinas 1953,
xvii.
52
“. . . sense [is] a sort of form receptive of all sensible forms.” Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima,
trans. Pasnau, 3.13 (p. 391). “. . . sensus est quedam forma receptiua omnium formarum sensibilium.” Aquinas
1984, 3.7 (p. 236).
53
Aquinas 2002, 71, 277-78; Aquinas 1888-1906, ST Ia q. 78 a. 3 co.; Pasnau 1996, 33.
54
Everson 1995, 178; Pasnau 1997, 52.
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41
weight and temperature of the object). Aquinas described this process by saying that
“sense . . . takes on the form of the thing cognized without the matter, of course, but
along with the material conditions.”55 The sensible form (or species) received by the
senses remains grounded and connected to a particular this, in this instance an octave
(sounded at this moment by these voices or instruments) while other sounds—such as
the sound of the singer’s stomach growling—are set aside.56 (Boethius speaks of the
apprehension of sensible species in his De institutione musica).57 This process of reception, when joined to the work of the internal senses, may be described as one of conversion of “scattered data into a single, unified percept.”58
The senses may receive these . . . impressions or species from the environment, but
this confused mass of data is converted by the sense powers (external and internal)
into more-complex and more-sophisticated representations. At the level of the external senses, an unstable field of color is structured into three dimensional objects that
persist through time and motion. Sensible species take on this structure, and hence
the senses display a higher degree of cognition.59
Having received the sensible form (or species) of an octave through the sense of
hearing, the soul retains this form by means of one of the internal senses (alluded to
by Pasnau in the quotation above) that Aquinas called “phantasia” (see Appendix 1).60
This power retains and preserves the sensible form of the octave. These sensible
forms could be called fantasmata, as Jacobus did in the quotation above. From the sense
of sight, the phantasia creates something like a photograph, from the sense of hearing,
the phantasia creates something like a recording. The products of phantasia are called
“phantasms” and these are distinguished from sensible forms in that the latter do not
endure through time, while the former are retained.61
55
Aquinas 2002, 139 (lines 66-70); Aquinas 1888-1906, ST, Ia q. 84 a. 2 co.; Kretzmann 1993, 138, 153 n.
56
Pasnau 1997, 86-89, 113-14; 14-15, n. 25.
57
See 2.2 in Appendix 2.
58
Pasnau 1997, 56.
59
Ibid., 52-53.
60
Ibid.1997, 97.
61
Aquinas 1995, 15, n. 5; Pasnau 1997, 52-53.
34.
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Once a phantasm has been created, the intellect performs a series of operations in
two separate but cooperative roles: first it operates as the productive (or agent) intellect and second as the receptive (or possible) intellect.62 In its first role it takes up the
phantasm (as its raw material) and performs an abstraction, obtaining an intelligible
form (i.e., a universal concept), in this case, of the octave.63 According to Kretzmann,
“the intelligible species are purely conceptual, noneidetic, thoroughly abstract entities
occurring only in possible intellect—like one’s concept of triangularity or one’s understanding of the Pythagorean theorem rather than like even abstract geometric imagery
. . . Intelligible species may be either concepts (of) or thoughts (that).”64 (Two citations
from Boethius in Appendix 2 describe this process).65
Thus, while the sense of hearing had retained some of its “individuating material
conditions” when it received the sensible species of the octave via the senses, the intellect now sets these conditions aside and it takes up the essential and universal features
that characterize all octaves (though insofar as these features are rooted in particular
octaves).66 For musicians in the medieval period, the essential feature of the octave
would be a proposition involving the equivalency of “octave” and the ratio “2:1.”67
An example using visual phenomena might be helpful: upon seeing a horse, the
sense of sight would receive the sensible species of the horse and this species would
be retained within the sensitive soul as a phantasm of this particular horse.68 The agent
intellect would then grasp the universal “horse-ness” or “what-it-means-to-be a horse”
of a horse from within the phantasm.69 According to Pasnau, “whereas it is the senses
62
Aquinas 2002, 85-87 (see also the valuable diagram on p. 281, the basis of Appendix 2); Aquinas 18881906, ST Ia q. 79 a. 4 s.c., co, ad 4.
63
Owens 1993, 49-50; Pasnau 1996, 306-7; Kretzmann 1993, 14; Aquinas 1953, xiv-xxxi, and xviii n. 16.
64
Kretzmann 1993, 141 and 155, n. 47, 155-56, n. 50.
65
See 2.2 in Appendix 2. Cf. 2.14.
66
Aquinas 1999, 3.8 (p. 357); Aquinas 1984, 3.2 (p. 212); Pasnau 2002, 293-94.
67
Bigelow 1998, s.v., “Universals;” Spade 1994; Meyer 1998, 3-25. Cf. Pasnau and Shields, 53-54 and their
“Suggested Readings” on pp. 78-79.
68
Pasnau 1997, 111-13.
69
Pasnau 1997, 307.
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43
that apprehend the particular horse, it is intellect that apprehends horseness. . . . Intellect, to put this more concretely, enables us to recognize that it is a horse we are looking at. . . . The senses, on their own, apprehend just the particular, accidental qualities
of the world. Intellect conceptualizes and categorizes these raw data. . . . [T]he agent
intellect is responsible for forming general concepts out of our sensory impressions.”70
After forming the general concept of the octave (or horse), the productive (or
agent) intellect then “informs” the receptive or possible intellect (see Appendix 1).
