Handbook of Self and Identity ( PDFDrive )

Handbook of
Self and Identity
Second Edition
Edited by
Mark R. Leary
June Price Tangney
THE GUILFORD PRESS
New York London
To Mike Kernis and Fred Rhodewalt,
whose enthusiasm, warmth, and contributions
to the psychology of the self are sorely missed
© 2012 The Guilford Press
A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc.
72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012
www.guilford.com
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Last digit is print number:
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Handbook of self and identity / edited by Mark R. Leary, June Price Tangney.–2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4625-0305-6 (hbk.)
1. Self. 2. Identity (Psychology). I. Leary, Mark R. II. Tangney, June Price.
BF697.H345 2012
155.2—dc23
2011026421
About the Editors
Mark R. Leary, PhD, is Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience at Duke University. His research focuses on the processes by which people think about and evaluate
themselves; the effects of self-reflection on emotion and psychological well-being; and
how people are influenced by concerns about how they are perceived and evaluated by
others. He is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Association for
Psychological Science, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, and a
recipient of the Lifetime Career Award from the International Society for Self and Identity. Dr. Leary was the founding editor of the journal Self and Identity and is currently
Editor of Personality and Social Psychology Review.
June Price Tangney, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at George Mason University. A Fellow of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology and of the Association for
Psychological Science, she is Associate Editor of American Psychologist. Dr. Tangney’s
primary research interest is the development and implications of moral emotions; her
current work focuses on moral emotions among incarcerated offenders. A recipient of
George Mason University’s Teaching Excellence Award, she strives to integrate service,
teaching, and clinically relevant research in both the classroom and her lab.
iii
Contributors
Mark D. Alicke, PhD, Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
Jamie Arndt, PhD, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri,
Columbia, Missouri
Arthur Aron, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stony Brook University,
Stony Brook, New York
Mahzarin R. Banaji, PhD, Department of Psychology, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Roy F. Baumeister, PhD, Department of Psychology, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, Florida
Jennifer S. Beer, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, Texas
Michael D. Buhrmester, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, Texas
Charles S. Carver, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Miami,
Coral Gables, Florida
Jennifer Crocker, PhD, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio
Susan E. Cross, PhD, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa
Edward L. Deci, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Rochester,
Rochester, New York
Thierry Devos, PhD, Department of Psychology, San Diego State University,
San Diego, California
David Dunning, PhD, Department of Psychology, Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York
Carol S. Dweck, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, California
Kari M. Eddington, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina
at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina
iv
Contributors
Kristen Elmore, MSW, Institute for Social Research, Department of Psychology,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Elena L. Goetz, BA, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina
Jonathan S. Gore, PhD, Department of Psychology, Eastern Kentucky University,
Richmond, Kentucky
Jennifer T. Gosselin, PhD, Department of Psychology, Sacred Heart University,
Fairfield, Connecticut
Jeff Greenberg, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona
Corey L. Guenther, PhD, Department of Psychology, Creighton University,
Omaha, Nebraska
Susan Harter, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Denver,
Denver, Colorado
Michael A. Hogg, PhD, School of Behavioral and Organizational Sciences,
Claremont Graduate University, Los Angeles, California
Que-Lam Huynh, PhD, Department of Psychology, San Diego State University,
San Diego, California
Stanley B. Klein, PhD, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences,
University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California
Mark R. Leary, PhD, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina
Geoff MacDonald, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
James E. Maddux, PhD, Department of Psychology, George Mason University,
Fairfax, Virginia
Walter Mischel, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University,
New York, New York
Robert W. Mitchell, PhD, Department of Psychology, Eastern Kentucky University,
Richmond, Kentucky
Carolyn C. Morf, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Bern,
Bern, Switzerland
Natalie Nardone, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stony Brook University,
Stony Brook, New York
Daphna Oyserman, PhD, Institute for Social Research, Department of Psychology,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Lora E. Park, PhD, Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo,
State University of New York, Buffalo, New York
David Paunesku, MA, Department of Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, California
v
Contributors
vi
Tom Pyszczynski, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Frederick Rhodewalt, PhD (deceased), Department of Psychology, University of Utah,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Richard M. Ryan, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Rochester,
Rochester, New York
Barry R. Schlenker, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Florida,
Gainesville, Florida
Constantine Sedikides, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton,
Southampton, United Kingdom
Carolin J. Showers, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma,
Norman, Oklahoma
Paul J. Silvia, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina
at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina
George Smith, MS, Institute for Social Research, Department of Psychology,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Timothy J. Strauman, PhD, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience,
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
William B. Swann, Jr., PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, Texas
June Price Tangney, PhD, Department of Psychology, George Mason University,
Fairfax, Virginia
Meredith L. Terry, PhD, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience,
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
Dianne M. Tice, PhD, Department of Psychology, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, Florida
Jessica L. Tracy, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Kathleen D. Vohs, PhD, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Harry M. Wallace, PhD, Department of Psychology, Trinity University,
San Antonio, Texas
Gregory M. Walton, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, California
Ethan Zell, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina
at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina
Virgil Zeigler-Hill, PhD, Department of Psychology, Oakland University,
Rochester, Michigan
Preface
In retrospect, we find it difficult to understand why behaviorism dominated academic
psychology throughout much of the 20th century. The notion that we might be able to
explain the complexities of human behavior without any consideration of what people
might be thinking and feeling now seems absurd. In overlooking important aspects of
human experience and important antecedents of human behavior, behaviorism stymied
for decades many areas of research that involved cognitive or mentalistic concepts.
One of the fatalities of the behaviorist monopoly was research on the self. Building
on millennia of thought in philosophy, William James had given the self a prominent
place in his groundbreaking 1890 text, The Principles of Psychology. Reading James’s
chapter “The Consciousness of Self,” many turn-of-the-century psychologists and sociologists could not escape the sense that people’s thoughts and feelings about themselves
are important determinants of their behavior. James’s writing influenced many early
theorists, most prominently Baldwin, Cooley, and Mead, who shared and elaborated
upon this view, but mentalistic concepts such as the self, self-concept, and self-esteem
were all but banished from mainline behavioral and social science once behaviorism
took hold.
A century later, the self reappeared with a vengeance, energized partly by the cognitive revolution in psychology. Today, one cannot make much progress through most
areas of human psychology without encountering constructs that invoke the self, and
other social and behavioral sciences are replete with self-related research as well. Even
animal researchers have come to appreciate the fact that at least some nonhuman animals have the capacity to self-reflect, and that this ability has implications for understanding their behavior. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of scholarly articles
and chapters published about the self in the past 50 years, there now exist a thriving
international, interdisciplinary society for scholars who study self and identity (the International Society for Self and Identity), numerous conferences that deal with the self,
and a journal called Self and Identity.
Given the tremendous advances in theory and research on topics related to the self,
we assimilated the work in this burgeoning area in the first edition of the Handbook
of Self and Identity, published in 2002. Now, 10 years later, not only has the field
vii
viii
Preface
advanced markedly in many of the areas that we included in the first edition, but also
new areas of investigation have emerged. The second edition of the Handbook reflects
an effort to offer updated reviews of well-established areas of self research and to pre­
sent coverage of topics that have blossomed since the earlier edition. Readers who are
familiar with the first edition of the Handbook will see that the new edition contains
nine new chapters.
From the beginning, we faced massive challenges in terms of deciding which lines
of work should be covered in such a volume and identifying the scholars who should
contribute to it. There is far more important, influential work on self and identity than
can be glimpsed in a single volume, and far more noted scientists who have contributed
important work than could be invited to contribute chapters. We have tried to craft a
volume that reflects both established and emerging topics in the field, but we make no
pretense that we have included all important lines of work.
After an introductory chapter that provides a broad historical and conceptual perspective on self and identity, the chapters are organized into four sections. Part I examines topics that primarily involve self-related cognition, including self-awareness,
self-related thought, and self-regulation. A great deal of theory and research have been
devoted to cognitive aspects of the self—not only the content of people’s thoughts about
themselves but also how self-relevant information is organized, stored, and retrieved,
and how people bring it to bear on regulating themselves. The chapters in Part I cover
topics such as self-awareness, identity, self-concept, self-organization, implicit self­processes, self-efficacy, and self-regulation.
The topics covered in Part I involve largely “cold” self-processes, focusing on how
people develop, process, store, and use information about themselves. The chapters in
Part II, in contrast, deal with “hot” processes that involve motivation and emotion.
A great deal of research has studied self-motives such as self-enhancement and self­verification, as well as how self-thought and self-evaluation are related to people’s emotional experiences. The chapters in this section share a focus on self-processes that
involve evaluation, motivation, and emotion.
One criticism that has been leveled at some research on self and identity is that it
has treated the self in a disembodied, decontextualized manner, thereby losing much
of its inherently interpersonal nature. The chapters in Part III redress this complaint
by focusing on interpersonal aspects of the self. Clearly, much of what happens when
people interact—in relationships, groups, or casual interactions—is influenced by how
the individuals construe themselves. In turn, those self-construals are greatly affected
by interpersonal and cultural factors.
The chapters in Part IV deal with physiological, phylogenetic, and developmental
perspectives on the self. Many of the major advances in the past 10 years have involved neuroscientific efforts to understand the brain processes that underlie self-related
thought, motivation, and emotion. Thus, this edition of the Handbook includes two
new chapters that address neuroscientific perspectives on the self. Most psychologists
would agree that newborn babies, like most nonhuman animals, have at most a rudimentary bodily or ecological self but no capacity for true self-awareness or self-relevant
thought. Chapters in this section also address interesting questions about the selves of
other animals and the ways in which people’s self-thoughts and self-evaluations change
with age.
One of the most notable things about human beings that distinguishes them from
all other animals is their ability to reflect on themselves in abstract and symbolic ways,
to form images and ideas of what they are like, to ponder important questions about
Preface
ix
themselves, to seek outcomes that are congenial to their sense of self, to exert deliberate
control over themselves, and to engage in other acts of selfhood. Although our understanding of these processes will undoubtedly advance in the coming years, researchers
and theorists have made enormous strides in illuminating these quintessential human
processes related to the self. This volume represents an attempt to integrate and summarize state-of-the-art knowledge about self and identity.
M ark R. Leary
June P rice Tangney
Reference
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Contents
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct in the Behavioral and Social Sciences
1
Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney
I. Awareness, Cognition, and Regulation
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System:
Toward a Converging Science of Selfhood
21
Carolyn C. Morf and Walter Mischel
3. Self-­Awareness
50
Charles S. Carver
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
69
Daphna Oyserman, Kristen Elmore, and George Smith
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge: Features, Functions, and Flexibility
105
Carolin J. Showers and Virgil Zeigler-Hill
6. Reflected Appraisal through a 21st-­Century Looking Glass
124
Harry M. Wallace and Dianne M. Tice
7. Expandable Selves
141
Gregory M. Walton, David Paunesku, and Carol S. Dweck
8. Implicit Self and Identity
155
Thierry Devos, Que-Lam Huynh, and Mahzarin R. Banaji
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
180
Roy F. Baumeister and Kathleen D. Vohs
10. Self-­Efficacy
198
James E. Maddux and Jennifer T. Gosselin
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self: A Self-­Determination
Theory Perspective on Internalization within Contexts and Cultures
225
Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci
xi
Contents
xii
12. Self-­Regulation Failure and Health: Pathways to Mental and Physical Illness
247
Timothy J. Strauman and Elena L. Goetz
13. Hypo-Egoic Mindsets: Antecedents and Implications of Quieting the Self
268
Mark R. Leary and Meredith L. Terry
II. Evaluation, Motivation, and Emotion
14. Social Self-­Analysis: Constructing and Maintaining Personal Identity
291
Mark D. Alicke, Corey L. Guenther, and Ethan Zell
15. Contingencies of Self-Worth
309
Jennifer Crocker and Lora E. Park
16. Self-­Protection
327
Constantine Sedikides
17. Individual Differences in Self-­Esteem
354
Geoff MacDonald and Mark R. Leary
18. Freedom versus Fear Revisited: An Integrative Analysis
of the Dynamics of the Defense and Growth of Self
378
Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg, and Jamie Arndt
19. Self-­Verification: The Search for Coherence
405
William B. Swann, Jr., and Michael D. Buhrmester
20. Self and Emotion
425
Paul J. Silvia and Kari M. Eddington
21. Self-­Conscious Emotions
446
June Price Tangney and Jessica L. Tracy
III. Interpersonal Behavior and Culture
22. The Relation of Self to Social Perception
481
David Dunning
23. Social Identity and the Psychology of Groups
502
Michael A. Hogg
24. Self and Close Relationships
520
Arthur Aron and Natalie Nardone
25. Self-­Presentation
542
Barry R. Schlenker
26. Contemporary Perspectives on Narcissism
and the Narcissistic Personality Type
571
Frederick Rhodewalt
27. Cultural Models of the Self
Susan E. Cross and Jonathan S. Gore
587
Contents
xiii
IV. Physiological, Phylogenetic,
and Developmental Perspectives
28. The Two Selves: The Self of Conscious Experience and Its Brain
617
Stanley B. Klein
29. A Social Neuroscience Perspective on the Self
638
Jennifer S. Beer
30. Self-­Recognition in Animals
656
Robert W. Mitchell
31. Emerging Self-­Processes during Childhood and Adolescence
680
Susan Harter
Author Index
717
Subject Index
739
Chapter 1
The Self as an Organizing Construct
in the Behavioral and Social Sciences
Mark R. Leary
June Price Tangney
Major advances in science often occur when
the work of a large number of researchers begins to converge on a single unifying
construct. Within psychology, for example,
“learning” dominated the psychological
landscape of the 1950s, “attitude” served as
a rallying point in the 1960s, “attribution”
was pervasive during the 1970s, and “cognition” was ubiquitous during the 1980s and
1990s. Even when the specific topics studied
under a particular conceptual umbrella vary
widely, the overlapping and complementary
findings of many researchers often lead to a
rapid, synergistic accumulation of knowledge. In retrospect, periods in which a large
number of researchers rally around the same
maypole may appear somewhat faddish.
Nonetheless, progress on a particular topic
is often rapid when researchers invest a good
deal of time and effort in it.
Since the 1970s, one such unifying construct within psychology and other social
and behavioral sciences has been the self, as
hundreds of thousands of articles, chapters,
and books have been devoted to self-­related
phenomena. The various topics that have fallen under the umbrella of the self have been
quite diffuse—self-­awareness, self-­esteem,
self-­control, identity, self-­verification, self­affirmation, self-­conscious emotions, self-
­ iscrepancy, self-­evaluation, self-­monitoring,
d
and so on—­leading Baumeister (1998) to
conclude that “self is not really a single topic
at all, but rather an aggregate of loosely related subtopics” (p. 681). In one sense, this
is undoubtedly true. Yet virtually all of these
phenomena involve, in one way or another,
the capacity for self-­reflection that lies at the
heart of what it means to have a self.
Although a great deal of behavior occurs automatically and nonconsciously
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), many complex human behaviors involve some degree
of self-­reflection. Some phenomena—such
as long-term planning, choking under pressure, self-­conscious emotions such as shame
and guilt, self-­verification, and deliberate
self-­presentation—­simply cannot occur in
animals that are unable to self-­reflect. Other
phenomena—such as interpersonal communication, conformity, cooperation, mating, and nonsocial emotions such as sadness
and fear—do not necessarily require self­reflection yet are drastically modified when
people think about themselves. As a result,
understanding the complexities of human
behavior without reference to the human capacity to think about oneself seems impossible. Indeed, reflexive consciousness may be
the most important psychological character1
2
istic that distinguishes human beings from
most, if not all, other animals.
In light of the obvious importance of self­reflection to understanding human behavior,
we find it curious that behavioral and social
scientists took so long to move the study of
the self to a prominent position, particularly
given that its importance was recognized
millennia ago. The beginnings of intellectual discussions of the self are often traced
to Plato (circa 428–347 B.C.E.), but we find
Eastern writers wrestling with the problem
of the self even earlier. The Upanishads,
written in India as early as 600 B.C.E., the
Tao te Ching in China (circa 500 B.C.E.), and
the philosophy of Gautama Buddha (circa
563–483 B.C.E.) dealt extensively with questions about self, reflexive consciousness, and
identity that still interest researchers today.
Many of the insights of these early philosophers were surprisingly astute, foreshadowing recent “discoveries” in behavioral and
social science.
For nearly two millennia afterward, most
discussions of the self appeared in religious
and theological contexts as writers analyzed
the evils of egotism, pride, and selfishness,
and pondered ways to help people escape the
self-­centeredness that the writers believed
interferes with spiritual insight and leads to
immoral behavior. During the Enlightenment, most major philosophers tackled the
problem of the self, including Descartes,
Locke, Hume, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Kant,
but the first detailed psychological discussion of the self did not appear until William
James (1890) devoted a chapter of The Principles of Psychology to “The Consciousness of Self.” James laid a strong conceptual
foundation for the study of the self, touted
the importance of the self for understanding
human behavior, and set a strong precedent
for regarding the self as a legitimate topic of
scholarly investigation.
Oddly, however, behavioral scientists did
not pick up where James left off for many
years, due in large measure to the domination of psychological thought by behaviorism on one hand and psychoanalysis on
the other. Most academic researchers were
persuaded by behaviorism’s admonition
to avoid mention of invisible internal entities such as the self, and those enamored by
psychoanalysis couched investigations of
psychological processes in Freudian terms.
Although Freud posited the existence of an
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
executive ego that struggled to manage the
individual’s intrapsychic affairs, his conceptualization was too far removed from prevailing constructs in academic psychology
to promote widespread adoption among behavioral scientists.
Even so, several influential theorists emphasized the importance of the self for understanding human behavior, and society
more generally, during the early part of the
20th century. Charles Horton Cooley (1902)
was particularly instrumental in bringing
the self to the attention of sociologists, and
George Herbert Mead (1934) extended and
refined Cooley’s ideas with a psychological
twist. Likewise, Ellsworth Faris (1937) and
Herbert Blumer (1937) further promoted the
study of the self in sociology, leading to the
development of what became known as “symbolic interactionism,” encompassing the notion that the meaning of things—­including
the self—is derived from social interaction,
the reactions of significant others, and one’s
interpretation of those interactions. A little
later, Erving Goffman’s (1959) seminal work
on self-­presentation stimulated another
wave of interest in the self. Although Goffman himself dismissed psychology’s view of
an inner self, the researchers who imported
the study of self-­presentation into psychology assumed that the psychological self was
intimately involved in self-­presentation (E.
Jones, 1964; Schlenker, 1980).
At about the same time, the neo-­Freudians
began to offer perspectives on the self that
differed markedly from Freud’s notion of the
ego and that tied the self to interpersonal
processes. Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, and
Harry Stack Sullivan, for example, provided
views of the self that were more palatable
to academic psychologists than the original
incarnation of psychoanalysis (Ansbacher
& Ansbacher, 1964; Horney, 1950; Sullivan, 1953). Over time, these ideas evolved
into the clinical perspectives known as ego
psychology, self psychology, and object relations theory (Kurzweil, 1989).
In the mid-1950s, Gordon Allport (1955,
p. 37) observed:
Perhaps without being fully aware of the historical situation, many psychologists have
commenced to embrace what two decades ago
would have been considered a heresy. They
have re-­introduced self and ego unashamedly
and, as if to make up for lost time, have em-
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
ployed ancillary concepts such as self-image,
self-­actualization, self-­affirmation, phenomenal ego, ego-­involvement, ego-­striving, and
many other hyphenated elaborations which to
experimental positivism still have a slight flavor of scientific obscenity.
Much of this work within psychology had
a humanistic bent, as exemplified by Carl
Rogers’s (1959) theories of personality and
psychotherapy, and Abraham Maslow’s
(1954) work on fully functioning (i.e., self­actualized) individuals. However, although
they provided many new ideas, the efforts of
the neo-­Freudians, humanists, and symbolic
interactionists led to little systematic empirical research on the self.
Three developments converged to increase
the attention given to the self by academic
psychologists and sociologists in the second
half of the 20th century. The first concerted
empirical interest in the self arose in the context of self-­esteem in the 1950s and 1960s
(Berger, 1952; Coopersmith, 1967; Janis &
Field, 1959; Rosenberg, 1965). Not only did
these writers demonstrate the importance
of self-­esteem as a psychological construct,
but they also provided self-­report measures
that stimulated a good deal of research. This
early work on the predictors and concomitants of trait self-­esteem then led to an interest in how people maintain their self-­esteem
in the face of various threats to their identity. Beginning in the 1960s, theorists began
to use self-­esteem motivation to explain a
broad variety of phenomena, including conformity, self-­serving attributions, reactions
to self-­relevant feedback, attitude change,
prosocial behavior, and group behavior
(e.g., Aronson, 1969; Bradley, 1978; Gergen,
1971; Greenwald, 1980; S. Jones, 1973).
The second development, the cognitive revolution in psychology, legitimized the study
of thoughts and internal control processes.
Armed with new models of how people attend to and process information—many
of them rooted in computer metaphors—­
researchers began to conceptualize the self in
terms of attentional and cognitive processes
(Markus, 1977). Self-­awareness theory
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972) was particularly
instrumental in changing how psychologists
viewed the self, and led to control and cybernetic approaches to self-­regulation (Carver
& Scheier, 1981; Hull & Levy, 1979). Studying the self from a cognitive framework also
3
led to an expansion of interest in identity,
which, although long a popular topic within
sociology (Burke & Tully, 1977; McCall &
Simmons, 1966; Rosenberg, 1965; Stryker,
1980), attracted more attention in psychology after identity and self-­concept were explicitly cognitivized (Cheek, 1989; Epstein,
1973; Markus, 1980).
Third, the publication of several measures
of dispositional attributes related to the self
prompted a surge of interest in self-­related
topics in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition
to the measures of trait self-­esteem mentioned earlier (Coopersmith, 1967; Janis &
Field, 1959; Rosenberg, 1965), measures
of self-­monitoring (Snyder, 1974), self­consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975), self-­concept (Wylie, 1974), and identity (Cheek, 1982) fueled a great deal of
theoretical and empirical attention to the
self. The ease with which research could
be conducted using self-­report measures of
these characteristics was both a blessing (in
that it generated a proliferation of research
interest) and a curse (because it led to a large
number of hastily designed studies).
By the 1980s, the self had emerged as a
vibrant and central topic of investigation
and, by a decade later, interest in the self
dominated many areas of psychology and
sociology. Progress on each of these topics
did not always inform the others as much as
one might have liked (see Morf & Mischel,
Chapter 2, this volume), but the fact that so
many researchers were studying related constructs pushed our understanding of self and
identity forward at a fast clip.
The Meanings of “Self”
In one sense, it is surprising that psychologists and sociologists took so long to embrace the relevance of the self for understanding human behavior. Not only had its
importance been discussed for nearly 3,000
years, but also influential early figures such
as James, Cooley, and Mead had stressed its
utility as an explanatory construct. In another sense, however, it is perhaps surprising that progress in understanding self and
identity has been as rapid as it has. From the
beginning, the topic has been bogged down
in a conceptual quagmire as muddy as any
in the social and behavioral sciences. Although psychologists and sociologists often
4
have had difficulty agreeing how to define
and conceptualize their constructs, “self”
has been particularly troublesome. Not only
have we lacked a single, universally accepted
definition of “self,” but also many definitions clearly refer to distinctly different phenomena, and some uses of the term are difficult to grasp no matter what definition one
applies.
To see that this is the case, consider what
the term self refers to in each of the following phrases, each of which has received attention by self researchers: self-­awareness,
false self, turning against the self, expanding
the self, self-talk, honoring the self, vulnerability of the self, loss of self, self-­disclosure,
the border between self and others, social
self, self-­schema, traumatized self, sense of
self, lack of time for the self, possible self,
self-­actualization, quieting the self. At best,
inspection of these and other self-­related
terms suggests that self does not mean the
same thing in all of these constructions; at
worst, one begins to wonder what the term
self actually means in any of them. To complicate matters, different writers have used
precisely the same terms differently, and
sometimes individual writers have used self
in more than one way within a single article
or chapter!
Semantic debates in science are often unproductive. Magee (1985) warned that “the
amount of worthwhile knowledge that comes
out of any field of inquiry . . . tends to be in
inverse proportion to the amount of discussion about the meaning of words that goes
into it. Such discussion, far from being necessary to clear thinking and precise knowledge, obscures both, and is bound to lead
to endless argument about words instead of
matters of substance” (p. 49). Despite Magee’s warning, however, we feel compelled to
spend a few pages grappling with the definition of self and self-­related constructs. At
minimum, we hope to alert researchers to
the ways in which self is used and to urge
them to choose their words with care.
Disparate Uses of “Self”
We have identified five distinct ways in
which behavioral and social scientists commonly use the word self and its compounds
(e.g., self-­esteem, self-­regulation, self­verification). (Olson, 1999, discussed eight
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
uses of self among philosophers, some of
which overlap with ours.)
Self as the Total Person
First, writers sometimes use the word self
as more or less synonymous with person,
which also seems to be common in everyday language. In this usage, one’s “self” is
just that person, him- or herself. The compound self-­mutilation relies on this meaning (the individual mutilates his or her own
person), as do self-­monitoring (the person
monitors him- or herself as a person) and
self-­defeating behavior (the person is undermining his or her personal well-being). Similarly, writers sometimes use self to refer to
the person him- or herself when oneself or
themselves would be clearer (as in a study
that found that “lack of time for self” was a
common complaint among respondents).
Although this is obviously a perfectly acceptable use of self in everyday writing, uses
that equate the self with the person do not
refer to the psychological construct that is of
interest to self researchers. From a psychological standpoint, most people (social and
behavioral scientists included) do not seem
to think that a person is a self, but rather
that each person has a self (Olson, 1999). If
this is so, using self as a synonym for the
whole person in psychological writing is unnecessary and potentially confusing. When
one means the person him- or herself, using
person or reflexive pronouns, such as oneself
or themselves will avoid confusion.
Self as Personality
Other writers have used self to refer to all or
part of an individual’s personality. For example, Wicklund and Eckert (1992) equated
self with one’s “behavioral potentials” (p. 3),
and Tesser (2002, p. 185) suggested that the
self is “a collection of abilities, temperament, goals, values, and preferences that distinguish one individual from another. . . . ”
Similarly, when Maslow (1954) wrote about
self-­actualization, he was referring to actualization of a person’s personality—a personality that was integrated, nondefensive,
and optimally functioning. Again, using self
as a rough synonym for personality may be
acceptable in everyday discourse. Even so,
using self to refer to a person’s personality or
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
the sum of the aspects of a person that make
him or her psychologically unique breeds
considerable confusion in scholarly writing.
(If a person’s self is that person’s personality, does that mean that all personality researchers are actually studying the self?) In
our view, the term personality captures this
meaning (the sum of a person’s aspects that
make him or her psychologically distinct) far
better than self does (although the self is obviously relevant to understanding aspects of
personality).
Self as Experiencing Subject
James (1890) introduced a distinction, subsequently adopted by generations of theorists
and researchers, between two intertwined
aspects of the self—the self as subject and
the self as object. The self as subject, or “I,”
is the psychological process that is responsible for self-­awareness and self-­knowledge;
many writers have called this entity the “self
as knower” to distinguish it from the “self as
known.” Thus, many writers use self to refer
to the inner psychological entity that is the
center or subject of a person’s experience.
This use of self is reflected in the phenomenology of selfhood. Most people have the
sense that there is an experiencing “thing”
inside their heads that registers their experiences, thinks their thoughts, and feels
their feelings. Furthermore, many people
report that this mental presence is at the
core of who they really or most essentially
are (Olson, 1999). The fact that there is no
specific neurophysiological structure underlying this experience of self (see Klein, Chapter 28, and Beer, Chapter 29, this volume)
does not undermine the subjective sense
that there is a conscious entity—a self—“in
there” somewhere.
Self as Beliefs about Oneself
James contrasted the “self-as-­knower” (the
I-self) with the “self-as-known” (the Meself). Many uses of self refer to perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings about oneself—the
various answers that a person might give to
questions such as “Who am I?” and “What
am I like?” Thus, when we speak of a fragmented self, we presumably mean that an
individual’s beliefs about him- or herself do
not form a coherent whole. Likewise, when
5
people enhance the self, they are inflating the
positivity of their beliefs about themselves,
and when they self-­disclose, they are sharing the information they have about themselves with other people. Processes such as
self-­verification and self-­affirmation also
involve people’s perceptions of and beliefs
about themselves.
We believe that it is important to distinguish clearly between a person’s “self” per se
and the person’s knowledge or beliefs about
him- or herself. Regarding the self as nothing
more than a person’s beliefs about him- or
herself as a person is not particularly useful
(cf. Epstein, 1973). Fortunately, most writers
have used terms such as self-­concept, selfimage, self-­schema, or self-­beliefs to refer
specifically to people’s conceptualizations of
or beliefs about themselves.
Self as Executive Agent
A fifth usage regards the self as a decision
maker and doer, as the agentic “ghost in the
machine” that regulates people’s behavior.
As Hamachek (1971) noted, one aspect of
the self involves “the personality structure
that represents the core of decision-­making,
planning, and defensiveness” (p. 6). Baumeister’s (1998) discussion of the “executive
function” of the self captures this usage. Far
from the problematic homunculus or psychodynamic ego that befuddled researchers
of earlier generations, the executive self is
often conceptualized as a cybernetic, self­control process (Carver & Scheier, 1981).
When we speak of processes involving “self­control” and “self-­regulation,” we are referring to this executive feature of the self (see
Baumeister & Vohs, Chapter 9, and Strauman & Goetz, Chapter 12, this volume).
A Conceptual Morass
As we have shown, various writers have
used self to refer to the person him- or herself, to the person’s personality, to the seat
of self-­awareness, to the person’s knowledge
about him- or herself, and to the source of
agency and volition. A reader for whom
self connotes any one of these definitions of
self may easily misinterpret writers who use
other definitions. For example, when we say
that infants and most nonhuman animals
do not possess a self, do we mean that they
6
fail to meet the criteria for being a person,
have no personality, lack subjectivity, do not
have a concept of who or what they are, or
cannot exercise deliberate self-­control? In
one sense, we may mean all of these things,
but in another sense, we may mean none
of them. Similarly, the prefix self- refers to
a quite different construct in terms such as
self-­observation, self-­actualization, selftalk, self-­schema, and self-­regulation.
A Plea for Clarity
Our intention is not to offer the final word on
the meaning of self but rather to alert writers
to the widespread semantic confusion that
exists, urge them to consider their uses of self
carefully, and offer a few suggestions. First,
we think that writers should avoid using self
as a synonym for person and personality in
scholarly writing. Not only do clearer and
more precise words than self exist for these
constructs, but also most work in the social
and behavioral sciences that focuses on the
self deals with something other than the
total person or the personality.
Each of the other three uses of self described earlier has some merit. The self is,
in fact, somehow involved in (1) people’s experience of themselves (though a self is not
needed for consciousness per se); (2) their
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings about
themselves; and (3) their deliberate efforts to
regulate their own behavior. However, none
of these three specific uses of self captures
the nature of the self in a way that encompasses all of the others. Thus, we must either concede that self has at least three very
different meanings (not a desirable state of
affairs if we desire precision and clarity) or
else arrive at a definition that encompasses
all three of these uses.
If we dig down to the fundamental, essential quality that underlies all three of these
uses of the term self, we arrive at the human
capacity for reflexive thinking—the ability
to take oneself as the object of one’s attention
and thought. Virtually all scholarly interest
in the self involves, in one way or another,
phenomena that involve this capacity for reflexive consciousness. At its root, then, we
think it is useful to regard the self as the set
of psychological mechanisms or processes
that allows organisms to think consciously
about themselves. The self is a mental capac-
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
ity that allows an animal to take itself as the
object of its own attention and to think consciously about itself.
This definition of self accommodates the
three preceding connotations. The special
psychological apparatus that permits self­reflection affects the nature of conscious experience (because people can think about the
self-­relevancy of what they experience), underlies all perceptions, beliefs, and feelings
about oneself (because self-­conceptualization
requires the ability to self-­reflect), and allows
people deliberately to regulate their own behavior (because deliberate self-­regulation
requires thinking about personal goals and
how to meet them). Furthermore, with a few
exceptions (e.g., self-­mutilation), most hyphenated psychological constructs that have
self- as a prefix—such as self-­efficacy, self­deception, self-­schema, self-­presentation,
and self-­control—all refer to constructs,
processes, or phenomena that, at their base,
involve the ability to think reflexively about
oneself.
Whether or not others agree with our
basic definition of self, one way to avoid
confusion is to use precise terms in place of
the ambiguous self. All of those hyphenated
self terms serve us well in this regard. For
example, if the focus is on the self as object,
terms that denote thoughts about the self
should be used as appropriate, such as self­schema, self-­concept, self-­belief, or others.
In our experience, a clearer, more precise
term than self can almost always be found,
except perhaps when referring to the cognitive mechanism that allows reflexive self­thinking to take place, for which self may be
the only designation. Writers should scour
their papers for the word self and substitute
less ambiguous, more descriptive terms for
the constructs they are discussing.
Carving Up the Self Pie
Starting with the idea that the self is the mental apparatus that underlies self-­reflection,
we can begin to bring order to the vast array
of phenomena that self researchers have
studied by considering the self-­processes
that have been of greatest interest to investigators. At the risk of oversimplifying, most
of the psychological phenomena that have
been studied with regard to the self involve
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
one of three basic psychological processes:
­attention, cognition, and regulation. These
three processes are inextricably related, and
it is rare for one to occur without one or both
of the others. For example, focusing attention on oneself often results in self-­relevant
cognitions and allows the possibility of regulation; thinking about oneself requires self­attention; self-­regulation requires both self­attention and self-­cognition; and so on. Even
so, these seem to be distinct psychological
processes that have different consequences
and are probably controlled by different regions of the brain (see Klein, Chapter 28, and
Beer, Chapter 29, this volume, for some initial findings on the neural substrates associated with distinct self-­related phenomena).
Attentional Processes
At the most basic level, possession of a self
allows people to direct their conscious attention to themselves, either spontaneously
or purposefully. (In the case of deliberate
self-­attention, the regulatory function is also
involved.) Only a few other animals appear
to possess a self that has a rudimentary capacity for self-­attention, namely chimpanzees, orangutans, dolphins, and elephants
(Gallup & Suarez, 1986; Mitchell, Chapter
30, this volume). As considerable work on
self-­attention has shown, simply focusing
attention on oneself has important effects
on thought, emotion, and behavior (Carver,
Chapter 3, this volume; Carver & Scheier,
1981; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and self-­awareness is required
for most other self-­related processes.
Cognitive Processes
Possession of a self allows people to think
consciously about themselves. Some of these
self-­thoughts involve one’s current state and
situation, others involve one’s enduring attributes and roles, and still others involve
memories and imaginings, such as thoughts
of oneself in the past or future. The capacity for self-­relevant thought underlies the
construction of a self-­concept and identity,
as well as the development of the various
standards that guide people’s actions and influence their emotions, such as standards involving what they should do or be (Higgins,
1987). Among other things, self-­relevant
7
cognitions provide the link between the social world and the individual.
Executive Processes
The ability to attend to and think about
themselves, both now and in the future,
allows the possibility for human beings to
regulate themselves. Unlike other animals,
people can decide to control how they think,
feel, and behave, then set about to do so. Of
course, people’s efforts at self-­control are
met with mixed success, but the possession
of a self at least allows the possibility that
one can occasionally escape the influence
of one’s environment, history, and internal
state to act in autonomous, self-­directed
ways (Vohs & Baumeister, 2011; Baumeister
& Vohs, Chapter 9, this volume).
Theorists have found it a challenge to
conceptualize the executive aspect of the
self in a way that avoids positing something
like a homunculus. If a person controls his
or her responses through volition, who or
what is doing the controlling? Cybernetic,
computer, and neural network models have
all helped in this regard, explaining how interconnected elements of a physical system
can allow the system to autoregulate in complex ways. However, none of these models
can account easily for precisely how people
make conscious, deliberate, intentional
choices. Our sense is that this problem will
not be addressed adequately until the larger
problem of consciousness is solved. Once
we understand how consciousness can arise
from biological matter, we ought to be in a
better position to talk about how it is that
consciousness can focus on itself, allowing
an organism to think about its own thoughts
and direct the responses of the body in which
it resides.
What about Motivation
and Emotion?
Beyond capacities for self-­relevant attention,
cognition, and regulation, many writers have
also imbued the self with motivational and
emotional qualities, positing special self­motives (e.g., motives for self-­enhancement
and self-­verification) and self-­relevant emotions (e.g., pride, guilt, shame, and embarrassment). However, the relationship be-
8
tween the self and motivation and emotion
is indirect and complex, and we do not think
that the evidence at present is sufficient to
conclude that the self possesses motivational
or emotional qualities of its own.
The difficulty in addressing this question
is that self is not essential for either emotion
or motivation in the same way that it is required for self-­attention, self-­thought, and
self-­regulation. An organism must have a
self in order to attend to, think about, and
intentionally regulate itself, but self-less animals experience emotions and have motives,
and human beings also demonstrate automatic, nonconscious motives and affective
reactions that do not involve self-­reflection
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Put simply,
many emotional and motivational processes
do not require a self. Even so, possessing a
self clearly extends people’s range of motivational and emotional experiences beyond
those of other animals, and the self appears
to underlie several motivational and emotional phenomena that appear to be unique
to human beings.
The Self and Emotion
Having a self changes the nature of emotional experience by allowing people to create emotions in themselves by imagining
self-­relevant events, reacting emotionally to
symbolic images of themselves in their own
minds, consciously contemplating the causes
of their reactions, and deliberately regulating
their emotional experiences (Leary, 2003).
By being able to think about themselves,
people can create subjective events that elicit
emotional reactions. These emotions are not
part of the self per se but rather are the consequences of certain self-­thoughts and other
appraisals.
However, one special category of emotions does appear to require a self. The
self-­conscious emotions—such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride—occur
only when people either judge themselves
relative to their personal standards or imagine how they are being regarded by other
people (Tangney & Tracy, Chapter 21, this
volume; see also Tangney & Dearing, 2002;
Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tracy, Robins, &
Tangney, 2007). Most theorists concur that
self-­reflection is necessary in order for people to experience these emotions, and that
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
neither nonhuman animals who lack a self
nor human infants before the ages of 15–18
months appear to experience these emotions
(Lewis, 1992; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979;
Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989;
Tracy & Robins, 2007).
It is unclear at present whether these
self-­conscious emotions should be considered part of the self (inasmuch as they cannot occur without it), or whether they are
best regarded as the output of an integrated
cognitive–­affective system that is linked to
the self. Given that the underpinnings of
many of the self-­conscious motives may be
found in nonhuman animals (particularly
in encounters among conspecifics involving dominance and submission; Gilbert &
Trower, 1990), it may be best to regard them
for now as emotions that have been appropriated by the self. Clearly, the precise nature of the link between the self and emotion deserves concerted research attention
(Leary, 2003, 2007).
Self‑Motives
Likewise, possession of a self opens the
possibility of motivated actions that are
not possible without one. Writers have
postulated several self-­related motives, including self-­esteem maintenance (or ego
defense), self-­verification, self-­appraisal,
self-­actualization, self-­affirmation, and
self-­expansion (see in this volume Aron &
Nardone, Chapter 24; Harter, Chapter 31;
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Arndt, Chapter
18; Ryan & Deci, Chapter 11; Sedikides,
Chapter 16; Swann & Buhrmester, Chapter
19; Walton, Paunesku, & Dweck, Chapter
7). However, it is not clear whether it is best
to attribute these motives to the self per se
(as if the self wants certain things for itself)
or to view them as self-­mediated ways to satisfy other, more basic motives and needs. We
do not question that people behave in ways
that make it appear as if they are inherently
motivated to preserve their self-­esteem, to
maintain a consistent view of themselves, to
seek accurate information about themselves,
and so on, nor that self-­reflection is often
involved in these processes. Yet rather than
reflecting freestanding self-­motives that are
especially dedicated to fostering some quality of the self (e.g., a positive evaluation,
consistency, integrity, or expansion), these
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
pervasive proclivities may emerge from more
general and fundamental motives, such as to
promote relationships, minimize unpleasant
affect, or reduce uncertainty (Pyszczynski et
al., Chapter 18, this volume).
Put differently, having a self gives people
additional ways of dealing with threats,
negative feelings, and uncertainty that are
not available to self-less animals. Other animals must take behavioral action to change
their emotions (e.g., fleeing a predator) or to
reduce uncertainty (e.g., exploring a novel
stimulus). Armed with a self, however, people may influence their feelings simply by
thinking about themselves and their worlds
in certain ways. So, for example, people can
engage in self-­deception or self-­affirmation
to make themselves feel better; can overestimate the amount of control that they have
over events to reduce anxiety; can construe
themselves in ways that give them a consistent and, thus, more useful self-image; or can
decide that more certainty exists than is, in
fact, the case. In each instance, they are cognitively manipulating information in ways
that achieve certain psychological outcomes,
in a sense “cheating” the system by reaping
the subjective effects of events that they experience only in their minds. Viewed in this
way, these phenomena seem to emerge from
self-­mediated efforts to satisfy other motives
rather than from freestanding motives of the
self.
Thus, it may be more parsimonious to
conclude that emotional and motivational
systems are intimately linked to the self but
are not an inherent part of it. Thus, for example, emotion and motivation may be affected when people compare themselves
with their standards or with their past selves
(Carver, Chapter 3, this volume; Carver &
Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1987); contemplate
their failures, shortcomings, and moral lapses (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney &
Tracy, Chapter 21, this volume); think about
how other people perceive them (Leary &
Kowalski, 1995); ponder their goals and how
to achieve them (Cantor & Zirkel, 1990); or
assess their ability to perform certain tasks
(Maddux & Gosselin, Chapter 10, this volume; Maddux, 1999). In each case, reflexive consciousness, along with self-­generated
affect, may energize and direct behavior,
but the emotional and motivational systems
themselves are independent of the mecha-
9
nism that is responsible for self-­reflection
(i.e., the self). People’s thoughts about themselves (which do involve the activity of the
self) influence their emotion and motivation
in much the same way that thoughts about
many things in the world can affect what
they feel and desire at any particular time.
Self‑Constructs, Self‑Processes,
and Self‑Phenomena
Table 1.1 lists, in alphabetical order, a number of constructs, processes, and phenomena
that, in one way or another, deal explicitly with the self. Although the list is by no
means exhaustive, it provides a flavor for
the variety of phenomena studied under the
rubric of the self. Importantly, as suggested
earlier, the self- prefix means something different in different terms. So, for example,
the self in self-­destructive behavior seems
to refer to something different from the self
in self-­awareness. (Terms that do not refer
to the psychological self in any way, such as
self-­fulfilling prophecy, are not included.)
The first thing one notices is the sheer
number of self-­related terms. Just out of curiosity, we looked to see how many hyphenated self terms appeared in the abstracts
in the PsycINFO computerized database
through March 2011. Eliminating the term
self-­report, we found over 260,000 abstracts
that contained a hyphenated self term, and
this did not include such other central self
terms as ego and identity! The most frequent
ones included self-­concept, self-­esteem, self­control, self-­disclosure, self-­actualization,
self-­monitoring, self-­confidence, and self­awareness.
Inspection of Table 1.1 also shows how
splintered research on the self is at present.
Little effort has been devoted to exploring
how each of the constructs, processes, and
phenomena relate to other entries in Table
1.1. A smattering of work has examined
the relationships among different constructs
(e.g., Tesser, Crepaz, Beach, Cornell, &
Collins’s [2000] efforts to show the substitutability of various processes that involve
self-­esteem maintenance), but such efforts
have been sparse. Researchers may wish
to give additional attention to how their
particular topic of interest relates to other
self-­processes more generally. Our current
microtheories of specific self-­related phe-
10
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
TABLE 1.1. Self-­Related Constructs, Processes, and Phenomena
Desired/undesired self
Ego
Ego defense
Ego extension
Ego ideal
Ego identity
Ego integrity
Ego strength
Ego threat
Feared self
Future/past self
Ideal self
Identity
Identity orientation
Ought/should self
Possible selves
Self-­acceptance
Self-­actualization
Self-­affirmation
Self-­appraisal
Self-­assessment
Self-­awareness
Self-blame
Self-care
Self-­categorization
Self-­completion
Self-­complexity
Self-­concept
Self-­confidence
Self-­conscious emotions
Self-­consciousness
Self-­control
Self-­criticism
Self-­deception
Self-­defeating behavior
Self-­definition
Self-­development
Self-­disclosure
Self-­discrepancy
Self-doubt
Self-­efficacy
Self-­enhancement
Self-­esteem
Self-­evaluation
nomena take us only so far in understanding the self as a whole.
When we first designed Table 1.1, we
planned to indicate beside each construct
whether the term refers primarily to an attentional, cognitive, or executive feature of
the self, or to an emotional–­motivational
phenomenon in which the self is inherently
involved. However, we quickly despaired of
making these designations. Virtually every
construct on the list involves at least two—
and often three or four—of these features.
For example, self-­awareness is clearly an attentional phenomenon at heart, yet it is tied
intimately to self-­cognition, self-­regulation,
and self-­relevant motivation and emotion
(Carver, Chapter 3, this volume), and researchers who have studied self-­awareness
have often been interested in its cognitive,
regulatory, motivational, or emotional
concomitants rather than in self-­attention
per se. Likewise, self-­efficacy is a cognitive
phenomenon that relates directly to regulatory, motivational, and emotional processes
(Maddux & Gosselin, Chapter 10, this volume), and self-­conscious emotions are emotional phenomena that necessarily involve
self-­attention and self-­cognition and have
regulatory implications (Tangney & Tracy,
Self-­handicapping
Self-help
Self-­identification
Self-­identity
Self-image
Self-­management
Self-­monitoring
Self-­organization
Self-­perception
Self-­preservation
Self-­presentation
Self-­protection
Self-­reference
Self-­regard
Self-­regulation
Self-­reliance
Self-­schema
Self-­silencing
Self-talk
Self-trust
Self-­verification
Self-worth
Chapter 21, this volume). Our inability to
categorize unequivocally any of the constructs in Table 1.1 is instructive because it
shows that the attentional, cognitive, and
regulatory aspects of the self are intimately
interconnected, with pervasive links to emotion and motivation.
Recent Advances
and Future Directions
As noted, questions about the nature of the
self have captured the attention of philosophers for centuries and behavioral scientists
since the latter part of the 19th century.
After the seminal speculative writings of
James, Cooley, Baldwin, Mead, and others,
the “first generation” of empirical research
on the self that emerged in the middle of
the 20th century focused primarily on self­esteem. During the 1950s and 1960s, various
methods were developed to assess individual
differences in trait self-­esteem, and efforts
were made to determine the causes, correlates, and consequences of high versus low
self-­regard. Then, as interest in the self grew
during the 1970s, other new constructs were
introduced and a great deal of groundbreak-
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
ing research was conducted on topics such as
self-­awareness, self-­perception, self-­concept,
self-­schema, self-­control, self-­presentation,
self-­monitoring, and self-­control.
A second generation of self research arose
in the 1980s. At that time, conceptualizations of the self became markedly more rich
and differentiated. No longer mostly the domain of personality psychology, theory and
research on the self began to spread across
the behavioral and social sciences, and to
link explicitly with the study of basic interpersonal and intrapersonal phenomena.
Within social psychology, researchers interested in social cognition, attitudes, group
processes, social influence, and interpersonal relationships began to explore self­processes. Basic research on motivation and
emotion also began to draw heavily on self­related constructs (e.g., self-­efficacy, identity, self-­enhancement, self-­verification, self­discrepancy, and self-­conscious emotions),
and clinical research on affective and personality disorders often traced these difficulties
to problems with self and identity. Several
lines of research in developmental psychology likewise incorporated self-­relevant
constructs, and, of course, personality psychology continued to investigate individual
differences in self-­related attributes and intrapsychic processes involving the self. In addition, sociologists, who had long embraced
the importance of the self for understanding
the link between the individual and the social order (Cooley, 1902), devoted increasing
attention to self and identity (Hewitt, 2007).
The second generation of self research that
emerged in the 1980 and 1990s showed the
role that self-­related processes play in a wide
array of phenomena and coalesced the study
of the self into a vibrant, definable field.
In the first 10 years of the new millennium,
additional new topics were identified, but
perhaps more importantly, four overarching
emergent themes linked self and identity to
processes that involve evolution, development, culture, and advances in neuroscience. These four perspectives provided ways
to integrate a broad expanse of theory and
research because, no matter the self-­related
phenomenon under study, researchers could
consider its evolutionary underpinnings,
how it changes with development, the role
of culture, and the brain regions that are
responsible for it. These meta perspectives
11
on the self ushered in the third generation of
self research.
The Evolution and Historical
Development of the Self
Mirroring a trend across the behavioral sciences, self researchers began to consider the
self from an evolutionary perspective. In reviewing archeological, anthropological, and
historical evidence, psychologists grappled
with several questions. One set of questions
concerns the evolutionary functions of the
self. What does the self do? Why is it helpful to have a self? How were human beings
selected for “self-ness”? What is it about the
self that enhances one’s chances for survival
or, more to the point, increases one’s inclusive fitness? In short, what evolutionary
pressures and developments brought about
the modern self? A second set of related
questions concerns the point during human
evolution when the self emerged. When in
the course of human prehistory do we find
evidence that people could think consciously
about themselves?
Theorists have offered different accounts
of the appearance of self (Baumeister, 1987;
Leary & Buttermore, 2003; Sedikides &
Skowronski, 2003), and many issues have
not been resolved, but the discussion pressed
our understanding of the self forward.
In addition, theorists grappled with more
recent cultural developments that may have
provided fertile ground for an ever more
elaborated and differentiated sense of self.
One cultural event critical to the development of the modern self was the shift from
hunting and gathering to sedentary farming
that occurred approximately 10,000 years
ago (see Martin, 1999). The advent of agriculture and, for the first time, sedentary
communities allowed people to specialize,
opening the door to more differentiated
identities. Once groups of human beings
began cultivating food, it was possible for
one person to produce enough food to feed
multiple individuals, thereby freeing people
up to do more than just hunting, gathering,
and scavenging for their next meal. Some individuals could now specialize as toolmakers, weavers, builders, farmers, merchants,
and so on. Thus people’s identities became
increasingly differentiated, both in terms of
their self-­perceptions (“I’m the person who
12
makes the tools”) and in terms of how others
viewed them (“She’s the group’s main toolmaker”). The shift from hunting–­gathering
to agriculture was also likely critical to the
development of the self in a second respect.
The shift from nomadic to sedentary existence allowed people to accrue personal possessions because people were no longer limited to what they could carry. For the first
time, they made relatively permanent homes
filled with personal objects, creating both a
sense of ownership and a unique space that
likely fostered a sense of individual identity
and self.
Regarding the functional advantages of
the self, one key factor may be motivation
toward mastery and excellence that a sense
of self helps to confer. In the world of the
hunter–­gatherer, the primary motives likely
stemmed from points rather low on the hierarchy of needs—food to satisfy hunger, social acceptance for protection and support,
sex to satisfy lust, shelter and clothing in service of safety and comfort. Once these basic
needs were satisfied (e.g., after a good meal),
motivation presumably decreased. But as
people developed a sense of self—an identity
as a toolmaker, for instance—they became
invested in their work, thought about how
their work was viewed by others, took pride
in their accomplishments, and strived toward
excellence. In short, the ability to self-­reflect
permitted the pursuit of long-term personal
goals that were no longer tied to an immediate reinforcement.
People’s identities continue to become
increasingly complex owing to advances in
communication technology, the explosive
growth in information, the Internet, the
dizzying array of choices we face each day,
the diversity of our communities, our transience, and social media (Gergen, 1991). The
question is whether changes in the content
of human identities, moving into the 21st
century, will have implications for the basic
cognitive–­affective processes that underlie
them. What are the evolutionary pressures,
if any, operating on the self today?
Developmental Questions about the Self
Harter (Chapter 31, this volume) emphasizes
how much rich territory can be explored at
the interface between developmental psychology and what have historically been
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
“adult” social psychological approaches
to the self. At first glance, broad questions
about the development of the self (e.g., How
does [some aspect of the self] develop?) are
misleadingly simple, masking several distinct
types of developmental questions. This is not
merely a matter of measuring self-­esteem in
children and adults to see if they differ. For
example, developmental researchers interested in self-­esteem have begun to examine
not only developmental changes in level of
self-­esteem but also developmental changes
in the composition of self-­esteem (e.g., Is social self-­esteem more closely linked to global
self-­esteem in adolescence compared with
middle adulthood?) and in the implications
of self-­esteem (e.g., Is self-­esteem more important to resilience in the face of failure at
earlier than later stages of development?).
In most areas of self research, four types of
developmental questions can be examined.
The first two questions concern normative
developmental changes: First, are there developmental changes in the level of a given
self-­related construct across the lifespan? For
example, is the self of a 6-year-old as complex as the self of a 60-year-old? Are there
developmental differences in the degree to
which people engage in self-­evaluation maintenance strategies? Are adolescents more inclined to engage in social comparisons, relative to younger children or adults?
The second set of questions involves developmental changes in the quality of a given
self-­related construct across the lifespan.
For example, does the nature or organization of some aspect of the self change with
age (e.g., Are there age-­related changes in
degree of compartmentalization)? Are children inclined to engage in different kinds of
self-­evaluation maintenance strategies than
their parents? Do older adults make different types of social comparisons, relative to
younger individuals?
The third and fourth kinds of developmental questions focus on individual differences. Although there may be mean age
differences in fear of death, self-­complexity,
the frequency and types of social comparisons, and so on, within a given age group,
substantial individual differences exist along
these dimensions. Where do these differences come from? What do we know about
the developmental roots of individual differences in self-­attributes or self-­processes?
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
For example, what biological, cognitive, and
early environmental factors foster the development of more versus less complex selves?
Are certain cultural or family socialization
contexts associated with the development of
specific types of self-­evaluation maintenance
strategies or with the propensity to engage in
social comparisons?
Fourth, and finally, we may ask whether
developmental changes exist in the implications of those individual differences: Are
some individual differences more critical—
more adaptive or maladaptive—at certain
life stages than at other life stages? For example, do self-­complexity and compartmentalization have different implications for psychological adjustment and resilience under
stress for adolescents versus adults? Are certain self-­evaluation maintenance strategies
effective in maintaining self-­esteem among
adolescents but less so among adults? Does
the relationship between upward social
comparison and life satisfaction shift with
increasing age?
These are just a sampling of the kinds of
questions that can be examined at the intersection of developmental and self psychology. Each of these four basic developmental
questions can be posed in reference to most,
if not all, of the self-­related attributes and
processes described in this volume, and
many represent virgin territory yet to be addressed in the research literature. We hope
that in the next decade, social and personality psychologists will consider developmental
issues in the context of their research on the
self. Similarly, we hope that developmental
researchers will continue to incorporate into
their own research many of the rich ideas
and methods found in self-­related research
conducted by personality and social psychologists on adults.
Culture and Self
A repeating theme across many chapters in
this volume is the intimate link between self
and culture. More and more, theorists and
researchers are considering cultural context
when studying the nature, meaning, and
functions of many self-­attributes and self­related processes. As emphasized by Cross
and Gore (Chapter 27, this volume; see also
Markus & Kitayama, 1991), culture plays a
pivotal role in the construction of self-­beliefs
13
and identity. As a result, fundamental differences in the nature of self-­related phenomena can be seen in qualitatively distinct
cultures.
As with developmental aspects of the self,
questions about cultural differences may appear deceptively simple at first glance (e.g.,
How does the propensity to experience
shame differ across cultures?). Here, too,
four distinct types of questions about self
and culture can be posed, paralleling the developmental questions just discussed.
The first two questions again concern differences in level or quality—in this instance,
differences across cultural groups. First, are
there cultural differences in the level of a
given self-­related construct? We might ask,
for example, whether people from different
cultures vary in level of self-­esteem, self­consciousness, shame-­proneness, mastery
motives, or death anxiety. Are there cultural
differences in the degree of overlap between
self and others that underlies intimacy?
Second, do cultural differences exist in
the quality of a given self-­related construct?
For example, does the relative importance
of self-­esteem in specific domains vary as a
function of culture (e.g., Is social self-­esteem
more closely linked to global self-­esteem in
interdependent vs. independent cultures?).
Are there cultural differences in the kinds of
contexts that give rise to mastery motives or
to death anxiety? Are there cultural differences in the overlap between self and other
people (Aron & Nardone, Chapter 24, this
volume)?
The third and fourth questions focus on
individual differences involving interaction
or moderator effects. Although cultures may
differ in mean level of an attribute, substantial individual differences exist within each
cultural group, differences that may have
culturally specific antecedents and consequences. Are there cultural differences in
the etiology or developmental roots of individual differences in certain self-­attributes
or self-­processes? For example, are there
cultural differences in the types of parenting styles that give rise to high self-­esteem or
an emphasis on mastery versus performance
goals? Are there cultural differences in the
types of early experiences that foster a lifelong vulnerability to death anxiety or the
capacity engage in close intimate relationships?
14
Finally, we can address questions regarding cultural differences in the implications
of those individual differences. We may ask,
for example, whether high self-­esteem and
the pursuit of mastery versus performance
goals are more adaptive in independent versus interdependent cultural contexts. Can
high self-­esteem and a mastery orientation
be a liability in some contexts but not in
others? Does the relationship between death
anxiety and creativity differ across cultures?
Does the relationship between relationship
intimacy and overlap between self and other
vary as a function of interdependence of culture?
Again, this is only a sample of the kinds of
questions about self and culture that can be
examined. Each of these four basic questions
about culture can be posed in reference to
most, if not all, of the self-­related attributes
and processes described in this volume. In
recent years, self researchers have begun to
make some inroads into this extensive territory, mostly with regard to the first question concerning mean differences across
cultures. But most of the existing research
focuses on only two cultures—­Japanese and
North American—and the other three questions about the link between self and culture
have barely been addressed. In the coming
years, we will surely learn more about the
self around the globe.
Neuroscience and the Self
At the time that the first edition of the Handbook of Self and Identity was published
(Leary & Tangney, 2003), only a few controlled studies had examined the brain regions associated with self-­related processes
using positron emission tomography (Craik
et al., 1999) or functional magnetic resonance imaging (Kelley et al., 2002). Prior to
this time, most research on the relationship
between brain and self involved studies of
patients with damage to the brain, particularly to the frontal lobes (for an early review,
see Stuss & Benson, 1984; see also Klein,
Chapter 28, and Beer, Chapter 29, this volume). In the years since, dozens of studies
have investigated the areas of the brain associated with self-­referential processing
(D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Ochsner et al.,
2005), self-­enhancement (Beer & Hughes,
2010; Blackwood, Bentall, Simmons, Mur-
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
ray, & Howard, 2003), autobiographical
memory (Cabeza et al., 2004), executive
processes involved in self-­regulation (Brass
& Haggard, 2007), changes in state self­esteem (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Muscatell,
Byrne Haltom, & Leary, in press), and the
random self-­related thoughts that arise
when people’s minds wander (Mason et al.,
2007).
By far, the greatest attention has been
directed toward the prefrontal areas of the
brain, known for many years to be involved
in self-­related thought and executive control of one’s actions. In addition, interesting
work has examined ways in which thinking
about oneself is both similar to and different from thinking about other people (Beer,
Chapter 29, this volume). For example, what
brain regions are involved when people
think about themselves through the eyes of
other people? As noted, an important function of self-­awareness is to permit people to
think about how they are seen by others, and
thinking about reflected appraisals presumably involves simultaneously thinking about
oneself and about other people. How does
processing differ when people are thinking
about how a significant other views them
as opposed to how they are viewed generally? And, what brain areas are active when
people have emotional reactions to other
people’s judgments of them, such as when
they feel socially anxious, ashamed, or embarrassed?
Although a great deal has been learned
about the neurological underpinnings of
self-­related thought, research needs to move
beyond the neural bases of self-­referential
processing and self-­evaluation to examine
the full range phenomena associated with the
self. For example, the field is ripe for groundbreaking work on brain functions associated
with death anxiety, self-­expansion experiences, inclusion of others in the self, mastery
versus performance motives, self-­regulatory
efforts, and hypo-egoic mindsets.
Of course, the premier question that continues to baffle psychologists and neuroscientists involves how biochemical and electrical activity in biological matter gives rise to
subjective experience and self-­awareness in
the first place. A full understanding of the
self will not occur until researchers solve
the problem of consciousness. Despite the
amount of attention to consciousness and
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
claims that the question has been answered
(Dennett, 1991), no one has adequately explained it. We suspect that the answer will
ultimately require a paradigm shift in how
scientists think about the relationship between biological processes and personal experience.
Conclusion
Developing a full understanding of human
thought, emotion, and behavior appears
impossible without taking into account the
fact that human beings can attend to, think
about, and act on themselves in ways that
are not possible for any other animal. Major
strides have been made in understanding
self-­relevant processes over the past century, and now that self research is a large and
thriving area, progress should continue at a
fast pace.
Although we are optimistic about the
state of self theory and research, our optimism is tempered slightly by the fact that
the field is composed of a large number of
pockets of self-­contained research literatures
that have yet to be adequately integrated.
With a few exceptions, behavioral and social scientists, perhaps with good reason,
have avoided large-scale theorizing in favor
of limited-­domain theories, leaving the big
picture to philosophers of mind. Although
the philosophers have contributed many useful ideas and theoretical perspectives on the
self (see Gallagher & Shear, 1999), they have
generally not tied those ideas to the extensive empirical literature in psychology and
sociology. As a result, social and behavioral
scientists have not rushed to embrace those
perspectives, use them to interpret their own
findings, or base their research on them. The
future of self research will depend in large
measure on how successfully broad theoretical advances are able to link together specific bodies of research that deal with self
and identity.
References
Allport, G. W. (1955). Becoming. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Ansbacher, H. L., & Ansbacher, R. R. (Eds.).
(1964). Superiority and social interest: A col-
15
lection of later writings by Alfred Adler. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Aronson, E. (1969). Dissonance theory: Progress
and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson,
W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Cognitive
consistency theories: A sourcebook (pp. 5–27).
Skokie, IL: Rand McNally.
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The
unbearable automaticity of being. American
Psychologist, 54, 462–479.
Baumeister, R. F. (1987). How the self became
a problem: A psychological review of historical research. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 163–176.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. Gilbert,
S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 680–740). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Beer, J. S., & Hughes, B. L. (2010). Neural systems of social comparison and the “above­average” effect. NeuroImage, 49, 2671–2679.
Berger, E. M. (1952). The relation between expressed acceptance of self and expressed acceptance of others. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 47, 778–782.
Blackwood, N. J., Bentall, R. P., Simmons, A.,
Murray, R. M., & Howard, R. J. (2003).
Self-­responsibility and the self-­serving bias:
An fMRI investigation of causal attributions.
NeuroImage, 20, 1076–1085.
Blumer, H. (1937). Social psychology. In E. P.
Schmidt (Ed.), Man and society (pp. 144–198).
New York: Prentice-Hall.
Bradley, G. W. (1978). Self-­serving biases in the
attribution process: A reexamination of the
fact or fiction question. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 36, 56–71.
Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2007). To do or not to
do: The neural signature of self control. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 9141–9145.
Burke, P. I., & Tully, J. (1977). The measurement
of role/identity. Social Forces, 55, 881–897.
Cabeza, R., Prince, S. E., Daselaar, S. M., Greenberg, D., Budde, M., Dolcos, F., et al. (2004).
Brain activity during episodic retrieval of autobiographical and laboratory events: An fMRI
study using a novel photo paradigm. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 1533–1594.
Cantor, N., & Zirkel, S. (1990). Personality, cognition, and purposive behavior. In L. A. Pervin
(Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and
research (pp. 135–164). New York: Guilford
Press.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Atten-
16
tion and self-­regulation: A control-­theory
approach to human behavior. New York:
Springer-­Verlag.
Cheek, J. M. (1989). Identity orientations and
self-­interpretation. In D. M. Buss & N. Cantor
(Eds.), Personality psychology: Recent trends
and emerging directions (pp. 275–285). New
York: Springer.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner’s.
Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self­esteem. San Francisco: Freeman.
Craik, F. I. M., Moroz, T. M., Moscovitch, M.,
Stuss, D. T., Winocur, G., Tulving, E., et al.
(1999). In search of the self: A positron emission tomography study. Psychological Science,
10, 26 –34.
D’Argembeau, A., Ruby, P., Collette, F., Degueldre, C., Balteau, E., Luxen, A., et al. (2007).
Distinct regions of the medial prefrontal cortex are associated with self-­referential processing and perspective taking. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 935–944.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained.
Boston: Little, Brown.
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory
of objective self-­awareness. New York: Academic Press.
Duval, T. S., & Silvia, P. J. (2001). Self-­awareness
and causal attribution: A dual systems theory.
Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Eisenberger, N. I., Inagaki, T. K., Muscatell, K.
A., Byrne Haltom, K. E., & Leary, M. R. (in
press). The neural sociometer: Brain mechanisms underlying state self-­esteem. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-­concept revisited: Or
a theory of a theory. American Psychologist,
28, 404–416.
Faris, E. (1937). The nature of human nature.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H.
(1975). Public and private self-­consciousness:
Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–528.
Gallagher, S., & Shear, J. (Eds.). (1999). Models of the self. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.
Gallup, G. G., Jr., & Suarez, S. D. (1986). Self­awareness and the emergence of mind in humans and other primates. In J. Suls & A. G.
Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives
on the self (Vol. 3, pp. 3–26). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
Gergen, K. J. (1971). The concept of self. New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Gergen, K. J. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life. New
York: Basic Books.
Gilbert, P., & Trower, P. (1990). The evolution
and manifestation of social anxiety. In W. R.
Crozier (Ed.), Shyness and embarrassment
(pp. 144–177). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in
everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday/
Anchor.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego:
Fabrication and revision of personal history.
American Psychologist, 35, 603–613.
Hamachek, D. E. (1971). Encounters with the
self. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Hewitt, J. (2007). Self and society: A symbolic
interactionist social psychology. Boston: Allyn
& Bacon.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-­discrepancy: A theory
relating self and affect. Psychological Review,
94, 319–340.
Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth.
New York: Norton.
Hoyle, R. H., Kernis, M. H., Leary, M. R., &
Baldwin, M. W. (1999). Selfhood: Identity,
esteem, regulation. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Hull, J. G., & Levy, A. S. (1979). The organizational functions of the self: An alternative
to the Duval and Wicklund model of self­awareness. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 37, 756–768.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology.
New York: Holt.
Janis, I. L., & Field, P. B. (1959). A behavioral
assessment of persuasibility: Consistency of
individual differences. In C. I. Hovland & I.
L. Janis (Eds.), Personality and persuasibility
(pp. 55–68). New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Jones, E. E. (1964). Ingratiation. New York:
Appleton-­Century-­Crofts.
Jones, S. R. (1973). Self- and interpersonal evaluations: Esteem theories versus consistency theories. Psychological Bulletin, 79, 185–199.
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C.,
Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F.
(2002). Finding the self?: An event-­related
fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 785–794.
Kurzweil, E. (1989). The Freudians: A compara-
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
tive perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Leary, M. R. (2003). The self and emotion. In
R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences
(pp. 773–786). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Leary, M. R. (2007). How the self became involved in affective experience: Three sources
of self-­reflective emotions. In J. L. Tracy, R.
W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), The self­conscious emotions: Theory and research
(pp. 38–52). New York: Guilford Press.
Leary, M. R., & Buttermore, N. E. (2003). Evolution of the human self: Tracing the natural
history of self-­awareness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 33, 365–404.
Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1995). Social
anxiety. New York: Guilford Press.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (Eds.). (2003).
Handbook of self and identity. New York:
Guilford Press.
Lewis, M. (1992). Shame: The exposed self. New
York: Free Press.
Lewis, M., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1979). Social
cognition and the acquisition of self. New
York: Plenum Press.
Lewis, M., Sullivan, M. W., Stanger, C., &
Weiss, M. (1989). Self-­development and self­conscious emotions. Child Development, 60,
146–156.
Maddux, J. E. (1999). Personal efficacy. In V.
J. Derlega, B. A. Winstead, & W. H. Jones
(Eds.), Personality: Contemporary theory and
research (2nd ed., pp. 229–256). Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Magee, B. (1985). Philosophy and the real world:
An introduction to Karl Popper. LaSalle, IL:
Open Court.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-­schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Markus, H. (1980). The self in thought and
memory. In D. M. Wegner & R. R. Vallacher
(Eds.), The self in social psychology (pp. 102–
130). New York: Oxford University Press.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture
and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review,
98, 224–253.
Martin, L. (1999). I-D compensation theory: Some implications of trying to satisfy
immediate-­return needs in a delayed-­return
culture. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 195–209.
17
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and behavior.
New York: Harper & Row.
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D.,
Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C.
N. (2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-­independent thought, Science, 315, 393–395.
McCall, G., & Simmons, J. L. (1966). Identities
and interactions: An examination of human
association in everyday life. New York: Free
Press.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Miller, R. S. (1996). Embarrassment: Poise and
peril in everyday life. New York: Guilford
Press.
Ochsner, K. N., Beer, J. S., Robertson, E. A.,
Cooper, J., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Kihlstrom, J. F.,
et al. (2005). The neural correlates of direct
and reflected self-­knowledge. NeuroImage,
28, 797–814.
Olson, E. T. (1999). There is no problem of the
self. In S. Gallagher & J. Shear (Eds.), Models
of the self (pp. 49–61). Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.
Rogers, C. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-­centered framework. In S.
Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science
(Vol. 3, pp. 184–256). New York: McGrawHill.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (2003). Evolution of the symbolic self: Issues and prospects.
In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 594–609). New
York: Guilford Press.
Snyder, M. (1974). Self-­monitoring of expressive
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 30, 526–537.
Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1984). Neuropsychological studies of the frontal lobes. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 3–28.
Stryker, S. (1980). Symbolic interactionism: A
social structural version. Menlo Park, CA:
Benjamin/Cummings.
Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory
of psychiatry. New York: Norton.
Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). Shame
and guilt. New York: Guilford Press.
18
Tangney, J. P., & Fischer, K. W. (Eds.). (1995).
The self-­conscious emotions: The psychology
of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride.
New York: Guilford Press.
Tesser, A. (2002). Constructing a niche for
the self: A bio-­social, PDP approach to
­understanding lives. Self and Identity, 1, 185–
190.
Tesser, A., Crepaz, N., Beach, S. R. H., Cornell,
D., & Collins, J. C. (2000). Confluence of self­esteem regulation mechanisms: On integrating
the self-zoo. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1476–1489.
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2007). Emerging
insights into the nature and function of pride.
1. The Self as an Organizing Construct
Current Directions in Psychological Science,
16, 147–150.
Tracy, J. L., Robins, R. W., & Tangney, J. P.
(Eds.). (2007). The self-­conscious emotions:
Theory and research. New York: Guilford
Press.
Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (Eds.). (2011).
Handbook of self-­regulation: Research, theory, and applications (2nd ed.). New York:
Guilford Press.
Wicklund, R. A., & Eckert, M. (1992). The self­knower: A hero under control. New York: Plenum Press.
Wylie, R. (1974). The self-­concept (Vol. 1). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Part I
Awareness, Cognition,
and Regulation
Chapter 2
The Self as a Psycho-­Social
Dynamic Processing System
Toward a Converging Science of Selfhood
Carolyn C. Morf
Walter Mischel
The concept of “self” has been central in
psychology from William James at the start
of the last century, to Carl Rogers in its middle years, to the current explosion of work
on this topic, as the chapters in this volume
reflect. During the same hundred years, this
highly popular construct also has been condemned as a fiction that merely renamed
the dreaded homunculus that sits inside the
person and is made its causal agent. That
specter could be avoided easily if the self is
treated as just a set of concepts that people
hold about themselves—­individual, relational, and collective—as it was in its resurgence
in psychology in the 1970s, concurrent with
the cognitive revolution and after its long neglect during decades of behaviorism. However, in a rapidly accelerating trajectory,
self research and theory has grown greatly
beyond those beginnings in new directions.
It is bursting with important findings and
offering exciting new prospects, but at the
same time creating fresh challenges and still
struggling with classic problems.
We have two goals in this chapter. First,
we provide a perspective on the current state
of the science of the self. This state is robust and vibrant, but it also is complex and
diffuse. Relevant work is scattered across
diverse subfields and disciplines that often
operate in isolation, impervious to developments just across the boundaries. As a result,
integration and the growth of a cumulative
science of self are exceedingly difficult, making it essential to cross those boundaries to
obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
self. At present, the disparate self-­relevant
strands include work in areas beyond social
cognition and social psychology that include
personality, clinical psychology and psychiatry, developmental psychology, cognitive and
neurological science, sociology, cultural psychology, philosophy—and more. Although
the breadth of this work makes an inclusive
overview unrealistic, we discuss in the first
major section the shifting boundaries and
expansions of the concept of self since the
start of the last century. We also consider
some of the particularly difficult challenges
with which self research has struggled and
that still confront it, in particular the homunculus problem and the boundary with
personality.
Our second goal is to build on these developments to construct a more integrative framework for understanding the self.
Toward this goal, we discuss in the second
major section a growing consensus about the
21
22
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
essentials that “selfhood” encompasses and
the recognition that these characteristics
need to be conceptualized as an organized
coherent system. We present an evolving
integrative model of a comprehensive self­system that seems to be emerging from many
converging lines of theory and research. We
do not see this system as “ours,” but rather
as an effort to integrate diverse contributions that already exist—it is a system that
rests on, and is intended to reflect, decades
of cumulative contributions from many sides
of our science.
In such a system, the self and its directly
relevant processes (e.g., self-­evaluation, self­regulation, self-­construction) may be conceptualized fruitfully as a coherent organization of mental–­emotional representations,
interacting within a system of constraints
that characterize a person (or a type) distinctively. In its complex organization and
processing dynamics, the self-­system draws
as a metaphor on both current connectionist theory and on neural network models.
But it also is a motivated, proactive knowing, thinking, feeling action system that is
constructed, enacted, enhanced, and maintained primarily in interpersonal contexts
within which it develops. Through this organized system the person experiences the
social, interpersonal world and interacts
with it in characteristic self-­guided ways,
in a process of continuous self-­construction
and adaptation.
In the third and final major section, we
examine the implications and challenges of
this type of model for further theory and research. The Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing Model of the self is put forward in this
chapter to help capture the complexities of
self-­relevant phenomena and in an effort to
build an increasingly cumulative science of
the self and/or selfhood.
Perspectives on a Century of Self
Research: The Expanding Self
in Psychology
Expansion of the Self Construct
and Its Implications
The long and fascinating history of the psychology of self and selfhood lies outside the
scope of this chapter, and has been compre-
hensively reviewed elsewhere (Baumeister,
1987). We solely highlight some of the recurrent issues and recent major trends that led
up to the current conception of the self. For
many centuries, the self played a key part in
the work of philosophers concerned with the
problem of human consciousness from Descartes (1637/1970) on, just as it still engages
contemporary philosophy (e.g., Chalmers,
2010). Its modern account in psychology
generally is seen as beginning with James
(1890), who foreshadowed much of how we
conceive of the self today. James analyzed
the flux of consciousness coexisting with the
sense of continuity in the stream of thought,
the importance of habit (or what now is
called automaticity), and the selectivity of
consciousness, of attention, and of all the
workings of the human mind. In his famous
chapter on the self, he elucidated most of the
topics that still define much of the agenda
of contemporary self research, including the
feelings and emotions of self, the diverse aspects of self, self-­esteem, the self-as-­knower,
the I and the Me, and how the former appropriates the latter, and more.
The current recognition that the self is
essentially a social phenomenon that arises
out of social experience had early roots in
the writings of John Dewey (1890), Charles
Cooley (1902), George Herbert Mead (1934),
and other symbolic interactionists, and
within clinical psychology, psychiatry, and
personality (e.g., in the interpersonal theory
of H. S. Sullivan). The implications of this
social nature of the self for the development
of a comprehensive model of the self-­system
is one of the major themes of this chapter.
A second enduring theme, recognized since
the first half of the 20th century, is the importance for adaptation and coping of the
executive functions (e.g., self-­regulation,
self-­defense) of the self, emphasized first by
the ego psychologists (e.g., Adler, A. Freud,
Jung), stemming originally from the psychodynamic Freudian tradition (see Mischel,
Shoda, & Ayduk, 2008, for an overview).
Furthermore, in the second half of the last
century the self-­evaluative functions of the
self, as reflected in self-­esteem, as well as the
importance of the concept of identity, became central in the object relations theories
of clinicians such as Melanie Klein, Heinz
Kohut (1971), and Otto Kernberg (1976).
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
Guardians of the Self during the Reign
of Behaviorism
From the 1930s to the 1960s, behaviorism
dominated American academic psychology
and virtually killed the self as a legitimate
topic for psychological inquiry, banning it
as outside the boundaries of science. Thus,
although the psychology of self and selfhood
began at least at a theoretical level with the
start of psychology, its modern impact on
the development of the science was not felt
widely for many decades. During this time
the clinical–­personality area became the self
construct’s guardians.
Within clinical psychology, interest in
the self resurfaced as the core of a humanistic protest movement in the 1950s. It was
aimed both against American behaviorism
with its mechanistic push–pull determinism
based on the powers of “stimulus control,”
as well as against psychoanalytic theory
coming from Europe propagating the unconscious id-based (sex and aggression) motivational determinism of Freudian theories.
One of the self’s most influential American
advocates was Carl Rogers (1951), who emphasized the importance of the organism’s
goal-­directed attempts toward actualization
and fulfillment, a process within which the
experiences of the self played a central role.
This then-­rebellious viewpoint created great
interest especially among humanistically
oriented psychologists and clinicians, but
soon ran into challenges. The concern was
that Rogers’s view of self was another homunculus—a “little man in the head” that
performed all sorts of feats. For example,
for Rogers (1947, p. 365): “When the self
is free from any threat of attack, then it is
possible for the self to consider these hitherto rejected perceptions, to make new differentiations, and to reintegrate the self in
such a way as to include them.” The worry
of course was that for Rogers the self seemed
to take on a life of its own beyond the “me”
or “I”—it is even a self that can “reintegrate
the self.” Unwilling to give the self such extraordinary causal powers, Gordon Allport,
one of the construct’s early defenders even at
the height of behaviorism, noted then: “To
say that the self does this or that, wants this
or that, wills this or that, is to beg a series
of difficult questions. The psychologist does
23
not like to pass the buck to a self-agent. . . . It
is unwise to assign our problems to an inner
agent who pulls the strings” (Allport, 1961,
pp. 129–130).
Sharing Allport’s concerns, for many
years personality psychologists refrained
from dealing with the motivated or agentic
aspects of the self and instead, in the l950s
and 1960s, research was done on more static
alternatives such as broad trait descriptions
of “what people are like,” and to individual
differences in those qualities (e.g., global self­esteem). But beyond that, the self received
little empirical attention until the cognitive
revolution in the 1970s rapidly transformed
psychology itself.
The Cognitive Revolution:
Self as a Knowledge Structure
The cognitive revolution with its use of the
computer metaphor and advances in cognitive psychology offered new approaches to
avoiding the homunculus problem. Social
psychologists turned to examining the self as
an essentially “cool” cognitive, unmotivated, knowledge structure—an information­processing machine based on computer
analogs of the 1970s (see Linville & Carlston, 1994, for a review). These paradigms
returned the self to the realm of legitimate
study for empirical psychologists, leading to
a resurgence of interest and a virtual explosion of research on the self-­concept during
the 1970s, mostly housed within the domain of social cognition. The research work
during this time dealt primarily with “self
as known” or as object, and significant advances were made, especially in understanding the self’s structure (e.g., Greenwald &
Pratkanis, 1984; Swann & Bosson, 2010).
This work was aided by new conceptual insights, such as the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, which
facilitated conceptualization of many complex features of the self, for example, the
diverse, multiple forms of its expressions,
or the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of
its stability and malleability. This period of
cognitive revolution also contributed an arsenal of new methods—from rediscovering
the diverse uses of reaction time to priming
procedures, to innovative recall and recognition measures—that have become essential
24
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
quotidian tools for social psychologists and
for self researchers.
But soon afterward, research about the
self expanded dramatically as self researchers began to look beyond the self as object
to consider its functions as a “doer,” thereby
reinfusing the self with agentic qualities.
Thus, in the 1980s the construct of the self
continued to expand and acquired personal
agency and such basic processing dynamics
as self-­evaluation, self-­enhancement, self­defense, self-­regulation, and self-­control.
This enrichment and expansion of the self­construct further vitalized the area. For
example, knowledge structures became
extended to include outcome expectations,
action-­evaluation, affective information,
and even goals and desires (as discussed by
Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999,
p. 15). Hence, the self again became motivated, driven by goals and a wide range of motives, expectations, beliefs, values, and so on
(e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Emmons,
1991; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Mischel,
1973, 2012; Pervin, 1989). And, the more
agentic and autonomous the self became, the
more the homunculus threat returned.
Avoiding the Homunculus
in an Agentic Self: Processing Models
and Neural Networks
The explosion of interest in the motivated
self both revitalized research in the area
and reintroduced fundamental challenges
for generating satisfying models that can
account for those diverse and basic self­relevant agentic activities. Emboldened by
the renewed popularity of hypothesized
motives as mediating units, homunculus
fears receded, and students of the self began
hypothesizing increasingly numerous self­motives. However, as Prentice (2001, p. 324)
noted, while the proliferation of motives may
be generative, the problem remains that they
are often invoked to try to explain the phenomena that led to their creation. Required
are models for understanding the self and
its diverse processes with increasing depth
while side-­stepping the traps of pseudoexplanations into which the concept of a self
as causal agent can quickly lead.
Fortunately, although the homunculus
is difficult to bury, promising steps toward
avoiding circularity were taken by build-
ing processing frameworks for the self’s
regulatory functions using concepts such as
cybernetic feedback control loops and self­regulation theories (e.g., Carver, Chapter 3,
this volume; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Van Lange, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011), and many such
efforts are represented in this volume. The
distinguishing feature of these approaches
as efforts to bypass the homunculus is that
they go beyond post hoc naming of motives. They focus instead on the specifics of
the processes that generate the phenomena
of interest by explaining, for example, the
ways in which self-­regulation becomes possible through the use of cognitive reframing
strategies (e.g., Mischel et al., 2011; Morf &
Horvath, 2010). Moreover, further advances
in theory now seem possible as a result of
recent developments in neural networks and
connectionist modeling that try to account
for part-­processes within a coherent self­system in their effort to conceptualize the
individual as an actor with agency who self­regulates, plans and exerts self-­control, and
pursues goals proactively (e.g., Bower, 2007;
Mischel, 2012; Mischel & Shoda, 1995;
Morf & Horvath, 2007; Read & Miller,
1998).
The most recent advances are coming
from innovation in brain imaging and other
cognitive neuroscience methods, which are
opening the route to identifying the neurological correlates of self-­knowledge (for reviews, see Klein, 2004; Moran, Kelley, &
Heatherton, in press). The hope is that these
methods will help pinpoint the mechanisms
through which people develop representations of self and explain how these combine so that people come to experience a
unitary sense of self. It remains to be seen
if the findings ultimately justify the current enthusiasm, but one can already see
some promising advances, for example, in
decomposing the neural correlates for processing information about self and others
(e.g., Heatherton et al., 2006; Ochsner et al.,
2005; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007), and
for the cognitive/affective and the implicit/
explicit aspects of self-­reflection (Moran,
Heatherton, & Kelley, 2009; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006).
There is also increasing understanding of
the neural operations involved in the detection of social threat (e.g., Adolphs, Baron-
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
Cohen, & Tranel, 2002; Berthoz, Grezes,
Armony, Passingham, & Dolan, 2006) and
social rejection (e.g., Kross, Egner, Ochsner,
Hirsch, & Downey, 2007). Even such
complex processes as self-­control and self­regulation (Wagner & Heatherton, 2010),
or those involved in building a good reputation (Knoch, Schneider, Schunk, Hohmann,
& Fehr, 2009) are being explored at the neural level.
Importantly, in addressing the homunculus issue, a recent brain imaging study
(confirming behavioral data) showed that
the brain mechanisms involved in experiencing a sense of agency are those responsible
for comparing predicted and actual action­effects (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass,
2009). Thus, ideomotor (action-­effect) learning seems to be an essential aspect of self­agency. Moreover, attempting to integrate
neuroimaging results on the self, Legrand
and Ruby (2009) suggested that self-­related
evaluations involve a wide cerebral network
that demonstrates no specific preference for
the self. Rather, the activity of the network,
they argued, can be explained by basic cognitive processes common to all tasks. Self­specificity derives solely from sensorimotor
integration of (motor) command of one’s
actions and the sensory consequences in the
social world. Together, the findings converge
to make clear that “the self” is not a single
system but rather a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems interacting
in complex ways (see also Klein & Gangi,
2010).
The accumulating neuropsychological
findings begin to offer insights into potential mechanisms by which different aspects
of self combine to create the experience of
an integrated stream of consciousness, personal identity, and even the phenomenological experience of self-­agency. As we begin
to see how and where the brain creates the
agentic self we experience, the homunculus
fades away. Nevertheless, there is a continued need to contextualize these part­processes within a coherent, comprehensive
self-­system that functions as an organized
whole and allows their interconnections and
dynamics to be seen as they work within a
person, not just as isolated components. In
later sections, we illustrate how recent developments in neural networks may ultimately
enable a conception that captures the person
25
as a thinking, feeling being who self-­reflects
and self-­evaluates, while also taking account
of the impact of both the social context and
automatic implicit processing.
The Self and Personality:
An Inherently Entangled Relationship
Given that the self seems key in virtually all
psycho-social processes of central importance to the person, it is unsurprising that
as research and theory on the self evolved
in recent decades, the boundaries between
self processes and structures, and personality processes and structures have become increasingly fuzzy, resulting in a great deal of
parallel play.
The nature of the relation between self
and personality of course depends crucially
on how each construct and area is defined.
If, as Tesser (2002) noted, the self now is “a
collection of abilities, temperament, goals,
values, preferences that distinguish one individual from another” (p. 185), it becomes
close to the conception of what are commonly thought of as key aspects of personality (John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008; Mischel
et al., 2008). Confusion developed over the
years because disciplinary boundaries and
the splits they produce in how the phenomena of interest are identified, partitioned, and
pursued evolved from historical accident
and old traditions, rather than by design or
in response to discovered new phenomena.
Thus, historical “accidents” have landed
the self more or less in the province of social psychology and particularly social cognition, whereas the person mostly divided
from social contexts became the domain of
personality psychology.
Consequently researchers on each side of
the self and personality boundary frequently fail to connect to relevant literature just
across the boundary, even though they are
both trying to understand such critically
self-­relevant phenomena as self-­control, self­evaluation and regulation, self-­standards,
goals and discrepancies, reactions to success
and failure, self-­defense, and the like. Given
the overlap in their interests they inevitably—­
albeit often unknowingly—­develop parallel concepts, measures, and findings, thus
shadowing each other rather than building
on each other in complementary ways that
would enhance the growth of a more cu-
26
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
mulative science (Morf, 2002). Much of the
prolific theory and research about the self in
psychology (Swann & Bosson, 2010) has not
been linked to the dynamics of the personality processing system with which the self—
no matter how conceptualized—is necessarily closely related and indeed entangled. By
examining self-­processes in isolation from a
personality system, it has become difficult
to understand, for example, how people can
engage in apparently self-­defeating or paradoxical self-­regulatory behaviors and goal
pursuits. Moreover, it has been impossible
to address how such self-­processes might develop in the first place.
On the other side, much of the work in
mainstream personality psychology in the
last 30 years has focused on stable traits conceptualized as broad behavioral tendencies,
as in the so-­called “Big Five,” using mostly
psycholexical rating measures (e.g., Hogan,
Johnson, & Briggs, 1997; reviewed in Mischel et al., 2008). Consequently, it has paid
little or no attention to self-­relevant processes in the cognitive and affective processing
dynamics that characterize different individuals and types, or to the adaptations and interpersonal constructions that characterize
so much of people’s lives. In this classic trait
tradition, individual differences are conceptualized in terms of essentially stable broad
behavioral dispositions, or traits, that people “have” enduringly and that predispose
them to engage in relevant behaviors that
play out in the life course in characteristic
stable ways (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 2008).
Moreover, dispositions and their behavioral
expressions are assumed by definition to
correspond directly: The more a person has
a trait of conscientiousness, for example, the
more conscientious the person’s behavior is
expected to be. Individual differences in the
trait, in turn, are used as explanations for
why people differ in the important ways they
do, leading critics to point out the circularity
of the approach. Perhaps most misleading,
the Big Five Trait approach has led many of
its advocates to equate their approach with
the very construct of personality itself (e.g.,
discussed in Pervin, 1994).
The personality-­equals-traits equation is
extremely unfortunate because it risks excluding the very processes of greatest relevance to the self, such as the person’s core
goals, motivations and conflicts (Athay &
Darley, 1981). If personality is equated with
traits that are stable predispositions of this
sort, it may “predispose” the self and its vicissitudes in particular directions, but it is
quite distinct from the self and its construction over the life course. In contrast, many
contemporary self researchers have focused
more on what goes on inside the person’s
head (i.e., how the way people “think” about
things affects their behavior). Their interest
in individual differences is in terms of how
people vary in degree of particular self­processes (e.g., high/low self-­monitoring,
or high/low self-­handicapping) (Swann &
Bosson, 2010).
Personality as a Dynamic Processing System:
Reconnecting Self to Personality
The personality-equals-traits equation is by
no means universally shared (e.g., Cervone
& Shoda, 1999; Mischel, 1968, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Morf & Horvath, 2010;
Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011; Pervin,
1994). Rejecting this equation, an alternative and fundamentally different conception
of personality also has evolved throughout
the history of the field, and it has much closer affinity to theory and research on the self.
In this tradition, personality is construed as
a system of mediating processes and structures, conscious and unconscious. The focus
is on how these mediating processes can
explain how and why people think and feel
as they do, and their interactions with the
social world throughout the life cycle (e.g.,
Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 2010).
Freud’s theory was only the first and boldest of personality process theories in what
has become a long tradition whose pioneers
include such figures as Alfred Adler, Harry
Stack Sullivan, Henry Murray, Kurt Lewin,
and George Kelly. In modern personality and
social psychology, mediating process models
have had a substantial resurgence during the
social cognition era in the last three decades
(see Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Gollwitzer &
Bargh, 1996; Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996;
John et al., 2008). Drawing both from the
early traditions and borrowing from social
cognitive and information processing paradigms that also encompass the role of automatic and unconscious processing (e.g.,
Bargh, 1997; Higgins, 1996a; Kihlstrom,
1987, 1990), newer approaches in personal-
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
ity have emerged that are concerned with the
goals, motivations, and affect that underlie
behavior central to self and self-­regulation
(see Hoyle, 2010). Unlike work on isolated
self-­processes, these approaches try to capture and account for “personality-like” types
or individual differences at the person level.
They do so by addressing the internal
cognitive–­affective–­motivational states and
“processing dynamics” of the person and
their interpersonal as well as intrapersonal
expressions as the person adapts to and
shapes the social environment. This approach is exemplified in models such as the
“Cognitive–­A ffective Processing System”
(Mischel & Ayduk, 2011; Mischel & Shoda,
1995) and the dynamic self-­regulatory processing approach to personality (Morf &
Horvath, 2010; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001b;
Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011), and is
directly relevant to—and overlaps with—­
current self theory and research. Nevertheless, much of this work is located in areas
often defined as personality and developmental psychology, or at their outer edges
and hyphenated interfaces, and is cast in
terms in which the self is not the focus. Consequently, it is easily perceived as outside the
disciplinary boundaries of traditional research on the self and irrelevant, although it
may be substantively central.
In conclusion, splitting the self from its personality system would be manifestly dysfunctional for self theory. Doing so would leave
the self disconnected from the individual’s
motivations and life pursuits, including self­evaluation and self-­assessments, planning
and control processes, and so forth—the list
is long—as well as from its development. The
costs of splitting self from the conception of
personality are arguably even more severe for
personality theory. They leave the personality without a self, split from its most central
driving motivations and organizing processes (e.g., self-­regulation, self-­enhancement,
self-­construction,
self-­evaluation,
self­protection), in danger of being little more
than a static list of traits or factors. It reflects
not a natural division dictated by differences
in the relevant phenomena of the self and personality, but rather unfortunate disciplinary
divisions and historical accidents that carve
nature at just the wrong joints.
In the next part of this chapter we seek
to facilitate the needed integration between
27
research and theory on self processes and on
other personality processes within a unifying conceptual framework. We also integrate research findings on implicit processes
and brain research, and put the homunculus
to rest.
Toward a Psycho‑Social Dynamic
Processing Model of the Self
Consensus on the Characteristics
of the Self
What phenomena must a comprehensive
self-­system explain? Fortunately, a broad
cumulative agreement regarding the features of the self and “selfhood” is evident
in integrative summaries that capture the essence of the emerging consensus view (e.g.,
Baumeister, 1998; Hoyle et al., 1999; Leary
& Tangney, 2003; Swann & Bosson, 2010).
These reviews see the self as both stable and
variable, consistent and inconsistent, rational and irrational, planful and automatic,
agentic and routinized. Furthermore, the
self in contemporary psychology is not just a
knowledge structure and thus “known” but
also a “doer” and indeed a “feeler” that it
driven as much by affect as guided by cognition. Moreover, a unique, central feature of
the self is self-­awareness and conscious self­thinking that allows the person to reflect on
experiences and to monitor and evaluate his
or her reactions. Nevertheless, some of the
experiences of the self and its expressions
also are at implicit levels outside awareness.
While this is all merely descriptive, in our
reading a consensus is also apparent regarding two core features of the self that provide
a basis for developing an explanatory approach that can account for these complexities and seeming inconsistencies:
1. The self is an organized, dynamic
cognitive–­affective motivated action system.
2. The self is an interpersonal self­construction system.
Regarding the first feature, a system view of
the self recognizes that the diverse aspects
and functions of the self are not isolated components or unconnected part processes and
knowledge structures but rather interacting
facets of a coherent system that operates at
28
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
multiple levels concurrently. It conceptualizes the self as a coherent organization of
mental–­emotional (cognitive–­affective) representations on the one hand, and further
portrays it as a motivated, dynamic, action
system. The self is dynamic in that the system continuously accommodates to and assimilates information from the social world
within which it is contextualized, and it is
an action system insofar as it generates behavior. These actions are motivated, and the
meanings and goals that inform and guide
them are largely constructed interpersonally
in the social world.
Regarding the second feature, it has long
been clear that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to understand the self detached
from its social context (e.g., Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Hoyle et al., 1999; Markus &
Cross, 1990; Mendoza-­Denton & Mischel,
2007). Consequently, to understand the self
requires studying individuals with regard to
their interpersonal behavior, many of which
may consist of efforts to get others to respond
in ways that are consistent with their goals or
projects. These efforts reflect the motivated
and agentic qualities of the self-­system, which
importantly include ways of behaving and
thinking “aimed at asserting, protecting, or
repairing identity or self-­esteem” (Hoyle et
al., 1999, p. 20). To capture “who someone
is,” then, one needs to understand the person’s identity goals through their expression
in social interaction: It is within those interactions that the individual’s self-­theory is
constructed, validated, and revealed (Morf,
Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011).
In the consensus view, therefore, the self
is not simply passively reactive to the social
world; rather, it is a motivated, goal-­directed
self-­regulatory system that is proactive and
agentic. The self-­system thus subsumes such
executive functions as planning, interpreting, and monitoring behavior, and selectively processing information about both
the person and the social world. Essential to
these functions is the “capacity for reasoned
self-­reflection” (e.g., Baumeister, 1998;
Hoyle et al., 1999, p. 2). Indeed, perhaps
the most distinguishing feature of the self­system is that it deals with how people construct self-­relevant meanings by reflecting
on themselves, their past, and their possible
futures. In the present view, however, while
the meaning system of the self requires as its
sine qua non self-­awareness and conscious
self-­thinking, it is not necessarily always either conscious or self-aware, and often operates automatically and nonverbally (e.g.,
Bargh, 1997). In short, absent self-­awareness
and consciousness, one cannot imagine a
self system; but a self without implicit processes and indirect manifestations would be
insufficient to capture the complexities, diverse, and often conflicted aspects of the self
system that operate concurrently at multiple
levels of awareness.
In the sections that follow, we sketch a
framework for viewing the self as a Psycho­Social Dynamic Processing System that tries
to capture the essence of the key aspects and
functions of the self, and that helps to account for them systematically—a system
that we hope will have heuristic value for
future research and theory-­building. The
discussion of this model is organized around
the two key consensus features of the self, as
noted earlier:
1. The self is an organized dynamic
cognitive–­affective motivated action system.
2. The self is an interpersonal self­construction system. This is followed by
a discussion of how the behavioral expressions of the self-­system provide evidence for understanding the nature of the
system.
The Self as an Organized Cognitive–
Affective Motivated Action System
General Processing Characteristics, Units,
and Dynamics of the Self-­System
Conceptualizing the self-­system as an organized, dynamic, motivated cognitive–­
affective (knowing–­feeling) action system requires that one address the nature of the units
in the system, the relationship and organization among these units, and their dynamic
functioning. We begin with the assumption
that the mental representations in this type
of processing system consist of cognitions
and affects (emotional states) that interact
and interconnect within a stable network
that guides and constrains their activation.
These characteristics are similar to those of
the Cognitive–­A ffective Processing System
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Shoda & Mischel,
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
1998) and the dynamic self-­regulatory processing approach to personality (Morf &
Horvath, 2010; Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch,
2011), both of which offer integrative social–­
cognitive–­affective frameworks for personality processes and dynamics.
When applied to the self-­system, however, the focus shifts to identify the types
of cognitive–­affective units or representations a self-­system needs in order to perform
its diverse functions. The units in the self­system can be mapped on to diverse psychological variables and constructs that are
important for understanding self-­relevant
processes. These include representations
of self-­knowledge and self-­concepts (e.g.,
self-­esteem), self-­relevant goals, beliefs and
-expectancies (e.g., self-­efficacy) about the
self, the person’s theories about the self, self­relevant affects (e.g., anxiety, shame, pride),
and values central to the person. Also encompassed are self-­regulatory and self-­evaluative
standards, and self-­construction competencies and mental representations of strategies
and scripts for generating diverse types of
social behavior. These cognitive–­affective
units operate both at automatic and volitional levels, and are basic for self-­regulation
and effective pursuit of goals (Gollwitzer
& Bargh, 1996; Horvath & Morf, 2009;
Mendoza-­Denton, Ayduk, Mischel, Shoda,
& Testa, 2001; Mischel, 1973).
In thinking about the necessary general
processing characteristics for the self-­system,
we borrow from a connectionist, neural
network-like metaphor (for a discussion, see
Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Morf & Horvath,
2007). We do so because these models can
take account of multiple simultaneous processes without invoking a single central control—thus helping one to understand the self
while minimizing the homunculus threat. In
connectionist processing networks, all outputs reflect a distributed pattern of activation
across a large number of simple processing
units, the nature of which depends on (and
changes with) the connection weights between the links and the satisfaction of mutual constraints across these links (Rumelhart
& McClelland, 1986). Similarly, in the self­system, concepts are not stored as discrete
units; rather activation spreads through the
system across the current cognitive–­affective
links, each time subtly updating and changing them. Thus, self-­constructs and -units
29
are themselves composed of activation patterns among much lower-level units (as also
discussed in Shoda & Mischel, 1998) and
importantly, they are always constructed
(and reconstructed) in situ rather than retrieved “as is.”
These self-units or representations are organized into distinctive networks for each
person. The distinctive organization of interrelations is the result of an individual’s genetic endowment and biological history (e.g.,
temperament), as well as his or her social
learning and developmental history within
the particular culture and subculture. These
factors underlie the organization of the system, and this organization determines which
units become activated together in the system’s interactions with the social environment. Thus, the organization and structure
of the system consist of the relatively stable
links and connections formed among the
units, as well as the strength of their associations. Consistent with a connectionist model
then, patterns of activation create and “run”
the self-­system.
This activation can have various sources.
First, it can occur in response to social stimuli during interpersonal interactions that
are encountered or self-­initiated. Activation,
however, can also be generated internally, as
in self-­reflection and rumination. For example, in thinking about particular aspects of
the self, associated affective reactions (anxiety, shame, guilt, pride, eagerness, fear) may
be activated, and further activate a cascade
of other cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions (e.g., efficacy expectations, self­doubts, defensive denials). These activations
quite literally involve an active contextualized construction or reconstruction process
rather than a retrieval or enactment of preexisting entities from storage.
However, because the pattern of activation must satisfy, at least locally, the constraints represented in the network connection weights, each person is characterized by
a relatively stable activation network among
the units within the self-­system. The processing dynamics of the self-­system, thus,
refer to the system’s characteristic patterns
of activation among the cognitive–­affective
units within it, in relation to different features of the social environment. In this sense
the self-­system is “biased” because the connections are activated and updated in non-
30
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
random, predictable ways distinctive for the
individual. For example, if threat to a particular person’s self-­esteem in certain types
of situations (e.g., threats of abandonment
by a partner, being outperformed by another person) tends to activate rage, which
in turn activates behavior that derogates the
source of the threat, such a pattern may be
seen predictably in future similar situations
(e.g., Ayduk, Downey, Testa, Yen, & Shoda,
1999; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993).
Individual differences, then, are the result
of differences in the chronic accessibility of
the units (e.g., Higgins, 1996b) and, equally
important, in the distinctive organization
of the interrelations among them (Mischel,
2004; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Differential
accessibility and organization also contribute to enduring individual differences in the
features of situations that people select and
to which they are particularly responsive
(Morf & Horvath, 2010). Development and
change in the system typically occur slowly
as a result of subtle adjustments of association strengths among the units as different
parts of the system are activated and reconstructed in particular contexts. More dramatic changes to the self-­system are possible
if contextual factors instigate consistent and
major shifts in activation patterns (e.g., depression, moving to a new culture, war, and
traumatic experiences). Furthermore, the
recognition that memories and concepts—­
including those about the self, personality,
and other people—are constructed rather
than retrieved speaks directly to the nature
of the self-­construction process. All concepts are freshly generated or reconstructed
within the constraints of the system but also
in dynamic interaction within a particular
context that activates and updates the system.
Multiple Levels of Functioning and Subsystems
The self-­system functions at multiple levels
and subsumes a number of subsystems that
operate concurrently and in parallel. While
it can be useful, as several of the chapters in
this volume illustrate, to conceptualize subsystems for in-depth analyses, here we wish
to underline that subsystems and particular
self-­relevant processes do not operate in isolation. Rather, they are played out and exert
their influence in interdependent functioning
within the total self-­system. Furthermore,
within a coherent self-­system, not all subprocesses are necessarily equal: They likely
are organized into superordinate and subordinate hierarchies in terms of their importance and priorities for the functioning and
maintenance of the system as a whole.
In the self-­system, constructs such as the
self-­concept and identity play an important
role in guiding and constraining such organization by providing the superordinate goals
within that organization. Consistent with a
connectionist network analysis of the self,
we assume that super-­ordinate hierarchies
and goals are more densely and more tightly
connected with other nodes, due to more
frequent activation (see Morf & Horvath,
2010). The existence of organization and
coherence within the system does not imply
that it is conflict-free. On the contrary, conflicting goals and behavior tendencies in different contexts and domains can be understood in terms of the concurrent operation
of different goals and different motives in
parallel and at different levels of the system
exerting their reciprocal influences in tandem (e.g., Emmons & King, 1988; Graziano
& Tobin, 2001). Furthermore, the organizations among self components also vary with
regard to their degree of integration, compartmentalization, or fragmentation (e.g.,
Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993;
Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992).
Core processes such as self-­regulation
and self-­control in the course of goal pursuit illustrate the conjoint operations of the
self-­system, and the interactions among its
subsystems. Considerable accumulating evidence shows that effective self-­regulation is
transacted to a large degree automatically
and with no, or little, explicit awareness (see
Morf & Horvath, 2010, for a discussion). Indeed, conscious processes are not necessarily
typical, and may operate far less often than
previously thought (Fitzsimons & Bargh,
2004). Automaticity has its advantages over
deliberate self-­regulation, which consumes
a lot of cognitive resources (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) and
sometimes disrupts well-­learned automatic
processes (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006; Hassin, 2005). Nevertheless, even
if less common, effortful, sometimes self­conscious interruptions of the automatic
flow are fundamental for effectiveness of
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
the self-­system. Effortful control (Eisenberg,
Smith, Sadovsky, & Spinrad, 2004) is particularly important for diverse self-­regulatory
and self-­control functions that require overriding accessible, automatic (and potentially
dysfunctional) impulsive response tendencies (e.g., fight or flight) with more adaptive
but less easily accessible strategies in the service of goals important to the self. Effortful
control requires planning, rehearsing, self­monitoring, and strategic attention (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Mischel, 2012;
Mischel & Ayduk, 2011). But, to be maintained over time, these control efforts have
to be converted from conscious and effortful to automatic and spontaneous control
(Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005). In
this sense, the enactment of “willpower” to
allow continued goal pursuit depends on the
automatic interaction between these more
automatic and more effortful subsystems
(Mischel, 2012). We elaborate on the interactions between two types (hot/cool, implicit/explicit) of more automatic and more
controlled subsystems here because they are
particularly key for self-­regulation. However, while illustrative of subsystem interactions in general, this by no means captures
the full complexity of the relations among
subsystems.
Hot/Cool Subsystems in Self‑Regulation. Several theorists have postulated similar frameworks involving two orthogonal,
though potentially continuously interacting
processing systems, each of which is responsive to different input features and operates
by its own processing rules and characteristics (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). While
the terms employed in each theory are somewhat different, in essence one system tends
to be more affect-based or “hot” and thus
more automatic, impulsive, and faster to
respond. The other, “cool” system is based
more on logic and reason and thus involves
slower, more mediated and effortful cognitive processing that is less reflexive and more
reflective. In the self-­system, the “cool” or
“know” system includes processes such as
the encoding or knowledge representations
of the self and of situations, self-­relevant
goals and values, outcome expectations,
plans and attention control strategies. These
become activated within the particular con-
31
text. However, to the degree that these activations are not merely isolated “cool” cognitions or knowledge structures when relevant
to the self, but also are intimately interconnected with emotions and affect-laden representations, they operate in continuous interaction with the “hot” system. Likewise,
although each system has its biological basis
in different brain systems, these also continuously interact (LeDoux, 1996; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999; Posner & Rothbart, 2000).
Self-­relevant behavior is the product of
the joint operation of the two systems. Their
relative dominance/balance is determined by
individual differences in self-­regulation and
by situational variables that prime either rational formal analysis, or induce emotional
arousal. For example, the presence of high
stress or negative arousal (either acutely
within the situation or chronically within
the person) increases hot activation and attenuates the operations of the cool system.
Interactions among these two systems become particularly important as the person
inevitably runs into barriers, frustrations,
and temptations that activate hot, impulsive
responding in the course of pursuing longterm self-­relevant goals that are central to
the person. Persistence and adaptation in
face of these barriers depend—like all goal
pursuit—on purposeful self-­regulation and
mental control. In these control processes
the “hot” representations of events are
transformed in ways that strategically cool
them, for example, through ideation (e.g.,
thinking of a marshmallow as a cloud instead of as soft, chewy and yummy) and/
or self-­distraction (Mischel, 2012; Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Individuals for
whom such self-­regulatory competencies are
highly accessible can more adaptively and
automatically use their attention control
skills and metacognitive knowledge of effective ways to self-­control in the service of
effective long-term pursuit of important selfgoals (Mischel & Ayduk, 2011).
Implicit/Explicit Subsystems in Self‑­
Regulation. Beyond hot and cool, or affect
versus cognition driven, self-­relevant behavior is also the product of how the explicit
and implicit self-­systems interact. These latter systems vary in terms of their explicit
controllability; or the degree to which they
involve versus circumvent deliberate thought
32
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
processes. Implicit aspects of the self involve those self-­processes that are much less
controllable and more automatic—some of
which even may be below awareness (Devos,
Huynh, & Banaji, Chapter 8, this volume).
There is disagreement about whether implicit
self-­representations represent fundamentally
distinct underlying constructs from explicit
self-­knowledge (e.g., Epstein, 1994), or the
same constructs, wherein the latter simply
are additionally affected by other processes (e.g., self-­presentational concerns) (e.g.,
Olson & Fazio, 2009). Nevertheless, clearly
both implicit and explicit self-­representations
are components of the self-­system that conjointly influence the thoughts, emotions, and
behaviors that are generated. Importantly,
although implicit self-­processing operates
rather automatically and often below awareness, it is neither necessarily more accurate
nor more authentic (Nosek, Greenwald, &
Banaji, 2007). The two subsystems provide
different and complementary information
about the self-­system.
Studies that focus on how the two systems
interact are especially informative. For example, discrepancies between the positivity
of explicit and implicit self-­esteem have been
shown to lead to defensive behavior (e.g.,
Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-­Browne,
& Correll, 2003; Kernis et al., 2005;
McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005);
and discrepancies between implicit and explicit motives have been linked to increases
in psychosomatic symptoms (Baumann,
Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; Job, Oertig, Brandstätter, & Allemand, 2010). Moreover, implicit self-views have been linked to important behaviors, including career or romantic
partner choices (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones,
2005), prejudice and discrimination (McConnell & Leibold, 2001), and aggression
(Banse & Fischer, 2002; Morf, Horvath,
& Zimmermann, 2011). And sometimes
implicit measures even have incremental
predictive validity over explicit self-views
(Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009).
Interplay of Subsystems in Self‑Regulation. The conceptualization of these systems, hot and cool, implicit and explicit, at
the psychological level, also invites parallel
explorations of their neural underpinnings
at the brain level. The neural mechanisms
underlying self-­control and self-­regulatory
processes are being studied vigorously, and
unsurprisingly appear to be quite complex
and influenced by a host of determinants and
their interactions. They may differ, for example, as a function of the type of information being dealt with (e.g., some things are
harder to ignore, suppress, or the like) and
the processing stage at which control has to
be exerted (Casey et al., in press; Ochsner
& Gross, 2005). A meta-­analysis of over 40
neuroimaging studies of a variety of tasks
measuring cognitive control (Nee, Wager,
& Jonides, 2007) showed nonoverlapping
patterns of brain activation across a number
of cognitive control tasks tapping different
stages of processing. Collectively, imaging
and behavioral evidence indicate that processes involved in resolving interference come
from a “family of functions” rather than
from a “single unitary construct,” and that
distinct functions can be linked to distinct
underlying neurobiology (Nee & Jonides,
2009; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007). As
these neurobiological mechanisms become
clarified they will undoubtedly be linked
also to mechanisms of self-­regulation of central interest for process-­oriented researchers
studying self-­construction dynamics at the
psychological and behavioral levels.
Burying the Homunculus
A distinct advantage of conceptualizing
the self as a dynamic system with processing characteristics similar to those of connectionist models is that such models do not
require a central control plan. They are able
to generate exceedingly complex patterns
of behavior as a function of the network of
relationships among the units that make up
the system. These models thus provide an appealing route for conceptualizing the self and
its processes in network terms while avoiding the homunculus problem: The agency is
in the organization of the network, and no
internal controller needs to be invoked, as
was the case in the earlier information processing models of the 1970s. Furthermore,
the recognition that memories and concepts,
including those about the self, personality,
and other people, are constructed rather
than retrieved, speaks directly to the nature
of the self-­construction process. All con-
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
cepts are freshly generated or re­constructed
not only within the constraints of the system but also in dynamic interaction within
a particular context that activates and updates the system. We next consider how the
cognitive–­affective self-­system functions
within the interpersonal world in which it
develops its distinctive self-­relevant goals
and meaning structures, and in this sense
constructs itself.
The Interpersonal
Self‑Construction Process
The self-­system described earlier emerges
through a process of self-­construction that
involves continuous reciprocal interaction
between the dynamics of the system and the
demands and affordances of the particular
situation and contexts (e.g., Athay & Darley, 1981; Mischel, 2004; Morf & Horvath,
2010; Vygotsky, 1978). This emphasis on
the interpersonal nature of the self departs
from the traditions in personality and self
psychology that focus on self-­contained
inner, intrapsychic processes and dynamics
(e.g., as exemplified in Freud’s theories of the
internal warfare among the subsystems of
personality). In sharp contrast to the traditional exclusive inner-­system focus, we share
the view of many other contemporary self
theorists that the self is fundamentally interpersonal. Moreover, the self-­construction
process is intrinsically rooted within, and
dependent upon, interpersonal processes
that unfold in the social world (e.g., Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Hoyle et al., 1999;
Markus & Cross, 1990; Morf, Torchetti, &
Schürch, 2011). These social interactional
processes and “situations” involve not only
significant other individuals but also relevant social groups that ultimately become
part of one’s “collective self” (e.g., Sedikides
& Brewer, 2001). Indeed, interpersonal processes may precede changes in intrapersonal
processes, and the latter may be modified
subsequently to take other interpersonal aspects into account. The social experiences
and processes are seamlessly connected to
the intraindividual dynamics that they reflect and that in part create them, and they
become an inextricable component of how
the self is experienced (as illustrated in Morf
& Rhodewalt, 2001a, 2001b).
33
Role of Pre‑Dispositions
The construction of the self does not begin
with a blank slate. Biological and genetic
factors, social learning history, developmental processes, and cultural–­social influences
all interact dynamically and continuously
in the developing self-­system (e.g., Tesser,
2002). Individual differences in multiple
biochemical–­genetic–­somatic factors may
be conceptualized as pre-dispositions—
with emphasis on the pre to make clear that
they are biological precursors—that may
manifest indirectly, as well as directly, at the
psycho-­social and behavioral levels of analysis in diverse and complex forms (Mischel &
Shoda, 2008).
These predispositions ultimately influence
such personality and self-­relevant qualities
as sensory and psychomotor sensitivities
and vulnerabilities, skills and competencies, temperament (including activity level
and emotionality), chronic mood, and affective states (e.g., Plomin, DeFries, McClearn,
& McGuffin, 2008). In turn, these qualities interact with social cognitive, social
learning, and cultural–­societal influences
mediated by, and further interacting with,
the self-­system that becomes constructed
over time. Consequently, these predispositions influence the organization of the self­system, the self-­construction process, and
the behavioral-­signatures that ultimately
characterize the person (Mischel, 2004;
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Self-­construction
is thus born out of the interactions between
these pre-­dispositions and the evolving self­system in its dynamic transactions with the
interpersonal world in which it is contextualized.
Early Development of the Meaning System
In the process of constructing the self-­system,
as the person interacts with the social world,
social stimuli acquire their personal cognitive
and affective meanings. These meanings are
a result of both the person’s more automatic,
nonreflective reactions and interpretations of
social events, and his or her more deliberate
reflections and evaluations. The self-­system
thus is a motivated meaning system insofar
as the self-­relevant meanings and values that
are acquired in the course of its development
34
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
(or “self-­construction”) inform, constrain,
and guide the interpretations of experience,
goal pursuits, self-­regulatory efforts, and
interpersonal strategies. In this lifelong self­construction process, identity, self-­esteem,
and self-­relevant goals, values, and life projects are built, maintained, promoted, and
protected. Through the self-­construction
process the self-­system takes shape and, in
turn, affects and is influenced by the social
contexts and networks that constitute its social world. In this sense, self-­construction is
a developmental process in which the self­system is in part its product and in part its
architect.
The nature of caregiving beginning in
early life has an immense impact on the
self-­system, self-­evaluations, and the types
of attachment and social relationships that
develop (e.g., Claussen & Crittenden, 2003;
Gunnar, 2001; Harter, 1999). Early attachment experiences affect the types of mental
“working models” that are constructed:
Working models serve like templates through
which subsequent relationship experiences
may be selected, filtered, and interpreted
(e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002; Baldwin &
Dandeneau, 2005; Mikulincer & Shaver,
2007; Zayas, Mischel, Shoda, & Aber,
2011; Zayas & Shoda, 2007). The formation and expression of these attachment relationships illustrate the proactive and interactive (rather than reactive–­passive) nature
of the self-­construction process already in
early life. The impact of a caretaker depends
on the self-­regulatory strategies the toddler
uses to deal with experienced stressors (e.g.,
Sethi, Mischel, Aber, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
2000)—although those strategies themselves
were influenced by the nature of the earlier
caregiving. Moreover, the strategies that
evolve in interactions early in life have significant stability and long-term implications
for the self-­regulatory competencies that
develop and that in turn impact on the efficacy of goal pursuit and self-­esteem (Ayduk
et al., 2000; Mischel et al., 1989; Sethi et
al., 2000). Self-­construction thus continues
throughout the life course.
Processes in Self‑Construction:
A Proactive, Motivated System
As a person acquires strategies for dealing
with different types of interpersonal situ-
ations during the life course, he or she develops a preferred theory of him- or herself.
This self-­theory at first may be rudimentary,
but it becomes elaborated and increasingly
complex over time as the person seeks to test
and validate it in the social world (Epstein,
1973). Over time, individuals weave together their autobiographical memories in stories
they tell about themselves and their lives.
They construct these self-­narratives subjectively and selectively to make meaning out
of the events they experience, integrate their
goals, make sense of conflict, and explain
how and why they change over time (McAdams, 2008). Such self-­theories, even when
increasingly multifaceted and enriched, likely remain largely implicit although they have
diverse explicit expressions.
Much remains to be learned about how the
individual’s self-­theories influence the operations of the self-­system, but it is clear that
they do so, significantly affecting the directions that self-­construction takes (e.g., Harter, 1999; Hoyle et al., 1999; McAdams et
al., 2006; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Swann
& Buhrmester, Chapter 19, this volume).
Extensive research documents their importance in guiding the acquisition of goals/
values, self-­evaluations, motivations, and
regulatory competencies; in selecting the life
tasks and projects that are pursued; and in
proactively constructing the particular types
of interpersonal situations and relationships
that become the person’s interpersonal world
(Cantor et al., 1991; Emmons, 1989, 1991;
Little, Lecci, & Watkinson, 1992; Pervin,
1989; Zirkel & Cantor, 1990). Actions in the
service of self-­construction thus are biased
in the selection and interpretation of social
feedback and performance outcomes, motivated at least in part by the desire to build,
affirm, and protect a desired identity and self­esteem in line with the person’s self-­theory
(e.g., Hoyle et al., 1999; Morf, Horvath, &
Torchetti, 2011; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001a;
Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011). In developing and testing these theories the person is
“first of all an actor rather than a thinker or
a theorist” (Athay & Darley, 1981, p. 283).
Individuals, of course, are not unlimited in
the self-­theory or identity they can construct
but rather do so within the constraints—and
opportunities—of the evolving self-­system
(e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Buss,
1997). Within those constraints, adjust-
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
ment and change in self-­theories and in the
system are possible, although they are limited in terms of the connectionist metaphor
by the connections and “weights” already
formed in the system. These weights reflect
the talents, skills, and abilities, as well as
the goals and construction competencies of
the self-­system, in light of which new information is encoded and processed. The self­construction process provides and modifies
progressively the weights in the system’s development as the individual learns new skills
and different social stimuli and experiences
acquire their cognitive–­affective meanings
and value and become “reinforcing.” Extraordinary circumstances and experiences,
including effective therapeutic interventions,
contribute to more major reorganizations of
the system itself (Adler & McAdams, 2007;
Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
In short, the self-­system constructs its
niches (Tesser, 2002) in a developmental
process of accommodation and assimilation.
In turn, the self-­system reacts in characteristic ways to those situations, cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally. Self-­construction
is an intrinsically interactionist process:
People’s theories about themselves are based
on and modified by their experiences in the
interpersonal world, just as the latter are influenced by and in part created by those theories. In time, over the life course these interactions progressively generate the unique
trajectories and defining experiences and
relationships that constitute the “relational
self”—in which knowledge about the self is
linked with knowledge about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self–other
relationship (Andersen & Chen, 2002).
Expressions of the Self‑System
As we have described, the self-­system is responsive to contexts but is itself relatively
stable in its organization and processing dynamics—in this sense the self is both “stable
and variable.” The states within the system
refer to the activation levels of the cognitions and affects at a given time (Shoda &
Mischel, 1998). They reflect the external
situations encountered and the past experiences of the person, and encompass what is
commonly referred to as the working self­concept. The variable expressions of the
states of the self—the thoughts and feelings
35
activated, and the behaviors generated, plotted as a function of psychologically salient
features of situations—­emerge as stable,
distinctive situation–­behavior profiles. This
was shown both empirically and through
formal computer modeling (e.g., Borkenau,
Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2006;
Shoda & LeeTiernan, 2002; Shoda & Mischel, 1998; Zayas, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2002).
These profiles with characteristic elevations
and shapes constitute the individual’s characteristic IF–THEN personality signature
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Signatures of the Self
When these IF–THEN relations are self­relevant, they may be thought of as signatures of the self and of the self-­system.
IF–THEN self-­signatures are stable characteristics of the processing system that are
reflected and seen not just in consistencies
across situations, but importantly also in
the way a person’s thoughts, feelings, and
behavior vary as a function of specific features of situations in predictable and stable
patterns (she does or feels A when X, but
does or feels B when Y). Thus, whereas the
cognitions and affects that are activated at a
given time in the self-­system may change as
the situation does, how they change and the
relations among them are assumed to reflect
the relatively stable structure and organization of the self-­system. For example, whenever a person encounters an individual with
a configuration of features relevant to himor herself, the thoughts and feelings that
are activated follow a particular predictable
pattern, as illustrated in work on transference (Andersen & Chen, 2002) and narcissism (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001b; Morf,
Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011).
When the current situations change, so
do the self-­states that become activated, reflecting the person’s interpersonal history
and the distinctive organization of the self­system. It is within this organized system,
and the stream of thoughts and feelings generated by it, that the person experiences the
social world, resulting in predictable patterns of behavioral expression. These signatures of the self can provide a window into
their underlying meanings and the nature
of the self-­system. For example, if two colleagues have the same mean level “sociabil-
36
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
ity” but one is always exceptionally warm
and friendly with his students but not his
senior colleagues, while the other consistently shows the opposite pattern, we learn
about the motivations and goals that underlie each person’s stable IF–THEN patterns
(Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Shoda, 1999). The
observation and systematic examination of
these stable patterns of IF–THEN relations
provides a route for systematically studying
the self-­system. It does so by addressing the
nature of the processing system that intrinsically generates both enduring overall levels of behavior, as reflected, for example, in
overall stable levels of self-­esteem and types
of characteristic social behavior (sociability,
conscientiousness), and also in stable, potentially predictable patterns of variability
across different situations. This analysis allows a fresh perspective for understanding
and unpacking many seemingly paradoxical, self-­defeating, and bizarre behaviors
and conflicts within the self-­system (Morf,
2006; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001b).
Individual Differences in Self‑Systems
Individual differences in self-­systems are
conceptualized in terms of differences in the
chronic accessibility of particular cognitive–­
affective units and in the distinctive organization of interrelationships among them,
that is, in their processing dynamics (Mischel, 2004, 2012; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Individual differences also reflect differences
in the distinctive identity goals that people
pursue in their self-­construction efforts
(Morf & Horvath, 2010). For example, a
person may be characterized by having academic competence as a central goal for his
or her self-­construction, and also by becoming easily anxious about it. Thus, both the
goal and the anxiety are at a high chronic
accessibility level. In addition, when that
goal is activated it may be connected to the
anxiety activation, which in turn may trigger a stable pattern of self-­defense. These
dynamics may unfold in a stable pattern
of cognitive–­affective internal reactions, as
well as manifest with distinctive coping reactions in interpersonal relations (reflecting
the organization of interconnections in the
system).
Given the interpersonal nature of the self,
and therefore the need to construct adaptive
coping mechanisms and strategies for optimizing those relationships, both empathy
and role-­taking and role-­playing ability may
be especially important aspects of individual
differences. Likewise, the ability to make
subtle discriminations among types of social
situations so that behavior can be appropriately adapted to the specific affordances and
constraints appears to have functional value
and to enhance favorable outcomes (Chiu,
Hong, Mischel, & Shoda, 1995). To the
degree that individuals share similar goals,
interpersonal competencies, and processing
dynamics in the self-­construction process,
they can be studied together as constituting
particular self-­construction types (as discussed in Part III). Research on these types
has begun to specify the distinctive nature of
their processing dynamics and characteristic
strategies, and to connect them to the self­signatures that they generate (e.g., Bornstein,
2011a; Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011;
Pietrzak, Downey, & Ayduk, 2005; Shaver
& Mikulincer, 2011). Those signatures and
the underlying processing dynamics, in turn,
become the focus of assessment in the study
of self-­construction types.
Summary
Consistent with the connectionist metaphor and the cognitive–­affective (Mischel
& Shoda, 1995) or dynamic self-­regulatory
(Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011) processing approaches to personality, the self­system is conceptualized as an organized
meaning system, guided and constrained
by the organization of relationships among
the person’s self-­relevant cognitions and affects. The characteristic processing dynamics of the system are activated in relation
to perceived self-­relevant features of situations and played out primarily in interpersonal contexts in particular predictable,
characteristic patterns of stable IF–THEN
relationships—the distinctive self-­signatures
of the person. Thus, consistent with the
consensus view regarding the defining characteristics of the self, the Psycho-Social Dynamic Processing System captures a self that
is both variable across different types of
situations and relatively stable within them.
It is an agentic doing system, an organized
cognitive–­affective (knowing, thinking, feeling) system and an interpersonal system.
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
Using a Systems Approach to Go
Beyond the “Self‑Zoo”
Critics of research on the self in psychology have noted with increasing alarm, and
perceptiveness, that the self has become the
victim of a spreading prefix disease with the
self becoming prefix for virtually every psychological process—from self-­enhancement
and self-­regulation to self-­control and
self-­reflection, to self-­awareness and self­monitoring, to self-­everything, ad infinitum.
A similar sentiment was captured in Tesser,
Martin, and Cornell’s (1996) phrase “selfzoo”—by which he describes a heterogeneous, ever-­growing collection of assorted
(though often substitutable) self-­defense
mechanisms. Consensus seems to be converging that to gain control of the zoo, the
self needs to be conceptualized as a coherent, organized system (e.g., Hoyle et al.,
1999) because self-­relevant processes do not
operate in isolation and independently but
rather concurrently in parallel and at multiple levels. Sorting out the zoo thus requires
understanding when and how various self­processes interrelate, trade off, and stimulate or inhibit each other.
The type of self-­system outlined in this
chapter offers a route toward a more coherent and integrative approach to the self. It
assumes that understanding the diverse phenomena of self requires that we contextualize their expressions and search for their
underlying organization and meaning in the
psycho-­social system that generates them. It
addresses the phenomena of the self as they
are experienced and unfold within a particular person over time—a goal to which
self theorists beginning with William James
have been committed, but with little progress in a century. To study the continuous
stream of experience and behavior requires
attention to the variability intrinsic to such
experience and to the underlying processing dynamics. A systems approach is needed
that takes account of the variability of the
states of mind and consciousness that James
long ago noted, and the interactions between these states and the events that prime
them. The type of interactionist self-­system
described may provide a route for the rigorous idiographic study of the flow of these
experiences and facilitate finding the stabil-
37
ity and IF–THEN consistencies within them
(e.g., Eizenman, Nesselroade, Featherman,
& Rowe, 1997; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson &
Witt, 2010; Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff,
2008; Mischel & Shoda, 2010; Van Mechelen, 2009).
This view of the “situated” or contextualized person has parallels in many other
domains of psychological science that share
the growing recognition that virtually all expressions of the human mind are contextualized (e.g., see Mind in Context, edited by
Feldman Barrett, Mesquita, & Smith, 2010).
This trend is reflected in work ranging from
“situated cognitions” (e.g., Smith & Semin,
2007) and embodiment (Semin & Smith,
2008) to contextualized memory (e.g., Everling, Tinsley, Gaffan, & Duncan, 2006),
to the contextualized situation-­dependent
workings of the brain and DNA (e.g., Champagne, 2009). Like most of science, psychological science is becoming increasingly
focused on context and interactions, and
sensitive to the critical importance of the
particular relevant “environment” for understanding the phenomena of interest, whether
social, psychological, economic–­political or
(and most self-­evident) biological–­genetic
(see Champagne, 2009; Mischel et al.,
2008). In this conceptualization and the
proposed self-­system, the intrapersonal processes within the system are in continuous
seamless interaction with the interpersonal
relationships within which the system is contextualized. It therefore should be fruitful to
examine them conjointly, as it is at the locus
of the linkages between the two types of
self-­signatures (intrapersonal dynamics and
interpersonal) that the meaning of each can
be more fully understood.
Identifying Self‑Construction Types
Self-­signatures are necessarily idiographic,
but they lend themselves readily to the nomothetic study of the signatures shared by
a self-­construction type. Guided by a system approach, a major challenge for future
research on the self is the identification of
such types. A self-­construction type consists
of people who have a common organization
of relations among mediating units in the
processing of certain self-­relevant situation
features. To identify these individuals, assessments are directed at finding their com-
38
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
mon self-­signatures—that is, the IF–THEN
patterns of behavior variation that they
share (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Mischel
et al., 2008; Morf, 2006; Morf & Horvath,
2010). These patterns in turn provide clues
to the common self-­construction goals and
dynamics that underlie and generate the signatures.
The concept of self-­construction types invites construct validity research to explore
the characteristic self-­systems and signatures
that distinguish different types. Progress is
being made in defining a number of types of
self-­construction. The most striking signature of the narcissistic type, for example, is
that while these individuals engage in virtually relentless efforts of self-­affirmation and
self-­esteem enhancement, these efforts often
seem to become undone in the process because the interpersonal strategies they employ
ultimately impair the very relationships upon
which they depend (Morf & Rhodewalt,
2001b; Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011;
Rhodewalt, Chapter 26, this volume). On
the surface this signature is paradoxical. But
it begins to make sense when it is understood
as the manifestation of a system of motivated
self-­construction in which many processes
are working in parallel at different levels.
The narcissists’ primary self-­construction
concerns revolve around establishing their
superiority. At direct and explicit levels, they
are chronically vigilant to exploit opportunities in which their grandiose self-­concepts
can be affirmed and bolstered—an endeavor
at which they often succeed (see Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011, for a review).
Simultaneously, they tend to have cynical and nonempathic views of others and
seem insensitive to other people’s concerns
and situational constraints. Thus, narcissists
promote their grandiosity unbounded, often
beyond what is socially acceptable, and even
when long-term costs are self-­defeating and
potentially relationship-­destructive (e.g.,
Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Paulhus, 1998). Yet at other, less directly accessible levels, the same individuals may be easily
threatened and exceptionally vulnerable in
their self-­esteem, which changes the meaning
of their grandiose self-­promotion signature
(Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011). They
seem chronically alert to, and indeed scan
for, threats to their superiority (Horvath &
Morf, 2009) and often respond inappropriately and excessively to self-­esteem threat
(Bushman et al., 2009; Twenge & Campbell,
2003). Together, the observed signatures
allow one to infer the self-­construction type.
A key feature seems to be narcissists’ desire
to demonstrate superiority, co-­occurring
perhaps with a latent fear of low worth.
This feature induces chronic sensitivity for
situational opportunities or threats for self­promotion. And, in turn, these perceptions
activate distinctive and characteristic ways
of processing information, and subsequent
response and coping dynamics in order to
secure self-­promotion or self-­restoration,
sometimes at the expense of others.
A distinctively different self-­construction
type emerges in the behavioral signatures
of individuals high on rejection sensitivity. Their signature revolves around maintaining close nurturing relationships (for
a review, see Romero-­Canyas, Downey,
Berenson, Ayduk, & Kang, 2010). This
signature is seen in intimate relationship
when they encounter ambiguous behaviors
that could be construed as uncaring (e.g., a
partner is attentive to someone else). These
events trigger their expectations of rejection,
abandonment, feelings of anger and resentment, and anxiety and rage at the prospect
of abandonment. Coercive and controlling
behaviors then become activated but typically are blamed on the partner’s behavior.
Their defining self-­signature is complex: It
includes being more prone than others to
anger, disapproval, and coercive behaviors
in certain types of intimate situations, but
also being more supportive, caring, or over­accommodating than most people (e.g., in
initial encounters with potential partners)
(Ayduk, May, Downey, & Higgins, 2003;
Romero-­Canyas, Downey, Reddy, et al.,
2010).
Like narcissism, the signature of high
rejection-­sensitive individuals can be paradoxical: Although they are above all motivated to avoid rejection, they often bring
it on through the very behaviors aimed to
avert it (e.g., Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, &
Khouri, 1998). It begins to make sense, however, once one understands their underlying
processing dynamics. Driven by their highly
salient self-­construction goal to avoid the
implications of rejection and abandonment
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
for the self, they overestimate the danger of
rejection and go overboard to try to minimize this threat by engaging in self-­defensive
behaviors that inadvertently may generate
the rejection they strive to avoid.
In short, the personality signatures that
emerge are the outputs of current states of a
system in which parallel operations of constraints and affordances at many different
levels have been processed simultaneously.
The signatures become predictable once one
understands the internal psychological reality for the individual, which is based on his
or her enduring concerns. As these examples
suggest, the self-­construction prototypes
that best lend themselves to such analyses
are cast at middle levels of abstraction rather
than at more superordinate, abstract levels
(e.g., Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982;
Emmons, 1989; Morf, 2002; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001b). At this middle level, trait
prototypes involve specific, contextualized
representations of the person and of others.
These midlevel prototypes are characterized
by particular kinds of cognitive and affective representations of themselves and others, visible in distinctive patterns of beliefs,
values, emotional reactions, self-­regulatory
processes, and goal-­driven interpersonal
styles and scripts for social behavior. Together, these representations define the types
of situations that will become opportunities or threats for their goal pursuit, as well
the strategies that are going to be useful in
achieving them.
Narcissists are set on winning and showing off their ability and, thus, take endless
risks to promote themselves, especially in
achievement situations. Rejection-­sensitive
individuals, in contrast, are more prevention
oriented and would rather suppress personal
needs to reduce interpersonal conflicts, or
reduce involvement or commitment to the
relationship to avoid being hurt (Ayduk et
al., 2003). Nevertheless, the specific overt
behaviors of the two personality types may
often look alike. For example, both will engage in aggressive or ingratiating behaviors
at times. However, when more closely inspected, they differ substantially in their behavioral signature—­showing the behavior in
response to very different trigger conditions.
This implies that in order to allow meaningful predictions of future behavior in particu-
39
lar situations, broad personality dimensions
need to be decomposed to the type level
where they may be seen to be expressions
of different types of self-­construction goals.
An exciting challenge for future research is
to determine more precisely to what degree,
and in what ways, a behavioral disposition
needs to be contextualized in order to constitute a meaningful self-­construction type.
Assessment/Measurement Implications
The systems approach to assessment of self­construction types illustrated here contrasts
in significant ways with current mainstream
assessment practices. The latter typically
approach the assessment of individual differences guided by the traits = personality
model described earlier. Thus global, relatively context-free self-­report measures, for
example, scales from the Big Five, are usually employed to tap broad factors such as
Extraversion or Neuroticism, and the IF–
THEN patterns are treated as error variance and deliberately bypassed. In contrast,
as the systems approach reveals, people
display distinctive, predictable, and meaningful patterns of behavioral variability in
their self-­signatures; that is, they will differ
reliably and meaningfully in terms of when
and with whom they are relatively more and
less sociable or aggressive than others, even
if they are alike in their total overall degree
of sociability or aggressiveness (Mischel &
Shoda, 1995).
Therefore assessment in the systems approach is not limited to broad overall average characteristics, although they can,
of course, be included. IF–THEN self­signatures require IF–THEN assessments:
They call for measures that capture the predictable variability of the contextualized
self, not just its overall levels. The focus is on
the IF–THEN patterns that characterize the
self-­signatures of the type because these patterns provide clues to the individual’s goals,
values, and the underlying organization of
the self-­system. Hence, they need to be central in assessments designed to do justice to
the complexities and diverse manifestations
of the self-­system in different contexts and
relationships, and at different levels.
To study these signatures systematically
requires assessing the individual’s thoughts,
40
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
feelings, and action tendencies (the THEN)
in relation to changes in the IF that are activated, internally or externally (Ayduk et
al., 1999; Baldwin & Meunier, 1999). Given
that at least some of these IF–THEN relations are themselves stable in ways characteristic of the person (Shoda, Mischel, &
Wright, 1994), they also may allow an indepth analysis of the stream of experience
that goes much beyond uncontextualized
introspective reports or global assessments.
They can even lead to experimental paradigms that identify the important IF trigger stimuli that are linked predictably to
changes in the person’s cognitive–­affective
states and behavioral reactions (e.g., Shoda
& Tiernan, 2002). The analysis of underlying processing dynamics in self-­construction
types requires experiments using manipulations that alter the psychological processes
and produce measurable changes in behavior
(for a detailed outline of the steps involved
in behaviorally referenced experimentation,
see Bornstein, 2003, 2011b). As Bornstein
(2011b) noted, process-­focused assessment
shifts away from finding optimal criterion
measures toward finding “optimal manipulations that maximize the impact of the manipulations on the underlying processes”
(p. 540).
Furthermore, a systems approach seeks to
assess processes and dynamics at multiple
levels of analysis and measurement. The
narcissism dynamics summarized earlier illustrate that what appears to be going on
at the surface may very well not be what is
going on at the level of implicit processing,
and therefore both levels need to be considered (see Morf, 2006, for a discussion). That
calls for indirect, implicit assessments, such
as response latency to “hot” trigger stimuli
that activate the vulnerability (e.g., failure
or rejection scenes or words), or other indirect tests (e.g., Downey, Mougois, Ayduk,
London, & Shoda, 2004; Greenwald et al.,
2002; Horvath & Morf, 2009; Morf, Horvath, & Zimmermann, 2011).
By integrating diverse data obtained via
different methods and procedures at different levels of analysis, an increasingly comprehensive view of a given self-­construction
type emerges (Bornstein, 2011b). The development of models and methods to identify
these signatures and their underlying orga-
nization with increasing precision provides
an important agenda and a host of research
challenges.
Development of Different
Self‑Construction Types
When the self is conceptualized as an organized system and people are seen in terms of
their different types of self-­construction, a
cascade of new questions arises about how
different self-­systems develop and evolve,
and how they are linked to social relationships and outcomes over the life course.
There is good reason to believe that the
roots for self-­construction types, or at least
the basic ingredients that influence their formation, are visible early in life. Longitudinal
studies of self-­regulatory ability, particularly the ability to delay gratification, assessed
initially in the first few years of life, found
that the interactions between the early life
attachment and self-­control systems predictably influenced the lives and self-­systems
that evolved over 40 years later (e.g., Ayduk
et al., 2000, 2008; Zayas et al., 2011). To illustrate, the attention control strategies used
at 18 months to deal with brief maternal separation predict aspects of self-­control when
at age 5 the children try to wait to get two
cookies later rather than one now. And the
seconds of time they delay are in turn linked
to their subsequent social and cognitive development and mental and physical health
over the life course, on measures ranging
from their SAT scores to adult attachment
relations as well as educational and health
outcomes (e.g., Ayduk et al., 2009; Mischel
et al., 2011).
Especially relevant for self researchers interested in the development of different self­construction types, early delay ability seems
to buffer against the development of a variety
of dispositional vulnerabilities later in life.
Studies on diverse demographic populations
have shown that delay ability predicts less
physical and verbal aggression, less bullying
behavior, less substance abuse, and higher
self-worth and self-­esteem, even in youth
who are at dispositionally and socially at risk
(Ayduk et al., 2000; Rodriguez, Mischel, &
Shoda, 1989). Early delay ability has even
been shown to mitigate the development of
features of borderline personality disorder
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
(Ayduk et al., 2008). Presumably, the strategies that children develop to self-­regulate
and overcome immediate temptations influence how they deal in later life with increasingly demanding contexts that require exertion of “willpower.” And that, in turn, is
likely to have significant implications for the
freedom and flexibility with which individuals are able to pursue their central identity
goals as they in part shape their interpersonal worlds and develop their self-­concepts,
their relational selves, and who they become
over the life course. Together, these findings
underline the importance of understanding
the conjoint development and complex interplay of the many processes and factors,
from biological to social, that influence the
trajectories for how self-­construction types
emerge, change, and maintain themselves.
The challenge is to identify the conditions
under which potential vulnerabilities for
the self can be minimized, or appropriately
buffered, and opportunities for enhanced
self-­actualization can be optimized.
Crossing Subdiscipline Boundaries
in Pursuit of the Self
Fields and subdisciplines within psychology,
like selves, undergo evolutions and redefine themselves. This was seen in the 1970s
when in response to the cognitive revolution
much of social psychology quickly metamorphosed into social cognition. An analogous transformation may be underway in
the relationship between the study of the self
and of personality in academic psychology.
As the view of the self is expanding to encompass diverse executive and motivational
functions—­functions that traditionally have
been at the heart of the basic processes and
dynamics of personality—the boundaries
between the two domains are becoming increasingly fuzzy and potentially dissolving.
In this sense, the psychology of self is becoming the contemporary form of what used
to be “ego and object relations” psychology,
but now informed by decades of relevant new
research and theory building. At first glance,
this kind of shift may seem to be consistent
with the view of “personality as antecedents
to the self” (Hoyle et al., 1999, p. 17), and
of the self as a “mediator between personality and adjustment” (Graziano, Jensen-
41
­ ampbell, & Finch, 1997, p. 392). In that
C
view (Roberts & Robins, 2000), personality
becomes the attributes a person has, and the
self-­system becomes the dynamic cognitive–­
affective–­action system that deals with what
the motivated person does and experiences
(Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 2010).
In the present view, however, an adequate
conception of what the person “has” needs
to capture the fundamental plasticity of the
human brain and of the predispositions that
initially reflect the individual’s biological
inheritance. A close look at human development, as seen, for example, in the self­construction process, suggests not a one-way
influence process but a dynamic reciprocal
interactionism, exemplified in the two-way
influence process between mother and child
in early life. And similar, continuous twoway influence processes seem to characterize
virtually all aspects of bio-­psycho-social adaptation, accommodation, and assimilation
in its many diverse forms, including in the
development and functioning of the brain
(e.g., Sutton, 2002).
Self theory and research now seem well
­positioned to address the large empty conceptual space between whatever temperamental, affective, and cognitive pretuning or
prewiring the newborn brings to the world
and the exquisitely complex patterns of adaptation and self-­construction that evolve
in people’s subsequent interactions with the
social world throughout life. One substantive advantage of casting the processing
dynamics that underlie self-­construction in
a framework of “selfhood” (rather than of
personality) is that it bypasses many of the
classic century-old assumptions about personality dynamics (e.g., about the nature
of unconscious motivational determinism à
la Freud, the focus on pathology, the belief
that “personality can’t change”). Many of
these assumptions do not fit the emerging
view of mind, brain, and their plasticity in
interaction with the contexts within which
they function. Such plasticity and adaptiveness, however, seem highly compatible with
a view of the self that allows the potential
for multiple selves and alternative possible
selves, all organized within a larger interacting self-­system. (Note, in contrast, that
unlike the possibility of “multiple selves”
the concept of “multiple personalities”
42
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
makes sense only in terms of an illness). In
short, a dynamic self-­system may facilitate
a more “positive” and optimistic approach
to the human potential and the opportunities for self-­directed freedom and constructive change (e.g., Aspinwall & Staudinger,
2002).
In light of the expansion of the self as a
construct and as a system, the study of the
self now seems perched at the intersect—­
indeed the hub—­between areas that include
personality processes and dynamics, social
cognition, emotion–­motivation, developmental psychology, interpersonal behavior, clinical–­health psychology–­behavioral
medicine, and cultural psychology. This
expanded, integrative view influences how
the science of the self organizes itself (e.g.,
in terms of conferences and journals), trains
its students, and shapes its research projects.
A curriculum for the training of the “complete self researcher” ideally needs to span
virtually every area of psychological science.
Indeed, the ideal researcher on the self may
have to be one of the endangered species of
“generalists” remaining within psychology.
Or perhaps rather than attempting to be generalists in a world of specialists, a better alternative is to form inter-­disciplinary teams
with the expertise needed for the particular
questions pursued. But most important—
and the focus of this chapter—this expanded, yet integrated view of the self impacts on
the type of conceptual framework needed to
capture the complexities and scope of self­relevant phenomena and processes with the
depth they deserve.
The Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing
System for the self outlined in this chapter
has tried to build a conceptual bridge that
takes account of relevant developments in
diverse areas, focusing particularly on research cast in the language of the self and
parallel work on the cognitive–­affective processing dynamics of personality. The two
lines of research and theory on personality
dynamics and on self-­construction overlap
substantially in the phenomena they seek to
understand, and in the principles and procedures that guide their common search. Our
hope is that their closer integration in future
work will help to build a more cumulative
science of both selfhood and personality—
or perhaps the two will ultimately converge
toward the study of “personhood.”
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported in
part by a grant (No. 100014-130116-1) from the
Swiss National Science Foundation to Carolyn
C. Morf. We would like to thank Stephan Horvath, Vivian Zayas, and Mark Leary for helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
References
Adler, J. M., & McAdams, D. P. (2007). Telling stories about therapy: Ego development,
well-being, and the therapeutic relationship.
In R. Josselson, A. Lieblich, & D. P. McAdams (Eds.), The meaning of others: Narrative
studies of relationships (pp. 213–236). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Adolphs, R., Baron-Cohen, S., & Tranel, D.
(2002). Impaired recognition of social emotions following amygdala damage. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 1264–1274.
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and growth in
personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
Andersen, S. M., & Chen, S. (2002). The relational self: An interpersonal social-­cognitive
theory. Psychological Review, 109, 619–645.
Aspinwall, L. G., & Staudinger, A. U. (2002). A
psychology of human strengths: Perspectives
on an emerging field. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Athay, M., & Darley, J. M. (1981). Toward an
interaction-­centered theory of personality. In
N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Personality, cognition, and social interaction (pp. 281–
308). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Ayduk, O., Downey, G., Testa, A., Yen, Y., &
Shoda, Y. (1999). Does rejection elicit hostility in rejection sensitive women? Social Cognition, 17, 245–271.
Ayduk, O., May, D., Downey, G., & Higgins, E.
T. (2003). Tactical differences in coping with
rejection sensitivity: The role of prevention.
Personal and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
435–448.
Ayduk, O., Mendoza-­Denton, R., Mischel, W.,
Downey, G., Peake, P., & Rodriguez, M.
(2000). Regulating the interpersonal self: Strategic self-­regulation for coping with rejection
sensitivity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79, 776–792.
Ayduk, O., Zayas, V., Downey, G., Cole, A. B.,
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
Shoda, Y., & Mischel, W. (2008). Rejection
sensitivity and executive control: Joint predictors of borderline personality features. Journal
of Research in Personality, 42, 151–168.
Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B.
(2009). Predicting actual behavior from the
explicit and implicit self-­concept of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 533–548.
Baldwin, M. W., & Dandeneau, S. D. (2005). Understanding and modifying the relational schemas underlying insecurity. In M. W. Baldwin
(Ed.), Interpersonal cognition (pp. 33–61).
New York: Guilford Press.
Baldwin, M. W., & Holmes, J. G. (1987). Salient
private audiences and awareness of the self.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
52, 1087–1098.
Baldwin, M. W., & Meunier, J. (1999). The cued
activation of attachment relational schemas.
Social Cognition, 171, 209–227.
Banse, R., & Fischer, I. (2002, July). Implicit and
explicit aggressiveness and the prediction of
aggressive behaviour. Poster presented at the
11th conference on Personality of the European Association of Personality Psychology,
Jena, Germany.
Bargh, J. A. (1997). Reply to commentaries. In
R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), The automaticity of everyday life: Advances in social cognition (Vol.
10, pp. 231–246). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Baumann, N., Kaschel, R., & Kuhl, J. (2005).
Striving for unwanted goals: Stress-­dependent
discrepancies between explicit and implicit
achievement motives reduce subjective wellbeing and increase psychosomatic symptoms.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
89, 781–799.
Baumeister, R. F. (1987). How the self became
a problem: A psychological review of historical research. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 163–176.
Baumeister R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert (Ed.), The handbook of social psychology
(pp. 680–740). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M.,
& Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252–1265.
Berthoz, S., Grezes, J., Armony, J. L., Passingham, R. E., & Dolan, R. J. (2006). Affective
response to one’s own moral violations. NeuroImage, 31, 945–950.
Bolger, N., & Zuckerman, A. (1995). A Framework for studying personality in the stress
43
process. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 69, 890–902.
Borkenau, P., Riemann, R., Spinath, F. M., &
Angleitner, A. (2006). Genetic and environmental influences on person situation profiles.
Journal of Personality, 74, 1451–1479.
Bornstein, R. F. (2003). Behaviorally referenced
experimentation and symptom validation: A
paradigm for 21st-­century personality disorder research. Journal of Personality Disorders, 17, 1–18.
Bornstein, R. F. (2011a). An interactionist perspective on interpersonal dependency. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20,
124–128.
Bornstein, R. F. (2011b). Toward a process­focused model of test score validity: Improving psychological assessment in science and
practice. Psychological Assessment, 23(2),
532–544.
Bower, G. H. (2007). The trait versus situation
debate: A minimalist view. In Y. Shoda, D.
Cervone, & G. Downey (Eds.), Persons in
context: Building a science of the individual
(pp. 19–42). New York: Guilford Press.
Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., Thomaes,
S., Ryu, E., Begeer, S., & West, S. G. (2009).
Looking again, and harder, for a link between
low self-­esteem and aggression. Journal of
Personality, 77, 427–446.
Buss, D. M. (1997). Evolutionary foundations
of personality. In R. Hogan, J. A. Johnson,
& S. R. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp. 317–344). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Campbell, W. K., Goodie, A. S., & Foster, J. D.
(2004). Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 297–
311.
Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). Personality and social intelligence. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Cantor, N., Mischel, W., & Schwartz, J. C.
(1982). A prototype analysis of psychological
situations. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 45–77.
Cantor, N., Norem, J., Langston, C., Zirkel, S.,
Fleeson W., & Cook-­Flannagan, C. (1991).
Life tasks and daily life experience. Journal of
Personality, 59, 425–451.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-­regulation: A control theory
approach to human behavior. New York:
Springer-­Verlag.
Casey, B. J., Somerville, L. H., Gotlib, I. H.,
Ayduk, O., Franklin, N., Askren, M. K., et al.
44
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
(in press). Behavioral and neural correlates of
delay of gratification 40 years later. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
USA.
Cervone, D., & Shoda, Y. (Eds.). (1999). The coherence of personality: Social-­cognitive bases
of consistency, variability, and organization.
New York: Guilford Press.
Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Champagne, F. (2009). Beyond nature vs. nurture: Philosophical insights from molecular
biology. APS Observer, 22, 1–3.
Chiu, C. Y., Hong, Y., Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y.
(1995). Discriminative facility in social competence: Conditional versus dispositional encoding and monitoring–­blunting of information. Social Cognition, 13, 49–70.
Claussen, A. H., & Crittenden, P. M. K. (2003).
Maternal sensitivity. In P. M. K. Crittenden &
A. H. Claussen (Eds.), The organization of attachment relationships: Maturation, culture
and context (pp. 115–125). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner’s.
Descartes, R. (1970). The philosophical works
of Descartes (E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross,
Trans., Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1637)
Dewey, J. (1890). On some current conceptions
of the term “Self.” Mind, 15, 58–74.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Nordgren, L. F. (2006). A
theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives
on Psychological Science, 1, 95–109.
Donahue, E. M., Robins, R. W., Roberts, B. W.,
& John, O. P. (1993). The divided self: Concurrent and longitudinal effects of psychological adjustment and social roles on self-­concept
differentiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 834–846.
Downey, G., Freitas, A. L., Michaelis, B., &
Khouri, H. (1998). The self-­f ulfilling prophecy in close relationships: Rejection sensitivity and rejection by romantic partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
545–560.
Downey, G., Mougois, V., Ayduk, O., London,
B. E., & Shoda, Y. (2004). Rejection sensitivity and the defensive motivational system:
Insights from the startle response to rejection
cues. Psychological Science, 15, 668–673.
Eisenberg, N., Smith, C. L., Sadovsky, A., &
Spinrad, T. L. (2004). Effortful control: Relations with emotion regulation, adjustment, and
socialization in childhood. In R. F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of self­regulation: Research, theory, and applications
(pp. 151–170). New York: Guilford Press.
Eizenman, D. R., Nesselroade, J. R., Featherman,
D. L., & Rowe, J. W. (1997). Intraindividual
variability in perceived control in a older sample: The MacArthur successful aging studies.
Psychology and Aging, 12, 489–502.
Emmons, R. A. (1989). Exploring the relations
between motives and traits: The case of narcissism. In D. M. Buss & N. Cantor (Eds.),
Personality psychology: Recent trends and
emerging directions (pp. 32–44). New York:
Springer-­Verlag.
Emmons, R. A. (1991). Personal strivings, daily
life events, and psychological and physical
well-being. Journal of Personality, 59, 453–
472.
Emmons, R. A., & King, L. A. (1988). Conflict
among personal strivings: Immediate and
long-term implications for psychological and
physical well-being. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 54, 1040–1048.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-­concept revisited or
a theory of a theory. American Psychologist,
28, 405–416.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive
and the psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709–724.
Everling, S., Tinsley, C. J., Gaffan, D., & Duncan, J. (2006). Selective representation of task­relevant objects and locations in the monkey
prefrontal cortex. European Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 2197–2214.
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Automatic self-­regulation. In R. F. Baumeister & K.
D. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of self-­regulation:
Research, theory, and applications (pp. 151–
170). New York: Guilford Press.
Fleeson, W. (2001). Toward a structure- and
process-­integrated view of personality: Traits
as density distributions of states. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 1011–
1027.
Fleeson, W., & Witt, J. (2010). The relevance of
Big Five trait content in behavior to subjective
authenticity: Do high levels of within-­person
behavioral variability undermine or enable authenticity achievement? Journal of Personality, 78, 1353–1382.
Fournier, M. A., Moskowitz, D. S., & Zuroff, D.
C. (2008). Integrating dispositions, signatures,
and the interpersonal domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 531–545.
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (1996). The
psychology of action: Linking cognition and
motivation to behavior. New York: Guilford
Press.
Gollwitzer, P. M., Bayer, U. C., & McCulloch,
K. C. (2005). The control of the unwanted. In
R. R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman, & J. A. (Eds.), The
new unconscious (pp. 485–515). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996).
Goal effects on action and cognition. In E.
T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social
psychology: Handbook of basic principles
(pp. 361–399). New York: Guilford Press.
Graziano, W. G., Jensen-­Campbell, L. A., &
Finch, J. F. (1997). The self as a mediator between personality and adjustment. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 392–
404.
Graziano, W. G., & Tobin, R. M. (2001). The
distributed processing of narcissist: Paradox
lost? Psychological Inquiry, 12(4), 219–222.
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A.,
Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellott, D. S.
(2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes,
stereotypes, self-­esteem, and self-­concept. Psychological Review, 109, 3–25.
Greenwald, A. G., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984).
The self. In S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.),
Handbook of social cognition (pp. 129–178).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Gunnar, M. (2001, April). Relationships as a
central context of early childhood. In D. A.
Philips & J. P. Shonkoff (Chairs), From neurons to neighborhoods: The science of early
child development. Symposium conducted at
the meeting of the Society for Research and
Child Development, Minneapolis, MN.
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self: A
developmental perspective. New York: Guilford Press.
Hassin, R. R. (2005). Non-­conscious control and
the case for implicit working memory. In R.
R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.),
The new unconscious (pp. 196–224). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Heatherton, T. F., Wyland, C. L., Macrae, C. N.,
Demos, K. E., Denny, B. T., & Kelley, W. M.
(2006). Medial prefrontal activity differentiates self from close others. Social Cognitive
and Affective Neuroscience, 1, 18–25.
Higgins, E. T. (1996a). Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: Affect and motivation from distinct pains and pleasures. In P. M. Gollwitzer
& J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action:
45
Linking cognition and motivation to behavior
(pp. 91–114). New York: Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1996b). Knowledge activation:
Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E.
T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social
psychology: Handbook of basic principles
(pp. 133–168). New York: Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (Eds.).
(1996). Social psychology: Handbook of basic
principles. New York: Guilford Press.
Hogan, R., Johnson, J. A., & Briggs, S. R. (Eds.).
(1997). Handbook of personality psychology.
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Horvath, S., & Morf, C. C. (2009). Narcissistic
defensiveness: Hypervigilance and avoidance
of worthlessness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1252–1258.
Hoyle, R. H. (Ed.). (2010). Handbook of personality and self-­regulation. Malden, MA: Wiley­Blackwell.
Hoyle, R. H., Kernis, M. H., Leary, M. R., & Baldwin, M. W. (1999). Selfhood: Identity, esteem,
regulation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology
(Vols. 1 & 2). New York: Holt.
Job, V., Oertig, D., Brandstätter, V., & Allemand, M. (2010). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit motivation and unhealthy
eating behavior. Journal of Personality, 78,
1209–1238.
John, O. P., Robins, R. W., & Pervin, L. A. (Eds.).
(2008). Handbook of personality: Theory and
research (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P.,
Hoshino-­Browne, E., & Correll, J. (2003).
Secure and defensive high self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85,
969–978.
Kernberg, O. (1976). Object relations theory and
clinical psychoanalysis. New York: Aronson.
Kernis, M. H., Abend, T. A., Goldman, B. M.,
Shrira, I., Paradise, A. N., & Hampton, C.
(2005). Self-­serving responses arising from
discrepancies between explicit and implicit
self-­esteem. Self and Identity, 4, 311–330.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237, 1445–1452.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1990). The psychological unconscious. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook
of personality: Theory and research (pp. 445–
464). New York: Guilford Press.
Klein, S. B. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of
knowing one’s self. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.),
The cognitive neurosciences (Vol. 3, pp. 1077–
1090). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
46
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Klein, S. B., & Gangi, C. E. (2010). The multiplicity of self: Neuropsychological evidence
and its implications for the self as a construct
in psychological research. Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences, 1191, 1–15.
Knoch, D., Schneider, F., Schunk, D., Hohmann, M., & Fehr, E. (2009). Disrupting the
prefrontal cortex diminishes human ability
to build a good reputation. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences USA, 106,
20895–20899.
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New
York: International Universities Press.
Kross, E., Egner, T., Ochsner, K., Hirsch, J., &
Downey, G. (2007). Neural dynamics of rejection sensitivity. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 945–956.
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (Eds.). (2003).
Handbook of self and identity. New York:
Guilford Press.
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain. New
York: Simon & Schuster.
Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self­specific?: Theoretical investigation and critical
review of neuroimaging results. Psychological
Review, 116, 252–282.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-­complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-­related depression
and illness. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 663–676.
Linville, P. W., & Carlston, D. E. (1994). Social
cognition of the self. In P. G. Devine, D. C.
Hamilton, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Social cognition: Impact on social psychology (pp. 143–
193). New York: Academic Press.
Little, B. R., Lecci, L., & Watkinson, B. (1992).
Personality and personal projects: Linking the
big five and PAC units of analysis. Journal of
Personality, 60, 501–525.
Markus, H., & Cross, S. (1990). The interpersonal self. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of
personality: Theory and research (pp. 576–
608). New York: Guilford Press.
McAdams, D. P. (2008). Personal narratives and
the life story. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, &
L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality:
Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 241–261).
New York: Guilford Press.
McAdams, D. P., Bauer, J. J., Sakaeda, A. R.,
Anyidoho, N. A., Machado, M. A., Magrino­Failla, K., et al. (2006). Continuity and change
in the life story: A longitudinal study of autobiographical memories in emerging adulthood.
Journal of Personality, 74, 1371–1400.
McConnell, A. R., & Leibold, J. M. (2001). Rela-
tions among the Implicit Association Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures
of racial attitudes. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 37, 435–442.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2008). The five­factor theory of personality. In O. P. John, R.
W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook
of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed.,
pp. 159–181). New York: Guilford Press.
McGregor, I., Nail, P. R., Marigold, D. C., &
Kang, S.-J. (2005). Defensive pride and consensus: Strength in imaginary numbers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89,
978–996.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society:
From the standpoint of a social behaviorist.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mendoza-­Denton, R., Ayduk, O., Mischel, W.,
Shoda, Y., & Testa, A. (2001). Person X Situation interactionism in self-­encoding (I am . . .
when . . . ): Implications for affect regulation
and social information processing. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 533–
544.
Mendoza-­Denton, R., & Mischel, W. (2007).
Integrating system approaches to culture and
personality: The Cultural Cognitive–­A ffective
Processing System. In S. Kitayama & D.
Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 175–195). New York: Guilford Press.
Mesquita, B., Feldman Barrett, L., & Smith, E.
R. (Eds.). (2010). The mind in context. New
York: Guilford Press.
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool
system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review,
106, 3–19.
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2007). Attachment in adulthood: Structure, dynamics, and
change. New York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social
learning reconceptualization of personality.
Psychological Review, 80, 252–283.
Mischel, W. (2004). Toward an integrative science of the person. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 1–22.
Mischel, W. (2012). Self-­control theory. In P. A.
M. Van Lange, A. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social
psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 1–22). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mischel, W., & Ayduk, O. (2011). Willpower in
a Cognitive-­A ffective Processing System: The
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
dynamics of delay of gratification. In K. D.
Vohs & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), Handbook
of self-­regulation: Research, theory, and applications (2nd ed., pp. 83–105). New York:
Guilford Press.
Mischel, W., Ayduk, O., Berman, M., Casey, B.
J., Gotlib, I., Jonides, J., et al. (2011). “Willpower” over the life span: Decomposing impulse control. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience [Special Issue on Aging], 6,
252–256.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive–­
affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure.
Psychological Review, 102, 246–268.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (2008). Toward a
unifying theory of personality: Integrating
dispositions and processing dynamics within
the Cognitive–­A ffective Processing System
(CAPS). In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A.
Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality (3rd
ed., pp. 208–241). New York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (2010). The situated
person. In L. Feldman Barrett, B. Mesquita,
& E. R. Smith (Eds.), The mind in context
(pp. 149–173). New York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Ayduk, O. (2008). Introduction to personality: Toward an integrative science of the person (8th ed.). New York:
Wiley.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L.
(1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science, 44, 933–938.
Moran, J. M., Heatherton, T. F., & Kelley, W.
M. (2009). Modulation of cortical midline
structure by implicit and explicit self-­relevance
evaluation. Social Neuroscience, 4, 197–211.
Moran, J. M., Kelley, W. M., & Heatherton, T. F.
(in press). Self-­knowledge. In K. N. Ochsner &
S. Kosslyn (Eds.), Oxford handbook of cognitive neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moran, J. M., Macrae, C. N., Heatherton, T. F.,
Wyland, C. L., & Kelley, W. M. (2006). Neuroanatomical evidence for distinct cognitive
and affective components of self. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 1586–1594.
Morf, C. C. (2002). Personality at the hub: Extending the conception of personality psychology. Journal of Research in Personality, 36,
649–660.
Morf, C. C. (2006). Personality reflected in a
coherent indiosyncratic interplay of intra- and
47
interpersonal self-­regulatory processes. Journal of Personality, 74, 1527–1556.
Morf, C. C., & Horvath, S. (2007). Connectionism as metaphor: Toward an integrated, unified conception of self-­system and individual
differences. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 108–
113.
Morf, C. C., & Horvath, S. (2010). Self­regulation processes and their signatures: Dynamics of the self-­system. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.),
Handbook of personality and self-­regulation
(pp. 117–144). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Morf, C. C., Horvath, S., & Torchetti, L.
(2011). Narcissistic self-­enhancement: Tales
of (successful?) self-­portrayal. In M. D. Alicke & C. Sedikides (Eds.), Handbook of self­e nhancement and self-­protection (pp. 399–
424). New York: Guilford Press.
Morf, C. C., Horvath, S., & Zimmermann, T.
D. (2011). In the mind of a male narcissist:
Worthlessness primes aggression. Manuscript
under review.
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (1993). Narcissism
and self-­evaluation maintenance: Explorations
in object relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 668–676.
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001a). Expanding
the dynamic self-­regulatory processing model
of narcissism: Research directions for the future. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 243–251.
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001b). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic
self-­regulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177–196.
Morf, C. C., Torchetti, L., & Schürch, E. (2011).
Narcissism from the perspective of the dynamic self-­regulatory processing model. In W. K.
Campbell & J. D. Miller (Eds.), The handbook
of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatment (pp. 56–70) Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Nee, D. E., & Jonides, J. (2009). Common and
distinct neural correlates of perceptual and memorial selection. NeuroImage, 45, 963–975.
Nee, D. E., Jonides, J., & Berman, M. G. (2007).
Neural mechanisms of proactive interference
resolution. NeuroImage, 38, 740–751.
Nee, D., E., Wager, T. D., & Jonides, J. (2007).
Interference resolution: Insights from a meta­analysis of neuroimaging tasks. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 1–17.
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R.
(2007). The Implicit Association Test at age 7:
A methodological and conceptual review. In J.
48
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
A. Bargh (Ed.), Social psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher mental
processes (pp. 265–292). New York: Psychology Press.
Ochsner, K. N., Beer, J. S., Robertson, E. R.,
Cooper, J. C., Gabrieli, J. D., et al. (2005). The
neural correlates of direct and reflected self­knowledge. NeuroImage, 28, 797–814.
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 9, 242–249.
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Implicit and
explicit measures of attitudes: The perspective
of the MODE model. In R. E. Petty, R. H.
Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights
from the new implicit measures (pp. 19–63).
New York: Psychology Press.
Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-­enhancement:
A mixed blessing? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 74, 1197–1208.
Pelham, B. W., Carvallo, M., & Jones, J. T.
(2005). Implicit egotism. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 14, 106–110.
Pervin, L. A. (1989). Goal concepts in personality and social psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pervin, L. A. (1994). A critical analysis of trait
theory. Psychological Inquiry, 5, 103–113.
Pietrzak, J., Downey, G., & Ayduk, O. (2005).
Rejection sensitivity as an interpersonal vulnerability. In M. W. Baldwin (Ed.), Interpersonal cognition (pp. 62–84). New York: Guilford Press.
Plomin, R., DeFries, J. C., McClearn, G. E., &
McGuffin, P. (2008). Behavioral genetics (5th
ed.). New York: Worth.
Posner, M., & Rothbart, M. K. (2000). Developing mechanisms of self-­regulation. Development and Psychopathology, 12, 427–441.
Prentice, D. A. (2001). The individual self, relational self, and collective self: A commentary. In C. Sedikides & M. B. Brewer (Eds.),
Individual self, relational self, collective self
(pp. 315–326). Philadelphia: Psychology Press/
Taylor & Francis.
Read, S. J., & Miller, L. C. (1998). Connectionist models of social reasoning and social behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Roberts, B. W., & Robins, R. W. (2000). Broad
dispositions, broad aspirations: The intersections of personality traits and major life goals.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
26, 1284–1296.
Rodriguez, M. L., Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y.
(1989). Cognitive person variables in the delay
of gratification of older children at-risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,
358–367.
Rogers, C. R. (1947). Some observations on the
organization of personality. American Psychologist, 2, 358–368.
Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client-­centered therapy:
Its current practice, implications and theory.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Romero-­Canyas, R., Downey, G., Berenson, K.,
Ayduk, O., & Kang, J. N. (2010). Rejection
sensitivity and the rejection–­hostility link in
romantic relationships. Journal of Personality, 78, 119–148.
Romero-­Canyas, R., Downey, G., Reddy, K. S.,
Rodriguez, S., Cavanaugh, T. J., & Pelayo, R.
(2010). Paying to belong: When does rejection
lead to ingratiation? Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 99, 802–823.
Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1986).
Parallel distributed processing: Explorations
in the microstructure of cognition: Vol. 1.
Foundations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sedikides, C., & Brewer M. B. (2001). Individual self, relational self, collective self. Philadelphia: Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.
Semin, G. R., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2008). Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective,
and neuroscientific approaches. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Sethi, A., Mischel, W., Aber, L., Shoda, Y., &
Rodriguez, M. (2000). The relationship between strategic attention deployment and self­regulation: Predicting preschooler’s delay of
gratification form mother–­toddler interactions.
Developmental Psychology, 6, 767–777.
Shaver, P. R., & Mikulincer, M. (2011). Attachment theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W.
Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 2,
pp. 160–179). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Shoda, Y. (1999). Behavioral expressions of a
personality system: Generation and perception
of behavioral signatures. In D. Cervone & Y.
Shoda (Eds.), The coherence of personality:
Social-­cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization (pp. 155–181). New
York: Guilford Press.
Shoda, Y., & Mischel, W. (1998). Personality as a
stable cognitive–­affective activation network:
Characteristic patterns of behavior variation
emerge from a stable personality structure. In
S. Read & L. C. Miller (Eds.), Connectionist
2. The Self as a Psycho-­Social Dynamic Processing System
models of social reasoning and social behavior
(pp. 175–208). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Wright, J. C. (1994).
Intraindividual stability in the organization
and patterning of behavior: Incorporating
psychological situations into the idiographic
analysis of personality. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 67, 674–687.
Shoda, Y., & LeeTiernan, S. (2002). What remains invariant?: Finding order within a person’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors across
situations. In D. Cervone & W. Mischel (Eds.),
Advances in personality science (pp. 241–270).
New York: Guilford Press.
Showers, C. (1992). Compartmentalization of
positive and negative self-­knowledge: Keeping
bad apples out of the bunch. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 1036–1049.
Smith, E. R., & Semin, G. R. (2007). Situated
social cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 132–135.
Spengler, S., von Cramon, D. Y., & Brass, M.
(2009). Was it me or was it you?: How the
sense of agency originates from ideomotor
learning revealed by fMRI. NeuroImage, 46,
290–298.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and
impulsive determinants of social behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8,
220–247.
Sutton, S. K. (2002). Incentive and threat reactivity: Relations with anterior cortical activity. In
D. Cervone & W. Mischel (Eds.), Advances in
personality science (pp. 127–150). New York:
Guilford Press.
Swann, W. B., Jr., & Bosson, J. (2010). Self
and identity. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, &
G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 589–628). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Tesser, A. (2002). Constructing a niche for the
self: A bio-­social, PDP approach to understanding lives (Special issue: Self-­Concept,
Self-­Regulation, and Psychological Vulnerability). Self and Identity, 1, 185–190.
Tesser, A., Martin, L. L., & Cornell, D. P. (1996).
On the substitutability of self-­protective mechanisms. In P. M. Gollwitzer & Bargh, J. A.
49
(Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 48–
68). New York: Guilford Press.
Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). “Isn’t
it fun to get the respect that we’re going to deserve?”: Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 29, 261–272.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Kruglanski, A. W., & Higgins, E. T. (Eds.). (2011). Handbook of theories of social psychology. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Van Mechelen, I. (2009). A royal road to understanding the mechanisms underlying personin-­context behavior (Special issue: Personality
and Assessment 40 Years Later). Journal of
Research in Personality, 43, 179–186.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wagner, D. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2010). Giving in to temptation: The emerging cognitive
neuroscience of self-­regulatory failure. In K.
D. Vohs & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), The handbook of self-­regulation: Research, theory, and
applications (2nd ed., pp. 41–63). New York:
Guilford Press.
Zayas, V., Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Aber, J. L.
(2011). Roots of adult attachment: Maternal
caregiving at 18 months predicts adult peer
and partner attachment. Social Psychological
and Personality Science, 2, 289–297.
Zayas, V., & Shoda, Y. (2007). Predicting preferences for dating partners from past experiences of psychological abuse: Identifying the
“psychological ingredients” of situations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33,
123–138.
Zayas, V., Shoda, Y., & Ayduk, O. (2002). Personality in context: An interpersonal systems
perspective. Journal of Personality, 70, 851–
898.
Zhu, Y., Zhang, L., Fan, L., & Han, S. (2007).
Neural basis of cultural influence on self­representation. NeuroImage, 34, 1310–1316.
Zirkel, S., & Cantor, N. (1990). Personal construal of life tasks: Those who struggle for independence. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 58, 172–185.
Chapter 3
Self-­Awareness
Charles S. Carver
When you think about yourself, what
comes to mind? When your attention drifts
to yourself while you’re working on something, does it change anything about what
you’re doing, or how you do it? When you
notice yourself being in the gaze of a group
of others, what are your reactions? When
you set out to make a particular impression
on a stranger, how do you go about crafting your self-­portrayal? These are some of
the questions that underlie the study of self­awareness processes.
Today’s interest in the concept of self­awareness has deep roots in the literature of
psychology and sociology, tracing back at
least as far as the writings of William James
(1890) and the sociological school of symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902; Mead,
1934). James pointed out that the self has
what appears to be a unique capacity that he
termed reflexivity: the ability to turn around
and take itself as the object of its own view.
Thus, the self has both a “process” aspect—
the self as the knower—and a “content”
aspect—the self as that which is known. In
the language of the first person singular, the
self is both the “I”—the active subject engaged in experience—and also potentially
the “me”—the object of its own experience
(Mead, 1934).
50
This property of reflexivity does not always dominate the flow of subjective experience. Rather, it enters the flow to a greater
degree at some times and to a lesser degree at
other times. People’s awareness can gravitate
to a wide range of possible stimuli. Sometimes people are especially aware of things
outside themselves. Sometimes, however,
their attention is drawn to experiences occurring inside themselves or more generally
to themselves as entities in the social matrix.
These variations in the content that is being
processed, or thought about, appear to have
several influences on what happens next.
When attention is directed to the self instead
of to the outside world, experience changes.
Just exactly how experience changes when
attention is self-­directed has been the matter
of some debate over the past 35 years. This
chapter describes some of the ideas that have
been proposed in that regard.
From Philosophy to Experimental
Social Psychology
What happens when attention is self­focused? Responses to that question have
come from several directions, with several
different underlying rationales. Given the
3. Self-­Awareness
diversity of the starting points, the various
responses that people have suggested have
some overtones that differ fairly substantially from one to another.
James
James (1890) wrote about a wide range of
topics concerning the self. In so doing, he
provided suggestions about at least one thing
that can happen when people become aware
of themselves. Elsewhere in his writings he
noted that self-­esteem (feeling good or bad
about the self) is dependent on both pretensions (aspirations) and successes (perceived
accomplishments). For example, if a young
man has no aspiration to play football well,
the fact that he is not good at football has
no adverse implications for his self-­esteem.
However, if he does have aspirations for excellence at football, the extent to which those
aspirations are being fulfilled in his behavior
is quite relevant for his self-­esteem.
Self-­esteem thus can be defined by the
extent of discrepancy between pretensions
and present behavior. It would seem to follow that such discrepancies become noticeable only to the extent that the person’s attention is directed toward this aspect of the
self. This principle raises the possibility that
self-­directed attention can create negative
feelings (low self-­esteem), if present behavior
does not correspond to pretensions or aspirations. If behavior does correspond to the
aspirations, in contrast, the result should be
pride and satisfaction.
Cooley and Mead
The symbolic interactionist writings on the
property of reflexivity (Cooley, 1902; Mead,
1934) dealt primarily with how the self
comes to exist, as opposed to how self-focus
influences subsequent experience. Nonetheless, they do have some implications for the
latter as well. This view holds that there is
no sense of self at birth, that it develops as
a function of interaction with others. As we
observe that other people react to us in an
evaluative way (praising and rewarding, or
criticizing and punishing), we gradually become aware that there is a perspective other
than our own subjective impression of the
world. Gradually, we become able to take
that outside perspective; more particularly,
51
we become able to take this perspective on
ourselves.
Because we interact with many different
people as this viewpoint develops, Mead
called it the “perspective of the generalized
other.” When we reflect on ourselves, from
then on, we do so from that perspective, and
we evaluate ourselves in the same way as
those other people had done earlier. Thus, we
come to evaluate ourselves from the point of
view of the social standards held by people
to whom we are exposed in growing up.
This view resembles that of James in assuming that when attention is self-­directed
(when a person takes the perspective of the
generalized other), there will be an evaluation
of the self with respect to some comparison
value. James suggested that that comparison
value will be a personal aspiration. From
the view of the symbolic interactionists, it is
more likely to be a social value that has been
internalized from exposure to others.
It is a little more explicit from the symbolic interactionist view than from the view
of James that the resultant evaluation can be
positive as well as negative. That is, if the
self that one sees when taking the perspective of the generalized other fails to live up
to a social value, the evaluation will be self­critical. If the self is fully embodying that
value, however, the evaluation will be positive and self-­congratulatory.
Duval and Wicklund
These early writings about the self and its
reflexive property were theoretical in nature. Indeed, they represented philosophical
statements as much as psychological ones.
Although a lot of research was conducted on
a related psychological phenomenon—self­esteem—­during the mid-20th century, it was
not until later that systematic studies of the
effects of self-­awareness per se were undertaken.
In 1972, Duval and Wicklund, a pair of
experimental social psychologists, published
a book that detailed their initial explorations in the effects of experimentally manipulated self-­awareness. Their conceptual
view drew in some respects on the history of
ideas outlined earlier, and in other respects
diverged from that history. Consistent with
the earlier writings, Duval and Wicklund assumed that when attention gravitated to the
52
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
self (or was induced to the self), the person
would become aware of salient standards
or values, and would be drawn to notice
any discrepancy between his or her present state and whatever standard was salient.
However, their view of the consequences of
becoming aware of such discrepancies was
also informed by another set of influences
from within social psychology during that
period.
Specifically, Duval and Wicklund (1972)
made use of a motivational principle that
had become common in social psychology in
the 1950s and 1960s, deriving from the earlier work of Hull (1943) and Spence (1956).
This principle was that behavior and cognitive processes follow from aversive motivational drive states. Following dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957) and reactance
theory (Brehm, 1966), both of which used
the drive principle, Duval and Wicklund’s
self-­awareness theory postulated that the
awareness of a discrepancy between one’s
present state or behavior and a salient standard would create an aversive drive. People
in such a situation would be motivated to
avoid self-­awareness; if they could not avoid
self-­awareness, they would be motivated to
try to reduce the discrepancy, thus reducing
the drive state.
This motive principle was consistent with
the idea from James and Mead that failing
to conform to a salient aspiration or social
value would lead to negative self-­evaluation.
Wicklund (1975) later added the idea that if
the person was at or above the salient standard, the result could instead be positive
self-­evaluation, again consistent with the
ideas of James and Mead.
A large number of studies make the case
that self-focus causes closer conformity to
salient standards. Increasing self-focus has
caused effects as diverse as the following:
Students conformed more closely to an instruction to work fast on a clerical task
(Wicklund & Duval, 1971); students conformed more to their personal attitudes
about punishment when those attitudes had
been made salient (Carver, 1975) and rated
erotica more consistently with their own
standards (Gibbons, 1978); people opposed
to stereotyping restrained themselves from
doing so, whereas those who condoned it
stereotyped even more (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998); men conformed
more to an implicit social standard of “chivalry” when giving punishment to a woman
(Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974); students
allocating group earnings responded more
to equity and equality norms when each was
salient (Greenberg, 1980; Kernis & Reis,
1984).
Two points should be emphasized about
these studies: First, in all cases, self-­focused
attention caused participants to conform
more closely to the standard that was salient
as being appropriate in that situation. Second, this effect of self-focus is an influence
on a process, not a direct effect on the content of behavior. That is, being self-aware
can make you less punitive if the salient
standard is to be so (Scheier et al., 1974),
but it can also make you more punitive if the
standard calls for it (Carver, 1974, 1975).
The content of behavior when self-focus is
high depends on the reference value. People
often can easily plug in one standard or another, and the effect of self-focus on overt
action changes correspondingly.
Attribution
Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) use of the concept of standards of comparison had great
conceptual resonance with the ideas of James
and Mead. However, Duval and Wicklund
also added another principle, based partly on
ideas from Heider (1944). This idea, which
would prove to be important later in the self­awareness literature, was that self-­focused
attention would make the self more prominent as a causal agent. To the extent that the
self was prominent as a causal agent, the self
would receive proportionally greater causal
attribution regarding events in which it was
involved. That is, the self would be blamed
or credited with the outcomes of those events
to a greater degree when attention was self­directed than when it was not.