“[I]n virtue of receiving such concepts, [the receptive, possible, or passive intellect] is
brought to a state of actually cognizing.”71 And yet this process and its relation to the
formation of a full habitus or scientia—which are the terms in which Jacobus defines
musica—is far from simple. MacDonald addresses this complexity and illuminates the
difficulty:
Aquinas’s discussion of human cognitive functioning sometimes gives the impression
that he takes the attainment of intellective cognition of universals to be a relatively
simple and virtually automatic accomplishment. But that impression is misleading. . . .
the process can be lengthy and laborious. The fact that our apprehension of a universal
requires induction, that is, repeated encounters with the relevant sensible particulars,
and accumulated experience (experimentum) indicates that the process of intellective
abstraction can be deliberate, reflective, and progressive. Our initial encounters with
sensible objects might give us only rudimentary, shadowy, or vague cognition of their
real natures, cognition that can be developed and refined with further experience.
Given these remarks, it seems best to think of the abstracting activity of the agent
intellect not as a sort of mysterious instantaneous production of a universal form out
of the data provided to it by sensation, but as a gradual, perhaps arduous, intellectual
process.72
Having obtained the universal of the octave (i.e., its 2:1 nature) and combined it
with other musical universals, the intellect builds propositions and constructs demonstrations.73 The conclusions of these demonstrations (and by extension, the propositions and universals on which they are built) are properly the object of the scientia of
70
Ibid., 13. Cf. Pasnau 1997, 128-29.
71
Ibid., 13; Aquinas 1999, 1.6 (p. 52); Aquinas 1984, 1.6 (p. 31); Aquinas 1999, 3.8 (p. 352); Aquinas 1984,
3.2 (p. 208); Aquinas 1999, 52, n. 5; Owens 1993, 51; and Pasnau 1997, 195-219.
72
MacDonald 1993, 183-84, 194 n. 71.
73
Barker 1989, 67-68.
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music.74 Thus, musica—taken as a scientia and a habitus—can range from the most incipient state (e.g., the soul possessing a single universal) to the most advanced demonstrative network of propositions and conclusions.75
Distinguishing musica theorica and musica practica as forms of cognition
Recognizing the nature of musical universals and how they are obtained in the acquisition of a musical habitus, one may now turn to the distinction between theoretical and
practical music based upon this habitus.76 While both cognitive activities—i.e., theoretical and practical music—take universals as their objects, they are distinguished according to their respective “ends” or goals. In other words, one distinguishes theoretical-musical cognition from practical-musical cognition by what they do with the
universals that they possess. Aquinas and Jacobus explained this process (while other
authors alluded to it).77
According to Aquinas, the theoretical intellect “considers something true or false
in general, which is to consider it unconditionally [simpliciter], whereas the practical intellect does so by applying it to a particular possible action, since action occurs in connection with particulars.”78 Jacobus distinguished the theoretical and practical activities
of the intellect by asserting that “the purpose of theoretical or contemplative knowl74
Aquinas 2002, 296 (Commentary on the corpus of 79.9); Pasnau 2002.
75
In his Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Robert Pasnau summarizes “three levels of intellectual operation” that reflects the process through which the objective knowledge of a scientia is constructed: “1. The first operation of intellect, the simple intellective grasp of some universal feature of an object. 2. The second operation,
composition and division, which involves putting various concepts together, by either affirming one of another
([i.e.,] composition) or denying one of another ([i.e.,] division). 3. The third operation, reasoning, which involves a
complex ordering of composite thoughts” (p. 273). Based on Pasnau’s summary, one may offer a snapshot of the
preceding account of how one learns about an octave: (1) grasp the quiddity of the octave, i.e., 2:1, within a sounding (or remembered) octave; (2) compose a proposition, e.g., 2:1 is a multiple ratio; (3) through reason, construct a
syllogism, e.g., (a) All multiple ratios form a consonance, (b) 2:1 is a multiple ratio, (c) 2:1 forms a consonance.
76
Aquinas 2002, 2.12 (pp. 199-200); Aquinas 1984, 2.12 (p. 115). The impulse to distinguish musical theory
from practice appears in authoritative taxonomies of music since antiquity. See Aristides Quintilianus 1983, 17-18,
76-77 (1.5). Cf. Martianus Capella 1977, 362-82 (Book 9); William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E. L. Burge
1971, 53-54 and 210-27 passim.
77
See 2.13 in Appendix 2.
78
Aquinas 1999, 3.12 (p. 386); Aquinas 1984, 3.6 (p. 233).
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45
edge [scientia] is cognition”79 while “the purpose of practical knowledge [scientia] is
something produced.”80 For both Aquinas and Jacobus, the theoretical intellect contemplates universals as ends-in-themselves while the practical intellect brings these
same universals into the realm of action. Aquinas had begun his commentary on De
anima with a comparable observation: “Now some kinds of knowledge [scientiae] are
practical, some theoretical. These differ in that the practical kinds are for the sake of
some accomplishment, whereas the theoretical kinds are for their own sake.”81
Thus, the practical intellect is not so much a distinct form of the intellect as an
extension of the theoretical intellect to practical matters.82 Writing of scientiae in general, Jacobus described how a scientia disposes one’s soul to a particular type of action,
in this case the acquisition of moral virtue: “For in fact through scientia the cognition
of truth is taken to oneself, and, if [this scientia] is practical and pertains to morals, one
is disposed through it to the acquisition of goodness, which consists in the moral
virtues.”83 “Music,” according to Jacobus, “can . . . be called practical, because it can be
extended to some practice (i.e., to something to be done or produced) since the speculative intellect is able, by extension, to be made practical.”84 Having received the habitus
of musica in the soul, one may direct knowledge that had been previously considered
as an end in itself to practical matters, transforming (through extension) this theoretical knowledge into practical knowledge.