To test this, Duval and Wicklund (1973)
had participants make causal attributions
for hypothetical outcomes in states of high
or lower self-­awareness. Greater attributions
to the self were made when attention was
self-­directed. Using a variety of paradigms,
this general finding has been replicated repeatedly, showing that self-aware persons
ascribe greater responsibility to themselves
for various kinds of events, including the
plights of other people (e.g., Arkin & Duval,
3. Self-­Awareness
1975; Duval, Duval, & Neely, 1979; see also
Carver & Scheier, 1981, pp. 102–103).
Additional Contributors Suggest
Further Principles
The early work by Duval and Wicklund
(1972) attracted a good deal of interest from
others in personality and social psychology.
As is often the case, this interest eventually
resulted in new hypotheses and several differences of opinion. These differences of
opinion helped to channel subsequent research in several directions. They also led
to conceptualizations of self-­awareness and
its consequences that had very different
metatheoretical underpinnings.
Salience of Various Self Elements
One idea that was soon added stemmed
fairly directly from intuition, although it
also seems to be implied by the attributional
principle just discussed. The idea was that
whatever aspect of the self was salient at the
moment attention was self-­directed would
have a disproportionate influence on the
person’s subsequent subjective experience
and behavioral response (e.g., Buss, 1980).
Sometimes a behavioral standard is what is
salient; other times the self as a causal agent
is what is salient; sometimes yet other aspects of the self are salient.
For example, the physical self constantly
generates internal stimuli—­emotions, aches
and pains, sensations of hunger, daydreams.
If one of those internal stimuli is salient, perhaps self-­focused attention would selectively
pick that stimulus out, and it would seem
subjectively more intense or more prominent than it otherwise would. If so, perhaps
it would influence behavior more than it
otherwise would. This “salience of self” hypothesis led to many studies.
Scheier and Carver (1977) used this idea
to predict that affective experience would
feel more intense when attention was self­focused than when it was not. They induced an affective state, then increased self­awareness. When participants were then
asked to report their feelings, they reported
feelings of greater intensity than did those
who were less self-aware. Similarly, Phillips and Silvia (2005) later found that self-
53
a­ wareness increased the intensity of negative
emotions reported by persons who had relatively high discrepancies between their aspirations and their current state.
Scheier (1976) also used this line of thought
to predict that greater awareness of an affect would make the person more responsive
behaviorally to the affect. He generated a
state of anger in some participants through
a staged provocation, then gave them an opportunity to retaliate against the person who
had provoked them. Participants who were
higher in self-focus reported more anger and
were also more aggressive than those who
were lower in self-focus.
Another derivation from this line of
thought turned it on its head. What would
happen if a person was led to expect an internal event, but the event failed to occur?
What would self-focus do in such a case?
The hypothesis was posed that the selfaware state in this case would make the person more aware of the absence of the anticipated sensation.
This hypothesis was confirmed in several
studies. In one of them (Gibbons, Carver,
Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979) participants
were led to expect that a powder they ingested (actually a placebo, which had no effect) would produce symptoms of physical
arousal—­sweaty palms, racing heart, and
so forth. After an intervening task, the participants were asked to make ratings of their
symptom levels. Those lower in self-focus
reported the anticipated symptoms. Those
with higher self-focus reported (correctly)
that they were not experiencing symptoms.
Ancillary data indicated that the self-aware
participants had engaged in a search for
the specific symptoms they had been led to
expect, revealing the absence of the sensations.
These findings were conceptually replicated in further studies focusing on other kinds
of suggestibility phenomena. In one such
study (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979,
Study 1), male undergraduates were shown
slides of nude women, chosen as moderately
attractive. An offhanded remark prior to the
viewing of the slides suggested to the participant that previous viewers had found them
to be either extremely attractive or extremely unattractive. This remark had a strong influence on the ratings that participants later
made of the women in the slides. However,
54
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
the impact was less among self-aware participants, whose ratings were in the intermediate range of attractiveness.
Self‑Knowledge from Recurrent
Self‑Focus
Nasby (1985, 1989a, 1989b) suggested what
appears to be a longer-term consequence of
having spent a good deal of time focusing
on the self. Rather than examine momentary
effects of directing attention to the self, he
considered the effects of self-focus that may
build up over many repeated instances, or
perhaps follow from a tendency to probe
more deeply over time.
This might be a good place to point out
that the term self-­awareness has different
connotations in different contexts. The research literature under discussion uses it in
a way that differs a bit from its meaning in
other contexts (and perhaps differs from the
meaning that comes most readily to your own
mind). The term self-­awareness as used here
does not typically imply a prolonged or penetrating self-­examination or self-­absorption.
Nor does it usually connote self-­knowledge
beyond the ordinary. Attention is the selective processing of particular aspects of the
informational field available, with some information being more fully processed than
other information. Self-­awareness in this
literature is usually regarded as self-­focused
attention, selective processing of information about the self.
Nasby pointed out, however, that selective processing of self-­knowledge is a process
that also lies behind the development of the
self-­concept. He further argued that people
who spend a good deal of their time engaged
in that kind of selective processing naturally
develop a view of themselves that is more
elaborated and more firmly anchored than
do other people. He has also found evidence
consistent with this view (see also Hjelle &
Bernard, 1994). In a similar vein, Turner
(1978) found that people who tend to think
about themselves process self-­relevant information more quickly than people who think
about themselves less. Specifically, they are
quicker to decide whether trait terms apply
to them or not.
In a way, the idea discussed here follows
fairly directly from the logic behind the salience of self findings just described. That is,
if one pores over the information one has
about oneself, whether from repeated subjective experience or from more consolidated stores of information, one gains a clearer
and more internally consistent view of the
subject one is viewing.
Indeed, self-­awareness may also enhance
people’s ability to access such information
about themselves from memory. Gibbons
and colleagues (1985) asked persons with
clinical disorders to report on aspects of
their health problems. Self-focus led to more
accurate self-­reports of their hospitalization
history, as compared against hospital records and staff judgments.
Self‑Awareness and Selective Processing
of Self‑Related Information
The notion that self-­awareness is involved
in the processing of personally relevant information was also proposed by Hull and
Levy (1979). Their view is very different
in at least one important respect from the
self-­awareness model of Duval and Wicklund (1972) and from other models to follow. Specifically, Hull and Levy argued that
self-­awareness is not a matter of attentional
focus at all; rather, it is a matter of selective
processing and encoding of certain aspects of
the information that the person has brought
in from the environment. In this view, when
people are self-­focused, they are selectively
encoding information that pertains to the
self. This selective encoding renders the person especially sensitive to aspects of the environment that are potentially self-­relevant.
Hull and Levy (1979) used a series of laboratory tasks to examine predictions from
their model. One of these was an incidental
encoding paradigm, in which people are presented with a series of descriptive words and
asked to answer different questions about
different words. Later there is a surprise recall task, in which the people are to remember the words they had been presented. A
common finding is that being asked whether
a word applies to oneself makes it more likely to be recalled. Hull and Levy found that
people who tend to think about themselves
a lot are especially prone to such incidental
encoding of the self-­relevance of personality
traits.
In another study, Hull and Levy (1979)
found that self-­awareness results in more
3. Self-­Awareness
self-blame for hypothetical bad outcomes,
but only if the judgment was made publicly. Presumably self-focus in the private­judgment condition sensitized participants
to the issue of self-­esteem protection. In
contrast, self-focus in the public-­judgment
condition sensitized them to implications for
their social image and other people’s reactions to them.
Other Principles Concerning
Matching to Standard
In many ways, the most interesting of the
initial self-­awareness effects was the behavioral conformity to salient standards of behavior. Duval and Wicklund (1972) viewed
these effects in terms of a drive reduction
process. A different interpretation of those
effects was offered a few years later (Carver,
1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981). This alternative view placed the self-­awareness effect
within the framework of a very different
motivational dynamic than the one assumed
by Duval and Wicklund (1972).
Specifically, this view treated self­awareness-­induced conformity to salient
standards as an instance of the operation of
a discrepancy-­reducing cybernetic feedback
loop. Discrepancy-­reducing feedback processes had already been used for some time
as a depiction of a class of self-­regulatory dynamics in both artificial and living systems
(MacKay, 1956; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Wiener, 1948).
Carver and Scheier adopted that construct
and applied it to the discrepancy-­reducing
consequence of self-­awareness.
Cybernetics and Discrepancy‑Reducing
Feedback Processes
The elements of a discrepancy-­reducing
feedback loop (whether in a living or artificial system) are a reference value (or set
point, or goal), a perceptual input channel,
a “comparator” that checks the fit between
reference and input, and an output channel
that serves to change present conditions in a
way that induces closer conformity between
reference and input. In a homeostatic physiological system the loop serves to counter
disruptive influences from outside the system, keeping some quality stable (e.g., body
55
temperature, heart rate). In a more dynamic
system, the reference value is a moving target, and the feedback process tracks that
moving target. For example, when a person
engages in strenuous physical activity, the
reference value for heart rate goes up, and
the physiological system activating the heart
keeps the actual rate higher than it otherwise would. When the activity ceases, the
reference rate falls.
What makes the motivational dynamic of
this model different from that of the drive
theory model is that this one does not assume
an aversive drive state behind the regulatory
processes. Rather, feedback loops are seen
as naturally occurring self-­regulatory organizations within living systems. They keep
sensed values within relatively constrained
ranges in the natural course of events, operating fairly automatically. Adopting this
view with respect to consciously mediated
human behavior raises a number of questions, of course, including (but not limited
to) whether this view dispenses with the concept of “will” (Ryan & Deci, 1999).
Carver and Scheier (1981; Carver, 1979)
found this view on self-­awareness processes
compelling in part because many of the elements of self-­awareness theory line up neatly
against those of the feedback loop. Duval and
Wicklund (1972) had said that self-­awareness
induces a tendency to compare one’s present
behavior or state against whatever standard
of comparison is salient in the situation (a
tendency that was verified by Scheier and
Carver, 1983). This is exactly what happens
in the comparator function of a feedback
loop. Duval and Wicklund also had allowed
for the possibility that the awareness of a
discrepancy between present condition and
standard would lead to a behavioral effort to
reduce the discrepancy. That discrepancy reduction process is the function of a feedback
loop taken as a whole.
Indeed, the idea that this construct could
be applied to the experience of self-­awareness
turns out not to have been so new after all.
MacKay had foreshadowed this interpretation of self-­awareness effects as feedback
processes in 1963. He wrote then (p. 227)
that “an artifact capable of receiving and
acting on information about the state of
its own body can begin to parallel many of
the modes of activity we associate with self­consciousness.”
56
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Carver and Scheier (1981) joined this view
of self-­awareness with ideas from other places (e.g., Powers, 1973) to argue for the existence of a hierarchical assembly of feedback
loops (see also Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
The hierarchical organization accounts for
how concrete physical motions take place in
response to the relatively abstract intention
to act. This view is addressed in more detail
a little later in the chapter.
Discrepancy‑Enlarging
Feedback Processes
The idea that self-­awareness engages a feedback loop also suggested another hypothesis. Specifically, although the discrepancy­reducing loop is the most common sort of
feedback process, it is not the only one.
There also exist discrepancy-­enlarging feedback processes (DeAngelis, Post, & Travis,
1986; Maruyama, 1963; McFarland, 1971;
Shibutani, 1961). These loops act to create
and increase a discrepancy between a sensed
condition and a reference value.
Several studies have been conducted to
determine whether there are conditions
under which self-focus would produce this
discrepancy-­enlarging effect rather than the
discrepancy-­reducing effect. One of them
made use of a phenomenon known as a
negative reference group, a group to which
people compare themselves, for the purpose
of maintaining and even emphasizing differences. A negative reference group is a group
you want not to resemble. The easiest example is the tendency of many adolescents
to treat their parents as a group to diverge
from, in every possible way. Behavior that
manifests a contrary quality thus helps the
adolescent differ from the standard of the
parents.
Carver and Humphries (1981) used this
idea to test the possibility that self-focus
would enhance a discrepancy-­enlarging
tendency. They chose a group of participants who had a readily identifiable negative
reference group: Cuban American college
students. These students raised in an exile
community had been taught all their lives
to treat the Castro government in Cuba as a
negative reference group. They were given a
set of policy statements, ostensibly from the
Castro government. They then were asked to
report their own opinion on the issue of each
policy statement. Those who were higher in
self-focus made reports that deviated more
from those of the negative reference group
than did those who were lower in self-focus.
Several further studies examined reactance phenomena. Reactance occurs when a
person feels pressured to believe something
or do something—when the perceived freedom of choice is being infringed on (Brehm,
1966). Of most importance at present is the
fact that the typical response to reactance is
to behave contrarily—to do the opposite of
what one is being pressured to do. This looks
very much like a discrepancy-­enlarging process, and it turns out that this process is
also enhanced by higher levels of self-focus
(Carver & Scheier, 1981, pp. 157–162).
Carver and Scheier (1998) argued more
recently that discrepancy-­reducing and
-enlarging processes are also manifest in
two kinds of social comparison phenomena (Buunk & Gibbons, 1997; Helgeson &
Taylor, 1993; Wood, 1989, 1996). Social
comparison sometimes involves comparing
oneself to someone who is better off than
oneself (upward comparison); other times it
involves comparing oneself to someone who
is worse off than oneself (downward comparison). Carver and Scheier (1998) suggested that when people do upward comparison,
their main reason for doing so is to use the
point of comparison as a positive reference
value. It provides something to shoot for,
something positive to become. When people do downward comparison, in contrast,
the main reason is to push themselves away
from those negative values. They actively try
not to become like the persons to whom they
are comparing themselves.
Role of Expectancies
Another theoretical derivation in the developing literature of self-­awareness stemmed
from the fact that the Carver and Scheier
model did not assume a negative emotional
response to self-­awareness when there was
a discrepancy between self and standard.
This assumption in the Duval and Wicklund
model raised a number of questions.
One very obvious question concerned the
fact that Duval and Wicklund (1972) had
posited two potential responses to the aversiveness of self-focus. Indeed, their view was
3. Self-­Awareness
that behavioral discrepancy reduction was
not even first in line. First would be an attempt to avoid self-­awareness, if this could
be done. Since Carver and Scheier did not
assume an aversive drive state, they did not
expect an attempt to avoid self-focus to
dominate. Indeed, they argued that such a
response would occur only under certain
fairly specific conditions.
Several studies during that period seemed
to support that idea. For example, Steenbarger and Aderman (1979) pointed out
that in previous work the experimentally
created discrepancies that led to avoidance
were always inflexible. That is, the discrepancies were fixed because of some aspect of
the situation faced by the participants. With
no opportunity to do anything about reducing them, they avoided facing them. Steenbarger and Aderman argued that this might
not occur if participants thought they could
do something to reduce the discrepancy.
They set up a situation in which that possibility was made salient for some of the participants. Self-focus proved to be aversive—
and led to avoidance—only among those in
whom the discrepancy was set up to be irreducible. If the discrepancy was potentially
reducible, these effects did not occur.
At about the same time, Carver and Scheier
had the idea that which of the two responses
would be made to self-­awareness depended
on people’s expectancies of being able to reduce the discrepancy. If people expect to be
successful, they strive to reach their goals,
even if that involves a struggle. If people expect to fail, they experience a tendency to
disengage effort, and sometimes even to disengage from the goal itself. This depiction fit
the pattern that had emerged from the work
just described.
It also had a considerable resonance with
other ideas appearing in other literatures
during that period. For example, Wortman
and Brehm (1975) had devised an integration between reactance and helplessness
theories. This proposed integration rested
on the idea that reactance (which is sometimes expressed as renewed efforts to attain
a goal) occurs when the person feels able to
reach the goal, whereas helplessness (which
is expressed as abandoning effort) occurs
when the person feels unable to succeed. In
the same vein, Carver and Scheier (1981)
came to refer to the avoidance response not
57
as an avoidance of self-­awareness but rather
as a disengagement of effort from action directed at attaining that particular goal (see
also Klinger, 1975).
Several further studies provided support
for this line of reasoning (reviewed in Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). In one study,
participants who reported being moderately
afraid of snakes were asked to approach and
pick up a live snake. These persons had all
reported the same level of fear but slightly
differing levels of confidence about being
able to execute the behavior. Self-focus interacted with confidence, such that persons
higher in confidence reacted to self-focus by
intensifying their efforts, whereas persons
lower in confidence quit the attempt sooner.
Another study created a discrepancy by
a manipulation in which all persons performed poorly at an initial task said to reflect intelligence. Expectancies of being able
to do better on a second task (also related to
intelligence) were then manipulated, and the
participants attempted the second task. The
second task, however, was actually a measure of persistence. The item that participants attempted first was impossible to solve
correctly, and the question was who would
try hardest (longest). Again self-focus interacted with expectancies, causing greater
persistence among those led to be confident,
and lower persistence among those led to be
doubtful.
More recent work appears to show that
responses to self-focus depend partly on the
size of the discrepancy being confronted.
Duval, Duval, and Mulilis (1992) conceptually replicated the pattern just described for
persistence but added that qualifier. In their
studies, self-focus led to enhanced persistence among those who had been led to perceive themselves as able to close a relatively
small discrepancy between present condition
and standard of comparison. But among
those with very large discrepancies, even the
perception of constant movement toward the
goal did not lead to persistence under selffocus. Only when the rate of progress was
adequate—­relative to the discrepancy—did
the facilitation occur.
There is also evidence that self-focus enhances task-­focused effort (as reflected in
blood pressure change), but only under certain conditions (Gendolla, Richter, & Silvia,
58
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
2008). The task had to be demanding, but
not outrageously demanding. There was no
increased effort in this research if the task
was too easy, and there was no increase if
the task was seen as impossible.
Affect
As described earlier, the Carver–­Scheier view
on self-­awareness effects did not include an
assumption about aversive drive states. Yet it
is clear that people do sometimes have negative affect when experiencing self-­awareness.
As also noted earlier, this was most likely
when the discrepancy between state and
standard was relatively fixed—when there
was doubt about being able to move forward. Further thought about these issues led
to conceptual development in another direction that deserves brief mention, although
it takes us away from the self-­awareness
literature per se. This development comes
from further thought about the feedback
construct, taken together with the pattern of
findings about conditions under which self­awareness leads to negative feelings. The
result is a theory about the source of affect
(valence) in emotional experience (Carver &
Scheier, 1990, 1998, Chaps. 8–9).
The essence of the theory is the argument
that a feedback loop different from the one
already discussed monitors the effectiveness over time of movement toward incentives (and, separately, movement away from
threats). An analogy may help this make
sense. The feedback loop discussed earlier in
the chapter (which controls behavior) manages a psychological quality analogous to
the physical quality of distance. In effect,
the feedback loop that relates to affect controls a psychological quality analogous to
velocity—­distance over time.
This second feedback system is assumed
to compare a signal corresponding to rate of
progress against a reference rate. Discrepancies noticed by this system are manifest subjectively as affect. If the rate of progress is
too low, negative affect arises. If the rate is
just acceptable, but no more, there is no affect. If the rate exceeds the criterion, positive
affect arises. In essence, the argument is that
positive feelings mean that one is doing better than one needs to, and negative feelings
mean one is doing worse than one needs to
(for broader discussion and a review of evi-
dence, see Carver & Scheier, 1998, Chaps.
8 and 9).
This line of thought is consistent with the
finding that self-focus is aversive when the
behavioral discrepancy cannot be reduced,
but not when the discrepancy can be reduced. That is, given the desire to reduce a
discrepancy that is unchanging, velocity is
zero, which is guaranteed to be below the
criterion rate, thus yielding negative affect.
This line of thought goes further than the
previously discussed findings, however. It
holds that even moving forward in discrepancy reduction will be associated with negative feelings if progress is too slow. Carver
and Scheier (1998) expanded this notion into
a more general view of how feelings come to
exist, and what their functions are.
Aspects of Self
Another theoretical contribution to the
self-­awareness domain took the literature
in a very different direction, although this
direction also had several precedents in the
history of ideas on this topic. This contribution came about as a side consequence of
the effort to create an analogue in individual
differences to the experimental variation of
self-­awareness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975). This effort resulted in a self-­report
measure called the Self-­Consciousness Scale,
which had subscales measuring tendencies
to be aware of two different aspects of the
self.
Public and Private Aspects of the Self
Private self-­consciousness is the tendency to
be cognizant of covert, personal aspects of
the self. Public self-­consciousness is the tendency to be cognizant of the self as a social
object. The subscales that measure these
tendencies are distinct, though usually positively correlated. Thus, a person can be high
in one tendency, or high in both—there is no
assumption that these two contents of awareness are opposites. This distinction echoed a
distinction made by James (1890) between
social and spiritual aspects of the self, and
a distinction by Wylie (1968) between social
and private aspects of the self.
A variety of studies soon examined these
differences between people (Carver &
3. Self-­Awareness
Scheier, 1985). Some studies also extended
the logic to experimental manipulations. The
latter studies make the case that some manipulations make people selectively aware of
private self-­aspects, whereas other manipulations make people selectively aware of public
self-­aspects (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
An example of the latter is a project in
which Froming, Walker, and Lopyan (1982)
selected people who reported having a personal attitude about the use of punishment
that either tended to oppose or to favor it,
and having a subjective norm (a belief about
what most people believe) that differed from
their own attitude. These people were later
placed into a situation where they had to
teach another person using punishments for
incorrect responses, but could freely choose
the level of punishment. Compared to a control condition, a manipulation believed to
direct attention preferentially to private self­aspects (a small mirror) caused behavior to
shift in the direction of the participant’s personal attitude. A manipulation believed to
direct attention preferentially to public self­aspects (an evaluative audience) caused behavior to shift toward the subjective norm.
As a general conclusion, awareness of different aspects of the self relates to salience of
different values: social and personal (Wiekens & Stapel, 2010). The public–­private distinction, taken together with ideas discussed
earlier concerning confidence and doubt,
is also embedded in models proposed for
specific domains of behavior. For example,
Schlenker and Leary (1982) suggested that
the deficits of socially anxious persons reflect doubts about their ability to attain desired self-­presentational goals. The effects of
such doubts are amplified by focusing attention on public aspects of the self—the self as
it is being displayed to others in the social
group.
Despite a wide adoption of the public–­
private distinction, there has been disagreement about its value. Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1987) argued (in part) that public
self-­awareness is not a valuable construct. To
them, taking a public pressure into account
in behaving could not be a self-­awareness
phenomenon because such a behavior does
not involve the self. This raises the question
of what the self consists of, a question that
is very interesting and complicated in its
own right (Leary, 2004). Carver and Scheier
59
(1987) replied to this argument that the self
is very much involved in such behaviors because it is the self that chooses to take into
account the social context and the preferences of others. Thus, self-­presentational
acts are attempts by the self to create certain
displays to other people, for the self’s own
reasons.
The idea that people can take into account
their own needs and desires, and the needs
and desires of a social group, at different
times (or in different cultures) has been used
by many theorists over the last two decades.
Carver and Scheier (1998, Chap. 7) reviewed
a variety of applications of those ideas.
Although the Self-­Consciousness Scale
has been useful as an individual-­differences
measure of self-focus, it blurs some important distinctions. Trapnell and Campbell
(1999) argued that two different motives underlie focus on the private self. One motive
is curiosity; the other is the mental probing
of negative feelings. On that basis they distinguished between what they called reflective and ruminative facets of private self­consciousness. Trapnell and Campbell found
(as have others) that items measuring private
self-­consciousness split into two subsets.
Both subsets relate to the trait of openness to
experience, but one also relates to neuroticism. The two item sets behaved differently
enough to cause Trapnell and Campbell to
develop their own measure of reflection and
rumination. The items of their scales are
aimed explicitly at those two tendencies: Rumination items use language about thinking
back, rethinking, and being unable to put
something behind oneself. Reflection items
use language about being fascinated, meditative, philosophical, and inquisitive.
The main point here is that both of these
newer scales reflect individual differences
in the awareness of some aspect of the self.
Thus, both are self-­consciousness measures,
though they differ from each other in a way
not captured by the measure of Fenigstein
and colleagues (1975). But their work makes
an even broader point: The experience of the
self has a very great deal of diversity. It is
possible to assess individual differences in
the tendency to focus on any particular one
of those experiences of the self. The number
of potential scales is endless. Perhaps in the
future more such differences will be revealed
to be important.
60
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Hierarchical Organization
In considering the various aspects of the self,
the discussion is starting to return to the
idea that the self is partly about the pursuit
of goals, the matching of actions to salient
standards. Let me turn now to another issue
that pertains to that idea.
Some goals are broader in scope than
others. How to think about the difference
in breadth can be hard to put your finger
on. Sometimes it’s a difference in the time
involved in the action. That is, some goals
(getting a college degree) take a long time;
other goals (mowing the lawn) take a short
time. Often the difference in breadth is more
than a matter of time. It’s a difference in the
goal’s level of abstraction. For example, the
goal of following instructions for doing a
task is fairly concrete; the goal of living up
to your potential as a human being is more
abstract.
In a 1973 book, William Powers argued
that a hierarchical organization of feedback
loops underlies the self-­regulation of behavior. Since feedback loops imply goals, this
argument also constituted a model of hierarchical structuring among the goals used
in acting. His general line of thinking ran
as follows: In a hierarchical organization of
feedback systems, the output of a high-level
system consists of the resetting of reference
values at the next lower level of abstraction.
To put it differently, higher-order or superordinate systems “behave” by providing goals
to the systems just below them (see also the
action identification theory of Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987).
The values specified as behavioral outputs
become more concrete and restricted as one
moves from higher to lower levels of the hierarchy. Control at each level reflects regulation of a quality that contributes to the quality controlled at the next higher level. Each
level monitors input at a level of abstraction
that’s appropriate to its own functioning,
and each level adjusts output so as to minimize discrepancies at that level.
Powers focused mostly on low levels of
abstraction, saying less about the levels that
are of most interest to personality and social
psychologists, other than to suggest labels
for several levels whose existence makes intuitive sense. Sequences are strings of acts
that run off directly once cued. Programs are
activities that require conscious decisions at
various points. Principles are qualities that
are abstracted from (or implemented by) programs. These are qualities at the level of abstraction of traits or personal values. Powers
gave the not-very-­euphonious name system
concepts to the highest level he considered,
but goal representations at this level reduce
essentially to the idealized overall sense of
self, relationship, or group identity.
A simple way of portraying this hierarchy
is illustrated in Figure 3.1. This diagram
omits the loops of feedback processes, using
lines to indicate only links among goal values. The lines imply that moving toward a
particular lower-level goal contributes to
the attainment of some higher-level goal (or
even several at once). Multiple lines leading
to a given goal indicate that several lowerlevel action qualities can contribute to its
attainment. As indicated previously, there
are goals to “be” a particular way and goals
to “do” certain things (and at lower levels,
goals to create physical movement).
Another point made by the notion of hierarchical organization concerns the fact that
goals are not equivalent in importance. The
higher one goes into the organization, the
more fundamental into the overriding sense
of self are the qualities encountered. Thus,
in general, goal qualities at higher levels are
intrinsically more important than those at
lower levels.
An issue raised in the preceding section is
what the self comprises. It was raised there
with regard to the question of whether the
self is involved in self-­presentational phenomena or conformity to social pressures.
My own opinion (noted there) is that some
goals of the self are explicitly goals for self­presentation and impression management.
These goals fall under principles that involve
taking others’ opinions into account. Other
goals take others into account less. These fall
under different sorts of orienting principles.
A question that’s interesting to pose but
hard to answer is how many layers of a
person’s goals should be considered to fall
under the label self? Most would certainly
agree that the ideal self belongs under that
label. The broad idealized sense of self readily translates into principles of conduct, and
it seems likely that most people would agree
that one’s guiding principles are also elements of the self.
3. Self-­Awareness
61
System concepts
Ideal
self
“Be”
goals
Principles
Programs
Sequences
Be
thoughtful
Prepare
dinner
Slice
broccoli
“Do”
goals
Motor
control
goals
FIGURE 3.1. A hierarchy of goals (or of feedback loops) within the self. Lines indicate the contribution of lower-level goals to specific higher-level goals. They can also be read in the opposite direction,
indicating that a given higher-order goal specifies more-­concrete goals at the next lower level. The
hierarchy described in text involves goals of “being” particular ways, which are attained by “doing”
particular actions. From Carver and Scheier (1998). Copyright 1998 by Cambridge University Press.
Reprinted by permission.
But where are the limits? How far down
the hierarchy of goals can you go and have
it still be sensible to think about the goals
as part of the self? Are the goals that define
programs of action part of the self? Certainly each person individualizes the pattern
of goals that makes up even such a common activity as doing the laundry or taking
a holiday trip. Furthermore, people differ
from one another in terms of the programs
in which they engage. But does that make
these goal structures part of the self? I see no
clear answer to this question.
There is some precedent, though, for
equating a reduction in self-focus (e.g., via
alcohol use; Hull, 1981) with suspension
of self-­regulation at the principle level and
higher, and sometimes even at the program
level. Does this mean there is no self at lower
levels? The answer may be a matter of definition. The sequences programmed into
people’s repertoires differ from one person
to another, implying a distinctiveness that
may connote selfhood. On the other hand,
these bits of information are so concrete and
minimal that it may not be useful to think of
them as elements of the self.
The discussion of how many of these layers constitute the self also raises another
question, related but different: Are all these
layers of the hierarchy involved in behavior
all the time? No. There appear to be many
times in life when people mindlessly engage
in sequences of action or programs of behavior, with little or no regard to whether these
actions conform to particular principles or
the ideal self. Indeed, it is arguable that the
sense of the ideal self comes into play relatively infrequently in most people’s lives. This
view is reflected in a plethora of dual-­process
theories that have arisen in psychology over
the past decade or more (for an overview,
see Carver, Johnson, & Joormann, 2008).
Such theories suggest that behavior is often
managed by lower levels of the hierarchy of
control, with no involvement of deliberative
processes.
To put it a different way, it appears that
the upper levels of control come into play as
influences on behavior only when the per-
62
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
son focuses on them. In contrast, whenever
behavior is being called for, all levels lower
than the one being focused on are presumably engaged.
Recent Directions
The self-­awareness area has enjoyed something of a resurgence of research interest in
the recent past. Duval and Silvia and their
colleagues (Duval, Silvia, & Lalwani, 2001;
Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia & Gendolla,
2001) have raised a number of questions regarding the prior literature of self-­awareness
effects. They have also argued that some of
the principles introduced early in the developing literature have greater importance
than is commonly realized.
Salience of the Self
One of the questions raised by Silvia and
Gendolla (2001) concerns a set of findings
described earlier in this chapter in the context of “salience of self” effects. That is,
several studies seemed to indicate that self­focused attention causes an increase in the
subjective intensity of internal sensations.
Furthermore, self-­focused attention appeared to enhance awareness of the absence
of sensations that the person expected to
occur but which actually were not present.
Silvia and Gendolla argue that these effects
actually are something else: that they are attempts to behave in line with salient standards, to increase consistency among aspects
of the self. In their view, in situations where
self-focus led people to report judgments of
more intense affect, the participants in the
research were conforming to a standard favoring emotional expression.
In an intriguing set of studies (reviewed
in Silvia & Gendolla, 2001), Silvia induced
affect along with a variety of different sorts
of situational and personal cues (in different
studies), thereby making different kinds of
standards salient. In general, he found that
when standards emphasizing the appropriateness of feeling and expressing emotions
were salient, self-focus led to reports of
stronger emotions. When standards emphasizing the inhibition of emotions were salient, self-focus led to reports of less emotion
(or had no influence on reports of emotion).
What of the findings that self-focus reduces suggestibility effects? Silvia and Gendolla
(2001) interpreted these effects as also reflecting the principle of conformity. Rather
than conformity to a behavioral standard,
though, these effects are said to reflect
conformity—­consistency—­within the self.
Silvia and Gendolla argued that participants
in these studies all knew the information
they had been given was incorrect, but that
only the self-aware participants were motivated to point it out. Being self-aware, they
were motivated by the desire for consistency
between internal experience and the judgments they made. Again, then, the findings
can be interpreted in terms of matching an
aspect of behavior to a standard, in this case
an internal reference value (the perception).
Although the Silvia and Gendolla article
is interesting, it is also somewhat misleading in one respect. Specifically, throughout
the article, they refer to a perceptual “accuracy” hypothesis: that self-focus makes
people more accurate in their perceptions.
However, the studies under discussion more
typically focused on the subjective intensity
of the experience rather than accuracy per se
(an exception being Gibbons, 1983).
My interpretation of the earlier work has
been that self-focus in that context expands
the mental image of the focal region of a
dimension of experience, much as a thumbnail image on a website expands to a larger
size when clicked. This does not necessarily argue for greater accuracy, however. Instead, what results may be a sharper view of
a more limited region of experience (looking very closely at 1 inch instead of an entire foot). The person looking at the larger
subjective image (e.g., presence of affect)
may exaggerate what is there rather than be
more accurate about it. The person looking
at a small subjective image (e.g., absence of
arousal) may exaggerate how little of the
experience there is. This issue renders some
of the points made by Silvia and Gendolla
less compelling, though other points are well
taken.
Throughout these recent accounts of
self-­awareness phenomena threads the idea
that self-­awareness effects are more about
cognitive consistency than about anything
else (Duval & Duval, 1983; Duval et al.,
2001; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). Thus, those authors interpret
3. Self-­Awareness
many other findings in terms of the consistency principle. For example, Duval and
Silvia (2002) told people they had passed
or failed on a cognitive task, under conditions of higher or lower self-focus. Manipulation checks showed that the groups were
equivalently aware of having met or failed
to meet the standard. However, only the
more self-­focused group made defensive attributions for the failure and showed loss of
self-­esteem. The researchers concluded that
it requires self-focus to engage the desire for
consistency, thus yielding such effects.
Attributions and Behavior
Another aspect of this more recent work on
self-­awareness is a renewed interest in the
attributional effects of self-­awareness. This
interest has, in part, taken the form of closer
scrutiny of the effects of situational constraints on the attributions made under high
self-focus (see Silvia & Gendolla, 2001).
For example, participants in some of this
research worked on mental rotation tasks,
which had been described as reflecting people’s ability at three-­dimensional problem
solving. In some studies, participants were
told their performance was substandard.
Half were led to believe that they could rapidly improve; the other half were told their
chance of improving was slim. Persons high
in self-focus made attributions for their failure that differed from those of control subjects in the following pattern: When they
expected to improve, they attributed failure
internally; when they expected to be unable to improve, they attributed the failure
externally. It appears from findings such as
these that self-­defensiveness in response to a
failure emerges when the chances of making
up for the failure are low, but not when the
chances are higher.
To account for findings of this sort, Duval
and Duval (1983) had argued for a confluence of the principles of attribution and consistency. They suggested that an internal attribution for the failure to meet a standard
prompts the matching-to-­standard process,
but this kind of attribution also creates a
problem for self-­esteem management. The
problem would be minimal if the failure
were easy to correct. However, it would be
far more troublesome if the failure were a
permanent one. In the latter case, the cost
63
of the permanent self-­discrepancy outweighs
any cost that might arise from making an
inaccurate attribution. Thus, in the case of
the permanent failure, the person is likely
to make a more external attribution under
self-focus. Several studies have produced
findings consistent with this reasoning (see
Silvia & Duval, 2001).
Another extension of this reasoning came
from Dana, Lalwani, and Duval (1997).
They argued that sometimes people shift
their behavior so it conforms to the standard,
and sometimes they shift the standard to be
more like their behavior. They told research
participants that they had failed to meet a
performance standard, then led them to
focus either on the standard itself or on their
performance. Among participants attending
to the standard, self-focus led them to derogate the standard and not try to improve
their performance in a subsequent task period. Among those attending to their performances, however, self-focus caused greater
efforts during the second task period, with
no derogation of the standard.
Duval and Lalwani (1999) proposed that
attributional processes underlie this difference between groups. The argument is that
focusing on the standard leads people to attribute the cause of the discrepancy to the
standard. Focusing on their own performance leads people to attribute the cause
of the discrepancy to themselves. Self-focus,
then, causes people to act on what they see
as the cause of the discrepancy. In the one
case, this means changing the standard; in
the other, it means changing their behavior.
Brain Functioning, Self‑Awareness,
and Self‑Regulation
A final topic I want to mention briefly, although I do not go into it deeply, is a body of
brain research that bears on some of the processes described in this chapter. It has been
argued for some time that the prefrontal cortex controls phenomena that are captured by
the term self-­awareness (e.g., Stuss & Alexander, 2000; Stuss, Alexander, & Benson,
1997). Much of this argument until recently
has rested on studies of persons with frontal
lobe damage. Stuss and his colleagues now
argue that the frontal cortex has three categories of function: energization, task setting,
and monitoring (e.g., Stuss & Alexander,
64
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
2007). These functions, which are handled
by different areas of the frontal lobes, come
together to form broader executive functions.
There is also a literature on the function
known by others as conflict monitoring or
error monitoring. For example, in one study,
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, and Donchin
(1993) had people perform a long series
of simple choices while electroencephalographic (EEG) data were recorded to assess
aspects of their brain activity. Of particular interest was what occurred on trials on
which subjects made errors. The errors were
related to a particular pattern in the EEG,
which indicated that a brain mechanism was
noting the error even as it was being made.
Furthermore, this pattern also predicted
several measures implying attempts at error
correction. Taken together, the data suggest
the existence of a brain system that detects
errors and attempts to compensate for them.
Since that time, a great deal of additional effort has been expended to understand better
how, and where, the brain monitors and corrects errors (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Schultz, 2006;
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). Monitoring and correcting of errors, of course,
is essentially the discrepancy-­noting and
-reducing function that follows from self­focused attention.
Indeed, the proliferation of new techniques to monitor brain function while research participants are engaged in various
kinds of tasks has led to a surge of interest in
brain activity under various conditions. Research is attempting to determine what brain
regions are especially active in the course of
particular kinds of information processing.
It is hoped that this, in turn, will shed light
on how various aspects of information processing differ.
Several neuroimaging studies have now
shown that cortical structures, including the
medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, are active during tasks such
as self-­reflection, self-­referential encoding,
and judgments of one’s own traits (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley,
2004). These regions also tend to be activated more during retrieval of autobiographical
memories compared to other types of memory (for a review, see Cabeza & St. Jacques,
2007). There is even evidence that different
areas of the brain are more active when one
is thinking about the independent self than
when thinking about interdependent aspects
of self (Sui & Han, 2007).
Although these links between neuropsychology and social–­personality psychology
are tenuous as yet, they are also exciting.
They suggest that in work such as this there
may emerge a better understanding of the
physiological mechanisms within which the
phenomena described in this chapter take
place.
Concluding Comment
This chapter has reviewed a variety of
ideas and research about the effects of self­awareness on people’s subjective experience
and on ongoing behavior. The sources of this
work have ranged from the 19th to the 21st
centuries. The ideas themselves have ranged
in their nature from drive theories to cybernetic theories.
One theme that has run fairly strongly
through the literature of ideas on this topic
is the principle of attaining consistency between elements of the self, and between the
self and the actions in which it engages. The
human mind appears to have a mechanism
that operates to compare mental elements
to each other (self and experience, goal and
behavior) and bring them into greater consistency, if that can be done without too
much difficulty. If it cannot be done fairly
easily, other things may happen: perhaps an
avoidance of further consideration of the elements, or perhaps even an effort to move the
elements farther from each other, as though
to place them in different parts of the mental organization of the self. Whether this
reflects an internal drive state or whether it
is a natural consequence of the way living
systems are organized remains a matter of
debate.
Although this chapter is finished, it is very
unlikely that the final chapter on this topic
has been written. Research on the consequences of self-­awareness is alive and well,
and theoretical models of how the effects
emerge continue to evolve and grow. As is
true of all literatures that concern the self,
the topic is one that is complex and deep.
With much more to be known, there will
3. Self-­Awareness
also be much more for future authors to
chronicle.
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported by
grants from the National Cancer Institute (No.
CA64710) and the National Science Foundation
(No. BCS0544617).
References
Arkin, R., & Duval, S. (1975). Focus of attention
and causal attributions of actors and observers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 427–438.
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M.,
Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). Conflict
monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108, 624–652.
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory of psychological
reactance. New York: Academic Press.
Buss, A. H. (1980). Self-­consciousness and society anxiety. San Francisco: Freeman.
Buunk, B. P., & Gibbons, F. X. (Eds.). (1997).
Health, coping, and well-being: Perspectives
from social comparison theory. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Cabeza, R., & St. Jacques, P. (2007). Functional
neuroimaging of autobiographical memory.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 219–227.
Carver, C. S. (1974). Facilitation of physical aggression through objective self-­awareness.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
10, 365–370.
Carver, C. S. (1975). Physical aggression as a
function of objective self awareness and attitudes toward punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 510–519.
Carver, C. S. (1979). A cybernetic model of self­attention processes. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 37, 1251–1281.
Carver, C. S., & Humphries, C. (1981). Havana
daydreaming: A study of self-­consciousness
and the negative reference group among Cuban
Americans. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 40, 545–552.
Carver, C. S., Johnson, S. L., & Joormann, J.
(2008). Serotonergic function, two-mode
models of self-­regulation, and vulnerability to
depression: What depression has in common
with impulsive aggression. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 912–943.
65
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-­regulation: A control-­theory
approach to human behavior. New York:
Springer-­Verlag.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1985). Aspects of self, and the control of behavior. In
B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life
(pp. 146–174). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1987). The blind
men and the elephant: Selective examination
of the public–­private literature gives rise to a
faulty perception. Journal of Personality, 55,
525–541
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins
and functions of positive and negative affect:
A control-­process view. Psychological Review,
97, 19–35.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the
self-­regulation of behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner’s.
Dana, E. R., Lalwani, N., & Duval, T. S. (1997).
Objective self-­awareness and focus of attention
following awareness of self-­standard discrepancies: Changing self or changing standards
of correctness. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 16, 359–380.
DeAngelis, D. L., Post, W. M., & Travis, C. C.
(1986). Positive feedback in natural systems
(Biomathematics Series, Vol. 15). Berlin:
Springer-­Verlag.
Duval, S., Duval, V. H., & Neely, R. (1979). Selffocus, felt responsibility, and helping behavior.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
37, 1769–1778.
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory
of objective self-­awareness. New York: Academic Press.
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1973). Effects
of objective self-­awareness on attribution of
causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 17–31.
Duval, T. S., & Duval, V. H. (1983). Consistency
and cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Duval, T. S., Duval, V. H., & Mulilis, J.-P. (1992).
Effects of self-focus, discrepancy between
self and standard, and outcome expectancy
favorability on the tendency to match self to
standard or to withdraw. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 340–348.
Duval, T. S., & Lalwani, N. (1999). Objective
self-­awareness and causal attributions for
self-­standard discrepancies: Changing self or
changing standards of correctness. Personal-
66
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1220–
1229.
Duval, T. S., & Silvia, P. J. (2002). Self-­awareness,
probability of improvement, and the self­serving bias. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 82, 49–61.
Duval, T. S., Silvia, P. J., & Lalwani, N. (2001).
Self-­awareness and causal attribution: A dual
systems theory. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H.
(1975). Public and private self-­consciousness:
Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–527.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Froming, W. J., Walker, G. R., & Lopyan, K.
J. (1982). Public and private self-­awareness:
When personal attitudes conflict with societal
expectations. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 18, 476–487.
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer,
D. E., & Donchin, E. (1993). A neural system
for error detection and compensation. Psychological Science, 4, 385–390.
Gendolla, G. H. E., Richter, M., & Silvia, P. J.
(2008). Self-focus and task difficulty effects on
effort-­related cardiovascular reactivity. Psychophysiology, 45, 653–662.
Gibbons, F. X. (1978). Sexual standards and reactions to pornography: Enhancing behavioral
consistency through self-­focused attention.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
36, 976–987.
Gibbons, F. X. (1983). Self-­attention and self­report: The “veridicality” hypothesis. Journal
of Personality, 51, 517–542.
Gibbons, F. X., Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., &
Hormuth, S. E. (1979). Self-­focused attention
and the placebo effect: Fooling some of the
people some of the time. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 263–274.
Gibbons, F. X., Smith, T. W., Ingram, R. E.,
Pearce, K., Brehm, S. S., & Schroeder, D. J.
(1985). Self-­awareness and self-­confrontation:
Effects of self-­focused attention on members
of a clinical population. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 48, 662–675.
Greenberg, J. (1980). Attentional focus and locus
of performance causality as determinants of
equity behavior. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 38, 579–585.
Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality. Psychological Review, 51,
358–374.
Helgeson, V. S., & Taylor, S. E. (1993). Social
comparisons and adjustment among cardiac
patients. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 1171–1195.
Hjelle, L. A., & Bernard, M. (1994). Private self­consciousness and the retest reliability of self­reports. Journal of Research in Personality,
28, 52–67.
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New
York: Appleton-­Century-­Crofts.
Hull, J. G. (1981). A self-­awareness model of
the causes and effects of alcohol consumption. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 90,
586–600.
Hull, J. G., & Levy, A. S. (1979). The organizational function of the self: An alternative to the
Duval and Wicklund model of self-­awareness.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
37, 756–768.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Johnson, M. K., Baxter, L. C., Wilder, L. S.,
Pipe, J. G., Heiserman, J. E., & Prigatano, G.
P. (2002). Neural correlates of self-­reflection.
Brain, 125, 1808–1814.
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L.,
Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F.
(2002). Finding the self?: An event-­related
fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 785–794.
Kernis, M. H., & Reis, H. T. (1984). Self­consciousness, self-­awareness, and justice in
reward allocation. Journal of Personality, 52,
58–70.
Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment
to and disengagement from incentives. Psychological Review, 82, 1–25.
Leary, M. R. (2004). Editorial: What is the self?:
A plea for clarity. Self and Identity, 3, 1–3.
MacKay, D. M. (1956). The epistemological
problem for automata. In C. E. Shannon & J.
McCarthy (Eds.), Automata studies (pp. 235–
251). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
MacKay, D. M. (1963). Mindlike behavior in artefacts. In K. M. Sayre & F. J. Crosson (Eds.),
The modeling of mind: Computers and intelligence (pp. 225–241). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Macrae, C. N., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Milne,
A. B. (1998). Saying no to unwanted thoughts:
Self-focus and the regulation of mental life.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 578–589.
Macrae, C. N., Moran, J. M., Heatherton, T. F.,
3. Self-­Awareness
Banfield, J. F., & Kelley, W. M. (2004). Medial
prefrontal activity predicts memory for self.
Cerebral Cortex, 14, 647–654.
Maruyama, M. (1963). The second cybernetics:
Deviation-­amplifying mutual causal processes. American Scientist, 51, 164–179
McFarland, D. J. (1971). Feedback mechanisms
in animal behavior. New York: Academic
Press.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H.
(1960). Plans and the structure of behavior.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Nasby, W. (1985). Private self-­consciousness, articulation of the self-­schema, and recognition
memory of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 704–709.
Nasby, W. (1989a). Private and public self­consciousness and articulation of the self­schema. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 56, 117–123.
Nasby, W. (1989b). Private self-­consciousness,
self-­awareness, and the reliability of self­reports. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 950–957.
Phillips, A. G., & Silvia, P. J. (2005). Self­awareness and the emotional consequences of
self-­discrepancies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 703–713.
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of
perception. Chicago: Aldine.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (1999). Approaching
and avoiding self-­determination: Comparing
cybernetic and organismic paradigms of motivation. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Advances in
social cognition (Vol. 12, pp. 193–215). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Scheier, M. F. (1976). Self-­awareness, self­consciousness, and angry aggression. Journal
of Personality, 44, 627–644.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1977). Self­focused attention and the experience of emotion: Attraction, repulsion, elation, and depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 625–636.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1983). Self­directed attention and the comparison of self
with standards. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 205–222.
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Gibbons, F. X.
(1979). Self-­directed attention, awareness of
bodily states, and suggestibility. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1576–
1588.
67
Scheier, M. F., Fenigstein, A., & Buss, A. H.
(1974). Self-­awareness and physical aggression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 264–273.
Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social
anxiety and self-­presentation: A conceptualization and model. Psychological Bulletin, 92,
641–669.
Schultz, W. (2006). Behavioral theories and the
neurophysiology of reward. Annual Reviews
of Psychology, 57, 87–115.
Shibutani, T. (1961). Society and personality: An
interactionist approach to social psychology.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Silvia, P. J., & Duval, T. S. (2001). Objective self­awareness theory: Recent progress and enduring problems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 230–241.
Silvia, P. J., & Gendolla, G. H. E. (2001). On introspection and self-­perception: Does self-­focused
attention enable accurate self-­knowledge? Review of General Psychology, 5, 241–269.
Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior theory and conditioning. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Steenbarger, B. N., & Aderman, D. (1979). Objective self-­awareness as a nonaversive state:
Effect of anticipating discrepancy reduction.
Journal of Personality, 47, 330–339.
Stuss, D. T., & Alexander, M. P. (2000). Executive functions and the frontal lobes: A conceptual view. Psychologische Forschung, 63,
289–298.
Stuss, D. T., & Alexander, M. P. (2007). In
there a dysexecutive syndrome? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362,
901–915.
Stuss, D. T., Alexander, M. P., & Benson, D. F.
(1997). Frontal lobe functions. In M. R. Trimble & J. L. Cummings (Eds.), Contemporary
behavioral neurology: Vol. 16. Blue books of
practical neurology (pp. 169–187). Woburn,
MA: Butterworth-­Heinemann.
Sui, J., & Han, S. (2007). Self-­construal priming
modulates neural substrates of self-­awareness.
Psychological Science, 18, 861–866.
Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private
self-­consciousness and the five-­factor model of
personality: Distinguishing rumination from
reflection. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76, 284–304.
Turner, R. G. (1978). Self-­consciousness and
speed of processing self-­relevant information.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4,
456–460.
68
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What
do people think they’re doing?: Action identification and human behavior. Psychological
Review, 94, 3–15.
Wicklund, R. A. (1975). Objective self-­awareness.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 233–275).
New York: Academic Press.
Wicklund, R. A., & Duval, S. (1971). Opinion
change and performance facilitation as a result
of objective self-­awareness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, 319–342.
Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1987).
The fallacy of the private-­public self-focus distinction. Journal of Personality, 55, 491–523.
Wiekens, C. J., & Stapel, D. A. (2010). Self­awareness and saliency of social versus individualistic behavioral standards. Social Psychology, 41, 10–19.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Control and
communication in the animal and the machine. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wood, J. V. (1989). Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes.
Psychological Bulletin, 106, 231–248.
Wood, J. V. (1996). What is social comparison
and how should we study it? Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 520–537.
Wortman, C. B., & Brehm, J. W. (1975). Responses to uncontrollable outcomes: An integration of reactance theory and the learned
helplessness model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 8, pp. 277–336). New York: Academic
Press.
Wylie, R. C. (1968). The present state of self theory. In E. F. Borgatta & W. W. Lambert (Eds.),
Handbook of personality theory and research
(pp. 728–787). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D.
(2004). The neural basis of error detection:
Conflict monitoring and the error-­related
­negativity. Psychological Review, 111, 931–
959.
Chapter 4
Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
Daphna Oyserman
Kristen Elmore
George Smith
Want a burger and fries or softly steamed
fish and fungi? How about offering a bribe
to win that contract? Feel like bungee jumping? People believe that they do not need to
seriously weigh the pros and cons of these
choices before deciding, that their identities
provide a meaning-­making anchor. They
know who they are, and who they are directs
their choices. In that sense, choices large
and small feel identity-based and identity­congruent.
Identities are the traits and characteristics, social relations, roles, and social group
memberships that define who one is. Identities can be focused on the past—what used
to be true of one, the present—what is true
of one now, or the future—the person one
expects or wishes to become, the person one
feels obligated to try to become, or the person one fears one may become. Identities are
orienting, they provide a meaning-­making
lens and focus one’s attention on some but
not other features of the immediate context
(Oyserman, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Together, identities make up one’s self-­concept—
variously described as what comes to mind
when one thinks of oneself (Neisser, 1993;
Stets & Burke, 2003; Stryker, 1980; Tajfel,
1981), one’s theory of one’s personality
(Markus & Cross, 1990), and what one be-
lieves is true of oneself (Baumeister, 1998;
Forgas & Williams, 2002). In addition to
self-­concepts people also know themselves
in other ways: They have self-­images and
self-­feelings, as well as images drawn from
the other senses—a sense of what they
sound like, what they feel like tactically,
a sense of their bodies in motion. Though
these self-­aspects were part of the initial
conceptualization of what it means to have a
self (James, 1890/1927), they have received
less empirical attention. People feel that they
know themselves, since they have a lot of experience with themselves and a huge store of
autobiographical memories (Fivush, 2011).
As we outline in this chapter, this feeling
of knowing is important even though the
assumptions on which it is based are often
faulty. Feeling that one knows oneself facilitates using the self to make sense and make
choices, using the self as an important perceptual, motivational and self-­regulatory
tool. This feeling of knowing oneself is based
in part on an assumption of stability that is
central to both everyday (lay) theories about
the self and more formal (social science) theories about the self. Yet as we describe in the
second half of this chapter, the assumption
of stability is belied by the malleability, context sensitivity, and dynamic construction of
69
70
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
the self as a mental construct. Identities are
not the fixed markers people assume them to
be but are instead dynamically constructed
in the moment. Choices that feel identity­congruent in one situation do not necessarily feel identity-­congruent in another situation. This flexibility is part of what makes
the self useful. As noted by William James
(1890/1927), thinking is for doing. People
are pragmatic reasoners, sensitively attuned
to the contextual affordances and constraints
in their immediate surroundings, though
not necessarily to the source of these influences on their judgments and behavior (e.g.,
Schwarz, 2002, 2007, 2010). People do not
simply respond to contextual cues; rather,
their responses are both moderated and mediated by the effect of these cues on who they
are in the moment (Oyserman, 2007, 2009a,
2009b; Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2010).
In this chapter, we consider these two core
issues—the feeling of knowing oneself and
the dynamic construction of who one is in
the moment. We suggest that the self is an
important motivational tool both because
the self feels like a stable anchor, and because the identities that constitute the self
are, in fact, dynamically constructed in context. The self is useful because people look
to their identities in making choices and
because these identities are situated, pragmatic, and attuned to the affordances and
constraints of the immediate context.
For ease, we divide this chapter into sections. In the first section (Setting the Stage),
we briefly operationalize what is meant by
self and identity, drawing on other reviews
from both sociological and psychological
perspectives (e.g., annual review and other
large summaries: Brewer, 1991; Callero,
2003; Elliot, 2001; Markus & Wurf, 1987;
Owens, Robinson, & Smith-Lovin, 2010;
Oyserman, 2007). In the second section (Understanding Process), we consider what the
self is assumed to be—a stable yet malleable
mental construct, and what gaps remain
in how the self is studied. In the third section (Thinking Is for Doing), we address the
basis for future research, and in the fourth
section (Dynamic Construction), we outline
predictions about what the pragmatic, situated, experiential, and embodied nature of
mental processing imply for self and identity.
Our final section (Wrapping Up and Moving
Forward) provides a bulleted summary and
highlights what we see as important new directions.
Setting the Stage
A number of years ago McGuire and McGuire
(1988) cheerfully noted that the academic
literature on the self is dull even though the
topic is interesting; they call this the anti-Midas touch. In a reversal of Rumpelstiltskin’s
task, self-­researchers somehow managed to
spin piles of boring hay from the sparkling
gold of their topic. A generation later, readers
of the literature may still search for the gold
in vain. Self and identity remain topics of high
interest not only for psychologists, but also
across the social sciences—­psychologists,
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and even economists make reference
to self and identity. Google Scholar yields 3
million citations, and limiting focus to professional search engines (the Web of Science,
PsycINFO) still yields tens of thousands of
articles in which self-­concept or identity are
included as key words. This unwieldy mass
includes both studies in which self and identity are asserted as explanatory factors and
in which something is empirically assessed
or manipulated and described as some aspect
of self or identity.
So what is this self (or identity) that is so
important? Self and identity researchers have
long believed that the self is both a product
of situations and a shaper of behavior in
situations. Making sense of oneself—who
one is, was, and may become, and therefore
the path one should take in the world—is a
core self-­project. Self and identity theories
assume that people care about themselves,
want to know who they are, and can use this
self-­knowledge to make sense of the world.
Self and identity are predicted to influence
what people are motivated to do, how they
think and make sense of themselves and others, the actions they take, and their feelings
and ability to control or regulate themselves
(e.g., for conceptual models, see Baumeister,
1998; Brewer, 1991; Brown, 1998; Carver
& Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Oyserman, 2007).
In this section we provide a set of brief
operationalizations. Our goal is to provide
some clarity with a number of caveats. First,
self and identity are sometimes used inter-
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
changeably and other times used to refer to
different things. Second, what self and identity refer to differs both across and within
publications. Third, this ambiguity extends
to whether the self and identity in the singular or plural; that is, whether there is one or
multiple selves, identities, and self-­concepts.
Relevant reviews highlighting these issues
from a sociological perspective (e.g., Callero, 2003; Owens et al., 2010), from a social identity perspective (e.g., Brewer, 1991;
Ellmers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), and from
a social and personality psychology perspective (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Markus
& Wurf, 1987; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001;
Swann & Bosson, 2010) provide some sense
of the breadth of the topic. Our goal is not
to attempt to revisit all of the issues raised
in these reviews but rather to provide a
working outline of the constructs in order
to highlight ways forward in research. Like
McGuire and McGuire (1988) our goal is
to shed light on the gold—what makes the
self so indispensible to understanding how
people live in the world, make choices, and
make meaning of their experience.
Basic Operationalization
Self
In common discourse, the term self often refers to a warm sense or a warm feeling that
something is “about me” or “about us.” Reflecting on oneself is both a common activity
and a mental feat. It requires that there is an
“I” that can consider an object that is “me.”
The term self includes both the actor who
thinks (“I am thinking”) and the object of
thinking (“about me”). Moreover, the actor
both is able to think and is aware of doing
so. As the philosopher John Locke famously
asserted, “I think, therefore I am.” Awareness of having thoughts matters.
Another way to denote these three aspects
(thinking, being aware of thinking, and taking the self as an object for thinking) is to
use the term reflexive capacity (Kihlstrom,
Beer, & Klein, 2003; Lewis, 1990). Rather
than attempt to distinguish between the
mental content (me) and the aspects of the
mental capacity of thinking (I), modern use
of the term self includes all these elements
(Baumeister, 1998; Callero, 2003; Kihlstrom
et al., 2003; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Owens
71
et al., 2010). While theories converge on the
notion that reflexive capacity is critical to
having a self, theories diverge in how memory is considered in service of sustaining the
self. On the one hand, the self can be considered primarily a memory structure such that
the me aspect of self has existence outside
of particular contexts and social structures.
In contrast, the self can be considered primarily a cognitive capacity such that what
constitutes the me aspect of self is created
inside of and embedded within moment-to­moment situations. From the latter perspective, what is stable is not recalled content but
rather the motivation to use the self to make
meaning; memory is used but the me self is
not stable.
While in some ways helpful, the shorthand
me can inadvertently limit focus of attention
to one way of conceiving the self—what cultural and clinical psychologists might call an
immersed individualistic sense of self. While
less studied, people can think of themselves
in different ways. An individualistic perspective focuses on how one is separate and different from others, but people can also consider how they are similar and connected via
relationships (sometimes called a collectivistic perspective). An immersed perspective
focuses on the self up close and from inside
the mind’s eye, but people can also consider
themselves in other ways. They can consider
how they might look from a distance, how
they might look from the outside, in the eyes
of others. Each perspective highlights and
draws attention to some aspects of “me”
and makes other aspects less likely to come
to mind.
Cultural psychologists have focused attention on between-­society differences in the
likelihood of focusing on the “me” versus
the “us” aspects of the self (Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis,
1989). For example, Americans are described
as more likely than East Asians to take a “me”
perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In
contrast, social identity researchers demonstrate that whether one takes a “me” or an
“us” perspective is not fixed by culture but
influenced by context (Brewer, 1991; Brewer
& Gardner, 1996; Hogg, 2003, 2006). More
situated approaches demonstrate empirically
that small shifts in contexts influence whether anyone, American or East Asian, takes
on “me” or “us” perspectives (for reviews,
72
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
see Oyserman, 2007, in press; Oyserman &
Lee, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Sorensen,
2009). Taking on a “me” or an “us” perspective influences perception and mental
procedures more generally, as we discuss in
the section on self-­concept.
In addition to being able to take both a
separated and a connected perspective on
the self, people can also consider themselves
from immersed or distal perspectives (Kross,
2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005).
That is, people can consider themselves as
actors buffeted by others and situations
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972); conversely, they
can take a step back and consider themselves
from a more distal perspective. People can
consider what others might be observing
about them, seeing themselves, as it were,
through the eyes of others (Cohen & Gunz,
2002). Memories include both close and distal perspectives, termed field and observer
memories by Nigro and Neisser (1983). In
observer memories, the actor takes the perspective of an observer, seeing oneself from
the outside; this is not the case for field
memories, which are from the original perspective of the actor. Switching perspective
is consequential. Thus, thinking about the
self from a more distal perspective focuses
attention on one’s broader goals and values
(Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope,
2008). It also reduces emotional investment
in the self, reducing both rumination about
the past (Kross, 2009) and perceived overlap
between the self one is now and the self one
will become (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy,
2008).
Ecologically, the two axes of self­perspective are likely related (Cohen &
Gunz, 2002). Taking a relational “us” perspective on the self is likely to co-occur with
taking a more distal perspective on the self
to include what others might be seeing (for
an applied review of the interface between
culture and autobiographical memory, see
Schwarz, Oyserman, & Peytcheva, 2010).
However, people can be induced to take any
combination of these perspectives, including
the potentially less common combinations of
separate “me” and temporal distal observer
perspective, or relational “us” and close immersed perspective. Because they are able
to reflect on themselves over time and from
multiple perspectives, people can evaluate
themselves using multiple standards, pre-
dict how social interactions will go, and
self-­regulate by acting in ways that facilitate
future self-needs and wants. In that sense,
there is not a single me but multiple me’s, or
at least multiple facets to each me. Rather
than consider these multiple selves, we propose considering each of these as structuring
self-­concepts, as we explain next.
Self‑Concept
Self-­concepts are cognitive structures that
can include content, attitudes, or evaluative
judgments and are used to make sense of the
world, focus attention on one’s goals, and
protect one’s sense of basic worth (Oyserman & Markus, 1998). Thus, if the self is
an “I” that thinks and a “me” that is the
content of those thoughts, one important
part of this “me” content involves mental
concepts or ideas of who one is, was, and
will become. These mental concepts are the
content of self-­concept.
While we focus on the structural aspect of
self-­concept (e.g., individualistic, collectivistic, proximal immersed, distal other), much
of the literature focuses on content and evaluative judgment, asking what people describe
when they describe themselves and how positively they evaluate themselves. This focus
on content plus evaluative judgment is quite
common in research on children and adolescents, and typically involves closed-ended
rating scales in a series of domains (e.g.,
physical appearance, athletic ability, emotional stability, peer relationships, family relationships; see Harter, Chapter 31, this volume; Marsh, 1990). However, content can be
studied separately from evaluative judgment,
often with open-ended probes asking people
to describe their current, ideal, and ought
self-­concepts, or their desired and undesired
possible selves (for a review of measurement
of possible self-­concepts, see Oyserman &
Fryberg, 2006). In the same way, some research focuses explicitly on self-­judgments
or self-­attitudes. These self-­judgments are
typically operationalized as self-­esteem or
self-­efficacy and are a distilled evaluation of
the person’s sense of worth and competence
in the world (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 2001;
Crocker & Park, Chapter 15, this volume;
Rosenberg, 1979).
Self-­concepts also differ in how they are
structured. Researchers have documented
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
differences in which content domains are
organized together, in complexity, in how
positive and negative information is stored,
and in the likelihood that strategies for action are linked to self-goals. Consider first
the structural implications of how content
is considered. People may organize and
structure their self-­concepts around some
domains that others commonly use to make
sense of them—their race or ethnicity, their
gender, their weight, their age, or their academic standing in school. If this social information is used to organize self-­concept,
people may be said to be schematic for the
domain, which implies that they will process information that is relevant to it more
quickly and efficiently and remember it better than information that is irrelevant to it
(Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982).
It also implies that people will act in ways
that fit their schemas (Oyserman, 2008; Oyserman, Brickman, & Rhodes, 2007).
Beyond particular aspects of content, some
people may feel that all aspects of the self are
related; others may feel that many aspects
of the self function independently (Linville,
1987). Organization may hew to valence, so
that a person may compartmentalize positive and negative self-views such that evidence one is a disorganized scholar does not
disturb the sense that one is bound for great
glory in academia (Showers, Abramson, &
Hogan, 1998).
People may have multiple self-­concepts,
with some better organized and articulated
than others (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Epstein, 1973; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989;
Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, 2001,
2007). Structure matters, and some self­concepts effectively facilitate self-­regulation,
whereas others leave one vulnerable to premature goal-­disengagement and battered
feelings of worth and competence (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-­Johnson, 2004;
Oyserman, Harrison, & Bybee, 2001;
Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 2006).
As we noted in the section on self, people can consider themselves from a number
of perspectives—the individualistic “me”
self or the collectivistic “us” self, the temporally near “now” self or the temporally
distal “future” self, the immersed “mind’seye” self or the observer’s “eyes of others”
self. While much of the literature terms
these self, we propose considering each of
73
these a self-­concept structure. Multiple such
structures are available in memory for use,
though people are likely to differ in which
structures are more chronically accessible.
Self-­concept researchers have documented
that whether people focus on social roles
and relationships or individuating traits and
characteristics in describing themselves depends significantly on their immediate situational cues. Researchers can easily “prime”
(bring to mind) one way of thinking about
self-­concept or the other.
For example, just reading a paragraph
with first-­person singular (I, me) versus
plural (we, us) pronouns, unscrambling
sentences with these words, or considering differences versus similarities to one’s
friends and family shifts self-­concept content (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991;
Triandis, 1989; for a review of the evidence,
see Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).
Moreover, priming self-­concept structure
in this way influences not only how people
think about themselves but how they think
generally. For example, in one experiment,
participants primed with me- or us-­relevant
pronouns were shown 64 unrelated objects
on a page and told they would be asked to
remember what they saw. They were equally
good at the task but us-­primed participants
were better at the surprise part of the memory task in which they were unexpectedly
also asked to recall where the objects were
on the page (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002).
Me-­primed participants remembered what
they saw but not the relationships among objects (see also Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber,
& Chen, 2009).
Identity
Erikson (1951, 1968) developed a widely used
model of identity development that focused
on development of identity via exploration
and commitment. Erikson used the term
identity in ways synonymous with what others have termed self-­concept. However, the
term identity can also be conceptualized as
a way of making sense of some aspect or part
of self-­concept (Abrams, 1994; 1999; Hogg,
2003; Serpe, 1987; Stryker & Burke, 2000;
Tajfel & Turner, 2004). For example, one
can have a religious identity that contains
relevant content and goals, such as what to
do, what to value, and how to behave.
74
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
The social psychological and sociological
identity literatures contrast personal and social identities, also termed collective identities (for a review, Brewer & Roccas, 2001;
Hogg, 2003). Social identities, as defined
by Tajfel (1981), involve the knowledge that
one is a member of a group, one’s feelings
about group membership, and knowledge of
the group’s rank or status compared to other
groups. Though this definition does not
focus much on content of ingroup membership beyond knowledge, regard, and rank,
other definitions have highlighted that social
identities include content (Oyserman, 2007;
Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh,
& Hart-­Johnson, 2003).
Just as there may be many self-­concepts,
identity theorists differ in how to conceptualize how many identities a person is likely to
have. Much as James (1890/1927) described
multiple selves, predicting that people have
as many selves as they have interaction partners, identity and social identity theorists
discuss multiple identities based in multiple situations. Identity theorists (Stryker,
1980; Stryker & Burke, 2000) focus on how
cross-­situational stability of identity content
emerges. From this perspective, identities are
distinct parts of the self-­concept, the internalized meanings and expectations associated with the positions one holds in social networks and the roles one plays. In contrast,
social identity theorists (Abrams, 1999; Onorato & Turner, 2002; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel
& Turner, 2004) focus on cross-­situational
malleability. In its strongest formulation, social identity theories predict that in each interaction, people take on a different identity
(see Owens et al., 2010, for a review from a
sociological perspective).
In thinking about identity content and
identity function, social identity researchers
sometimes focus on connection to and similarities with other ingroup members (Brewer,
2001; Oyserman et al., 2003). Other times
they focus on the distinction between the ingroup and outgroup (Brewer, 2001; Spears,
Gordijn, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). The groups (gender,
nationality, race/­ethnicity, religious heritage
groups, or first-year psychology majors) on
which identities are based are likely to differ in their longevity and how psychologically meaningful they feel across time and
situations (Brewer, 1991; Oyserman, 2007,
2009a; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Social
identity and identity theorists also study two
other kinds of identities, role identities and
personal identities. Role identities reflect
membership in particular roles (e.g., student, parent, professional) that require another person to play a complementary role.
One cannot be a parent without children, a
student without teachers, or a professional
without clients or peers who recognize one’s
role. Personal identities reflect traits or
characteristics that may feel separate from
one’s social and role identities or linked to
some or all of these identities (for a review,
see Owens et al., 2010).
Thus, personal identities refer to content
quite isomorphic with what is typically referred to as self-­concept in the psychological
literature. An advantage in using the term
identity rather than self-­concept in this regard is that it reserves the term self-­concept
for broader perspectives, as we discussed
previously—after all, being a shy person is
likely to mean something different when
considered as part of what makes one separate and different from others (individualistic self-­concept) or as part of what makes
one related and similar to others (collectivistic self-­concept).
Summary
Self, self-­concept, and identity can be considered as nested elements, with aspects of
the “me”-forming self-­concepts and identities being part of self-­concepts. Yet scholars often use the terms self and identity as
if they were synonyms (Swann & Bosson,
2010). Sometimes the terms are used in reference to the process of making sense of the
world in terms of what matters to “me” or
to the consequences of social contexts on a
variety of beliefs and perceptions about the
self, or simply to refer to membership in sociodemographic categories such as gender or
social class (Frable, 1997). Other times what
is meant is an implicit sense or a warm feeling of relevance and inclusion rather than a
cold feeling of irrelevance and exclusion (see,
e.g., Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005; Steele,
Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Thus, the terms
can and often are used to explain what
might be the process underlying outcomes
but differ dramatically in terms of what, if
anything, is assessed or manipulated.
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
That said, theories converge in assuming
that self, self-­concept, and identity come from
somewhere, are stored in memory, and matter. We term these three core notions about
self and identity mental construct, social
product, and force for action, and discuss
them in turn in the following sections. Thus,
self, self-­concept, and identity are mental
constructs that are shaped by the contexts
in which they develop and influence action.
We address each of these core notions next.
To accommodate this heterogeneity and still
move forward in considering how self and
identity may matter, in the rest of this chapter we use the phrase self and identity when
this more general and vague usage is a better
fit with the literature we are citing, and specific terms (e.g., identities) where relevant.
Self and Identity Are Mental Concepts
Self and identity theories converge in asserting that self and identity are mental constructs, that is, something represented in
memory. This capacity develops early. When
shown their faces in a mirror, many children
age 18 months and nearly all children age
24 months touch their foreheads to remove
a smudge unobtrusively produced by smearing some paint on their foreheads (Lewis &
Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This response is interpreted to mean that children know what
they look like and know a smudge should
not be on their foreheads. This image-based
self-­recognition is not limited to the face; at
this age toddlers also notice a sticker secretly
placed on their legs (Nielsen, Suddendorf, &
Slaughter, 2006).
Thus, children seem to have stored a visual image of who they are in memory. This
image is likely to be quite fine-­grained. For
example, people prefer the visual image of
themselves they are used to seeing (mirror
image) to a nonmirror image (Mita, Dermer,
& Knight, 1977). Other senses are also involved in mental representations of self in
memory. Consider that infants begin to experience the self as physically distinct from
context and as motorically acting in space
(Bronson, 2000). This visceral sense of the
self as a physical object having body parts
and controlling action is not unique to early
development (Botvinik & Cohen, 1998;
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke,
2007). Traces of the self are believed to exist
75
in one’s handwriting, signature, bodily posture, and physical stance (Kettle & Häubl,
in press). Thus, as early argued by James
(1890/1927), at its core, the self is physical
and material.
The emerging field of social neuroscience
has attempted to pinpoint where in the brain
the self resides, demonstrating different locations for self-­relevant processing that is
associative versus conscious and reflective
(Beer, Chapter 29, this volume; Lieberman,
2007). While specificity of activity in particular neural regions is not a necessary feature
of the self, the prefrontal cortex has been associated with conscious processes, and the
medial wall is hypothesized to support processes related to introspection—­aspects of
what the self is assumed to be and do. Thus,
current research programs point to frontal
lobe activity as involved in cognitive processes related to the self. Activation in the
anterior cingulate cortex is associated with
reflecting on whether a trait is self-­relevant
or not (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004) and with reflecting on
one’s own performance (Bengtsson, Dolan,
& Passingham, 2011). Medial prefrontal activity connected to self-­representation tasks
may be visual modality–­specific, at least for
sighted individuals (for a review, see Ma &
Han, 2011). That is, among sighted individuals, medial prefrontal activation and enhanced functional connectivity between the
medial prefrontal and visual cortices occurs
during self-­judgments (compared to other­judgments) when trait words are shown
rather than heard (Ma & Han, 2011).
However, self-­concept research typically
focuses on semantic memory rather than
localization in the brain. Children rapidly
develop both language and cognitive capacities, and with these capacities come
language-based autobiographical memories
(Fivush & Hammond, 1990). Organizing
their memories with social norms of what
matters and how to make sense, children
can begin to create a semantic rather than
visceral sense of self—what one does, what
one is supposed to do (Fivush & Hammond,
1990; see also Harter, 2003; Harter, Chapter
31, this volume). Self-­concept research has
typically focused on children’s capacity to
describe and rate themselves across multiple
dimensions. For example, by second grade
children can report on multiple dimensions
76
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
of their self-­concept (Marsh, Barnes, Cairns,
& Tidman, 1984). Teens are able to articulate that they act and feel differently about
themselves in different roles and contexts
(Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell,
1997; McConnell, 2011). The method used,
rating scales, implies that the mental concept being studied is a set of ratings. Indeed,
much self-­concept research assumes that
explicit self-­report of the self as an attitude
object is useful, implying that self-­concept
is stable, chronically accessible in memory,
and accessed in the same way across situations. However, as discussed in the third section (Thinking is for Doing), each of these
assumptions is open to question (Schwarz,
2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
Self and Identity Are Social Products
Self and identity theories converge in grounding self and identity in social context. Contextual effects on the self may be distal—­
parenting practices, schooling, the culture,
the time and place in which one lives, the
experiences one has had early in life. Contextual effects on the self also may be proximal—the psychological implications of the
immediate situations one is in (e.g., for reviews, see Hogg, 2003, 2006; Oyserman &
Markus, 1993, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 2004).
Models differ in what context refers to. Some
focus on macro-level contexts, especially the
historical epoch, society, and culture within
which one lives. Empirical analysis of effects
at this level can involve historical and crossgroup comparisons but is also amenable to
experimental priming techniques (see, e.g.,
Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Uskul, 2008). Contexts can also
be at a middle level; these contexts include
family, school, and neighborhood, and the
family processes and socialization practices
with which one grew up. Here, too, analyses may be descriptive, comparative, or experimental (see, e.g., Chen & Chen, 2010;
Oyserman & Yoon, 2009). Finally context
may be more micro-level, the day-by-day,
moment-to-­moment situations one experiences because of these structures and institutions.
Each of these levels of analyses has roots
in both psychological and sociological perspectives as described early on by James
(1890/1927), Cooley (1902) and Mead
(1934). Cooley’s description of the looking
glass self encapsulates James’s (1890/1927)
insight that how others see the self matters,
suggesting that reflected appraisals, whether
they reinforce or undermine one’s self images, are important building blocks for the
self. A large body of research has examined
this assumption. Results support the social
construction of self by showing that people
do generally incorporate what they think
others think of them in the self, though selfviews are typically more positive than others’
views (for summaries and original research,
see Felson, 1993; Shrauger & Schoeneman,
1979).
Generally speaking, self and identity are
social products in at least three ways. First,
people do not create themselves from air;
rather, what is possible, what is important,
what needs to be explained all come from
social context—from what matters to others. This means that people are likely to define themselves in terms of what is relevant
in their time and place: Group memberships
(e.g., religion, race, or gender), family roles,
looks, school attainment, or athletic prowess should matter more or less depending on
what is valued in one’s culture and in one’s
place within social hierarchy. Second, being
a self requires others who endorse and reinforce one’s selfhood, who scaffold a sense
that one’s self matters and that one’s efforts
can produce results. This means that people
should feel better about themselves, more capable of attaining their goals, and so on, in
contexts that provide these scaffoldings than
in contexts that do not. Third, the aspects
of one’s self and identity that matter in the
moment are determined by what is relevant
in the moment.
Because getting others to endorse one’s
identities matters, people change their behavior to get others to view them as they
view themselves (Oyserman, 2007, 2009a,
2009b). A clear way to signal an identity socially is to act in ways that are (stereotypically) congruent with it. To test whether this
happens, researchers can look for or create
situations in which an important identity is
ambiguous or actively undermined and see
if people are more likely to act in ways that
fit stereotypes in these circumstances. For
example, black children who are worried
that they are not viewed as African American and Asian Americans who are worried
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
that they are not viewed as Americans may
choose to act in ways that help them fit in.
To test this prediction, in one set of studies, the in-class behavior, friendship choices,
and school grades of African American and
Latino American middle school students
were assessed (Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee,
& Celious, 2006). The prediction was that
children who did not believe they looked like
ingroup members would be more likely to
act in ways (stereotypically) congruent with
their racial/­ethnic identity because by acting
like a (stereotypical) ingroup member they
could convince others that they held the identity. Indeed, compared to dark skin-toned
African Americans, light skin-toned African
Americans reported feeling less socially accepted. This felt lack of acceptance translated to action; their report cards showed poorer academic attainment and teachers rated
them as misbehaving in class more. Similar
effects were found for Latino children who
said they did not look Latino. These children chose less academically oriented peers
as friends, attained worse grades, and were
more likely to misbehave in class. Friendship
choice mediated effects of “looking Latino”
on academic performance. Fitting into the
group they perceived as “acting” (stereotypically) like the ingroup mattered.
Rather than focus on school behavior, another set of studies focused on food choices
(Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011).
To test the prediction that people will act
in ways that (stereotypically) fit an ambiguous or undermined identity, these authors
randomly assigned Asian American college
student participants to either be welcomed
to the study without comment or to first be
queried as to whether they were American.
The query regarding their American identity
mattered. Asian Americans who were first
asked if they were American chose more prototypically American foods to eat and said
they liked these foods more than those who
were not first asked if they were American.
This occurred even though the American
foods were less healthy than the Asian ones.
Thus, the answer to one of our opening questions—“Want a burger and fries or softly
steamed fish and fungi?”—was not fixed but
instead depended on how Asian American
identity was constructed in context.
Effects are not limited to minority groups
and can involve undesired as well as desired
77
identities. British undergraduates reported
intending to drink less alcohol and to engage
in healthier eating during the coming week
after being induced to think of themselves
as British rather than American or as British people rather than college students (the
latter groups were stereotyped as unhealthy;
Tarrant & Butler, 2011). American undergraduates reported that they had consumed
less alcohol after being exposed to flyers
that depicted graduate students (negatively
stereotyped as nerdy) as heavy alcohol users
(Berger & Rand, 2008).
Self and Identity Are Forces for Action
A common theme among self and identity
theorists is that the self matters for behavior.
Yet demonstrating that how one thinks about
oneself produces action rather than simply
being associated with it has proven difficult.
A clear way to demonstrate that the self does
influence behavior is to manipulate whether
and how people think about themselves, and
to show that this influences their subsequent
behavior. To make the self salient, participants are asked to sit in front of a mirror
(Carver & Scheier, 1978) or to do something
else to bring the self to mind, such as signing their name (Kettle & Häubl, in press),
describing what makes them similar or different from others (Markel, 2009; Trafimow
et al., 1991), or circling first-­person singular
pronouns (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999;
Sui & Han, 2007). Each of these paradigms
shifts responses, but the specific nature of
the consequences of making the self salient
for action depends on the interplay between
which aspects of the self are brought to mind
in the context and the task at hand (Oyserman, 2007).
To examine these processes more closely,
researchers often manipulate the salience
of a particular aspect of the self. For example, in one study, participants were provided with rigged feedback to induce them
to believe that they were generally competent or incompetent. This influenced their
self-­esteem, and their self-­esteem influenced
their subsequent prejudicial responses to
others (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Study 1).
In another study, researchers reminded participants of their identity as psychology students, then, using an elaborate cover story,
led them to believe that psychology students
78
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
are neater (or less neat) than a comparison
group (economics students). Students acted
in ways that fit how their psychology student
identity had been presented to them, coloring
more neatly after reading stories about neatness ostensibly written by psychology students and more messily if these stories were
attributed to economics students (Spears et
al., 2004).
Some researchers go beyond documenting
effects of context on self-­concept or of self­concept on behavior to predict that context
affects behavior by affecting self-­concept
content (self-­concept change mediates the influence of context on behavior). For example
Jiang, Cho, and Adaval (2009) manipulated
context by exposing Hong Kong Chinese
participants either to words and numbers
related to having luck (e.g., “lucky,” number
strings containing 8) or to not having luck
(e.g., “unlucky,” number strings containing 4) either subliminally or supraliminally
with a variety of cover stories. They demonstrated that both a self-­rating “I am a lucky
person” (Studies 1 and 2) and a risk preference (e.g., preferring a chance to save money
over a sure thing; Study 3) were significantly
higher for participants randomly assigned
to the lucky versus the unlucky condition.
Moreover, when both self-­rating and a risky
behavior choice were measured at the same
time, the effect of condition on risk preference (e.g., willingness to pay to participate
in a gamble) was mediated by a change in
self-­rating (Studies 3 and 4). Experiments
such as these clarify that small changes in
contexts do shift at least some aspects of
self-views and so are a promising trend for
the field. While necessarily artificial and
not attempting to articulate what exactly is
meant by use of the terms self or identity,
experiments of this type demonstrate how
contexts influence momentary perceptions
about the self and identity.
To increase ecological validity, some experimenters conduct field research on the
effect of identity in context. One way to examine effects of context on behavior is by
asking people to consider an identity either
before or after they engage in an identity­relevant behavior (Oyserman, Gant, &
Ager, 1995, Study 2; Oyserman et al., 2003,
Studies 2 and 3). Another possibility is to
subtly prime a particular behavior as either
relevant or irrelevant to a core identity such
as gender (Elmore & Oyserman, in press) or,
for college students, one’s major (Smith &
Oyserman, 2011).
For example, in a number of studies we
asked students to complete a novel math task
either before or after we asked them about
their racial/ethnic identity (what it is, what it
means in their everyday lives). In these studies, African American, Hispanic and Native American (American Indian) children
mostly described their racial/ethnic identity
in terms of connection to the ingroup. Some
also described a connection to larger society
generally or specifically reported that school
attainment was part of their racial/ethnic
identity. Those who did describe connection to larger society and school attainment
worked harder on the math task, especially
if they did the task after first considering
their racial/ethnic identity (Oyserman et al.,
1995, Study 2; 2003, Study 2). The results of
this experimental manipulation of identity
salience were replicated with Arab Israeli
middle and high school students (Oyserman
et al., 2003, Study 3).
Understanding Process
As demonstrated in the previous section,
effectively demonstrating that the self influences action often involves manipulating which self-­concept or identity comes to
mind. Perhaps one of the reasons that few
such studies of this nature exist is that many
theories assume that the self is relatively stable. Stability can be assumed to emerge from
early plasticity; that is, social contexts may
shape the self as it is developing, but once developed, the self may be difficult to change.
Stability can be assumed even in theoretical
perspectives that articulate self-­concept and
identity as memory structures that are updated and revised with each use. In this section, we consider people’s experience of the
self as stable and ask what evidence there is
for malleability and dynamic construction.
Experienced Stability
A conundrum for the study and understanding how self and identity operate is that even
if self and identity change, people can still
have an experience of stability, so self-­report
may not be helpful. Consider Plato’s analogy
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
of a ship whose owner mends and repairs it,
replacing planks as needed. Eventually all
the planks are replaced. Is it the same ship?
Depending on what the questioner means,
the answer could be “yes” or “no.” That is,
the ship functions as always, so it is the same
ship, even though all the components are
new, so it is a different ship. The self may be
considered in the same way. Over time self
and identity do their job. Like Plato’s ship
that keeps its owner above water while getting him where he needs to go, self and identity do their job of making meaning, focusing attention, and sustaining goal-­focused
self-­regulation. But at the same time, like the
ever-­changing planks, what self and identity
mean may be dynamically constructed. As
a result, what one focuses on, what one’s
goals appear to be, and how one works toward them changes as well. Self and identity
continue to function, thus feeling the same,
even though the content changes dramatically. Thus, a feeling of stability can emerge
whether people have a motivation to perceive
the self as stable or not.
The Self as a Stable Essence
People assume that people, themselves included, have a stable essence or core that
predicts their behavior, that who they are
matters for what they do, and that what they
do reflects who they are (Arkes & Kajdasz,
2011; James, 1890/1927). The assumption
that deeper essences constrain surface features or psychological essentialism is a basic
cognitive organizing schema that is at the
core of categorization (Medin & Ortony,
1989).
Even preschool children, age 2½, infer
stability of traits in inanimate and biological categories from as little as one example
(for reviews, see Gelman, 1999; Gelman &
Diesendruck, 1999). For instance, they infer
that flamingos but not bats feed their young
mashed up food after learning that flamingos and blackbirds are in the same category
(birds) and being told once that blackbirds
feed their young mashed-up food. By age 5
children infer that both biological (e.g., has
melatonin) and psychological (e.g., likes
looking pretty) characteristics transfer across
instances of a social category (Diesendruck
& Eldror, 2011). By age 10 children are as
willing as adults to use personality traits
79
(e.g., generous) to predict behavioral consistency of individuals over time (Aloise, 1993;
Kalish, 2002; Rholes & Ruble, 1984).
Once established, the notion of essences
feels intuitively obvious, and adults are quick
to infer the existence of enduring dispositions motivating people’s behavior (Ross,
1977) and to infer traits from their behavior (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994). People
often describe themselves in terms of stable
traits (e.g., sincerity) and actions (e.g., giving
loose change to homeless people) (Cousins,
1989; English & Chen, 2011; Semin, 2009).
This essential sense of self appears universal although whether people use adjectives
or action verbs to describe their traits, and
whether they assume their traits apply within particular situations or across situations
may vary cross-­culturally (English & Chen,
2011, Semin, 2009; see also Cross & Gore,
Chapter 27, this volume).
Is the Self Stable?
Separate from people’s perceptions, it seems
reasonable to ask whether the self is a stable
mental construct. Most comprehensive social
science theories of the self articulate both
stability and fluidity as aspects of the self.
Thus, identity and social identity theories
describe the self as including both a stable
set of evaluative standards and a fluid, ever­changing description in the moment (Turner,
1956). In some formulations, both stability
and changeability have been viewed as part
of maintaining a stable and positive sense of
self-­esteem (Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1983) or a stable sense of self more generally (Swann, 1983; Swann & Buhrmester,
Chapter 19, this volume). Since maintaining
a self-image requires doing “face work” to
convince others of one’s self-­presentation
(Goffman, 1959), proponents of some sociological perspectives have argued for stability
of the self over time as a result of stability
of social interactions (Serpe, 1987; Stryker,
1980). There is some support for this interpretation. For example, Serpe (1987) found
that college students did not vary in how they
rated six college role identities (e.g., coursework, dating) over three data points in their
first semester of college, presumably because
the context (college) remained the same.
One way to ask this question is whether a
healthy or effective self is essentially stable
80
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
and invariant across time and situations.
Some psychologists have argued that this is
the case, noting that the self protects itself
from change (for reviews, see Greenwald,
1980; Markus & Kunda, 1986), changing
only when the conditions of life require it
(Gecas, 1982; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984;
Rosenberg, 1979; Swann 1983, 1985). If
this is the case, then there should be individual differences in self-­stability, and these
differences should be consequential. Indeed,
Kernis and colleagues (Kernis, Cornell, Sun,
Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Kernis, Paradise,
Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000)
present evidence that people differ in how
stable their self-­esteem is and that stability is
associated with well-being. Feeling that the
self is not stable is in fact one of the diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder (Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, &
Bohus, 2004).
To examine resistance to change, researchers can manipulate feedback experimentally
or follow people over time or compare responses of people across age groups to make
inferences about time. Experimental methods typically involve two steps. Researchers
first obtain self-­ratings, then provide unexpected feedback. The goal is to see whether
people refuse to accept feedback that does
not fit their self-image. Nonexperimental
methods also involve more than one step. Either the researcher tracks the same participants over time or samples participants at
different ages or points in their life course to
make inferences about stability.
Experiments typically indicate that people
go to great lengths to protect the images they
have of themselves, ignoring or reinterpreting contradictory information and distancing themselves from the source of such information (Markus, 1977; Swann, 1983,
1985). Similar stability is inferred from
longitudinal and cross-­sectional studies.
For example, Marsh and his colleagues have
examined the stability of domain-­specific
self-­concepts, asking children, adolescents,
and young adults to respond to a battery of
self-­report measure ratings of their abilities
in a number of domains (e.g., school, peer
relationships, and problem solving). Reports
are relatively stable in that the participants’
relative ranks remain similar over time. They
also show some fluctuation, such that higher
ratings are reported on average by children
and later adolescents rather than middle adolescents (Marsh, 1989; Marsh, Craven, &
Debus, 1998).
Research on identity development (Erikson, 1951, 1968) assumes growth toward
stability; that is, though children have identities, the adolescent to adulthood transition
is theorized as involving reexamination of
important identities. After trying on various
possibilities, adolescents and young adults
are predicted to stake a claim to an identity that then remains stable. Although cognizant that identity is a context-­dependent
mental construct, research in this tradition
manipulates neither social context to test effects on identity nor identity to test effects on
behavior. Instead, the focus is on empirically
testing whether identity changes over time as
expected and, once an identity is committed
to, whether it is stable. Researchers focus
on operationalizing the process of committing to an identity and testing whether this
process is best described linearly (progress
toward identity commitment) or cyclically
(exploration and commitment followed by return to exploration; e.g., Bosma & Kunnen,
2001; Waterman, 1999). Rather than test
for stability by assessing the extent to which
children, adolescents, and young adults rate
their self-­concepts of abilities in various domains consistently over time, these researchers use closed-ended scales of self-­reported
extent of exploration and engagement either
in specific identities (e.g., ethnic identities;
Ong, Fuller-­Rowell, & Phinney, 2010) or in
identity as a whole (e.g., Crocetti, Rubini, &
Meeus, 2008).
So-­called “stage theories” of identity development posit a fixed attitude about the
self, something that is difficult to document
in the attitude field as a whole (on attitudes,
see Schwarz, 2007). Indeed, these theories
have generally failed to find support when
tested over time (Cross, Smith, & Payne,
2002). That is, people who seemed to be at
one stage of identity development often report being at an earlier stage at later points
in time (Cross et al., 2002; Strauss & Cross,
2005). However, stage theory research continues. For example, research on racial and
ethnic identity commonly asks whether adolescents move from exploration to commitment, as would be predicted by the theory
(e.g., Kiang & Fuligni, 2009; Matsunaga,
Hecht, Elek, & Ndiaye, 2010).
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
The Self as Context Sensitive
Even though lay and theoretical perspectives
focus on stability, it is possible that a stable
self is not necessarily an effective self. To
the extent that the self is a tool for meaning
making, maintaining sense of worth, and
regulating behavior, then an effective self
should be sensitive to new information and
so be malleable and variant across change
in features of the external (time, situation)
and internal (motivation) environment. The
appearance of stability in empirical studies
may be deceptive. Self and identity may appear quite stable or quite changeable depending on how they are assessed. For example,
if features of the situation matter and if the
situation is stable, self and identity will appear stable, making it impossible to learn if
they are context-­dependent. Moreover, since
people tend to experience the self in context,
they may experience stability even though
which aspects of the self are salient may depend on what makes one distinctive in the
moment (McGuire & McGuire, 1988), what
makes one similar to others in the moment
(Brewer, 1991), and one’s immediate feelings
about being similar or distinct (Markus &
Kunda, 1986).
Empirically, it is possible to disentangle
situation-based invariance from situationbased variance by manipulating situations
prior to assessing self and identity. Effects
can be subtle. In an early test, Markus and
Kunda (1986) used an elaborate cover story
to manipulate whether their white, female,
American college student participants experienced their tastes and preferences (e.g.,
about colors, objects, clothes) as being different from or just like the tastes and preferences of others like them. They were then
shown words and asked to click a button
marked “me” if the word described them
and a button marked “not me” if it did not.
Mixed with neutral words were words evoking difference (e.g., unique, different) and
similarity (e.g., average, follower). Last,
participants were asked to provide their associations to six words—three relevant to
being different, and three relevant to being
the same as others. The manipulation did
not influence how people rated themselves.
They chose just as many similarity words
and just as many difference words as “me”
whether they had just experienced their
81
tastes and preferences as being different or
just like others. If the researchers had only
measured the number of “me” responses,
these results would support the prediction
that self-­concept is stable. Indeed, most evidence that self-­concept is stable comes from
repeated assessment using a measure such as
that used in this study.
But the researchers in this study also obtained reaction time (how long it took to respond “me” or “not me”). The manipulation
did influence speed of response. Participants
made to feel similar to others were faster to
endorse “me” words relating to being distinct. What comes to mind quickly may well
influence behavior in the moment more than
what comes to mind more slowly, so that
reaction time may matter in real-world settings. Yet if the goal of research is to make
predictions about how the self and identity
function in real ecologies, it might be useful
to study real situations rather than artificial
ones.
Studying context sensitivity in school,
for example, would require sampling students as they enter varying situations (e.g.,
the hallway, homeroom, afterschool activities, see Oyserman & Packer, 1996) or move
through their social networks (e.g., Kindermann, 1993). Naturalistic studies often find
surprising stability in self-­concept content
and high predictive power of this content
over time. For example, Altschul, Oyserman, and Bybee (2006) found both stability and predictive power in their assessment
of three elements of racial/ethnic identity
(connectedness, awareness of racism, embedded achievement) over four measurement points. Their data collection covered 2
school years and the transition from middle
to high school. Not only were the three elements of racial/ethnic identity stable over
time, but higher endorsement of these three
elements of racial/ethnic identity predicted
better performance over time (controlling
for prior performance). In another study
(Oyserman, 2008), content of racial/ethnic
identity in ninth grade predicted academic
performance and in-class behavior 4 years
later (controlling for prior performance and
behavior).
These studies clearly demonstrate that self
and identity matter for behavior, but do they
also mean that self and identity are basically
stable and not context sensitive? We argue
82
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
that naturalistic studies typically do not
allow inferences about context sensitivity (or
context insensitivity). It is possible that racial/ethnic identity as assessed in these studies is highly sensitive to context but that the
contexts did not feel psychologically different even though assessments were obtained
across different classrooms, schools, and
school years. Experiments allow researchers to manipulate those aspects of context
predicted to be psychologically meaningful; natural settings do not. Thus, naturalistic and experimental research on identity
provide information on different questions:
Does the self appear stable, and can the self
be made to change?
How Strong Is Empirical Support?
A rich array of social science theories assumes that the self matters for life choices
and behavior, but a similarly robust body
of evidence that this is so has yet to be assembled. The theory–­evidence gap means
that, to date, self and identity theories may
or may not provide robust models of what
self and identity do and how they function.
This problem has been noted in some (e.g.,
Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1998;
Markus & Wurf, 1987) but not all reviews
(e.g., Callero, 2003; Stets & Burke, 2003).
However, given the large number of publications evoking self and identity as explanatory factors, failing to attend to the theory–­
evidence gap means that the field as a whole
has not made as much progress as might be
hoped in understanding self and identity as
mental constructs and as forces for action.
This means that context effects on self and
identity may or may not work as theories
describe them, and self and identity may be
more or less powerful as meaning-­making
lenses and motivators of action than theories
describe. At worst, the self may not matter
at all.
While research on autographical memory
is continuing to grow (Fivush, 2011), the
structure of self-­concept(s) in memory is less
understood (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; McConnell, 2011). A main tension is between
theories that assume a single hierarchically
organized self-­concept and theories that do
not. The alternative to a single self hierarchically organized in memory could be that
people have multiple, only loosely associated
self-­concepts stored in memory. But it could
also be that people dynamically create a new
self-­concept each time one is called for. While
appealing to a lay sense that the self must be
a single ­entity, a single-­structure model does
not fit well with how memory and cognition
work generally (Strack & Deutsch, 2004;
Wyer & Srull, 1989), as we consider in the
third section. Therefore, rather than focus
on how a single self-­concept might be structured in memory, much of the literature now
focuses on “working,” “online,” or “active”
self-­concept, one’s salient theory about oneself in the moment, or focuses on a particular
self-­concept content rather than attempting
to study all self-­concepts (e.g., for reviews,
see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Oyserman,
2007; Smeesters et al., 2010; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009). By rooting their formulation
of the self in situated and social cognition
perspectives (Schwarz, 2007, 2009, 2010;
Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007; Wyer & Srull,
1989), these theorists attempt to leverage social science knowledge about how the mind
works to make predictions about the self as
a mental construct (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman & Destin, 2010; Wheeler, DeMarree,
& Petty, 2007).
Social Comparison as Contrast
A large body of research has examined the
contextualized nature of self-­evaluations by
setting up social comparisons. Early formulations assumed that people generally contrast themselves with others and that this
can lead to better or worse self-­evaluations
(for reviews, see Blanton, 2001; Collins,
1996). A large number of experiments randomly assigned people to a no-­comparison
control, an upward comparison condition
(someone more successful), or a downward comparison condition (someone less
successful). Compared to no-­comparison
participants, those in the upward comparison condition reported more negative self­evaluations (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude,
2004; Taylor & Lobel, 1989), while those
in the downward comparison conditions
reported more positive self-­ratings (e.g., Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995).
These results fit with social identity theorists’ argument that downward outgroup
comparisons contribute positively to social
identity (Tajfel, 1981) and imply that people
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
may be motivated to find downward comparisons. But, as it turns out, people do
not always contrast themselves with others. Consider the experiments conducted by
Lockwood and Kunda (1997), who randomly assigned participants to either read materials about a ‘superstar’ student or not, and
then judge their current and future selves. If
people always contrast themselves to others,
then the superstar comparison should have
resulted in more negative self-­evaluations
whether considering oneself now or in the
future. Indeed, students in the superstar
condition did rate their current self more
negatively. However, these same students
rated their future possible self more positively. Why were the results different when considering one’s future possible self rather than
one’s current self? One possibility is that in
the present, participants could clearly see
that they were not like the superstar, so the
superstar was then a comparison standard.
However, in the future, the superstar might
be a role model; that is, participants might
become like the superstar, so the superstar
could be included in their self-­judgment (see
also Tesser & Collins, 1988; Tesser, Martin,
& Cornell, 1996).
Incorporating Others into the Self
Rather than assume that people contrast
themselves with others, a more appropriate question is under what circumstances
are people likely to contrast themselves with
others and under what circumstances are
they likely to include others in their self­judgments? Consider the social context of
school. In many urban school districts, failure rates are so high that students are likely
to be aware of many other students who are
doing poorly in school. If people routinely
contrast themselves with others, then students in these schools should have plenty
of downward social comparison opportunities and consequently judge themselves quite
positively. Oyserman and colleagues (1995,
Study 3) tested this prediction in a sample of
students attending an urban middle school.
Boys in the control condition (not assigned
to a social comparison) did indeed judge
themselves quite positively, rating themselves as highly likely to succeed in school
in the coming year. Academic identities were
just as highly positive for boys assigned to
83
imagine someone they knew who was succeeding in school and how they were similar to this student (assimilate positive) or to
imagine someone they knew who was failing
in school and how they were different from
this student (contrast negative). Effects were
less clear for girls, who seemed more likely
simply to include others in their self-­ratings,
reporting less optimism when considering
others who were failing and more optimism
when considering others who were succeeding.
One possibility is that the girls were more
likely to perceive themselves as connected
and related to others (i.e., have a relational self-­concept; Cross & Madson, 1997;
Markus & Oyserman, 1989). This interpretation was supported in a number of studies
with college students in which women tended to incorporate others’ academic outcomes
into their academic identities (Kemmelmeier
& Oyserman, 2001a, Studies 1 and 2).
Women, whether sampled from an urban
campus with predominantly first-­generation
college students or from an elite public university, rated their academic identities more
negatively if they were randomly assigned
first to consider their similarities with someone they knew who had failed (rather than
consider their differences from this target
other or make no comparison at all). These
effects were especially strong if the comparison other was also a woman. Effects were in
the same direction but weaker for men.
To test the possibility that these effects
were due to relational self-­concept, Kemmelmeier and Oyserman (2001b) assessed
participants’ relational self-­concept (sample
item: “My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am”) before assigning them to either an upward comparison
condition or a no-­comparison control. The
expected gender difference in relational self­concept was obtained (females reported being
more relational than males). However, what
previously seemed to be a gender effect was
really a relational self-­concept effect. Relational self-­concept fully moderated the effect
of upward comparison. Among participants
low in relational self-­concept, those in the
experimental condition (“Think of someone
who is succeeding in school”) rated themselves more negatively than those in the control (no-­comparison) condition. The reverse
occurred for participants high in relational
84
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
self-­concept; those in the experimental condition rated themselves more positively than
those in the control condition.
These effects were replicated using a priming paradigm (Stapel & Koomen, 2001).
After circling the words I, me, and my in a
paragraph or unscrambling sentences including these words, participants were quicker to
focus on differences between themselves and
others. The reverse occurred after circling
the words we, our, and us in a paragraph
or unscrambling sentences including these
words; then participants were quicker to
focus on similarities between themselves and
others. When primed to consider themselves
relationally, participants included negative
as well as positive information about the
other in their self-­judgments. When primed
to consider themselves individualistically,
participants excluded positive as well as negative information about the other from their
self-­judgments. Thus, effects did not seem to
be motivated by a desire to enhance or feel
good about the self.
Outside the laboratory, people may automatically include others with valued attributes in self and identity. For example, Cialdini and his colleagues (1976) tracked college
students over a series of football weekends.
On weekends in which the team won, students were more likely to wear school-theme
clothing and refer to their university as “we.”
On weekends in which the team lost, students were less likely to wear school-theme
clothing and were more likely to refer to their
university as “they.” People have been found
to include in the self successful sports teams
(Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998;
Boen, Vanbeselaere, & Feys, 2002), winning politicians (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Pandelaere, et al., 2002), and successful marketers
(Arnett, German, & Hunt, 2003). While in
these studies people include successful and
not failed others in their self-­concepts, as we
noted earlier, when made to feel connected,
people do include both positive and negative
features of others in the self.
Summary
Self and identity have been argued to be
stable, as well as context sensitive. Evidence
for both predictions is available. Yet simply
providing supporting evidence does not address questions about process. We have just
summarized evidence that people sometimes
assimilate others into their self-­concepts and
identities, at other times contrastingly compare themselves to these others, and at still
other times seem to do neither. Thus, the
real question seems to be not whether context influences self-­concept and identity, but
how this happens. To address these issues,
we return to the notion that thinking is for
doing and articulate what is known about
social cognition as relevant to the task of
predicting how and when contexts construct
online identities, and how these identities
shape behavior.
Thinking Is for Doing
A recurrent theme within social psychology
is that cognition is pragmatic, contextualized, and situated; that is, people think in
order to act—how one thinks is profoundly
shaped by the options available and what
one is trying to do (Fiske, 1992). People
think in contexts that are made up of others,
human artifacts, physical spaces, tasks, and
language (Smith & Semin, 2004). People are
sensitive to meaningful features of their immediate environment and adjust their thinking and doing to what seems contextually
relevant (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fiske,
1992). Taken together this means that, far
from being easily predictable from prior attitudes and judgments, human judgment is
greatly influenced by the information accessible at the moment of decision making
and what that information is taken to mean
(Schwarz, 2007). Like other judgments,
judgments about oneself are situated.
Moreover, mental construal matters; people act based on how a situation feels and
what it seems to be “about” (Cesario, Grant,
& Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 1998; Schwarz,
2007; Schwarz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, &
Yoon, 2007). This implies that which identity comes to mind and what it means is dynamically constructed. While experiments
manipulate salient information to test particular processes, outside the laboratory,
information can become accessible through
rapid, associative networks and spreading activation, as well as through deliberative reflection on images, semantic content,
goals, rules, and feelings (Lieberman, 2007;
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As we discuss in
the section on dual processing, repeatedly
accessed identities may become part of the
associative network and so become rapidly
accessed; however, features of the immediate situation influence which other elements
of the associative network are cued. Thus,
what an identity actually means is likely to
differ from situation to situation.
Cognitive and behavioral adjustments to
what contexts seem to be about are often automatic and outside of conscious awareness
(Smith & Collins, 2010; Smith & Conrey,
2010; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). This
means that people may experience self and
identity as stable, failing to notice sensitive
adjustment of identity to pragmatics of the
situation. However, the effects of contextually salient information on judgment can be
profound (Schwarz, et al., 2003; Wyer &
Srull, 1989). Implications for self and identity research are addressed throughout this
and the final section.
Inclusion–Exclusion
In the previous section, we reviewed evidence that people sometimes compare themselves to others and incorporate others into
identity. People were assumed to use others
automatically as a standard of comparison.
Yet the evidence did not support this assumption; people sometimes included and
sometimes excluded others from their judgments. To understand when people include
contextually salient information into their
judgments about themselves and when they
exclude this information, using it to form a
standard against which to judge themselves,
we now turn to the social cognition literature. The inclusion–­exclusion model makes
predictions for when each process is likely to
occur (Bless & Schwarz, 2010; also termed
the assimilation–­contrast model—Blanton,
2001; Schwarz et al., 2003).
The inclusion–­exclusion model makes the
general prediction that information that feels
relevant to the judgment task can be used in
formulating either a standard for judgment
or the target of judgment itself. People are
likely to include social information into self
judgment unless the social information is
marked as different enough from the self
that it becomes excluded and is used as a
contrasting standard. Sufficient difference
85
from the self may be cued by information
that is non-­normative or extreme, and by
information referring to a particular instance or exemplar rather than to a broader
category. Given that a specific other person
is not oneself, people include specific others
in their self-­judgments only if the other feels
close or similar to oneself.
Consider a person listening to a lecture.
She begins to wonder about herself: To what
extent has she been successful in life so far,
and how likely is she to succeed in the future? Whatever comes to mind is likely to be
used in her self-­assessments. As reviewed in
Bless and Schwarz (2010), the direction of
the contextual influence can be classified as
assimilation or contrast. Assimilation occurs
when the implication of salient information
has a positive relationship with the resulting
judgment. Contrast occurs when the implication of salient information has a negative
relationship with the resulting judgment.
Returning to our example, contextually
salient information may influence either
what she understands success to mean in
the moment (the standard of comparison)
or which self-­attributes come to mind in
making the judgment (aspects of the target). Information that informs the standard
results in a mental process of contrasting
the target with the information that comes
to mind. For example, the speaker may be
boring or interesting; the audience may be
following along avidly or nodding off apathetically. If she is at or above the standard
set by the focus of her attention, she will
see success as likely for her and recall her
past as being pretty successful as well. Information that informs the target results in
a mental process of assimilating the target to
the information that comes to mind. In this
case, the same speaker and audience traits
will be included into her own judgment. For
example, the audience may include students
from her cohort or her major; the speaker
may be an alumnus of the same undergraduate institution as she is or they may share
other attributes (a birthday, initials, favorite
color) that facilitate assimilation. Then the
speaker’s vitality and the audience’s capacity
can inform her about herself. Thus, whether
a person uses contextual information as a
contrasting standard on which to judge the
self or assimilates contextual information
into self-­judgment is not a feature of the in-
86
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
formation but rather a result of how the information is construed in the moment. One
important way in which this has been studied is by demonstrating that people are more
likely to assimilate when primed to use a collectivistic (relational “us”) self-­concept and
are more likely to contrast when primed to
use an individualistic (separate “me”) self­concept. Online sense of identity is importantly influenced by whether information in
the situation is included or contrasted with
the identity.
Metacognitive Experience
Metacognitive experiences—the feelings
that emerge while thinking, and one’s interpretation of these feelings—are another
major source of construal. People assume
that feelings of fluency (ease) or disfluency
(difficulty) that arise in the judgment context are informative for the judgment itself.
Often this may be the case. However unless provided a reason to consider source,
people are not sensitive to the source of their
metacognitive experiences. This means that
they are likely to use even irrelevant metacognitive experiences to inform judgment
(Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1996).
For example, if people experience difficulty thinking of reasons they are satisfied with
their marriage, they infer that they are not
satisfied; if they experience difficulty reading
a recipe, they infer that it is more difficult to
make; if they experience difficulty reading
a question, they infer that they are not confident of the answer (Schwarz 2004; Song
& Schwarz, 2008a, 2008b). While these
inferences may often be correct, in these
experiments, difficulty was manipulated to
be external to and irrelevant for the judgment: Sometimes the print font was difficult
to read, other times participants were asked
to list many reasons—a standard deviation
more than the average person otherwise
would. This was difficult. However, unless
their attention was drawn to the extraneous
source of their experienced difficulty, people
assumed that their metacognitive experience
was informative.
Much as metacognitive experience influences judgment in other domains, metacognitive experience is likely to matter in
judgments of self and identity. The meaning
attributed to fluency and disfluency matters,
and fluency and disfluency have different effects on judgments about self and identity
depending on how these feelings are interpreted. What feels right in the moment often
takes on the characteristics of a percept;
that is, because it is effortlessly experienced,
it feels necessarily true. This feeling of effortlessness, in turn, leads to a sense that
one has accessed a “true” aspect of self or
identity, with the implication that the self
is stable. As outlined in the next section
on dual-­processing models, this feeling of
effortlessness may arise as a result of associative (System 1) reasoning rather than the
“truth” value of the online identity. Implications of mental construal for identity are
drawn out in detail in the section “Dynamic
Construction.”
Dual‑Processing Models
While not used in theories of self and identity, dual-­processing models of automatic and
controlled cognition have been proposed in
nearly every other domain of psychology
(Chaiken & Trope 1999). Dual-­processing
models distinguish between two processing
systems, one that is effortful and controlled
and another that is effortless and automatic
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The effortless reflexive system involves associative links that
are turned on via spreading activation. The
effortful reflective system involves systematic and sequential processing of information (Lieberman, 2007; Strack & Deutsch,
2004). These systems have been variously
labeled System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich &
West, 2000), intuition and reasoning (Kahneman, 2003), and impulsive and reflective
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004), among other
terms.
Earlier formulations often postulated that
thinking occurs in one or the other system.
This left open the question of how thinking
would shift from one system to the other.
Emerging evidence clarifies that thinking
occurs simultaneously in both systems; that
is, System 1, the reflexive system, is always
at work. System 2, the reflective system, may
or may not be active. It becomes active when
one has the time, resources, and desire to
consider carefully (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
When both systems are working, each pro-
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
cesses with its own style, and whether a judgment or action is produced by the processing
outcome of System 1 or 2 will depend on
whether action takes place immediately or
later among other constraints.
Associative, reflexive thinking, the results of System 1 reasoning, feels intuitive,
spontaneous, and effortless. These are the
“I just feel it in my gut” kinds of thoughts.
In contrast, reflective thinking, the results
of System 2 reasoning, feels effortful, like
the result of thinking about and applying
a set of rules or explicit strategies to solve
a problem. Although intuitive reasoning is
sometimes associated with heuristic processing, with errors in judgment or reasoning,
and with emotion-based and with nonconscious processing, the two systems differ not
in consciousness or accuracy but in speed,
flexibility, and, it seems, in the neural networks involved (Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 2007).
Because reflexive processing seems to
occur without intention or effort, it has been
called natural assessment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Natural assessments include
assessment of physical properties (e.g., size,
distance, loudness) as well as assessment of
some abstract properties, including similarity, causal propensity, surprisingness, affective valence (e.g., whether something is good
or bad), and mood (Kahneman & Frederick,
2002). These natural assessments are immediately available as bases for choice and
action.
In contrast, in the reflective system, behavior is elicited as a consequence of a decision process. This decision process is often
assumed to take on an expectancy–value
framework (Feather, 1982). Thus, before
acting, a person can bring to mind how
much an outcome is valued and how likely
action is to produce the outcome of choice.
This formulation is consistent with a number
of psychological theories about goal pursuit,
including theories of reasoned action (Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1977), theories of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988), theories of goal pursuit (Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004;
Gollwitzer & Kirchhof, 1998), self-­efficacy
theories (Bandura, 1977, 2001), and expectancy–value theories (Eccles et al., 1983) that
describe how the self is involved in action. It
is certainly likely that sometimes people ef-
87
fortfully consider who they are, what their
goals are and, therefore, what they should
do in the moment (reflective, System 2 processing). However, it also seems likely that
people often go with the flow—the typically
timid may suddenly agree to bungee jumping
if the associative network firing of the moment include both “me” and “not like that
old fogey” (reflexive, System 1 processing).
Since System 1 is always working and System 2 takes effort, people under cognitive
load often process only with System 1 unless
they are motivated to do otherwise, perhaps
if a particularly important self-goal comes
to mind.
Dual-­processing models make predictions for moment-to-­moment processing of
information. At any moment in time, both
reflexive and reflective processing may be
occurring. Intentions to act in accordance
with one’s identity are unlikely to be carried
out unless they come to mind in the moment. While planned intentions to act are
likely part of the reflective system, behavior
can arise from either system. Generally, percepts (either external or internally imagined)
effortlessly and automatically cue a cascade
of spreading activation to percepts stored in
memory and associatively linked to the current percept. What comes to mind is likely
to depend on which associative links have
been recently activated. For example, seeing
a homeless woman can cue images of one’s
own mother, a feared future image of oneself
without tenure, or fears of crime. Both the
reflexive and reflective systems are involved
in processing this information. While the self
was initially predicted to be located only in
neural systems involved in the reflective system, the neural evidence now suggests that
the self is located in neural systems involved
with both reflexive and reflective processing as dual-­processing models would predict
(Lieberman, 2007). Sometimes people effortfully consider whether an identity describes
them—­drawing content from memory and
planning behavior that fits who they are and
who they want to become. Other times, effortful processing does not occur or is beaten to the punch line by quicker associative
processing. In these situations, an identity
associatively cued through spreading activation will lead to a behavior that feels right
in context.
88
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Summary
Pragmatic, contextualized, and situated approaches make two critical points. First,
cognitive processes are context-­sensitive
and, second, context sensitivity does not
depend on conscious awareness. Thinking
and action are influenced by what comes
to mind and feels relevant in the moment.
What comes to mind is a subset of all one’s
existent knowledge. This means that psychologically meaningful situations influence cognition: “Cognition emerges from
moment-by-­moment interaction with the environment rather than proceeding in an autonomous, invariant, context-free fashion”
(Smith & Semin, 2004, p. 56). Thinking is
influenced by the context in which it occurs,
including physical and social features of the
external context, as well as the experience
of thinking itself. Human thinking is not
invariant and context free; rather, people
think flexibly and are responsive to the immediate environment. The context sensitivity highlighted by situated approaches does
not depend on conscious awareness of the
impact of psychologically meaningful features of situations on cognition. Not only do
situational effects not require explicit justification, but also drawing attention to the potential influence of context can change the
response (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Schwarz, 2007,
2010).
The pragmatic, contextualized, and situated nature of cognition and its reliance on
dual processing has a number of important
implications for self and identity. First, what
people think about themselves is influenced
by meaningful features of their immediate
environment. Like other judgments, judgments about the self are formed in the moment. Features of the environment simultaneously cue associative and more systematic
processes, both yielding clues as to who one
is and why that matters in the moment. Second, the behavioral consequences of salient
aspects of identity are influenced by what
the situation seems to be about. Both the
content and behavioral implications of an
online identity are dynamically constructed
in the moment. The implications of dynamic
construction for how self-­concept and identities matter are articulated in more detail in
the next section.
Dynamic Construction
We began our chapter with a number of
core precepts, noting that self and identity
theories converge in asserting that the self,
self-­concept, and identity are mental construals, social products, and forces for action that feel stable yet are malleable. We
outlined how the terms have been used, provided examples of the evidence marshaled
for each, and called into question the field’s
ability to move forward if it does not better
integrate with emerging understanding of
how the mind works, as outlined in the previous section, “Thinking Is for Doing.” In
this section, we consider the possibility that
self-­concepts and identities are not only malleable but actually dynamically constructed
with each use, and the implications of this
possibility for the impact of self-­concepts
and identities on how people think and what
they do. We summarize our thoughts using
the identity-based motivation model as our
organizing framework (Oyserman, 2007,
2009a, 2009b).
Identity‑Based Motivation
People interpret situations in ways that are
congruent with their currently active identities, prefer identity-­congruent actions over
identity-­incongruent ones, and interpret any
difficulties they encounter in light of identity
congruence. When action feels identity congruent, experienced difficulty in engaging in
relevant behaviors simply highlights that the
behavior is important and meaningful. Conversely, when action feels identity incongruent, the same difficulty suggests that engaging in these behaviors is pointless and “not
for people like me.” These perceptions have
important downstream effects on meaning
making and behavior both in the moment
and over time.
The identity-based motivation model has
three core postulates that can be termed dynamic construction, action and procedural
readiness, and interpretation of ease and
difficulty. From the first postulate (dynamic construction) comes the prediction that
which identities come to mind, what these
identities are taken to mean, and therefore,
which behaviors are congruent with them
are dynamically constructed in context (even
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
though identities feel stable and separate
from contexts). From the second postulate
(action and procedural readiness) comes the
prediction that identities cue readiness to act
and to make sense of the world in terms of
the norms, values, and behaviors relevant to
the identity. Which actions are relevant and
what sense to make of situations depends on
identity content, which itself is dynamically
constructed.
The third postulate, interpretation of ease
and difficulty, involves two aspects. With
regard to the metacognitive experience of
ease, the prediction is that ease in bringing
to mind an identity or in performing a behavior will be interpreted as affirming the
centrality of the identity and the identity relevance of the behavior. “If it feels right, it
must be the true me.” Unfortunately, important identities are not always easy to bring to
mind, and persistently engaging in identity­relevant behaviors is rarely simple. Thus, a
straightforward prediction from the identity-based motivation model is that, all things
being equal, people will often fail in their
pursuit of self-­change. Whichever identities
come to mind in the moment and whichever
behaviors are easily linked to them are the
ones a person will pursue. However, the second aspect of metacognitive experience is
the interpretation of experienced difficulty.
An identity-based motivation model predicts
that the consequence of experienced difficulty will depend on the questions an experience of difficulty is used to answer, as
detailed next.
Dynamic Construction
The identity-based motivation model proposes that people are motivated to interpret
situations and act in ways that feel congruent with their identities. But identities are
dynamically constructed, so what an identity means depends on how it is comes to
mind in the moment and what difficulties
working on it are taken to mean. Consider racial/ethnic identity. On the one hand,
identity content is associated with larger
social structure. For example, a study of
the relationship between neighborhood relative segregation and racial/ethnic identity
among low-­income African American and
Latino youth in Detroit found that segre-
89
gation is associated with content of racial/
ethnic identity (Oyserman & Yoon, 2009).
Living in a neighborhood with higher than
city-­average segregation was associated with
less endorsement and living in a neighborhood with lower than city-­average segregation was associated with more endorsement
of the three components of racial/ethnic
identity relevant to academic performance
(connectedness, awareness of racism, and
embedded achievement).
On the other hand, what racial/ethnic
identity is taken to mean is also actively constructed in the moment, as demonstrated
in the following study. In this study, also
involving low-­income students, researchers
randomly assigned children to attend their
regular elective class or an alternative elective twice a week over the first weeks of
the fall marking period (Oyserman, Bybee,
& Terry, 2006). Children in the alternative
elective participated in group activities designed to dynamically create a feeling that
school-­focused possible identities were congruent with other important identities and a
means to attain desired and avoid undesired
adult identities. As predicted, the school­focused possible identities and congruence
of these identities with racial identity increased in intervention, not control youth,
and these school-­focused possible identities predicted change in behavior. Increased
school-­focused possible identities predicted
more in-class participation, more time spent
doing homework, and better grades and attendance.
Another set of studies, also involving low­income African American and Latino children, directly tested the impact of dynamically creating a sense that school-­focused
possible identities are a means of attaining
desired possible selves (Destin & Oyserman, 2010, Studies 1 and 2). In a first study,
low-­income students were asked to consider
themselves 10 years in the future. Responses
were content-coded for whether they reported attaining their future self as dependent on
or independent of school. Students who saw
their future self as depending on school success worked harder in school and got better
grades. In the second study, a new sample of
low-­income students was randomly assigned
to receive either Census information showing the connection between educational at-
90
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
tainment and average earnings in their state
or Census information on average earnings
for top athletes and entertainers—the future
selves described in Study 1 as independent of
school success. As predicted, compared with
children in the education-­independent future
self condition, children in the education­dependent future self condition not only
said that they would spend more time on
homework that night but they were also
eight times more likely to actually hand in
an extra-­credit assignment.
Thus, which identities come to mind and
what they mean in context is a function
of both chronic and situational cues, with
some situations more likely to cue particular
identities or constellations of identities than
others. People’s interpretation of cued identities (or identity constellations) depends on
the pragmatic meaning of these identities in
the particular context.
The identity-based motivation model
shares with social identity (Tajfel & Turner,
2004), self-­categorization (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and
symbolic self-­completion (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981) theories the notion that people
act to increase felt similarity to salient social
identities, particularly when membership
might feel threatened. Like many theories in
cultural psychology (Triandis, 1989, 1995),
the identity-based motivation model predicts
that differences in identity expression reflect
differences in the relative salience of organizing self-­concept structures, including individual and collective self-­concepts.
However, by arguing for dynamic construction, the identity-based motivation
model moves beyond these prior formulations in a number of ways. It predicts that
what an identity means and, therefore,
what is congruent with it, is dynamically
constructed in the moment and can motivate both positive and self-­undermining
or even self-­destructive behaviors. It also
predicts that when behavior feels identity
congruent, the experience of difficulty in
working on the behavior is likely to be interpreted as meaning that the behavior is an
important part of the process, not an indication that the behavior is impossible or unnecessary.
Evidence for the first premise comes from a
series of studies examining the shifting effect
of identity on health (Oyserman, Fryberg, &
Yoder, 2007). In a series of studies we (Oyserman et al., 2007, Studies 1 and 2) demonstrated that minority and majority groups
held the same baseline beliefs about the efficacy of a healthy lifestyle in reducing health
risks. Nevertheless, minority group members
were more likely to identify unhealthy behaviors such as eating fried foods, drinking
soda, and adding salt as ingroup ­behaviors
and less likely to identify as ingroup-­defining
healthy behaviors such as flossing teeth or
exercising as an adult. These differences
were striking because participants were college students at an elite private university.
More important, their perceptions of what
is or is not an ingroup thing to do made their
correct baseline beliefs about the efficacy of a
healthy lifestyle vulnerable to identity-based
motivational concerns.
In follow-up studies, we primed minority
(e.g., Latino, African American, or American Indian) and low-­income identities and
found that when these identities were salient, participants’ access to information
about health and belief in the preventive capacity of health behaviors was undermined.
Latino and African American children
randomly assigned to consider their social
identities reported higher fatalism about
their future health as adults than children
in the control group (Oyserman, Fryberg, et
al., 2007, Study 3). They were also less successful in accessing their health knowledge,
making more mistakes on a health knowledge quiz than children in the control group
for whom social identities were not primed
(Oyserman, Fryberg, et al., 2007, Study
4). Moreover, smoking, weight gain, and
high sugar consumption were rated as less
likely to negatively influence health among
African American and Native American
participants randomly assigned to a social
identity–­salient condition rather than a control condition (Oyserman, Fryberg, et al.,
2007, Studies 5–7).
Action and Procedural Readiness
When an identity is cued, what comes to
mind is not simply the content of the identity but also relevant actions and ways of
thinking about the world. Consider research
demonstrating that chronic or momentarily
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
primed relational (“us”) self-­concept results
in assimilating others’ characteristics as
part of the self (Kemmelmeier & Oyserman,
2001a; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). More generally, priming people to consider themselves
as separate and distinct influences how they
process information generally. The idea is
that what comes to mind when an identity is
cued is not simply content but also a general
way of making sense of the world. Recall
that self-­concepts can be structured to focus
on “me” or “us,” to focus on the actor’s perspective “mind’s eye” or the observer’s perspective “eye of another.” Identities take on
these structural aspects.
Thus, identities are predicted to include
not only content but also a mindset or way
of making sense of the world. People asked
to describe how they are separate and distinct from their family and friends or to circle singular “me” or plural “us” first-­person
pronouns in a paragraph do not just describe
relevant personal or social relational self­traits and characteristics, they also apply the
primed mindset or self-­concept structure to
other tasks (Oyserman et al., 2009). Those
primed with a collectivistic mindset are better at tasks in which integrating helps—they
remember where objects were located in
space better than those primed with a individualistic mindset. Those primed with an
individualistic mindset are better at tasks in
which separating helps—they are quicker at
Stroop tasks requiring that one ignore some
perceptual cues while processing others
(saying out loud the color in which the word
red is printed requires ignoring the semantic
meaning as irrelevant).
Of course, everyone has an array of identities; some personal “me” self-­concepts and
others social “us” self-­concepts. At the same
time, as discussed in previous sections, there
is some evidence of chronic between-group
differences in the propensity for “me” and
“us” self-­concepts to be well ­articulated.
Markus and Oyserman (1989) reviewed and
synthesized the extant literature on gender differences in mathematical and spatial
abilities. Men and women, they found, differed in how they navigated and made sense
of three-­dimensional space. Men were more
likely to report mental imagery separated
from their own perspective, seeing the world
as the crow flies rather than as they tra-
91
versed it. These gender differences mapped
onto differences in performance on tasks
that involved rotation of objects in three­dimensional space.
Markus and Oyserman (1989) proposed
that self-­concept structure could predict these effects. Although both men and
women can have social identities based in
gender, men and women may differ in the
propensity to use social and relational information in articulating identities and therefore in the likelihood of accessing “me” or
“us” self-­concepts. Men were predicted to
be more likely to define the self as separated
from contexts and relationships, and women
were predicted to be more likely to define
the self as embedded in contexts and relationships. Gender differences in self-­concept
structure should have implications for which
cognitive procedures are accessible, and this
in turn should predict differences in spatial
tasks benefiting from different cognitive
procedures. In particular, separate “me”
self-­structure should make separating cognitive procedures generally accessible, which
should make context easier to ignore and
therefore tasks involving three-­dimensional
rotation in space easier.
Whereas Markus and Oyserman’s (1989)
argument was based on a review of the gender literature on cognitive style, subsequent
focus shifted to cross-­national differences
arguing for cultural differences in personal
versus social focus of self-­concept (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). At the same time,
cross-­national differences in judgment and
decision making that were also emerging
seemed to parallel the previously described
gender differences in self-­concept structure
(for a review, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). For example, European
Americans seem to focus on the figure and
ignore background in processing visual information generally, whereas Chinese (Nisbett, 2003) and Japanese (Kitayama, Duffy,
Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) people seem to
focus on the relationship between figure and
background, congruent with a social identity focus on the self as connected and related.
While none of these models directly tested
mediation, all implied an important role of
self-­concept structure.
Triandis and his colleagues (Trafimow et
al., 1991; Triandis, 1989) provided an initial
92
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
demonstration that these effects may be due
to dynamic construction of identity. They
demonstrated that they could reliably predict
whether people would use more personal or
social identities to describe themselves by
shifting participants’ in-the-­moment focus
on themselves as similar to or different from
friends and family. They also showed that
once a personal or social identity focus was
cued in one situation, it was likely to be used
again in another situation. In the past 20
years, this basic finding has been replicated
using a variety of situational cues, showing
that people in the East and the West describe
themselves using more or fewer social identities depending on which is cued in a given
situation (for a review, see Oyserman & Lee,
2008a, 2008b).
How identity is cued matters for behavior. The answer to one of our opening questions—“How about offering a bribe to win
that contract?”—has been demonstrated to
vary depending on whether people considered the question after being primed with
a “me” or an “us” self-­concept (Mazar &
Aggarwal, 2011, Study 2). People were randomly assigned to read a paragraph and
circle “me” first-­person singular or “us”
first-­person plural pronouns. They took on
the role of a sales agent competing against
other agents to win a contract and had to
decide whether to offer or not to offer a
bribe. Those in the “me” condition were less
likely to do so. This replicated the authors’
secondary analyses of large cross-­national
datasets showing that bribery is more common in collectivistic compared to individualistic countries (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011,
Study 1). Thus, shifts in identity focus shift
readiness to act, even in ways people generally view as dishonest.
Interpretation of Difficulty
This formulation of identity as including
both content (what one thinks about when
one thinks about oneself) and interpretation
of accompanying metacognitive process (reflection on how thinking feels) first appeared
in the writing of William James (1890/1927).
More recently, social cognition research has
demonstrated the importance of considering
both the content of thoughts and the meaning attributed to feelings of ease or difficulty
associated with these thoughts (see Schwarz,
2002, 2004, 2010). Images of oneself having
current and future identities are inextricably
linked with feelings of ease or difficulty, and
what these feelings mean depends on the
question one asks oneself in regards to the
feeling. If the question is “Is this important
to me?” then experienced difficulty may be
interpreted as meaning that the answer is
“Yes, this is important to me. Otherwise,
why am I working so hard?” Conversely, if
the question is “Is this the real me?” then
experienced difficulty may be interpreted
as meaning that the answer is “no” because
feelings of ease are commonly interpreted as
truth and genuineness.
Common interpretations of felt difficulty
are that if it is hard to think of or hard to do,
then it is less likely to be true (Higgins, 1998;
Schwarz & Clore, 1996). This would imply
that the experience of metacognitive difficulty can easily be understood to mean “not
true for me.” However, a number of studies
have documented that other interpretations
are possible (Schwarz, 2004, 2010). Sports
stories abound with reinterpretation of the
meaning of experienced difficulty (e.g., “No
pain, no gain”) and the need to keep trying (e.g., “You miss 100% of the shots you
don’t take”). Similarly, when attempting to
attain a school-­focused identity, the metacognitive experience of difficulty is generally
interpreted as “not the true me” but could
be reinterpreted to mean other things. Difficulty can be viewed as a normative part of
the process (e.g., “Success is 1% inspiration
and 99% perspiration”). Difficulty can also
provide evidence of progress (e.g., “The important things in life are the ones you really
have to work for”). If difficulty and failures
along the way are viewed as critical to eventual success, then difficulty is evidence of
striving.
This means that interpretation of difficulty is critical if identities are actually to influence behavior over time. Consider the behaviors required to attain a “good student”
identity or a “healthy person” identity. To be
or become a good student, one would need
not only to pay attention in class, bring home
and do homework, take notes and study for
exams, but also to forsake or at least limit
activities that might interfere with these
choices. What difficulty means depends on
the questions the experience of difficulty is
assumed to answer. Consider the “good stu-
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
dent” identity. A student experiencing difficulty in schoolwork might ask a number of
questions. If the question is “Have I studied
enough?” then difficulty could be taken to
mean that one had not studied enough. In
this case, difficulty should result in increased
effort. But if the question is “Is this really
the true me?” then difficulty could be taken
to mean that one cannot become a good student. In this case, difficulty should result in
reduced effort.
To test this notion, elementary school children in an afterschool program for children
with difficulties in school were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (difficulty
without interpretation, difficulty with interpretation), asked to describe their possible
selves for the coming year, and given a novel
math task (Novin & Oyserman, unpublished data). All children were reminded that
they were participating in the afterschool
program. In the no-­interpretation condition,
children were asked to give an example of
a time that a school task was difficult for
them. In the interpretation condition, children were asked to give an example of a time
that a school task was difficult for them but
they kept trying because school is important
to them. As predicted, interpretation mattered. Children in the interpretation condition described more possible selves and were
more persistent at the novel math task.
The common interpretation of difficulty
as meaning low ability fits well with Americans’ belief that intelligence and many other
abilities are fixed rather than malleable
(Dweck, 2002). For effort to matter, one
must believe that ability is malleable and
can be incrementally improved rather than
believe it is a stable trait or entity (Dweck,
2002). Students holding incremental theories are more likely to persist over time,
as do students convinced to hold an incremental theory (Dweck, 2002). The identitybased motivation model provides a framework within which to understand entity and
incremental formulations as naive theories
explaining what difficulty means. If effort
matters (incremental theory of ability), then
difficulty is likely to be interpreted as meaning that more effort is needed. However if
effort does not matter (an entity theory of
ability), then difficulty is likely to be interpreted as meaning that ability is lacking, so
effort should be suspended.
93
Summary
Identity-based motivation is the readiness to
engage in identity-­congruent action (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006;
Oyserman, Fryberg, et al., 2007) and to use
identity-­congruent mindsets in making sense
of the world (Oyserman et al., 2009). Although often experienced as stable, identity
is highly malleable and situation-­sensitive,
so which aspect of identity comes to mind is
a dynamic product of that which is chronically accessible and that which is situationally cued. Moreover, because what is cued is
a general mindset rather than a specific content list, identity’s impact on action and procedural readiness is likely to occur outside of
conscious awareness and without systematic
processing.
When situations cue an identity (e.g., female), what the cued identity carries with it
is not a fixed list of traits (e.g., warm, energetic). Rather, the cued identity carries with
it a general readiness to act and make sense
of the world in identity-­congruent terms,
including the norms, values, strategies, and
goals associated with that identity, as well
as the cognitive procedures relevant to it.
What exactly this readiness looks like is dependent on what the cued identity comes to
mean in the particular context in which it
is cued. Being female is likely to mean different things in different contexts—a job
interview, a date, an appointment at a hair
salon. This does not imply that identities do
not predict behaviors over time but that the
predictive power of an identity depends on
the stability of the contexts in which it is
cued. Because differing contexts cue different aspects of an identity and differing intersections with other identities, the identity–­
behavior link may be opaque. The effect of
an identity will be stable over time to the
extent that individuals repeatedly encounter psychologically isomorphic situations
because in each instance the situation will
engender readiness to take the same actions
(for a related discussion of the stability of
attitudes see Schwarz, 2007). Once a choice
becomes identity linked, it is automatized.
If it feels identity-­syntonic, it feels right and
does not require further reflection. On the
other hand, if it feels nonsyntonic to identity, it feels wrong and this feeling also does
not invite further reflection.
94
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Wrapping Up
and Looking Forward
We began this chapter with the proposition
that self and identity feel stable though they
are probably not really stable in the way
people experience them. Rather, identities
are dynamically constructed in context. We
argued that both experienced stability and
context-based dynamic construction are
helpful. Experienced stability allows people
to make predictions based on their sense that
they know themselves and increases their
willingness to invest in their own futures.
At the same time context-based dynamic
construction facilitates sensitive attunement
of behavior to contextual affordances and
constraints. We articulated how this might
happen by using the identity-based motivation model.
We also summarized core terms, noting
that while self and identity are often used interchangeably, some clarity can be attained
by considering them as a series of nested constructs, with self as the most encompassing
term, self-­concepts being embedded within
the self, and identities being embedded
within self-­concepts. The self has a reflexive capacity, the ability to consider oneself
as an object and to become aware that one is
doing so. Like other object categories (cats,
tables), the self is a fuzzy construct. This
means that people have a sense that they
know what their self is, even though what
exactly it refers to differs from situation to
situation. Just as cats vary—some are softer
and more friendly than others but they all
share an essential “catness”—people do not
always act the same but are in some essential
way still the same. Though one may be disappointed in the antics of one’s messy, rude,
or disorganized self, or surprised at the abilities of one’s self under fire and even say “I
did not know I had it in me,” one still refers
to some essence of “me.” Firmly separating
oneself into truly different entities, having
multiple personalities, is rare and is considered a form of mental illness.
The mental content included in the various
“me” selves can be called self-­concept. Self­concepts include content as well structure
and evaluative judgment. These evaluative
judgments about the self are typically termed
self-­esteem or self-­efficacy. Self-­esteem and
self-­efficacy research dominated American
self-­concept research for many years but
the field has now broadened substantially.
Self-­concept structure has been studied in a
number of ways, but two main lines of research focus on what we term mindsets and
hierarchy. Hierarchy research starts with
the assumption that diverse content about
the self must be ordered in some hierarchy
and focuses on factor analysis of evaluative judgments about the self in an array of
content domains. The goal is to determine
whether self-­concepts are nested, overlapping, or basically orthogonal (independent
of one another). Other research on structure
examines structure of positive and negative
self-­concept content and complexity or number of self-­perceived self-­concept domains.
While not uninteresting, we find hierarchy
research currently less exciting than the second main branch of research on self-­concept
structure, which we term mindset research.
Mindset researchers assume that people
have multiple self-­concepts distinguished by
differences in organizing frame, content, and
downstream consequences for judgment,
perception, and behavior. This research is
dominated by the study of individualistic
compared to collectivistic self-­concepts, but
also includes research on perspective taking
(immersed, distal) and temporal focus (near,
far). Research on mindsets is a particularly
exciting new frontier for self researchers because it demonstrates that people have multiple self-­concept structures available to them
that can be easily cued but differ in their
content and consequences. For example,
an individualistic mindset entails not only
using more abstract language to describe
oneself and thinking of oneself as separate
and distinct, but it also has consequences
for perception and mental construal. Specifically, an individualistic mindset increases
the likelihood that objects in the world will
be perceived as separate rather than related,
and that contextual information will be
used as a standard of comparison or ignored
completely rather than assimilated into self­judgments.
Moving to what is meant by identity, we
suggested that identities include content
and readiness to act and employ mindsets
to make meaning. Personal identities are
a person’s traits, characteristics and attributes, goals and values, and ways of being.
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
Confusingly, these are often termed selves
in the social science literature. Social identities are a person’s roles, interpersonal relationships and group memberships, and the
traits, characteristics, attributes, goals, and
values congruent with these roles, relationships, and memberships.
To better understand where these identities come from and how they matter for
judgment and behavior both in the moment
and over time, we proposed a better integration of study of the self, self-­concept, and
identity with the study of mental processes.
Three core predictions emerge from this
integration, which we term dynamic construction, action and procedural readiness,
and interpretation of ease and difficulty. As
clarified by modern dual-­processing models
of cognition, thinking involves both reflexive and reflective processing. Reflexive, System 1, processing is rapid and effortless, the
result of spreading activation of associative
networks. This form of processing is posited
always to be operating in the background,
yielding quick responses that feel fluent. The
other form of processing, reflective, or System 2, processing is slower and more effortful, the result of systematic consideration of
content and application of rules. This form
of processing operates when people have the
time, motivation, and mental capacity to engage it.
Given that people have a large store of
autobiographical knowledge in memory,
almost any associative network is likely to
eventually link to some aspect of autobiographical knowledge. This implies that reflexive processing is likely to yield an association with some aspect of self, so that an
identity or aspect of identity will frequently
come to mind as part of ongoing System 1
processing whether or not System 2 processing is engaged. However what that identity
means in the moment depends in large part
on what else also comes to mind in this moment of reflexive processing. Most information is assumed to be relevant and people assimilate whatever comes to mind into their
online identity judgments, using this information as a standard to judge the self only
under certain circumstances. That is, once
an identity comes to mind through reflexive
processing, what it means depends on the
other information that comes to mind in
context. This information is included in the
95
identity unless there is reason to use it as a
standard of comparison for the identity.
Returning to the Midas touch that makes
self, self-­concept, and identity feel interesting, we recommend three avenues for future research. First, self, self-­concept, and
identity are interesting because they seem
to predict behavior over time. How does
this actually happen? Second, self-­concept
and identity are interesting because whatever comes to mind feels real and stable yet,
as we have demonstrated, self-­concept and
identity are highly malleable and can even
be dynamically constructed in the moment,
so stability often is more seeming than real.
How do these two experiences coexist and
under what circumstances does awareness of
shifts, malleability, and dynamic construction improve well-being? Third, self-­concept
and identity are interesting because the self
exists over time. People can and do imagine
the self continuing over time and from childhood can imagine some desired and undesired future identities. Though people sometimes invest current effort to attain these
future identities, often they underperform,
failing to attain their aspirations perhaps
because they misinterpret feelings of difficulty as meaning that goals are impossible
or feelings of ease as meaning that they do
not need to try. What predicts current investment in the future self, whether particular future identities or the well-being of the
future self more generally (e.g., savings for
retirement, practicing healthy lifestyles to
reduce future risk) is thus a third important
venue for future research.
Acknowledgment
The funding support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to Daphna Oyserman is gratefully acknowledged.
References
Abrams, D. (1994). Social self-­regulation [Special
issue: The self and the collective]. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 473–483.
Abrams, D. (1999). Social identity and social
cognition. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.),
Social identity and social cognition (pp. 197–
229). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
96
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Ajzen, I. (1988), Attitudes, personality, and behavior. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude–­
behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and
review of empirical research. Psychological
Bulletin, 84, 888–918.
Aloise, P. A. (1993). Trait confirmation and disconfirmation: The development of attribution
biases. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 55, 177–193.
Altschul, I., Oyserman, D., & Bybee, D. (2006).
Racial–­ethnic identity in mid-­adolescence:
Content and change as predictors of grades.
Child Development, 77, 1155–1169.
Arkes, H. R., & Kajdasz, J. (2011). Intuitive theories of behavior. In B. Fischoff & C. Chauvin
(Eds.), Intelligence analysis: Behavioral and
social scientific foundations (pp. 143–168).
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Arnett, D., German, S., & Hunt, S. (2003). The
identity salience model of relationship marketing success. Journal of Marketing, 67,
89–105.
Banaji, M. R., & Prentice, D. A. (1994). The self
in social contexts. Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 297–332.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-­efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191–215.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An
agentic perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 1–26.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680–
740). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bengtsson, S. L., Dolan, R. J., & Passingham, R.
E. (2011). Priming for self-­esteem influences
the monitoring of one’s own performance. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6,
417–425.
Berger, J., & Rand, L. (2008). Shifting signals to
help health: Using identity signaling to reduce
risky health behaviors. Journal of Consumer
Research, 35, 509–518.
Bernhardt, P. C., Dabbs, J. M., Fielden, J. A.,
& Lutter, C. D. (1998). Testosterone changes
during vicarious experiences of winning and
losing among fans at sporting events. Physiology and Behavior, 65, 59–62.
Blanton, H. (2001). Evaluating the self in the context of another: Assimilation and contrast effects in social comparison. In G. B. Moskowitz
(Ed.), Cognitive social psychology: The Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of
Social Cognition (pp. 75–87). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Bless, H., & Schwarz, N. (2010). Mental construal and the emergence of assimilation and contrast effects: The inclusion/exclusion model.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
42, 319–373.
Boen, F., Vanbeselaere, N., & Feys, J. (2002). Behavior consequences of fluctuation group success: An Internet study of soccer-team fans.
Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 796–781.
Boen, F., Vanbeselaere, N., Pandelaere, M.,
Dewitte, S., Duriez, B., Snauwaert, B., et al.
(2002). Politics and basking-in-­reflected-glory:
A field-study in Flanders. Basic and Applied
Social Psychology, 24, 205–214.
Bosma, H., & Kunnen, E. S. (2001). Determinants and mechanisms in ego identity development: A review and synthesis. Developmental
Review, 21, 39–66.
Botvinik, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands
“feel” touch that eyes see. Nature, 391, 756.
Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being
the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17,
475–482.
Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identification and
intergroup conflict: When does ingroup love
become outgroup hate? Rutgers Series on Self
and Social Identity, 3, 17–41.
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is
this “we”?: Levels of collective identity and
self representations. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 71, 83–93.
Brewer, M. B., & Roccas, S. (2001). Individual values, social identity, and optimal distinctiveness. In C. Sedikides & M. Brewer
(Eds.), Individual self, relative self, collective
self (pp. 219–237). Philadelphia: Psychology
Press.
Bronson, M. B. (2000). Self-­regulation in early
childhood: Nature and nurture. New York:
Guilford Press.
Brown, J. (1998). The self. Boston: McGrawHill.
Callero, P. (2003). The sociology of the self. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 115–133.
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of trait information as
evidence for spontaneous inference generation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
6, 840–856.
Carver, C., & Scheier, M. (1978). Self-­focusing
effects of dispositional self-­consciousness,
mirror presence, and audience presence. Jour-
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36,
324–332.
Carver, C., & Scheier, M. (1990). Principles of
self-­regulation: Action and emotion. In E. T.
Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook
of motivation and cognition: Vol. 2. Foundations of social behavior (pp. 3–52). New York:
Guilford Press.
Cesario, J., Grant, H., & Higgins, E. T. (2004).
Regulatory fit and persuasion: Transfer from
“feeling right.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 388–404.
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual­process theories in social psychology. New
York: Guilford Press.
Chen, X., & Chen, H. (2010). Children’s social
functioning and adjustment in the changing
Chinese society. In R. K. Silbereisen & X.
Chen (Eds.), Social change and human development: Concepts and results (pp. 209–226).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cialdini, R., Borden, R., Thorne, A., Walker,
M., Freeman, S., & Sloan, R. (1976). Basking
in reflected glory. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 45, 1232–1242.
Cohen, D., & Gunz, A. (2002). As seen by the
other . . . : Perspectives on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners
and Westerners. Psychological Science, 13,
55–59.
Collins, R. L. (1996). For better or for worse:
The impact of upward social comparison on
self-­evaluations. Psychological Bulletin, 119,
51–69.
Cooley, C. (1902). Human nature and the social
order. New York: Scribner’s.
Cousins, S. (1989). Culture and self-­perception
in Japan and the United States. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 124–131.
Crocetti, E., Rubini, M., & Meeus, W. (2008).
Capturing the dynamics of identity formation
in various ethnic groups: Development and
validation of a three-­dimensional model. Journal of Adolescence, 31, 207–222.
Cross, S. E., & Madson, L. (1997). Models of the
self: Self-­construals and gender. Psychological
Bulletin, 122, 5–37.
Cross, W. E., Jr., Smith, L., & Payne, Y. (2002).
Black identity: A repertoire of daily enactments. In P. B. Pedersen, J. G. Draguns, J. E.
Lonner, & J. E. Trimble (Eds.), Counseling
across cultures (5th ed., pp. 93–108). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Davies, P. G., Spencer, S. J., & Steele, C. M.
(2005). Clearing the air: Identity safety mod-
97
erates the effects of stereotype threat on women’s leadership aspirations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 276–287.
Destin, M., & Oyserman, D. (2010). Incentivizing education: Seeing schoolwork as an investment, not a chore. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 46, 846–849.
Diesendruck, G., & Eldror, E. (2011). What children infer from social categories. Cognitive
Development, 26, 118–126.
Dweck, C. (2002). The development of ability
conceptions. In A. Wigfield & J. Eccles (Eds.),
Development of achievement motivation
(pp. 57–88). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Eccles, J., Adler, T., Futterman, R., Goff, S., Kaczala, C., Meece, J., et al. (1983). Expectancies,
values and academic behaviors. In J. Spence
(Ed.), Achievement and achievement motives
(pp. 76–146). San Francisco: Freeman.
Elliot, A. (2001). Concepts of the self. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Ellmers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self
and social identity. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 161–186.
Elmore, K. C., & Oyserman, D. (in press). If
“we” can succeed, so can “I”: Identity-based
motivation and gender in the classroom. Contemporary Educational Psychology.
English, T., & Chen, S. (2011). Self-­concept consistency and culture: The differential impact
of two forms of consistency. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 838–849.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-­concept revisited or
a theory of a theory. American Psychologist,
28, 404–416.
Erikson, E. H. (1951). Childhood and society.
New York: Norton.
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis.
New York: Norton.
Feather, N. T. (1982). Expectations and actions:
Expectancy–value models in psychology.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Felson, R. B. (1993). The (somewhat) social self:
How others affect self-­appraisals. In J. Suls
(Ed.), Psychological perspectives on the self
(Vol. 4, pp. 1–26). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Ferguson, M., & Bargh, J. (2004). Liking is for
doing: The effects of goal pursuit on automatic
evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87, 557–572.
Fishbach, A., & Ferguson, M. J. (2007). The goal
construct in social psychology. In A. W. Kruglanski & T. E. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed.,
pp. 490–515). New York: Guilford Press.
98
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Fiske, S. T. (1992). Thinking is for doing: Portraits of social cognition from daguerreotype
to laserphoto. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 877–889.
Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 559–582.
Fivush, R., & Hammond, N. (1990). Autobiographical memory across the preschool years:
Toward reconceptualizing childhood amnesia.
In R. Fivush & J. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing
and remembering in young children: Emory
Symposia in Cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 223–248).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Forgas, J. P., & Williams, K. D. (Eds.). (2002).
The social self: Cognitive, interpersonal, and
intergroup perspectives. New York: Psychology Press.
Frable, D. (1997). Gender, racial, ethnic, sexual,
and class identities. Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 139–162.
Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. (1999).
“I” value freedom, but “we” value relationships: Self-­construal priming mirrors cultural
differences in judgment. Psychological Science, 10, 321–326.
Gecas, V. (1982). The self-­concept. Annual Review of Sociology, 8, 1–33.
Gelman, S. (1999). The role of essentialism in
children’s concepts. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 27, 55–98.
Gelman, S. A., & Diesendruck, G. (1999).
What’s in a concept?: Context, variability, and
psychological essentialism. In I. E. Sigel (Ed.),
Development of mental representation: Theories and applications (pp. 87–111). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in
everyday life. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
Gollwitzer, P., Fujita, K., & Oettingen, G. (2004).
Planning and the implementation of goals. In
R. F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of self-­regulation: Research, theory, and
applications (pp. 211–228). New York: Guilford Press.
Gollwitzer, P., & Kirchhof, O. (1998). The willful pursuit of identity. In J. Heckhausen & C.
Dweck (Eds.), Motivation and self-­regulation
across the lifespan (pp. 389–423). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego:
Fabrication and revision of personal history.
American Psychologist, 35, 603–618.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1989). The
self as a memory system: Powerful, but ordi-
nary. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 41–54.
Guendelman, M., Cheryan, S., & Monin, B.
(2011). Fitting in but getting fat: Identity
threat as an explanation for dietary decline
among U.S. immigrant groups. Psychological
Science, 22, 959–967.
Harmon-Jones, E., Simon, L., Greenberg, J.,
Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & McGregor, H.
(1997). Terror management theory and self­esteem: Evidence that increased self-­esteem
reduced mortality salience effects. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 24–
36.
Harter, S. (2003). The development of self­representations during childhood and adolescence. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.),
Handbook of self and identity (pp. 610–642).
New York: Guilford Press.
Harter, S., Bresnick, S., Bouchey, H., & Whitesell, N. R. (1997). The development of multiple role-­related selves in adolescence. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 835–854.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-­discrepancy: A theory
relating self and affect. Psychological Review,
94, 319–340.
Higgins, E. T. (1989). Self-­discrepancy theory:
What patterns of self-­beliefs cause people to
suffer? Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 93–136.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention:
Regulatory focus as a motivational principle.
In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1–46). New
York: Academic Press.
Hogg, M. A. (2003). Social identity. In M. R.
Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of
self and identity (pp. 462–479). New York:
Guilford Press.
Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P.
J. Burke (Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories (pp. 111–136). Stanford CA:
Stanford University Press.
James, W. (1927). The principles of psychology.
New York: Dover. (Original work published
1890)
Jiang, Y., Cho, A., & Adaval, R. (2009). The
unique consequences of feeling lucky: Implications for consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 171–184.
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. (1972). The actor
and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the
causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins,
& B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
the causes of behavior (pp. 79–94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics.
American Economic Review, 93, 1449–1475.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution
in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and
biases (pp. 49–81). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Kalish, C. W. (2002). Children’s predictions of
consistency in people’s actions. Cognition, 84,
237–265.
Kemmelmeier, M., & Oyserman, D. (2001a).
Gendered influence of downward social comparison on current and possible selves. Journal
of Social Issues, 57, 129–148.
Kemmelmeier, M., & Oyserman, D. (2001b). The
ups and downs of thinking about a successful
other: Self-­construals and the consequences of
social comparisons. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 311–320.
Kernis, M. H., Cornell, D. P., Sun, C. R., Berry,
A. J., & Harlow, T. (1993). There’s more to
self-­esteem than whether it is high or low: The
importance of stability of self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,
1190–1204.
Kernis, M. H., Paradise, A. W., Whitaker, D. J.,
Wheatman, S. R., & Goldman, B. N. (2000).
Master of one’s psychological domain: Not
likely if one’s self-­esteem is unstable. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,
1267–1305.
Kettle, K., & Häubl, G. (in press). The signature
effect: How signing one’s name influences
consumption-­related behavior. Journal of
Consumer Research.
Kiang, L., & Fuligni, A. (2009). Ethnic identity
in context: Variations in ethnic exploration
and belonging within parent, same-­ethnic
peer, and different-­ethnic peer relationships.
Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 38, 732–
743.
Kihlstrom, J. F., Beer, J. S., & Klein, S. B. (2003).
Self and identity as memory. In M. R. Leary
& J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and
identity (pp. 68–90). New York: Guilford
Press.
Kihlstrom, J. F., & Cantor, N. (1984). Mental
representations of the self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 1–47.
Kindermann, T. (1993). Natural peer groups as
contexts for individual development: The case
99
of children’s motivation in school. Developmental Psychology, 29, 970–977.
Kitayama, S., Duffy, S., Kawamura, T., & Larsen, J. (2003). Perceiving an object and its context in different cultures. Psychological Science, 14, 201–206.
Kross, E. (2009), When the self becomes other.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1167, 35–40.
Kross, E., Ayduk, O., & Mischel, W. (2005).
When asking “why” does not hurt: Distinguishing rumination from reflective processing of negative emotions. Psychological Science, 16, 709–715.
Kühnen, U., & Oyserman, D. (2002) Thinking
about the self influences thinking in general:
Cognitive consequences of salient self-­concept.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
38, 492–499.
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., &
Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-­consciousness. Science, 317,
1096–1099.
Lewis, M. (1990). Self-­knowledge and social development in early life. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.),
Handbook of personality (pp. 277–300). New
York: Guilford Press.
Lewis, M., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1979). Social
cognition and the acquisition of self. New
York: Plenum Press.
Lieb, K., Zanarini, M., Schmahl, C., Linehan,
M., & Bohus, M. (2004). Borderline personality disorder. Lancet, 364, 453–461.
Lieberman, M. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 259–289.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-­complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-­related illness and
depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 663–676.
Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars
and me: Predicting the impact of role models
on the self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73, 91–103.
Ma, Y., & Han, S. (2011). Neural representation of self-­concept in sighted and congenitally
blind adults. Brain: A Journal of Neurology,
134, 235–246.
Macrae, C. N., Moran, J. M., Heatherton, T. F.,
Banfield, J. F., & Kelley, W. M. (2004). Medial
prefrontal activity predicts memory for self.
Cerebral Cortex, 14, 647–654.
Markel, P. (2009). If it’s to be, it starts with me!:
The bidirectional relation between goals and
the self. Doctoral dissertation, University of
100
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Wurzburg, Germany. Retrieved July 7, 2011,
from opus.bibliothek.uni-­w uerzburg.de/volltexte/2009/4297/pdf/petramarkeldissertation.pdf.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-­schemas and social processing information about the self. Journal of
Personality and Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Markus, H., Crane, M., Bernstein, S., & Siladi,
M. (1982). Self-­schemas and gender. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 42,
38–50.
Markus, H., & Cross, S. (1990). The interpersonal self. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of
personality: Theory and research (pp. 576–
608). New York: Guilford Press.
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and
the self: Implications for cognition, emotion,
and motivation. Psychological Review, 20,
568–579.
Markus, H., & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and
malleability of the self-­concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 858–866.
Markus, H., & Oyserman, D. (1989). Gender
and thought: The role of the self-­concept. In
M. Crawford & M. Gentry (Eds.), Gender and
thought: Psychological perspectives (pp. 100–
127). New York: Springer-­Verlag.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic
self-­concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–
337.
Marsh, H. W. (1989). Age and sex effects in
multiple dimensions of self-­concept: Preadolescence to early adulthood. Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, 417–430.
Marsh, H. W. (1990). A multidimensional, hierarchical model of self-­concept: Theoretical
and empirical justification. Educational Psychology Review, 2, 77–172.
Marsh, H., Barnes, J. Cairns, L., & Tidman, M.
(1984). Self-­Description Questionnaire: Age
and sex effects in the structure and level of
self-­concept for preadolescent children. Journal of Educational Psychology, 76, 940–956.
Marsh, H. W., Craven, R., & Debus, R. (1998).
Structure, stability, and development of young
children’s self-­concepts: A multicohort–­
multioccasion study. Child Development, 69,
1030–1053.
Matsunaga, M., Hecht, M. L., Elek, E., & Ndiaye, K. (2010). Ethnic identity development
and acculturation: A longitudinal analysis
of Mexican-­heritage youth in the Southwest
United States. Journal of Cross-­C ultural Psychology, 41, 410–427.
Mazar, N., & Aggarwal, P. (2011). Greasing the
palm: Can collectivism promote bribery? Psychological Science, 22, 843–848.
McConnell, A. R. (2011). The multiple self­aspects framework: Self-­concept representation and its implications. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 3–27.
McGuire, W., & McGuire, C. (1988). Content
and process in the experience of self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21,
97–144.
Mead, G. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning
(pp. 179–196). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mita, T. H., Dermer, M., & Knight, J. (1977).
Reversed facial images and the mere-­exposure
hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 597–601.
Mussweiler, T., Rüter, K., & Epstude, K. (2004).
The ups and downs of social comparison:
Mechanisms of assimilation and contrast.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
87, 832–844.
Neisser, U. (1993). The perceived self: Ecological
and interpersonal sources of self knowledge.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nielsen, M., Suddendorf, T., & Slaughter, V.
(2006). Mirror self-­recognition beyond the
face. Child Development, 77, 176–185.
Nigro, G., & Neisser, U. (1983). Point of view
in personal memories. Cognitive Psychology,
15, 467–482.
Nisbett, R. (2003). The geography of thought:
How Asians and Westerners think differently . . . and why. New York: Free Press.
Ong, A. D., Fuller-­Rowell, T., & Phinney, J. S.
(2010). Measurement of ethnic identity: Recurrent and emergent issues. Identity, 10, 39–49.
Onorato, R., & Turner, J. (2002). Challenging
the primacy of the personal self: The case
for depersonalized self-­conception. In Y.
Kashima, M. Foddy, & M. Platow (Eds.), Self
and identity: Personal, social, and symbolic
(pp. 145–178). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Owens, T. J., Robinson, D. T., & Smith-Lovin,
L. (2010). Three faces of identity. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 477–499.
Oyserman, D. (1993). The lens of personhood:
Viewing the self, others, and conflict in a multicultural society. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 65, 993–1009.
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
Oyserman, D. (2001). Self-­concept and identity.
In A. Tesser & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Blackwell
handbook of social psychology (pp. 499–517).
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Oyserman, D. (2007). Social identity and self­regulation. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of
basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 432–453). New
York: Guilford Press.
Oyserman, D. (2008). Racial–­ethnic self­schemas: Multi-­dimensional identity-based
motivation. Journal of Research on Personality, 42, 1186–1198.
Oyserman, D. (2009a). Identity-based motivation:
Implications for action-­readiness, procedural­readiness, and consumer behavior. Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 19, 250–260.
Oyserman, D. (2009b). Identity-based motivation and consumer behavior: Response to
commentary. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 276–279.
Oyserman, D. (in press). Culture as situated cognition: Cultural mindsets, cultural fluency and
meaning-­making. European Review of Social
Psychology.
Oyserman, D., Brickman, D., Bybee, D., & Celious, A. (2006). Fitting in matters: Markers of
in-group belonging and academic outcomes.
Psychological Science, 17, 854–861.
Oyserman, D., Brickman, D., & Rhodes, M.
(2007). Racial–­ethnic identity in adolescence:
Content and consequences for African American and Latino and Latina youth. In A. Fuligni (Ed.), Contesting stereotypes and creating identities: Social categories, identities and
educational participation (pp. 91–114). New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Oyserman, D., Bybee, D., & Terry, K. (2006).
Possible selves and academic outcomes: How
and when possible selves impel action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91,
188–204.
Oyserman, D., Bybee, D., Terry, K., & Hart­Johnson, T. (2004). Possible selves as roadmaps. Journal of Research in Personality, 38,
130–149.
Oyserman, D., Coon, H., & Kemmelmeier, M.
(2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions
and meta-­analyses. Psychological Bulletin,
128, 3–72.
Oyserman, D., & Destin, M. (2010) Identitybased motivation: Implications for intervention.
Counseling Psychologist, 38, 1001–1043.
Oyserman, D., & Fryberg, S. A. (2006). The
101
possible selves of diverse adolescents: Content
and function across gender, race and national
origin. In J. Kerpelman & C. Dunkel (Eds.),
Possible selves: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 17–39). Huntington, NY: Nova.
Oyserman, D., Fryberg, S., & Yoder, N. (2007).
Identity-based motivation and health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,
1011–1027.
Oyserman, D., Gant, L., & Ager, J. (1995). A
socially contextualized model of African
American identity: Possible selves and school
persistence. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 69, 1216–1232.
Oyserman, D., Harrison, K., & Bybee, D. (2001).
Can racial identity be promotive of academic
efficacy? International Journal of Behavioral
Development, 25, 379–385.
Oyserman, D., Kemmelmeier, M., Fryberg, S.,
Brosh, H., & Hart-­Johnson, T. (2003). Racial­ethnic self-­schemas. Social Psychology Quarterly, 66, 333–347.
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W.-S. (2007). Priming
“culture”: Culture as situated cognition. In S.
Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of
cultural psychology (pp. 255–279). New York:
Guilford Press.
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008a). Does
culture influence what and how we think?:
Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 311–342.
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008b). A situated cognition perspective on culture: Effects
of priming cultural syndromes on cognition
and motivation. In R. M. Sorrentino & S.
Yamaguchi (Eds.), Handbook of motivation
and cognition across cultures (pp. 237–265).
New York: Elsevier.
Oyserman, D., & Markus, H. (1993). The sociocultural self. In J. Suls & A. Greenwald (Eds.),
Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 4,
pp. 187–220). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Oyserman, D., & Markus, H. R. (1998). Self as
social representation. In S. U. Flick (Ed.), The
psychology of the social (pp. 107–125). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Oyserman, D., & Packer, M. (1996). Social cognition and self-­concept: A socially contextualized model of identity. In J. Nye & A. Brower
(Eds.), What’s social about social cognition?:
Research on socially shared cognition in small
groups (pp. 175–201). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Oyserman, D., & Sorensen, N. (2009). Understanding cultural syndrome effects on what
102
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
and how we think: A situated cognition model.
In R. Wyer, Y.-Y. Hong, & C.-Y. Chiu (Eds.),
Understanding culture: Theory, research and
application (pp. 25–52). New York: Psychology Press.
Oyserman, D., Sorensen, N., Reber, R., & Chen,
S. X. (2009). Connecting and separating
mindsets: Culture as situated cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97,
217–235.
Oyserman, D., & Uskul, A. K. (2008). Individualism and collectivism: Societal-level processes with implications for individual-level and
society-level outcomes. In F. van de Vijver, D.
van Hemert, & Y. Poortinga (Eds.), Multilevel
analysis of individuals and cultures (pp. 145–
173). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Oyserman, D., & Yoon, K.-I. (2009). Neighborhood effects on racial–­ethnic identity: The undermining role of segregation. Race and Social
Problems, 1, 67–76.
Pelham, B., & Wachsmuth, J. (1995). The waxing and waning of the social self. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 825–
838.
Pronin, E., Olivola, C., & Kennedy, K. (2008).
Doing unto future selves as you would do unto
others: Psychological distance and decision
making. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 34, 224–236.
Rholes, W. S., & Ruble, D. N. (1984). Children’s
understanding of dispositional characteristics of others. Child Development, 55, 550–
560.
Rosenberg, M. (1979). Conceiving the self. New
York: Basic Books.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and
his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 10, 173–280.
Schwarz, N. (2002). Situated cognition and
the wisdom of feelings: Cognitive tuning. In
L. Feldman Barrett & P. Salovey (Eds.), The
wisdom in feeling: Psychological processes in
emotional intelligence (pp. 144–166). New
York: Guilford Press.
Schwarz, N. (2004). Metacognitive experiences
in consumer judgment and decision making.
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14, 332–
348.
Schwarz, N. (2007). Attitude construction:
Evaluation in context. Social Cognition, 25,
638–656.
Schwarz, N. (2009). Mental construal in social
judgment. In F. Strack & J. Förster (Eds.),
Social cognition: The basis of human interaction (pp. 121–138). Philadelphia: Psychology
Press.
Schwarz, N. (2010). Meaning in context: Metacognitive experiences. In B. Mesquita, L. Feldman Barrett, & E. R. Smith (Eds.), The mind
in context (pp. 105 –125). New York: Guilford
Press.
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Wänke, M., & Winkielman, P. (2003). Accessibility revisited. In G.
Baudenhausen & A. Lambert (Eds.), Foundations of social cognition (pp. 51–77). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and
phenomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins &
A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology:
Handbook of basic principles (pp. 433–465).
New York: Guilford Press.
Schwarz, N., Oyserman, D., & Peytcheva, E.
(2010). Cognition, communication, and culture: Implications for the survey response
process. In J. A. Harkness, M. Braun, B. Edwards, T. P. Johnson, L. Lyberg, P. P. Mohler,
et al. (Eds.), Survey methods in multinational, multiregional and multicultural contexts
(pp. 177–190). New York: Wiley.
Schwarz, N., Sanna, L. J., Skurnik, I., & Yoon,
C. (2007). Metacognitive experiences and the
intricacies of setting people straight: Implications for debiasing and public information
campaigns. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 39, 127–161.
Schwinghammer, S. A., Stapel, D. A., & Blanton,
H. (2006). Different selves have different effects: Self-­activation and defensive social comparison. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32, 27–39.
Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. B. (2001). Individual self, relational self, collective self. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Semin, G. (2009). Language, culture, cognition:
How do they intersect? In R. Wyer, C.-Y. Chiu,
& Y.-Y. Hong (Eds.), Understanding culture:
Theory, research, and application (pp. 259–
270). New York: Psychology Press.
Serpe, R. (1987). Stability and change in self:
A structural symbolic interactionist explanation. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50, 44–55.
Showers, C. J., Abramson, L. Y., & Hogan, M.
E. (1998). The dynamic self: How the content
and structure of the self-­concept change with
mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 478–493.
Shrauger, J. S., & Schoeneman, T. J. (1979).
Symbolic interactionist view of self-­concept:
4. Self, Self-­Concept, and Identity
Through the glass darkly. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 549–573.
Smeesters, D., Wheeler, S. C., & Kay, A. C.
(2010). Indirect prime-to-­behavior effects:
The role of perceptions of the self, others, and
situations in connecting primed constructs to
social behavior. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 42, 259–317.
Smith, E. R., & Collins, E. C. (2010). Situated
cognition. In L. Feldman Barrett, B. Mesquita,
& E. R. Smith (Eds.), The mind in context
(pp. 126–145). New York: Guilford Press.
Smith, E. R., & Conrey, F. R. (2010). Mental
representations are states, not things: Implications for implicit and explicit measurement. In
B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit
measures of attitudes (pp. 247–264). New
York: Guilford Press.
Smith, E., & Semin, G. (2004). Socially situated
cognition: Cognition in its social context. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
36, 53–117.
Smith, E., & Semin, G. (2007). Situated Social
Cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 132–135.
Smith, G. C., & Oyserman, D. (2011). Yes we
can!: Cuing effort with Obama. Manuscript
under review.
Song, H., & Schwarz, N. (2008a). Fluency and
the detection of misleading questions: Low
processing fluency attenuates the Moses illusion. Social Cognition, 26, 791–799.
Song, H., & Schwarz, N. (2008b). If it’s hard to
read, it’s hard to do: Processing fluency affects
effort prediction and motivation. Psychological Science, 19, 986–988.
Spears, R., Gordijn, E., Dijksterhuis, A., &
­Stapel, D. (2004). Reaction in action: Intergroup contrast in automatic behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30,
605–616.
Stanovich, K., & West, R. (2000). Individual
differences in reasoning: Implications for the
rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–665.
Stapel, D. A., & Koomen, W. (2001). I, we, and
the effects of others on me: How self-­construal
level moderates social comparison effects.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
80, 766–781.
Steele, C., Spencer, S., & Aronson, J. (2002).
Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
34, 379–440.
103
Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2003). A sociological
approach to self and identity. In M. R. Leary
& J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and
identity (pp. 128–152). New York: Guilford
Press.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and
impulsive determinants of social behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8,
220–247.
Strauss, L. C., & Cross, W. E., Jr. (2005). Transacting black identity: A two-week daily diary
study. In G. Downey, J. S. Eccles, & C. M.
Chatman (Eds.), Navigating the future: Social
identity, coping, and life tasks (pp. 67–95).
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Stryker, S. (1980). Symbolic interactionism: A
social structural version. Menlo Park, CA:
Benjamin Cummings.
Stryker, S., & Burke, P. (2000). The past, present, and future of identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63, 284–297.
Sui, J., & Han, S. (2007). Self-­construal priming
modulates neural substrates of self-­awareness.
Psychological Science, 18, 861–866.
Swann, W. B. (1983). Self-­verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self.
In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Social
psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2,
pp. 33–66). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Swann, W. B., Jr. (1985). The self as architect
of social reality. In B. Schlenker (Ed.), The
self and social life (pp. 100–125). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Swann, W. B., & Bosson, J. (2010). Self and
identity. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 589–628). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (2004). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In J. Jost
& J. Sidanius (Eds.), Political psychology: Key
readings (pp. 276–293). New York: Psychology Press.
Tarrant, M., & Butler, K. (2011). Effects of self­categorization on orientation towards health.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 50, 121–
139.
Taylor, S., & Lobel, M. (1989). Social comparison activity under threat: Downward evaluation and upward contacts. Psychological Review, 96, 569–575.
Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-­evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. Advances
104
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 181–
227.
Tesser, A., & Campbell, J. (1983). Self-­definition
and self-­evaluation maintenance. In J. Suls &
A. Greenwald (Eds.), Social psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2, pp. 1–31). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tesser, A., & Collins, J. F. (1988). Emotion in social reflection and comparison situations: Intuitive, systematic, and exploratory approaches.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
55, 695–709.
Tesser, A., Martin, L. L., & Cornell, D. P. (1996).
On the substitutability of self-­protective mechanisms. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh
(Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 48–
68). New York: Guilford Press.
Trafimow, D., Triandis, H., & Goto, S. (1991).
Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 649–655.
Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 96, 506–520.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher,
S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-­c ategorization
theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Turner, R. H. (1956). Role-­taking, role standpoint, and reference group behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 61, 316–328.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction
fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological
Review, 90, 293–3l5.
Wakslak, C., Nussbaum, S., Liberman, N., &
Trope, Y. (2008). Representations of the self
in the near and distant future. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 757–773.
Waterman, A. S. (1999). Identity, the identity statuses, and identity status development: A contemporary statement. Developmental Review,
19, 591–621.
Wheeler, S. C., & DeMarree, K. G. (2009). Multiple mechanisms of prime-to-­behavior effects.
Social and Personality Psychology Compass,
3, 566–581.
Wheeler, S. C., DeMarree, K., & Petty, R.
(2007). Understanding the role of the self in
prime-to-­behavior effects: The active-self account. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 234–261.
Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1981).
Symbolic self-­completion, attempted influence, and self-­deprecation. Basic and Applied
Social Psychology, 2, 89–114.
Wyer, R., & Srull, T. (1989). Memory and cognition in its social context. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Chapter 5
Organization of Self-­Knowledge
Features, Functions, and Flexibility
Carolin J. Showers
Virgil Zeigler-Hill
From a lay perspective, an expert on the organization of self-­knowledge might be expected to provide insight regarding the sorts
of questions that trouble individuals who are
prone to introspection and self-­awareness.
These include the “Who am I?” questions of
identity: what are my characteristics, which
attributes describe me, and which attributes
do not? Related to this are questions of self­determination: What is my potential, where
should I go, and how should I get there?
Surely, people with well-­organized self­concepts know what they are striving for,
have realistic goals for self-­improvement and
self-­change, and feel confident that they can
make choices to further these goals. As laypersons, we also hope that experts on self­concept organization can help us become
more comfortable with who we are; that is,
we expect them to show us how to handle
our moments of self-doubt and how to manage those aspects of ourselves that we wish
to ignore or deny. From the lay perspective,
people with well-­organized self-­concepts
should know who they are, where they are
going, and how to handle unwanted feelings
that emerge over time.
From a scientific perspective, research on
self-­concept organization focuses less on the
character of people with well-­organized self­concepts than on organizational processes—
the dimensions people use to organize self­beliefs, how these dimensions of self-­concept
organization function, and the potential
consequences of each. If there is an especially
adaptive type of self-­concept organization, it
will most likely be one that matches the motivational and emotional context of the individual, rather than one that applies across
the board. Nonetheless, whether by intention
or accident, the literature on self-­concept
organization does speak to the layperson’s
issues of identity, self-­determination, and
self-doubt. This chapter reviews a variety of
approaches to self-­concept organization that
have clear implications for identity and adjustment. We consider how these approaches
address the layperson’s queries and the related issues they raise.
Organization of Self‑Knowledge:
Features and Functions
At first glance, the issues addressed by
studies of self-­concept organization seem
less existential and less enticing than the
issues raised by laypersons. The term self105
106
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
c­ oncept organization typically invokes an
information-­processing model focused on
how items of self-­knowledge are sorted into
categories. Such category structures can
be viewed more broadly as associative networks of self-­relevant beliefs in which the interconnections or associative links between
specific self-­beliefs are paramount (Cantor
& Kihlstrom, 1987).
The basic assumption of this model is that
the amount of self-­relevant information in
memory is vast, so some form of organization
is needed to guide the retrieval of relevant
self-­beliefs in any information-­processing
context. The subset of beliefs retrieved is the
working self-­concept, which contains the
information that will be brought to bear in
that context (Cantor, Markus, Niedenthal,
& Nurius, 1986). Thus, the question of self­organization boils down to a question of accessibility. Organizational factors determine
which self-­beliefs will be brought to bear on
the information-­processing task at hand. In
this way, organizational factors may allow
people to override the content of their self­concepts. Whereas traditional information­processing models suggested that the sheer
amount of positive and negative self-­beliefs
determine a person’s global self-­evaluation,
the present view is that organizational factors may moderate these effects. For instance, even though a great many negative
self-­beliefs may be available in the total self­repertoire, if the self-­concept is organized so
that this information does not become accessible, its impact will be minimal. In this way,
self-­concept organization goes beyond the
content of a person’s self-­beliefs in determining how the self functions (Showers, 2000).
An early approach that generated interest
in the organization of self-­knowledge was
self-­schema theory (Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). For example,
studies of negative self-­schemas supported
the hypothesis that negative information is
both available and highly accessible for depressed individuals (Bargh & Tota, 1988;
Gotlib & McCann, 1984). Some studies
(e.g., those using a Stroop task with priming) did test specific interconnections between self-­relevant beliefs (e.g., Gotlib &
Cane, 1987; Segal, Hood, Shaw, & Higgins,
1988). However, that approach did not directly assess the underlying structure of the
schemas (Segal, 1988). Nonetheless, these
studies supported the idea that negative information about the self is highly organized
for depressed individuals.
The working self-­concept, as well as the
underlying memory structure or associative
network from which it is drawn, is conceived
as continually being reconstructed online
(Markus & Nurius, 1986). Stability of the
interconnections or category structure of
that network, then, corresponds to stability
in an individual’s strategies for accessing that
structure. In this view, an individual may
have favorite strategies for constructing and
updating the working self-­concept that are
more or less stable across contexts (Cantor
& Kihlstrom, 1987). These strategies need
not be conscious or intentional but may simply evolve over time as effective responses.
To the extent that the individual employs the
same organizational strategy over and over,
the structures and interconnections will appear stable. However, because the structure
is continually reconstructed online, and because the individual’s strategies may vary
with context, there is likely to be considerable flexibility in this system as well. Thus, a
college professor may actively construct her
“nutty professor” self-image on the way to a
large lecture class (whether she is aware of
this process or not), except just prior to an
exam, when she recruits the “stern professor” self-image instead.
Reconstructive strategies and the knowledge structures that result from them are
influenced by motivational, emotional, and
cognitive processes within the individual, as
well as by context. The most fundamental
cognitive process involved is that of categorization, based on a perceiver’s judgments
of similarity among relevant beliefs. Thus,
one student may see failure on a history test
as similar and related to failure on the racquetball court (“failure” category), whereas
another student may see failure at history as
similar to success in calculus (“school” category). Emotional processes may influence
the accessibility of similarly valenced beliefs,
as well as categorization processes (Bower,
1981; DeSteno & Salovey, 1997). For example, Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Innes-Ker
(1999) have shown that people in emotional
states are more likely to use emotional features as a basis for categorization (i.e., happy
or sad people would be more likely to use the
“failure” category).
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
Finally, a person’s motivational state influences the type of self-­knowledge that is
relevant and useful (Singer & Salovey, 1988;
Woike, Gershkovich, Piorkowski, & Polo,
1999). For example, a person motivated to
feel better (i.e., to self-­enhance) may activate
the belief “good at calculus” (“school” category) as a form of self-­affirmation, whereas
a person motivated toward accuracy and
problem solving might look for commonalities within a set of failure experiences (“failure” category; cf. Trope, 1986). Taylor and
Gollwitzer (1995) suggest that a deliberative
mindset (when people are considering their
options) should encourage realistic thinking and the activation of both positive and
negative beliefs, whereas an implemental
mindset (when people are carrying out the
actions they have decided on) is associated
with activation primarily of positive beliefs.
The very basic motivational distinction between promotion focus (striving to attain
good outcomes such as advancement and
gain) and prevention focus (avoiding bad
outcomes such as danger and loss) has been
associated with differential accessibility of
episodic memories consistent with the goal
(Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994;
Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). Individuals
with a promotion focus recall events and,
therefore, aspects of self that further a goal
(e.g., waking up early for class, attempting
to catch a movie), whereas individuals with
a prevention focus recall experiences and
related self-­beliefs that involve avoiding an
undesired end state (e.g., not scheduling a
class conflict, trying to avoid getting stuck
on the subway). Presumably, each of these
motivational states involves the reorganization of self-­knowledge to make goal-­relevant
experiences more accessible.
Once a working self-­concept is constructed and self-­knowledge relevant to the current context is accessible, that information
influences subsequent behavior. The active
self-­knowledge can alter interpretations of
the current situation, guide behavior, and
regulate emotions. In turn, each life experience alters the structure of the self-­concept
by building new associations and interconnections among self-­beliefs that, in turn,
affect the selves that are constructed in the
future. However, when it comes to understanding how the self-­concept functions in
specific contexts, researchers typically set
107
aside this view of a working self-­concept
that is actively constructed online and shift
their focus to relatively stable features of
self-­concept organization.
Multiple Selves: Benefits and Costs
For theoretical and empirical purposes, a
person’s overall self-­concept is typically
represented as a set of basic-level categories or self-­aspects (cf. Cantor, Mischel, &
Schwartz, 1982; Linville, 1985; Rosch,
1978). These categories may be idiographically defined, and each represents a distinct
self or persona (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The
basis for these multiple self-­concept categories may vary from person to person, or even
within the same person, but they typically
correspond to distinct roles, contexts, relationships, activities, traits, states, and the
like. The elements of each category are the
specific items of self-­knowledge associated
with that self-­aspect. These elements include
attributes experienced in that self-­aspect,
emotional states, behaviors, and episodic
memories of past experience.
Two types of measure assess multiple self­concept categories. One type emphasizes the
structure of the elements across self-­concept
categories. An example is the self-­descriptive
card-­sorting task originally developed by
Zajonc (1960) and extended by Linville
(1985) to assess self-­complexity (cf. Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992; Showers,
1992a). Respondents are given a stack of
cards, each of which contains a potentially
self-­descriptive attribute. Respondents are
asked to sort the cards into groups, so that
each group represents an aspect of themselves or their lives. They may use the cards
more than once or, if an attribute does not
describe them, they may set that card aside.