Jacobus further illustrated this transformation-through-extension using two examples from parallel disciplines: “For, considering number, although it is a contemplative scientia, it is extended to practice in arithmetic using Arabic numbers [algorismo], and
79
Finis enim theoricae vel speculativae scientiae <cognitio> est. Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.1 (p. 15).
80
Finis enim practicae scientiae opus est. Ibid., 1.3 (p. 18).
81
Aquinas 1999, 1.1 (p. 6). “In scienciis autem quedam sunt practice et quedam speculatiue, et hee
different quia practice sunt propter opus, speculatiue uero propter se ipsas . . .” Aquinas 1984, 1.1 (p. 4). Cf.
Aquinas 1888-1905, Ia q. 14 a. 16 co.; Aquinas 1948, Ia q. 14 a. 16 co.; I:85-86.
82
See the article entitled “Are Speculative and Practical Intellect Distinct Capacities?” [ST Ia q. 79 a. 11]
and the accompanying notes in Aquinas 2002, 100-2, 297.
83
Per scientiam quippe cognitio sumitur veritatis, et, si sit practica et moralis, per eam disponitur quis ad
<ademptionem> bonitatis, quae in moralibus consistit virtutibus. Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.1 (p. 7).
84
Potest tamen musica . . . practica vocitari, quia praxim ad aliquam potest extendi, id est ad aliquod opus,
speculativus siquidem intellectus extensione fieri potest practicus. Ibid., 1.2 (p. 15).
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number is extended to geometric figures in the second [book] of [Boethius’]
Arithmetica.”85 Thus, taken in itself the consideration of number exists as a theoretical
scientia, but when extended to certain types of arithmetic activity, it becomes practical.
Several chapters later, Jacobus offered a second example: “[A]lthough theoretical
geometry considers the proportions of continuous quantity and their measures,
through investigation by the mind alone, practical geometry attempts to measure the
length, width, and depth of some quantity by sensible experience.”86 Jacobus went on
to apply this process of extension to music. Although musica “is the perfection of the
soul by means of reason belonging to speculation, nevertheless by means of its reason
the soul can attend to a body of practice and (as it were) perfect it.”87
While describing the extension of reason from theory to practice, both Aquinas
and Jacobus recognized limits to this process. Not every theoretical cognition could be
extended in this way. Thus Aquinas had distinguished two types of theoretical cognition. The first concerned things that cannot be applied to a particular action.
[I]ntellectus speculatiuus speculatiue considerat ea que sunt tantum speculabilia et
nullo modo agibilia, sicut cum considerat quod triangulus habet tres angulos equales
duobus rectis et alia huiusmodi, manifestum est quod speculatiuus intellectus non
speculatur aliquid actuale, neque aliquid dicit de fugibili et persequibili.88
The theoretical intellect considers in a theoretical way things that are available only for
theoretical consideration and that can in no way be done—as when it considers that
[a] triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, and other things of that sort—it
is obvious that theoretical intellect does not consider theoretically anything that has to
85
Ibid. Concerning algorismus, see White 1981, 181 and n. 110. Concerning the introduction of algorism
and the decline in popularity of Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, see Huglo 1990, 162.
86
. . . cum theorica geometria solo mentis speculatione quantitatis continuae proportiones et earum intueatur mensuras, practica geometria quantitatis alicuius longitudinem, latitudinem, profunditatemque experimento
sensibili conatur mensurare. Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.1 (p. 9).
87
Item musica, etsi sit animae perfectio ratione speculationis, tamen ratione suae praxis corpus respicere
potest et ipsum aliqualiter perficere. Ibid., 1.2 (pp. 15-16). It is unclear in this passage, whether Jacobus is referring
to the perfecting of a body of practice or to the perfecting of a physical body. The former interpretation would be
stronger if Jacobus had used the genitive form of praxis, though the passages cited in the preceding paragraphs
suggest that something like a “body of practice” might be Jacobus’ meaning. The latter interpretation receives support from the passage cited in n. 86 of Chapter 2, where Jacobus associates practical musica instrumentalis with the
body and hearing.
88
Aquinas 1984, 3.8 (p. 243).