The self-­concept categories are generated idiographically (e.g., “me at school,” “me with
my friends,” “me when I’m in a bad mood”;
see Table 5.1 for an example).
The second type of measure focuses on
a person’s tendency to differentiate among
multiple self-­concepts at the category level.
An example is the Self-­Attributes Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham & Swann, 1989; cf.
Marsh, Barnes, & Hocevar, 1985). In this
measure, specific self-­aspect domains (e.g.,
intellectual/academic ability, athletic abil-
108
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
TABLE 5.1. Sample Self-­Descriptive Card Sort (Self-­Complexity = 3.99;
Maximum Value = 5.32)
Not always
“perfect”
Funny
Responsible
Lovable
Looking at the
good in everyone
Giving
Friendly
Capable
Hardworking
–Indecisive
–Lazy
–Isolated
–Weary
–Sad and blue
–Insecure
Intelligent
Happy
Energetic
Outgoing
Fun and entertaining
Communicative
Mature
Independent
Organized
Interested
Hardworking
Lovable
Needed
Friendly
Optimistic
Giving
Interested
Good
work ethic
Making
decisions
Taking
disappointment hard
Good student
Talented
Hardworking
Capable
Intelligent
Interested
Successful
Confident
Mature
Independent
Organized
Energetic
–Indecisive
–Uncomfortable
–Tense
–Insecure
–Sad and blue
–Insecure
–Like a failure
–Hopeless
–Inferior
–Isolated
–Incompetent
Intelligent
Interested
Organized
Hardworking
Successful
Capable
Confident
Fun and entertaining
Helpful
Note. The minus sign (–) indicates negative attributes for the purpose of computing compartmentalization (Showers,
1992a). This sort is perfectly compartmentalized (phi = 1.0). From Showers, Abramson, and Hogan (1998). Copyright
1998 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.
ity, physical attractiveness) are chosen by
the researcher. Respondents provide self­evaluations in each of these domains (e.g.,
rating their intellectual/academic ability
relative to other college students), as well
as other ratings (e.g., perceived importance
of each domain, the certainty of their self­evaluation, a description of their ideal self).
For both types of measures, the ability to
differentiate among different domains or
categories of the self is associated with indicators of overall psychological adjustment
such as mood or global self-­esteem.
Both types of measure oversimplify self­representations. First, the amount of self­knowledge represented is a mere fraction of
what is available in memory stores. More
importantly, the measures do not capture
any interconnections between self-­categories
that allow one aspect of self (e.g., student)
to activate another (e.g., racquetball player)
and imply that the self has a higher-order hierarchical structure (Rosenberg, 1988).
Most theoretical perspectives suggest
that the experience of multiple selves is an
inherent part of existence and contributes
to psychological well-being (e.g., Gergen,
1972). Multiple selves should be the natural
outgrowth of people’s ability to discrimi-
nate the features of different situations and
the attributes, attitudes, and behaviors appropriate in each (Mischel, 1973; Snyder,
1974). The principal advantage of multiple
selves is that they afford flexibility in response. For example, a person with multiple
“tennis selves” can respond appropriately in
each type of match. One can be the “winat-all-costs” self when playing a tournament against an opposing team, but the
“good sport” self when practicing with a
team member (Markus & Wurf, 1987). In
extreme circumstances, multiple selves may
provide resilience against traumatic events.
When the “good scholar” self experiences
a crushing rejection from a top journal, the
“good parent” self may provide a source of
self-­affirmation (Steele, 1988).
What evidence is there that multiple selves
contribute to psychological well-being? Linville (1985, 1987) assessed a feature of multiple self-­concept categories known as self­complexity. A person’s self-­representation is
said to be more complex to the extent that,
in describing the self, a person identifies a
greater number of self-­categories that are
highly elaborated (i.e., represented by many
traits or attributes) and that do not overlap
(i.e., do not share sets of attributes). Thus,
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
each self-­category should have a unique set of
attributes or self-­knowledge associated with
it. To the extent that multiple selves share
many attributes, they are not so distinct,
and that reduces self-­complexity. Researchers have debated the merits of the H dimensionality statistic that is typically used to assess self-­complexity (Attneave, 1959; Locke,
2003; Scott, 1969). Even though H is clearly
associated with the number of self-­aspects
generated, its association with the overlap
of traits among self-­aspects appears to be
curvilinear. Some authors have suggested
alternative indicators of self-­complexity or
self-­concept overlap (e.g., Luo, Watkins, &
Lam, 2009; Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle,
1999).
According to Linville’s (1987) affective
extremity model, self-­complexity minimizes
the amount of the self implicated by external
events, buffering their impact (see McConnell & Strain, 2007, for a review). As predicted, high self-­complexity has been associated
with less negative mood in college students
under conditions of high life stress (Cohen,
Pane, & Smith, 1997; Linville, 1987; see
also Dixon & Baumeister, 1991). Research
also supports the prediction that individuals
with low self-­complexity are more reactive
to both positive and negative experiences
(i.e., affective spillover amplification; McConnell, Rydell, & Brown, 2009; McConnell,
Strain, Brown, & Rydell, 2009). Relatively
simple self-­concept structures may serve to
heighten the impact of recent events by increasing and extending the accessibility of
relevant aspects of self-­knowledge (Renaud
& McConnell, 2002). As a result, individuals who organize their self-­concepts in a less
complex fashion tend to feel considerably
better than other people when their lives are
going well, but feel far worse when things
are going poorly.
Despite the theoretical appeal of multiple
selves, an alternative view is that multiple
selves create a sense of self-­fragmentation
(Block, 1961; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, &
John, 1993). People with multiple selves may
lack a core self, that is, a single self-­concept
category with a consistent set of attributes
that could potentially guide thoughts, feelings, and behavior in a wide range of situations. A person with a core self presumably
has resolved conflicting attributes, identified
the most central features or domains of self,
and integrated them into a coherent whole
109
(James, 1890/1963; Rogers, 1959). The advantage to having a core self is, first of all,
simplicity. New working self-­concepts do
not have to be constructed in each situation,
and it is easy to select appropriate behaviors
that one is capable of performing. It is also
easy to choose which situations to enter because one’s attributes and preferences are
consistent (cf. Campbell, 1990; Setterlund &
Niedenthal, 1993). Finally, having only a few
distinct self-­categories may be less taxing
than maintaining multiple selves (Donahue
et al., 1993; Lecky, 1945). It may be stressful to switch from an ambitious, competitive
self in the workplace to a nurturing, expressive self at home. Such shifts among multiple
selves may also contribute to the experience
of role conflict (Oyserman & Markus, 1998).
In Gergen’s (1991) view, the need to accommodate new experiences, new information,
or new role models may “saturate” the self,
causing us to lose touch with our moral core.
Moreover, it is not clear that nonoverlapping
selves offer the best buffer for stress. Consider an individual who strives to be nurturing both in the workplace and at home. If the
sense of self as a nurturing boss is threatened
by an employee’s failure, then the sense of
self as a nurturing parent could potentially
stabilize self-­perceptions. Thus, the argument that overlap among self-­aspects tends
to augment threats to the self may be misguided. As long as a threat is restricted to one
domain, a simple structure of self-­attributes
could actually provide resilience to threat.
Donahue and colleagues (1993) found
empirical support for the benefits of the
core self in a pair of studies that used an
attribute-­focused measure of multiple selves.
The task was similar to the self-­descriptive
card sort in that participants rated the self­descriptiveness of a set of attributes across
multiple social roles. However, the task was
different from the card sort in that the self­aspect categories (social roles) were provided by the researcher (e.g., student, friend,
employee, son or daughter, and romantic
partner). Individuals whose self-­descriptions
across social roles were more differentiated
(i.e., more distinct) scored lower on measures of psychological adjustment. Greater
self-­concept differentiation (SCD) was also
associated with more role transitions (e.g.,
divorce, job changes) over the lifespan.
The apparent inconsistency between the
findings for self-­complexity and SCD is re-
110
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
solved in part by Linville’s (1985, 1987)
model. Under conditions of low stress, a less
complex self implicates more of the total self
in one’s life experiences (presumably, these
are positive experiences if stress is low). If
participants in the SCD studies typically
were experiencing low stress over their lifetimes, then the two lines of research are
consistent: Both show a negative correlation
between the existence of nonoverlapping
selves (high self-­complexity, high SCD) and
psychological well-being when stress is low.
However, in keeping with the predictions
of the affective extremity model, studies of
vulnerable populations find that low self­complexity characterizes individuals with
borderline personality disorder (Gardner,
1997), an anxious–­ambivalent attachment
style (Mikulincer, 1995), and possibly narcissism (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995), whereas
high self-­complexity characterizes individuals who score high on both sociotropy (interpersonal investment) and autonomy (valuing
independence; Solomon & Haaga, 1993), as
well as traumatized individuals who are not
experiencing psychological distress (Morgan & Janoff-­Bulman, 1994). Lutz and Ross
(2003) found that self-­complexity and SCD
are negatively correlated with each other and
have associations with psychological adjustment that are independent and in opposite
directions (i.e., self-­complexity is positively
associated with adjustment, and SCD is negatively associated with adjustment). Perhaps
a complex representation of oneself across
multiple situations can coincide with a clear
representation of a well-­integrated core self,
producing an exceptionally healthy combination of stability and flexibility. For example, if an individual identified himself, with
equal importance, as being nurturing in his
parenting role and competitive in his professional role, there could still be a core self
(“superdad”) that drives behavior when the
multiple selves are in conflict, and provides a
sense of clarity and consistency for the self.
tiple selves are differentiated is the dimension of time. People easily articulate past,
current, and future or possible selves (Cross
& Markus, 1991; Markus & Nurius, 1986).
Distinct possible selves (concepts of the self
in the future) are the representation of a person’s goals. They embody significant hopes,
dreams, or fears. They provide motivational
anchors, such as the selves that one desires
to avoid. Typically, they combine the representation of directions to approach or avoid
with expectations of success for those goals.
When positive expected selves are balanced
by matching feared possible selves, motivational resources are high. The positive expected selves provide direction, while the
negative feared selves provide energy and
persistence, thereby preventing people from
drifting from their goals (Oyserman &
Markus, 1990). Possible selves also help to
defend the current self by providing a context for one’s current self-view. Thus, if the
present is not going well, a positive possible
self may create hope for the future. As the
current self changes, possible selves may be
adjusted to create discrepancies that are optimal for motivation and well-being (Cross
& Markus, 1991).
In the most complex representation of future or possible selves, a person’s concept
of the self in the future is represented by its
own set of multiple selves, corresponding
to specific roles, situations, relationships,
states, traits, and the like. The complexity
of this set of future self-­concept categories
moderates a person’s affective responses to
feedback relevant to long-term goals, such
that a more complex future self is associated
with less extreme reactions to both positive
and negative feedback (Niedenthal et al.,
1992). Thus, the existence of multiple selves,
differentiated with respect to time, instantiates motivation by providing representations
of goals, defining directions for effort, creating optimal self-­discrepancies, and helping
to regulate emotional responses.
Multiple Selves: A Source
of Motivation
Multiple Selves: Differentiation
by Importance and Self‑Evaluation
We have already indicated how the online
construction of working selves is influenced
by motivational states. However, multiple
selves themselves are often a source of motivation. One dimension along which mul-
Another important function of the differentiation of multiple selves is to regulate a
person’s self-­evaluations or emotional reactions to specific self-­beliefs. We review three
features of self-­organization that contribute
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
to this process: importance differentiation;
compartmentalization and integration; and
self-­concept clarity. Fundamentally, all of
these areas of the literature address the issue
of how a person deals with negative self­knowledge.
Importance Differentiation
In children, the ability to differentiate
among multiple selves emerges around age 8
(Fischer, 1980; Harter, 1999). Prior to this,
children are thought to experience themselves as all-good or all-bad, but in middle
childhood, children begin to articulate that
they are good in math but poor in sports,
for example. Along with this, an additional
organizational feature emerges, namely, the
differentiation of these multiple selves according to their importance. Children who
report that their excellent math skills are important and their poor sports performance
is unimportant have higher self-­esteem than
children for whom positive domains are not
the important ones (Harter, 1999).
In adults, differential importance (DI)
as measured by the SAQ is correlated with
higher self-­esteem (Pelham & Swann, 1989).
The DI measure is the correlation of people’s
self-­evaluations across a nomothetic set of
life domains with their ratings of the perceived importance of each domain for their
concept of themselves. Using a similar measure, Marsh (1993) has argued that correlating domain-­specific self-­evaluations with
nomothetic ratings of importance provides
an equally good indicator of a person’s psychological adjustment. In either case, there
is consistent evidence that differentiation
of self-­evaluations across multiple domains
is linked to global self-­evaluations. These
findings raise the possibility that people
may be able to use self-­differentiation in a
strategic fashion, adjusting either their self­perceptions (in important domains) or their
perceptions of importance (in extremely
positive or extremely negative domains) to
maintain or enhance self-­esteem (cf. Tesser,
2000).
Compartmentalization and Integration
The impact of negative self-­beliefs may also
depend on the evaluative organization of the
self, namely, the distribution of positive and
negative beliefs across self-­aspect categories
111
(Showers,1992a, 2000). Evaluative organization occurs along a continuum, with
the extremes referred to as evaluative compartmentalization (i.e., positive and negative beliefs about the self are separated into
distinct self aspects, such that each contains
primarily positive or primarily negative information) and evaluative integration (i.e.,
self-­aspect categories contain a mixture of
positive and negative beliefs). Examples of
compartmentalized and integrative self­concept structures are shown in Table 5.2.
The evaluative organization of self­knowledge may influence the accessibility of
positive and negative self-­beliefs (Showers,
1995). When an event activates a compartmentalized self-­aspect that contains purely
positive self-­beliefs, a person is flooded with
positive self-­knowledge and is likely to feel
quite good. However, if that person’s self­concept were organized in an evaluatively
integrative fashion, the same event would
activate one or more self-­aspects containing a mixture of positive and negative beliefs. With both positive and negative beliefs
about the self in mind, the person with an
integrative self-­concept structure should
have a less positive (and possibly emotionally conflicted) reaction to the event than
would the person with a compartmentalized
self-­concept.
Of course, if an event primed a purely
negative self-­aspect, then the compartmentalized individual would be flooded with
negative self-­beliefs and feel much worse
than an individual with an integrative self­concept who experienced the same event.
The cumulative impact of compartmentalized organization depends on the frequency
with which purely positive or purely negative
self-­aspects are activated. In other words,
there are two types of compartmentalized
organization, described as “positively compartmentalized” or “negatively compartmentalized” to indicate whether the purely
positive or purely negative self-­aspects are
most important (i.e., most frequently accessed or most central to the self). Integrative structures can also be either “positive”
or “negative” depending on the relative
importance of positive and negative self­aspects. As long as most experiences activate
positive self-­aspects, then a compartmentalized self-­concept structure may be preferable
to an integrative structure. However, when
negative self-­aspects are activated quite fre-
112
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
TABLE 5.2. Examples of Compartmentalized Organization (“Harry”) and Integrative
Organization (“Sally”) for Identical Items of Information about Self as Student
“Harry”
Compartmentalized organization
“Sally”
Integrative organization
Renaissance scholar (+)
Taking tests, grades (–)
Humanities classes (+/–)
Science classes (+/–)
+ Curious
+ Disciplined
+ Motivated
+ Creative
+ Analytical
+ Expressive
– Worrying
– Tense
– Distracted
– Insecure
– Competitive
– Moody
+ Creative
– Insecure
+ Motivated
– Distracted
+ Expressive
– Moody
+ Disciplined
+ Analytical
– Competitive
– Worrying
+ Curious
– Tense
Note. A positive or negative valence is indicated for each category and each item. The (+/–) symbol denotes a mixed-valence
category. From Showers (1992a). Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.
quently, then integrative organization may
be advantageous because it facilitates access
to whatever positive self-­beliefs exist and
thereby minimizes the impact of negative attributes and beliefs.
Findings consistent with the basic model
of evaluative organization have been obtained in numerous studies, most of which
rely on a self-­descriptive card-­sorting task
to assess self-­concept structure (e.g., Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; Showers, 1992a; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan,
1998; Showers & Kling, 1996). In the version of the card-­sorting task used to assess
evaluative self-­organization, respondents
typically sort 40 attributes (20 positive and
20 negative) into groups to represent the different aspects of themselves (i.e., their multiple selves). Respondents also provide ratings
of the positivity, negativity, and importance
of these self-­aspect categories to allow for
a distinction between positive and negative
self-­concept structures (e.g., positive compartmentalization vs. negative compartmentalization). However, results consistent with
the model have also been obtained using a
self-­descriptive listing task (Showers, 1992b,
Studies 1 and 2), a self-­descriptive paragraph
task (Showers, 1992b, Study 2), and the variation of self-­evaluations across life domains
(Showers & Ryff, 1996).
The basic model of evaluative organization predicts that compartmentalized individuals will report either especially positive
or especially poor adjustment (i.e., positive
compartmentalization or negative compartmentalization). Moreover, their psychological adjustment may be unstable, swinging
between these extremes due to shifts in the
salience of positive and negative self-­aspects
as they are activated by recent events. This
means that a person with a positively compartmentalized self-­concept structure who
typically feels quite good may experience
a dramatic change in feelings of self-worth
and mood when a negative event occurs that
activates a purely negative self-­aspect and
floods the individual with an unfamiliar set
of negative attributes. Similarly, individuals
who are typically negatively compartmentalized may suddenly feel much better when a
positive event activates a rarely experienced
purely positive self-­aspect. This “hidden
vulnerability” of compartmentalized individuals should result in both higher highs
and lower lows than those experienced by
integrative individuals, whereas integration
should buffer individuals from heightened
reactivity to the vicissitudes of life because
both positive and negative self-­knowledge
remains accessible regardless of which particular self-­aspects are activated. Support for
this idea comes from a set of studies showing
that compartmentalized individuals were
more reactive than integrative individuals to
negative events occurring in their daily lives
and to a laboratory manipulation concerning social rejection (Zeigler-Hill & Showers,
2007). Previous work found that individuals
who were high on both narcissism and compartmentalization had the most unstable reports of self-­esteem (Rhodewalt et al., 1998),
and that compartmentalized individuals
were especially slow to recover from induced
negative mood (Showers & Kling, 1996). In
studies of clinical relevance, compartmen-
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
talization of the self-­concept structure has
been associated with high social anxiety and
bipolar disorder (Power, de Jong, & Lloyd,
2002; Stopa, Brown, Luke, & Hirsch, 2010;
Taylor, Morley, & Barton, 2007).
Self‑Concept Clarity
Self-­concept clarity, or the tendency to report self-­beliefs that are clear and confidently defined, as well as stable and internally consistent, has been established as an
individual-­difference variable (Campbell,
1990). Individuals with low self-­concept
clarity have clouded notions of who they
are and what traits they possess. Low self­clarity is associated with neuroticism, low
agreeableness, low self-­esteem, low internal
state awareness, chronic self-­analysis, and a
ruminative form of self-­focused attention.
Low self-­clarity affects decision-­making
strategies, making it difficult for people to
identify similar others as models for their
own behavior (Setterlund & Niedenthal,
1993).
Interestingly, no associations between
self-­concept clarity and measures of self­differentiation have been observed (Campbell, Assanand, & Di Paula, 2000). One
possibility is that low self-­concept clarity
involves self-­differentiation gone awry; that
is, a person endorses opposite attributes
without an overarching or integrative structure. Thus, low self-­concept clarity may
imply a disorganized, unintegrated self,
whereas structural parameters such as self­complexity, differentiation, or evaluative
integration typically imply a high degree of
self-­concept organization.
The association between low self-­concept
clarity and low self-­esteem makes sense if
people with low self-­concept clarity are endorsing both positive traits and their opposites. Low self-­esteem in college students may
be best characterized by a mixture of positive
and negative traits, whereas high self-­esteem
is characterized by primarily positive traits
(Campbell, 1990). Thus, low self-­esteem
in college students may correspond to self­uncertainty rather than an unambiguously
negative view of the self. Consistent with
this view, activation of negative self-­beliefs
may create low self-­concept clarity; that is,
rather than being incorporated into the self­structure as beliefs held with high certainty
113
(cf. Pelham & Swann, 1989), negative self­beliefs may actually coexist with opposite or
conflicting beliefs, creating confusion as to
one’s self-­definition.
Self‑Organization:
A Strategic View
From a cognitive–­affective strategies perspective on personality, individual differences in self-­concept organization are likely
to reflect underlying motivations rather than
inherent traits. For example, a person may
develop high self-­complexity as a way of coping with ongoing stress because that feature
of self is associated with less negative affect.
Similarly, importance differentiation may be
driven by the need or desire to self-­enhance.
The choice of possible selves or the salience
of ideal versus ought self-­discrepancies may
be a way of motivating or sustaining high
effort. These choices and processes are strategic to the extent they serve a person’s goals
and motives, even if the person is not explicitly aware of them (Kihlstrom, 1984; Showers & Cantor, 1985).
In the case of evaluative organization,
compartmentalization may reflect a goal of
self-­enhancement, leading to the desire to
avoid or deny negative attributes altogether.
In contrast, integrative structures may grow
out of a value for realism and the motivation
to feel prepared for future negative events (at
the expense of feeling some negative emotion). Underlying cognitive–­affective predispositions may also play a role. Variables
such as need for cognition, personal need
for structure, need for closure, or affective
intensity may contribute to an individual’s
preferred strategies. In particular, compartmentalization has been linked to emotional
response categorization, the tendency to
rely on the emotional qualities of stimuli in
making similarity judgments. This tendency
likely stems from a heightened affective or
aroused response to emotional stimuli that
sensitizes these individuals to their emotional qualities. In other words, compartmentalized individuals may have an inherent
emotionality that leads them to react to the
emotional qualities of stimuli and also motivates them to compartmentalize the structure of the self as a way of avoiding negative
affect (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2009, 2011).
114
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Dynamics of Self‑Organization
Given the view that the working self-­concept
is continually being reconstructed online,
the organized self is likely to be a flexible
and dynamic system. The dynamics of organizational dimensions can take two forms:
short-term flexibility and long-term change.
Short‑Term Flexibility
By short-term flexibility, we mean the matching of the organizational structure to the current context. Because some types of organization are more useful in some contexts than
in others, a well-­adapted person may shift
type of self-­organization to fit the context.
Taking this one step further, individual differences in organizational styles may result
in idiographic matchings of organization and
context, analagous to the behavior–­situation
profiles documented by Mischel and Shoda
(1995) and Mendoza-­Denton, Ayduk, Mischel, Shoda, and Testa (2001). For example,
because both compartmentalization and
integration are effective strategies for handling negative self-­beliefs, some individuals
may rely on increased integration in times of
stress, whereas others may become increasingly compartmentalized. Thus, it may be
necessary to know individuals’ preferred
strategies or styles to predict their patterns
of change across contexts.
Short-term flexibility has been demonstrated for several of the organizational dimensions described earlier. In a longitudinal
study of college students selected for either
high or low cognitive vulnerability to depression, self-­concept organization was assessed
at two times when participants were experiencing either high or low levels of major
negative life events (Showers et al., 1998).
For low-­vulnerable (resilient) participants,
compartmentalization was greater when
stress was high than when stress was low,
and greater compartmentalization under
stress was correlated with less depressed
mood. Thus, these resilient individuals were
able to shift their style of organization in a
way that seemed to be an adaptive response
to stress. However, increased integration
may be adaptive when people struggle to
address negative aspects or experiences in a
clinical setting. A longitudinal study of 38
new clients at a university counseling center
found that self-­structure was relatively compartmentalized at intake but became more
integrative when assessed 4–5 months later
(Boyce, Zeigler-Hill, Mattachione, Turner,
& Showers, 2008). Confronting and coping
with feelings of distress may cause a transient shift to a more integrative structure.
In a clever experiment, Margolin and Niedenthal (2000) demonstrated short-term flexibility in self-­complexity using a cognitive­tuning manipulation. Some participants
expected to receive personality feedback
from a psychologist, while others expected
to transmit personality information to her.
Receivers showed greater self-­complexity
than transmitters. Perhaps receivers were
preparing to accommodate the new information, whereas transmitters were trying to
focus on a simplified self-­representation. In
other words, we may adjust the complexity
of our self-­representations to fit the task at
hand (cf. Zajonc, 1960). Similarly, Landau,
Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge, and Arndt
(2009) found that inducing a state of mortality salience decreases self-­complexity (for
individuals high in personal need for structure). They argue that a simpler, more unified self-­structure serves as a defense against
existential terror.
Long‑Term Change
Long-term change in self-­concept organization involves either the development of organizational strategies that are new to the
individual or the application of previously
known strategies to a different class of situations. One of the first organizational dimensions to develop in children is the internal–­
external dimension as they increasingly
associate their behaviors with stable self­characteristics rather than external influences (Mohr, 1978). Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey,
and Whitesell (1997) have documented children’s development of the ability to differentiate the importance of multiple self domains
as they mature. A more extreme version of
self-­differentiation in children is the phenomenon of splitting the self into the “good
me” and the “bad me” (Kernberg, 1975).
This differentiation, or splitting, is a primitive way of coping with undesired attributes,
behaviors, or affect, so that the good self
does not have to acknowledge the bad self.
In normal children these selves are increas-
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
ingly integrated with age, perhaps because
children learn to associate their good and
bad selves with specific contexts, or to differentiate them according to their importance.
Thus, the roots of organizational features
such as self-­complexity, evaluative organization, possible selves, and self-­certainty have
been observed in children. However, with
the exception of importance differentiation
and, to some extent, self-­complexity (Jordan
& Cole, 1996), developmental changes in
these features of self-­organization have not
been explicitly addressed.
Long-term change in self-­concept organization during the course of adulthood fits
many of the models discussed so far, but
few concrete data exist. Given the shortterm flexibility of differential importance in
young adults, it seems possible that people
whose self-­esteem suffers from a failure of
importance differentiation could learn this
strategy for enhancing their self-views. The
acquisition of this strategy could simply increase flexibility in stressful situations or, if
the strategy of differential importance is applied more broadly, baseline levels of importance differentiation could change.
The theoretical models associated with
self-­complexity and evaluative organization
lend themselves directly to the notion that
long-term self-­change might occur. First, in
Linville’s (1985, 1987) self-­complexity model,
the effectiveness of high self-­complexity for
dealing with stressful situations raises the
possibility that individuals who are exposed
to stressful events and manage to cope well
will begin to develop greater complexity in
their self-views (cf. Fiske & Linville, 1980;
Jordan & Cole, 1996; Pelham, 1993). Similarly, in the case of evaluative organization,
exposure to certain kinds of stressors or to
individuals who model compartmentalized
or integrative thinking may alter a person’s
preferred strategies for handling specific
types of events. Indeed, the finding that
compartmentalization increases with stress
in low-­vulnerability individuals goes against
the basic hypothesis that integrative thinking should be most advantageous when negative attributes are salient (Showers, 2002;
Showers et al., 1998). However, the stressful
experiences of college students may be especially easy to compartmentalize. Perhaps
chronic stresses later in life (e.g., a prolonged
divorce, career setbacks) are more difficult
115
to compartmentalize and require integrative
thinking, gradually shifting people who experience such stressors toward that type of
organization.
Evidence for both processes (i.e., increased
compartmentalization when feasible; increased integration in response to chronic
stress) emerged from our study of childhood maltreatment (Showers, Zeigler-Hill,
& Limke, 2006). The sample was college
students who reported experiencing sexual
or emotional maltreatment before age 15.
Those who had experienced the most severe
maltreatment (i.e., both sexual and emotional events) displayed relatively integrative self­concept structures, whereas those who experienced moderate levels of maltreatment (i.e.,
either sexual or emotional maltreatment,
but not both) tended to possess relatively
compartmentalized self-­concept structures.
Moreover, within the latter group, compartmentalization was associated with relatively
positive self-­reports of psychological adjustment. At severe levels of maltreatment, self­concept structure was not associated with
adjustment. However, it is possible that integration may have hidden benefits, such as
enhanced resilience, when confronted with
negative experiences in the future. That is,
conventional measures of psychological adjustment (e.g., face-valid self-­report measures that ask respondents to indicate the
extent to which they are bothered by various
symptoms of poor adjustment) may not adequately capture the benefits of integrative
self-­concept structures.
A complete dynamic model of self-­concept
organization should take into account both
short-term flexibility and the possibility of
long-term change in organizational styles.
The dynamic model of compartmentalization accounts for both types of self-­change
(Showers, 2002). In this model, the likelihood of self-­change is related to the occurrence of stress (which activates negative self­beliefs), the organizational alternatives that
a person “knows,” and the fit between an
organizational strategy and the features of
the current stress. A central feature of the
dynamics of this structural system is the
relative ease or difficulty of maintaining a
compartmentalized or integrative style of
thinking.
Of the two types of evaluative organization, compartmentalization seems easy and
116
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
efficient. The use of the evaluative dimension as a basis for categorization is well
­established (e.g., Bower, 1981; Niedenthal
et al., 1999; Osgood, 1969), whereas integrative structures require a person to override a natural tendency to associate beliefs
of the same valence. Moreover, when an
integrative person thinks “I’m insecure, but
also creative,” that person may have to suppress a negative emotional response to feeling insecure in order to bring the positive
belief about creativity to mind. This process
most likely requires effort, attention, and
other cognitive resources (Showers & Kling,
1996). If integration requires high effort
and resources, then people may tend to rely
on compartmentalized structures whenever
they can, shifting only to integrative ones
when the extra effort is warranted. Consistent with this view, nondisordered individuals with a positively compartmentalized self­structure showed the ability to shift to an
integrative style of thinking when they were
asked to focus on a specific negative attribute (McMahon, Showers, Rieder, Abramson, & Hogan, 2003).1
Given the prevalence of compartmentalized self-­structures under stress, the effort
and attention that integration may require,
and the ability of compartmentalized individuals to shift to integrative thinking when
they focus on a negative attribute, it seems
that integrative structures may be transient,
and may emerge primarily when individuals are focusing a great deal of attention on
negative attributes. Because maintaining integrative structures may be difficult, many
people may eventually revert to a compartmentalized style of organization. This dy-
namic view of self-­structure is diagrammed
in Figure 5.1.
At the top of Figure 5.1, positive compartmentalization is depicted as the baseline style
of organization for most individuals. The assumption is that most individuals construct
self-­concepts that are basically positive and
arrange their lives to maintain relatively low
levels of stress. Under these conditions, they
take advantage of the effectiveness and efficiency of a compartmentalized self-­concept
structure. From the top, moving down either
side of the diagram, Figure 5.1 depicts how
self-­concept structures may change when
negative attributes become salient (e.g.,
when stressful events occur).
The left side of the diagram shows the hypothesized shift in self-­concept structure for
individuals who are not handling their stress
or salient negative attributes especially well.
These individuals may shift to a negatively
compartmentalized style of organization.
The leftmost line indicates that such a shift
should be associated with extremely low
self-­esteem and the most negative mood.
The right side of the diagram shows the pattern of change hypothesized for individuals
who are coping relatively well with stress
or salient negative beliefs. When negative
attributes become salient, these individuals
may tend to focus attention on them and
engage in an integrative thinking process in
an attempt to minimize the impact of these
attributes. Eventually, however, this effort
becomes too much and many individuals
may revert to a compartmentalized style
of organization. This process may involve
compartmentalizing the stresses or negative attributes that they have experienced; in
FIGURE 5.1. Dynamic model: How the self-­concept structure may change in response to stressful life
events. From Showers (2002). Copyright 2002 by The Guilford Press. Reprinted by permission.
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
other words, it may correspond to a recompartmentalization of one’s life. People who
succeed in recompartmentalizing their self­concepts should be the happiest and experience the highest self-­esteem and the greatest
psychological well-being.
For example, at the time of a divorce, a
person who typically compartmentalizes
positive and negative attributes may expend
a great deal of effort to think integratively
about his or her negative attributes until
that thought process becomes exhausting (or
any relevant concerns are resolved). At that
point, recompartmentalization would allow
the person to focus on primarily positive attributes again. This recompartmentalization
may be facilitated by external circumstances. For instance, during child custody negotiations, people may have many integrative
thoughts about their failings as parents, yet
find that those negative self-­beliefs are more
easily recompartmentalized once custody issues are resolved.
As the model suggests, however, there may
be some individuals who remain committed to
integrative styles of thinking. These individuals (1) may actually prefer integrative thinking
(i.e., are more practiced and find it less effortful than do others) or (2) may have negative
attributes (or negative experiences) that are
especially difficult to compartmentalize. For
example, the loss of a loved one or a difficult
divorce may make it difficult to segregate attributes of self associated with these events
from more positive self-­domains. In these
cases, integration may be a “best they can do”
strategy. The upper line in Figure 5.1 indicates
that individuals who remain integrative experience some degree of residual negative mood
or lower self-­esteem as a result of the continued focus on negative attributes that this style
of organization implies. Integrative structures
avoid the strong focus on negative attributes
associated with negative compartmentalization, but over the long term, integration may
never create the strong positive feelings about
the self that positive compartmentalization
can provide. In other words, compartmentalized individuals may make a trade-off
between extreme positive self-­feelings and
their vulnerability to self-­esteem instability,
whereas integrative individuals choose more
moderate, but stable, self-views that protect
them from extreme negative states (Showers
& Zeigler-Hill, 2007).2
117
Applications to Other Target
Individuals and Groups
The self is but one of the knowledge structures that people use to organize memory
and guide behavior. There is a long history
of studying the organization of beliefs about
outgroups (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones,
1980), stereotyped groups (Wittenbrink,
Judd, & Park, 2001), or attitude objects in
general (Judd, Drake, Downing, & Krosnick, 1991). More recently, literature on
attitude conflict and ambivalence suggests
new ways of looking at evaluatively laden
self-­beliefs (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994;
Lavine, Thomsen, Zanna, & Borgida, 1998;
Priester & Petty, 2001). The applications developed in our own laboratories emphasize
perceptions of minority groups (Leister &
Showers, 2010) and perceptions of others in
close relationships (e.g., Showers & Kevlyn,
1999). Specifically, this research shows that
the compartmentalized or integrative structure of positive and negative beliefs about a
romantic partner predicts feelings for that
partner, as well as relationship outcomes 1
year later (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2004). In
accordance with findings for self-­structure
and self-­esteem, among individuals with basically positive perceptions of their romantic
partners, compartmentalization of positive
and negative beliefs about that partner was
associated with the greatest liking and loving
in the present; however, 1 year later, the relationships of those who had relatively integrative partner structures at the outset were
more likely to be ongoing. These results are
consistent with a view that compartmentalized structures may overinflate positive feelings, whereas integrative perspectives may
be more realistic. One exception is when
compartmentalized structures allow people
to tolerate a partner’s flaws, possibly because
external factors keep them in otherwise unhappy relationships (cf. Amodio & Showers,
2005). When individuals experienced high
relationship conflict, increases in compartmentalization were correlated with ongoing
relationship status after 1 year (Showers &
Zeigler-Hill, 2004).
Parents, of course, provide another example of a close relationship partner. Not surprisingly, the structure of college students’
positive and negative beliefs about their
parents is associated with feelings of liking
118
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
and loving, and the qualities of the adult
child–­parent relationship (Limke & Showers, 2010). Adult children who compartmentalize their parents’ perceived flaws describe
relationships with them that seem compartmentalized, in that they score highly on all
relationship dimensions—­contact, cooperation, closeness, and liking—­despite the parents’ flaws. In contrast, adult children who
structure beliefs about parents in a more integrative fashion describe relationships that
reveal a mix of high liking and high emotional closeness with lower cooperation and
contact. These findings support the view that
compartmentalized and integrative parent
structures, as assessed by the card-­sorting
task, reflect distinctive and important strategies for coping with the negative attributes
of significant others. There is considerable
flexibility in the application of these strategies, as suggested by the evidence for both
short- and long-term change, including context specificity that stretches across target
individuals and groups, and also situational
contexts of the self.
Conclusion
In this chapter we take the point of view
that the organization of self-­knowledge is a
dynamic process that reflects an individual’s
current strategy for constructing the self.
It addresses four basic issues: (1) the comparative advantages of maintaining a set
of context-­specific multiple selves versus a
single, well-­defined core self; (2) the ways
in which multiple selves (especially discrepancies between current and future selves)
contribute to motivation; (3) how the organization of positive and negative attributes
within the self-­concept structure affects
mood, self-­esteem, and self-­concept clarity;
and (4) the possibilities for self-­change, both
short-term flexibility in response to specific
situations and long-term development and
change. Future directions include the specification of underlying cognitive processes,
including the activation of specific elements
within the self-­concept structure; examination of nonevaluative dimensions of self­categorization; and applications of work on
self-­concept organization to a broader range
of psychological phenomena.
Returning to the lay perspective, we may
consider the extent to which literature on
self-­concept organization has addressed the
layperson’s concerns. First, this literature
suggests that questions of identity will be
answered in terms of both multiple selves
and the possibility of a higher-order core
self. Second, questions of self-­determination
(“Where should I go?”) will be addressed by
representations of future and possible selves
that embody a person’s goals. Third, people
may learn to handle self-doubt by reorganizing positive and negative self-­beliefs in order
to minimize negative impact. Most importantly, an understanding of self-­concept
organization may help individuals gain insight into who they are and foster avenues
for self-­change, so that people can ultimately
become who they want to be.
Notes
1. Recall that positive compartmentalization
refers to people with compartmentalized self­structures in which positive self-­aspect categories are either more salient or more important
than negative self-­aspect categories.
2. In their 2-year study of individuals with high
and low cognitive vulnerability to depression
(average time elapsed = 22 months, N = 79),
Showers and colleagues (1998) found the following test–­retest stabilities for dimensions
of self-­concept organization: compartmentalization, r = .56; self-­complexity, r = .46; differential importance, r = .07; proportion of
negative self-­descriptors, r = .71. Note that,
here, the measure of differential importance is
derived from ratings of self aspects generated
in the card-­sorting task rather than responses
to the SAQ (Pelham & Swann, 1989).
References
Amodio, D. M., & Showers, C. J. (2005). “Similarity breeds liking” revisited: The moderating role of commitment. Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships, 22, 833–852.
Attneave, F. (1959). Applications of information theory to psychology. New York: Holt­Dryden.
Bargh, J. A., & Tota, M. E. (1988). Context­dependent automatic processing in depression:
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
Accessibility of negative constructs with regard to self but not others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 925–939.
Block, J. (1961). Ego-­identity, role variability,
and adjustment. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 25, 392–397.
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129–148.
Boyce, K., Zeigler-Hill, V., Mattachione, E.,
Turner, B., & Showers, C. J. (2008, February).
Self-­structure and self-­change in psychological
treatment. Poster presented at the meeting of
the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Albuquerque, NM.
Cacioppo, J. T., & Bernston, G. G. (1994). Relationship between attitudes and evaluative
space: A critical review, with emphasis on the
separability of positive and negative substrates.
Psychological Bulletin, 115, 401–423.
Campbell, J. D. (1990). Self-­esteem and clarity
of the self-­concept. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 59, 538–549.
Campbell, J. D., Assanand, S., & Di Paula, A.
(2000). Structural features of the self-­concept
and adjustment. In A. Tesser, R. B. Felson, &
J. M. Suls (Eds.), Psychological perspectives
on self and identity (pp. 67–87). Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). Personality and social intelligence. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Cantor, N., Markus, H., Niedenthal, P., & Nurius, P. (1986). On motivation and the self­concept. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino
(Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 96–
121). New York: Guilford Press.
Cantor, N., Mischel, W., & Schwartz, J. C.
(1982). A prototype analysis of psychological
situations. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 45–77.
Cohen, L. H., Pane, N., & Smith, H. S. (1997).
Complexity of the interpersonal self and affective reactions to interpersonal stressors in life
and in the laboratory. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 21, 387–407.
Cross, S., & Markus, H. (1991). Possible selves
across the life span. Human Development, 34,
230–255.
DeSteno, D. A., & Salovey, P. (1997). The effects
of mood on the structure of the self-­concept.
Cognition and Emotion, 11, 351–372.
Ditzfeld, C. P., & Showers, C. J. (2009, May).
Emotional processing in categorization: Understanding the cognitive structure of the self.
119
Poster presented at the annual meeting of the
Association for Psychological Science, San
Francisco.
Ditzfeld, C. P., & Showers, C. J. (2011). Emotional processing in categorization: Understanding the cognitive structure of the self.
Social Cognition, 29, 111–124.
Dixon, T. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Escaping the self: The moderating effect of self­complexity. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 17, 363–368.
Donahue, E. M., Robins, R. W., Roberts, B. W.,
& John, O. P. (1993). The divided self: Concurrent and longitudinal effects of psychological adjustment and social roles on self-­concept
differentiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 834–846.
Fischer, K. W. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of
hierarchies of skills. Psychological Review,
87, 477–531.
Fiske, S., & Linville, P. (1980). What does the
schema concept buy us? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6, 543–557.
Gardner, J. A. (1997). Borderline personality disorder and self-­complexity: Application of Linville’s self-­complexity–­affective–­extremity hypothesis. Dissertation Abstracts International
B: Sciences and Engineering, 59(01), 416.
Gergen, K. J. (1972). Multiple identity: The
healthy, happy human being wears many
masks. Psychology Today, 5, 31–35, 64–66.
Gergen, K. J. (1991). The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life. New
York: Basic Books.
Gotlib, I. H., & Cane, D. B. (1987). Construct
accessibility and clinical depression: A longitudinal investigation. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 96, 199–204.
Gotlib, I. H., & McCann, C. D. (1984). Construct accessibility and depression: An examination of cognitive and affective factors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47,
427–439.
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self: A
developmental perspective. New York: Guilford Press.
Harter, S., Bresnick, S., Bouchey, H. A., & Whitesell, N. R. (1997). The development of multiple role-­related selves during adolescence. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 835–853.
Higgins, E. T., Roney, C., Crowe, E., & Hymes,
C. (1994). Ideal versus ought predilections
for approach and avoidance: Distinct self-
120
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
r­ egulatory systems. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 66, 276–286.
Higgins, E. T., & Tykocinski, O. (1992). Self­discrepancies and biographical memory:
Personality and cognition at the level of psychological situation. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 18, 527–535.
James, W. (1963). The principles of psychology.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. (Original work published 1890)
Jordan, A., & Cole, D. A. (1996). Relation of
symptoms to the structure of self-­knowledge
in childhood. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 530–540.
Judd, C. M., Drake, R. A., Downing, J. W., &
Krosnick, J. A. (1991). Some dynamic properties of attitude structures: Context-­induced
response facilitation and polarization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60,
193–202.
Kernberg, O. (1975). Borderline conditions and
pathological narcissism. New York: Aronson.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1984). Conscious, subconscious,
unconscious. In K. S. Bowers & D. Meichenbaum (Eds.), The unconscious reconsidered
(pp. 149–211). New York: Wiley.
Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., Sullivan, D., Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2009). The protective identity: Evidence that mortality salience
heightens the clarity and coherence of the self­concept. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 796–807.
Lavine, H., Thomsen, C. J., Zanna, M. P., &
Borgida, E. (1998). On the primacy of affect
in the determination of attitudes and behavior: The moderating role of affective–­cognitive
ambivalence. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 34, 398–421.
Lecky, P. (1945). Self-­consistency: A theory of
personality. New York: Anchor.
Leister, A. J., & Showers, C. J. (2010, April).
Cognitive structures for racial groups predict
prejudicial attitudes and experience. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern
Psychological Association, Chicago.
Limke, A., & Showers, C. J. (2010). Organization of parent knowledge: Compartmentalization and integration in adult child–­parent relationships. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 36, 1225–1240.
Linville, P. W. (1982). The complexity–­extremity
effect and age-based stereotyping. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 193–
211.
Linville, P. W. (1985). Self-­complexity and affective extremity: Don’t put all of your eggs
in one cognitive basket. Social Cognition, 3,
94–120.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-­complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-­related illness and
depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 663–676.
Linville, P. W., & Jones, E. E. (1980). Polarized
appraisals of out-group members. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 689–
703.
Locke, K. D. (2003). H as a measure of complexity of social information processing. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 268–
280.
Luo, W., Watkins, D., & Lam, R. Y. H. (2009).
Validating a new measure of self-­complexity.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 91, 381–
386.
Lutz, C. J., & Ross, S. R. (2003). Elaboration
versus fragmentation: Distinguishing between
self-­complexity and self-­concept differentiation. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 22, 537–559.
Margolin, J., & Niedenthal, P. M. (2000). Manipulating self-­complexity with communication role assignment: Evidence of the flexibility
of self-­concept structure. Journal of Research
in Personality, 34, 424–444.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-­schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves.
American Psychologist, 41, 954–969.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic
self-­concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–
337.
Marsh, H. W. (1993). Relations between global
and specific domains of self: The importance
of individual importance, certainty, and ideals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 975–992.
Marsh, H. W., Barnes, J., & Hocevar, D. (1985).
Self–other agreement on multidimensional
self-­concept ratings: Factor analysis and
multitrait–­multimethod analysis. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1360–
1377.
McConnell, A. R., Rydell, R. J., & Brown, C.
M. (2009). On the experience of self-­relevant
feedback: How self-­concept organization influences affective responses and self-­evaluations.
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
45, 695–707.
McConnell, A. R., & Strain, L. M. (2007).
Content and structure of the self-­concept. In
C. Sedikides & S. J. Spencer (Eds.), The self
(pp. 51–73). New York: Psychology Press.
McConnell, A. R., Strain, L. M., Brown, C. M.,
& Rydell, R. J. (2009). The simple life: On the
benefits of low self-­complexity. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 823–835.
McMahon, P. D., Showers, C. J., Rieder, S. L.,
Abramson, L. Y., & Hogan, M. E. (2003). Integrative thinking and flexibility in the organization of self-­knowledge. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 27, 167–184.
Mendoza-­Denton, R., Ayduk, O., Mischel, W.,
Shoda, Y., & Testa, A. (2001). Person * situation interactionism in self-­encoding (I am . . .
when . . . ): Implications for affect regulation
and social information processing. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 533–
544.
Mikulincer, M. (1995). Attachment style and the
mental representation of the self. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1203–
1215.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social
learning reconceptualization of personality.
Psychological Review, 80, 252–283.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive–­
affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure.
Psychological Review, 102, 246–268.
Mohr, D. M. (1978). Development of attributes
of personal identity. Developmental Psychology, 14, 427–428.
Morgan, H. J., & Janoff-­Bulman, R. (1994).
Positive and negative self-­complexity: Patterns
of adjustment following traumatic versus non­traumatic life experiences. Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology, 13, 63–85.
Niedenthal, P. M., Halberstadt, J. B., & InnesKer, A. H. (1999). Emotional response categorization. Psychological Review, 106, 337–
361.
Niedenthal, P. M., Setterlund, M. B., & Wherry,
M. B. (1992). Possible self-­complexity and affective reactions to goal-­relevant evaluation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
63, 5–16.
Osgood, C. E. (1969). On the whys and wherefores of E, P, and A. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 12, 194–199.
121
Oyserman, D., & Markus, H. R. (1990). Possible
selves and delinquency. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 59, 112–125.
Oyserman, D., & Markus, H. R. (1998). Self as
social representation. In U. Flick (Ed.), The
psychology of the social (pp. 107–125). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Pelham, B. W. (1993). The idiographic nature
of human personality: Examples of the idiographic self-­concept. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 64, 665–677.
Pelham, B. W., & Swann, W. B. (1989). From self­conceptions to self-worth: On the sources and
structure of global self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 672–680.
Power, M. J., de Jong, F., & Lloyd, A. (2002).
The organization of the self-­concept in bipolar disorders: An empirical study and replication. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26,
553–561.
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (2001). Extending
the bases of subjective attitudinal ambivalence:
Interpersonal and intrapersonal antecedents of
evaluative tension. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 80, 19–34.
Rafaeli-Mor, E., Gotlib, I. H., & Revelle, W.
(1999). The meaning and measurement of self­complexity. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 341–356.
Renaud, J. M., & McConnell, A. R. (2002). Organization of the self-­concept and the suppression of self-­relevant thoughts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 79–86.
Rhodewalt, F., Madrian, J. C., & Cheney, S.
(1998). Narcissism, self-­knowledge organization, and emotional reactivity: The effect of
daily experiences on self-­esteem and affect.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
24, 75–87.
Rhodewalt, F., & Morf, C. C. (1995). Self and
interpersonal correlates of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: A review and new findings.
Journal of Research in Personality, 29, 1–23.
Rogers, C. R. (1959). The essence of psychotherapy: A client-­centered view. Annals of Psychotherapy, 1, 51–57.
Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S.
(1977). Self-­reference and the encoding of personal information. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 35, 677–688.
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In
E. Rosch & B. B. Loyd (Eds.), Cognition and
categorization (pp. 27–48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
122
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Rosenberg, S. (1988). Self and others: Studies
in social personality and autobiography. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
21, 57–95.
Scott, W. A. (1969). Structure of natural cognitions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 261–278.
Segal, Z. V. (1988). Appraisal of the self-­schema
construct in cognitive models of depression.
Psychological Bulletin, 103, 147–162.
Segal, Z. V., Hood, J. E., Shaw, B. F., & Higgins,
E. T. (1988). A structural analysis of the self­schema construct in major depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 417–485.
Setterlund, M. B., & Niedenthal, P. M. (1993).
“Who am I? Why am I here?”: Self-­esteem,
self-­clarity, and prototype matching. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,
769–780.
Showers, C., & Cantor, N. (1985). Social cognition: A look at motivated strategies. Annual
Review of Psychology, 36, 275–305.
Showers, C. J. (1992a). Compartmentalization of
positive and negative self-­knowledge: Keeping
bad apples out of the bunch. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 1036–1049.
Showers, C. J. (1992b). Evaluatively integrative
thinking about characteristics of the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18,
719–729.
Showers, C. J. (1995). The evaluative organization of self-­knowledge: Origins, processes,
and implications for self-­esteem. In M. H.
Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-­esteem
(pp. 101–120). New York: Plenum Press.
Showers, C. J. (2000). Self-­organization in emotional contexts. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling
and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 283–307). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Showers, C. J. (2002). Integration and compartmentalization: A model of self-­structure
and self-­change. In D. Cervone & W. Mischel (Eds.), Advances in personality science
(pp. 271–291). New York: Guilford Press.
Showers, C. J., Abramson, L. Y., & Hogan, M.
E. (1998). The dynamic self: How the content
and structure of the self-­concept change with
mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 478–493.
Showers, C. J., & Kevlyn, S. B. (1999). Organization of knowledge about a relationship partner: Implications for liking and loving. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,
958–971.
Showers, C. J., & Kling, K. C. (1996). Organization of self-­knowledge: Implications for recovery from sad mood. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 70, 578–590.
Showers, C. J., & Ryff, C. D. (1996). Self­differentiation and well-being in a life transition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 448–460.
Showers, C. J., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2004). Organization of partner knowledge: Implications
for relationship outcomes and longitudinal
change. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30, 1198–1210.
Showers, C. J., & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2007). Compartmentalization and integration: The evaluative organization of contextualized selves.
Journal of Personality, 75, 1181–1204.
Showers, C. J., Zeigler-Hill, V., & Limke, A.
(2006). Self-­structure and emotional maltreatment: Successful compartmentalization and
the struggle of integration. Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology, 25, 473–507.
Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1988). Mood and
memory: Evaluating the network theory of affect. Clinical Psychology Review, 8, 211–251.
Snyder, M. (1974). Self-­monitoring of expressive
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 30, 526–537.
Solomon, A., & Haaga, D. A. F. (1993). Sociotropy, autonomy, and self-­complexity. Journal of
Social Behavior and Personality, 8, 743–748.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self­affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302).
New York: Academic Press.
Stopa, L., Brown, M. A., Luke, M. A., & Hirsch,
C. R. (2010). Constructing a self: The role of
self-­structure and self-­certainty in social anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48,
955–965.
Taylor, J. L., Morley, S., & Barton, S. B. (2007).
Self-­organization in bipolar disorder: Compartmentalization and self-­complexity. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 31, 83–96.
Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects
of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 213–226.
Tesser, A. (2000). On the confluence of self­esteem maintenance mechanisms. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 4, 290–299.
Trope, Y. (1986). Self-­enhancement and self­assessment in achievement behavior. In R. M.
Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook
of motivation and cognition: Vol. 1. Founda-
5. Organization of Self-­Knowledge
tions of social behavior (pp. 350–378). New
York: Guilford Press.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2001).
Evaluative versus conceptual judgments in
automatic stereotyping and prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37,
244–252.
Woike, B., Gershkovich, I., Piorkowski, R., &
Polo, M. (1999). The role of motives in the
content and structure of autobiographical
123
memory. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76, 600–612.
Zajonc, R. B. (1960). The process of cognitive
tuning in communication. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 159–167.
Zeigler-Hill, V., & Showers, C. J. (2007). Self­structure and self-­esteem stability: The hidden
vulnerability of compartmentalization. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33,
143–159.
Chapter 6
Reflected Appraisal
through a 21st-­Century Looking Glass
Harry M. Wallace
Dianne M. Tice
The concept of reflected appraisal—also
known as reflected self-­appraisal or the
looking-glass self—refers to the processes
by which people’s self-views are influenced
by their perceptions of how others view
them.1 Reflected appraisal is reflected in the
metaphor that people use others as a mirror
(i.e., looking glass) for judging themselves,
and also in the sense that others’ judgments
are reflected in self-­judgments. The concept
refers simultaneously to person A’s self­appraisal and person A’s appraisal of person
B’s appraisal of person A. These appraisals
exert reciprocal influence: Self-views affect
judgments of others’ views, and judgments
of others’ views affect self-views. In short,
reflected appraisal can be viewed as a cycle
of mutually influential judgments. 2
Psychologists, sociologists, and communication scholars have routinely acknowledged
the role of reflected appraisal in self-­concept
development since James (1890), Cooley
(1902), and Mead (1934) articulated its importance. The volume of published studies
offering direct or indirect evidence for reflected appraisal is overwhelming. Mere correlation between the content of self-views
held and social feedback received could be
construed as evidence for reflected appraisal,
but one need not rely on correlational data
124
to conclude that perceptions of others’ appraisals can influence self-­perception. Many
experiments that have randomly assigned
participants to receive social feedback have
reported whether self-­appraisals changed
as a result of such feedback, and a subset
of these studies also reports perceptions of
others’ perspectives that may have mediated feedback-­induced self-­concept change.
Such sources of reflected appraisal evidence
are often modestly framed as manipulation
checks designed to show that feedback had
the intended impact. We assume that the
volume of published studies offering direct
or indirect evidence for reflected appraisal is
considerably larger than the already impressive number of studies that explicitly address
reflected appraisal because researchers now
have little incentive to call attention to basic
replications of reflected appraisal phenomena that have long been taken for granted.
Reviews of reflected appraisal research
have previously been published (e.g., Felson,
1993; Lundgren, 2004; Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Tice & Wallace, 2003), but
most have either been sidebars in papers
written to address other issues or have focused narrowly on one subcomponent of reflected appraisal. For this chapter, we sought
to extend the reflected appraisal literature
6. Reflected Appraisal
by offering an up-to-date review of empirical evidence relevant to each stage of the reflected appraisal cycle. We start by analyzing
people’s impressions of others’ impressions
of them, then examine how impressions of
others influence self-views. We conclude by
highlighting challenges faced by reflected
appraisal researchers and considering how
new technology is changing the study and
nature of reflected appraisal.
Perceptions of Others’ Appraisals
The stage of reflected appraisal in which
people form subjective impressions of others’ views of them is commonly called metaperception.3 When discussing the psychological consequences of reflected appraisal,
one is obliged to clarify that the process is
driven by the perception of others’ views,
which may or may not resemble the reality
of others’ views. The theme of disconnection between metaperception and reality has
been revisited often in reflected appraisal research (e.g., Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979).
Myriad factors can undermine individuals’
empathic accuracy, their ability to imagine
others’ perspectives correctly (Ickes, 1997).
Metaperception usually requires making inferences based on an incomplete, ambiguous
set of cues. Assessing how one is viewed by
other people is easy only to the extent that
others communicate their perspective clearly, directly, and honestly. Of course, people
generally avoid revealing the details of their
appraisals to the people they appraise, especially if the details could be hurtful or offensive (Blumberg, 1972; DePaulo & Bell,
1996).
The mere availability of cues that convey
the perspective of another does not guarantee that person perceivers will use them
(O’Conner & Dyce, 1993). One explanation relates to individuals’ limited ability
and motivation to attend to and reflect upon
relevant available information about other
people. For example, the act of intentionally managing the impression one presents
to others diverts attention that could otherwise be focused on noting others’ responses
(e.g., Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989).
Furthermore, the process of actively trying
to understand others can encourage topdown information processing, causing tun-
125
nel vision (e.g., Gilbert, Jones, & Pelham,
1987; Gilbert & Krull, 1988). Even when
people receive and pay attention to concrete
evidence about others’ views of them, they
may still reject or minimize the importance
of this information if it conflicts with their
expectations (e.g., Jones, 1986) and preferences (e.g., Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004).
Self‑Appraisals Steer Metaperceptions
To convey the difficulty of deducing others’ views, Shrauger and Shoeneman (1979)
adopted the phrase through a looking glass
darkly to emphasize the opaqueness of the
looking glass. However, as Murray, Holmes,
MacDonald, and Ellsworth (1998) recognized, the same phrase could also be used to
describe the excessive pessimism that characterizes some people’s metaperceptions.
Consistent with self-­consistency models of
self-­evaluation, individuals with chronically
low or insecure self-­esteem sometimes struggle to accept evidence that others really do
think well of them (e.g., Campbell, Simpson,
Boldry, & Kashy, 2005; Lemay & Dudley,
2009; McNulty, 2008; Murray, Holmes,
Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). As Murray,
Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, and Kusche (2002)
put it, people with low self-­esteem are more
likely to “make mountains out of molehills”
by assuming that minor criticisms from others signal overall negative appraisals. Moreover, the social norm of communicating
compliments while withholding criticism
magnifies the impact of critical feedback
that does get expressed and can even lead
people to perceive neutral social feedback
as negative (e.g., Leary, Haupt, Strausser, &
Chokel, 1998).
Still, people who underestimate the positivity of others’ impressions of them seem
to be more the exception than the rule.
The self-­enhancement bias that pervades
self-­evaluations (e.g., see research on optimistic bias and better-than-­average effects described by Alicke, Guenther, & Zell
[Chapter 14, this volume]) is also evident
in metaperceptions—­especially when the
risk of encountering disconfirming evidence
is minimal (Preuss & Alicke, 2009). Most
people have positive overall self-­esteem
(Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) and
are prone to self-­flattering interpretations of
social feedback (see review by Baumeister,
126
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
1998). For example, Murray, Griffin, Rose,
and Bellavia (2003; Murray et al., 1998)
showed that high self-­esteem individuals
respond to esteem-­threatening events by increasing their confidence in others’ positive
views of them. Even unbiased person perceivers should tend to overestimate others’
opinions of them simply because positive appraisals are more commonly expressed than
negative appraisals (DePaulo & Bell, 1996).
The evidence just presented indicates that
existing self-views affect interpretation of
information regarding others’ views, but
sometimes self-views are the primary or
only source of metaperceptions, not merely
a filter. An impressive body of evidence indicates that metaperception, like other categories of social judgment, often relies more
on egocentric projections of self-views than
on assessments of external information (see
reviews by Felson, 1993; Krueger, 1998,
2007). Self-views can dominate judgments
of others for several reasons. Social cognition research has repeatedly demonstrated
that chronically accessible self-views influence social judgments automatically and unconsciously (see review by Baldwin, 1992).
Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, and Gilovich
(2004) concluded that basing judgments of
others’ views on self-views constitutes the
first stage of the perspective-­taking process—an initial default judgment that can be
overridden only if circumstances allow and
encourage more thorough information processing. Mere awareness of one’s own views
can interfere with one’s ability to correctly
gauge others’ perspectives (Chambers, Epley,
Savitsky, & Windschitl, 2008). Moreover,
people can justify interjecting self-views into
judgments of others’ views because they assume that others share their views. The false
consensus effect describes the tendency for
people to overestimate the overlap between
their views and those of others (Marks &
Miller, 1987; Ross, Greene, & House,
1977). People are also prone to the illusion
of transparency—overestimating the extent
to which their feelings are evident to others
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), especially if they feel self-­conscious (Vorauer &
Ross, 1999).
Although the impact of self-views on
metaperceptions is typically large, it is not
inevitable. People are less likely to assume
that another person shares their views when
the other person is noticeably different from
them (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), an outgroup
member (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Frey &
Tropp, 2006), or someone who is not emotionally close (Ames, 2004a, 2004b). People are also more apt to take a systematic,
bottom-up approach to evidence analysis in
judging other people’s views of them, rather
than relying on self-views or other judgment
heuristics, if they think the judgment is relevant to their personal future (Kaplan, Santuzzi, & Ruscher, 2009). In general, if information about others’ views is salient and
unambiguous, people are more likely to use
it when assessing others rather than to rely
only on self-views or other heuristics (e.g.,
Baron, Albright, & Malloy, 1995; Jussim,
Soffin, Brown, Ley, & Kohlhepp, 1992).
Perspective-­taking aids can also reduce self­projection in metaperception: Albright and
Malloy (1999) showed that participants’
metaperception accuracy improved if they
were first shown a videotape of their own
behavior.
Metaperception Accuracy
In the past 25 years, measurement and statistical innovations have allowed researchers to assess metaperception accuracy with
more sophistication. In their seminal review
of this topic, Kenny and DePaulo (1993) concluded that individuals can judge how people
in general view them with reasonable accuracy, but they overestimate the uniformity of
others’ views because they cannot accurately
distinguish the perspectives of specific other
people. This perspective fits well with the notion of the “generalized other” proposed by
Mead (1934). The generalized other concept
assumes that reflected appraisal processes
are insensitive to differences between others’ appraisals: Other people get lumped together into a collective whole, so it does not
matter whether the metaperceptions driving
the reflected appraisal process are judgments
of the views of one person or many people
(see discussion by Felson, 1989).
More recent studies have confirmed people’s ability to recognize how most others
view them, but several have also determined
that people are sometimes quite capable of
judging the views of specific others (e.g.,
Carlson & Furr, 2009; Levesque, 1997; Oltmanns, Gleason, Klonsky, & Turkheimer,
6. Reflected Appraisal
2005). At first glance, the notion that metaperception is often reasonably accurate (see
Jussim [1993] and Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, & Cohen [2005] for endorsements of this perspective) might seem difficult to reconcile with the aforementioned
evidence that multiple factors distort judgments of others’ views. To an extent, debates
about metaperception accuracy boil down
to different interpretations of the same statistics—a 75% level of metaperception accuracy could be framed as an impressive or
lousy performance. Another explanation is
that bringing attention to factors that challenge people’s ability to grasp others’ perspectives suggests that these factors undermine perspective taking more consistently
and to a greater degree that is actually the
case. In other words, accuracy in perspective
taking might be typical, but the exceptions
are compelling and therefore attract disproportionate research attention (see discussion
by Jussim, 2005). Yet another possibility is
that metaperception accuracy occurs despite
people’s reliance on self-views for judging
others’ views.
Although people exaggerate the extent of
overlap between views of themselves and
others, one could argue that people’s social
views on the whole tend to be more similar
than different, at least regarding ingroup­relevant topics. This makes sense because
an individual’s self-views are partly based
on the same behavior and outcomes that determine others’ views of that individual (Albright, Forest, & Reiseter, 2001; Chambers
et al., 2008; Malloy, Albright, & Scarpati,
2007). If a person is viewed similarly by that
person and by others, the same metaperceptions should result from either pure projections of self-views or unbiased perspective
taking. Metaperception accuracy should
presumably be relatively high for judgments
of self-­dimensions that are tied to discrete,
observable actions (e.g., basketball freethrow skill), and relatively low for more abstract self-­dimensions (e.g., basketball court
awareness). Considering the challenges involved in deciphering others’ perspectives,
using one’s own perspective to estimate
other people’s perceptions may sometimes
yield more reliably accurate judgments than
trying to exercise empathy and carefully analyze external evidence (e.g., DiDonato, Ullrich, & Krueger, 2011); however, this argu-
127
ment is challenged by evidence that people
can be surprisingly clueless about their own
strengths and weaknesses (Dunning, 2005).
In summary, research demonstrates that
people’s judgments of how others view them
derive, at least in part, from extrapolation
and imposition of existing self-views. Injecting one’s own self-views into judgments of
how one is viewed by others can compromise
the accuracy of these judgments, yet people’s
assessments of how others view them seem
to be fairly accurate despite, or perhaps even
because of, this egocentrism. In the next section, we shift from examining how people’s
self-views influence metaperceptions to examining how people’s self-views are influenced by metaperceptions.
Effects of Metaperception
on Self‑Perception
Self-­concept change resulting from reflected
appraisal may entail a fundamental shift
in one’s global self-­appraisal, or it could
be restricted to a minor, trivial subcomponent of the self-­concept. The point that self­appraisals can be influenced by perceptions
of others’ appraisals may seem obvious,4
but the extent of this influence was probably underappreciated before Leary and
colleagues introduced sociometer theory
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Sociometer
theory offers a convincing explanation for
why self-views are so susceptible to influence from perceptions of others’ evaluations:
People care about others’ views because
their good or bad feelings about themselves
directly depend on how they think others
feel about them. Individuals share a fundamental need for assurance of connection
with people who accept them (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). The sociometer model asserts
that self-­esteem is essentially an index of
perceived social acceptance. Even anticipating change to one’s social acceptance status
impacts self-­appraisal (Leary et al., 1995).
Self-­esteem is particularly sensitive to negative metaperceptions that threaten minimum
standards for belongingness; positive metaperceptions that merely reinforce one’s sense
of being accepted have relatively less impact
on self-­esteem (Leary et al., 1995; for more
confirmation that negative social feedback
128
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
packs more punch than positive feedback,
see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001; Fenigstein, 1979). 5
The process by which metaperceptions
become integrated into one’s self-­concept
is mostly automatic (for reviews, see Chen,
Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; Higgins & Pittman, 2008). Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez
(1990) demonstrated this fact by showing
that priming students to think about authority figures associated with disapproval (the
Pope or the department chair) caused their
self-views to become more negative. Additional evidence can be drawn from Shah’s
(2003a, 2003b) finding that one person’s
exposure to other people’s views about the
goals that person should pursue caused that
person to shift goals automatically to fit
other people’s perspectives. Effects of exposure to others’ appraisals extend beyond the
window of time in which exposure occurred.
For example, Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko,
and Eccleston (2009) showed that encountering an experimenter wearing a T-shirt
promoting tolerance of different body sizes
led female participants to experience higher
state self-­esteem when interacting with this
experimenter (now wearing a message-free
shirt) 1 week later.
The same self-­affirmation and self­enhancement biases that guide the formation of metaperceptions are also evident in
the integration of metaperceptions into selfviews. People embrace and assimilate social
feedback into self-views more rapidly if the
feedback is consistent with their existing
self-views and the implications are positive
(e.g., Shrauger, 1975). People also selectively
recall metaperception details that match or
bolster preferred self-views (e.g., Sanitioso
& Wlodarski, 2004). Swann, Bosson, and
Pelham (2002) found that people can even
expand the boundaries of their self-­concepts
to incorporate desirable social feedback.
Choice of social environment provides a
good example of how individuals can exert
control over reflected appraisal outcomes.
People want to feel good, or at least not
feel bad, about themselves, so they choose
to spend time with people who reinforce
their current or ideal self-­appraisals (e.g.,
McNulty & Swann, 1994; Swann & Read,
1981). Although much of the bias observed
in reflected appraisal is best characterized as
automatic and passive, people also play an
active role in shaping the reflected appraisal
process, and to some degree they do so with
awareness and intention.
Moderators of and Mediators
of Metaperception Internalization
By definition, demonstrations of reflected
appraisal effects highlight the instability and
conditionality of people’s self-­appraisals.
Reflected appraisal susceptibility indicates a
self-­concept that is not fully formed, or at
least not held with confidence. In general,
research has linked self-­concept instability
and contingency with more psychological
problems than benefits (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, & Sommers, 2004; Kernis, Paradise,
Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000).
The same could be said for the psychological
correlates of sensitivity to reflected appraisal. Perceptions of others’ appraisals exert
more influence on the self-­appraisals of people who have low self-­esteem (e.g., Murray,
Holmes, & Griffin, 1996), anxious avoidant
attachment (e.g., Srivastava & Beer, 2005),
a record of low achievement (e.g., Madon,
Jussim, & Eccles, 1997), or stigmatized personal features (e.g., Cioffi, 2000; Khanna,
2010; Santuzzi & Ruscher, 2002). The tendency for individuals with low self-­esteem
to make mountains out of molehills also
applies to their response to critical social
feedback (Murray et al., 2002). Compared
to people with high self-­esteem, people
with low self-­esteem have more difficulty
confining the self-­evaluative consequences
of specific criticism to the narrow facets of
self directly implicated by the feedback. Unfortunately, the people whose self-­esteem
fluctuates most dramatically with perceived
social approval also tend to be evaluated
less favorably by others (Harter, Stocker, &
Robinson, 1996).
Cultural differences in the degree to
which people’s self-­concepts are affected by
reflected appraisal have been observed, most
notably in comparisons between collectivistic East Asian cultures and individualistic
Western cultures. Collectivism prioritizes interconnections between oneself and others,
and Suh (2007) confirmed that self-views of
East Asians are more contingent on perceptions of others’ appraisals than self-views of
individuals from Western cultures. In Suh’s
words, the “perspective of others very often
6. Reflected Appraisal
becomes the default position of the East
Asian self” (p. 1327). This conclusion dovetails with research showing that the Chinese
are much better at perspective taking than
Americans (Wu & Keysar, 2007). Heine,
Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, and Henrich (2008) found that Japanese participants
were insensitive to the presence of a mirror
that caused North American participants to
become more self-aware, an outcome suggesting that North Americans are less accustomed to considering how they appear
to others. People display more confidence in
other people’s ability to judge them if they
live in East Asian cultures (Tafarodi, Lo,
Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 2004) or report attitudes reflecting a collectivistic orientation (Vorauer & Cameron, 2002). This
connection between individualism and the
belief that others cannot accurately judge
may help to explain the comparatively high
levels of self-­esteem found in Western cultures: Individualistic people should find it
easier to rationalize their rejection of undesired social feedback.
Reflected appraisal outcomes partly depend on one’s perception of the other person’s
characteristics. As Cooley (1902) proposed,
perceptions of another person’s appraisal are
more likely to become assimilated into the
self-­concept if the other person is considered
relevant, important, valued, desired, and an
ingroup member (e.g., Cast, Stets, & Burke,
1999; Rosenberg, 1973; Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005; Turner
& Onorato, 1999). Sinclair and colleagues
(2005) found that pondering other people’s
appraisals could even push self-views in the
opposite direction of others’ appraisals, if
the other people were undesirable relationship partners. However, not all evidence
neatly corresponds with the principle that
reflected appraisals of important others
matter more. Harter (1999) confirmed that
self-­appraisals of children are most affected
by perceived appraisals of their parents, but
her finding that teens and adults are more affected by the appraisals of peers than family
members or their closest friends is harder to
square with other evidence regarding effects
of metaperception target importance. Harter explained this apparent contradiction by
speculating that people view the appraisals
of their closest family and friends as biased
and therefore less credible.
129
Metaperceptions can influence self-views
directly or they can alter self-views indirectly by inducing behavior change. People
adjust their behavior, whether strategically
or unintentionally, in response to their sense
of how others currently view them, or in response to their expectations for how others
will view them after observing the behavior.
People’s perceptions of others’ appraisals of
their capabilities automatically affect their
goal setting, performance, and responses
to performance outcomes (Shah, 2003a,
2003b). The impact of people’s metaperceptions on their behavior is best exemplified
by research on self-­fulfilling prophecy and
stereotype threat. Self-­fulfilling prophecy
describes how receiving information about
others’ expectations can cause people to
behave in a manner that confirms others’
expectations (see reviews by Jussim & Harber, 2005; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978). Stereotype threat refers to fear of confirming
negative stereotypes about the abilities of
one’s group—a fear that often undermines
performance, thus confirming the stereotype
(see review by Schmader, Johns, & Forbes,
2008). Explanations of self-­fulfilling prophecy generally emphasize that internalization
of others’ expectancies precedes expectancy­confirming behavior, which reinforces the
internalization process. In contrast, the
stereotype threat literature emphasizes that
when negative stereotypes regarding the capabilities of some group are made salient,
members of that group generally underachieve whether they accept the validity of
the stereotype or not.6
The behavior that metaperceptions influence can affect self-­appraisals through self­perception or by causing metaperceptions
to change. Self-­perception, the process by
which one’s self-­appraisals adjust according
to the implications of one’s own behavior,
can partly be explained by people’s preference for self-­consistency, but this explanation alone cannot account for evidence that
people are more likely to internalize their
behavior when it is also observed by other
people (Kelly & Rodriguez, 2006; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Tice,
1992). People often behave in ways that
conflict with personal attitudes and values,
but public commitment to such behavior
dramatically increases the consequences for
their self-­concept—­especially if the audience
130
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
is perceived to have a personal interest in the
behavior (Harter, 1999; Pasupathi & Rich,
2005). People have reason to recognize or
at least assume that observers tend to attribute behavior to the stable personal qualities
of the individual engaging in the behavior,
rather than viewing the behavior as an abberation or as the product of forces outside
of the individual (see review by Gilbert &
Malone, 1995). Indeed, when people disclose unflattering personal information or
publicly humiliate themselves, they usually
overestimate the negative impact on others’ views of them (e.g., Gromet & Pronin,
2009). Therefore, engaging in uncharacteristic behavior may cause people to amend
their judgment of an observer’s appraisal
of them, which may in turn cause them to
change their self-views. In short, metaperception can shape behavior, which in turn
can shape metaperception.
The real-world consequences of the connections between metaperceptions and
behavior, as well as the outcomes of self­appraisals, could potentially be profound.
For example, Murray and colleagues (1996)
have shown that the actions of people who
view their partners with rose-­colored glasses
elevate their partners’ self-­appraisals, which
in turn promotes behavior worthy of positive appraisal. Murray’s findings have been
extended by research on the Michelangelo
effect (Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, &
Whitton, 1999), which describes the process
by which close relationship partners shape
each other’s behavior and self-­appraisals toward desired ideals. The Michelangelo effect
essentially highlights a form of self-­fulfilling
prophecy: Treating others as if they possessed the traits that you wished they had
actually leads others to feel that they possess
those traits and to engage in behavior consistent with the desired traits.
Kelly’s (2000) research on secret disclosure in psychotherapy provides another example of how reflected appraisal effects can
be mediated by people’s behavior. Kelly’s
work suggests that people routinely withhold shameful secrets from their therapist in
order to project a more positive self-image.
By restricting negative self-­disclosure, people can more easily accept that their therapist truly holds them in high regard and has
positive expectations for their future (see
also Lemay & Clark, 2008). Although hid-
ing personal information from others has
been linked with negative psychological outcomes in some contexts (e.g., Uysal, Lin, &
Knee, 2010), Kelly (2000) concluded that
downsides of avoiding full self-­disclosure
in therapy may be offset by advantages associated with people’s ability to internalize
their positive self-­presentation and their perception of being viewed positively by their
therapist.
In summary, research confirms that metaperceptions change self-views directly or by
inducing behavior that people internalize.
When self-views change, the cycle of reflected
appraisal repeats: Change in self-­appraisal is
likely to produce change in people’s metaperceptions.
Research Challenges
and Opportunities
Studying reflected appraisal presents several
challenges. Perhaps the biggest is the fact
that reflected appraisal is not one but rather
an interlocking series of processes (see Figure
6.1). To date, most of the empirical evidence
relevant to reflected appraisal has emerged
from studies designed to test hypotheses
relevant to a single component of reflected
appraisal. Capturing the nuances of each element of the reflected appraisal cycle for all
participants in a single study is impractical,
if not implausible, but the lack of such studies leaves open the possibility that the reality of reflected appraisal as a whole could
be different than the sum of evidence from
studies addressing narrow slices of reflected
appraisal would indicate.
Reflected appraisal researchers also face
methodological challenges in trying to distinguish between competing explanations
for outcomes observed. For example, as discussed earlier, mere correspondence between
self-­appraisals and metaperceptions could
reflect judgments of oneself influencing judgments of others, judgments of others influencing judgments of oneself, or independent
judgments of oneself and others. Another
challenge is distinguishing the influence of
others’ real or perceived appraisals on self­appraisal from self-­broadcasting—the influence of self-­appraisal on others’ appraisals
(see discussions by Felson, 1993; Kenny &
DePaulo, 1993; Srivastava & Beer, 2005).
6. Reflected Appraisal
131
self-appraisal
self-projection
self-perception
others’ behavior
behavior change
metaperception
FIGURE 6.1. Components of reflected appraisal.
Moreover, it is not always easy to isolate reflected appraisal effects from less complex,
more direct sources of social influence, such
as social comparison, mimicry (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), and perceived self–
other overlap (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, &
Nelson, 1991).
The fact that multiple mechanisms can
account for the impact of one’s social environment on self-views raises the question of
whether reflected appraisal plays a relatively
major or minor role when compared with alternative forms of social influence. Sedikides
and Skowronski (1995) determined that social comparisons influence self-­appraisals
more than reflected appraisal, but the reality of reflected appraisal has never really
been challenged, at least not when reflected
appraisal definitions specify that subjective perceptions of others drive the process.
People seem to believe that reflected appraisal is an important factor in their self­appraisals (Harter et al., 1996). In recent
years, some businesses have begun trying to
increase their employees’ productivity and
psychological health through the use of reflected appraisal interventions such as the
“360-degree exercise” or the “reflected best
self exercise” that encourage participants to
understand their strengths by viewing themselves through the perspective of their peers
(e.g., Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, &
Quinn, 2005).
It may be a cliché to note that rapidly improving neuroscience techniques hold high
promise for enhancing knowledge of psychological processes, but neuroscience has already advanced reflected appraisal research.
An examination of the neurological underpinnings of reflected appraisal is beyond the
scope of this chapter, but a study by Pfeifer
and colleagues (2009) offers an example of
how neuroscience can help. Prior research
had established that teens are sensitive to reflected appraisal (e.g., Harter et al., 1996),
but it had not directly compared reflected
appraisal for teens and adults. Pfeifer and
colleagues used functional magnetic resonance imaging to probe the brain activity of
adult and adolescent samples during a self­reflection task. They found that teen brains
showed significantly more activity than
adult brains in the area at the intersection of
the inferior parietal lobule and posterior superior temporal gyrus—a brain region that
has been linked with third-­person perspective taking. This evidence allowed Pfeifer
and colleagues to conclude that reflected appraisal does indeed affect the self-­appraisals
of adolescents more than adults.
Internet‑Mediated Reflected Appraisal
Having established that technology innovations can benefit the study of reflected
appraisal, we now consider the intriguing
possibility that one relatively new technology—the Internet—has already significantly
changed reflected appraisal processes and
outcomes. For the first time in history, faceto-face interaction now is not necessarily
the dominant means by which people assess
and are assessed by others (Zhao, 2006).
The telephone reduced people’s reliance on
face-to-face communication, but the emergence of the Internet has truly been a game
changer for social interaction. People now
routinely use computers to present themselves and provide feedback to others via
personal webpages, e-mail, and—to an increasing degree—­social networking sites. In
2010, Americans were spending a greater
132
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
percentage of internet time using social networking sites and blogs than e-mail (23%
vs. 8%; NielsenWire, 2010). The Pew Research Center reported that nearly three­quarters of the teens and young adults in the
world with Internet access were using social
networking sites in 2009 (Lenhart, Purcell,
Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010). It also found that
55% of adults ages 18–25 visited social networking sites at least once a day (Taylor &
Keeter, 2010). Researchers have not had
enough time to grasp fully the psychological
consequences of the movement toward electronic social networking (partly because the
favored mode of Internet communication
keeps changing), but we suspect that Zhao
(2005) was on target in observing that Internet communication partners “constitute
a distinctive ‘looking glass’ that produces a
‘digital self’ that differs from the self formed
offline” (p. 387).
The Internet gives people the ability to
elicit and gather social feedback around the
clock. The Pew Research Center found that
83% of young adults report always keeping their cell phones (which today typically
offer text messaging if not Internet capability) within arm’s length when sleeping
(­Taylor & Keeter, 2010). The increasing
extent to which people are connected to social feedback raises the possibility that people’s self-views may now be more affected
by reflected appraisal than they used to be.
Before cell phone and Internet use became
common, researchers (Schoeneman, 1981;
Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995) concluded
that self-­concept is more strongly influenced
by self-­reflection than reflected appraisal.
But when these studies were conducted,
self-­reflection had less competition. Today,
instead of engaging in self-­reflection during
moments of downtime, people may choose
instead to call or text a friend, or log on to
the Internet.
The Flattering Facebook Looking Glass
Different channels of Internet communication could have different implications for
reflected appraisal, but we focus on the
compelling example of the Facebook social
networking website. At this point in time,
Facebook (2011) is by far the most popular
option for computer-­mediated communication, with 500 million users. One longi-
tudinal diary study found that students at
an American college spent an average of
30 minutes per day on Facebook (Pempek,
Yermolayeva, & Calvert, 2009). Facebook
users create self-­descriptive personal profile home pages that they link to the profiles
of other Facebook users (linked users are
called “friends” in Facebook lingo). When
Facebook users log on, they can easily view
others’ profile updates and new messages
sent. Facebook privacy settings allow users
to decline another user’s request to be linked
as a friend, or to remove a link to an existing
friend, but the fact that Facebook users are
commonly linked to more than 200 friends
(e.g., Pempek et al., 2009; Tong, van der
Heide, Langwell, & Walther, 2008) hints
that users are often not particularly selective
in filtering friend requests.
Facebook-­mediated reflected appraisal
probably differs from traditional paths of
reflected appraisal in a number of ways,
but in our view the most important difference is that Facebook appears more likely to
promote positive self-­appraisals by allowing
people to present their preferred self-image,
cultivate a large network of “friends,” and
dodge signs of others’ negative appraisals.
To be sure, like any communication medium, Facebook can and has been used as a
tool for abusing people. But on the whole,
the features and norms of Facebook promote
more self-­esteem bolstering than bashing.
From a self-­presentation standpoint, communicating through Facebook rather than
during live interactions allows people more
opportunities to craft subtly their public
identity through written communications
and by selectively displaying photos and links
to favored people, places, and things (Gonzalez & Hancock, 2011; Zhao, Grasmuch,
& Martin, 2008). Internet self-­presentation
is rarely blatantly untruthful (e.g., Back et
al., 2010; Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons,
2002), but it surely involves selective disclosure. Zhao and colleagues (2008) found
that all of the 60 college students’ Facebook
pages they studied projected a socially desirable identity.
Because Facebook enhances users’ ability to project a positive impression of themselves, they have reason to expect their
Facebook friends to think well of them.
Although observers who form impressions
of Facebook users discount forms of self-
6. Reflected Appraisal
­ resentation that can easily be manipulated
p
(Walther, 2009), impression managers are
likely to assume that others accept the details of their self-­presentation at face value.
This assumption is bolstered by evidence
that people overestimate the degree to which
their e-mail messages achieve their communication goals (Kruger, Epley, Parker, & Ng,
2005), and pre-­Facebook evidence that owners of personal webpages judge that others
form more positive impressions of them by
viewing their webpage than through face-toface interaction (Sherman et al., 2001).
Facebook not only allows people to boost
their self-­esteem by internalizing the complimentary self-­presentations they craft, but
it also gives people chronic access to self­affirming feedback from others. We have already discussed how social norms in general
encourage people to express their positive
views but not their criticisms of others, but
Internet social network environments may
stack the deck even further in favor of positive social feedback. One reason why users
of Facebook and other social networking
sites may expect to receive flattering social
feedback relates to the previously mentioned
ability of users to regulate their communications to fit their sense of what would be
socially appropriate or advantageous. Just
as Facebook users have the power to present themselves to others in ways that emphasize personal strengths, other users also
have the ability to hide their real feelings if
expressing them could be hurtful or counterproductive. In real-time, face-to-face interactions, suppressing knee-jerk expressions
of negative feelings (annoyance, disgust,
frustration, etc.) toward others or their actions should be more difficult to manage. Facebook also offers self-­esteem maintenance
advantages when users do receive criticism
from Facebook friends. Users can escape
esteem-­threatening feedback by logging off,
rereading more supportive messages posted
previously, or just removing the offenders
from their list of friends, thereby blocking
future critical postings.
Three features of Facebook’s default settings warrant attention for steering people
toward positive feelings and supportive
commentary. First, personal pages automatically display the total number of Facebook
friends one has accumulated, so users receive reassurance of social acceptance (usu-
133
ally by hundreds of friends) whenever they
log on. Second, as Twenge and Campbell
(2009) noted, the Facebook “friends” label
confers undeserved status to relationships
between people who often barely know each
other. Third, the Facebook default screen includes a “Like” button that allows people to
quickly express their endorsement or appreciation for comments or content that others
post, but the default screen does not include
a parallel “Dislike” or “Hate” button that
would make it easier for people to express
criticism.
Facebook allows people simultaneously
to show off and obtain self-­affirming feedback—two features that narcissists should
find especially appealing. Studies by Buffardi and Campbell (2008) and Mehdizadeh (2010) both found that narcissism predicted quantity of Facebook activity, and
although Bergman, Fearrington, Davenport,
and Bergman (2011) did not find the same
relationship, they did show that narcissists
were more likely to report using Facebook
for self-­promotion. Buffardi and Campbell
proposed that exposure to others’ narcissism
on Facebook causes people to present themselves in a more narcissistic manner; perhaps
it is no coincidence that students today are
generally more narcissistic than college students in prior generations (Twenge, Konrath,
Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008).
Gonzales and Hancock (2011) gathered
the strongest evidence to date for the notion that Facebook provides a self-­flattering
looking glass. Their research randomly assigned participants to view a mirror, their
personal Facebook page, or someone else’s
Facebook page. Participants who saw their
own Facebook page subsequently had higher self-­esteem than participants assigned to
other experiment conditions. Gonzales and
Hancock interpreted their results as evidence of the benefits of being able personally
to craft one’s Facebook image, but their results could also be attributed to benefits of
exposure to the supportive virtual presence
of Facebook friends.
Although Facebook should be a valuable
social resource for people who are sociable
by nature, the people who seem to gain the
most from the alternative social interface
offered by Facebook and other Internet social networking options are those who have
the most trouble interacting with people in
134
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
face-to-face meetings. All people may benefit from connections with accepting others,
but some people struggle to overcome fears
related to social exposure and interaction.
Individuals who are socially anxious, shy, or
lack self-­esteem tend to feel more comfortable engaging with others through an Internet environment that allows them to control
their self-­presentation more easily, without
being overwhelmed by having to grasp and
respond simultaneously to the complex interpersonal cues exchanged in face-to-face
interactions (e.g., Baker & Oswald, 2010;
Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Joinson,
2004).7
Of course, social networking does not
guarantee self-­esteem advantages. The Facebook norm of socially supportive feedback
probably does not extend to the minority of
users whose self-­presentations violate standards of social appropriateness. Also, true
masters of the art of face-to-face interaction
have less to gain from the movement toward
Internet-based forms of communication. In
some cases, self-­esteem benefits of reflected
appraisal via Facebook may be canceled out
by the upward comparison threats posed by
exposure to seemingly thriving Facebook
friends (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011).
Closing Thoughts
When compared to the history of research
on some other topics relevant to self and
identity, the reflected appraisal literature is
relatively uncontentious. Early accounts of
reflected appraisal offered by James, Cooley,
and Mead have largely withstood decades
of scientific scrutiny. Nonetheless, although
consensus on the “big picture” of reflected
appraisal has remained fairly stable, the complex details of reflected appraisal processes
are now far better understood. The nature
and direction of numerous biases common
to reflected appraisal have been isolated, as
have relevant individual differences in the
people viewing their reflection and in those
serving as mirrors. It will be interesting to
learn whether some of the established principles of reflected appraisal processes will
need to be revised when researchers catch
up to the recent revolutionary changes in the
tools people use to appraise themselves and
others.
Notes
1. Reflected appraisal is typically framed as a
subcomponent or manifestation of symbolic
interactionism, but the terms are sometimes
used interchangeably.
2. Scholars have rarely focused on distinctions
between cognitive and emotional dimensions
of reflected appraisal; this chapter likewise
infers both dimensions in referring to views,
judgments, and appraisals of and by self and
others.
3. Some authors have used the reflected appraisal label narrowly to refer to metaperception;
our broader conceptualization of reflected appraisal encompasses both metaperception and
the self-­appraisals that influence and result
from metaperception.
4. One might question how self-views could
be changed by metaperceptions if the metaperceptions were based on self-views. In this
case, concluding that others share one’s views
of self should change self-views by strengthening the confidence with which they are held.
5. As Murray and colleagues (1998) noted, if
low self-­esteem is indeed a symptom of not
feeling socially accepted, it is sadly ironic that
individuals with low self-­esteem have such
difficulty accepting the validity of others’ expressions of acceptance.
6. The term self-­stereotyping, or metastereotyping, is sometimes used to describe cases
of reflected appraisal in which people judge
themselves in accordance with the stereotypes
they associate with the group(s) to which they
belong.
7. Some early research on the psychological consequences of Internet use—­before Internet
use became mainstream behavior—­suggested
that the socially skilled benefit more from the
Internet than the socially inept (e.g., Kraut et
al., 1998), but the opposite pattern has typically been found in more recent research.
References
Albright, L., Forest, C., & Reiseter, K. (2001).
Acting, behaving, and the selfless basis of
metaperception. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 81(5), 910–921.
Albright, L., & Malloy, T. E. (1999). Self­observation of social behavior and metaperception. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 77(4), 726–734.
6. Reflected Appraisal
Ames, D. R. (2004a). Inside the mind reader’s
tool kit: Projection and stereotyping in mental
state inference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 340–353.
Ames, D. R. (2004b). Strategies for social influence: A similarity contingency model of projection and stereotyping in attribute prevalence
estimates. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87(5), 573–585.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G.
(1991). Close relationships as including other
in the self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60(2), 241–253.
Back, M. D., Stopfer, J. M., Vazire, S., Gaddis,
S., Schmukle, S. C., Egloff, B., et al. (2010).