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47
do with action, nor does it have anything to say about what is to be avoided and what
is to be sought.89
In Aquinas’ second type of theoretical cognition, the theoretical intellect considered something that could be, but in a particular case was not, extended to the domain
of action:
Aliquando autem intellectus considerat aliquid agibile, non tamen practice set speculatiue, quia considerat ipsum in uniuersali et non secundum quod est principium particularis operis; et de hoc dicit consequenter quod neque intellectus secundum quod
fuerit speculatus, id est speculatiue considerauerit, aliquid huiusmodi, id est aliquod
agibile, nondum precipit uel persequi uel fugere, sicut cum multociens intelligimus
aliquod terribile uel delectabile, set intellectus non iubet timere uel desiderare.90
But sometimes intellect does consider something that can be done—and yet not practically, but theoretically. For it considers it universally, and not in such a way as to be
the source of a particular deed. And regarding this [Aristotle] says, next, that intellect
insofar as it does consider theoretically something of this sort—i.e., consider in a
theoretical way something that can be done—does not yet command either pursuing
or avoiding, as when, often enough, we have intellective cognition of some frightening or pleasant thing but intellect does not enjoin fear or desire.91
Having distinguished these types of theoretical cognition, Aquinas recapitulated
his distinction of practical intellection from theoretical, again citing Aristotle: “So
Aristotle says . . . this is practical intellect, which differs from theoretical [intellect] as
regards its end. For theoretical intellect inquires into the truth not for the sake of
something else, but for the sake of truth alone, whereas practical intellect’s inquiry into
truth is for action’s sake.”92
According to these criteria, one may understand the relation between the theory
and practice of music—as it was conceived within the Speculum musicae—in terms of
the soul and its activities. From this cognitive perspective, both musica theorica and mu89
Aquinas 1999, 3.14 (p. 401).
90
Aquinas 1984, 3.8 (p. 243).
91
Aquinas 1999, 3.14 (p. 401).
92
Ibid, 3.15 (pp. 405-6). “Dicit ergo . . . hic est intellectus practicus, qui differt a speculatiuo secundem finem: nam speculatiuus speculatur ueritatem non propter aliquid aliud, set propter ipsam tantum, practicus autem
speculatur ueritatem propter operationem.” Aquinas 1984, 3.9 (p. 245).
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sica practica begin with the actions of the soul engaged in “considering” [perpendens] and
“judging” [judicare] concord or harmony [concordiam]93 or objects that pertain to musica
by affiliation.94 If this considering, pondering and judging are performed as ends in
themselves, the activities are theoretical.95 If these cognitions take place as means to
activities outside the soul, then these activities become practical. Thus, the same musical topic often can be both theoretical and practical.96 For example, a medieval musician might employ the monochord in order to study, ponder and judge a variety of
intervals as ends in themselves (i.e., as sonic embodiments of mathematical principles).
Another musician might employ the same monochord to produce the same intervals
93
Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.2 (p. 14). For Jacobus, musica, defined in its broadest terms, includes not only the
proportions of sounds but any proportion or concord found anywhere: “To be sure, music taken generally is not
about the number belonging to sounds or only about numbered sounds combined together, but concerns the
number of any sorts of things conjoined simultaneously, to the extent that some condition (taken generally) of
proportion, concord, order, or connection can be perceived between those things, as proportion is understood
through harmonic modulation (taken generally), as has been said. And it does not consider the number of things
absolutely, but to the extent that some connection, order, proportion, or concord between several combined, distinct things is discerned, of whatever quality those things of sound, humanity, or of the world (corporeal or incorporeal, heavenly or beyond the heavens) may be.” [Non est enim musica generaliter sumpta de numero sonorum
vel de sonis numeratis invicem comparatis solum, sed de numero rerum quarumcumque simul collatarum, prout
inter illas attendi potest quaedam habitudo cuiusdam proportionis, concordiae, ordinis vel connexionis, ut per harmonicam modulationem generaliter sumptam intelligatur habitudo sumpta, ut dictum est. Nec considerat numerum rerum absolute, sed prout inter res aliquas plures et distinctas simul comparatas reperitur habitudo cuiusdam
connectionis, ordinis, proportionis vel concordiae, qualescumque sint res illae sonorae, humanae vel mundanae,
corporales vel spirituales, coelestes vel supercoelestes.] Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.2 (p. 16).
94
Aquinas 1888-1906, Ia q. 1 a. 3 ad 1; Aquinas 2006, 6 (with commentary on p. 161).
95
Though considering, pondering and judging concord are the ends of specifically musical-theoretical
cognition, there are additional consequences or ends that stem from these activities understood as generally theoretical activities. Through theoretical cognition, the soul of the knower becomes more perfect. Jacobus described
both the general and the specific ends: the “cognition of harmonic modulation” [cognitionem armonicae modulationis]
is the “immediate and proper end” [finis . . . immediatus et proprius] of musica and the “pertaining-to-scientia perfection
of the soul” [perfectionem animae scientialem] is the “remote and common end” [finis . . . communis et remotus]. The former
is the proper end of musica because only music engages in the “cognition of harmonic modulation.” The latter is
common because musica, along with all other theoretical disciplines [scientia speculativa] perfects the soul. Jacobus
1955-1973, 1.2 (p. 16). See also Aquinas 1999, 1.1 (p. 6); Aquinas 1984, 1.1 (p. 4).; Aquinas 1999, 3.10 (p. 368);
Aquinas 1984, 3.4 (p. 211); Aquinas 1999, 3.13 (p. 391); Aquinas 1984, 3.7 (p. 236). Cf. Aquinas, 1888-1906, Iª q. 14
a. 5 arg. 2 and ad 2; Aquinas 1948, Obj. 2 (I:75), Reply Obj. 2 (I:76).