Facebook profiles reflect actual personality,
not self-­idealization. Psychological Science,
21(3), 372–374.
Baker, L. R., & Oswald, D. L. (2010). Shyness
and online social networking services. Journal
of Social and Personal Relationships, 27(7),
873–889.
Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and
the processing of social information. Psychological Bulletin, 112(3), 461–484.
Baldwin, M. W. (1996). Self-­esteem and “if . . .
then” contingencies of interpersonal acceptance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(6), 1130–1141.
Baldwin, M. W., Carrell, S. E., & Lopez, D. F.
(1990). Priming relationship schemas: My advisor and the Pope are watching me from the
back of my mind. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 435–454.
Bargh, J. A., McKenna, K. Y. A., & Fitzsimons,
G. M. (2002). Can you see the real me?: Activation and expression of the “true self” on
the Internet. Journal of Social Issues, 58(1),
33–48.
Baron, R. M., Albright, L., & Malloy, T. E.
(1995). Effects of behavioral and social class
information on social judgment. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(4), 308–
315.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680–
740). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer,
C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than
good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4),
323–370.
Baumeister, R. F., Hutton, D. G., & Tice, D. M.
(1989). Cognitive processes during deliberate
self-­presentation: How self-­presenters alter
135
and misinterpret the behavior of their interaction partners. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 25(1), 59–78.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (2005). The
need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117(3), 497–529.
Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Hutton, D. G.
(1989). Self-­presentational motivations and
personality differences in self-­esteem. Journal
of Personality, 57, 547–579.
Bergman, S. M., Fearrington, M. E., Davenport,
S. W., & Bergman, J. Z. (2011). Millennials,
narcissism, and social networking: What narcissists do on social networking sites and why.
Personality and Individual Differences, 50,
706–711.
Blumberg, H. H. (1972). Communication of interpersonal evaluations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 23(2), 157–162.
Buffardi, L. E., & Campbell, W. K. (2008).
Narcissism and social networking web sites.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
34(10), 1303–1314.
Campbell, L., Simpson, J. A., Boldry, J., & Kashy,
D. A. (2005). Perceptions of conflict and support in romantic relationships: The role of attachment anxiety. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 88(3), 510–531.
Carlson, E. N., & Furr, R. M. (2009). Evidence
of differential meta-­accuracy: People understand the different impressions they make.
Psychological Science, 20(8), 1033–1039.
Cast, A. D., Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (1999).
Does the self conform to the views of others?
Social Psychology Quarterly, 62, 68–82.
Chambers, J. R., Epley, N., Savitsky, K., &
Windschitl, P. D. (2008). Knowing too much:
Using private knowledge to predict how one
is viewed by others. Psychological Science,
19(6), 542–548.
Chen, S., Boucher, H. C., & Tapias, M. P. (2006).
The relational self revealed: Integrative conceptualization and implications for interpersonal
life. Psychological Bulletin, 132(2), 151–179.
Cioffi, D. (2000). The looking-glass self revisited: Behavior choice and self-­perception in the
social token. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck,
M. R. Hebl, & J. G. Hull (Eds.), The social
psychology of stigma (pp. 184–219). New
York: Guilford Press.
Clement, R. W., & Krueger, J. (2002). Social categorization moderates social projection. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(3),
219–231.
136
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner’s.
Crocker, J., Luhtanen, R. K., & Sommers, S. R.
(2004). Contingencies of self-worth: Progress
and prospects. European Review of Social
Psychology, 75, 133–181.
DePaulo, B. M., & Bell, K. L. (1996). Truth and
investment: Lies are told to those who care.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
71(4), 703–716.
DiDonato, T. E., Ullrich, J., & Krueger, J. I.
(2011). Social perception as induction and
inference: An integrative model of intergroup
differentiation, ingroup favoritism, and differential accuracy. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 100(1), 66–83.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The
perception-­behavior expressway: Automatic
effects of social perception on social behavior.
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 1–40). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Drigotas, S. M., Rusbult, C. E., Wieselquist, J.,
& Whitton, S. W. (1999). Close partner as
sculptor of the ideal self: Behavioral affirmation and the Michelangelo phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
293–323.
Dunning, D. (2005). Self-­insight: Roadblocks
and detours on the path to knowing thyself.
New York: Psychology Press.
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007).
The benefits of Facebook “friends:” Social capital and college students’ use of online social
network sites. Journal of Computer-­Mediated
Communication, 12, 1143–1168.
Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich,
T. (2004). Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 327–339.
Facebook. (2011). Press release. Retrieved March
11, 2011, from www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?statistics.
Felson, F. B. (1989). Parents and the reflected
appraisal process: A longitudinal analysis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
56(6), 965–971.
Felson, R. B. (1993). The (somewhat) social self:
How others affect self-­appraisals. In J. M. Suls
(Ed.), The self in social perspective (pp. 1–26).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fenigstein, A. (1979). Self-­consciousness, self­attention, and social interaction. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 37(1),
75–86.
Frey, F. E., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). Being seen as
individuals versus as group members: Extending research on metaperception to intergroup
contexts. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 10(3), 265–280.
Gilbert, D. T., Jones, E. E., & Pelham, B. W.
(1987). Influence and inference: What the active perceiver overlooks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(5), 861–870.
Gilbert, D. T., & Krull, D. S. (1988). Seeing less
and knowing more: The benefits of perceptual
ignorance. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54(2), 193–202.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin,
117(1), 21–38.
Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K., & Medvec, V. H.
(1998). The illusion of transparency: Biased
assessments of others’ ability to read one’s
emotional states. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 75(2), 332–346.
Gonzales, A. L., & Hancock, J. T. (2011). Mirror,
mirror on my Facebook: Effects of exposure
to Facebook on self-­esteem. Cyberpsychology,
Behavior, and Social Networking, 14, 79–83.
Gromet, D. M., & Pronin, E. (2009). What were
you worried about?: Actors’ concerns about
revealing fears and insecurities relative to observers’ reactions. Self and Identity, 8, 342–
364.
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of self. New
York: Guilford Press.
Harter, S., Stocker, C., & Robinson, N. S.
(1996). The perceived directionality of the link
between approval and self-worth: The liabilities of a looking glass self-­orientation among
young adolescents. Journal of Research on
Adolescence, 6(3), 285–308.
Heine, S. J., Takemoto, T., Moskalenko, S., Lasaleta, J., & Henrich, J. (2008). Mirrors in
the head: Cultural variation in objective self­awareness. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 34(7), 879–887.
Higgins, E. T., & Pittman, T. S. (2008). Motives
of the human animal: Comprehending, managing, and sharing inner states. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 361–385.
Ickes, W. (1997). Empathic accuracy. New York:
Guilford Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology.
New York: Holt.
Joinson, A. N. (2004). Self-­esteem, interpersonal
risk, and preference for E-mail to face-to-face
communication. CyberPsychology and Behavior, 7(4), 472–478.
6. Reflected Appraisal
Jones, E. E. (1986). Interpreting interpersonal
behavior: The effects of expectancies. Science,
234, 41–46.
Jordan, A. H., Monin, B., Dweck, C. S., Lovett,
B. J., John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Misery
has more company than people think: Underestimating the prevalence of others’ negative
emotions. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 37(1), 120–135.
Jussim, L. (1993). Accuracy in interpersonal expectations: A reflection–­construction analysis
of current and classic research. Journal of Personality, 61(4), 637–668.
Jussim, L. (2005). Accuracy in social perception:
Criticisms, controversies, criteria, components,
and cognitive processes. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 37, pp. 1–93). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Jussim, L., & Harber, K. D. (2005). Teacher
expectations and self-­f ulfilling prophecies:
Knowns and unknowns, resolved and unresolved controversies. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 9(2), 131–155.
Jussim, L., Harber, K. D., Crawford, J. T., Cain,
T. R., & Cohen, F. (2005). Social reality makes
the social mind: Self-­f ulfilling prophecy, stereotypes, bias, and accuracy. Interaction Studies, 6(1), 85–102.
Jussim, L., Soffin, S., Brown, R., Ley, J., & Kohlhepp, K. (1992). Understanding reactions to
feedback by integrating ideas from symbolic
interactionism and cognitive evaluation theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(3), 402–421.
Kaplan, S. A., Santuzzi, A. M., & Ruscher, J.
B. (2009). Elaborative metaperceptions in
outcome-­dependent situations: The diluted
relationship between default self-­perceptions
and metaperceptions. Social Cognition, 27(4),
601–614.
Kelly, A. E. (2000). Helping construct desirable identities: A self-­presentational view of
psychotherapy. Psychological Bulletin, 126,
475–494.
Kelly, A. E., & Rodriguez, R. R. (2006). Publicly
committing oneself to an identity. Basic and
Applied Social Psychology, 28(2), 185–191.
Kenny, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1993). Do
people know how others view them?: An empirical and theoretical account. Psychological
Bulletin, 114(1), 145–161.
Kernis, M. H., Paradise, A. W., Whitaker, D. J.,
Wheatman, S. R., & Goldman, B. N. (2000).
Master of one’s psychological domain?: Not
likely if one’s self-­esteem is unstable. Person-
137
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(10),
1297–1305.
Khanna, N. (2010). “If you’re half black, you’re
just black”: Reflected appraisals and the persistence of the one-drop rule. Sociological
Quarterly, 51, 96–121.
Kraut, R. E., Patterson, M., Lundmark, V.,
Kiesler, S., Mukhopadhyay, T., & Scherlis, W.
(1998). Internet paradox: A social technology
that reduces social involvement and psychological well-being? American Psychologist,
53(9), 1017–1032.
Krueger, J. I. (1998). On the perception of social
consensus. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30,
pp. 163–240). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Krueger, J. I. (2007). From social projection to
social behavior. European Review of Social
Psychology, 18, 1–35.
Kruger, J., Epley, N., Parker, J., & Ng, Z. (2005).
Egocentrism over E-mail: Can we communicate as well as we think? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 925–936.
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The
nature and function of self-­esteem: Sociometer theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 32,
pp. 1–62). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Leary, M. R., Haupt, A. L., Strausser, K. S., &
Chokel, J. T. (1998). Calibrating the sociometer: The relationship between interpersonal
appraisals and state self-­esteem. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5),
1290–1299.
Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., &
Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-­esteem as an interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
68(3), 518–530.
Lemay, E. P., & Clark, M. S. (2008). “Walking
on eggshells”: How expressing relationship insecurities perpetuates them. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(2), 420–441.
Lemay, E. P., & Dudley, K. L. (2009). Implications of reflected appraisals of interpersonal
insecurity for suspicion and power. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(12),
1672–1686.
Lenhart, A., Purcell, K., Smith, A., & Zickuhr,
K. (2010). Social media and young adults. Pew
Internet and American Life Project. Retrieved
March 11, 2011, from www.pewinternet.
org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young­Adults.aspx.
Levesque, M. J. (1997). Meta-­accuracy among
138
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
acquainted individuals: A social relations
analysis of interpersonal perception and metaperception. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 72(1), 66–74.
Lundgren, D. C. (2004). Social feedback and
self-­appraisals: Current status of the Mead–­
Cooley hypothesis. Symbolic Interaction,
27(2), 267–286.
Madon, S., Jussim, L., & Eccles, J. (1997). In
search of the powerful self-­f ulfilling prophecy.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
72(4), 791–809.
Malloy, T. E., Albright, L., & Scarpati, S. (2007).
Awareness of peers’ judgments of oneself: Accuracy and process of metaperception. International Journal of Behavioral Development,
31(6), 603–610.
Marks, G., & Miller, N. (1987). Ten years of research on the false-­consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review. Psychological
Bulletin, 102(1), 72–90.
McNulty, J. K. (2008). Neuroticism and interpersonal negativity: The independent contributions of perceptions and behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(11),
1439–1450.
McNulty, S. E., & Swann, W. B. (1994). Identity negotiation in roommate relationships:
The self as architect and consequence of social
reality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1012–1023.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mehdizadeh, S. (2010). Self-­Presentation 2.0:
Narcissism and self-­esteem on Facebook.
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 13(4), 357–364.
Murray, S. L., Griffin, D. W., Rose, P., & Bellavia, G. M. (2003). Calibrating the sociometer:
The relational contingencies of self-­esteem.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
85(1), 63–84.
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Griffin, D. W.
(1996). The self-­fulfilling nature of positive illusions in romantic relationships: Love is not
blind, but prescient. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 71, 1155–1180.
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., Griffin, D. W., Bellavia, G., & Rose, P. (2001). The mismeasure
of love: How self-doubt contaminates relationship beliefs. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 27(4), 423–436.
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., MacDonald, G., &
Ellsworth, P. C. (1998). Through the looking
glass darkly?: When self-­doubts turn into relationship insecurities. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 75(6), 1459–1480.
Murray, S. L., Rose, P., Bellavia, G. M., Holmes, J. G., & Kusche, A. G. (2002). When
rejection stings: How self-­esteem constrains
relationship-­enhancement processes. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3),
556–573.
Nielsen Wire. (2010, August 2). What Americans
do online: Social media and games dominate
activity. Retrieved March 11, 2011, from
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/
what-­a mericans-do-­o nline-social- mediaand-games-­dominate-­activity.
O’Connor, B. P., & Dyce, J. (1993). Appraisals
of musical ability in bar bands: Identifying the
weak link in the looking-glass self chain. Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, 14(1), 69–86.
Oltmanns, T. F., Gleason, M. E. J., Klonsky, E.
D., & Turkheimer, E. (2005). Meta-­perception
for pathological personality traits: Do we
know when others think that we are difficult?
Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 739–751.
Pasupathi, M., & Rich, B. (2005). Inattentive listening undermines self-­verification in personal
storytelling. Journal of Personality, 73(4),
1051–1085.
Pempek, T. A., Yermolayeva, Y. A., & Calvert, S.
L. (2009). College students’ social networking
experiences on Facebook. Journal of Applied
Developmental Psychology, 30, 227–238.
Pfeifer, J. H., Masten, C. L., Borofsky, L. A.,
Dapretto, M., Fuligni, A. J., & Liberman,
M. D. (2009). Neural correlates of direct and
reflected self-­appraisals in adolescents and
adults: When social perspective taking informs self-­perception. Child Development,
80(4), 1016–1038.
Preuss, G. S., & Alicke, M. D. (2009). Everybody
loves me: Self-­evaluations and metaperceptions
of dating popularity. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 35(7), 937–950.
Roberts, L. M., Dutton, J. E., Spreitzer, G. M.,
Heaphy, E. D., & Quinn, R. E. (2005). Composing the reflected best-self portrait: Building
pathways for becoming extraordinary in work
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 712–736.
Rosenberg, M. (1973). Which significant others?
American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 829–860.
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1978). Interpersonal expectancy effects: The first 345 studies.
Behavioral and Brain Studies, 1(3), 377–415.
6. Reflected Appraisal
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The
false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in
social perception and attribution processes.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
13(3), 279–301.
Sanitioso, R. B., & Wlodarski, R. (2004). In
search of information that confirms a desired
self-­perception: Motivated processing of social feedback and choice of social interactions.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
30(4), 412–422.
Santuzzi, A. M., & Ruscher, J. B. (2002). Stigma
salience and paranoid social cognition: Understanding variability in metaperceptions among
individuals with recently acquired stigma. Social Cognition, 20(3), 171–197.
Schlenker, B. R., Dlugolecki, D. W., & Doherty,
K. (1994). The impact of self-­presentations on
self-­appraisals and behavior: The power of
public commitment. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 20, 20–33.
Schmader, T., Johns, M., & Forbes, C. (2008).
An integrated process model of stereotype
threat effects on performance. Psychological
Review, 115(2), 336–356.
Schoeneman, T. J. (1981). Reports of the sources of self-­knowledge. Journal of Personality,
49(3), 284–294.
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1995). On the
sources of self-­knowledge: The perceived primacy of self-­reflection. Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, 14(3), 244–270.
Shah, J. (2003a). Automatic for the people: How
representations of significant others implicitly
affect goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 84(4), 661–681.
Shah, J. (2003b). The motivational looking glass:
How significant others implicitly affect goal
appraisals. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 85(3), 424–439.
Sherman, R. C., End, C., Kraan, E., Cole, A.,
Campbell, J., Klausner, J., et al. (2001). Metaperception in cyberspace. CyberPsychology
and Behavior, 4(1), 123–129.
Shrauger, J. S. (1975). Responses to evaluation as
a function of initial self-­perceptions. Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 581–596.
Shrauger, J. S., & Schoeneman, T. J. (1979).
Symbolic interactionist view of self-­concept:
Through the looking glass darkly. Psychological Bulletin, 86(3), 549–573.
Sinclair, S., Huntsinger, J., Skorinko, J., & Hardin, C. D. (2005). Social tuning of the self:
Consequences for the self-­evaluations of ste-
139
reotype targets. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 89(2), 160–175.
Srivastava, S., & Beer, J. S. (2005). How self­evaluations relate to being liked by others:
Integrating sociometer and attachment perspectives. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89(6), 966–977.
Suh, E. M. (2007). Downsides of an overly
context-­sensitive self: Implications from the
culture and subjective well-being research.
Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1321–1343.
Swann, W. B., Bosson, J. K., & Pelham, B. W.
(2002). Different partners, different selves:
Strategic verification of circumscribed identities. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(9), 1215–1228.
Swann, W. B., & Read, S. J. (1981). Acquiring
self-­knowledge: The search for feedback that
fits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(6), 1119–1128.
Tafarodi, R. W., Lo, C., Yamaguchi, S., Lee, W.,
& Katsura, H. (2004). The inner self in three
countries. Journal of Cross-­C ultural Psychology, 35(1), 97–117.
Taylor, P., & Keeter, S. (2010), February). Millennials: A portrait of generation next (Pew
Internet and American Life Project). Retrieved
March 11, 2011, from pewsocialtrends.
org/files/ 2010/10/millennials-­c onfident­connected-open-to-­change.pdf.
Tice, D. M. (1992). Self-­presentation and self­concept change: The looking-glass self is also
a magnifying glass. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 63, 435–451.
Tice, D. M., & Wallace, H. M. (2003). The reflected self: Creating yourself as (you think)
others see you. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney
(Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 91–
105). New York: Guilford Press.
Tong, S. T., van der Heide, B., Langwell, L., &
Walther, J. B. (2008). Too much of a good
thing?: The relationship between number of
friends and interpersonal impressions on Facebook. Journal of Computer-­Mediated Communication, 13, 531–549.
Turner, J. C., & Onorato, R. S. (1999). Social
identity, personality, and the self-­concept: A
self-­categorization perspective. In T. R. Tyler,
R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John (Eds.), The psychology of the social self (pp. 11–46). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2009). The
narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of entitlement. New York: Free Press.
140
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (2008). Further
evidence of an increase in narcissism among
college students. Journal of Personality, 76(4),
919–928.
Uysal, A., Lin, H. L., & Knee, C. R. (2010). The
role of need satisfaction in self-­concealment
and well-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(2), 187–199.
Vorauer, J. D., & Cameron, J. J. (2002). So
close, and yet so far: Does collectivism foster transparency overestimation? Journal of
Person­ality and Social Psychology, 83(6),
1344–1352.
Vorauer, J. D., & Ross, M. (1999). Self-­awareness
and feeling transparent: Failing to suppress
one’s self. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 415–440.
Walther, J. B. (2009). Self-­generated versus other­generated statements in computer-­mediated
communication: A test of warranting theory
using Facebook. Communication Research,
36(2), 229–253.
Weisbuch, M., Sinclair, S. A., Skorinko, J. L., &
Eccleston, C. P. (2009). Self-­esteem depends
on the beholder: Effects of a subtle social value
cue. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 143–148.
Wu, S., & Keysar, B. (2007). The effect of culture on perspective taking. Psychological Science, 18(7), 600–606.
Zhao, S. (2005). The digital self: Through the
looking glass of telecopresent others. Symbolic
Interaction, 28(3), 387–405.
Zhao, S. (2006). The Internet and the transformation of the reality of everyday life: Toward a
new analytic stance in sociology. Sociological
Inquiry, 76(4), 458–474.
Zhao, S., Grasmuch, S., & Martin, J. (2008).
Identity construction on Facebook: Digital empowerment in anchored relationships. Computers in Human Behavior, 24, 1816–1836.
Chapter 7
Expandable Selves
Gregory M. Walton
David Paunesku
Carol S. Dweck
Why do threats to the self result in ineffective strategies or impaired performance for
some people but not others? Why are some
interventions especially effective in preventing this impairment, and what do these interventions have in common?
Two of the most influential approaches
to the study of the self in social psychology
involve the working self (Markus & Wurf,
1987) and self-­complexity theory (Linville,
1987). In the present chapter, we suggest
that a perspective that combines the working
self and self-­complexity theory can provide
new insight into the self and important self­related phenomena, and can suggest new directions for research. We call our approach
“expandable selves” theory.
We begin by presenting the working self
and self-­complexity theory. Then, using research on stereotype threat and on implicit
theories of intelligence as paradigmatic examples, we discuss how our perspective on
expandable selves can illuminate effective
and ineffective responses to self-­related
threats and offer a new understanding of
strategies to improve people’s functioning in
the face of threat.
The Working Self
and Self‑Complexity Theory
Theory and research on the working self emphasize how the contents of the active self
change in different situations. Because the
self contains too much information for all
of it to be simultaneously active, only a subset of this information is activated, typically
those contents of the self that appear relevant
to the situation at hand. Thus, different contexts, roles, and identities can evoke different working selves (e.g., McGuire, McGuire,
Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire, McGuire,
& Winton, 1979) that in turn guide people’s attitudes, judgments, and behaviors.
For instance, bilingual Chinese Canadians
evidence more characteristically Chineseself patterns, such as greater endorsement
of Chinese cultural values and lower self­esteem when they complete study materials in Chinese rather than in English (Ross,
Xun, & Wilson, 2002). Other research finds
that which working self is activated in a
context can affect important behavioral outcomes. Asian American women primed with
their ethnic identity (e.g., answering ques141
142
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
tions about languages spoken in their home,
how many generations their family had been
in America, etc.) performed better on a subsequent math test than women in a control
condition, an effect that is consistent with
positive stereotypes about the math ability
of Asians. However, consistent with research
on stereotype threat, when Asian American
women were primed with their gender identity (e.g., answering questions whether they
preferred coed or single-sex living arrangements), they performed less well on the math
test (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).
These findings on the working self are
consistent with recent theorizing about the
representation and functioning of the self.
For instance, McConnell’s (2011) multiple
self-­aspects framework (MSF) portrays the
self as “a collection of multiple, context­dependent selves” (p. 3). There is also, in
MSF, attention to how the different aspects
of the self activated in a given context may
combine to produce psychological and behavioral outcomes. Mischel’s cognitive–­
affective processing system (CAPS) theory
(e.g., Mischel & Morf, 2003; Morf &
Mischel, Chapter 2, this volume) depicts a
similarly dynamic self. This theory proposes
that the self is composed of a large number
of if–then contingencies, representing the
different thoughts, feelings, and behavioral
tendencies that are or could be activated in
a given context (see also Cervone, 2005). At
the heart of these theories is the contextual
nature of the contents of the self, the idea
that the self is not unitary or constant but
changes in reliable ways as situations evoke
different context-­dependent selves.
In contrast, self-­complexity theory has emphasized how the structure of a more global
and stable self can differ for different people.
The complexity of this structure in turn can
affect people’s ability to cope with threats or
failures and can ultimately affect their overall well-being (Linville, 1985, 1987). In classic research, Linville (1987) found that people with greater self-­complexity—who have
more and more differentiated self-­aspects—­
experience less stress and depression, and
show better physical health following stressful events such as social and academic difficulties, financial problems, and work related
pressure (for a review, see Rafaeli-Mor &
Steinberg, 2002; Showers & Zeigler-Hill,
Chapter 5, this volume). Subsequent research
has shed light on why this might be so. Individuals who are high in self-­complexity can
more successfully suppress negative or distracting self-­relevant thoughts by diverting
their attention to positive aspects of self that
are unrelated to and untainted by the negative thoughts (Renaud & McConnell, 2002).
By contrast, lower self-­complexity is thought
to lead to greater reactivity to life events because those events affect a larger proportion
of the person’s overall self-­concept (and, in
the face of negative events, there are fewer
remaining positive aspects to which one may
turn).
Combining insights from the working self
and self-­complexity theory, we propose that
regardless of chronic self-­complexity the
working self that is active in a given situation can vary in its breadth, complexity,
and structure—that it is expandable and
contractable. Different situations may bring
to the fore either a wide range of aspects or
only isolated aspects of the self. As a result,
the working self in a situation may be relatively broad or relatively narrow. Consistent
with self-­complexity theory, we suggest that,
in general, when the working self is narrow
it may be more vulnerable and have fewer
resources with which to function effectively
in challenging situations. In this chapter we
focus on how people cope with threat because threat situations are challenging and
require effective coping. At the same time,
as we discuss later, many threat situations
may call forth a relatively narrow self. An
important implication of our expandable
self theory is that an effective strategy to improve functioning in the face of threat is to
broaden the working self that is active in the
context at hand.
Toward this end, we examine two phenomena in which threat is high and optimal functioning is important: performance
under stereotype threat and performance
in the face of challenge or setbacks among
people who endorse a fixed (entity) theory
of intelligence. In each case, we suggest that
threat tends to narrow people’s active working self—­reducing it to the threatened aspect
of self—and, correspondingly, remedies that
improve people’s functioning in the face of
such threats do so in part by restoring a
broader working self. We suggest that such
remedies can broaden the self in three ways:
(1) by connecting the narrower working self
7. Expandable Selves
to other aspects of the self, such as personal
or group identities that are not under threat;
(2) by connecting it to a future, more capable
self; or (3) by connecting it to valued other
people.
Stereotype Threat as a Narrowing
of the Self
People experience stereotype threat when
they are at risk for being viewed through
the lens of a negative stereotype about their
group (Steele, 2010; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). We can all experience stereotype
threat in relevant circumstances. When a
woman takes an evaluative math test, she
may be aware of negative stereotypes that
impugn the ability of women in math. As
a consequence, she may worry that should
she perform poorly, this poor performance
could be seen as proof that women are bad
at math. When Latino Americans or African
Americans take an intellectual test, they may
worry that a poor performance could be seen
as evidence that their ethnic group is less intelligent than others. When a man engages
in a conversation about an emotion-laden
topic, he may be cognizant of negative stereotypes about men’s emotional intelligence.
When white individuals talk with ethnic/minorities about a sensitive race-­related topic
such as Affirmative Action or immigration
policy, they may worry about confirming the
stereotype that white people are racist.
An important theme in all these cases is
that people worry about being viewed and
treated only or primarily as members of a
particular, negatively stereotyped social
group. For this reason, stereotype threat can
evoke a self that is defined chiefly in terms
of the negatively stereotyped group identity.
The other aspects of people’s selves may simply disappear from their active psychology—
their broader likes and dislikes, strengths,
values, personal allegiances and friendships,
interests and hobbies, idiosyncratic political views, and so forth. It is as though these
aspects of the self become irrelevant when
the reputation of a valued group identity is
at stake.
The notion that the active self may change
under stereotype threat has not been a major
focus of research. But this idea is implicit in
the original formulation of stereotype threat
143
theory. Steele (1997) wrote, “It [stereotype
threat] happens when one is in the field of
the stereotype, what Cross (1991) called
‘spotlight anxiety’ (p. 195), such that one
can be judged or treated in terms of a racial stereotype” (p. 616, original emphasis).
In the spotlight of a stereotype, it may seem
that nothing but the threatened group identity is relevant.
A role for the self is also evident in Steele’s
(1997) early discussion of efforts to reduce
stereotype threat. Steele writes,
Schooling that [reduces stereotype threat], I
have called wise, a term borrowed from Irving
Goffman (1963), who borrowed it from gay
men and lesbians of the 1950s. They used it to
designate heterosexuals who understood their
full humanity despite the stigma attached to
their sexual orientation—­usually family and
friends, who knew the person beneath the
stigma. So it must be, I argue, for the effective
schooling of stereotype-­threatened groups.
(p. 624)
In the context of stereotype threat, wise
schooling would convey to students that they
are seen as more than a member of a stereotyped group—that they are full people.1
Is there evidence that stereotype threat
causes a person’s active self to shrink to a
negative stereotype? Does this shrinking of
the self contribute to the cognitive and intellectual decrements associated with stereotype threat? And do effective remedies for
stereotype threat expand the self, restoring a
broader, more “complex” self and returning
people to their full humanity?
How Does Stereotype Threat Narrow
the Active Working Self?
The way in which stereotype threat narrows
the working self takes a particular form by
virtue of the fact that people typically resist being reduced to a negative stereotype.
Under stereotype threat, thoughts of the negative stereotype may be activated. However,
on explicit measures, people may try to distance themselves from the stereotype (Steele
& Aronson, 1995; Pittinsky, Shih, & Ambady, 1999; see also Pronin, Steele, & Ross,
2004) and, furthermore, when engaged in a
stereotype-­relevant task, they may effortfully try to suppress thoughts of the stereotype
(Logel, Iserman, Davies, Quinn, & Spencer,
144
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
2009). Ironically, this effortful suppression
may require people to monitor the environment for cues of the stereotype (cf. Wegner,
Erber, & Zanakos, 1993), heightening their
responsiveness to threatening cues (e.g.,
Murphy, Steele, & Gross, 2007). This suppression may lead people to experience rebound effects after the task has been completed (Logel et al., 2009). In this sense, even
despite people’s best efforts, the working self
under stereotype threat may be built around
or narrowed to the stereotype.
Evidence for this process can be seen
in Steele and Aronson (1995, Study 3), in
which African American students who anticipated taking a threatening, evaluative
verbal test exhibited heightened accessibility
of negative racial stereotypes on a word stem
completion task, suggestive of the increased
salience of their racial identity in the threatening situation. At the same time, however,
on explicit measures, African Americans
expressed less interest in stereotypically African American activities, such as playing
basketball and listening to rap music (see
also Pronin et al., 2004). One interpretation
of these results is that under threat, African
American students’ became increasingly
conscious of their racial identity but strove
to resist being seen solely through the lens
of race.
In another line of research, Logel and
colleagues (2009) showed suppression of
stereotype-­relevant thoughts by women
taking a math test under stereotype threat.
But after the test, women in the stereotype
threat condition exhibited a postsuppression
rebound, evidencing faster response time to
gender stereotype words. Despite their efforts to push the stereotype away, contending with it increased its presence in people’s
minds. Notably, Logel and colleagues found
that this effortful thought suppression contributed to the negative effects of stereotype
threat on intellectual performance (see also
Taylor & Walton, 2011). Taken together,
these results suggest how stereotype threat
can narrow the self to one defined in terms
of the stereotype.
Do Remedies for Stereotype Threat
Expand the Self?
If a narrowing of the self contributes to the
performance decrements associated with
stereotype threat, would strategies to expand the active working self mitigate stereotype threat? If this were the case, it would
both suggest novel practical remedies for
stereotype threat and provide a more unified theoretical understanding of stereotype
threat. Indeed, a key question in contemporary research on stereotype threat involves
understanding how even brief interventions
can reduce the effects of stereotype threat
and generate striking improvements in academic performance among negatively stereotyped students (for reviews, see Cohen
& Garcia, 2008; Steele, 2010; Walton &
Spencer, 2009; Yeager & Walton, 2011). For
instance, Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, and Master
(2006) found that a 15- to 20-minute value
affirmation exercise in which students wrote
about personally important values reduced
the black–white achievement gap in grade
point average (GPA) among seventh-grade
students and produced benefits that persisted, with boosters, over the next 2 years, especially for initially low-­performing African
Americans (Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-­Vaughns,
Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009). Similarly, Walton and Cohen (2007, 2011) found that a
1-hour intervention to buttress first-year
college students’ feelings of social belonging
in school raised black students’ grades from
sophomore through senior year, halving the
black–white achievement gap over this period (see also Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002;
Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003).
We suggest that an important mechanism by which many strategies work to reduce stereotype threat involves broadening
students’ active self in the academic context—expanding the self beyond the group
identity that is threatened by the stereotype
(Steele, 1997). Evidence for this mechanism
can be seen in both laboratory and field­experimental research. For instance, laboratory research finds that tasks that remind
students of more or broader aspects of the
self can reduce stereotype threat. Gresky,
Ten Eyck, Lord, and McIntyre (2005) asked
highly math-­identified women to draw “self­concept maps” before presenting them with
an evaluative, threatening math test. Women
who were asked to produce maps with many
nodes depicting diverse aspects of themselves
performed significantly better on an evaluative math test than women asked to produce
simple self-maps or none at all. This perfor-
7. Expandable Selves
mance gain eliminated the gender difference
in math scores.
Using a different task, Ambady, Paik,
Steele, Owen-Smith, and Mitchell (2004)
asked women a series of questions designed
to evoke aspects of their personal identity
such as their favorite food and movie (Study
1a), or positive and negative traits (Study
1b). In both studies, the individuation exercise, as compared to answering generic, impersonal questions, significantly improved
the math performance of women placed
under stereotype threat. In a related vein,
in the Logel and colleagues (2009) research
described earlier, when the researchers gave
women a task to broaden the self (to think of
an important part of themselves unrelated to
school), women’s math performance under
stereotype threat improved sharply.
Similarly, directly reminding people of an
unrelated positive group identity can prevent
stereotype threat, as in the Shih and colleagues (1999) study mentioned earlier, in
which priming Asian women with their ethnic rather than gender identity raised their
math performance (see also McGlone &
Aronson, 2007). A final strategy to broaden
people’s selves under stereotype threat involves challenging the assumption that the
group identity under threat is distinct and
isolated. For instance, Rosenthal and Crisp
(2006) found that asking women to think of
things that men and women have in common reduced stereotype threat.
Does Value Affirmation Expand
the Self?: Evidence from the Laboratory
Each of the lines of research we have just reviewed illustrates how exercises that expand
the active working self can improve performance in an otherwise threatening context
(see also Critcher & Dunning, 2009, Study
3). This analysis may shed light on the way
in which value affirmation exercises attenuate the effects of stereotype threat (see
Cohen & Garcia, 2008; Sherman & Cohen,
2006; Sherman & Hartson, 2011). In a typical value affirmation study, people are presented with a list of personal values (relationships with friends and family, having a
good sense of humor, being good at sports,
etc.) and asked to rank-order these values in
terms of their personal importance. In the
value affirmation condition, participants
145
are then asked to write about why their top­ranked value is important to them. In the
control condition, participants are asked to
write about why a low-­ranked value might
matter to someone else.
Much research shows that value affirmation exercises improve people’s functioning
in the face of threat (see Sherman & Cohen,
2006). For instance, value affirmations increase people’s acceptance of otherwise
threatening health information (e.g., Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). In the context
of stereotype threat, value affirmations can
improve academic performance, an effect
found in both laboratory research (Martens,
Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006; Taylor
& Walton, 2011) and, as noted, in intervention field experiments (Cohen et al., 2006,
2009).
Do value affirmations improve people’s
performance under stereotype threat in part
by broadening the active working self? Research on value affirmation interventions
grew out of classic self-­affirmation theory,
which posits that people have a basic need
to see themselves as good, moral, and efficacious (Steele, 1988). In this view, writing
about personal values reminds people of important sources of self-worth, which allows
people to cope more effectively with threat
(see Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However,
past theorizing has not directly examined
how the nature of the active self changes as a
consequence of affirmation exercises. It could
be that writing about personal values heightens a focus on the self, a view implied by the
term self-­affirmation. Alternatively, perhaps
writing about personal values broadens the
active self. It is because of this ambiguity
that we use the more neutral term value affirmation rather than self-­affirmation.
What is the evidence that value affirmations broaden the active self, restoring a person facing a threat from, as it were, a narrow
self to a fuller self? In one important line of
research, Crocker, Niiya, and Mischkowski
(2008) examined the emotions caused by
value affirmation exercises, and the role
these emotions play in mediating the effects
of the affirmation in helping people cope
with threat. They found that value affirmation has its strongest effects on positive,
other-­directed emotions such as “loving,”
“giving,” “empathetic,” and “connected;”
by contrast, it had appreciably smaller effects
146
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
on self-­directed emotions such as “proud,”
“strong,” and “admirable.” Moreover, the
increase in feeling “loving” and “connected”
statistically mediated the effect of the value
affirmation on the acceptance of threatening
health information—in this study, smokers’
acceptance of information about the health
risks of smoking. These findings led Crocker
and colleagues to conclude that “reminding
people what they love or care about may enable them to transcend the self” (p. 746).
We would amend this statement to say that
affirmation allows people to transcend the
narrow self defined by the threat at hand—
to become more than “a smoker” in this
context—and as a consequence to be able
to appraise and respond to information that
threatens “the smoker” in a more adaptive
manner.
There is more evidence that value affirmation expands the self in the face of threat.
Critcher and Dunning (2009) found that
value affirmation increases agreement with
explicit items consistent with a broader active self. In a context in which college students answered questions about their academic major, a value affirmation increased
agreement with items such as “If I did poorly
in an area related to my academic major,
this deficiency would be specific enough that
other aspects of myself would make up for it”
and “In thinking of domains that contribute
to how I feel about myself, nonacademic aspects easily come to mind.” In another study,
Critcher and Dunning found that a task in
which participants were asked to represent
diverse parts of the self in wedges within a
circle reduced defensiveness in response to
threatening information (receiving a poor
grade on an assignment) to the same degree as
a value affirmation (cf. Gresky et al., 2005).
Consistent with the hypothesis that the self­representation task and the affirmation had
similar psychological effects (expanding the
self), there was no additional reduction in
defensiveness among participants who completed both the self-­representation task and
the value affirmation.
The view that value affirmation reduces
threat by broadening the self is also consistent with research demonstrating that value
affirmation reduces threat only when the affirmed value is in a different domain than
the threat (Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, &
Aronson, 1997; Lehmiller, Law, & Tormala,
2010; Sivanthan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku,
2008). Indeed, value affirmations that do not
broaden the self—that is, those that simply
affirm the value that is subsequently threatened—have been shown to create greater
rigidity in the face of threat, for example,
increasing self-­justification and escalating
commitment to a failing course of action,
presumably by further focusing the working
self on the threatened aspect of self (Blanton
et al., 1997; Sivanathan et al., 2008).
If an expansion of the working self to include unthreatened aspects of self is sufficient to reduce defensiveness or improve performance in the face of threat, then merely
increasing the accessibility of unthreatened
aspects of self should reduce defensiveness.
A recent series of studies has explored this
possibility using priming. Its results suggest
that even subliminal primes can reduce defensiveness or increase performance if they
make unthreatened aspects of self more cognitively accessible (Paunesku, Walton, &
Dweck, 2011b). In one study, participants
who were placed under stereotype threat performed significantly better on an academic
achievement test after having been primed
with family and friends using a sentence­unscrambling task. In another study, the
same effect was obtained when participants
were incidentally exposed to a photographic
collage depicting (other people’s) families
and friends. In yet another study, the same
prime reduced defensiveness to threatening
health information.
Does Value Affirmation Expand
the Self?: Evidence from the Field
Our analysis suggests that value affirmations may improve functioning in the face
of threat by evoking a broader sense of self.
Is there evidence in field settings that value
affirmation interventions broaden the self?
Although such evidence is less direct than
findings from controlled laboratory experiments, consistent with this hypothesis, one
field experiment found that a value affirmation exercise reduced the accessibility of
negative racial stereotypes among African
American middle school students several
months after the intervention (Cohen et al.,
2006).
As noted earlier, a second intervention to
reduce stereotype threat involves efforts to
7. Expandable Selves
buttress students’ feelings of social belonging
in school. Walton and Cohen (2007, 2011)
found that a 1-hour social belonging intervention delivered to college freshmen raised
African American students’ grades over the
next 3 years. It is not hard to imagine how
strategies to enrich students’ relationships
with peers and instructors in an academic environment could broaden people’s active self
in the academic environment; that is, to the
extent that people feel they belong in a setting and are respected and valued by others
there, they may be less likely to worry that
they will be viewed only through the lens of
a negative racial stereotype—to be reduced
to a stereotype (Walton & Carr, 2011; see
also Carr, Walton, & Dweck, 2011).
Indeed, findings from Walton and Cohen’s
social belonging intervention provide evidence that the intervention induced a broader sense of self in participants. As in the
value affirmation intervention, Walton and
Cohen (2011) found that the social belonging intervention reduced the accessibility of
racial stereotypes among African American
students. Strikingly, in this study, reduction
in the accessibility of racial stereotypes was
observed 3 years after the intervention had
been delivered. Again, the lower accessibility
of racial stereotypes suggests the possibility
that the intervention led participants to experience a broader working self in the academic setting—one that was less narrowly
defined by a negatively stereotyped identity.
In this section we have argued that stereotype threat narrows the active self. It forces
people to contend with the negative stereotype about their group in such a way that their
working self may be defined chiefly in terms
of that stereotype. By contrast, research in
both the laboratory and field settings finds
that effective strategies to reduce stereotype
threat are ones that evoke a broader self.
These strategies bring people under threat
into contact with their fuller humanity and,
we suggest, thereby arm them with greater
resources to combat that threat.
Implicit Theories
and Expandable Selves
As we have seen, threats to one’s self or
identity often occur when a person is under
judgment—when a valued aspect of the self
147
is in danger of being undermined by failure or rejection. Another major context in
which this may happen involves implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1999; Dweck
& Leggett, 1988). Here, too, people under
judgment may experience threat, may have a
narrowed self in the face of this threat, and
may suffer impaired performance. Let us explore this phenomenon, keeping in mind that
since there is far less direct evidence about
the working self in this area of research, our
analysis will be more speculative.
People who view intelligence as fixed rather than as malleable often view academic
challenges as tests of their intelligence and
interpret academic setbacks as evidence of
a fixed inability (Blackwell, Trzesniewski,
& Dweck, 2007; Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; for
analogous findings in the social domain with
theories of personality, see Erdley, Cain,
Loomis, Dumas-Hine, & Dweck, 1997;
Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen,
& Dweck, 2011). As a consequence, for a
person with a fixed theory of intelligence,
an academic challenge poses the threat of
permanent negative evaluation in a domain
that may be central to the self. From this
view, in confronting an academic challenge
the active self may be defined chiefly by this
threat—“Am I smart or not?” And an answer, or a potential answer, in the negative
has been shown to promote highly defensive
behavior—­behavior designed to protect the
“fixed intelligence” self, but often at great
cost (see Dweck & Elliott-­Moskwa, 2010).
For example, after setbacks or in the face
of poor skills, those with a fixed theory of
intelligence often choose to bolter their sense
of ability by engaging in downward social
comparison (examining the work of students who performed worse than they had)
instead of upward comparison and trying
to learn from higher-­performing students’
work (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). They
have been shown to avoid remedial courses
that could brand them as unskilled but improve their chances for college success (Hong
et al., 1999). They also consider cheating a
viable option to restore their sense of ability (Blackwell et al., 2007), and have been
shown to lie about their suboptimal performance for similar reasons (Mueller &
Dweck, 1998). Across challenging school
transitions, those with a fixed theory of in-
148
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
telligence show worse and worse grades over
time relative to those with a malleable view
because overconcern with their ability leads
them to avoid challenging and effortful tasks
and to show defensive rather than mastery­oriented responses to difficulty (Blackwell et
al., 2007). In short, overconcern with their
narrow, “fixed intelligence” self appears to
lead those with fixed theories of intelligence
to sacrifice learning and hence their future
achievement.
By contrast, students who view intelligence as malleable—as something they can
develop—tend to interpret an academic setback as evidence that they have not yet acquired the relevant skills or found the strategies needed to succeed (e.g., Blackwell et al.,
2007; Hong et al., 2007). In response, they
may redouble their efforts, seek help, or try
new strategies (Blackwell et al., 2007; Hong
et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Moreover, experiments that have induced a malleable theory
have produced these same effects (see, e.g.,
Hong et al., 1999; Nussbaum & Dweck,
2008). Within a malleable theory, the working self that confronts an academic challenge
is not defined chiefly by its present ability. It
is also composed of a future self that could
have more of the ability under evaluation
and is, in fact, actively improving this ability by virtue of pursuing challenges. In this
way, the working self of an incremental theorist who encounters an academic challenge
is implicitly a broader self, and the integrity
of this broader self does not hang on the outcome of the particular academic challenge at
hand. Indeed, it could be the case that the
cues inherent in challenge or setbacks activate this broader self—a future self with
greater skills, and a present self with the resources and strategies to get there.
From this perspective, interventions that
instill a malleable theory—that lead people
to view intelligence as an attribute they can
develop—may generate their effects in part
by increasing the breadth and resources of
the active self in an academic context. Such
interventions tightly associate the experience of challenge to a future, improved self
that can surmount the challenge. In this way,
challenges that may otherwise narrow the
self instead prime an expanded self with self­improvement or learning goals. Blackwell
and colleagues (2007) used an eight-­session
workshop to teach a “growth mindset” to
middle school students in New York City.
In the control group, students received eight
sessions of important study skills, but in
the growth mindset group they also learned
that the brain grows new connections with
learning and effort, and that over time they
could get smarter. The students in the control condition continued to show the decline
in math grades that is common in middle
school, but students in the growth mindset
condition showed a sharp increase in math
achievement over the rest of the school year.
Reports from teachers, blind to condition,
confirmed that the students in the growth
mindset intervention showed greater adoption of learning goals even in the face of difficulty.
Anonymous self-­reports from students
who took an online version of the growth
mindset training further illustrate the idea
that adopting a growth mindset can broaden
the working self and enhance its resources,
bridging the way to a more competent future self. Many students reported that they
were now seeking and confronting difficulty,
using better and more study strategies, and
not giving up the way they used to because
they believed they were growing new neural
connections that would make them smarter
in the future.
Recently, Yeager, Trzesniewski, and
Dweck (2011) developed a six-­session intervention that taught high school students
a malleable theory of personality. Students
learned that their own personality and that
of their peers could be changed over time.
The students who learned this theory, compared to students who went through a six­session social coping skills program, showed
markedly less aggression in the face of peer
exclusion, and these effects lasted over the
remaining 3 months of the school year. How
did this happen?
Work by Yeager and colleagues (2011)
showed that students who hold a fixed theory of personality, when excluded or victimized, feel as though they have been reduced
to a bad and shameful person. This, in part,
leads them to harbor a desire for revenge.
Perhaps our malleable theory intervention
worked by allowing students to maintain a
broader and more complex working self in
the face of these social setbacks—a self that
implicitly contained future selves that could
7. Expandable Selves
learn or improve and not be subject to the
same mistreatment in the future. Indeed,
after the intervention, many of the participating students were sufficiently secure to
remain friendly and prosocial toward peers
who had excluded them. Interestingly, students in the control group that learned an
array of social coping skills did not show
improved, less aggressive reactions to social
setbacks, nor did they exhibit anywhere near
the same degree of prosocial behavior toward peers who had excluded them. Simply
teaching concrete skills may not be sufficient
to develop or maintain an expanded self in a
time of threat.
This work by Yeager and colleagues (2011)
provides an interest parallel to the work of
Helen Block Lewis (1971) on shame and to
her description of the impact of shame on the
self. Lewis underscored the idea that feelings
of shame impair the self and lead to a sense
of shrinking, of being small. In her view,
resolving feelings of shame reactivates—­
liberates—the larger self. The incremental
intervention may have both reduced the initial shame (allowing students to maintain a
broader self) and allowed students to more
readily resolve any remaining shame (further restoring a fuller self).
Finally, Carr, Dweck, and Pauker (2011)
recently investigated what happens when
college students hold a fixed theory of prejudice—that is, when people believe that prejudice is a fixed trait of the self. They have
shown that white individuals who hold this
view, even when they have low levels of explicit and implicit prejudice, act like highly
prejudiced individuals. They have a strong
wish to avoid interracial interactions; when
these interactions occur they wish to keep
their distance and terminate the interactions
as quickly as possible, and they are rated as
highly anxious and unfriendly in an interracial interaction. Follow-up research shows
that this is because people with the fixed theory are preoccupied with not appearing prejudiced to themselves and to others. They do
not want to think prejudiced thoughts, have
prejudiced feelings, or risk producing prejudiced speech or behavior. In other words,
their working self in that situation may be
reduced to that of a “potentially prejudiced
person.” Ironically, this preoccupation leads
them to behave precisely the way a prejudiced person would.
149
Carr and colleagues (2011) however,
showed that teaching a malleable theory of
prejudice erased these effects. In one study,
participants were given the opportunity to
engage in an activity that could reduce their
prejudice but required them to confront
their current prejudice and racial insensitivity. While participants who were led to view
prejudice as fixed tended to avoid such activities, those who were led to view prejudice as malleable actively sought them out.
They were not only less preoccupied with
the threat of appearing prejudiced but they
also seemed keen to realize a less prejudiced
future self.
In each of these lines of work, there was a
central personal quality that defined the individual as competent, worthy or good—as
intelligent; as having the positive regard of
one’s peers; and as being free of prejudice.
In each case that personal quality was under
threat by judgment or evaluation, and individuals with fixed mindsets overreacted
to the threat because it endangered their
view of themselves as competent, worthy,
or good. We suggest that, in each case, a
growth mindset manipulation or intervention helped individuals confront this threat
with less anxiety and more confidence by
broadening their active working self to incorporate a future, improved self. In this
way, the growth mindset intervention may
bear an important similarity with classic
attributional retraining interventions (see
Wilson, Damiani, & Shelton, 2002). For
instance, Wilson and Linville (1982, 1985)
communicated to first-year college students
that academic setbacks are normal in the
transition to college and are due to the difficulty of this transition. This message led to
improved grades and retention in school of
students who were struggling academically.
Similarly, Walton and Cohen’s (2007, 2011)
social belonging intervention communicated to first-year students that worries about
social belonging are common at first in the
transition to a new school and dissipate with
time. In these cases, a potentially important
aspect of the intervention is that it helps students see connections between their present
self and a future, improved self, broadening
students’ active self in the academic environment.
This approach may be contrasted with
strategies that change the individual’s per-
150
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
ception of a threat rather than that expand
the self to better tackle the threat. Such alternative strategies include reappraisal interventions to blunt the negative impact
of threatening information (see Gross &
Thompson, 2007). For instance, Jamieson,
Mendes, Blackstock, and Schmader (2010)
found that teaching students to view the
physiological arousal they experienced in
taking the Graduate Record Examination
(GRE) as evidence of a “challenge response”
rather than as a sign of impending failure
improved students’ scores on the mathematics portion of the GRE both on a practice
exam and, more than a month later, the
actual GRE. In this approach, students are
led to think differently about a stimulus in a
way that makes that stimulus less threatening. By contrast, growth mindset interventions (and attributional retraining interventions) potentially both change the meaning
of a stimulus such as an academic setback
and broaden the active self, so that it is not
defined exclusively by the threat at hand.
If the threats that arise from a fixed theory
of intelligence and stereotype threat both involve a narrowing of the self, and if remedies
to both kinds of threats involve broadening
the self, then interventions explored in one
area may be effective in the other. Consistent with this hypothesis, research finds that
a growth mindset intervention can prove especially effective in improving academic outcomes of students who confront negative stereotypes in school (see Aronson et al., 2002;
Good et al., 2003; Romero, Paunesku, &
Dweck, 2011). Moreover, Aronson (1999)
has directly shown that giving growth versus fixed mindset instructions before a standardized test alleviates rather than exacerbates stereotype threat.
Questions for the Future
This analysis raises potentially important research questions. For instance, would strategies to broaden the active self, such as completing a value affirmation exercise (Cohen
et al., 2006, 2009), creating a complex selfmap (Gresky et al., 2005), providing individuating information (Ambady et al., 2004),
or being passively primed with an important
unthreatened aspect of self (Paunesku et
al., 2011b), which help to reduce stereotype
threat, also improve functioning among
people with a fixed theory of intelligence in
the face of an academic setback?
Is the way that others regard one in a
given situation an especially powerful way
of expanding or contracting the working
self? Much of the stereotype threat effect derives from the belief that others regard one
through the lens of a stereotype. What factors would make someone more or less susceptible to being defined be others? Is a powerful person someone who has the power to
define other people’s selves, perhaps because
that person levies judgments and those judgments are valued?
Do idols, heroes, or role models who are
assimilated into the working self expand the
working self and make people feel more powerful, and does this help them function more
effectively (see Karniol et al., 2011)? How
do groups or group identities expand or contract the working self and make people more
able or less able to cope with threat?
What about person perception? Would expanding people’s view of others make them
more compassionate and altruistic? Would
teachers with expanded views of their students be able to develop the abilities of minority students more skillfully? As a society,
would we build fewer prisons and create
more job training programs?
It is also interesting to ask which kinds of
self-­broadening interventions or manipulations remain with individuals and are carried forward to help them combat threat in
new situations; that is, which kinds of self­broadening manipulations or interventions
become more lasting and accessible parts of
the self or provide strategies that individuals
can readily access in the wake of threat to
cope effectively? And what are the critical
ingredients of interventions that have these
lasting effects? It will be important to understand the characteristics of self-­broadening
interventions that “stick” and allow the individual to call forth the expanded self to
operate optimally in new situations.
Finally, just as threat can narrow the active
self, we note that an already narrow self can
easily be threatened (Critcher & Dunning,
2009; Sherman et al., 2000). For instance,
Paunesku, Walton, and Dweck (2011a)
found that people engage in active, motivated reasoning to defend even a mundane
aspect of self when this self-­aspect has been
brought to the fore by contextual cues. In
7. Expandable Selves
this research, people were led to adopt McDonald’s selves, Burger King selves, airplane
passenger selves, or car driver selves. In each
case, when these selves were highlighted,
people reasoned in ways that protected the
active self, even when this reasoning went
against their broader self-­interest. In general, then, narrow selves may have shrunken
perspectives and diminished resources, and
may prevent people from thinking and acting in their larger self-­interest.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have argued that threat
narrows the working self that is active in a
context, and that this narrowed self has relatively fewer resources with which to cope
with the threat. Using research on stereotype
threat and implicit theories of intelligence as
examples, we have argued that threat can define the active self in a context. Under stereotype threat, people may feel that they are no
more than a token of their negatively stereotyped group, that their many personal attributes and characteristics are irrelevant. With
a fixed theory of intelligence, people encountering academic challenges may feel that they
are no more than their fixed intelligence,
which is up for judgment, and that setbacks
can define them as permanently lacking in
ability. From the perspective of expandable
self theory, manipulations or interventions
that connect the working self to broader aspects of the self, to other people, or to a more
competent future self can help people gain
more resources to cope with threat. Individuating questions or value affirmation exercises
serve as an invitation for broader aspects of
the self to rejoin the active self that is present in the context. Similarly, social belonging
and growth mindset interventions may function to broaden the self, connecting the present self to others and to a future, improved
self. These expansions of the self may then
improve people’s functioning.
As we proposed at the outset, at a broader
theoretical level, our approach merges research on working selves, which suggests
that people’s sense of self fluctuates with
shifts in context, and self-­complexity theory,
which suggests that the structures of people’s
selves can affect how well they function and
respond to threat. We have proposed that
151
the self people bring to bear in a given context can be narrowed or expanded, resulting, in many cases, in thinned or enhanced
resources for coping with threats or difficulties in that context. It is intriguing to think
that the more people are aware of their expandable selves, the more they may be able
to evoke more complex and varied selves in
challenging situations and thereby harness
more resources to perform effectively.
Note
1. The concern that one will be viewed as less
than a full human being is not exaggerated.
Research shows that black Americans, for
instance, are associated more than white
Americans with apes and, furthermore, that
this black = ape association predicts endorsement of violence against black criminal suspects (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson,
2008). A recent news story describes the experience of an Israeli historian, Zeev Sternhell,
at the end of World War II: “Sternhell remembers a Polish woman shouting at Jews, ‘Filthy
animals, you came out of your holes, too bad
they didn’t finish you off!’ When [Sternhell]
emigrated to Israel, in 1951, at the age of sixteen, the transformation was, he says, ‘metaphysical.’ In Europe during the war, Sternhell
told his Haaretz colleague Ari Shavit, the
Jews ‘were human dust. They were people
who were shot in a way cats and dogs are
not shot. . . . And now, just a few years later,
the Jew becomes a full and complete being’ ”
(Remnick, 2011, p. 58).
References
Ambady, N., Paik, S. K., Steele, J., Owen-Smith,
A., & Mitchell, J. P. (2004). Deflecting negative self-­relevant stereotype activation: The effects of individuation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 401–408.
Aronson, J. (1999). The effects of conceiving
ability as fixed or improvable on responses
to stereotype threat. Unpublished manuscript,
New York University.
Aronson, J., Fried, C., & Good, C. (2002). Reducing the effects of stereotype threat on African American college students by shaping theories of intelligence. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 38, 113–125.
152
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Blackwell, L. A., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck,
C. S. (2007). Theories of intelligence and
achievement across the junior high school
transition: A longitudinal study and an intervention. Child Development, 78, 246–263.
Blanton, H., Cooper, J., Skurnik, I., & Aronson, J. (1997). When bad things happen to
good feedback: Exacerbating the need for self­justification with self-­affirmations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(7),
684–692.
Carr, P. B., Dweck, C. S., & Pauker, K. (2011).
Prejudiced behavior without prejudice?: Beliefs
about the malleability of prejudice affect interracial interactions. Manuscript in preparation.
Carr, P B., Walton, G. M., & Dweck C. S. (2011).
A sense of working together forestalls stereotype threat. Manuscript in preparation.
Cervone, D. (2005). Personality architecture:
Within person structures and processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 423–452.
Cohen, G. L., & Garcia, J. (2008). Identity, belonging, and achievement: A model, interventions, implications. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 365–369.
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N., & Master, A.
(2006). Reducing the racial achievement gap:
A social-­psychological intervention. Science,
313, 1307–1310.
Cohen, G. L., Garcia, J., Purdie-­Vaughns, V.,
Apfel, N., & Brzustoski, P. (2009). Recursive
processes in self-­affirmation: Intervening to
close the minority achievement gap. Science,
324, 400–403.
Critcher, C. R., & Dunning, D. (2009). Affirmations provide perspective: Reducing defensiveness by expanding the working self-­concept.
Unpublished manuscript, Cornell University,
Ithaca, NY.
Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Mischkowski, D. (2008).
Why does writing about important values reduce defensiveness?: Self-­affirmation and the
role of positive, other-­directed feelings. Psychological Science, 19, 740–747.
Cross, W. E., Jr. (1991). Shades of black: Diversity in African-­A merican identity. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-­theories: Their role in
motivation, personality, and development.
Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. S., & Elliott-­Moskwa, E. S. (2010).
Self-­theories: The roots of defensiveness. In J.
E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), The social
psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 136–156). New York: Guilford Press.
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social­cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256–273.
Erdley, C., Cain, K., Loomis, C., Dumas-Hines,
F., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). The relations
among children’s social goals, implicit personality theories and response to social failure.
Developmental Psychology, 33, 263–272.
Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M., &
Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet human: Implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization,
and contemporary consequences. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 292–
306.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the
management of spoiled identity. New York:
Touchstone.
Good, C., Aronson, J., & Inzlicht, M. (2003).
Improving adolescents’ standardized test performance: An intervention to reduce the effects of stereotype threat. Journal of Applied
Developmental Psychology, 24, 645–662.
Gresky, D. M., Ten Eyck, L. L., Lord, C. G., &
McIntyre, R. B. (2005). Effects of salient multiple identities on women’s performance under
mathematics stereotype threat. Sex Roles, 53,
703–716.
Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion
regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J.
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation
(pp. 3–24). New York: Guilford Press.
Hong, Y. Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D.,
& Wan, W. (1999). Implicit theories, attributions, and coping: A meaning system approach.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
77, 588–599.
Jamieson, J. P., Mendes, W. B., Blackstock, E.,
& Schmader, T. (2010). Turning knots in your
stomach into bows: Reappraising arousal improves performance on the GRE. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 208–
212.
Karniol, R., Galili, L., Shtilerman, D., Naim,
R., Stern, K., Manjoch, H., et al. (2011).
Why Superman can wait: Cognitive self­transformation in the delay of gratification
paradigm. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 40, 307–317.
Lehmiller, J. J., Law, A. T., & Tormala, T. T.
(2010). The effect of self-­affirmation on sexual
prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 276–285.
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis.
New York: International University Press.
Linville, P. W. (1985). Self-­complexity and af-
7. Expandable Selves
fective extremity: Don’t put all your eggs in
one cognitive basket. Social Cognition, 3,
94–120.
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-­complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-­related illness and
depression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 663–676.
Logel, C., Iserman, E. C., Davies, P. G., Quinn,
D. M., & Spencer, S. J. (2009). The perils of
double consciousness: The role of thought suppression in stereotype threat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 299–312.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic
self-­concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–
337.
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., & Schimel,
J. (2006). Combating stereotype threat: The
effect of self-­affirmation on women’s intellectual performance. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 42, 236–243.
McConnell, A. R. (2011). The multiple self­aspects framework: Self-­concept representation and its implications. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 3–27.
McGlone, M. S., & Aronson, J. (2007). Forewarning and forearming stereotype-­threatened
students. Communication Education, 56,
119–133.
McGuire, W. J., McGuire C. V., Child, P., &
Fujioka, T. (1978). Salience of ethnicity in
the spontaneous self-­concept as a function of
one’s ethnic distinctiveness in the social environment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 36, 511–520.
McGuire, W. J., McGuire, C. V., & Winton, W.
(1979). Effects of household sex composition
on the salience of one’s gender in the spontaneous self-­concept. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 15, 77–90.
Mischel, W., & Morf, C. C. (2003). The self as
a psycho-­social dynamic processing system:
A meta-­perspective on a century of the self in
psychology. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney
(Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 15–
43). New York: Guilford Press.
Mueller, C. M., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Praise
for intelligence can undermine children’s motivation and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 33–52.
Murphy, M. C., Steele, C. M., & Gross, J. J.
(2007). Signaling threat: How situational
cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings. Psychological Science, 18,
879–885
153
Nussbaum, A. D., & Dweck, C. S. (2008). Defensiveness vs. remediation: Self-­theories and
modes of self-­esteem maintenance. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 599–612.
Paunesku, D., Walton, G. M., & Dweck, C. S.
(2011a). Passive affirmation. Manuscript in
preparation.
Paunesku, D., Walton, G. M., & Dweck, C. S.
(2011b). Situational selves: The person and
the situation reconsidered. Manuscript under
review.
Pittinsky, T. L., Shih, M., & Ambady, N. (1999).
Identity adaptiveness and affect across one’s
multiple identities. Journal of Social Issues,
55(3), 503–518.
Pronin, E., Steele, C. M., & Ross, L. (2004).
Identity bifurcation in response to stereotype
threat: Women and mathematics. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 152–
168.
Rafaeli-Mor, E., & Steinberg, J. (2002). Self­complexity and wellbeing: A review and research synthesis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 31–58.
Remnick, D. (2011, February 28). The dissenters.
The New Yorker, pp. 46–59.
Renaud, J., & McConnell, A. R. (2002). Organization of the self-­concept and the suppression
of self-­relevant thoughts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(1), 79–86.
Romero, C. L., Paunesku, D., & Dweck, C. S.
(2011, April). Brainology in the classroom: An
online growth mindset intervention affects
GPA, conduct, and implicit theories. Poster
presented at the Society for Research in Child
Development, Montreal, Canada.
Rosenthal, H. E. S., & Crisp, R. J. (2006). Reducing stereotype threat by blurring intergroup boundaries. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 501–511.
Ross, M., Xun, W. Q. E., & Wilson, A. E.
(2002). Language and the bicultural self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28,
1040–1050.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-­defense: Self-­affirmation theory.
In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183–242).
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Sherman, D. K., & Hartson, K. A. (2011). Reconciling self-­defense with self-­protection:
Self-­affirmation theory. In M. D. Alicke
& C. Sedikides (Eds.), Handbook of self­e nhancement and self-­protection (pp. 128–
151). New York: Guilford Press.
154
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Sherman, D. A. K., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C.
M. (2000). Do messages about health risks
threaten the self?: Increasing the acceptance of
threatening health messages via self affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1046–1058.
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999).
Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and
shifts in quantitative performance. Psychological Science, 10, 80–83.
Sivanathan, N., Molden, D., Galinsky, A., &
Ku, G. (2008). The promise and peril of self­affirmation in de-­escalation of commitment.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 107(1), 1–14.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self­affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self.
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302).
New York: Academic Press.
Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52, 613–629.
Steele, C. (2010). Whistling Vivaldi: And other
clues how stereotypes affect us. New York:
Norton.
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype
threat and the intellectual test performance
of African Americans. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 69, 797–811.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002).
Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 379–440). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Taylor, V. J., & Walton, G. M. (2011). Stereotype
threat undermines academic learning. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
Walton, G. M., & Carr, P. B. (2011). Social belonging and the motivation and intellectual
achievement of negatively stereotyped students. In M. Inzlicht & T. Schmader (Eds.),
Stereotype threat: Theory, process, and application (pp. 89–106). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Walton, G. M., & Cohen, G. L. (2007). A question of belonging: Race, social fit, and achieve-
ment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 82–96.
Walton, G. M., & Cohen, G. L. (2011). A brief
social-­belonging intervention improves academic and health outcomes among minority
students. Science, 331, 1447–1451.
Walton, G. M., & Spencer, S. J. (2009). Latent
ability: Grades and test scores systematically underestimate the intellectual ability of
women and ethnic minority students. Psychological Science, 20, 1132–1139.
Wegner, D. M., Erber, R., & Zanakos, S. (1993).
Ironic processes in the mental control of
mood and mood-­related thought. Journal of
Pers­onality and Social Psychology, 65, 1093–
1104.
Wilson, T. D., Damiani, M., & Shelton, N.
(2002). Improving the academic performance
of college students with brief attributional interventions. In J. Aronson (Ed.), Improving
academic achievement: Impact of psychological factors on education (pp. 88–108). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Wilson, T. D., & Linville, P. W. (1982). Improving the academic performance of college freshmen: Attribution therapy revisited. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 367–
376.
Wilson, T. D., & Linville, P. W. (1985). Improving the performance of college freshmen with
attributional techniques. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 287–293.
Yeager, D. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck,
C. S. (2011). An implicit theories intervention
reduces adolescent aggression in response to
victimization and exclusion. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Yeager, D. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., Tirri, K.,
Nokelainen, P., & Dweck, C. S. (2011). Adolescents’ implicit theories predict desire for
vengeance after remembered and hypothetical
peer conflicts: Correlational and experimental evidence. Developmental Psychology, 47,
1090–1107.
Yeager, D. S., & Walton, G. M. (2011). Social­psychological interventions in education:
They’re not magic. Review of Educational
Research, 81, 267–301.
Chapter 8
Implicit Self and Identity
Thierry Devos
Que-Lam Huynh
Mahzarin R. Banaji
When William James (1890) wrote about the
unique problem of studying self and identity,
he immediately noted the peculiar blurring
of the otherwise clear demarcation between
the knower and the known. The object of
scrutiny, the self, was also the agent doing
the scrutinizing. This illicit merger of the
knower and the known has created an epistemological unease that philosophers have
worried about and psychologists have either
ignored or turned into an assumption so as to
ignore (see Klein, Chapter 28, this volume).
The human ability for self-­awareness and
self-­reflection is so unique that tapping it as
a primary source of information about mind
and social behavior has come at the expense
of confronting the severe problems of the
knower also being the known and of using
introspection as the primary path to discovery. In this chapter, we argue that at least
one circumstance can explicitly disentangle
the knower from the known in the study of
self: when it becomes explicit that the self-as­knower does not have introspective access to
the self-as-known. When knowledge about
oneself resides in a form that is inaccessible
to consciousness, a happy situation arises of
requiring other means of access. When such
indirect methods of access show patterns of
self-­knowledge and self-­affect that are disso-
ciated from what is obtained introspectively,
we have a psychologically intriguing moment: Why are they not consistent? Which
one is true, and according to what criteria?
What does each predict independently? What
is the developmental trajectory of both? Are
they malleable? In this chapter, we focus on
states of unconscious thought and feeling
about the self—those marked by a lack of
conscious awareness, control, intention, and
self-­reflection.
Over the past two decades, the study of
implicit social cognition has created new
paradigms for studying several traditional
fields (for reviews, see Bargh, 2007; Devos,
2008; Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Petty,
Fazio, & Briñol, 2008; Wittenbrink &
Schwarz, 2007). At first sight, this trend
might seem to say little about the topic of
self and identity. Indeed, it is a common assumption that studies of self centrally involve experiences of reflexive consciousness
(Baumeister, 1998): Individuals reflect on
their experiences, self-­consciously evaluate
the contents of consciousness, and introspect
about the causes and meaning of things. In
addition, the self is often viewed as playing
a consciously active role in making meaning, implementing choices, pursuing goals,
and initiating action. Studies that focus on
155
156
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
unconscious or automatic modes of thinking
and feeling, when applied to self and identity
processes, question these assumptions, and
they do so based on the discovery of mental
acts that are fully meaningful and lawful but
that appear to arise without introspective
access or deliberative thought.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of
research on the implicit social cognition of
self and identity. No attempt is made to review the literature at hand exhaustively; rather, we focus on reflections of self and identity
in a particular social context—the context
in which thoughts and feelings about oneself
are shaped by membership in a larger collective, and in which such thoughts and feelings
go beyond the self as target to represent and
shape a view of the collective. Such a focus
places us in the respectable company of others who also assume or demonstrate that the
individual self is meaningfully considered in
reference to social entities that transcend the
individual self (Cooley, 1902; Hogg, Chapter 23, this volume; Mead, 1934; Turner,
Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Walsh
& Banaji, 1997). We limit our coverage
to aspects of the self that emerge when (1)
viewed in the context of social group memberships, and (2) measured via thoughts and
feelings that are not consciously controllable
or within awareness. We begin with research
paradigms that link the study of self with social group and proceed to specific analyses
of basic preference for the ingroup and other
attributes associated with the self. We then
include analyses of implicit self and identity processes as viewed in research on self­evaluation, performance and behavior, and
goal pursuit. In the next major section, we
attend to the top-down influence of societal
and cultural factors on the construction of
implicit self and identity. Together, the research we review reveals the plasticity of the
self as it is shaped by the demands of social
group and culture.
The term implicit is used to refer to processes that occur outside conscious awareness. Evaluations of one’s self, for example,
may be influenced by group membership,
even though one is not aware of such an
influence. A female college student who
strongly identifies with her gender may unknowingly incorporate traditional gender
role expectations about parenthood into her
self-­concept, while consciously identifying
with higher education (Devos, Blanco, Rico,
& Dunn, 2008). There are multiple ways in
which one may be unaware of the source of
influence on thoughts, feelings, and behavior
(Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006).
For example, one may in some circumstances be unaware of the existence of the source
of influence, whereas in other circumstances
one may consciously and accurately perceive
the source of influence, while being unaware
of its causal role in self-­evaluation.
The term implicit is also applied to processes that occur without conscious control
(Payne, 2005). Here, the circumstances are
such that one may be perfectly aware of the
contingencies that connect a particular stimulus to a response but be unable to change or
reverse the direction of the thought, feeling,
or action. A woman may deliberately disagree with romantic fantasies about men as
chivalric rescuers of women and, at the same
time, be unable to control her automatic endorsement of fantasies consistent with traditional gender role expectations (Rudman &
Heppen, 2003). Although empirical investigations focus on one or another of these
aspects of unconscious social cognition, as
well as on those that elude intention and
self-­reflection, we use the term implicit here
to encompass both the processes that occur
without conscious awareness and those that
occur without conscious control.
Self and Social Group
Since at least the 1970s, the self-­concept has
been profitably studied by representing it as
an information structure with empirically
tractable cognitive and affective features.
From such a theoretical vantage point came
the idea that the self-­concept, like other mental representations (e.g., memory), could be
viewed as potentially operating in automatic
mode, and that aspects of self may be hidden
from introspective awareness, as are aspects
of perception and memory.
Research in the American social cognition tradition focused on the intrapersonal
and interpersonal aspects of self and identity, whereas another tradition, with European roots, emphasized the association
between self and social group, resulting in
an intergroup emphasis (see Hogg, Chapter
23, this volume). The latter’s most articu-
8. Implicit Self and Identity
late and encompassing formulation, labeled
self-­c ategorization theory (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), holds
that under particular conditions, group
members perceive themselves as exemplars of
the group rather than as unique individuals.
In this mode, they highlight the similarities
between themselves and other ingroup members, and they apply characteristics typical
of the ingroup to the self (self-­stereotyping).
In other words, the representations of self
and ingroup become inextricably linked.
Until recently, tests of this hypothesis mainly
involved self-­report measures (e.g., Biernat,
Vescio, & Green, 1996; Simon, Pantaleo, &
Mummendey, 1995). However, a number of
empirical investigations have revealed that
the processes by which the ingroup may be
said to become part and parcel of the self
also can operate at an implicit level.
Adapting a paradigm developed by Aron,
Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991), Smith and
Henry (1996) examined people’s psychological ties to significant ingroups. Participants were asked to rate themselves, their
ingroup, and an outgroup on a list of traits.
Next, they indicated, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether each trait was
self-­descriptive or not. Self-­descriptiveness
judgments were faster for traits on which
participants matched their ingroup than for
traits on which they mismatched. On the
contrary, no such facilitation was observed
for traits rated as matching or mismatching
the outgroup. This finding has been taken to
illustrate that the ingroup becomes part of
the representation of oneself. Using a similar
procedure, a follow-up study demonstrated
that the reverse was also true (Smith, Coats,
& Walling, 1999): Characteristics of the
self influenced evaluations of the ingroup,
in that participants were faster to make ingroup descriptiveness judgments for traits
that matched their self-­perceptions. Together, these results support the idea of a mental
fusion of the self and social group (see also
Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000).
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is a technique developed to assess the strength of
implicit associations between concepts (e.g.,
self, group) and attributes (e.g., evaluation
of good–bad, specific traits), and it also has
been used to study implicit self and identity.
The assumption underlying the technique is
157
that the more closely related a concept and
an attribute are (e.g., ingroup and good,
outgroup and bad), the more quickly information representing the concept and the attribute should be paired (for a review of conceptual and methodological aspects of this
technique, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji,
2007).
Recent experiments have used this technique and variations of it to investigate the
strength of self + group association, referring to this pairing as a measure of automatic identification with the social group.
For example, Devos and Banaji (2005) used
this procedure to capture the strength of implicit national identity among citizens of the
United States. Participants were asked to categorize, as quickly as possible, stimuli presented on a computer screen. Some stimuli
were pictures of American or foreign symbols (e.g., flags, coins, maps, monuments),
whereas other stimuli were pronouns frequently used to designate ingroups (e.g., we,
ourselves) or outgroups (e.g., they, other).
Participants completed this task twice. In
one case, American symbols were paired
with words representing the ingroup (e.g.,
we, ourselves), and foreign symbols were
combined with words representing the outgroup (e.g., they, other). In another case,
American symbols were combined with
outgroup words, and foreign symbols were
paired with ingroup words. Results indicated that participants performed the categorization task more quickly when American
symbols and ingroup words shared the same
response key. In other words, it was easier
to associate American symbols with words
such as we or ourselves rather than with
they or other. American symbols may be
seen here as automatically evoking belonging and implying that, at least when unable
consciously to control their responses, this
sample of Americans identified with their
national group.
In addition, such self + group associations can be assessed for multiple cultural
identities. Using the same technique, Devos
(2006) obtained patterns of self + culture
associations indicative of an implicit bicultural identity: Mexican American and Asian
American college students strongly identified
with both American culture and their cultures of origin (Mexican or Asian culture).
When the two cultures were pitted against
158
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
one another, respondents found it more difficult to pair “me” words with stimuli associated with either culture.
With similar methodologies, other empirical investigations have demonstrated
implicit associations between self and attributes, roles, or domains stereotypical of
gender categories (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Lindgren, Shoda, & George,
2007). For instance, automatic associations
between self and the concept “math” for
men and the concept “arts” for women have
been obtained repeatedly (Nosek, Banaji, &
Greenwald, 2002). Interestingly, identification with math among women (who initially
displayed a weak identification with this domain) increased when they were trained to
approach (rather than avoid) math as part
of an experimental task (Kawakami, Steele,
Cifa, Phills, & Dovidio, 2008). These implicit associations between self and group
stereotypes also extend to negative stereotypes about ingroups. For example, using
a sequential subliminal priming task, researchers have shown that women and European Americans implicitly associated
the self with ingroup stereotypical traits
but not outgroup stereotypical traits, and
both groups implicitly self-­stereotyped on
negative ingroup traits (e.g., dependent and
moody for women; snobby and materialistic
for European Americans) as much as they
did on positive ingroup traits (e.g., caring
and compassionate for women; educated
and successful for European Americans;
Lun, Sinclair, & Cogburn, 2009). In addition, Lane, Mitchell, and Banaji (2005) have
shown that implicit identification with a new
ingroup could occur quickly and without extensive contact with the group. As predicted, Yale students showed stronger implicit
identity with Yale as an institution (rather
than with Harvard), but strength of implicit
identity was equally strong among those
who had been on campus for a few days and
those who had been on campus for one year
or longer. These findings indicate that group
membership comes to be automatically associated with self, and that people automatically endorse stereotypical attributes of their
group as also being self-­descriptive.
Recent neuroimaging findings lend further support to the far-­reaching influences
of self–other linkages. For instance, Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji (2006) showed that
distinct regions of the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) are activated when individuals are asked to make inferences about the
opinions, likes, and dislikes of group members whose political views are similar versus
dissimilar to self. More precisely, when self–
other overlap could be assumed, inferences
about the target’s views engaged a region of
ventral mPFC associated with self-­referential
thought, whereas inferences about a dissimilar other activated a more dorsal region of
mPFC. Follow-up research revealed that
conscious attempts to adopt another person’s
perspective also prompted individuals to engage cognitive processes typically reserved
for introspection (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, &
Mitchell, 2008).
A Preference for Ingroups
The links between self and ingroup are
not only visible in implicit knowledge and
thought but also present in measures of attitude or evaluation. Tajfel (1974) emphasized
this point when he defined “social identity
as that part of an individual’s self-­concept
which derives from his knowledge of his
membership of a social group (or groups)
together with the emotional significance attached to that membership” (p. 69). A large
body of research shows that people evaluate
ingroup members more favorably than outgroup members (Mullen, Brown, & Smith,
1992), and we examine those studies that
used measures of implicit attitude or evaluation. The literature on implicit attitudes
clearly suggests that groups unconsciously
or automatically trigger more positive affective reactions when they are associated to the
self. Assessments of ethnic attitudes without
perceivers’ awareness or control consistently
reveal that European Americans have more
positive feelings toward European Americans than toward African Americans (e.g.,
Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji,
2000; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,
1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink,
Judd, & Park, 1997). Research also shows
that undergraduate students hold a more favorable attitude toward the category “young”
than toward the category “old” (e.g., Perdue
& Gurtman, 1990; Rudman, Greenwald,
Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). Strong implicit
preferences for American symbols have been
8. Implicit Self and Identity
revealed in several studies (Ashburn-Nardo,
Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Devos & Banaji,
2005; Rudman et al., 1999). Cunningham,
Nezlek, and Banaji (2004) have shown implicit positive associations to the category
white (rather than black), rich (rather than
poor), American (rather than foreign),
straight (rather than gay), and Christian
(rather than Jewish) among students known
to be white, American, and Christian, a
majority of whom were also assumed to be
high on the social class dimension and to be
heterosexual. These researchers have taken
the extra step of claiming that these implicit
preferences do not develop in isolation, and
that an individual difference marks the pattern: Those who show higher preference for
one ingroup also show higher preference for
all other ingroups; that is, they assert that
there is evidence for an implicit ethnocentrism dimension.
In most of the research described, researchers have assessed the implicit attitudes
of only people belonging to one particular
group. Of the few studies that measured
both sides, symmetry has been found under
some circumstances. For instance, Greenwald and colleagues (1998) reported data
from both Japanese Americans and Korean Americans, each of whom showed a
more positive implicit attitude toward their
own ethnic group. The level of immersion
in Asian culture moderated this pattern of
implicit preferences. More precisely, participants who were immersed in their particular Asian culture (i.e., had a high proportion of family members and acquaintances
from that culture and were familiar with the
language) showed greater ingroup preference. In another study, depending on their
religious affiliation, individuals exhibited an
implicit preference for Christian or Jewish
people (Rudman et al., 1999).
In summary, implicit preferences for the
ingroup are characteristic of a wide variety
of groups (affiliations with nation, state,
and city; school and sports team; family and
friends). Interestingly, implicit ingroup favoritism extends to evaluations and perceptions
of other ingroup members’ behaviors. For
instance, the term implicit ingroup metafavoritism was coined to account for the fact
that people implicitly preferred an ingroup
member who displayed ingroup bias, while
verbally endorsing the behavior of an egali-
159
tarian ingroup member (Castelli, Tomelleri,
& Zogmaister, 2008). In addition, people
tend to describe positive behaviors in more
abstract language terms (“X is helpful”)
when performed by an ingroup member than
when performed by an outgroup member (“X
gave them directions to go to the station”),
and the opposite holds for negative behaviors (Franco & Maass, 1996; Karpinski &
von Hippel, 1996; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, &
Semin, 1989; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, &
Vargas, 1997).
The tendency to favor the ingroup attitudinally (e.g., along a good–bad dimension)
sometimes underlies implicit stereotyping
(e.g., the assignment of specific qualities that
may also vary in evaluation). For example,
both men and women hold similar implicit
gender stereotypes but they exhibit them to
a stronger extent when they reflect favorably
on their own group (Rudman, Greenwald,
& McGhee, 2001). Male participants are
more likely to differentiate men and women
with respect to an attribute such as power,
whereas female participants are more likely
to do so on a trait such as warmth. In other
words, each group emphasizes stereotypes in
a self-­favorable direction.
Using measures of consciously accessible
cognition, the ingroup bias has been shown
to emerge under minimal conditions: The
mere categorization of individuals into two
distinct groups elicits a preference for the ingroup (Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, &
Flament, 1971). There is now evidence that
a minimal social categorization is sufficient
to activate positive attitudes automatically
or unconsciously toward self-­related groups
and negative or neutral attitudes toward nonself-­related groups. For example, Perdue,
Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) found
that participants responded faster to pleasant
words when primed with ingroup pronouns
(e.g., we or us) rather than with outgroup
pronouns (e.g., they or them), even though
they were unaware of the group-­designating
primes. Thus, the use of words referring to
ingroups or outgroups might unconsciously
perpetuate intergroup biases. More recently, Otten and Wentura (1999) showed that
neutral words automatically acquired an affective connotation, simply by introducing
them as group labels and by relating one of
them to participants’ self-­concepts. The self­related group label functioned equivalently
160
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
to positive primes, whereas the other label
functioned similarly to negative primes. In
other words, as soon as a word designated
an ingroup, it acquired positive connotation,
whereas words referring to an outgroup immediately conveyed a negative valence.
Even when groups are fictional and there
are no ingroup–­outgroup references (e.g.,
memorizing the name of four members of
a fictitious group), people spontaneously
identified with and formed positive opinions
about these novel groups, and this implicit
partisanship extended to nonhuman objects
(made-up car brands; Greenwald, Pickrell,
& Farnham, 2002; Pinter & Greenwald,
2004). These experiments suggest that the
ingroup bias occurs automatically and unconsciously under minimal conditions (see
also Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Otten &
Moskowitz, 2000).
Given the increasing body of evidence
that social identity processes can operate
outside of conscious awareness and control,
one might wonder about the developmental
process of implicit identity formation and
ingroup bias. Although implicit identity development has not been studied directly, we
can draw from the literature on implicit attitude formation to inform our views about
implicit identity development. Most often,
implicit social cognition has been conceptualized as the result of a slow learning process
through long-term experiences, such that implicit attitudes and beliefs emerge over time
as people detect and internalize regularities
in their social world (Rudman, 2004). However, theories of slow learning of implicit
social cognition fail to account for fast-toform and fast-to-­stabilize implicit identities,
such as the aforementioned study that found
college students very rapidly develop an implicit identity associated with their school
(Lane et al., 2005; see also Gregg, Seibt, &
Banaji, 2006).
In addition, researchers have documented implicit intergroup biases in children
as young as 3 years old. For example, in a
cross-­sectional study of European American children using the IAT, 6-year-olds,
10-year-olds, and adults displayed equally
strong implicit pro-white–anti-black preferences (Baron & Banaji, 2006). In another
cross-­sectional study, white British children
ages 6–16 displayed equally strong implicit
pro-white–anti-black preferences (Rutland,
Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). To
understand the sources of these intergroup
attitudes, Castelli, Zogmaister, and Tomelleri (2009) examined implicit and explicit
racial attitudes of 3- to 6-year-old white
Italian children and their parents. The parents’ self-­reported racial attitudes were not
related to their children’s responses, but the
mothers’ implicit racial preferences predicted their children’s playmate preferences and
attributions of negative and positive traits
to a black child. As a whole, these studies
suggest that even for young children, whose
attitudes are constrained by their cognitive
abilities, group perceptions are influenced
by significant adults and their surrounding
social environment (see also Olson, Banaji,
Dweck, & Spelke, 2006). Most notably,
these findings are consistent across cultures
examined thus far, but only for members of
the socially advantaged or dominant group,
suggesting that implicit social cognition
emerges early in life due to children’s ability
to make ingroup–­outgroup distinctions and
their sensitivity to social hierarchies within
the larger social context (Dunham, Baron,
& Banaji, 2008).
In terms of implicit identity development,
the implicit ingroup–­outgroup distinctions
evident in young children probably serve as
a basis for the implicit associations between
self and different social groups. In turn,
these implicit associations may be one of the
building blocks for social identity as Erikson
(1959) conceptualized it: The process of identity development necessarily involves both
conscious (e.g., sense of individual identity)
and unconscious (e.g., striving for continuity of personal character) components. Even
when identity is conceptualized as a process
of conscious, deliberate self-­evaluation and
self-­reflection (e.g., McAdams, 2001), implicit self + group associations acquired in
early childhood may influence the identities
that people choose to explore and the value
they assign to the groups to which they belong.
Preferences for Self Extend
to Attributes Associated with Self
Evidence for implicit ingroup favoritism is
reminiscent of research showing that the
mere ownership of an object or its associa-
8. Implicit Self and Identity
tion to the self is a condition sufficient to enhance its attractiveness. Nuttin (1985) found
that when individuals were asked to choose
a preferred letter from each of several pairs
consisting of one alphabet letter from their
names and one not, they tended reliably to
prefer alphabets that constitute their names.
This finding, known as the name letter effect
(NLE) has been replicated in many countries
and with samples from very different cultures (e.g., Albers, Rotteveel, & Dijksterhuis, 2009; Anseel & Duyck, 2009; Kitayama
& Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987).
In order to test whether the preference for
name letters depended on a conscious decision, Nuttin (1985) invited participants to
search for a meaningful pattern in the pairs
of letters presented. Despite the fact that no
time limit was imposed and that a monetary
award was promised to anyone who could
correctly identify the prearranged pattern of
letters, not a single participant could come
up with the solution. This finding supports
the idea that the NLE does not stem from
a conscious recognition of the connection
between the attribute and one’s self. In addition, the NLE does not seem to be a remainder of the positive mastery affect or the
intense positive emotions following initial
success on a socially valued skill experienced
by most people when they first succeed in
reading or writing their own names (Hoorens, Nuttin, Herman, & Pavakanun, 1990;
Hoorens & Todorova, 1988), or to be due
to an enhanced subjective frequency of ownname letters compared with non-name letters
(Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993). At present, the
most convincing interpretation of this effect
is that the preference for letters in one’s name
reflects an unconscious preference for self,
and its generality is shown through research
on preference for other self-­related information, such as birth dates over other numbers
(Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001).
Broadening this line of work, research
shows that the implicit positive evaluation of
self and associated attributes also influences
where people choose to live and what they
choose to do for a living. Across a dozen
studies, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones
(2002) found that people are more likely to
live in cities or states and to choose careers
whose names share letters with their own
first or last names. For example, a person
161
named Louis is disproportionately likely
to live in St. Louis, and individuals named
Dennis or Denise are overrepresented among
dentists (see also Anseel & Duyck, 2008,
2009). Correlational and experimental studies reveal that this implicit egotism extends
to the selection of romantic partners: People
were implicitly more attracted to others who
shared their initials or birth date numbers
than those who did not (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004).
Interestingly, archival and experimental
data indicate that this implicit preference for
the self generalizes to negatively valenced
events, even when people deliberately strive
for success (Nelson & Simmons, 2007). For
instance, baseball players whose name start
with the letter K (the letter used in Major
League Baseball to indicate a strikeout) were
more likely to strike out than other players,
and lawyers whose names start with A and
B (letters associated with better academic
performance) attended better law schools
than lawyers whose names start with C and
D (letters associated with worse academic
performance). Together, these findings on
the NLE and implicit egotism suggest that
personal choices may be constrained by
linkages to self that are not noticed, not consciously sought, and even surprising. They
reveal introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) effects of the self-­attitude
on evaluations of associated objects (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Balancing Self and Social Group
Work reviewed so far highlights the cognitive and affective ties between self and group
memberships, and stresses the fact that individuals are not necessarily fully aware
of these bounds on their thinking, or that
they are aware but unable to control their
operation. Now we turn to the relationships
among the cognitive and affective components that make up the self system. Several
theories predict some consistency between
constructs that represent self and social
group. For example, social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) assumes some interrelations among self-­esteem, group identification, and ingroup bias. According to
the theory, social identification serves as a
source of self-­esteem.
162
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Generally speaking, individuals strive to
maintain or increase their self-­esteem. They
can derive a sense of self-worth through favorable intergroup comparisons. Thus, self­esteem should be enhanced by membership
in a valued group, and strong identification
with the group should go hand in hand with
positive evaluation of the ingroup. Evidence
for the role of self-­esteem in intergroup comparisons is mixed (e.g., Abrams & Hogg,
1988; Brown, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone,
1998). Moreover, support for the idea that
there should be a positive correlation between group identification and ingroup favoritism is not overwhelming (Brewer, 2001;
Brown, 2000). The absence of expected relationships has led to examinations of these
constructs using implicit measures. For
example, Knowles and Peng (2005) found
that the strength of the automatic association between self and whites (ingroup identification) was positively correlated with the
intensity of the pro-white implicit attitude
(ingroup favoritism) and also accounted for
the extent to which individuals possessed
a restrictive representation of their ethnic
group by showing a reluctance to categorize
mixed-race individuals as white (ingroup
overexclusiveness).