96
Though Jacobus clearly praises both theoretical and practical musical cognition, he tends to think of
musica as primarily a speculative discipline (at least in the first six books of the Speculum musicae). In the second
chapter of Book 1 he writes that “music is principally speculative rather than practical.” [Musica enim principalius
est speculativa quam practica.] Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.3 (p. 18). See also Ibid., 1.2 (p. 15); Kilwardby 1976, 53 (cap.
18, lines 12-17); and Sharp 1934, 1-3, 5-30 (particularly p. 8).
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49
but this time for the sake of learning the pitches of a given cantus.97 The former activity would, according to the criteria of Aquinas and Jacobus, qualify as theoretical while
the latter would be judged as practical.
Jacobus illustrated this distinction within his account of musica instrumentalis. Unlike
other species of musica—such as musica mundana and musica humana—that belong solely
to theory, Jacobus divided musica instrumentalis between theory and practice. In his panegyric to music in the fifth chapter of Book 1, Jacobus invited his readers to “consider
instrumental or sounding music. Is this [type of music] lacking in praises? Not at all!
Indeed through it, with respect to its theoretical part, the soul, which is sustained by
many and various things, is refilled and perfected.”98
Jacobus went on to devote several chapters to divisions of musica instrumentalis and
in the final of these he directly addressed the distinction between theoretical musica
instrumentalis and practical musica instrumentalis. Both, according to Jacobus, treat nearly
the same thing: “Moreover, musica instrumentalis is divided into theoretical and practical,
which (as it were) consider the same thing: the number of sounds or sound that has
been numbered.”99 Though both “consider” the same thing, they are distinguished
principally by their “purpose” or “end.”100 Jacobus went on to explain that “theoretical
music consists in the contemplation of the truth of [these] things which pertain to this
genus of music: inquiring into and demonstrating the principles, properties, parts
[and] effects proper to its own subject. There it [i.e., theoretical musica instrumentalis]
stands, there it rests at last.”101 In contrast,
97
In a similar way, part of a treatise intended for theoretical cognition—e.g., a book on proportions—could
be altered slightly and supplemented in order to make it practical: the author could alter the horizon (or end) in
relation to which the material is presented, offering proportions as they pertain to the practice of music, that is, to
songs [pertinent ad praticam musice, videlicet ad cantum]. See Ciconia 1993, 24-25 (“The Revised De Proportionibus”), 23
with n. 67, and 417 n. 3.
98
Sed specialiter musicam intueamur instrumentalem vel sonoram. Caretne haec laudibus? Minime. Per
eam enim, quoad partem eius theoricam, anima, quam multis et variis fulcitur, repletur et perficitur intrinsecis delectationibus eorum, qui in ea periti sunt et eam, ut exposcit, diligunt. Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.5 (p. 24).
99
Adhuc instrumentalis musica in theoricam distinguitur et practicam, quae etsi aliqualiter versentur circa
idem, quia circa sonorum numerum vel sonum numeratum. Ibid., 1.19 (p. 62). See also the opening of Franco’s
Ars cantus mensurabilis, Franco of Cologne 1974, 23 and Muris 1972, “Prologus” (p. 48).
100
101
Tamen distinguuntur et principalius in fine vel a fine Ibid., 63. Cf. Johannes de Grocheio 1943, 2:46.
Nam theorica consistit in speculatione veritatis eorum quae ad hoc genus pertinent musicae: principia,
proprietates, partes, passiones circa suum proprium subiectum inquirens et demonstrans; ibi sistit, ibi finaliter con-
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Practica vero in opere suum finem ponit. Ad hoc tendit, ut sonos harmonicos exprimere sciat vel naturalibus vel artificialibus instrumentis. Prima respicit animam et intellectum speculativum, alia intellectum practicum, corpus et auditum.
Practical music maintains its purpose in labor. To this end practical music directs itself, with the result that it knows how to produce harmonic sounds either by means
of natural or artificial instruments. The first [type of music, i.e. theoretical musica instrumentalis] concerns the soul and the speculative intellect; the other concerns the
practical intellect, the body, and hearing.102
Jacobus’ concern with the soul and musica as a habitus within it clearly had implications beyond the mere definition of music as a scientia. The fundamental distinction
between musica theorica and musica practica and Jacobus’ judgment concerning the ends
of musical activity rested upon an epistemology derived from scholastic interpretations of Aristotle’s view of the soul, its powers and faculties, and the potential for
these faculties to be modified through learning. By patiently exploring the deeper
meaning of terms such as “habitus,” “scientia,” and “facultas” within the Speculum musicae,
the epistemological foundation of the treatise becomes clearer. (As the loci cited from
other treatises in Appendix 2 indicates, this foundation was common to other writings
on music as well.)
By clarifying the epistemology of the Speculum musicae, this study has secondarily
revealed how material that at first glance would seem to have little bearing on the musical content of the work can have musical significance: at the root of Jacobus’ distinction between musica theorica and musica practica, the reader finds an epistemology that
structures this distinction. Furthermore, as has been shown in another study, this distinction, proved to be one of the key factors that determined his judgement against
the music of his own age.103
quiescit. Jacobus 1955-1973, 1.19 (p. 63).
102
Ibid., 1.19 (p. 63). Following the preceding passage, Jacobus went on to distinguish two types of practica
musica: pure practica and mixed practica. Mixed musica practica is musical practice that emerges from theoretical reason,
i.e., the practice that has been treated in the preceding pages of this essay. Pure musica practica is musical practice that
derives from experience or use, rather than theoretical reason. This is the kind of practice performed by the cantor
who can sing but sings without an understanding of the theoretical basis of his performance. This distinction between mixed and pure musica practica is treated in Chapter 3 of Harne, ‘Theory and Practice in the Speculum musicae’, Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2008
103
Harne 2010.
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Thus, that for which Jacobus is best known—his spirited condemnation of the ars
nova—depended upon the ends that were appropriate to musica theorica and musica practica, which in turn emerged from his Aristotelian epistemology. While this study has
focused on the latter relationship, i.e., the relation between the distinction between
theory and practice as they emerge from epistemological considerations, it also indicates how scholars can obtain a more complete understanding of the musical content
of medieval treatises on music when they attend to both the musical and non-musical
content of such treatises.
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Appendix 1
The Cognitive Powers of the Soul According to Aquinas
The following diagram is a reproduction of “Diagram 1. The soul’s cognitive powers,”
found in Aquinas 2002, 281. Reprinted with permission.
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53
Appendix 2
Selected Passages in Medieval Treatises on Music that Refer to Cognition or Employ
Language Related to Cognition
2.1 Rational and irrational parts of the soul
Boethius (ca. 480-524), De institutione musica
In Boethius’ De institutione musica one finds a reference that is probably derived from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (a work Aristotle wrote before his De anima):
Quid est aliud quod ipsius inter se partes animae coniungat, quae, ut Aristoteli placet,
ex rationabili inrationabilique coniuncta est?104
What other than this [musica humana] unites the parts of the soul, which, according to
Aristotle, is composed of the rational and the irrational?105
2.2 Species grasped by the senses and the intellect
Boethius (ca. 480-524), De institutione musica
In his De institutione musica, Boethius referred to both the “species” grasped by the
senses as well as “species discerned by reason:”
[. . .] sensus circa materiam vertitur, speciesque in ea comprehendit, quae ita sunt fluvidae . . . species, quas pervidet, praeter subiecti communionem intuetur, atque ideo
eam integritas comitatur ac veritas [. . .]106
[. . .] the sense is concerned with matter, and it grasps species in those things that are
in flux . . . the species discerned by reason is observed over and above association with
the particular subject.107
104
Boethius 1867, 1.2 (pp. 188-90).
105
Boethius 1989, 1.2 (p. 10). See also Bower’s nn. 1, 39, 40, and 41 (all in Book 1).
106
Boethius 1867, 5.2 (p. 352). Could Boethius be referring to Aristotle’s sensible and intelligible species?
Bower notes that this passage does not appear in Ptolemy, Boethius’ source for book five. Concerning the
understanding of sense perception in ninth-century glosses on Boethius and the understanding of John Scotus
Eriugena, see Bower 1998, 163-83.
107
Boethius 1989, 5.2 (p. 163).
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2.3 “Habitus” as an actuality and its privation (as an analogy for presence and absence)
Franco of Cologne (fl. mid-13th cent.)
Sed cum prius sit vox recta quam amissa, quoniam habitus praecedit privationem,
prius dicendum est de figuris, quae vocem rectam significant, quam de pausis quae
amissam.108
But since vox recta precedes its absence, just as “habit” precedes “privation,” figures
which signify vox recta should be treated first, then rests which signify its absence.
2.4 “Habitus” as an actuality and its privation (as an analogy for the tone and the semitone)
Summa musice (c. 1300)109
[. . .] quia semitonium minus est quam tonus et sicut ad modum privationis se habens,
tonus autem ad modum habitus, et cum privatio non cognoscatur nisi per habitum,
prius videndum est quid sit tonus.”110
[B]ecause the semitone is less than the tone and may be compared to a state of privation, the one being the habitual state, and because privation cannot be perceived save
in relation to what is habitual, we must first consider the tone.111
2.5 The Vegetative Power of the Soul
Lambertus (i.e., [Ps.] Aristotle, 13th century), writing in the introduction to his Tractatus
de musica, spoke of the ways in which the arts and scientiae beget one another and referred (as an analogy) to the vegetative power [virtus vegetiva] within a single tree:
Nam sicut in arbore unam natura virtutem multarum vegetivam propagitum complantavit, sic in homine ratio ex unius scientia esse [rerum?] multorum docuit invenire.112
108
Franco of Cologne 1974, 29.
109
Bernhard, Michael. 1998. La Summa musice du Ps. –Jean de Murs: Son auteur et sa dation. Revue de
Musicologie, 84: 19-25.
110
Page 1991, 80.
111
Ibid. 164 (lines 921-925).
112
[Ps.] Aristotle 1931, 1:251.
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For just as in a tree, nature has planted together the one, propagated vegetative power,
thus in man, reason, by the scientia of one [art], has taught to discover many things.113
2.6 Scientia and Facultas
Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250-1331)
[C]um tamen vera sciencia in unaquaque facultate sit scire ipsius artis principia et radices, a quibus ipsa ars surgit . . . et secundum ipsam artem est infallibilis processus
secundum viam et ordinem racionis ad cavendum errorem, et sciendum in singulis
veritatem.114
“yet, nevertheless, true scientia in every single facultas is to know the principles of this
art itself and the roots, from which this art arises . . . and according to this, art has
developed without error according to the way and order of reason for the purpose of
guarding against error and knowing the truth in the particulars [singulis].”