Based on the growing body of evidence
regarding implicit processes involved in the
self system, Greenwald, Banaji, and colleagues (2002) proposed a unified theory
of social cognition that predicts patterns of
interrelations among group identification,
self-­esteem, and ingroup attitude. Their
approach draws its inspiration from theories of affective–­cognitive consistency that
dominated social psychology in the 1960s
(Abelson et al., 1968) and allows them to
integrate a range of otherwise isolated findings obtained with the IAT (Greenwald et
al., 1998). This approach is based on the assumption that social knowledge (including
knowledge about oneself) can be represented
as an associative structure.
From this point of view, the structure of
the self is a network of associations: The
self is linked to traits, groups, concepts, or
evaluations. A core principle of the theory
is that attitudes toward self and concepts
closely associated with self (i.e., components of self-­concept or identity) tend to be
of similar valence. In other words, according to the balance–­congruity principle, if
someone holds a positive attitude toward the
self and considers that a particular concept
(e.g., a group, an attribute, or a domain) is
part of his or her self-­concept, this person
should also hold a positive attitude toward
that particular concept.
A study on women’s gender identity illustrates this principle. For women, one would
typically expect an association between self
and the concept “female” (gender identity
or self + female), and a positive association
toward the self (positive self-­esteem or self
+ good). Based on the balance–­congruity
principle, these two links should also be accompanied by a third link: a positive association toward the concept “female” (liking
for female or female + good). More precisely,
the strength of the positive attitude toward
“female” should be a joint (or interactive)
function of the strength of the associations
between self and positive, and between self
and female. Data supported this prediction:
As gender identity increased, so did the positive relation between self-­esteem and liking
for women (Greenwald, Banaji, et al., 2002;
see also Aidman & Carroll, 2003; Rudman
& Goodwin, 2004). Support for similar hypotheses has been obtained using a variety
of social groups and differing clusters of
attributes that measure constructs such as
attitude, stereotype, and self-­esteem (e.g.,
Devos, Blanco, Rico, et al., 2008; Devos &
Cruz Torres, 2007; Greenwald, Banaji, et al.,
2002; Nosek et al., 2002). For instance, the
more college women identified with motherhood, the stronger the correlation between
self-­esteem and liking motherhood, but the
more they identified with college education, the stronger the correlation between
self-­esteem and liking for college education
(Devos, Diaz, Viera, & Dunn, 2007). Interestingly, evidence for such balanced (similarly valenced) identities has been obtained
primarily when implicit measures of self and
group identity are used, and it has appeared
in weaker form on measures of conscious affect and cognition (Cvencek, Greenwald, &
Meltzoff, in press).
Relational and Contextual
Self‑Definitions
Having shown self and social group connections on attitude and beliefs, we turn to
8. Implicit Self and Identity
research demonstrating that shifts in self­evaluation also occur without conscious intention. For example, the unconscious activation of significant others has implications
for self-­evaluation. Baldwin (1992) proposed
that the internalization of relationships involves the development of relational schemas;
these cognitive structures represent regularities in patterns of interpersonal interactions.
Often, the sense of self can be derived from
such well-­learned scripts of interpersonal
evaluations. In other words, activated relational schemas shape self-­evaluative reactions, even when these schemas are primed
below the level of awareness. Indeed, subliminal exposure to the name of a critical
versus an accepting significant other led participants to report more negative versus positive self-­evaluations (Baldwin, 1994). Similarly, graduate students evaluated their own
research ideas less favorably after being subliminally exposed to the disapproving face
of their department chair rather than the
approving face of another person (Baldwin,
Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). These effects occurred only when the prime was a significant
other. For instance, Catholic participants
rated themselves more negatively after exposure to the disapproving face of the Pope,
but not after exposure to the disapproving
face of an unfamiliar person. In addition, if
the Pope did not serve as a figure of authority, self-­evaluation remained unaffected by
the priming manipulation.
Unobtrusively making a social identity
salient or changing the parameters of a social context can also influence the social
self. For instance, Haines and Kray (2005)
showed that women’s identification with
social power was a function of the context
or social role to which they were assigned.
More precisely, women assigned to a highpower group displayed stronger implicit self
+ power associations than women assigned
to a low-power group. Similarly, women
assigned to a high-power role displayed a
more masculine implicit self-­definition than
women assigned to a low-power role. In a
study on men’s gender self-­concept, McCall
and Dasgupta (2007) also found that subtly manipulating status in a social interaction changed automatic self-­beliefs, but the
dynamic was very different for men than
for women: Men assigned to a low-­status
role nonconsciously counteracted this role
163
by exhibiting more leader-like self-­beliefs
than men placed in a high-­status role. Also
relevant to the aims of this chapter, studies
showed that priming the construct “equality” decreased implicit ingroup favoritism,
whereas priming the construct “loyalty”
enhanced it (Zogmaister, Arcuri, Castelli,
& Smith, 2008). In addition, contextual effects on implicit self-­definitions were found
for bilingual Latino college students (Devos,
Blanco, Muñoz, Dunn, & Ulloa, 2008): Participants who completed the IAT in English
showed stronger identification with family
than with school, but there was no difference
in identification with these two constructs
for those who completed the IAT in Spanish.
Once again, the difference between the two
language conditions (English vs. Spanish)
suggests that implicit identities are anchored
in the parameters of the social context. Internalized expectations about one’s social
group can shape self-­definitions even when
they are unobtrusively activated or assessed.
Research on implicit self-­esteem also indicates that contextual variations can produce an effect on unconscious or automatic preferences. For example, DeHart and
Pelham (2007) demonstrated in a 3-week
diary study that people with either low explicit self-­esteem or low self-­concept clarity
(extent to which self-­beliefs are clearly defined, internally consistent, and stable over
time) were more likely to report lower implicit self-­esteem on the days they reported
more negative life events. These fluctuations
in implicit self-­esteem were not shown for
people with high explicit self-­esteem or high
self-­concept clarity. As another example, the
NLE described earlier did not occur after
participants had received failure feedback
on an alleged IQ test, but it reemerged once
participants were given the opportunity to
affirm a personally important value (Koole,
Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis,
1999). Thus, it appears that a failure on
an alleged intelligence test increases the accessibility of failure-­related cognitions and
reduces, at least temporarily, participants’
implicit self-­esteem. Affirming an important aspect of one’s self-­concept permits one
to counteract the negative consequences of
the feedback. Evaluative conditioning tasks
have been shown to change implicit but not
explicit self-­esteem, whereas directed, conscious thinking about the self altered ex-
164
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
plicit but not implicit self-­esteem (Grumm,
Nestler, & von Collani, 2009; see also Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis,
2004).
Together, these studies are in line with a
growing body of research stressing that implicit associations are not fixed or rigid but
relatively malleable (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Such work also illustrates
the dynamic nature of self-­related processes
(Markus & Wurf, 1987). It is a fact of modern life that people belong to a range of social
groups, both chosen and given. As societies
become more heterogeneous, the opportunity for comparing and contrasting oneself
to others will increase. Across time and situations, varying identities may come forward
or recede from consciousness. Effects that
appear to be unsystematic and unpredictable may be quite lawful when unconscious
social influences on self-­evaluations are considered.
Performance and Behavior
If thoughts and feelings are transformed by
the activation of social group membership,
behavior should be influenced as well. Yet
because cognition and affect are much better understood components of psychology
than behavior, studies of the latter have been
less frequently reported. Perhaps for this
reason, and because behavior is the “gold
standard” in the behavioral sciences, studies that show the influence of social group
on self-­relevant behavior receive much attention. This is certainly true of work on stereotype threat, situations in which the presence
of a negative stereotype about one’s group
can handicap the performance of members
of the group (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson,
2002). According to the proponents of
this theoretical framework, when African
American students perform a scholastic or
intellectual task, they face the threat of confirming a negative stereotype about their
group’s intellectual ability. This threat, it is
speculated, interferes with intellectual functioning and can lead to detrimental impact
on performance. Support for this argument
has now been obtained in many experiments
showing the influence of subtle activation of
race/ethnicity, gender, class, and age distinctions on performance on standardized tests.
For example, Steele and Aronson (1995)
found that stereotype threat can affect the
performance of African American college
students, who performed significantly worse
than European Americans on a standardized
test when the test was presented as diagnostic of their intellectual abilities. This effect
did not occur when the test was presented
as nondiagnostic of their ability. Other studies have demonstrated that women underperform on tests of mathematical ability
when the stereotype associated with their
group was made salient (Spencer, Steele, &
Quinn, 1999). Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady
(1999) showed that activating gender identity or ethnic identity among Asian American women shifted performances to be,
respectively, inferior or superior on a math
test. The manipulations producing these effects are often rather subtle. In some cases,
it is sufficient to ask participants to indicate
their group membership just prior to assessing their performance (Steele & Aronson,
1995). In other cases, researchers have subliminally primed the negative stereotype,
which then impaired subjects’ performance
(e.g., Levy, 1996; Wheeler, Jarvis, & Petty,
2001). Interestingly, the manner in which the
stereotype is activated in the testing situation
determines its impact on performance (Shih,
Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002):
Positive stereotypical expectations (e.g.,
“Asians are good at math”) boosted targets’
performances when these expectations were
subtly activated, but not when they were blatantly activated. Other programs of research
demonstrate that stereotype threat effects
occur through automatic, unconscious processing of stereotype-­relevant information
relating to the performance situation. For
example, women who implicitly associated
“math” with “men” faster than “math”
with “women” chronically experienced stereotype threat, even under “reduced threat”
conditions (i.e., when they were told the
math test was not diagnostic of their math
ability); thus, they performed worse on math
tests than women who did not implicitly
hold stereotypical expectations (Kiefer &
Sekaquaptewa, 2007).
Considerable evidence shows that the activation of trait constructs or stereotypes also
can automatically or unconsciously influence social behavior (e.g., Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dijk-
8. Implicit Self and Identity
sterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg,
2000). When trait constructs or stereotypes
are primed in the course of an unrelated task,
individuals subsequently are more likely to
act in line with the content of the primed
trait construct or stereotype. For instance,
priming the stereotype of “professors” or
the trait “intelligent” enhanced performance
on a general knowledge task (similar to Trivial Pursuit), while priming the stereotype of
“soccer hooligans” or the trait “stupid” decreased performance on the test (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). These effects
are mediated by passive perceptual activity
and are direct consequences of environmental events (priming manipulations). Indeed,
manipulations or factors known to produce
changes in perception also affected behaviors. For example, priming stereotypes of social categories produced assimilation effects
like the ones we just described, whereas activating specific exemplars of the same categories led to contrast effects (Dijksterhuis
et al., 1998). More precisely, if participants
were primed with the category “professors”
(rather than “supermodels”), their own intellectual performance was enhanced (assimilation effect), but if they were primed with
the exemplar “Albert Einstein” (rather than
“Claudia Schiffer”) a decrement in their performance resulted (contrast effect).
Other studies have demonstrated that individuals can fail to detect changes in their
actions when those actions were induced
implicitly. For example, people can be unaware that their behaviors shift in accordance with the behaviors of others. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) coined the term
chameleon effect to describe the tendency
to mimic unconsciously the postures, mannerisms, or facial expressions of one’s interaction partners. They showed that the mere
perception of another’s behavior automatically increased the likelihood of engaging in
that behavior oneself. Individuals were more
likely to rub their faces or shake their feet
if they interacted with someone who was
performing that behavior. Such an effect is
assumed to serve an adaptive function by facilitating smooth social interaction through
increases in liking between individuals involved in the interactions; thus, it may occur
automatically to aid these interactions.
These findings are consistent with the notion that there is a motivational component
165
to automatic social behavior. Cesario, Plaks,
and Higgins (2006) argued that people use
stored information about social groups to
prepare for appropriate interactions with a
group member. Automatic social behavior
that stems from the activation of such information is the result of perceivers preparing for the interaction. Consistent with this
point of view, participants primed with “gay
men” (a negatively evaluated outgroup) displayed hostility, a behavior consistent with
the motivated preparation account rather
than the direct expression account of automatic behavior (which would have elicited
stereotype-­consistent behaviors, or passivity
and femininity in response to this prime). In
addition, participants primed with “elderly”
were more likely to walk slowly if they displayed implicit liking for the elderly, whereas
participants who displayed implicit disliking for the elderly were more likely to walk
fast. Such findings suggest that participants
were motivated to prepare for social interactions after the activation of social categories.
These effects are not restricted to common
social groups, but social groups tend to be
among the dimensions of social life that provide clear and consensual stereotypes and
may be particularly effective at producing a
connection to oneself.
Self‑Motives and Goal Pursuits
As illustrated in the work we just described,
research on self and identity over the past
two decades has put a greater emphasis than
before on the motivational mechanisms that
propel social behavior. Relevant to our aims
in the present chapter, research suggests that
defending one’s self-view may stem from a
discrepancy between implicit and explicit
self-­esteem. Of particular interest is the case
of individuals who hold relatively high explicit self-­esteem and relatively low implicit
self-­esteem. This form of discrepancy has
been characterized as defensive high self­esteem (as compared to secure high self­esteem) because these individuals tend to
have high levels of narcissism and to engage
in defensive behaviors including intergroup
biases (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005;
Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-­Browne,
& Correll, 2003). As a result of the discrepancy in implicit and explicit self-­esteem, in-
166
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
dividuals may be motivated to denigrate outgroups when they are threatened, in order
to feel better about themselves. Ironically,
this phenomenon is likely to occur when European American participants are told that
the IAT assesses racial bias (Frantz, Cuddy,
Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004). Under these
circumstances, participants showed greater
racial bias than did participants who believed that the IAT assessed cultural bias.
When the discrepancy between implicit and
explicit self-­esteem seeps into consciousness, individuals may experience self-­doubts
and may engage in enhanced processing of
discrepancy-­related information to resolve
the discrepancy (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler,
2006). To relieve their doubts, they may pay
more careful attention to relevant information in order to better understand the reasons for the discrepancy. The discrepancy
between implicit and explicit self-­esteem
might be exacerbated under threatening situations. For instance, when male participants
were told that they were gender-­deviant or
experienced social rejection, they showed
an increase in their implicit self-­esteem but
not in their explicit self-­esteem, suggesting
that implicit self-­esteem compensation may
serve to protect the self and may reduce anxiety (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007).
Although the psychological underpinnings
of implicit–­explicit discrepancies in self­evaluations are not fully understood yet,
growing evidence suggests that the combination of high explicit self-­esteem and low
implicit self-­esteem fosters defensiveness
and compensatory self-­enhancement activities (see also Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill,
& Swann, 2003; Kernis, Abend, Goldman,
Shrira, Paradise, & Hampton, 2005; Kernis,
Lakey, & Heppner, 2008; McGregor & Jordan, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2009).
In terms of goals, work based on Bargh’s
(1990) auto-­motives model is centrally relevant to the present discussion, beginning
with the idea that goal pursuits can occur
automatically and nonconsciously. Goals activated outside of awareness, control, or intention are pursued similarly to goals chosen
through deliberate or conscious means. For
example, Chartrand and Bargh (1996) demonstrated that information-­processing goals,
such as impression formation or memorization, can be automatically activated and
pursued. Individuals primed nonconsciously
with an achievement goal performed better on an achievement task and were more
likely to persist at the task than individuals who were not primed with such a goal
(Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar,
& Trötschel, 2001). In the same vein, when
primed with various interpersonal relationships, people pursued goals related to those
relationships, such as understanding their
relationship partners’ behaviors (Fitzsimons
& Bargh, 2003). For example, although
people have a strong tendency to generate
dispositional (vs. situational) explanations
for others’ behavior, there is evidence that
when properly motivated, people can overcome this tendency. In addition, people may
be especially motivated to find situational
explanations for their close relationship
partners’ behavior. Thus, when subliminally
primed with their best friend’s name, people
were more likely to search for situational (vs.
dispositional) causes for behavior in an unrelated attribution task. In other words, the
mere psychological presence of a relationship
partner led people to engage in goal-­directed
behavior.
Researchers have documented boundary
conditions of goal-­priming effects. For example, individuals ceased to pursue nonconsciously primed goals when these goals were
coactivated with negatively valenced information (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007).
Thus, not only can goal-­directed behaviors
be initiated outside of conscious awareness
or control, but the cessation of goal-­directed
behaviors can be triggered by the nonconscious processing of affective information.
Overall, the research reviewed here highlights the similarities between conscious and
nonconscious self-­motives or goals, with
implications for interpreting research using
implicit measurement. Research on self and
identity has documented the pervasiveness of
self-­presentational concerns (Leary, 1995),
and a common claim is that techniques assessing implicit attitudes or beliefs are usually free of self-­presentational concerns. However, such an argument assumes that when
people try to make a good impression, they
are fully aware of doing so. Research raises
the possibility that such implicit self-­motives
and goals may operate unconsciously, and
that self-­presentation itself is a complex process that may include strategic components
that are inaccessible to conscious awareness
8. Implicit Self and Identity
and control (Schlenker, Chapter 25, this volume).
Societal and Cultural Foundations
We now turn our attention to the influence
of societal and cultural factors on implicit
identities. We have indicated already that
stereotypes about social groups have an impact on the implicit self. Similarly, automatic
associations involving the self often reflect an
internalization of cultural stereotypes. We
begin with the premise that more often than
not, relations between groups are hierarchically organized (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
In other words, social groups rarely occupy
interchangeable positions, and groups that
enjoy greater social favors usually remain in
that position for extended periods, whatever
may be the criteria that characterize the hierarchy (e.g., numerical status, social status,
or power).
What is the impact of these factors on social identities? To what extent do members
of dominant and subordinate groups exhibit
a preference for their own group? On this
issue, contrasting predictions can be formulated. On the one hand, one would expect
that members of subordinate groups engage
in more ingroup bias than members of dominant groups. This would be consistent with
the idea that people in subordinate groups
have a stronger need to achieve a positive
social identity, which should be satisfied by
increasing favorable intergroup distinctions.
On the other hand, we might hypothesize
that members of subordinate groups are less
likely than members of dominant groups
to display a preference for their group because social conditions consistently impose a
less favorable evaluation of the subordinate
group. At least in the case of ethnic comparisons in the United States, the evidence at
hand seems to support the first alternative.
For instance, African Americans often display more ethnocentric intergroup perceptions than European Americans (e.g., Judd,
Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995).
However, a different pattern of findings
has emerged with some regularity when
implicit social identity has been examined.
Data collected though the Project Implicit
website (implicit.harvard.edu) provide some
insights on this issue (Nosek, Smyth, et al.,
167
2007): On a measure of explicit attitudes,
European American respondents reported a
preference for the group “European Americans” over the group “African Americans”
(d = 0.55), and African American respondents reported an opposite and even stronger
preference for their own group (d = –0.93).
The strong explicit liking reported by African American respondents stands in sharp
contrast to performance on the implicit
measure. Unlike European American respondents, who continued to show a strong
preference for “European Americans” over
“African Americans” on the implicit measure of attitudes (d = 1.00), African American respondents showed no such systematic
preference (d = –0.05).
Results from laboratory data confirm and
extend these findings (Livingston, 2002):
African Americans who believed that their
group was held in low regard by mainstream
American society did not exhibit an ingroup
bias at the implicit level, only at the explicit
level. African American students exhibited
implicit liking and identification with their
own ethnic group only when they believed
that European Americans held African
Americans in positive regard. In another
intergroup context, Jost, Pelham, and Carvallo (2002) found that students from both
high- and low-­status universities implicitly
associated academic characteristics with
the higher-­status group, and extracurricular activities with the lower-­status group.
Moreover, students from the high-­status
university exhibited significant ingroup favoritism on an implicit measure, whereas
students from the low-­status university did
not. When dominant group members were
compared to minority group members based
on race, religion, appearance, and social
class, dominant group members showed
more implicit ingroup preferences than minority group members, but this difference
was largest between the rich (highest-­status
group) and poor (lowest-­status group) (Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002).
Together, these findings illustrate that
ingroup favoritism is moderated by sociocultural evaluations of social groups. On
explicit measures, disadvantaged group
members exert effort to report positive attitudes, but the lower social standing of
their group is sufficiently internalized that
they do not show an implicit preference for
168
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
their own group. On the other hand, advantaged group members’ preferences show the
combined benefit of both ingroup liking and
the sociocultural advantage assigned to their
group. Such results are consistent with the
notion of system justification (Jost, Banaji,
& Nosek, 2004), or the idea that beyond ego
justification and group justification lies the
more insidious tendency to justify the system
or status quo, even when it reflects poorly
on one’s self or group. Members of dominant groups share thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors that reinforce and legitimize existing social systems, which is in their interest but, surprisingly, so do members of less
dominant groups. Examples reviewed in this
section indicate that ideological bolstering
can occur outside conscious awareness, and
this prevents perceivers and even targets of
prejudice from questioning the legitimacy of
social arrangements. It has been argued that
research underestimates ingroup favoritism
among low-­status groups because the most
widely used measure of group attitudes, the
IAT, is influenced by extrapersonal associations or cultural knowledge and, as such,
is not tapping personal attitudes (Olson,
Crawford, & Devlin, 2009). However, this
alternative interpretation assumes a clear
separation between cultural and personal
knowledge that overshadows the societal
foundations of implicit associations (Banaji,
2001).
Very little research has analyzed the relationship between self and identities that may
be in conflict. We have chosen to study these
by examining the interconnections between
ethnic and national identities. The United
States is a perfect testing ground because it
is a pluralist society composed of identifiable
ethnic groups that vary in length of association, immersion into mainstream culture, and
conditions of immigration. We investigated
the extent to which ethnic groups are implicitly conceived as being part of America in a
culture that explicitly holds that all groups
should be treated equally. We assumed that
the hierarchy present in American society
would structure associations between ethnicity and American identity (Sidanius &
Petrocik, 2001). We hypothesized that European Americans would be unconsciously
viewed as being more essentially American
and as exemplifying the nation, whereas eth-
nic minorities would be placed psychologically at the margins.
Using techniques developed to assess implicit associations, we examined the extent
to which various ethnic groups were associated with the concept “American” (relative to “foreign”). For example, we asked
participants to pair, as quickly as possible,
American or foreign symbols (e.g., flags,
maps, coins, monuments) with faces that
varied in ethnicity but were clearly understood to be American. Although participants were aware that all individuals were
American, irrespective of ethnicity, the data
consistently indicated that European Americans were more strongly associated with the
concept “American” than were Asian Americans, African Americans, Latinos, and even
Native Americans (Devos & Banaji, 2005;
Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Devos &
Heng, 2009; Devos & Ma, 2008; Nosek,
Smyth, et al., 2007; Rydell, Hamilton, &
Devos, 2010). Such implicit associations are
sometimes consistent with people’s explicit
beliefs. For example, Asian Americans and
Latinos are viewed as less American than
European Americans at both explicit and
implicit levels of responding.
In other cases, discrepancies between
explicit and implicit beliefs emerged. For
example, in a domain such as track and
field sports, black athletes were explicitly
more strongly associated with the category
“American” than were white athletes, but at
an automatic level, it remained easier to link
the concept “American” with white athletes
than with black athletes (Devos & Banaji,
2005). This American = white effect was
obtained even when known Asian American
exemplars were contrasted to known white
foreigners: Even though people were fully
aware that someone such as Kate Winslet is
not American, and that Lucy Liu is American, the white + American connection was
not eradicated (Devos & Ma, 2008). We
conclude from these studies that the national identity of being American is associated
with the ethnic identity of being white, and
even when it is consciously rejected, this association is strong at the implicit level.
Research examining the impact of participants’ ethnic identity on implicit ethnic–­
American associations has revealed that
Asian American and Latino participants
8. Implicit Self and Identity
view their own group as being less American than the group “European American,”
showing an internalization that is detrimental to their personal and group interests
(Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos et al., 2010).
Indeed, such implicit associations potentially hurt their national identity. African
American participants, on the other hand,
perceived their own group to be as American as the dominant group. In addition, the
propensity to link “white” and “American”
was positively correlated with the strength
of national identification (self + American)
for European American participants, but
it was not related to national identification
for Asian American and Latino participants
(Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos et al., 2010).
In other words, ethnic–­national associations
account for the merging of ethnic and national identifications for European Americans, but there is a relative dissociation between ethnic and national attachments for
Asian Americans and Latinos.
Interestingly, similar research conducted
in New Zealand revealed a different pattern
of ethnic–­national associations (Sibley &
Liu, 2007). European and Maori New Zealanders were explicitly and implicitly equally
associated with the New Zealand national
identity. There was a small tendency for European New Zealanders to associate their
ingroup more strongly with the national
identity, but this effect disappeared when
pictures of famous European and Maori
rugby players were used as stimuli. Variations across ethnic groups or national contexts are consistent with the notion that implicit associations are rooted in experiences,
bear the mark of cultural socialization, and
reflect sociocultural realities.
Research on culture and self-­concept
shows that members of different cultures
often define and evaluate the self in different
ways (Cross & Gore, Chapter 27, this volume). A major distinction in cross-­cultural
psychology is between collectivist and individualist societies (Triandis, McCusker, &
Hui, 1990). In collectivist cultures, people
define themselves as members of groups, subordinate their personal goals to group goals,
and show strong emotional attachment to
the group. In individualist cultures, people
place a strong emphasis on self-­reliance, individual achievement, and personal goals.
169
In their work on the self-­concept, Markus
and Kitayama (1991) argued that the self is
defined in terms of interdependence in Asian
cultures. In other words, the self is inherently
collective in these cultures. In contrast, the
typically Western conception of self is one in
which individuals see themselves as distinct
and independent from others. In a pioneering series of studies, Hetts, Sakuma, and
Pelham (1999) used this distinction to compare the implicit and explicit self-­concepts
of people who varied in their exposure to
individualistic cultures but were currently
living in the same culture. They examined
the extent to which explicit and implicit
self-­evaluations of recent Asian immigrants
differed from those of European Americans
and Asian Americans reared in the United
States. At the explicit level, they found little
difference between these groups. In particular, Easterners emigrating to a Western
culture seemed to endorse the kind of self­concept promoted in individualistic societies. However, a different picture emerged
at the implicit level. Using response latency
and word-­completion techniques, Hetts and
colleagues found strong differences between
groups in terms of personal versus group
regard. For people reared in an individualistic culture, ideas that were automatically
associated with the individual and collective
identities were relatively positive. For people socialized in a collectivistic culture, the
group or collective identity automatically
elicited positive thoughts, but ideas tied to
individual identity were neutral, ambivalent,
or even negative. Such discoveries are consistent with the idea that the need for positive
self-­regard is expressed through social or
collective identities in some cultures, and in
individualistic ways in others. The cultural
context can overshadow differences in cultural experiences when measured through
explicit self-­evaluations, but implicit self­evaluations reveal the mark of cultural socialization.
More recent investigations have focused
on culture and self-­esteem, and the overall
pattern is that at the explicit level, Westerners have higher self-­esteem than East
Asians, whereas at the implicit level, there
are no significant cross-­cultural differences
in self-­esteem (e.g., Boucher, Peng, Shi, &
Wang, 2009; Falk, Heine, Yuki, & Take-
170
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
mura, 2009; Heine & Hamamura, 2007;
Yamaguchi et al., 2007). This also extends
to another aspect of the self-­concept, namely, self-­enhancement, or the motivation to
view oneself positively. For example, Heine
and Hamamura (2007) conducted a meta­analysis of 91 cross-­cultural comparisons
between East Asians and Westerners on
self-­enhancement. On average, Westerners
showed a clear self-­serving bias (d = 0.87),
but East Asians did not (d = –0.01). However, these cultural differences disappeared
when results were separated by implicit versus explicit measurement: The average cultural difference between East Asians and
Westerners was very large (d = 0.83 to 0.91)
on 30 different explicit measures of self­enhancement, whereas the average cultural
difference was very small (d = 0.12) when
implicit measures of self-­enhancement were
used.
In summary, findings on self-­enhancement
and self-­esteem point to differential cultural
influences on the content of implicit attitudes
about the self and the explicit expression of
those attitudes. These results may be taken
as evidence that implicit self-­evaluations are
less influenced by normative demands than
their explicit counterparts. This being said,
researchers are only beginning to grasp the
complexities of cultural influences on implicit and explicit self-­definitions, and work
in this area often challenges common assumptions about cultural differences (e.g.,
Kitayama & Uchida, 2003; Kobayashi &
Greenwald, 2003).
Implicit and Explicit Self‑Concept
So far, we have emphasized research demonstrating that self-­related processes can occur
unconsciously or automatically. On several
occasions, we have pointed out that findings
at the implicit level converge with observations based on self-­report measures. In other
cases, we have stressed the fact that investigations of unconscious or automatic processes reveal a different picture than assessments of explicit self-­concepts or identities.
In this section, we examine how implicit and
explicit self-­related processes might be intertwined.
According to a recent meta-­analysis, on
average, the magnitude of the relationship
between implicit and explicit measures is
small (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner,
Le, & Schmitt, 2005). More importantly,
there is sometimes extreme variability in the
magnitude of correlations between implicit
and explicit measures, pointing to the need
to identify factors moderating the relationship (Nosek, 2005). Self-­presentation is the
attempt to alter or mask a response for social or personal purposes, and people may
be motivated to hide an identity that they
do not want others to know for a variety
of reasons (e.g., a Republican student on a
liberal college campus, a gay man who has
not revealed his sexual orientation at work).
Because implicit measures are less vulnerable to deliberate control than explicit measures, when self-­presentation concerns are
high, the discrepancy between implicit and
explicit reports is expected to increase. Another possible moderator of the relationship
between implicit and explicit measures is
the dimensionality or structure of the construct being assessed. Research conducted
on the evaluations of a wide range of social
objects has documented a greater correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes
when the attitude objects could be evaluated
along a bipolar continuum (e.g., gun control
vs. gun rights) than when they could not
be appraised using a simple structure (e.g.,
being pro-women does not imply being antimen; Nosek, 2005). From an information­processing perspective, responses regarding
attitudes or identities with a simple, bipolar structure are easier and faster to make,
whereas multidimensional attitudes or identities are more complex, less stable, and
more difficult to retrieve. Thus, when the
identity being assessed is multidimensional,
a discrepancy between implicit and explicit
measures is more likely to be found.
In the domain of self and identity, most
studies have examined the correspondence
between implicit and explicit measures of
self-­esteem. For example, Bosson, Swann,
and Pennebaker (2000) examined the correlations between various measures of implicit
and explicit self-­esteem. Although some
implicit measures correlated significantly
with explicit measures, the magnitude of the
observed correlations was relatively small
(all r’s > .27). Using confirmatory factor
analysis, Greenwald and Farnham (2000)
demonstrated that implicit self-­esteem and
8. Implicit Self and Identity
explicit self-­esteem were distinct constructs
(positively, but weakly, correlated). In addition, different measures of implicit self­esteem are often weakly intercorrelated,
raising questions about their convergent
validity and the dimensionality of the construct of implicit self-­esteem (Rudolph,
Schröder-Abé, Schütz, Gregg, & Sedikides,
2008; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007).
However, Oakes, Brown, and Cai (2008)
found a greater correspondence between implicit and explicit self-­esteem when the implicit measure was based on self-­relevant (vs.
self-­neutral) stimuli and the explicit measure
captured the affective (vs. cognitive) component of self-­esteem.
Several studies support the idea that,
under some circumstances, self-­descriptions
may switch from a controlled mode to an
automatic mode. For example, more positive automatic self-­evaluations are obtained
when participants are emotionally aroused
or when their attentional capacity is reduced
due to increased cognitive load (Paulhus,
Graf, & Van Selst, 1989; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). In related research, Koole and
colleagues (2001) found that the opportunity to engage in conscious self-­reflection
affected the degree of congruence between
implicit self-­esteem and self-­reported evaluations of the self. For example, slow self­evaluations were less congruent with implicit self-­evaluation than fast self-­evaluations.
Similarly, when participants were under
high cognitive load, implicit self-­evaluations
predicted self-­reported evaluations, but that
was not the case when cognitive resources
were available (low cognitive load). These
findings support the idea that when the capacity or the motivation to engage in conscious self-­reflection is low, implicit, automatic self-­evaluations are activated. More
recently, Jordan, Whitfield, and Ziegler-Hill
(2007) have shown that trust in one’s intuitions moderates the relationship between
implicit and explicit self-­esteem: People who
have faith in their intuitions (i.e., who are
more likely to view their intuitions as valid)
display more consistent implicit and explicit
self-­esteem than people who have less faith
in their intuitions.
In summary, the evidence suggests that implicit and explicit self-­concepts are distinct
constructs, although, at least under some
circumstances, connections may be detected.
171
An important challenge for future research
is to understand the similarities and differences between implicit and explicit measures
of self and identity, and to identify the circumstances under which these two types of
measures yield convergent versus divergent
responses. In this spirit, researchers have
started to explore the predictive validity of
implicit and explicit measures of self-­esteem
or self-­concept. In a pioneering experiment,
Spalding and Hardin (1999) found that implicit self-­esteem accounted for the extent
to which participants behaved anxiously in
an interview situation (as rated by the interviewer). Explicit self-­esteem did not predict participants’ apparent anxiety, but it
was related to participants’ own ratings of
anxiety. In a similar vein, Asendorpf, Banse,
and Mucke (2002) showed that an implicit
measure of self-­concept (self + shy association) accounted for spontaneous behavioral
responses in a realistic situation, whereas a
parallel explicit measure did not. These findings demonstrate the predictive validity of
implicit measures of self-­concept and attitude
(see also Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009;
Egloff, & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).
Conclusion
The question of how we know ourselves
and what we know about ourselves is of
fundamental interest to understanding how
self-­knowledge is represented, the degree to
which such knowledge is constructed in social context, and its implications for health
and well-being. Yet the epistemological quagmire inherent in the empirical assessment of
knowledge about oneself has always posed a
problem, as noted at the start of this chapter.
We suggested that analyses of unconscious
self-­processes may assist in this regard, and
we focused on the social aspect of self and
identity, focusing our attention on a particular aspect of the self—one that emerges in
the context of social group memberships.
From the initial research using implicit or
indirect measures of self and identity, we already have evidence about the role of social
group membership in creating a sense of self
and self-worth.
The work reviewed in this chapter raised
issues that are increasingly incorporated into
172
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
our understanding of the self. Processes that
capture group identity can operate without
introspective access or deliberative thought.
Group identity and even knowledge about
social groups (that is automatically learned
even if consciously denied) can have indirect influences on people’s judgments about
themselves. An unspoken assumption has
been that implicit attitudes, beliefs, and
motives about oneself are hard to change
given that they are overlearned associations
about a well-known object. Several findings
reported in this chapter would suggest, to
the contrary, that implicit associations are
not rigid, and that shifts in self-­definitions
and self-­evaluations can occur without conscious awareness or intention. Situational or
contextual manipulations reveal the plasticity of self-­related implicit social cognition.
Finally, several lines of research reported in
this chapter show the subtle but crucial ways
in which sociocultural variables shape self­related mental processes. In many instances,
sociostructural influences on psychological
processes become more obvious when research is focused on the nitty-­gritty of mental processes that are not consciously accessible but may nevertheless be found using
indirect measures. In that regard, work on
implicit processes promises to renew thinking about the obvious interplay among the
psychological and the social, the individual,
and the collective.
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported by
National Institute of Mental Health Grant Nos.
R24 MH 065515 and 3R24 MH 065515-06S1.
References
Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Holland, R. W. (2007).
The nonconscious cessation of goal pursuit:
When goals and negative affect are coactivated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 165–178.
Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J.,
Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., & Tannenbaum, P. (Eds.). (1968). Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago:
Rand McNally.
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments
on the motivational status of self-­esteem in
social identity and intergroup discrimination.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 18,
317–334.
Aidman, E. V., & Carroll, S. M. (2003). Implicit
individual differences: Relationships between
implicit self-­esteem, gender identity, and gender attitudes. European Journal of Personality, 17, 19–36.
Albers, L., Rotteveel, M., & Dijksterhuis, A.
(2009). Towards optimizing the Name Letter
Test as a measure of implicit self-­esteem. Self
and Identity, 8, 63–77.
Ames, D. L., Jenkins, A. C., Banaji, M. R., &
Mitchell, J. P. (2008). Taking another person’s
perspective increases self-­referential neural
processing. Psychological Science, 19, 642–
644.
Anseel, F., & Duyck, W. (2008). Unconscious applicants: A systematic test of the name-­letter
effect. Psychological Science, 19, 1059–1061.
Anseel, F., & Duyck, W. (2009). Implicit letter
preferences in job choice: An experimental test
of the role of cognitive load. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 143,
207–223.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G.
(1991). Close relationships as including other
in the self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60, 241–253.
Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., & Mucke, D. (2002).
Double dissociation between implicit and explicit personality self-­concept: The case of shy
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 83, 380–393.
Ashburn-Nardo, L., Voils, C. I., & Monteith, M.
J. (2001). Implicit associations as the seeds of
intergroup bias: How easily do they take root?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
81, 789–799.
Baccus, J. R., Baldwin, M. W., & Packer, D. J.
(2004). Increasing implicit self-­esteem through
classical conditioning. Psychological Science,
15, 498–502.
Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B.
(2009). Predicting actual behavior from the
explicit and implicit self-­concept of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 533–548.
Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and
the processing of social information. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 461–484.
Baldwin, M. W. (1994). Primed relational sche-
8. Implicit Self and Identity
mas as a source of self-­evaluative reactions.
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13,
380–403.
Baldwin, M. W., Carrell, S. E., & Lopez, D. F.
(1990). Priming relationship schemas: My advisor and the Pope are watching me from the
back of my mind. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 435–454.
Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitudes can be
measured. In H. L. Roediger, III, J. S. Nairne,
I. Neath, & A. Surprenant (Eds.), The nature
of remembering: Essays in honor of Robert
G. Crowder (pp. 117–150). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Bargh, J. A. (1990). Auto-­motives: Preconscious
determinants of social interaction. In E. T.
Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Vol. 2.
Foundations of social behavior (pp. 93–130).
New York: Guilford Press.
Bargh, J. A. (Ed.). (2007). Social psychology and
the unconscious: The automaticity of higher
mental processes. New York: Psychology
Press.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996).
Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects
of trait construct and stereotype activation on
action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244.
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A.,
Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The
automated will: Nonconscious activation and
pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014–1027.
Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of race
evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood.
Psychological Science, 17, 53–58.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T.
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1,
pp. 680–740). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Green, M. L.
(1996). Selective self-­stereotyping. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1194–
1209.
Bosson, J. K., Brown, R. P., Zeigler-Hill, V., &
Swann, W. B. (2003). Self-­enhancement tendencies among people with high explicit self­esteem: The moderating role of implicit self­esteem. Self and Identity, 2, 169–187.
Bosson, J. K., Swann, W. B., & Pennebaker, J.
W. (2000). Stalking the perfect measure of
implicit self-­esteem: The blind men and the
173
elephant revisited. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79, 631–643.
Boucher, H. C., Peng, K., Shi, J., & Wang, L.
(2009). Culture and implicit self-­esteem: Chinese are “good” and “bad” at the same time.
Journal of Cross-­C ultural Psychology, 40,
24–45.
Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identification and
intergroup conflict: When does ingroup love
become outgroup hate? In R. D. Ashmore, L.
Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), Social identity,
intergroup conflict, and conflict resolution
(pp. 17–41). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Wheeler, S. C. (2006).
Discrepancies between explicit and implicit
self-­concepts: Consequences for information
processing. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91, 154–170.
Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past
achievements, current problems and future
challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 745–778.
Castelli, L., Tomelleri, S., & Zogmaister, C.
(2008). Implicit ingroup metafavoritism: Subtle preference for ingroup members displaying
ingroup bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 807–818.
Castelli, L., Zogmaister, C., & Tomelleri, S.
(2009). The transmission of racial attitudes
within the family. Developmental Psychology,
45, 586–591.
Cesario, J., Plaks, J. E., & Higgins, E. T. (2006).
Automatic social behavior as motivated preparation to interact. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 90, 893–910.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1996). Automatic activation of impression formation and
memorization goals: Nonconscious goal priming reproduces effects of explicit task instructions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 464–478.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The
chameleon effect: The perception–­behavior
link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893–910.
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1997). Nonconscious
behavioral confirmation processes: The self­fulfilling consequences of automatic stereotype activation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 541–560.
Coats, S., Smith, E. R., Claypool, H. M., & Banner, M. J. (2000). Overlapping mental representations of self and ingroup: Reaction time
174
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
evidence and its relationship with explicit measures of group identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 304–315.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and social
order. New York: Scribner’s.
Cunningham, W. A., Nezlek, J. B., & Banaji,
M. R. (2004). Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism: Revisiting the ideologies of prejudice.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
30, 1332–1346.
Cvencek, D., Greenwald, A. G., & Meltzoff, A.
N. (in press). Balance identity theory: Evidence
for implicit consistency in social cognition. In
B. Gawronski & F. Strack (Eds.), Cognitive
consistency: A unifying concept in social psychology. New York: Guilford Press.
Dasgupta, N., McGhee, D. E., Greenwald, A. G.,
& Banaji, M. R. (2000). Automatic preference
for white Americans: Eliminating the familiarity explanation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 316–328.
DeHart, T., & Pelham, B. W. (2007). Fluctuations in state implicit self-­esteem in response
to daily negative events. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 157–165.
Devos, T. (2006). Implicit bicultural identity
among Mexican American and Asian American college students. Cultural Diversity and
Ethnic Minority Psychology, 12, 381–402.
Devos, T. (2008). Implicit attitudes 101: Theo­
retical and empirical insights. In W. D. Crano
& R. Prislin (Eds.), Attitudes and attitude
change (pp. 61–84). New York: Psychology
Press.
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). American =
white? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 447–466.
Devos, T., Blanco, K., Muñoz, C., Dunn, R.,
& Ulloa, E. C. (2008). Implicit orientation
toward family and school among bilingual
Latino college students. Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 449–471.
Devos, T., Blanco, K., Rico, F., & Dunn, R.
(2008). The role of parenthood and college education in the self-­concept of college students:
Explicit and implicit assessments of gendered
aspirations. Sex Roles, 59, 214–228.
Devos, T., & Cruz Torres, J. A. (2007). Implicit
identification with academic achievement
among Latino college students: The role of
ethnic identity and significant others. Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, 29, 293–310.
Devos, T., Diaz, P., Viera, E., & Dunn, R.
(2007). College education and motherhood
as components of self-­concept: Discrepancies
between implicit and explicit assessments. Self
and Identity, 6, 256–277.
Devos, T., Gavin, K., & Quintana, F. J. (2010).
Say “adios” to the American dream?: The interplay between ethnic and national identity
among Latino and Caucasian Americans. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 16, 37–49.
Devos, T., & Heng, L. (2009). Whites are granted the American identity more swiftly than
Asians: Disentangling the role of automatic
and controlled processes. Social Psychology,
40, 192–201.
Devos, T., & Ma, D. S. (2008). Is Kate Winslet
more American than Lucy Liu?: The impact of
construal processes on the implicit ascription
of a national identity. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 47, 191–215.
Diehl, M. (1990). The minimal group paradigm:
Theoretical explanations and empirical findings. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.),
European review of social psychology (Vol. 1,
pp. 263–292). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). I like myself but I don’t
know why: Enhancing implicit self-­esteem by
subliminal evaluative conditioning. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 345–
355.
Dijksterhuis, A., Aarts, H., Bargh, J. A., & van
Knippenberg, A. (2000). On the relation between associative strength and automatic behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 531–544.
Dijksterhuis, A., Spears, R., Postmes, T., Stapel,
D., Koomen, W., van Knippenberg, A., et al.
(1998). Seeing one thing and doing another:
Contrast effects in automatic behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
862–871.
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (1998).
The relation between perception and behavior,
or how to win a game of Trivial Pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
865–877.
Dunham, Y., Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R.
(2008). The development of implicit intergroup
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12,
248–253.
Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2002). Predictive
validity of an Implicit Association Test for assessing anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1441–1455.
Erikson, E. H. (1959). Identity and the life cycle:
Selected papers. Oxford, UK: International
Universities Press.
8. Implicit Self and Identity
Falk, C. F., Heine, S. J., Yuki, M., & Takemura,
K. (2009). Why do Westerners self-­enhance
more than East Asians? European Journal of
Personality, 23, 183–203.
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., &
Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobstrusive measure
of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,
1013–1027.
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2003). Thinking of you: Nonconscious pursuit of interpersonal goals associated with relationship
partners. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 84, 148–164.
Franco, F. M., & Maass, A. (1996). Implicit versus explicit strategies of outgroup discrimination: The role of intentional control in biased
language use and reward allocation. Journal
of Language and Social Psychology, 15, 335–
359.
Frantz, C. M., Cuddy, A. J. C., Burnett, M., Ray,
H., & Hart, A. (2004). A threat in the computer: The race implicit association test as a
stereotype threat experience. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1611–1624.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006).
Associative and propositional processes in
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit
and explicit attitude change. Psychological
Bulletin, 132, 692–731.
Gawronski, B., Hofmann, W., & Wilbur, C. J.
(2006). Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious?
Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 15, 485–499.
Gawronski, B., & Payne, B. K. (Eds.). (2010).
Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications. New
York: Guilford Press.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-­esteem,
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102,
4–27.
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A.,
Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellot, D. S.
(2002). Unified theory of implicit social cognition. Psychological Review, 109, 3–25.
Greenwald, A. G., & Farnham, S. D. (2000).
Using the Implicit Association Test to measure self-­esteem and self-­concept. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 1022–
1038.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz,
J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Asso-
175
ciation Test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 1464–1480.
Greenwald, A. G., Pickrell, J. E., & Farnham, S.
D. (2002). Implicit partisanship: Taking sides
for no reason. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 367–379.
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann,
E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding
and using the Implicit Association Test: III.
Meta-­analysis of predictive validity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17–41.
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. R. (2006).
Easier done than undone: Asymmetry in the
malleability of implicit preferences. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 1–20.
Grumm, M., Nestler, S., & von Collani, G.
(2009). Changing explicit and implicit attitudes: The case of self-­esteem. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 327–335.
Haines, E. L., & Kray, L. J. (2005). Self-power
associations: The possession of power impacts
women’s self-­concepts. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 35, 643–662.
Heine, S. J., & Hamamura, T. (2007). In search
of East Asian self-­enhancement. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 11, 4–27.
Hetts, J. J., Sakuma, M., & Pelham, B. W.
(1999). Two roads to positive regard: Implicit
and explicit self-­evaluation and culture. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35,
512–559.
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T.,
Le, H., & Schmitt, M. (2005). A meta-­analysis
on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-­report measures.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
31, 1369–1385.
Hoorens, V., & Nuttin, J. M. (1993). Overvaluation of own attributes: Mere ownership or
subjective frequency? Social Cognition, 11,
177–200.
Hoorens, V., Nuttin, J. M., Herman, I. E., & Pavakanun, U. (1990). Mastery pleasure versus
mere ownership: A quasi-­experimental cross­cultural and cross-­alphabetical test of the
name letter effect. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 20, 181–205.
Hoorens, V., & Todorova, E. (1988). The name
letter effect: Attachment to self or primacy of
own name writing? European Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 365–368.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology.
New York: Holt.
Jones, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Carvallo, M., &
Mirenberg, M. C. (2004). How do I love thee?
176
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Let me count the Js: Implicit egotism and interpersonal attraction. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 87, 665–683.
Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., & Zanna, M. P.
(2005). Types of high self-­esteem and prejudice: How implicit self-­esteem relates to ethnic
discrimination among high explicit self-­esteem
individuals. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 31, 693–702.
Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P.,
Hoshino-­Browne, E., & Correll, J. (2003).
Secure and defensive high self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85,
969–978.
Jordan, C. H., Whitfield, M., & Zeigler-Hill, V.
(2007). Intuition and the correspondence between implicit and explicit self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,
1067–1079.
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004).
A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political
Psychology, 25, 881–920.
Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., & Carvallo, M. R.
(2002). Non-­conscious forms of system justification: Implicit and behavioral preferences for
higher status groups. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 38, 586–602.
Judd, C. M., Park, B., Ryan, C. S., Brauer, M.,
& Kraus, S. (1995). Stereotypes and ethnocentrism: Diverging interethnic perceptions of
African American and white American youth.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
69, 460–481.
Karpinski, A., & von Hippel, W. (1996). The role
of the linguistic intergroup bias in expectancy
maintenance. Social Cognition, 14, 141–163.
Kawakami, K., Steele, J. R., Cifa, C., Phills, C.
E., & Dovidio, J. F. (2008). Approaching math
increases math = me and math = pleasant.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
44, 818–825.
Kernis, M. H., Abend, T. A., Goldman, B. M.,
Shrira, I., Paradise, A. N., & Hampton, C.
(2005). Self-­serving responses arising from
discrepancies between explicit and implicit
self-­esteem. Self and Identity, 4, 311–330.
Kernis, M. H., Lakey, C. E., & Heppner, W. L.
(2008). Secure versus fragile high self-­esteem
as a predictor of verbal defensiveness: Converging findings across three different markers. Journal of Personality, 76, 477–512.
Kiefer, A. K., & Sekaquaptewa, D. (2007). Implicit stereotypes and women’s math perfor-
mance: How implicit gender–math stereotypes
influence women’s susceptibility to stereotype
threat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 825–832.
Kitayama, S., & Karasawa, M. (1997). Implicit
self-­esteem in Japan: Name letters and birthday numbers. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 736–742.
Kitayama, S., & Uchida, Y. (2003). Explicit self­criticism and implicit self-­regard: Evaluating
self and friend in two cultures. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 476–482.
Knowles, E. D., & Peng, K. (2005). White selves:
Conceptualizing and measuring a dominantgroup identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 223–241.
Kobayashi, C., & Greenwald, A. G. (2003).
Implicit–­explicit
differences
in
self­enhancement for Americans and Japanese.
Journal of Cross-­C ultural Psychology, 34,
522–541.
Koole, S. L., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (2001). What’s in a name?: Implicit
self-­esteem and the automatic self. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 669–
685.
Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., van Knippenberg, A.,
& Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). The cessation of
rumination through self-­affirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
111–125.
Lane, K. A., Mitchell, J. P., & Banaji, M. R.
(2005). Me and my group: Cultural status can
disrupt cognitive consistency. Social Cognition, 23, 353–386.
Leary, M. R. (1995). Self-­presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior.
Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark.
Levy, B. (1996). Improving memory in old age
through implicit self-­stereotyping. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1092–
1107.
Lindgren, K. P., Shoda, Y., & George, W. H.
(2007). Sexual or friendly?: Associations about
women, men, and self. Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 31, 190–201.
Livingston, R. W. (2002). The role of perceived
negativity in the moderation of African Americans’ implicit and explicit racial attitudes.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
38, 405–413.
Lun, J., Sinclair, S., & Cogburn, C. (2009). Cultural stereotypes and the self: A closer examination of implicit self-­stereotyping. Basic and
Applied Social Psychology, 31, 117–127.
8. Implicit Self and Identity
Maass, A., Salvi, D., Arcuri, L., & Semin, G. R.
(1989). Language use in intergroup contexts:
The linguistic intergroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 981–993.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture
and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review,
98, 224–253.
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic
self-­concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–
337.
McAdams, D. P. (2001). The psychology of life
stories. Review of General Psychology, 5,
100–122.
McCall, C., & Dasgupta, N. (2007). The malleability of men’s gender self-­concept. Self and
Identity, 6, 173–188.
McGregor, I., & Jordan, C. H. (2007). The mask
of zeal: Low implicit self-­esteem, threat, and
defensive extremism. Self and Identity, 6,
223–237.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R.
(2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar
others. Neuron, 50, 655–663.
Mullen, B., Brown, R., & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance,
and status: An integration. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 22, 103–122.
Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2007). Moniker
maladies: When names sabotage success. Psychological Science, 18, 1106–1112.
Nosek, B. A. (2005). Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 565–584.
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G.
(2002). Math = male, me = female, therefore
math ≠ me. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 83, 44–59.
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R.
(2007). The Implicit Association Test at age 7:
A methodological and conceptual review. In J.
A. Bargh (Ed.), Social psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher mental
processes (pp. 265–292). New York: Psychology Press.
Nosek, B. A., Smyth, F. L., Hansen, J. J., Devos,
T., Lindner, N. M., Ranganath, K. A., et al.
(2007). Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. European Review
of Social Psychology, 18, 36–88.
177
Nuttin, J. M. (1985). Narcissism beyond Gestalt and awareness: The name letter effect.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 15,
353–361.
Nuttin, J. M. (1987). Affective consequences
of mere ownership: The name letter effect in
twelve European languages. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 381–402.
Oakes, M. A., Brown, J. D., & Cai, H. (2008).
Implicit and explicit self-­esteem: Measure for
measure. Social Cognition, 26, 778–790.
Olson, K. R., Banaji, M. R., Dweck, C. S., &
Spelke, E. S. (2006). Lucky versus unlucky
people and their social groups. Psychological
Science, 17, 845–846.
Olson, M. A., Crawford, M. T., & Devlin, W.
(2009). Evidence for the underestimation of
implicit in-group favoritism among low-­status
groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1111–1116.
Otten, S., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Evidence
for implicit evaluative ingroup bias: Affect­biased spontaneous trait inference in a minimal group paradigm. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 36, 77–89.
Otten, S., & Wentura, D. (1999). About the impact of automaticity in the Minimal Group
Paradigm: Evidence from affective priming
tasks. European Journal of Social Psychology,
29, 1049–1071.
Paulhus, D. L., Graf, P., & Van Selst, M.
(1989). Attentional load increases the positivity of self-­presentation. Social Cognition, 7,
389–400.
Paulhus, D. L., & Levitt, K. (1987). Desirable responding triggered by affect: Automatic egotism? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 245–259.
Payne, B. K. (2005). Conceptualizing control in
social cognition: How executive functioning
modulates the expression of automatic stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 488–503.
Pelham, B. W., Mirenberg, M. C., & Jones, J.
K. (2002). Why Susie sells seashells by the
seashore: Implicit egotism and major life decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 469–487.
Perdue, C. W., Dovidio, J. F., Gurtman, M. B.,
& Tyler, R. B. (1990). Us and them: Social categorization and the process of intergroup bias.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
59, 475–486.
Perdue, C. W., & Gurtman, M. B. (1990). Evidence for the automaticity of ageism. Journal
178
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 199–
216.
Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Briñol, P. (Eds.).
(2008). Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology Press.
Pinter, B., & Greenwald, A. G. (2004). Exploring implicit partisanship: Enigmatic (but
genuine) group identification and attraction.
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 7,
283–296.
Rubin, M., & Hewstone, M. (1998). Social identity theory’s self-­esteem hypothesis: A review
and some suggestions for clarification. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2,
40–62.
Rudman, L. A. (2004). Sources of implicit attitudes. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 13, 79–82.
Rudman, L. A., Dohn, M. C., & Fairchild, K.
(2007). Implicit self-­esteem compensation:
Automatic threat defense. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 798–813.
Rudman, L. A., Feinberg, J., & Fairchild, K.
(2002). Minority members’ implicit attitudes:
Automatic ingroup bias as a function of group
status. Social Cognition, 20, 294–320.
Rudman, L. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2004). Gender differences in automatic in-group bias:
Why do women like women more than men
like men? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87, 494–509.
Rudman, L. A., Greenwald, A. G., & McGhee,
D. E. (2001). Implicit self-­concept and evaluative implicit gender stereotypes: Self and ingroup share desirable traits. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1164–1178.
Rudman, L. A., Greenwald, A. G., Mellott, D.
S., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1999). Measuring the
automatic components of prejudice: Flexibility
and generality of the Implicit Association Test.
Social Cognition, 17, 437–465.
Rudman, L. A., & Heppen, J. B. (2003). Implicit
romantic fantasies and women’s interest in
personal power: A glass slipper effect? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
1357–1370.
Rudolph, A., Schröder-Abé, M., Schütz, A.,
Gregg, A. P., & Sedikides, C. (2008). Through
a glass, less darkly?: Reassessing convergent
and discriminant validity in measures of implicit self-­esteem. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 24, 273–281.
Rutland, L. A., Cameron, L., Milne, A., &
McGeorge, P. (2005). Social norms and self­presentation: Children’s implicit and explicit
intergroup attitudes. Child Development, 76,
451–466.
Rydell, R. J., Hamilton, D. L., & Devos, T.
(2010). Now they are American, now they are
not: Valence as a determinant of the inclusion
of African Americans in the American identity. Social Cognition, 28, 161–179.
Sakellaropoulo, M., & Baldwin, M. W. (2007).
The hidden sides of self-­esteem: Two dimensions of implicit self-­esteem and their relation
to narcissistic reactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 995–1001.
Schmeichel, B. J., Gailliot, M. T., Filardo, E.-A.,
McGregor, I., Gitter, S., & Baumeister, R. F.
(2009). Terror management theory and self­esteem revisited: The roles of implicit and explicit self-­esteem in mortality salience effects.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
96, 1077–1087.
Shih, M., Ambady, N., Richeson, J. A., Fujita,
K., & Gray, H. M. (2002). Stereotype performance boosts: The impact of self-­relevance
and the manner of stereotype activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
638–647.
Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999).
Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and
shifts in quantitative performance. Psychological Science, 10, 80–83.
Sibley, C. G., & Liu, J. H. (2007). New Zealand
= bicultural?: Implicit and explicit associations
between ethnicity and nationhood in the New
Zealand context. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 37, 1222–1243.
Sidanius, J., & Petrocik, J. R. (2001). Communal
and national identity in a multiethnic state:
A comparison of three perspectives. In R. D.
Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict
resolution (pp. 101–129). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Simon, B., Pantaleo, G., & Mummendey, A.
(1995). Unique individual or interchangeable group member?: The accentuation of intragroup differences versus similarities as an
indicator of the individual self versus the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 69, 106–119.
Smith, E. R., Coats, S., & Walling, D. (1999).
Overlapping mental representations of self, ingroup, and partner: Further response time evi-
8. Implicit Self and Identity
dence and a connectionist model. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 873–882.
Smith, E. R., & Henry, S. (1996). An ingroup
becomes part of the self: Response time evidence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 635–642.
Spalding, L. R., & Hardin, C. D. (1999). Unconscious unease and self-­handicapping: Behavioral consequences of individual differences in
implicit and explicit self-­esteem. Psychological
Science, 10, 535–539.
Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., & Quinn, D. M.
(1999). Stereotype threat and women’s math
performance. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 4–28.
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype
threat and the intellectual test performance
of African Americans. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 69, 797–811.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002).
Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 379–440). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup
behaviour. Social Science Information, 13,
65–93.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and
intergroup behaviour. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 1, 149–178.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social
identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S.
Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology
of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago:
Nelson-Hall.
Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C. H.
(1990). Multimethod probes of individualism
and collectivism. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 59, 1006–1020.
179
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher,
S. D., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Rediscovering
the social group: A self-­c ategorization theory.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 454–463.
von Hippel, W., Sekaquaptewa, D., & Vargas,
P. (1997). The linguistic intergroup bias as an
implicit indicator of prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 490–509.
Walsh, W. A., & Banaji, M. (1997). The collective self. In J. G. Snodgrass & R. L. Thompson (Eds.), The self across psychology: Self­recognition, self-­awareness, and the self
concept (pp. 193–214). New York: New York
Academy of Sciences.
Wheeler, S. C., Jarvis, W. B. G., & Petty, R. E.
(2001). Think unto others: The self-­destructive
impact of negative racial stereotypes. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 173–
180.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997).
Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit
level and its relationship with questionnaire
measures. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 72, 262–274.
Wittenbrink, B., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (2007).
Implicit measures of attitudes. New York:
Guilford Press.
Yamaguchi, S., Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R.,
Murakami, F., Chen, D., Shiomura, K., et al.
(2007). Apparent universality of positive implicit self-­esteem. Psychological Science, 18,
498–500.
Zogmaister, C., Arcuri, L., Castelli, L., & Smith,
E. R. (2008). The impact of loyalty and equality on implicit ingroup favoritism. Group
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11, 493–
512.
Chapter 9
Self-­Regulation and
the Executive Function of the Self
Roy F. Baumeister
Kathleen D. Vohs
The self is not a passive, indifferent, or unresponsive entity. Rather, the self is active, involved, and responsive, intentionally engaging in volitional processes to change, alter,
or modify its thoughts, feelings, responses,
and behaviors. Processes such as altering
one’s own behavior, resisting temptation,
and changing one’s moods are characterized
by the terms self-­control and self-­regulation.
More broadly, the self takes action, selects
a response from numerous options, filters
irrelevant information, and is responsible
for response selection and enactment. The
aspect of the self that initiates behaviors
and makes selections is called the executive
function.
Defined as such, executive functioning
and self-­regulation are ubiquitous. Activities
as varied as inhibiting a triumphant smile
or snide remark, choosing what sweater to
wear, suppressing undesired thoughts, running a marathon, practicing safe sex, and
being attentive during boring meetings involve self-­control and self-­regulation.
Psychologists invoked the term self­regulation to apply learning theories to
human behavior, which is often self-­directed
and volitional (although self-­regulation does
not have to be consciously initiated; see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Some researchers,
180
such as Deci and Ryan (e.g., 1991), Higgins
(e.g., 1989), and Banaji and Prentice (1994),
have focused on the willful, intentional acts
in which people engage to align themselves
with the person they ideally want to be or
should be. Although most of the empirical
research covered in this review involves carefully crafted experimental situations that
assess self-­regulation within a short time
period, in actuality, people’s self-­regulatory
efforts are often aimed at both short- and
long-term goals. Thus, human behavior goes
beyond the stimulus–­response models that
are well ­suited to animal learning theories.
Rather, contemporary self-­regulation theories aim to understand how—over periods of
days, weeks, and years—­people resist temptations, effortfully persist, and carefully
weigh options to choose the optimal course
of action to reach their goals.
Theories of self-­regulation and self-­control
blossomed in the 1980s and 1990s, and
have continued to develop, thanks in part
to an ever-­expanding wealth of empirical
findings. Consequently, the importance of
self-­regulation now appears immediate and
obvious. Many theories treat executive functioning as one of the most important functions of the self (Baumeister, 1998; Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1997). In addition,
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
scientific advances (e.g., theories, empirical
evidence) have illuminated the significance of
self-­regulation in promoting health, wealth,
companionship, and wisdom, illustrating its
considerable role in people’s lives.
The role of self-­regulation is especially
acute in modern cultures, insofar as people
may now be faced with more choices and decisions every day than were people of times
past within a year (see Schwartz, 2000, on
the so-­called “tyranny of choice”). Moreover, identity in contemporary society is very
much a product of self-­regulation, especially
in relation to people of premodern cultures
(see Baumeister, 1997). Looking back to premodern cultures, we see that people’s identity formed in relation to a group with which
they were intimately associated. Moreover,
identity was created through a sequence of
established rites, rituals, ceremonies, and
other cultural experiences. It was once
common and normative for people to live
among the same group of others from birth
until death, and in such a context a person’s
identity was defined and sustained by the
group, with little opportunity for choice or
change. In contrast, the increasing individualization and mobility of Western societies
have shifted the burden of responsibility for
creating and sustaining identity to the individual. It is now unusual for a person in a
modern Western society to spend an entire
life in the same town, whereas once it may
have been commonplace. Moreover, even
if a person does happen to remain in one
place for a lifetime, friends and neighbors
are likely to move away; hence, the person’s
social network would likely undergo significant change. One scholar described the
increasing individualization of the United
States over the 20th century as a “gradual
release . . . in which the individual’s linkages to traditional social collectivities (e.g.,
extended family, local community, status
group) have tended to weaken” (Buchmann,
1989, p. 21). The inevitable changing of
one’s social network frees the person from
many external constraints that once both required and supported stability of identity. In
its place are both an opportunity to change
and often a necessity of reinventing and redefining oneself.
Indeed, one of the most celebrated cultural stories of United States is the tale of
the person who overcame trials and tribula-
181
tions to become a great individual—an outstanding athlete, an international scholar, a
successful entrepreneur, or President of the
United States. Now that a person’s identity is
almost wholly self-­determined (or so Americans prefer to believe) and people are given
more choice in determining their life course,
each aspect of the self has the appearance of
being intentionally developed. Furthermore,
a lack of ties to extended family and local
community, and the high degree of mobility of modern lives, means that people not
only have to establish their identities but
they may also have to do so over and over
again with each new setting. This process
demands much from the self in terms of developing and maintaining a coherent sense of
identity—and especially if people are forced
repeatedly to re-­create a sense of who they
are with each change in environment. Thus,
the link between self-­regulation and identity
in modern Western cultures certainly adds
to the burden of selfhood.
Definitional Matters
and Conceptual Distinctions
Our review focuses on the executive function
of the self, with emphasis on self-­regulation
and self-­control, which are considered subcomponent processes of the executive function. In this section, we first distinguish
among these concepts by providing definitions and examples, then detail some theories regarding the purpose of having these
functions as part of the self.
The active, intentional aspect of the self is
referred to as the executive function of the
self or in terms of the agentic nature of the
self (see Baumeister, 1998; Gazzaniga, Ivry,
& Mangun, 1998; Robinson, Schmeichel,
& Inzlicht, 2010). The executive function of
the self can be thought of as the aspect of the
self that is ultimately responsible for the deliberate, planned, and intentional actions of
the individual. We prefer the term executive
function because the term agent is somewhat
misleading, at least with respect to its common usage of someone acting on behalf of
another party. When speaking of the agentic
nature of the self, there is an implied reflexiveness in terms of who is acting on behalf of
whom: The self is acting on itself. It could be
said, however, that the use of the word agent
182
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
in English parallels the “agentic” aspects of
the self if one recalls the distinction between
self as subject (“I”) and self as object (“me”),
as described by William James (1890/1950).
To define the executive function of the
self as the self-­aspect that initiates behavior
suggests that it is all-­encompassing or omnipresent. On the contrary, many human
responses and behaviors do not invoke the
executive function. Examples of nonexecutive functioning behaviors are coordination
of motor movements, reflexively turning
away from a flame, or jiggling one’s leg back
and forth. In contrast, many actions do require executive functioning. Signing up for
a dance class, getting divorced, and asking
for a raise are actions that come from the executive function. Behavior can occur without much in the way of a self, after all, as
is shown by the behaviors of many psychologically simpler creatures. Human organisms would also behave if they did not have
selves. The self, however, is a structure that
can exert considerable “steering” control
over behavior, such as by altering the course
of behavior, refraining from some responses,
and initiating behavior that would not otherwise be activated by the immediate stimulus environment. The self’s executive function thus dramatically increases the range,
complexity, and diversity of human behavior
compared to that of animals without a self.
It is involved, for instance, in making the deliberate (but often inconsequential) decisions
that are required to move through everyday
life, such as what color socks to wear, what
to cook for dinner, and what movie to see.
Less broad than the concept of executive
functioning, self-­regulation involves the self
initiating or controlling the person’s responses, with the (conscious or nonconscious) goal
of producing a desired outcome. Hence, the
process of self-­regulation involves overriding a natural, habitual, or learned response
by altering behavior, thoughts, or emotions.
This process can interrupt a response by
changing or modifying it, substitute another
response in its place, or block an additional
response from occurring (Baumeister, 1998;
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). The
process of self-­regulation has been broken
down into three components: establishing a
goal or desired state, engaging in appropriate
behaviors to obtain one’s goals (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981), and
monitoring progress toward the goal (which
requires tracking the distance between one’s
current state and the desired state).
The terms self-­regulation, self-­control, and
self-­discipline are often used interchangeably, although some authors draw distinctions among them. The term self-­regulation
is generally given the broadest usage, as it
encapsulates both the conscious and nonconscious processes by which the self controls behavior. The term self-­control is a subtype of self-­regulation, typically implying a
deliberate, conscious process. Some authors
use the term self-­control to refer specifically
to the processes by which the self inhibits
unwanted responses (e.g., resisting temptation, or holding one’s tongue when angry).
Self-­discipline, a more narrow and specific
term yet, refers to people’s intentional plans
to improve or better themselves, most likely
in accordance with cultural norms or mores.
Thus, the focus of our chapter is on research
and theory relating to self-­regulation generally, under which the other two terms are
subsumed.
Evolutionarily, the ultimate purpose of the
executive function is probably to improve
the fit between the self and the environment
(Gazzaniga et al., 1998). Because it was extremely difficult—in fact, probably impossible until modern times—to modify aspects
of the environment to fit the self, the goal of
achieving the tightest fit between the self and
the one’s surroundings was best achieved by
having a self capable of changing the person.
Thus, creatures with an executive self would
be most likely to pass on their genes because
they would be able to adapt to changes in
setting (e.g., nomadic life), changes in environmental contingencies, and changes
in interpersonal relationships. Conversely,
creatures without a flexible self would be
left to the mercy of the environment, with
any and all environmental changes lowering
their chances of survival, or such creatures
would spend excessive amount of time and
energy trying futilely to create the optimal
environment for themselves. Probably one of
the most crucial and adaptive aspects of the
executive function is the ability to guide current behavior according to long-term goals
that lie well beyond the immediate situation.
Delaying gratification, making long-term
plans (and pursuing them), and preparing
for possible events all involve self-­regulation,
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
and all of them probably contributed greatly
to the survival and reproductive success of
the first human beings to develop the requisite capacity.
Similarly, Sedikides and Skowronski
(1997) posit that the modern self emerged
during the Pleistocene epoch as the result of
social and ecological demands that created
a need for a symbolic self. (Leary [2004]
has suggested a more recent origin, based
on a more sophisticated definition of self.)
To be sure, evolutionary advantages accrued
for humans’ early ancestors who could (1)
set goals, (2) move themselves toward their
goals, (3) assess whether progress toward
the goal was being made, and (4) conceptualize alternative possibilities that would be
relevant at all of these stages. In short, the
ability to engage in self-­regulatory processes
so as to alter behavior in response to environmental pressures would have conferred
selection advantages through better health,
cognitive capacities, and social manners to
those who could enact them.
From an evolutionary perspective, there
may also have been certain types of stimuli or
information that promoted self-­regulation.
The presence of negative feedback or stimuli may have served as a catalyst for change
(see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001). If an organism perceives something negative in the environment—­whether
through direct perceptual contact (e.g., seeing the snarling face of a tiger) or indirectly,
perhaps via a negative emotional state (see
Schwarz & Clore, 1983)—this information
may trigger self-­regulatory processes aimed
at changing thoughts or actions in some way
so as to decrease (or eradicate) the negativity.
From this perspective, creatures that could
and would change themselves in response to
negative or threatening stimuli would likely
live to pass along their genes. Conversely,
creatures that did not change themselves in
response to environmental threats were less
likely to live and to reproduce. The self is required in this process insofar as the changes
in behavior as a result of negative or aversive
stimuli are not merely reflexive but rather involve actively changing the animal to avoid
the presence of future negative stimuli. Thus,
different evolutionary factors—­social and
ecological pressures (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997) and negative or threatening stimuli
(Baumeister et al., 2001)—may have played
183
a role in the development of self-­regulatory
capacities in modern-day humans.
Review of Theories
and Empirical Evidence
Social psychologists have studied the concept of self-­regulation using a variety of approaches, examining developmental models
(e.g., Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970), cybernetic
models (Carver & Scheier, 1982), personality traits (e.g., Funder, Block, & Block,
1983), cognitive factors (e.g., Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999), and the role of the self in the
environment (e.g., Baumeister, 1998). For
instance, classic experiments by Walter Mischel and colleagues (e.g., Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988)
illustrate the difficulty inherent in delaying
gratification. Likewise, test–­operate–test–
exit (TOTE) models of self-­regulation (e.g.,
Carver & Scheier, 1982) have emphasized
the role of feedback loops in self-­regulatory
processes. Social psychologists have used
empirical methods to address aspects of
self-­regulation such as appropriate goal setting (see Baumeister et al., 1994), the effects
of pursuing competing—and sometimes
conflicting—goals (e.g., Emmons & King,
1988), and the importance of affect and motivation (e.g., Pervin, 1989).
Advances in the study of self-­regulation include theoretical reconceptualizations (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 1994; Gollwitzer, 1999;
Richards & Gross, 2000), refinements of
current theories of self-­regulatory processes
(e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999), extensions of self-­regulation
theories into areas of study outside of the
intrapsychic self (e.g., interpersonal functioning; Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister,
2001; Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Vohs, Ciarocco, & Baumeister, 2001), and a plethora
of empirical studies on the processes of self­regulation. Hence, we think that a summary
of the current status of self-­regulation and
self-­control literature is particularly timely.
Delay of Gratification
The importance of self-­regulation and self­control—both in the immediate situation
and over time—has been highlighted by research on delay of gratification by Mischel
184
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
and colleagues (e.g., Mischel & Ebbesen,
1970; Mischel et al., 1988). Delay of gratification is an important form of self-­regulation
because it requires one to override pressing
and salient impulses to do whatever will
bring immediate gratification, in order to
pursue other goals and outcomes that may
objectively be more desirable or beneficial
but that will not materialize for some time.
Mischel and others have illustrated the
difficulty inherent in delaying gratification
under tempting conditions. In these studies, children are presented with the choice
between an immediately available treat or
a more attractive treat at a later time. Successful delay of gratification involves several
factors, most notably the use of effective
cognitive strategies. In their hot–cold model
of self-­regulation, Metcalfe and Mischel
(1999) posit that hot cognitions focus on the
rewarding, pleasurable, appetizing aspects
of objects, whereas cold cognitions focus
on conceptual or symbolic meanings. Thus,
engaging in cognitive transformations—­
changing consummatory “hot” cognitions
(e.g., thinking of how yummy marshmallows taste) into informational “cool” cognitions (e.g., imagining marshmallows as
little clouds)—predicts delay of gratification
in children (see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
Other successful strategies involve distraction (e.g., singing a song to oneself; although
the song must not be about the yumminess
of the marshmallows or it does not serve as
a successful distracter) and removing the
marshmallows from one’s line of sight (e.g.,
by covering one’s eyes or turning away) (see
Mischel, 1996). Thus, delay of gratification
experiments not only provided a paradigm
within which to study self-­regulation but
also demonstrated that the seemingly simple
act of self-­stopping is extremely difficult.
Furthermore, ability to delay of gratification affects personal well-being. Mischel and
colleagues (1988) investigated the long-term
importance of ability to delay gratification by
using delay of gratification scores obtained
at age 4 to predict social and cognitive outcomes assessed at age 14–15. Being able to
resist the temptations of available cookies or
other enticing treats in childhood predicted
successful adjustment in adolescence; that is,
children who were good at delaying gratification at an early age were more likely to
do well academically, be socially skilled, and
deal with setbacks and frustrations more easily. Even more impressive is the finding that
delay of gratification ability at age 4 predicts
higher SAT scores, a finding that was stronger than using intelligence scores at age 4 to
predict later SAT scores (Shoda, Mischel, &
Peake, 1990).
Moreover, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999)
proposed a refinement of executive function theories by proposing a hot–cold theory
of self-­regulation. As stated, Metcalfe and
Mischel draw distinctions between construing an object or goal in terms of its rewarding, pleasurable, appetizing aspects (i.e.,
construing the object in “hot” terms) and
construing an object or goal conceptually
or symbolically (i.e., construing the object
in “cool” terms). Moreover, Metcalfe and
Jacobs (1998) proposed that threatening
stimuli activate hot memory systems and deactivate cold memory systems. Hence, when
the appetitive hot system is activated (e.g.,
by food cues for chronic dieters), it is more
difficult to delay gratification. Met­calfe
and Mischel proposed that the hot–cold
distinction is based on how information is
processed in the brain, with the hot system
being amygdala-based and the cold system
being hippocampus-based. According to this
theory, the amygdala processes the appetitive and reward features of biologically significant stimuli, whereas the hippocampus
is related to making plans, strategies, and
goals, and is therefore responsible for self­control. Relating this theory to the delay
of gratification paradigm, temptation may
arise when an object’s mental representation
is transformed from cold to hot (or from hot
to hotter), thereby activating neurological
substrates related to appetitive behaviors
and deactivating those related to goal attainment.
Feedback Loops
One popular model of how self-­regulation
works involves feedback loops, most notably the TOTE model proposed by Carver
and Scheier (e.g., 1981, 1982, 1998; based
on Powers, 1973), which describes a supervisory process (cf. Norman & Shallice, 1986).
In the initial “test” phase, a person evaluates
his or her current status on some dimension
(e.g., current body weight) in comparison to
a desired end state (e.g., ideal body weight).
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
The “operate” phase involves efforts to
bring oneself into line with the standard,
and progress toward that goal is monitored
by further “test” phases. When a test finally
reveals that the standard has been met, the
processes is terminated, which constitutes
the “exit” phase of the loop.
The act of setting standards itself can be
a regulatory problem because, on the one
hand, setting standards that are too high
means that one might miss the goal. On the
other hand, setting standards that are too
low ensures that one obtains the goal, albeit
perhaps a relatively undesirable one.
Imagining a gap between where one
stands and where one wants to be standing
is a visual depiction of the concept of perceived discrepancies in goal pursuit. Not
only are they a characteristic of general goal
pursuit but perceived discrepancies also can
be larger and affect behavior more among
people with certain personality traits. Perfectionism is almost definitionally relevant
to perceived discrepancies. Perfectionism is a
personality trait that involves habitually establishing lofty or unrealistic standards. As
an example, women who are high in perfectionism are more likely to see themselves as
overweight (Vohs, Bardone, Joiner, Abramson, & Heatherton, 1999) and to be dissatisfied with their bodies (Vohs et al., 2001).
That women high and low in perfectionism
do not differ in actual body weight indicates
that women high in perfectionism set standards for thinness that are higher than their
current body weight. These unachievable
standards increase the likelihood of failure,
the result of which can be the development
of bulimic symptoms.
With regard to TOTE models, a more
specific definition of the “test” aspect of
the model involves the process of assessing
whether one has reached the established
standard. If not, and a discrepancy between
one’s current and desired state is perceived,
then people move into the next step of the
model, the “operate” mode. This component of the TOTE model has received less
attention than the other components, although theories and empirical findings are
beginning to accumulate (see the section
“Strengths Model of Self-­Regulation”).
One promising theory of effective ways
to change oneself to reach a goal is Gollwitzer’s (e.g., 1993, 1999) implementation in-
185
tentions theory. Gollwitzer conceptualized
the obtainment of goals in terms of action
intentions that enable people to cope with
obstacles or initiate behaviors. These implementation intentions are separate from goal
intentions, which specify the end state the
person desires to reach. Implementation intentions instead focus on the means by which
people will achieve the goal; thus, they underlie goal intentions. Implementation intentions take a conditional form, stating
that when certain situations or conditions
arise, certain behaviors will be performed.
For instance, when trying to maintain a
diet, a person might think, “When pieces
of cake are passed around, I will say that I
am too full to eat.” Gollwitzer’s (1999) empirical research shows that implementation
intentions—­either self-­directed or situationally induced—help people to start on their
goals. For instance, participants who were
asked to write a report on how they spent
Christmas Eve were either induced to think
about when and where they would write the
report or were simply asked to write the report. Within 48 hours of Christmas Eve (the
time frame within which the reports were
to be written), 75% of participants induced
to make implementation intentions wrote a
report, whereas only 33% of control participants completed the assignment (Gollwitzer
& Brandstätter, 1997).
Gollwitzer (e.g., 1993) proposed that the
mechanisms responsible for the beneficial
effects of implementation intentions are (1)
forming a mental representation of the hypothesized situation and (2) making the actions to be implemented more automatic.
With respect to the former, Gollwitzer (1996)
has found heightened perceptual and attentional responses among people who form
implementation intentions relative to those
who do not, suggesting that after implementation intentions are enacted, situations
that contain the anticipated criteria garner
more attention and, hence, promote the intended actions. With respect to the second
mechanism, automatization, Gollwitzer and
Brandstätter (1997) found that people who
were induced to form implementation intentions against racist remarks were quicker to
initiate their counterarguments than were
participants who had only the goal (but not
the implementation) intention to provide
counterarguments.
186
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Another theoretical approach to the
mechanisms of self-­regulation has been proposed by Gross (1999), who conceptualizes
emotion regulation in terms of antecedent­focused versus response-­focused strategies.
Antecedent-­focused regulation comes before
(or early in) the emotion-­provoking process
and involves four methods of preemptively
managing one’s emotional state. Gross labels these four methods situation selection,
situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change. Situation selection involves choosing specific types of people, places, and objects that optimize one’s
emotional state. Situation modification
involves intentionally changing a situation
in order to modify its effects on one’s emotions. Attentional deployment refers to effortful focus on certain aspects of the situation that will best suit one’s emotional goals.
The fourth method, cognitive change (also
called reappraisal), is used when the other
three options are not available because it involves reconstruing the situation to make it
less emotion provoking. As an example, if a
couple wants to have a nice evening out, the
partners might select a restaurant known to
have a romantic setting (situation selection);
ask to be moved if the mood is less-than­romantic because they are seated next to the
kitchen (situation modification); look into
each others’ eyes when talking (attentional
deployment); and relabel the situation as humorous when the waiter spills wine all over
the man’s shirt (reappraisal). In contrast,
response-­focused methods occur after a
full emotional reaction. Gross lists response
modulation, the act of directly controlling
emotional responses (e.g., suppressing disappointment and amplifying relief when one
is not chosen for a high-level executive position), as the primary response-­focused regulation strategy.
Research by Gross and others shows specificity in the effects of different emotion­regulation strategies. For instance, pretending that gruesome pictures of dead people
come from the set of a movie rather than
police files dampens self-­reported emotional
experience and facial expressiveness (Kramer, Buckhout, Fox, Widman, & Tusche,
1991). Additionally, appraising environmental demands as challenging versus threatening produces reliable cognitive, affective,
and physiological consequences (Tomaka,
Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997) relevant
to self-­regulation. Appraisals of challenge, in
which people believe they have the ability to
cope with the stressor, lead to positive affect,
low negative affect, and increased cardiovascular activity combined with decreased
vascular resistance (“efficient” and “organized” physiological reactions). Conversely,
appraisals of threat, in which people believe
that the stressor exceeds their abilities, lead
to negative affect and “disorganized” physiological reactions, such as moderate cardiac activity combined with an increase in
vascular resistance. Furthermore, research
by Richards and Gross (2000) shows that
relative to controlling emotions through
cognitive reappraisal, suppressing emotions
results in decrements in memory. These results suggest that regulating emotions after
an emotional response has been triggered requires regulatory resources that would otherwise be devoted to cognitive tasks, such as
focusing attention.
To determine whether the behaviors they
have enacted to close the discrepancy between current and desired goals have been
successful, people must monitor their progress. Reduced monitoring is a prime cause
of self-­regulatory failure because it is easy
for people to stop regulating if they fail to
evaluate their progress relative to the goal
(e.g., Kirschenbaum, 1987). For instance,
dieters are often taught to keep a journal of
their daily food intake and exercise regimen
to help them recognize their current caloric
intake and energy expenditures. In support
of the effectiveness of monitoring, chronic
dieters who are aware of their caloric intake eat significantly less than dieters who
are inattentive (Polivy, Herman, Hackett,
& Kuleshnyk, 1986). Deindividuation has
also been cited as an example of reduced
monitoring, wherein people lose awareness
of themselves as individuals and instead
become a component of a larger movement
(e.g., Diener, 1979). When people are deindividuated, they are more likely to engage in
behaviors that violate their personal morals,
such as committing violent acts as part of a
lynch mob (Mullen, 1986).
In addition to setting appropriate and valued standards, engaging in goal-­directed behaviors, and monitoring oneself with regard
to a single objective, in actuality, people
often attempt to achieve multiple, distinct
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
goals, some of which may be in conflict with
each other. For instance, a woman may have
the goal of eating healthy foods but also
have the goal of being nice to her husband.
Hence, when her husband brings home
greasy hamburgers and french fries for dinner, her goals may be in conflict. Research
by Emmons and King (1988) showed that
when people possess multiple, conflicting
goals, the resulting state is rumination and a
lack of progress toward any of them.
Recent work has extended feedback loop
models to incorporate a theory of motivational processes as related to the type of goal
states being sought. One class of goals involves attempting to reach desired states by
concentrating on the distance between one’s
current self and one’s ideal self. A second
class of goals involves attempting to avoid
undesired states by concentrating on the distance between the current self and an undesired self. These approach and avoidance
motivations have neural analogues called
the behavioral activation system (BAS) and
behavioral inhibition system (BIS), respectively (e.g., Gray, 1982). The BIS is engaged
when perceiving punishment and nonreward
signals, whereas the BAS is engaged when
perceiving reward and nonpunishment signals. This model has been used, for example,
to define the personality characteristics of
anxiety (BIS) and impulsivity (BAS) (Gray,
1982), to understand disinhibition processes
(i.e., failing to correct behavior after negative feedback; Patterson & Newman, 1993),
and to predict affective states in the presence
of contingent feedback (Carver & White,
1994). In addition, self-­report scales have
been created to assess BIS/BAS sensitivity
(e.g., Carver & White, 1994). Conceptualizing differential motivations in terms of the
interaction of rewards and punishments,
along with features of the situation that activate these motivations, looks to be a promising area for future self-­regulation research.
In summary, TOTE models (e.g., Carver
& Scheier, 1981, 1982) have provided an influential framework within which to study
self-­regulatory processes. New theories and
related empirical research have advanced
our understanding of how appropriate standards are established and maintained (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 1993; Vohs, Baumeister,
& Ciarocco, 2005), the assessment of one’s
current state relative to one’s desired end
187
state (e.g., Polivy et al., 1986); the formation
of plans and intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer,
1993); and the engagement of operations,
such as situational reappraisal to control
emotions (see Gross, 1999) or nonconscious
strategies (see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), to
reach a goal.
Trait Self‑Control
People’s chronic, habitual, or preferred level
of self-­control has been shown to have direct effects on functioning in a broad range
of domains. Research suggests that people
vary in their chronic self-­regulatory faculties, with some people being naturally more
efficacious than others (e.g., Funder et al.,
1983). Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone
(2004) showed that trait self-­control (as measured by a 36-item self-­report questionnaire)
is significantly associated with a variety of
physical and mental health indices. For instance, people higher in trait self-­control
report fewer symptoms of disordered eating
and alcohol abuse, lower anger proneness,
higher self-­esteem, more secure attachment
style, and even higher grade point averages.
In a study of Dutch adolescents (Finkenauer,
Engels, & Baumeister, 2005), high trait self­control was linked to fewer transgressions,
such as fighting, theft, and vandalism, and
also to more positive relationships with parents.
Indeed, the publication of the Self-­Control
Scale by Tangney and colleagues (2004)
stimulated a sharp rise in studies on personality differences in self-­control since the preceding edition of this Handbook. A meta­analysis by de Ridder, Lensvelt-­Mulders,
Finkenauer, Marijn Stok, and Baumeister
(2010) combined results from 50 studies
using that scale, as well as 43 studies that
used two other scales. In general, high trait
self-­control was associated with a wide assortment of positive outcomes, and there
was no evidence of negative outcomes. High
self-­control was most effective at predicting good performance in work and school,
moderately beneficial in terms of interpersonal relations and personal adjustment,
and slightly effective with eating and dieting.
Women and older people had slightly better
self-­control than men and young people, but
self-­control predicted positive outcomes substantially better for men and young people
188
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
than for women and old people. This pattern presumably indicates that self-­control is
useful for restraining problematic and antisocial impulses, which are generally stronger
among men and young people than among
women and old people. Still, trait self-­control
seems to be as important (and effective) for
promoting positive behaviors as it is for restraining negative behaviors.
An intriguing finding to emerge from
the meta-­analysis by de Ridder and colleagues (2010) had to do with the distinction between automatic and controlled behaviors. They predicted that self-­control
would mainly be useful in connection with
controlled behaviors, but the opposite was
found: Self-­control was more strongly associated with automatic behaviors such as routines and habits. The implication is that trait
self-­control may serve the individual best
not in heroic single acts of resisting temptation or persevering against misfortune,
but instead in establishing and maintaining
good habits. This finding dovetails well with
the value of self-­control in work and school
domains, where performance over the long
run is presumably best facilitated by steady
effort supported by good work habits.
Strengths Model of Self‑Regulation
We view the study of self-­regulatory resources as one of the most important factors in the understanding of self-­regulation.
As noted in the section on feedback loops
and TOTE models, only recently have psychologists begun to investigate what enables
people to perform the behaviors that bring
them toward their goals. Empirical studies
(e.g., Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988) and
theoretical postulates (e.g., Mischel, 1996)
suggest that resource models, in which
self-­regulation draws upon an expendable
psychological energy or resource, are appropriate representations of self-­regulatory
mechanisms.
An influential conceptualization views
self-­regulation as a limited resource that
controls impulses and desires (Baumeister
& Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, &
Tice, 2007). Consider a person who sets an
obtainable goal, accurately assesses current
and goal states, and tracks his or her progress. This person may still fail to achieve the
goal because of an inability to alter cognitive, emotional, or behavioral responses due
to depleted regulatory resources. According
to this model, self-­regulatory resources can
be temporarily depleted or fatigued by self­regulatory demands, such as when people
try to resist temptation (Vohs & Heatherton,
2000). The resource model views the capacity to self-­regulate as governed by a finite
pool of resources and posits the ability to
self-­regulate as a limited resource that acts
much like a muscle, such that the availability
of its strength is lower with each individual
act of self-­control but grows with judicious
use over time.
Support for the resource model comes
from research linking self-­stopping to temporary energy expenditure (e.g., Gilbert et
al., 1988; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Wegner,
Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990). Indeed, acts of
self-­regulation appear to deplete the body’s
basic energy supply. Studies by Gailliot and
colleagues (2007) found that acts of self­regulation lowered the levels of glucose in
the bloodstream. Glucose is a chemical produced by digestion of food that is carried by
the blood to muscles, brain, and organs, furnishing energy for their activities. Low levels
of blood glucose have been linked to a variety of poor behavioral outcomes, suggesting
a broad pattern of impaired self-­control (for
review, see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007),
and low levels of blood glucose produced by
experimental manipulations of self-­control
were associated with poor performance on
standard laboratory tests of self-­control
(Gailliot et al., 2007).