2.7 Reference to Aristotle’s De anima
Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250-1331)
Musica humana consistit et consideratur in proportionibus contrariarum qualitatum
et diversarum ac dissimilium parcium humani corporis inter se et respectu unionis
anime ad ipsum. De qua armonia Aristoteles in I.° de Anima et in libro de Animalibus,
et Galienus, et Avicenna in suis libris medicinalibus, et Algazel in suis naturalibus, et
Constabulus in libro de spiritu et anima multipliciter sunt locuti.115
Musica humana consists and is considered in proportions of contrary and diverse qualities and also of diverse parts of the human body in relation to themselves, and with
respect to the union of the soul to it. Concerning which harmonia, Aristotle in book
one of De anima in the book De animalibus, and Galen, and Avicenna in his medical
books, and Algazel in his De naturalibus, and Constabulus in the book De spiritu and
anima have treated in manifold ways.
113
This translation is based on a comparison with the text of the anonymous “Tractatus de musica” (taking
rerum for esse): Nam sicut in arbore unam natura uirtutem multarum regiiuum [regitiuum corr. supra lin.] propaginum complantauie. sic in homine: ratio ex unius scientia rerum multarum docuit inuenire.” http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/13th/LAMTRAC_MSBCLV30.html
114
Ernstbrunner. 1998. 165.
115
Ibid., 168-9.
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2.8 The sensitive power and the intellective power (of the soul)
Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250-1331)
Finis enim obiectorum potencie sensitive et intellective est . . . quod quantum ad apprehensionem suam a sensu et intellectu delectet et demulceat exterius sensum et interius animum et affectum.116
The purpose of objects of the sensitive power and the intellective power is . . . that
with regard to its own apprehension by the sense and intellect it may delight and
soften the exterior sense and interior mind and affection.
2.9 The particular senses and the common sense (of the soul)
Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250-1331)
Non possunt autem sensus singuli in suis obiectis delectari, nisi ipsa sensibilia apprehendant et percipiant: nec possunt ea percipere, nisi distinguant: propter quod sicut
ipsa percepcio sensibilium est opus et officium sensus particularis, ita et ipsorum
distinctio est opus et officium sensus communis, qui distinguit inter differencias sensibilium particularium et communium, sicut inter album et nigrum, et quadrangulum
et triangulum, et inmobile vel inmotum.
The single senses [i.e., sight, hearing, etc.] are not able to delight in their proper objects unless they apprehend and perceive the sensibilia [i.e, the particular objects of
perception such as the visible, etc.]: and they are not able to perceive them, unless they
distinguish them: hence, as the perception of sensibilia is the work and office of a
particular sense, so also the distinction of these sensibilia is the work and office of the
sensus communis.117
2.10 Cognition of proper sensibles
Johannes de Grocheio (ca. 1255 – ca. 1320)
In this instance, sound would be the object of auditory apprehension, from which the
intellect would apprehend the essential nature of the sound.
116
Ibid., 286.
117
Ibid., 347-48.
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Cuius cognitio est necessaria volentibus habere completam cognitionem de moventibus et motis. Videtur enim esse magis de sono, qui inter sensibilia propria reperitur et
potentiae apprehensivae obiectum est.118
The knowledge [of music] is necessary for those wishing to have complete knowledge
about things moving and things moved. Indeed it seems to be primarily about sound,
which is perceived among sensibilia propria and is the object of the apprehensive power.
2.11 Sensory and intellective cognition [i.e., the sensitive and intellective powers of the soul]
Johannes de Grocheio (ca. 1255 – ca. 1320)
Sic enim vadit tota cognitio humana sive sensitiva sive intellectiva, ut ait Aristoteles in
prooemio Physicorum.119
All human understanding, be it sensory or intellectual, grows deeper this way, as
Aristotle says in the preface to his Physics.120
2.12 The intellective power of the soul
Johannes de Grocheio (ca. 1255 – ca. 1320)
Quemadmodum enim anima intellectiva alias formas naturales in se virtualiter includit . . . ita viella in se virtualiter alia continet instrumenta.121
Just as the intellective soul includes within itself virtually all the other natural forms . . .
so the vielle includes in itself virtually all the others [i.e., string instruments].122
118
Grocheio 1943, 2:41.
119
Ibid., 2:41.
120
Grocheio 1973, 1.
121
Grocheio 1943, 2:52
122
Grocheio 1973, 19.
57
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2.13 Scientia, cognition, the soul and the practical intellect
Johannes de Grocheio (ca. 1255 – ca. 1320)
Grocheio also drew a comparison between the body and art, a comparison which depends upon both notions of the soul and theories of cognition:
Sicut enim calidum naturale est primum instrumentum, mediante quo anima exercet
suas operationes, sic ars est instrumentum principale sive regula, mediante qua intellectus practicus suas operationes explicat et exponit. Dicamus igitur, quod musica est
ars vel scientia de sono numerato, harmonice sumpto, ad cantandum facilius deputata.
Dico autem scientiam, in quantum principiorum tradit cognitionem, artem vero, in
quantum intellectum practicum regulat operando.123
Just as natural warmth (of the body) is the first tool through which the soul exercises
its functions, so art is a principal tool or rule through which the practical intellect
explains and exposes [exponit] its functions. We may say, therefore, that music is an art
or [scientia] concerning numbered sound taken harmonically, designed for singing easily. I say both a [scientia], insofar as it treats the knowledge [cognitionem] of principles,
and an art, insofar as it rules the practical intellect in performing [. . .]124
2.14 Theory and practice, art and experience, particulars and universals (within the cycle of cognition)
Johannes de Muris (ca. 1290-95; d. after 1344), Notitia artis musicae
In the Notitia artis musicae, Johannes de Muris described parts of the cycle in which
cognition begins with particulars (as experience), works toward universals, and then
reapplies these universals (as theoretical knowledge) to particulars (in practice):
Quoniam tamen ars est universalium, experimentum vero singularium, universalia
praesupponunt singularia, igitur ars experientiam praesupponit. Experientia quidem
fecit artem et expertos magis proficere videmus <<rationem sine experientia>>. Igitur necessarium est in unaquaque arte habere primo theoricam, practicam convenienter, ut illud, quod scitum est in universali, ad singulare valeat applicari. Sed cum omnis
ars ex experimentis dependeat, oportet unumquemque artificem primo circa artis experientiam laborare.125
123
Grocheio 1943, 2:46.
124
Grocheio 1973, 9-10.
125
Muris 1972, “Prologus” (p. 48).
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Nevertheless, because art treats universals, while experience treats particulars, [and]
universals presuppose particulars, for that reason art presupposes experience. Certainly experience produces art and we see that the experienced are more effective than
[those possessing] a rational account without experience. Consequently, it is necessary
in any art to possess the theoretical first, then the practical in agreement, so that what
has been known in the universal, may be applied to the particular. But since every art
depends upon experience, it is necessary that every art concern itself in the first place
with the experience of that art.
2.15 The soul as the substantial form of the body
Johannes Vetulus de Anagnia (fl. 14th century)
Est enim in humana natura forma substantialis, scilicet anima [. . .]126
There is in human nature a forma substantialis, namely, the soul [. . .]
2.16 Divisions of the soul and within the conjunction of the body and the soul
Anonymous [Pseudo-Theodonus] (14th century)
Humana quidem in humoribus corporis, in virtute animae et coniunctione corporis et
animae procreatur; de qua sunt variae et multiplices divisiones.127
Indeed [musica] humana is brought forth in the humors of the body, by virtue of the
soul and the union of the body and soul; concerning which there are various and
multiple divisions.
126
Verulus [Vetulus] 1977, 27.
127
Anonymous [Pseudo-Theodonus] 1971, 30.
59
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2.17 Reference to Aristotle’s De anima and cognition
Marchetto of Padua (fl. 1305–19), Pomerium.
Quoniam, dicente Philosopho in prooemio de Anima, accidentia multum conferunt
ad cognoscendum quod quid est, id est, per cognitionem accidentium devenimus in
cognitionem essentiae rei.128
Since, as Aristotle says in the prologue to his De anima,129 non-essential elements contribute a great deal to understanding what a thing is; i.e.., through the cognition of
non-essential elements we enter into the cognition of the essence of a thing.
2.18 Scientia and cognition by the senses and by the intellect
Marchetto of Padua (fl. 1305–19), Pomerium.
Et ratio huius est quia de imperfectis nunquam potest esse scientia mentalis, nec etiam
cognitio sensitiva, nisi per comparationem ad perfecta. Nunquam enim nec per intellectum, nec per sensum possemus cognoscere aliquid esse imperfectum, . . . ita quod
scientia, quantum ad ea quae cadunt sive in intellectu sive in sensu, semper est de
perfectis.130
And the reason for this is that there can never be a scientia of the mind nor cognitio
sensitiva concerning imperfect things, unless it is through a comparison with perfect
things. Indeed never, either through the intellect or through the sense, would we be
able to cognize something to be imperfect . . . so that a scientia—as regards what belongs to the intellect or to the sense—always concerns perfect things.
128
Marchetto of Padua 1961, 39 [1.1.1.introduction.].
129
De anima 1.1402b2
130
Marchetto of Padua 1961, 162-63.
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2.19 Reference to Aristotle’s De anima
Marchetto of Padua (fl. 1305–19), Pomerium.
[V]anus est enim intellectus (secundum Philosophum, tertio de Anima) qui petit impossibilia.131
Vain is the intellect (according to the Philosopher, in book three of De anima), which
seeks impossible things.
2.20 The soul as the source of the intellect and as the efficient cause of a treatise on music
Ars cantus mensurabilis mensurata per modos iuris (after 1375)
In this passage, the anonymous author glossed the verse “My soul will exult while I
sing to you” in terms of the four Aristotelian causes. In this gloss the soul is designated as the “efficient cause.”
Tangitur, et ultimo, causa efficiens . . . omnis enim effectus cuius principium est operatio intellectualis attribuitur proprie anime tanquam cause efficienti. Talis enim effectus est opus istud, cuius principium est anima.132
Finally an efficient cause is touched upon . . . for every effect the beginning of which
is the operation of intelligence is attributed to the soul itself as much as to the efficient cause. Such an effect is this work, the beginning of which is in the soul.133
131
Ibid., 199. Though Marchetto cites the third book of De anima, this is an incorrect locus.
132
Balensuela 1994, 137-139, see n. 18.
133
Ibid.
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