Perhaps most remarkably, doses of glucose improved performance on laboratory
tests of self-­control. Gailliot and colleagues
(2007) gave participants drinks of lemonade
sweetened either with sugar or with Splenda,
a diet sweetener that tastes much like sugar
but provides no glucose. The doses of sugar
offset the effects of depleted self-­regulatory
resources, whereas the lemonade sweetened
with Splenda had no effect.
Researchers have begun to develop the implications of the link between glucose and
self-­control. For example, Gailliot, Hildebrandt, Eckel, and Baumeister (2010) proposed that premenstrual syndrome (PMS)
may involve impaired self-­control caused
by low glucose rather than, as commonly
and stereotypically assumed, an upsurge in
antisocial impulses caused by premenstrual
discomfort. During the luteal phase of the
menstrual cycle, the body makes extra meta-
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
bolic demands, thus diverting glucose away
from other functions, such as self-­control.
There is no particular behavioral effect that
is the signature of PMS; rather, all manner
of impulsive behaviors increase, suggesting a
deficit in self-­control.
Direct evidence for a resource model of
self-­regulation has been provided using a
two-task paradigm in which participants
engage in an act of self-­regulation (e.g.,
mental control or regulation of emotional
expression). Subsequently, participants’ self­regulatory capacity on a separate task (e.g.,
physical stamina) is assessed. The results of
these studies indicate that the second act of
self-­regulation is often impaired as a result
of the initial act, suggesting that both acts
require some common resource that was
depleted by the initial act (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven,
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; see Baumeister et al., 2007, for a
review).
Most experimental studies of self­regulatory resources have involved manipulating situational demands to induce
self-­regulatory behaviors. This method of inducing self-­regulatory endeavors, which may
be far less demanding and meaningful than
the self-­initiated self-­regulatory tasks in which
people engage in their daily lives, has shown
robustly that one route to self-­regulatory
failure involves prior self-­regulatory endeavors. For example, Muraven and colleagues
(1998) asked participants first to engage in
a form of self-­regulation (e.g., mental control, emotional expression regulation); later,
participants’ self-­regulatory strength was
assessed by performance on a separate volitional task (e.g., physical stamina). This design illustrates that even externally created
self-­regulatory demands can temporarily affect global self-­regulatory strength (see also
Baumeister et al., 1998).
Related research has emphasized the depleting nature of pursuing habitual goals.
Vohs and Heatherton (2000) studied chronic dieters to demonstrate that the presence
of personally held inhibitions (e.g., dietary
restraint) could interact with the situation
(e.g., proximity of tempting foods) to deplete
self-­regulatory resources and subsequently
affect self-­regulation. Chronic dieters were
used as participants because these women
engage in classic self-­regulatory behaviors
when attempting to override the desire to
189
eat by focusing on long-term weight loss
goals. In these experiments, demand on self­regulatory resources was manipulated by exposing dieters to a situation that was either
strongly depleting (i.e., sitting next to a bowl
of candies) or weakly depleting (i.e., sitting
far from a bowl of candies). Subsequent ability to self-­regulate on a second self-­regulatory
task was poorer among dieters who had
been depleted, such that they ate more ice
cream (Study 1) and persisted less on a cognitive task (Study 2). Nondieters, conversely,
were not affected—and by suggestion, not
depleted—by the situational manipulations
involving the candies, again confirming the
importance of chronic inhibitions. These
studies take an individual-­difference approach to studying self-­regulatory depletion,
emphasizing the role of chronic differences
among people that may render them vulnerable to self-­regulatory depletion in certain,
regulation-­relevant situations.
Thus, exerting self-­control apparently
consumes a psychological resource, of which
blood glucose is presumably one important
component. After exerting self-­control,
people’s capacity to self-­regulate even in
seemingly unrelated domains is temporarily impaired. This state has been dubbed ego
depletion. We turn next to review the accumulating research on the manifestations of
ego depletion.
Patterns of Ego Depletion
Self-­regulation is a ubiquituous feature of
daily life. A recent experience-­sampling
study by Hofmann, Vohs, Foerster, and
Baumeister (2010) tracked 205 people as
they went about their lives for a week. About
a third of the total responses indicated that
people were actively resisting some desire or
impulse at that moment. Extrapolating from
these findings, people may spend 5–6 hours
every day resisting desires and impulses.
And, of course, that is not the only form of
self-­regulation. Given that each episode of
self-­regulation has the potential to reduce
self-­regulatory resources and promote ego
depletion, it is important to consider the cascading effects of engaging in self-­regulation
on subsequent self-­regulatory efforts in everyday life. Laboratory studies have begun
to reveal the many phenomena that are subject to self-­regulation—and to identify how
behaviors may change when people experi-
190
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
ence ego depletion. Here we review a representative assortment, though space precludes
covering every finding.
Much of intelligent thought depends on
self-­regulation. Controlled mental processes
are, by definition, controlled, and this control reflects self-­regulatory activities. Logical reasoning and other, similar forms of
intelligent thought are therefore impaired
during ego depletion. Schmeichel, Vohs,
and Baumeister (2003) found substantial
decrements in subjects’ performance on IQ
tests and other reasoning tasks as a result of
depletion. Automatic processes were not affected, so IQ tests that measure vocabulary
or general knowledge did not reveal changes
as a function of ego depletion. But whenever
people had to engage in effortful thought to
move from one set of information to another,
their performance was impaired insofar as
they had recently engaged in self-­regulation.
Masicampo and Baumeister (2008) showed
that decrements in logical reasoning stemming from ego depletion could be counteracted by giving people a dose of glucose in
the form of lemonade with sugar. As in other
studies, lemonade sweetened with artificial
sweetener (no glucose) had no effect on
counteracting the effects of ego depletion.
Many interpersonal behaviors depend on
self-­regulation and change under ego depletion. For example, aggressive responses to
provocation increase among depleted persons, although ego depletion has no effect
on aggression in the absence of provocation
(DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot,
2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). The difference in reactions to provocation versus
no provocation is important because it rules
out any suggestion that ego depletion itself
engenders hostile or aggressive tendencies.
Rather, the role of self-­regulation appears
to be restraint of aggressive impulses, and
when ego depletion reduces a person’s self­regulatory resources, aggressive impulses
become more likely to be enacted.
Prejudice and stereotyping constitute
widely studied patterns of interpersonal
behavior. Apparently, resisting prejudices
causes ego-­depletion, and ego-depleted persons exhibit more prejudicial behavior (cf.
Apfelbaum & Sommers, 2009). White participants harboring racist prejudices find it
depleting to interact with a black person,
presumably because they must inhibit their
hostile feelings or derogatory attitudes.
Nonprejudiced persons show no such effects. These prejudicial reactions, too, are
linked to blood glucose levels, and people
respond in less prejudicial ways when their
blood glucose levels are bolstered (Gailliot,
Peruche, Plant, & Baumeister, 2009).
Honesty may also depend on self­regulation. Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, and Ariely (2009) found that when
people’s resources were depleted, they yielded more readily to a temptation to cheat on
a test and thereby garner extra money for
themselves.
Self-­presentation is another important
activity that involves self-­regulation (e.g.,
Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990;
Schlenker, 1980). Vohs and colleagues (2005)
showed that effortful self-­presentation is
depleting and, conversely, that ego depletion impairs self-­presentation; that is, after
participants tried to present themselves in
nonhabitual ways (e.g., women acting in a
stereotypically masculine manner), their
subsequent self-­regulation on seemingly irrelevant tasks was impaired, consistent with
the notion that they had expended their resources while self-­presenting. In other experiments in the same investigation, after
people had engaged in self-­control, their
subsequent self-­presentations were suboptimal. For example, depleted persons presented themselves in more narcissistic ways, and
some people engaged in self-­disclosures that
were either overly intimate or aloof.
Behavior in close relationships also responds to ego depletion. Finkel and Campbell (2001) showed that ego-­depleted people
were less accommodating (i.e., behaved in
less constructive ways) in response to misbehavior by their romantic partners compared
to people whose resources had not been depleted by prior self-­control. Ego depletion
also seems to increase tendencies to engage
in violent or abusive treatment of romantic
partners (Finkel et al., 2006), consistent
with the research on aggression described
earlier. For these and other reasons, good
self-­control appears to be an important
contributor to successful close relationships
(Vohs, Finkenauer, & Baumeister, 2011).
Ego depletion also has implications for a
wide array of other behaviors. For example,
ego-­depleted persons engage in more impulsive spending than nondepleted persons
(Vohs & Faber, 2007). Depleted persons
are also more susceptible to unwelcome
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
thoughts of death and mortality (Gailliot,
Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). The latter
finding suggests that many of the findings
associated with terror management theory,
which treats fear of death as the supreme
human motivation (see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999), may be mediated
by ego-­depletion processes. Consistent with
that analysis, Gailliot and colleagues (2006)
found that defending oneself against the
threatening thoughts of death depletes the
self’s resources, thereby impairing subsequent self-­regulatory performance even on
activities that have no apparent relationship
to death.
Recent work has been undertaken to
test the robustness of the depletion effect.
One study tested the hypothesis that self­regulatory resource depletion effects are
qualitatively different from mere physical
tiredness effects (Vohs, Glass, Maddox, &
Markman, in press). The crucial experiment
used a full sleep deprivation design, in which
half of the participants were randomly assigned not to sleep for 24 hours before the
study took place, whereas the other half
were allowed to sleep. The former group
was kept awake by a chaperone, so there
was no mistaking that they had not gotten
any sleep. Then this factor was crossed with
a self-­regulatory resource depletion factor of
emotion regulation. The results showed that
self-­regulation, operationalized as aggressive
responding (or lack thereof) to a combative
interaction partner in an online game, was
predicted only by participants’ depletion
condition—and neither their sleep condition nor the interaction of the two. Hence,
self-­regulation depletion effects appear to be
quite different from a mere physical fatigue
effect.
Another study that tested the robustness
of the self-­regulatory resource model was a
meta-­analysis by Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and
Chatzisarantis (2010), who gathered the results of over 80 papers and confirmed that
ego depletion effects have been widely observed. The overall effect of an ego-­depletion
task (relative to another similar task that did
not involve self-­regulation) was a mediumto-large effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.62) for an
overall sample of over 50,000 participants.
Moreover, there were very few moderators
affecting the mean effect size, which again is
attributed to the consistency and strength of
the phenomenon.
191
Beyond Self‑Regulation:
Choice, Initiative, and Free Will
Ego-­depletion research, which grew out of
studies on self-­regulation, generally tested
the theory that self-­regulation depends on
a limited resource or strength, akin to the
folk notion of willpower. Because of the importance and prevalence of self-­regulation
in daily life, the resource used for self­regulation has to be regarded as one of the
most important aspects of the self.
However, this resource may have important implications that extend beyond self­regulation. Indeed, the term ego depletion
was selected in favor of the earlier term
regulatory depletion (Muraven et al., 1998)
based on an experiment suggesting that the
same resource used for self-­regulation may
also be used for choice (Baumeister et al.,
1998). That experiment used a cognitive
dissonance paradigm in which participants
were given the option to make a counterattitudinal speech (to which they agreed) or were
told to make a counterattitudinal speech.
Consenting led to subsequent decrements in
an unrelated measure of self-­control.
The suggestion that choosing depletes
the self was disputed by Moller, Deci, and
Ryan (2006). They proposed that the choice
was depleting only because it involved doing
something that went against the person’s
wishes, and they showed that making one or
two agreeable choices had no such depleting
effect.
The question of whether choice per se can
be depleting was resolved in a lengthy investigation by Vohs and colleagues (2008).
Across a series of experiments, making decisions and choices was repeatedly shown to
cause ego depletion. The studies even provided a conceptual replication of the finding by Moller and colleagues (2006) that a
small quantity of pleasant choices did not
deplete the self, but making a longer series
of pleasant decisions was depleting. That
experiment involved a bridal registry task,
in which participants were instructed to
choose items to receive as wedding gifts, as
if they were preparing to be married. Some
participants performed that task for 4 minutes and others for 12 minutes. At 4 minutes, the participants who disliked the task
showed depletion effects, while those who
enjoyed the task did not. At 12 minutes,
however, all participants showed depletion
192
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
effects, regardless of whether they liked or
disliked the task.
Thus, making choices depletes the self and
impairs subsequent self-­regulation. Conversely, initial acts of self-­regulation impair
subsequent decision making. Pocheptsova,
Amir, Dhar, and Baumeister (2009) found
that after brief exercises of self-­control, people made decisions differently. They were
less willing to compromise, and they were
more likely to succumb to irrational bias.
They even tended to avoid making decisions
if it was possible to postpone the choice.
Initiative too appears to depend on the same
willpower resource used for self-­regulation.
After being put into a state of ego depletion
by an initial act of self-­control, participants in
studies by Vohs, Baumeister, Pocheptsova, and
Dhar (2010) showed increased passivity, such
as being slower to take action to fix a problem,
and allowing their performance to suffer because they were less proactive in obtaining the
materials needed to do a good job.
Scholars are drawing broader implications
from the fact that self-­regulatory resources
are used for self-­regulation, decision making,
and initiative. For one, these lines of research
suggest that the self uses a single resource for
a variety of important activities. For another, the important activity that these processes enable might just be what is commonly
known as free will. Baumeister (2009) has
recently proposed that executive functioning
capacities underlie the popular notion of free
will. To be sure, the notion of free will is scientifically and philosophically controversial,
and it seems unlikely that laboratory experiments such as these are going to prove or disprove its existence. But that is not the goal.
Rather, Baumeister suggested that capacities
for self-­regulation, choice, and initiative are
the psychological manifestations of this controversial notion. Whether it deserves to be
called free will is debatable and may prove
to be a matter of semantics and definitions.
Crucially, however, philosophical treatments
of free will (e.g., Mele, 2006, 2009) typically draw upon examples involving choice,
self-­control, and initiative. Research on ego
depletion has provided evidence that these
seemingly diverse activities share a common
psychological substrate; moreover, the connection to blood glucose suggests that they
share a common physiological mechanism.
Thus, it has been shown that the self uses
some of its energy to regulate behavior,
make decisions, and respond actively instead
of passively. What remains to be seen, and
the focus of new and exciting endeavors, is
whether these vital activities might just reveal how free will came to be.
Neuropsychological Research
on Self‑Regulation
Neuroscientists also study self-­regulation
and executive functioning. In neuroscience,
the term executive function is mainly used
to denote cognitive mechanisms performed
by the frontal lobes, such as planning, volition, effortful and purposeful action, and
maximizing performance (Lezak, 1983).
From a neuroscientific perspective, executive function tasks require effortful acts such
as shifting between cognitive sets, problem
solving, and strategic planning. In addition,
executive function tasks often include a goal,
which then necessitates self-­regulation.
One popular method of testing executive
functioning is the Wisconsin Card-­Sorting
Task, in which participants sort cards that
have multidimensional characters (e.g., red
stars, blue stars, and red squares). Participants are asked to place the cards into piles
according to an unstated experiment-­defined
rule (e.g., all stars; all red cards). This aspect
of the task is not difficult, as most people
learn the sorting dimension after negative feedback from the experimenter. After
learning the rule, however, the experimenter
suddenly changes the sorting dimension and
the participant is then required to detect the
new rule. Shifting attention from one dimension to another, as well as filtering irrelevant
information, involves the frontal lobes. Indeed, patients with frontal lobe damage
cannot learn a new rule after the initial rule
has been learned. Instead they perseverate
and continue to apply the old rule again and
again (see Gazzaniga et al., 1998).
Although the frontal lobes govern multiple
aspects of self-­regulation, specific areas appear to be involved in enabling a person to
reach a goal. Within the prefrontal cortex, the
dorsolateral prefrontal area has been linked
to the representation of goal states, as well as
to the active process of filtering irrelevant information (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Koziol,
1993). Research has also suggested that the
anterior cingulate is related to response modification demands, especially with regard to
tasks that require divided attention (e.g.,
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, &
Petersen, 1991). Norman and Shallice (1986)
developed a model of goal-­orientated behaviors. In their model, the anterior cingulate is
hypothesized to monitor information on a
variety of levels, possibly providing the basis
for the so-­called supervisory attentional system (SAS; Norman & Shallice, 1986) that
oversees the executive functions of the brain.
The SAS governs controlled, effortful behaviors and is activated during situations that involve planning, novel contingencies, difficult
choices, or overriding habitual responses.
The SAS is likely activated during social psychological research on self-­regulation, as suggested by the types of paradigms found to be
sensitive to assessing the effects of depleted
self-­regulatory resources (e.g., Baumeister et
al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). These
paradigms present participants with difficult
choices (e.g., temptation) that require overriding a lower-level response (e.g., eating the
tempting foods) while in a novel situation.
Thus, neuropsychological research strongly
suggests that the anterior cingulate is involved in tasks that deplete self-­regulatory
resources. Additionally, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex appears to be necessary for the
activation, maintenance, and modification of
goal-­directed responses.
Recent work in neuroscience has begun
to illuminate the processes involved in ego
depletion. Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) used
electroencephalographic recording to investigate the brain activities associated with ego
depletion. Participants first inhibited their
emotional reactions to a pair of upsetting
film clips (or not, in the control condition),
then they performed the Stroop task (a standard measure of self-­control). Depleted participants showed a reduction in event-­related
negativity (ERN) responses, which involve
the anterior cingulate cortex and constitute
vital activity by which the brain detects errors and mismatches between behavior and
goals or values. Thus, the brain’s conflict­monitoring system appears to become less
active in the aftermath of self-­regulation.
A bridge between cognitive neuroscience
and social psychology is being formed, in
part by research on self-­regulation and executive functioning. Each perspective can
serve to strengthen our understanding of
executive functioning, and we encourage researchers to move toward an integration of
these two approaches.
193
Conclusions
Many of life’s greatest challenges involve attempting to achieve goals. Be it training to
run a marathon before turning 40, maintaining one’s current weight, raising happy
children, or not ending up like a despised
cousin, people are constantly trying to improve their lives through self-­regulation. The
executive function, under which self-­control
and self-­regulation are subsumed, is an indispensable facet of selfhood in its ability to
make a better fit between the person and the
environment. As seen in our review, the ability to self-­regulate is an integral component
of mental and physical well-being.
Some have questioned whether a person
can have too much self-­control. From our
perspective, little empirical evidence has
been found to support a curvilinear view
of self-­control. Rather, it is more likely that
when people exert self-­control and still fail
to achieve their goals, they miscalculated at
some step in the process or used an erroneous
strategy to reach the desired state (Baumeister et al., 1994). Systematic efforts by Tangney and colleagues (2004) and de Ridder
and colleagues (2010) to find maladaptive
correlates of high levels of self-­control repeatedly failed: The benefits of self-­control
were linear, not curvilinear.
Our review points to several advances
in the study of self-­regulation and self­control. We especially encourage the use of
a self-­regulation framework to study interpersonal processes, further investigations
of the role of nonconscious goal activation
and operations, and the neural correlates
of self-­regulatory functions. Furthermore,
we cannot overstate the importance of self­regulatory resources in understanding mechanisms of self-­control. Without the ability to
engage in successful self-­regulation, one cannot get from the current state to the desired
end state, despite setting appropriate goals,
understanding where one currently stands,
or having the best intentions.
As the findings described in this chapter
attest, the problems that result from a lack of
or breakdown in self-­control are consequential. Self-­regulation failure taxes the self, the
health of one’s relationships, and the state
of society. Conversely, strong self-­regulatory
abilities could yield great achievements at
both personal and societal levels. Remarkable accomplishments will only be achieved,
194
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
however, by developing, using, and strengthening self-­regulatory processes.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Institutes of Health (Grant No. MH-57039).
References
Apfelbaum, E. P., & Sommers, S. R. (2009).
Liberating effects of losing executive control:
When regulatory strategies turn maladaptive.
Psychological Science, 20, 139–143.
Banaji, M. R., & Prentice, D. A. (1994). The self
in social contexts. Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 297–332.
Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-­presentational
view of social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 3–26.
Baumeister, R. F. (1997). Identity, self-­concept,
and self-­esteem: The self lost and found. In
R. Hogan & J. A. Johnson (Eds.), Handbook
of personality psychology (pp. 681–710). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680–
740). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Free will in social psychology. Available at www.in-mind.org/issue9/free-will-in-­social-psychology.html.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer,
C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger
than good. Review of General Psychology, 5,
323–370.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M.,
& Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252–1265.
Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996).
Self-­regulation failure: An overview. Psychological Inquiry, 7, 1–15.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice,
D. M. (1993). When ego threats lead to self­regulation failure: Negative consequences of
high self-­esteem. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 64, 141–156.
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice,
D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and why
people fail at self-­regulation. San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M.
(2007). The strength model of self-­control.
Current Directions in Psychological Science,
16, 351–355.
Buchmann, M. (1989). The script of life in modern society: Entry into adulthood in a changing world. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-­regulation: A control theory
approach to human behavior. New York:
Springer-­Verlag.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control
theory: A useful conceptual framework for
personality–­social, clinical and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 111–135.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the
self-­regulation of behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral
inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 319–333.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1996). Automatic activation of impression formation and
memorization goals: Nonconscious goal priming reproduces effects of explicit task instructions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 464–466.
Ciarocco, N. J., Sommer, K. L., & Baumeister,
R. F. (2001). Ostracism and ego depletion: The
strains of silence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1156–1163.
Corbetta, M., Miezin, F. M., Dobmeyer, S.,
­Shulman, G. L., & Petersen, S. E. (1991).
Selective and divided attention during visual
discriminations of shape, color, and speed:
Functional anatomy by positron emission
tomography. Journal of Neuroscience, 11,
2382–2402.
Davidson, R. J., & Irwin, W. (1999). The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective
style. Trends in Cognitive Neuroscience, 3,
11–21.
de Ridder, D., Lensvelt-­Mulders, G., Finkenauer, C., Marijn Stok, F., & Baumeister, R. F.
(2010). Taking stock of self-­control: A meta­analysis of how self-­control affects a wide
range of behaviors. Unpublished manuscript,
Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality.
In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium
on Motivation (Vol. 38, pp. 237–288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T.,
& Gailliot, M. T. (2007). Violence restrained:
Effects of self-­regulation and its depletion on
aggression. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 43, 62–76.
Diener, E. (1979). Deindividuation, self­awareness, and disinhibition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1160–
1171.
Emmons, R. A., & King, L. A. (1988). Personal
striving conflict: Immediate and long-term
implications for psychological and physical
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54, 1040–1048.
Finkel, E. J., & Campbell, W. K. (2001). Self­control and accommodation in relationships:
An interdependence analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 263–277.
Finkel, E. J., Dalton, A. N., Campbell, W. K.,
Brunell, A. B., Scarbeck, S. J., & Chartrand,
T. L. (2006). High-­maintenance interaction:
Inefficient social coordination impairs self­regulation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91, 456–475.
Finkenauer, C., Engels, R. C. M. E., & Baumeister, R. F. (2005). Parenting behavior and adolescent behavioral and emotional problems:
The role of self-­control. International Journal
of Behavioral Development, 29, 58–69.
Funder, D. C., Block, J. H., & Block, J. (1983).
Delay of gratification: Some longitudinal personality correlates. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 44, 1198–1213.
Gailliot, M. T., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). Self­regulation and sexual restraint: Dispositionally and temporarily poor self-­regulatory abilities contribute to failure at restraining sexual
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 33, 173–186.
Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C.
N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., et
al. (2007). Self-­control relies on glucose as a
limited energy source: Willpower is more than
a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 92, 325–336.
Gailliot, M. T., Hildebrandt, B., Eckel, L. A.,
& Baumeister, R. F. (2010). A theory of limited metabolic energy and premenstrual syndrome (PMS) symptoms: Increased metabolic
demands during the luteal phase divert metabolic resources from and impair self-­control.
Review of General Psychology, 14, 269–282.
Gailliot, M. T., Peruche, B. M., Plant, E. A.,
& Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Stereotypes and
prejudice in the blood: Sucrose drinks reduce
195
prejudice and stereotyping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 288–290.
Gailliot, M. T., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baumeister,
R. F. (2006). Self-­regulatory processes defend
against the threat of death: Effects of mortality salience, self-­control depletion, and trait
self-­control on thoughts and fears of dying.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
91, 49–62.
Gazzaniga, M. S., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. R.
(1998). Cognitive neuroscience: The biology
of mind. New York: Norton.
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W.
(1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social inference and the self-­regulation of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55,
685–694.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1993). Goal achievement:
The role of intentions. In W. Stroebe & M.
Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social
psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 141—185). Chichester,
UK: Wiley.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). The violational benefits
of planning. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh
(Eds.) The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 287–
312). New York: Guilford Press.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans. American
Psychologist, 54, 493–503.
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Brandstätter, V. (1997).
Implementation intentions and effective goal
pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 186–199.
Gray, J. A. (1982). The neuropsychology of
anxiety: An enquiry into the functions of the
septo-­hippocampal system. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gross, J. J. (1999). Emotion and emotion regulation. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.),
Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 525–552). New York:
Guilford Press.
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1997). Hiding
feelings: The acute effects of inhibiting negative and positive emotion. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 95–103.
Higgins, E. T. (1989). Self-­discrepancy theory:
What patterns of self-­beliefs cause people to
suffer? In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 22, pp. 93–
136). New York: Academic Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Biases in social cognition:
“Aboutness” as a general principle. In C. McGarty & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The message of
196
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
social psychology: Perspectives on mind in society (pp. 182–199). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Hofmann, H., Vohs, K. D., Foerster, G., &
Baumeister, R. F. (2010). Seven days in the life:
An experience sampling study on everyday
desires. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Inzlicht, M., & Gutsell, J. N. (2007). Running
on empty: Neural signals for self-­control failure. Psychological Science, 18, 933–937.
James, W. (1950). The principles of psychology
(Vol. 2). New York: Dover. (Original work
published 1890)
Kirschenbaum, D. S. (1987). Self-­regulatory failure: A review with clinical implications. Clinical Psychology Review, 7, 77–104.
Koziol, L. F. (1993). The neuropsychology of attention deficit and obsessive compulsive disorder: Towards and understanding of the cognitive mechanisms of impulse control. In L. F.
Koziol, C. E. Stout, & D. H. Ruben (Eds.),
Handbook of childhood impulse disorders
and ADHD: Theory and practice (pp. 5–24).
Springfield, IL: Thomas.
Kramer, T. H., Buckhout, R., Fox, P., Widman,
E., & Tusche, B. (1991). Effects of stress on
recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 5, 483–
488.
Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self­awareness, egotism, and the quality of human
life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1990). Impression management: A literature review and
two-­component model. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 34–47.
Lezak, M. (1983). Neuropsychological assessment
(2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Masicampo, E. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008).
Toward a physiology of dual-­process reasoning and judgment: Lemonade, willpower, and
expensive rule-based analysis. Psychological
Science, 19, 255–260.
Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., & Ariely, D. (2009). Too tired
to tell the truth: Self-­control resource depletion and dishonesty. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 45, 594–597.
Mele, A. R. (2006). Free will and luck. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. R. (2009). Effective intentions: The
power of conscious will. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Metcalfe, J., & Jacobs, W. J. (1998). Emotional
memory: The effects of stress on “cool” and
“hot” memory systems. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 38, 187–222.
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A two-­system
analysis of delay of gratification. Psychological Review, 106, 3–19.
Mischel, W. (1996). From good intentions to
willpower. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh
(Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 197–
218). New York: Guilford Press.
Mischel, W., & Ebbesen, E. B. (1970). Attention
in delay of gratification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 329–337.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Peake, P. K. (1988).
The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 687–696.
Moller, A. C., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006).
Choice and ego depletion: The moderating role
of autonomy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1024–1036.
Mullen, B. (1986). Atrocity as a function of lynch
mob composition: A self-­attention perspective.
Applied and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12,
187–197.
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F.
(1998). Self-­control as limited resource: Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774–789.
Norman, D., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to
action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-­regulation
(pp. 1–18). New York: Plenum Press.
Patterson, C. M., & Newman, J. P. (1993). Reflectivity and learning from adverse events:
Toward a psychological mechanism for the
syndromes of disinhibition. Psychological Review, 100, 716–736.
Pervin, L. A. (1989). Psychodynamic systems reflections on a social intelligence model of personality. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.),
Advances in social cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 153–
161). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pocheptsova, A., Amir, O., Dhar, R., &
Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Deciding without
resources: Resource depletion and choice in
context. Journal of Marketing Research, 46,
344–355.
Polivy, J., Herman, C. P., Hackett, R., & Kuleshnyk, I. (1986). The effects of self-­attention and
public attention on eating in restrained and
unrestrained subjects. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 50, 1253–1260.
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of
perception. Chicago: Aldine.
9. Self-­Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon,
S. (1999). A dual-­process model of defense
against conscious and unconscious death­related thoughts: An extension of terror management theory. Psychological Review, 106,
835–845.
Richards, J. M., & Gross, J. J. (2000). Emotional
regulation and memory: The cognitive costs of
keeping one’s cool. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79, 410–424.
Robinson, M. D., Schmeichel, B. J., & Inzlicht,
M. (2010). How does the self control itself?:
Questions and considerations based on a cognitive control perspective. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 189–200.
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management:
The self-­concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R.
F. (2003). Intellectual performance and ego
depletion: Role of the self in logical reasoning and other information processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85,
33–46.
Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-­determination: The
tyranny of freedom. American Psychologist,
55, 79–88.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective
states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513–523.
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. A. (1997). The
symbolic self in evolutionary context. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1,
80–102.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent cognitive and self-­regulatory
competencies from preschool delay of gratification: Identifying diagnostic conditions. Developmental Psychology, 26, 978–986.
Stucke, T. S., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Ego
depletion and aggressive behavior: Is the inhibition of aggression a limited resource? European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 1–13.
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L.
(2004). High self-­control predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 72,
271–322.
Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kibler, J., & Ernst,
J. M. (1997). Cognitive and physiological antecedents of threat and challenge appraisal.
197
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
73, 63–72.
Vohs, K. D., Bardone, A. M., Joiner, T. E., Jr.,
Abramson, L. Y., & Heatherton, T. F. (1999).
Perfectionism, perceived weight status, and
self-­esteem interact to predict bulimic symptoms: A model of bulimic symptom development. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108,
695–700.
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N.
(2005). Self-­regulation and self-­presentation:
Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self­presentation depletes regulatory resources.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88, 632–657.
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Pocheptsova, A.,
& Dhar, R. (2010). Active initiative requires
self-control resources. Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota.
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J.,
Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., & Tice, D. M.
(2008). Making choices impairs subsequent
self-­control: A limited resource account of
decision making, self-­regulation, and active
initiative. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 94, 883–898.
Vohs, K. D., Ciarocco, N., & Baumeister, R. F.
(2001). Interpersonal functioning requires
self-­regulatory resources. Unpublished manuscript, Case Western Reserve University,
Cleveland, OH.
Vohs, K. D., & Faber, R. J. (2007). Spent resources: Self-­regulatory resource availability
affects impulse buying. Journal of Consumer
Research, 33, 537–547.
Vohs, K. D., Finkenauer, C., & Baumeister, R.
F. (2011). The sum of friends’ and lovers’ self­control scores predicts relationship quality.
Social Psychological and Personality Science,
2, 138–145.
Vohs, K. D., Glass, B. D., Maddox, W. T., &
Markman, A. B. (in press). Ego depletion is
not just fatigue: Evidence from a total sleep
deprivation experiment. Social Psychological
and Personality Science.
Vohs, K. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2000). Self­regulatory failure: A resource-­depletion approach. Psychological Science, 11, 249–254.
Wegner, D. M., Shortt, J. W., Blake, A. W., &
Page, M. S. (1990). The suppression of exciting thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 409–418.
Chapter 10
Self-­Efficacy
James E. Maddux
Jennifer T. Gosselin
Whether you think you can or whether you think
you can’t, you’re right.
—H enry Ford
“Self” and “identity” are concerned largely
with the question “Who am I?” Often people try to answer the question “Who am I?”
by asking “What am I good at?” and “What
can I accomplish?” The study of self-­efficacy
is concerned with understanding this important aspect of self and identity—­people’s
beliefs about their personal capabilities, and
how these beliefs influence what they try to
accomplish, how they try to accomplish it,
and how they react to successes and setbacks
along the way.
Since the publication of Bandura’s article
“Self-­Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory
of Behavior Change” in 1977, the term self­efficacy has become ubiquitous in psychology and related fields. Hundreds of articles on
every imaginable aspect of self-­efficacy have
appeared in journals devoted to psychology,
sociology, kinesiology, public health, medicine, nursing, and other fields. This research
can be only summarized here and cannot
be discussed in detail. Thus, the goal of this
chapter is breadth of coverage, not depth.
In the first section we discuss the definition and measurement of self-­efficacy. In the
second section we discuss how self-­efficacy
198
beliefs develop, and in the third, the importance of self-­efficacy and the application of
self-­efficacy theory to a number of areas of
human adaptation and adjustment.
Self-­efficacy is best understood in the context of social cognitive theory—an approach
to understanding human cognition, action,
motivation, and emotion that assumes people actively shape their environments rather than simply reacting to them (Bandura,
1986, 1997, 2001; Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997; Kross, Mischel, & Shoda, 2010;
Mischel, 1973; Shadel, 2010). Social cognitive theory has at least four basic premises.
First, people have powerful cognitive or
symbolizing capabilities that allow them
to create internal models of experience. Because of this capacity, people can observe
and evaluate their own thoughts, behavior,
and emotions. They also can develop new
plans of action, make predictions about outcomes, test and evaluate their predictions,
and communicate complex ideas and experiences to others.
Second, environmental events, personal
factors (cognition, emotion, and biological
events), and behaviors are reciprocal influ-
10. Self-­Efficacy
ences. People respond cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally to environmental
events. Also, through cognition, people can
exercise control over their own behavior,
which then influences not only the environment but also their cognitive, emotional, and
biological states.
Third, self and identity are socially embedded. They are perceptions (accurate or
not) of one’s own and others’ patterns of
cognition, emotion, and action as they occur
in patterns of situations, typically involving
real or imagined other people. Because they
are socially embedded, self and identity are
not simply what people bring to their interactions with others; they are created in these
interactions, and they change through these
interactions.
Fourth, the self-­reflective capacities noted
earlier set the stage for agency and self­regulation. People do not simply react to
the environment; they also act on the environment in an attempt to change it. People
choose goals and regulate their behavior in
the pursuit of these goals. At the heart of
self-­regulation is the ability to anticipate or
develop expectancies—to use past knowledge and experience to form beliefs about
and predictions of future events or states,
one’s abilities, and one’s behavior.
What Is Self‑Efficacy?
Self-­efficacy beliefs are beliefs about the
ability to “organize and execute the courses
of action required to produce given attainments” (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). Thus, self­efficacy theory and research are concerned
with people’s beliefs about personal control
and agency. Of course, notions about personal control and agency were not unknown
before 1977 and had been discussed by philosophers and psychologists for many years.
Spinoza, Hume, Locke, William James, and
(more recently) Gilbert Ryle all struggled to
understand the role of “volition” and “the
will” in human behavior (Russell, 1954;
Vessey, 1967). In psychology, effectance motivation (White, 1959), achievement motivation (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), locus of control (Rotter, 1966),
learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman,
& Teasdale, 1978), and other constructs
are concerned with perceptions of personal
199
competence and the relationship between
these perceptions and personal effectiveness,
achievement, and psychological well-being
(see also Skinner, 1995). However, most
of these models did not distinguish clearly
between the belief that specific behaviors
might produce specific outcomes and the
belief that one will be able to perform successfully the behaviors that might produce
the outcomes, although this distinction had
been alluded to before Bandura’s 1977 article (Kirsch, 1985). One of Bandura’s major
contributions was that he offered relatively
specific definitions of these familiar and
commonsense notions, and embedded them
in a comprehensive theory of behavior. The
essential idea of self-­efficacy was not new;
new were the concept’s theoretical grounding and the empirical rigor with which it
could now be examined.
Defining Self‑Efficacy
A good way to get a clearer sense of how self­efficacy is defined and measured is to understand how it differs from other concepts that
deal with the self, identity, and perceptions
of competence and control.
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not competencies.
Competencies are what people know about
the world and what they know how to do
in the world. They include “the quality and
range of the cognitive constructions and behavioral enactments of which the individual is capable” (Mischel, 1973, p. 266) and
the ability to “construct (generate) diverse
behaviors under appropriate conditions”
(p. 265). Self-­efficacy beliefs are beliefs regarding one’s ability to exercise one’s competencies in certain domains and situations.
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not concerned with
perceptions of skills and abilities divorced
from situations; they are concerned, instead,
with what people believe they can do with
their skills and abilities under certain conditions. In addition, they are concerned not
simply with beliefs about the ability to perform trivial motor acts but with the ability
to coordinate and orchestrate skills and abilities in changing and challenging situations.
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not simply predictions about behavior. They are concerned
not with what people believe they will do
but with what they believe they can do under
200
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
certain circumstances, especially challenging and changing circumstances.
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not intentions to
behave or intentions to attain particular
goals. Intentions are what people say they
are committed to doing or accomplishing—
what they say they will do, not what they say
they can do (Bandura, 2006a). Intentions are
influenced by a number of factors, including
self-­efficacy beliefs (Maddux, 1999b; Zhao,
Siebert, & Hills, 2005). In addition, self­efficacy beliefs can influence behavior directly and indirectly through their influence
on intentions (Bandura, 1999).
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not outcome expectancies (Bandura, 1997) or behavior­outcome expectancies (Maddux, 1999a).
Self-­efficacy beliefs are evaluations of how
well one can mobilize one’s resources to
perform behaviors to accomplish goals. An
outcome expectancy is a “judgment of the
likely consequence such performances will
produce” (Bandura, 1997, p. 21). Thus, as
people contemplate a goal and approach a
task, they consider what behaviors and strategies are necessary to produce the outcome
they want, and they evaluate the extent to
which they are able to perform those behaviors and implement those strategies (e.g.,
Ianotti et al., 2006).
Self-­efficacy is not perceived control.
The perception of control over something
depends on both self-­efficacy beliefs (that
one can produce certain behaviors or performances under certain conditions) and
behavior-­outcome expectancies (the belief
that certain behaviors or performances will
control what one wants to control) (Kirsch,
1999; Maddux, 1999a; see also in this volume Baumeister & Vohs, Chapter 9, on self­control and self-­regulation; Ryan & Deci,
Chapter 11, on self-­determination).
Self-­efficacy beliefs are not casual attributions. Casual attributions are explanations
for events, including one’s own behavior and
its consequences. Self-­efficacy beliefs can influence causal attributions, and vice versa,
because beliefs about competencies can influence explanations of success and failure,
and because explanations for success and
failure will, in turn, influence perceptions
of competence (e.g., Stajkovic & Sommer,
2000; Tolli & Schmidt, 2008). For example,
people with low self-­efficacy for an activity
are more likely than people with high self-
e­ fficacy to attribute success in that activity
to external factors rather than to personal
capabilities (Bandura, 1992; Schunk, 1995).
Individuals with lower self-­efficacy are also
more likely to attribute failure to lack of
ability than to lack of effort, while individuals with higher self-­efficacy are more likely
to attribute failure to lack of effort (e.g.,
Sherman, 2002). Research also suggests that
self-­efficacy beliefs mediate the relationship
between attributions and behavioral intentions, and between attributions and behavior (Nickel & Spink, 2010: Shields, Brawley,
& Lindover, 2006; Spink & Nickel, 2009).
Self-­efficacy is not self-­concept or self­esteem. Self-­concept is what people believe
about themselves, and self-­esteem is how
people feel about what they believe about
themselves. Self-­efficacy beliefs are an important aspect of self-­concept (e.g., Bong &
Skaalvik, 2004), but self-­concept includes
many other beliefs about the self that are
unrelated to self-­efficacy, such as beliefs
about physical attributes and personality
traits. Self-­esteem also appears to be more
affectively loaded than is self-­efficacy (Chen,
Gully, & Eden, 2004).
Self-­efficacy is not a trait. As Bandura
(2006b) states, “The efficacy belief system is
not a global trait but a differentiated set of
self-­beliefs linked to distinct realms of functioning” (p. 307). Self-­efficacy beliefs are beliefs about the ability to coordinate skills and
abilities to attain desired goals in particular
domains and circumstances. Self-­efficacy
beliefs can generalize from one situation
or task to another, depending on the similarities between the task demands, and the
skills and resources required to meet those
demands (e.g., Samuels & Gibbs, 2002), but
self-­efficacy beliefs in a specific domain do
not emanate from a trait-like general sense
of efficacy.
Although measures of trait-like general
efficacy beliefs have been developed (e.g.,
Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001; Judge, Locke,
Durham, & Kluger, 1998; Schwarzer,
Baessler, Kwiatek, Schroeder, & Zhang,
1997; Sherer at al., 1982; Tipton & Worthington, 1984) and have been used extensively in research, they generally have not
demonstrated predictive value above that
of domain-­specific self-­efficacy measures
(Bandura, 2001; ­Pajares, 1996). In addition, a meta-­analysis involving several thou-
10. Self-­Efficacy
sand studies found that general self-­efficacy,
locus of control, self-­esteem, and neuroticism are strongly related; that a single factor can explain the relationship among the
four traits; and that each adds very little to
the predictive value of the overall construct
(Windle, Markland, & Woods, 2008). Finally, the idea of construing and measuring
self-­efficacy as a trait divorced from situations is inconsistent with the social cognitive theory in which self-­efficacy theory is
embedded. As Stajkovic and Luthans (1998)
stated, “Decontextualizing specific efficacy
expectations replaces them with abstract beliefs (general self-­efficacy) that then become
incongruent with the defined premises of
social cognitive theory” (p. 244). The most
important question is not “Is there a personality trait called ‘general self-­efficacy’?
but “How useful is it to view self-­efficacy
as a trait?” If our goal is to understand the
role of self-­efficacy beliefs in the process of
self-­regulation, then viewing self-­efficacy as
a belief or expectancy as a self-­regulation
component that interacts with other components of self-­regulation will be more useful
than viewing it as a trait (an issue that we
return to later).
Self‑Efficacy and Personality
Although self-­efficacy is not a personality
trait, the capacity for developing strong self­efficacy beliefs may be related to personality.
As noted previously, children who are higher
in effortful control (which, as an aspect of
temperament, can be viewed as a personality
trait) may develop strong self-­efficacy beliefs
more easily than children who are lower in
this capacity.
Research on the five-­factor model of personality also suggests that certain people
may be more predisposed than others to
develop strong self-­efficacy beliefs. McCrae
and Lökenhoff (2010) suggested, for example, that people high in Conscientiousness
(which includes the components of deliberation, organization, and achievement orientation) are likely to set more explicit and more
challenging goals. Because setting explicit
and challenging goals is associated with goal
attainment, and because goal attainment enhances self-­efficacy beliefs, people who are
higher in Conscientiousness seem predis-
201
posed to develop strong self-­efficacy beliefs
more easily than people who are lower in
this trait. McCrae and Lökenhoff also suggested that people higher in achievement
orientation, an aspect of Conscientiousness,
also may respond more vigorously when
they detect discrepancies between a desired
state (goal) and a present state. Responding
vigorously to detected discrepancies is likely
to increase the probability of success, which
is conducive to the development of strong
self-­efficacy beliefs.
McCrae and Lökenhoff (2010) also suggested that people higher in Neuroticism—­
because they are motivated largely to avoid
failure and dejection—may set goals that are
poorly defined and less challenging than do
people lower in Neuroticism. Poorly defined
and less challenging goals are less likely to
be attained and are therefore less likely to
result in strong self-­efficacy beliefs. They
noted that a meta-­analysis (Judge & Ilies,
2002) did indeed find that higher Conscientiousness, higher Extraversion, and lower
Neuroticism is associated with setting more
challenging goals in task and job performance.
Little, Lecci, and Watkinson (1992; cited
in McCrae & Lökenhoff, 2010) found that
people who were lower in Neuroticism
viewed their personal goals as less stressful
and more meaningful, and felt more efficacious about goal attainment. People higher
in Extraversion and Conscientiousness also
reported stronger efficacy beliefs regarding
their goals.
Because Neuroticism is associated with
rumination, including a focus on threats to
the self (McCrae & Lökenhoff, 2010), people higher in Neuroticism are probably more
likely to become critically self-­diagnostic
(“What’s wrong with me?!”) than task­diagnostic (“What do I need to do now?”)
when encountering self-­regulatory challenges and setbacks. Task-­diagnostic behavior is
more likely to lead to success and therefore
to strengthen self-­efficacy beliefs (Bandura
& Wood, 1989; Wood & Bandura, 1989).
People higher in Conscientiousness are
less likely to procrastinate, more likely to
persist in the face of challenges, and better
able to delay or suppress gratification than
are people lower in conscientiousness (McCrae & Lökenhoff, 2010). Individuals who
are both high in Conscientiousness and low
202
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
in Neuroticism tend to have clear goals and
tend to persist under unfavorable conditions
(McCrae & Lökenhoff, 2010). Setting clear
goals, persisting under challenging conditions, delaying gratification, and not procrastinating increase the probably of success and
therefore the probability that self-­efficacy
beliefs will be enhanced.
Much research remains to be done before
firm conclusions can be drawn about the
relationship between personality and self­efficacy. Research suggests, however, that
people who are higher in Conscientiousness,
higher in Extraversion, and lower in Neuroticism more easily develop strong self-­efficacy
beliefs.
Measuring Self‑Efficacy Beliefs
To be useful in research and practice, concepts need to be translated into operational
definitions that lead to precise methods of
measurement that are consistent across studies. Unfortunately, self-­efficacy has been
measured in such a wide variety of ways that
comparing findings from one study to another often is difficult, as Forsyth and Carey
(1998) have pointed out regarding research
on self-­efficacy and safe-sex behavior. For
this reason, a few guidelines for measuring
self-­efficacy beliefs might be useful.
First, researchers should make sure that
they are not inadvertently measuring one
of the constructs previously described (e.g.,
self-­concept, self-­esteem, outcome expectancies, intentions) and calling it a measure
of self-­efficacy. Also, as noted previously,
self-­efficacy is not a trait and should not
be measured as such. Instead, measures of
self-­efficacy beliefs “must be tailored to
the particular domain of functioning that
is the object of interest” (Bandura, 2006a,
pp. 307–308; e.g., social skills, exercise, dieting, safe sex, math skills). Within a given
domain, self-­efficacy beliefs can be measured at varying degrees of behavioral and
situational specificity, depending on what
behavior or attainment one is trying to predict. Thus, the measurement of self-­efficacy
should be designed to capture the important
characteristics of the behavior and the context in which it occurs.
Specifying behaviors and contexts improves the predictive power of self-­efficacy
measures, but specificity can reach a point of
diminishing returns if carried too far. Therefore, the researcher must “know the territory” and have a thorough understanding of
the behavioral domain in question, including the types of abilities called upon and the
range of situations in which they might be
used (Bandura, 1997, 2006a). The information about behaviors and siatuations that is
essential for constructing self-­efficacy measures can be acquired by interviewing and
surveying people who are trying to change
the behavior of interest, such as people who
are trying to lose weight or engage in regular exercise (Bandura, 1997, 2006a; for
additional guidelines, see Bandura, 1997,
pp. 42–50; 2006a).
Measures of self-­efficacy also must be
concerned with gradations of challenge
(Bandura, 2006a). Tasks and situations differ in the degree of challenge that they present, and self-­efficacy measures should reflect
these differences. For example, a measure
of smoker abstinence self-­efficacy should
include a range of situations that differ in
the challenge they present to the struggling
nonsmoker (e.g., after a meal, while having
a drink or cup of coffee, when offered a cigarette). Self-­efficacy measures can err in the
direction of being not specific enough. For
example, a poor measure of self-­efficacy for
dieting would be “How confident are you
that you will be able to stick to your diet
when tempted to break it?” (Typically a
scale of 1–7, 1–10, or 1–100 is used.) A good
measure would include items that assess
self-­efficacy in a variety of situations, such
as “How confident are you that you will be
able to stick to your diet when watching television/when depressed/when someone offers
you high fat food/when eating breakfast at
a restaurant?” These items should include a
range of situations that offer a range of challenges from relatively easy to very difficult.
Self-­efficacy measures also can err in the direction of excessive specificity. For example,
an assessment of self-­efficacy for engaging in
safe sex might include the item “How confident are you that you could resist your partner’s insistence that using a condom isn’t
necessary?” But an item that asks “How
confident are you that you could open the
condom wrapper?” probably is neither necessary nor useful. Likewise, a good measure
of self-­efficacy for exercise might include an
10. Self-­Efficacy
item concerning confidence in “your ability
to fit a short walk or run into a busy day,”
but asking about confidence in “your ability
to tie your running shoes” is probably going
a little too far.
The variety of ways in which self-­efficacy
beliefs have been measured and particularly
the various domains and levels of specificity
with which they have been assessed, might
lead one to conclude that there are different
“types” of self-­efficacy (e.g., Cervone, 2000;
Ryan & Dzewaltowski, 2002; Schwarzer &
Renner, 2000). Self-­efficacy should not be
viewed as a construct that can be classified
into different “types”; instead, measures of
self-­efficacy beliefs are tailored for different types of behaviors and performances in
different domains and situations, ranging
from relatively simple motor acts to complex
and challenging behavioral sequences and
orchestrations. For example, “hammering
nails” and “sawing wood” may be simple
(but not always easy) motor acts, but “building a house” is a complex undertaking that
requires abilities beyond the effective manipulation of tools. One can have a strong self­efficacy belief for each of these motor acts
yet weak self-­efficacy beliefs for building a
house (both of which are true of the authors
of this chapter). Each “task” or “attainment” requires some generative capability,
although the generative capability required
for hammering a nail is relatively small,
whereas that required for building a house
is relatively large. Self-­efficacy beliefs about
sawing wood and building a house are not
different types of self-­efficacy; rather, they
are self-­efficacy beliefs for different types of
performances.
How Self‑Efficacy Beliefs Develop
Major Sources of Self-­Efficacy Beliefs
Self-­efficacy beliefs are the result of information integrated from five sources: performance experience, vicarious experience,
imaginal experience, verbal persuasion, and
affective and physiological states.
One’s own performance experiences are
the most powerful source of self-­efficacy information (Bandura, 1977, 1997). In other
words, beliefs about being able to do a task
are tied to past attempts at performing the
task. Successful attempts at control that are
203
attributed to one’s own efforts will strengthen self-­efficacy for that behavior or domain.
Perceptions of failure at control attempts
usually diminish self-­efficacy.
Self-­efficacy beliefs also are influenced by
vicarious experiences—observations of the
behavior of others and the consequences of
that behavior (Bandura, 1997). Individuals
use these observations to form expectancies about their own behavior and its consequences, depending on the extent to which
observers believe that they are similar to the
person being observed (the “model”). Learning by observing others is also termed observational learning, or learning that occurs
via modeling. In addition to the characteristics of the model, other factors that affect
the impact of observational learning include
the extent to which the observer attends to
the model, remembers or cognitively retains
the observed behavior, translates the mental representation of the behavior into self­perpetuated behavior, and is motivated to
perform the behavior. Vicarious experiences
generally have weaker effects on self-­efficacy
expectancy than do performance experiences; however, doing a task oneself is more
informative than watching someone else do
it (Ferrari, 1996).
Individuals also influence their self­efficacy beliefs by imagining themselves
behaving effectively or ineffectively in hypothetical situations. Such images can be inadvertent thoughts, or they can be used as
an intentional self-­efficacy and performance
improvement strategy. These images may be
derived from actual or vicarious experiences
with situations similar to the one anticipated, or they may be induced by verbal persuasion, as when a psychotherapist guides a client through imagination-based interventions
such as systematic desensitization and covert
modeling (Williams, 1995). Imagery has also
been used to improve self-­efficacy for a variety of tasks, athletic behaviors, and social
behaviors, from job interview performance
(Knudstrup, Segrest, and Hurley, 2003) to
golf-­putting (Short et al., 2002) to climbing (Jones, Bray, Mace, MacRae, & Stockbridge, 2002). Simply imagining oneself
doing something well, however, is unlikely
to influence self-­efficacy as much as actual
success experiences (Williams, 1995).
Self-­efficacy beliefs are also influenced by
verbal persuasion—others’ statements about
204
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
one’s abilities and probability of success. The
potency of verbal persuasion as a source of
self-­efficacy beliefs is influenced by factors
such as the expertness, trustworthiness, and
attractiveness of the source, as suggested by
decades of research on verbal persuasion
and attitude change (Petty & Briñol, 2010).
Verbal persuasion is a less potent source of
enduring change in self-­efficacy than are
performance experiences and vicarious experiences.
Physiological and emotional states influence self-­efficacy when people learn to
associate poor performance or perceived
failure with aversive physiological arousal
and perceived success with positive emotions. Thus, when people become aware of
unpleasant physiological arousal, they are
more likely to doubt their competence than
if their physiological states are pleasant or
neutral. When physiological sensations are
not distracting or overwhelming, individuals
can attend to the task at hand. Physiological
indicants of self-­efficacy expectancy, however, extend beyond autonomic arousal. For
example, in activities involving strength and
stamina, such as exercise and athletic performance, perceived efficacy is influenced by
experiences of fatigue and pain (Bandura,
1997). Most importantly, the interpretation
of physiological arousal during a task is a
key contributor to self-­efficacy and performance (Ciani, Easter, Summers, & Posada,
2009). For example, when giving a presentation, attributing an increase in heart rate to
the simple act of pacing across the floor is
not cause for concern, whereas attributing it
to anxiety is likely to be distracting and may
cause an increase in anxiety and a decrease
in confidence in one’s ability to give the presentation.
Proximal and Distal Sources
Self-­efficacy beliefs for a given performance
in a given situation are the result of the
confluence of proximal (current/immediate) and distal (past/remote) information
from the five sources just described. For example, social self-­efficacy during an ongoing interaction, such as a job interview or
conversation with a love interest, will be
determined by a variety of proximal and
distal sources of information about one’s social self-­efficacy. Distal sources include past
perceived successes and failure in similar
interactions, evaluations about one’s social
skills previously conveyed by important others, and recollection of one’s physiological
and emotional states during these similar
interactions. The person therefore enters
the new situation with established beliefs
about his or her ability to negotiate the situation successfully—­beliefs that can lead to
emotional comfort or to distress. Proximal
sources of social self-­efficacy might include
current physiological and emotional states
(e.g., relaxed vs. anxious), self-­evaluation of
ongoing performance; comments from others in the interaction; and interpretations
of the reactions of others, which together
suggest, on a moment-to-­moment basis,
whether one is moving toward achieving
one’s goals in the situation, including self­presentational goals (Leary & Kowalski,
1995; Maddux, Norton, & Leary, 1988).
Just as proximal (short-term) consequences
usually exert greater control over behavior
than distal (long-term) consequences, proximal information about self-­efficacy is likely
to have a more powerful immediate effect
on current self-­efficacy and performance
than distal past sources.
Developmental Aspects
of Self‑Efficacy Beliefs
Moment-to-­moment learning experiences
culminate over time to become well-­informed
self-­efficacy beliefs. With each subsequent
developmental period, the individual faces
new demands and challenges that can build
or diminish self-­efficacy in various domains
of life. This process begins in infancy and
continues throughout the lifespan. The early
development of self-­efficacy beliefs is influenced by (1) the development of the capacity
for symbolic thought, (2) the development of
a sense of a “self” that is separate from others, and (3) the observation of the reciprocal
cause–­effect relationship between behavior
and outcomes (Bandura, 1997).
As infants’ capacity for symbolic thought
and memory increases, they can begin to
imagine and even anticipate or predict events
in their environment (Leslie, 1982; Mandler,
1992; Stack & Poulin-­Dubois, 2002). They
also realize that they are distinct from others and from objects. They learn that biting their teddy bear’s hand does not hurt,
10. Self-­Efficacy
but that biting their own hand does. They
develop a sense of personal agency by performing the few actions of which they are
capable, such as flailing their arms and legs,
cooing, and grabbing and shaking objects.
With repeated observations of actions and
their consequences, they learn cause–­effect
relationships and begin to understand that
they can affect their environment. As it becomes increasingly clear that outcomes are
contingent upon their behavior, infants attempt novel actions and examine their outcomes. These observations provide an understanding of the control they have over
their surroundings (Bandura, 1997; Berry
& West, 1993; see also Harter, Chapter 31,
this volume).
Learning is not just about the learner and
the object, however. Learning often occurs
in the presence of others, either through observational learning or through an interaction between the child and a parent, caregiver, teacher, or peer. Observational studies
of parent–child interactions in infancy show
that rather than being passive recipients of
their social environment, infants anticipate,
instigate, mirror, and respond to their parents’ emotional expression and behaviors, as
well as seek comfort and social connection
to others (Stack & Poulin-­Dubois, 2002).
Parenting self-­efficacy and caregivers’ responses to their children’s attempts at exercising agency can play an important role
in the development of children’s efficacy
beliefs and corresponding outcomes (Maxwell, 1998). Caregivers can model effective
self-­regulation and perseverance, or they can
model ineffective strategies and hasty goal
abandonment. Furthermore, by choosing
tasks that are developmentally appropriate
but challenging, parents can provide positive learning experiences through verbal encouragement and scaffolding, which means
providing assistance and gradually removing it as the child learns (Mattanah, Pratt,
Cowan, & Cowan, 2005).
Attending school for the first time provides new opportunities for feedback, social
comparison, interpersonal interactions, and
resulting self-­efficacy development in academic and social domains (Urdan & Schoenfelder, 2006). Children’s self-­regulatory
skills are tested, as they must learn to wait
their turn, vie for attention from the teacher
and peers, sustain attention during class,
205
complete tasks, and sit quietly. Interpersonal
skills are developed through social interactions, as well as imaginative or pretend play
with dolls or toys and role playing with
others (Singer, 1998). Interpersonal feedback that is supportive and informative allows children to practice and improve these
skills. Academic skills are similarly developed through specific feedback, modeling,
encouragement, and self-­observation. These
early evaluative experiences contribute to
academic self-­efficacy, potentially impacting motivation and goal setting, expectations of success or failure, academic anxiety,
academic performance, and future interpretations of feedback (Berry & West, 1993;
Usher & Pajares, 2008).
With adolescence comes the need to
manage and adapt to changes across multiple domains of life, including peer relationships, educational demands, biological
changes and sexual development, romantic
relationships, and demands for increasing
autonomy and responsibility—such as making decisions about sex, substance use, and
college or career goals. Making responsible
decisions requires self-­regulation, whereby
individuals guide their own actions by comparing what they are about to do with self­standards, goals, and previous outcomes
(Bandura, 1997). Although self-­regulatory
self-­efficacy beliefs tend to decline during
adolescence (Vecchio, Gerbino, Pastorelli,
Del Bove, & Caprara, 2007), these beliefs
remain important predictors of outcomes in
many areas (Zimmerman & Cleary, 2006).
For example, general life satisfaction in late
adolescence is better predicted by academic
and social self-­efficacy beliefs in early adolescence than by popularity among peers
or academic achievement (Vecchio et al.,
2007). Adolescents with a stronger sense of
self-­efficacy to overcome peer pressure are
less likely to abuse substances, and engage
in unsafe sexual behavior and delinquent
behavior (Caprara et al., 1998; Ludwig &
Pittman, 1999). Additionally, self-­efficacy
for regulation of positive and negative emotions predicts self-­efficacy in the domains of
academics, empathy for others, and resistance to peer pressure, ultimately leading to
greater prosocial behavior, less delinquent
behavior, and less depression (Bandura,
Caprara, Barbaranelli, Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2003).
206
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
In addition to emotional regulation, a
major task of adolescence is managing the
changing interactions with family members
as roles shift to allow for increasing adolescent autonomy and responsibility. Adolescents who are more confident that they
can effectively regulate their own emotions
when communicating with their parents,
manage stressful or sensitive conversations,
and evoke parental perspective taking (collectively termed filial self-­efficacy) report
greater satisfaction with family life, more
open communication with their parents, and
less distrust and conflict over parental monitoring of their activities (Caprara, Pastorelli,
Regalia, Scabini, & Bandura, 2005). Parental involvement and open communication,
in turn, contribute positively to adolescents’
self-­efficacy (Fan & Williams, 2010).
Peer relationships become increasingly
important from childhood to adolescence
and can influence self-­efficacy in positive or
negative ways. For example, affiliation with
academically motivated peer groups seems
to influence academic self-­efficacy and performance positively, while nonacademically
oriented peer groups may have a negative
influence on academic self-­efficacy and performance (Chen, Dornbusch, & Liu, 2007;
Schunk & Meece, 2006). Peer groups are
not randomly formed, however, as individuals often choose groups that are similar to
themselves, and parents may play a direct
and indirect role in their child’s friend selection and peer affiliation (Chen et al., 2007).
The perceived ability to regulate affect and
manage relationships, including peer and
family relationships, are crucial components
of healthy adolescent development, with potential consequences for many domains of
functioning.
Adulthood brings additional concerns
and demands, primarily in the domains of
work and interpersonal roles. Beliefs about
job-­related abilities influence occupational
choices, career paths, job-­seeking behavior,
job performance, salary and promotion,
and job satisfaction (Abele & Spunk, 2009;
see Betz, 2007, for a review). These beliefs
therefore have the potential to impact one’s
life trajectory and family in a pervasive and
long-term manner. Furthermore, job satisfaction and a sense of personal accomplishment in the realm of work predict a sense of
self-worth and general well-being (Russell,
2008).
Emerging adults also develop beliefs
about their ability to fulfill certain roles,
such as the role of a spouse or parent, and
these beliefs influence how these roles are
carried out (Bandura, 1997). Greater parenting self-­efficacy is related to greater parenting competence and use of effective parenting strategies (Jones & Prinz, 2005), as
well as less parenting stress and depression
for both mothers and fathers (Sevigny &
Loutzenhiser, 2010). Additionally, parents
who have higher goals for their children and
feel highly efficacious about their ability to
advance their children’s intellectual growth
tend to have children with higher academic
self-­efficacy, which fosters greater academic
achievement (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) and higher career
goal setting among children (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001). Parenting self-­efficacy does not occur in isolation, however. The child’s behavior and the
reciprocal interaction between parent and
child influence parenting efficacy beliefs,
which in turn influence the child, and so on
(Bandura, 1997).
In later life, self-­efficacy often diminishes
for a wide array of major life domains, including health, relationships, and cognitive
tasks such as memory (McAvay, Seeman,
& Rodin, 1996). Nevertheless, self-­efficacy
can still be improved in older age. For example, memory self-­efficacy and performance on memory tasks among older adults
can be improved through memory training
techniques that target the factors that affect
self-­efficacy, including incremental personal
mastery experiences, vicarious learning experiences, verbal encouragement, and mitigation of anxiety (West, Bagwell, & Dark­Freudeman, 2008). Although age-­related
declines in efficacy beliefs may reflect actual
declines in ability, providing incentives to exercise one’s memory can enhance subsequent
memory performance. Similarly, in order for
older adults to reap the benefits of physical
exercise, self-­efficacy for exercise behavior
should also be bolstered (McAuley et al.,
2008). Among the infirm aged, the structure and organization of institutions (e.g.,
assisted living facilities and hospitals) may
actually diminish self-­efficacy in important
10. Self-­Efficacy
domains by limiting mastery experiences
(Welch & West, 1995). Older adults’ sons
and daughters and the institutions that serve
older adults should be mindful of the extent
to which the environments they provide engender a sense of agency and self-­efficacy for
the many tasks and behaviors that older individuals can perform.
Why Self‑Efficacy Beliefs
Are Important
Self-­efficacy plays a crucial role in our everyday lives in countless ways. Seven important
areas that have received considerable attention from researchers are self-­regulation,
psychological well-being and adjustment,
physical health, psychotherapy, education,
occupational choice and performance, and
collective efficacy among groups and organizations.
Because the importance of self-­efficacy
beliefs depends on the assumption that they
have some causal impact, we address that
issue first. Bandura and Locke (2003) summarized the findings of nine large meta­analyses on work-­related performances in
both laboratory and field studies, psychosocial functioning in children and adolescents,
academic achievement and persistence,
health functioning, athletic performance,
laboratory studies in which self-­efficacy
beliefs were altered experimentally, and
collective efficacy in groups. According to
Bandura and Locke (2003), “evidence from
these meta-­analyses is consistent in showing
that efficacy beliefs contribute significantly
to the level of motivation and performance”
(p. 87). (See Bandura & Locke, 2003, for a
more in-depth discussion of this research.)
Self‑Efficacy and Self‑Regulation
We begin by describing the role of self­efficacy beliefs in self-­regulation because all
of self-­efficacy’s effects flow from its role in
self-­regulation. Research on self-­efficacy has
added greatly to our understanding of how
people guide their own behavior in the pursuit of their goals, and how they sometimes
fail to do so effectively. Like self-­efficacy, the
capacity for self-­regulation is not a fixed and
generalized personality trait; instead, it is a
207
set of skills that, like self-­efficacy beliefs, develops in particular domains but can generalize across other domains.
Because self-­regulation refers to a set
of “processes by which people control
their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors”
(Hoyle, 2006, p. 1507), understanding self­regulation consists of understanding not
only who self-­regulates well and who does
not—“stable tendencies to self-­regulate in
particular ways or with characteristic levels
of success or failure” (p. 1508)—but also
the process of self-­regulation or how people
self-­regulate. A social cognitive approach to
self-­regulation is concerned specifically with
understanding this process, not simply measuring individual differences in general self­regulatory ability (Cervone, Shadel, Smith,
& Fioir, 2006; Doerr & Baumeister, 2010).
In fact, a social cognitive approach to self­regulation assumes that self-­regulation consists of a set of skills that can be learned and
improved with practice, while recognizing
that people differ in the capacity for mastering these skills because of differences in
personality (McCrae & Lökenhoff, 2010).
Social cognitive theory views self­regulation as consisting largely of “proactive
discrepancy production by adoption of goal
challenges working in concert with reactive
discrepancy reduction in realizing them”
(Bandura & Locke, 2003, p. 87). By setting
goals, people produce discrepancies between
where they are and where they would like to
be, then work to reduce these discrepancies
by striving to attain their goals. They then
mobilize their resources and efforts based
on what they believe is needed to accomplish
those goals (Bandura & Locke, 2003).
Self-­regulation (greatly simplified) depends on four interacting components (Bandura, 1997; Barone et al., 1997): goals or
standards of performance; planned goal­directed behavior; self-­evaluative reactions
to performance; and self-­efficacy beliefs (see
also Baumeister & Vohs, Chapter 9, this volume).
Goals are essential to self-­regulation because it is in the pursuit of desired outcomes
that people attempt to control their actions,
thoughts, and emotions. The ability to envision desired future events and states allows
people to create incentives that motivate and
guide their actions. Goals also provide peo-
208
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
ple with personal standards against which to
monitor their progress along the way, and to
evaluate both their progress and their abilities.
Once they have set goals, people develop
plans for attaining them. These planned actions typically consist of short-term goals,
or subgoals, that people view as pathways
to the more distant goal. They act in a way
intended to move them toward the goal, then
observe what happens.
Feedback is information about progress
toward or away from a goal. This information can be provided by the physical environment, other people, or oneself. Feedback
can take the form of current running speed
during a marathon, polling data during an
election campaign, a friend’s comment about
a sweater one is knitting, or self-­reflection
about the high and low points of a first date.
Feedback is essential to the effectiveness of
goal-­directed behavior, as it highlights the
discrepancies between the individual’s current state or behavior and the end state or
goal. This information can be used to make
modifications to the strategy for reaching
the goal (Locke & Latham, 1990).
People do not simply perceive information;
they interpret it. Likewise, feedback about
progress toward or away from a goal is interpreted, and different people interpret the
same feedback in different ways and react to
it differently. Thus, self-­e valuative reactions
are important in self-­regulation because people’s beliefs about the progress they are making (or not making) toward their goals are
major determinants of their emotional reactions during goal-­directed activity. These
emotional reactions, in turn, can enhance or
disrupt self-­regulation. The belief that one
is inefficacious and making poor progress
toward a valued goal produces distressing
emotional states (e.g., anxiety, depression)
that can lead to cognitive and behavioral
ineffectiveness and self-­regulatory failure.
The belief that one is making good progress
can be psychologically energizing and lead
to persistence.
Self-­efficacy beliefs influence self­regulation in several ways (Bandura, 1997;
Bandura & Locke, 2003; Locke & Latham,
1990). First, they influence the goals people
choose and the tasks they decide to tackle.
The higher one’s self-­efficacy in a specific
domain, the loftier the goals that one sets
in that domain (e.g., Tabernero & Wood,
1999).
Second, self-­efficacy beliefs influence
people’s choices of goal-­directed activities;
allocation of resources, effort, persistence
in the face of challenge and obstacles; and
reactions to perceived discrepancies between
goals and current performance (Bandura,
1997; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Vancouver,
More, & Yoder, 2008). In the face of difficulties, people with weak self-­efficacy beliefs
easily develop doubts about their ability to
accomplish the task at hand, whereas those
with strong efficacy beliefs are more likely to
continue their efforts to master a task when
difficulties arise. Perseverance usually produces desired results, and this success then
strengthens the individual’s self-­efficacy beliefs. Motivation to accomplish difficult tasks
and accomplish lofty goals is enhanced by
overestimates of personal capabilities (i.e.,
positive illusions; Taylor & Brown, 1988),
which then become self-­fulfilling prophecies when people set their sights high, persevere, then surpass their previous levels of
accomplishments (although it is not always
the case that “more is better,” which we address below).
Third, self-­efficacy for solving problems
and making decisions influences the efficiency and effectiveness of problem solving and decision making. When faced with
complex decisions, people who have confidence in their ability to solve problems are
able to think more clearly and make better
decisions than do people who doubt their
cognitive skills (e.g., Bandura, 1997). Such
efficacy usually leads to better solutions and
greater achievement. In the face of difficulty,
people with high self-­efficacy are more likely
to remain task-­diagnostic and to search for
solutions to problems. Those with low self­efficacy, however, are more likely to become
self-­diagnostic and reflect on their inadequacies, which distract them from their efforts
to assess and solve the problem (Bandura,
1997).
Recent research indicates that self­regulation is a limited resource that is temporarily depleted when people exercise it,
including when they make choices and decisions (Doerr & Baumeister, 2010). Making decisions and choices with high confidence (decisiveness) may be less effortful
than making choices and decisions with
10. Self-­Efficacy
low confidence (indecisiveness). Therefore,
people with higher self-­efficacy (and greater
decisiveness) for decision-­making abilities
may be less vulnerable to postdecision self­regulatory depletion than people with lower
self-­efficacy for decision making (and lower
decisiveness).
Most of the research on the effect of self­efficacy on self-­regulation suggests that
“more is better”—that is, the higher one’s
self-­efficacy, the more effective one’s self­regulation in pursuit of a goal. But can self­efficacy be “too high”? Perhaps so, in at least
three ways. First, as Bandura (1986, p. 393)
suggested, “a reasonable accurate appraisal
of one’s capabilities is . . . of considerable
value in effective functioning” and people
who overestimate their abilities may “undertake activities that are clearly beyond their
reach.” Certainly an important feature of
effective self-­regulation is to know when to
disengage from a goal because one’s efforts
are not paying off. Although strong self­efficacy beliefs usually contribute to adaptive tenacity, if these beliefs are unrealistically high, they may result in the relentless
pursuit of an unattainable goal. Thus, high
self-­efficacy beliefs that are not supported by
past experience or rewarded by positive goal­related feedback can result in wasted effort
and resources that might be better directed
elsewhere. As of yet, however, we have no
way of determining when self-­efficacy is
“too high” and at what point people should
give up trying to achieve their goals. Many
successful individuals throughout history
have a long record of failure and/or rejection
before reaching success.
Second, the way in which strong self­efficacy beliefs develop can affect their impact on behavior. Inflated self-­efficacy beliefs
(positive illusions) can lead to complacency
and diminished effort and performance over
time (Yang, Chuang, & Chiou, 2009), as
well as an increased willingness to engage
in potentially dangerous behaviors, such as
using a cell phone while driving (Schlehofer
et al., 2010). Furthermore, people who develop high levels of self-­efficacy without effort and struggle may set lower goals and be
satisfied with lower performance, compared
to those who attain strong efficacy beliefs
through hard work (Bandura & Jourdan,
1991). As a result, progress toward a goal
may be hindered.
209
Third, help-­seeking behaviors may be
lower when self-­efficacy beliefs are greater
than actual abilities. For example, smokers
with an inflated sense of self-­efficacy to quit
smoking are less inclined to enroll in programs to quit smoking and may have lower
success in quitting (Duffy, Scheumann,
Fowler, Darling-­Fisher, & Terrell, 2010).
This potential disadvantage of unrealistically high self-­efficacy and decreased help seeking may apply to other domains, including
one’s ability to regulate alcohol and other
substance use, diet, exercise, and many other
behaviors that involve self-­regulation.
Psychological Health and Well‑Being
The belief that one has good self-­regulatory
skills contributes to psychological health,
adjustment, and subjective well-being (e.g.,
Karademus, 2005). Most philosophers and
psychological theorists agree that a sense of
control over one’s behavior, one’s environment, and one’s own thoughts and feelings
is essential for happiness and a sense of wellbeing. Research on self-­efficacy has provided
strong support for this notion (e.g., Caprara,
Pastorelli, Regalia, Scabini, & Bandura,
2005; Caprara & Steca, 2005; Vecchio et
al., 2007). When the world seems predictable and controllable, and when behaviors,
thoughts, and emotions seem within their
control, people are better able to meet life’s
challenges, build healthy relationships, and
achieve personal satisfaction and peace of
mind. Feelings of low control are common
among people who seek the help of psychotherapists and counselors.
Self-­efficacy beliefs play a major role in
a number of common psychological problems and successful psychological interventions. Low self-­efficacy expectancies are an
important feature of depression (Bandura,
Pastorelli, Barbaranelli, & Caprara, 1999;
Blazer, 2002; Karademus, 2005; Maddux &
Meier, 1995; Riskind, Alloy, & Iacoviello,
2010). Depressed people usually believe they
are less capable than other people of behaving effectively in many important areas of
life. They usually doubt their ability to form
and maintain supportive relationships and
may therefore avoid potentially supportive
people during periods of depression.
Dysfunctional anxiety and avoidant behaviors are often the direct result of low
210
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
self-­efficacy expectancies for managing
threatening situations (Ahmad & Westra,
2008; Bandura, 1997; Williams, 1995).
People who have strong confidence in their
abilities to perform and manage potentially
difficult situations approach those situations calmly and are not unduly disrupted
by difficulties. On the other hand, people
who lack confidence in their abilities either
avoid potentially difficult situations or approach them with apprehension, thereby
reducing the probability that they will perform effectively. Thus, they have fewer success experiences and fewer opportunities to
increase their self-­efficacy. People with low
self-­efficacy also respond to difficulties with
increased anxiety, which usually disrupts
performance, thereby further lowering self­efficacy, and so on. Stressful events often
result in physical symptoms (e.g., headache)
as well as psychological symptoms, and self­efficacy beliefs influence the relationship
between stressful events and physical symptoms (Arnstein, Caudill, Mandle, Norris, &
Beasley, 1999; Marlowe, 1998). Self-­efficacy
beliefs also predict effective coping with
traumatic life events, such as homelessness
(Epel, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 1999), natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and criminal
assaults (Benight & Bandura, 2003).
For people with substance abuse problems, self-­efficacy for avoiding relapse in
high-risk situations and for recovery from
relapse predicts successful treatment and abstinence (Baldwin et al., 2006; Forcehimes
& Tonigan, 2008; Jafari & Shahidi, 2007;
Kelly, Magill, & Stout, 2009; McKellar,
Ilgin, Moos, & Moos, 2007). The same is
true in the successful treatment of people
with eating disorders (Cain, Bardone-Cone,
Abramson, Vohs, & Joiner, 2010; Goodrick
et al., 1999; Pinto, Guarda, Heinberg, DiClemente, 2006) and of male sex offenders
(Pollock, 1996; Wheeler, George, & Marlatt, 2006).
Physical Health and Well‑Being
Health and medical care in our society have
been shifting from an exclusive emphasis
on the treatment of disease to the prevention of disease and the promotion of good
health. Most strategies for preventing health
problems, enhancing health, and hastening recovery from illness and injury involve
changing behavior. In addition, psychology
and physiology are tightly intertwined, such
that affective and cognitive phenomena are
influenced by physiological phenomena and
vice versa (e.g., Smith, 2008). Thus, beliefs
about self-­efficacy influence health in two
ways—­through their influence over the behaviors that influence health, and through
their direct influence over physiological processes.
First, self-­efficacy influences the adoption
of healthy behaviors, the cessation of unhealthy behaviors, and the maintenance of
behavioral changes in the face of challenge
and difficulty. Research on self-­efficacy
has greatly enhanced our understanding
of how and why people adopt healthy and
unhealthy behaviors, and of how they can
most effectively change behaviors that affect
health (Bandura, 1997; Maddux, Brawley, &
Boykin, 1995; Marks, Allegrante, & Lorig,
2005; Rabinowitz Mausbach, Thompson, &
Gallagher-­T hompson, 2007; Serios, 2003).
All of the major theories of health behavior—such as protection motivation theory
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997), the health belief model (Strecher, Champion, & Rosenstock, 1997), the
theory of reasoned action/planned behavior
(Ajzen, 1988; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Maddux & DuCharme, 1997), and the transtheoretical stages of change model (Prochaska
& Prochaska, 2010)—include self-­efficacy
as a key component (see also Maddux, 1993;
Weinstein, 1993). In addition, self-­efficacy
beliefs are crucial to successful change and
maintenance of virtually every behavior crucial to health, including exercise, diet, stress
management, safe sex (O’Leary, Jemmot,
& Jemmot, 2008), smoking cessation, overcoming alcohol abuse, dealing with chronic
pain, compliance with treatment and prevention regimens, and detection behaviors
such as breast self-­examinations (AbuSabha
& Achterberg, 1997; Bandura, 1997; Bryan,
Aiken, & West, 1997; Dawson & Brawley,
2000; Ewart, 1995; Holman & Lorig, 1992;
Maddux et al., 1995; Reuter et al., 2010;
Scholz, Keller, & Perren, 2009; Schwarzer,
1992; Shiffman et al., 2000).
Second, self-­efficacy beliefs influence a
number of biological processes that, in turn,
influence health and disease (Bandura, 1997).
Research suggests that self-­efficacy beliefs
affect the body’s physiological responses to
10. Self-­Efficacy
stress, including the immune system (Antoni,
2003; Bandura, 1997; Mausbach et al., 2010;
O’Leary & Brown, 1995) and the physiological pathways activated by physical activity
(Rudolph & McAuley, 1995). Lack of perceived control over environmental demands
can increase susceptibility to infections and
hasten the progression of disease (Bandura,
1997). Self-­efficacy beliefs also influence the
activation of catecholamines, a family of
neurotransmitters important to the management of stress and perceived threat, along
with the endogenous painkillers referred to
as endorphins (Bandura, 1997; Benight &
Bandura, 2004; O’Leary & Brown, 1995;
Shenassa, 2001), as well as the production of
cortisol under stress (Gaab, Rohleder, Nater,
& Ehlert, 2005; Schwerdtfeger, Konermann,
& Schoenhofen, 2008).
Psychological Interventions
and Psychotherapy
Most professionally guided interventions,
including psychotherapy, are designed to
enhance self-­regulation because they are
concerned with helping people increase their
sense of efficacy over important aspects of
their lives (Frank & Frank, 1991). Different
interventions may be equally effective because they enhance self-­efficacy for crucial
behavioral and cognitive skills (Ahmed &
Westra, 2008; Bandura, 1997; Benight &
Bandura, 2004; Blazer, 2002; Maddux &
Lewis, 1995; Moos, 2008). Self-­efficacy theory emphasizes the importance of arranging
a client’s experiences in a way that enhances
his or her sense of efficacy for specific behaviors in specific problematic and challenging
situations. Self-­efficacy theory also suggests
that formal interventions should provide
people with the skills and sense of efficacy
for solving problems themselves.
Education
Historically, much of the literature on educational achievement has emphasized IQ,
painting a picture of static, innate abilities
and relatively immutable corresponding outcomes. Research employing social cognitive
theories, however, has shifted to explore the
important contribution of students’ changing perceptions of their academic abilities,
confidence that they can complete specific
211
academic tasks, predictions about academic
outcomes, and interpretation of success and
failure experiences (Pajares, 2005). Students
with higher levels of academic self-­efficacy
demonstrate higher academic goal setting,
value academic achievement more, spend
more time studying, earn higher grades, and
report greater concentration and control
while completing homework compared to
students with lower academic self-­efficacy
(Bassi, Steca, Delle Fave, & Caprara, 2007).
Nevertheless, like self-­efficacy that is
specific to other domains, academic self­efficacy is not a fixed entity; it shares a reciprocal relationship with daily experiences.
It may be bolstered by high marks in school;
an encouraging comment by a parent, peer,
or teacher; a sense of accomplishment after
solving a difficult math problem; or positive self-talk before an exam. Simply experiencing positive feedback, however, is not
enough. Students can just as easily reject
their teacher’s encouragement or attribute a
good grade to luck while maintaining low
academic self-­efficacy. For self-­efficacy to
increase, students must interpret their personal experiences as evidence that they are
capable of doing the task at hand (Baird,
Scott, Dearing, & Hamill, 2009). Furthermore, a strong sense of self-­efficacy may
benefit students when they receive negative
feedback, such as a low exam grade, because
they are more likely to attribute the low
grade to lack of effort, to persevere in the
face of failure, and to remain task-­focused,
which ultimately lead to a greater chance for
academic success.
Academic experiences are also socially
embedded (Martin & Dowson, 2009). Students often compare their performance to
that of their peers, seek feedback and approval from teachers and caregivers, and
choose models to emulate; each of these processes can affect self-­efficacy and academic
performance (Schunk & Meece, 2006). In
an academic setting, mastery goals involve
the desire to develop skills and competencies, while performance goals involve the
desire to earn a good grade or perform better than others. Classroom environments
that promote learning and mastery goals
over performance goals, specific feedback
over general feedback, and effort over ability
tend to result in higher levels of self-­efficacy
and perseverance (Schunk & Meece, 2006;
212
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Urdan & Schoenfelder, 2006). In such learning environments, setbacks are less threatening to beliefs about abilities and are viewed
as part of the learning process, while specific
feedback for improvement helps students to
make specific changes in their work so that
they are more likely to be successful. A stronger sense of academic self-­efficacy, in turn, is
associated with higher evaluations by teachers (Bassi et al., 2007) and a greater likelihood of seeking help from teachers (Ryan,
Gheen, & Midgley, 1998). The unfortunate
paradox here is that the students with the
least confidence in their abilities—the ones
who may be most in need of help—are also
the least likely to seek help, an avoidance
strategy that may serve as a barrier to both
skills acquisition and self-­efficacy improvement.
Outside of the classroom, parental academic involvement and modeling are important factors in children’s academic self­efficacy beliefs (Schunk & Meece, 2005).
Children of mothers attending college who
model mastery goals for their school-age
children tend to have greater academic self­efficacy and mastery goals for themselves;
furthermore, college mothers with greater
academic self-­regulation not only model a
positive student role for their children but
also have higher expectations for their children and mastery goals for their children’s
academic performance (Ricco, Sabet, &
Clough, 2009). These findings suggest that
while parents who value learning tend to
transmit this value by encouraging their children to learn for the sake of learning, parents who both model and convey the value
of learning provide two potential sources for
mastery of goal-­setting and academic self­efficacy development.
Other modeling research highlights the
importance of a model who demonstrates
that academic skills can be attained gradually, through persistence. Specifically, children
who were below average in math benefited
from exposure to a “coping model” who
demonstrated perseverance and positive selftalk while working through a math problem.
Children who were exposed to a “mastery
model” who instantly found the correct answer did not learn about the importance of
perseverance, as did the first group. Thus,
children who observed the coping model
not only had higher self-­efficacy for math
but also performed better compared to the
children who observed the mastery model
(Schunk, Hanson, & Cox, 1987; see also
Dweck & Elliot-­Moskwa, 2010).
Occupational Choice and Performance
Few choices have a greater impact on life satisfaction than one’s choice of occupation or
career. These choices are often restricted by
limitations not only in skills and abilities but
also in individuals’ beliefs about their skills
and abilities. Such self-­efficacy beliefs are
important predictors of which occupations
people choose to enter (the content of career
choices) and how people go about making
their choices (the process of career decision
making) (Hackett & Betz, 1995), above and
beyond what can be predicted from people’s
vocational interests (Donnay & Borgen,
1999). Specifically, academic self-­efficacy
during adolescence leads to greater job satisfaction and a lower probability of being unemployed at age 21 (Pinquart & Sorensen,
2003). When entering employment, higher
occupational self-­efficacy predicts both objective and subjective measures of career
success years later, including a higher salary,
a higher ranking job position, and greater
job satisfaction (Abele & Spurk, 2009). Regarding employment, it literally pays to have
high self-­efficacy.
Social cognitive career theory (SCCT) has
provided a framework for understanding the
important role of self-­efficacy in vocational
interests, choices, goal setting, and performance (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994). Specifically, self-­efficacy influences vocational
goals through its effect on outcome expectations and interests (Sheu et al., 2010). In other
words, individuals who believe they can perform the behaviors required for a particular
job are more likely also to believe that these
job-­related behaviors will lead to success at
that job. And the individual who believes
both of these are true will be more likely to
be interested in that line of work, ultimately
achieving goal-­directed thoughts and behaviors. In contrast, individuals who have low
self-­efficacy for particular job-­related behaviors are less likely to be interested in and
to pursue those careers, potentially limiting
their future opportunities.
Following job loss, job-­seeking behavior can be enhanced by improving self-
10. Self-­Efficacy
r­ egulatory behavior and developing effective
coping and problem-­solving techniques (Vinokur, van Ryn, Gramlich, & Price, 1991).
Individuals who have low self-­efficacy about
their vocational skills discourage themselves from applying for more appealing jobs
(Wheeler, 1993). Furthermore, the extent to
which self-­efficacy beliefs specific to one job
generalize or apply to other jobs or careers
can influence the scope of one’s job search.
In other words, a narrow sense of self­efficacy can limit a job search to jobs that
fit one’s experience exactly, while a broader
sense of job-­related self-­efficacy can broaden
the search to other jobs or even facilitate a
career change. In addition to job-­specific
competencies, beliefs about the skills and
strategies involved in a job search, termed
job search self-­efficacy, predict the intensity of one’s job search after unemployment,
which predicts subsequent reemployment
(Wanberg, Kanfer, & Rotundo, 1999).
Globally, there has been a steady demand
for individuals with training in science and
engineering (S&E), and these jobs tend
to be more resistant to job cuts and have
higher salaries compared to jobs in other
areas (National Science Board, 2010). In the
United States, approximately one-third of
undergraduate college degrees are in S&E,
whereas in Japan, China, and Singapore,
more than half of college degrees awarded
are in S&E. Furthermore, more than half of
doctorates in the natural sciences and engineering in the United States are earned by
international students, primarily from Asian
countries. Among undergraduates in Asia,
20% earn degrees in engineering, while only
5% of American undergraduates earn engineering degrees (National Science Board,
2010). In exploring ways for the United
States to compete with other countries in
this area, women and underprivileged ethnic
minorities may be regarded as an untapped
resource.
Although more women than men attend
and graduate from college in the United
States, and despite recent increases in women
majoring in S&E fields, men still outnumber women in degrees in computer science,
engineering, and physics (National Science
Board, 2010). With the exception of Asian
American students, ethnic minority students
tend to major in S&E fields in college at rates
similar to white students but have lower
213
rates of college attendance and graduation
compared to white students (National Science Board, 2010). While economic factors
and discrimination play a major role in these
discrepancies for women and ethnic minorities, negative stereotypes further plant a
seed of doubt that can impair performance
and impact career choices (Spencer, Steele,
& Quinn, 1999). Math self-­efficacy, for
example, is lower among girls than among
boys across 30 countries, even after controlling for mathematics ability (Williams
& Williams, 2010). Among African Americans, perceived racism is a barrier to both
self-­efficacy development and positive outcome expectancies in math (Alliman-­Brisset
& Turner, 2010). On the opposite end of
the spectrum, the perception of a supportive
campus climate that is not discriminatory is
related to greater academic self-­efficacy and
positive outcome expectancies for ethnic
minority biology and engineering students
(Byars-­Wilson, Estrada, Howard, Davis, &
Zalapa, 2010).
Perceptions of self-­efficacy, outcome expectancies, and social forces (i.e., stereotyping)
are associated with the underrepresentation
of women and ethnic minorities in careers
dominated by white males (Hackett & Betz,
1995). For example, women and African
Americans tend to avoid classes and careers
involving math and science (Betz, 1997). In
addition, based on stereotypes that women
and certain ethnic minorities are not as successful in these areas, they may not perform
to the best of their ability, creating a “self­fulfilling prophecy” as they inadvertently
undermine their own performance in accordance with expectancies (Major & O’Brien,
2005). Without success experiences, these
individuals’ self-­efficacy for performance in
these areas may remain low, leading to further avoidance of these kinds of pursuits.
Men and women usually express equivalent efficacy beliefs for most (but not all)
traditionally female-­dominated occupations, but women usually express lower self­efficacy for traditionally male-­dominated
occupations than for traditionally female­dominated occupations (Hackett & Betz,
1995). In addition, women and ethnic minorities have less access to self-­efficacy­enhancing experiences for traditionally nonfemale and nonminority careers (Hackett
& Byars, 1996). They generally have fewer
214
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
positive models—­particularly in science and
technology careers—­through which they
can gain vicarious experiences, and they
may receive less encouragement from others to pursue nontraditional careers. When
they encounter potential efficacy-­building
experiences, if they are aware of negative
gender or ethnic stereotypes, their performance is likely to suffer due to avoidance of
tasks, lack of focus on the task, or anxiety
(Hackett & Byars, 1996). Even when members of a minority group develop strong self­efficacy beliefs, due to discrimination they
may maintain low expectancies that their
performance will lead to desired outcomes
(Bandura, 1997).
Self-­efficacy beliefs predict not only what
occupations people choose but also how
well they perform those occupations. A
meta-­analysis of 144 studies on self-­efficacy
and work-­related performance (Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1998) found a weighted average
correlation of .38 between self-­efficacy measures and measure of work performance.
This relationship is stronger than what has
been shown for the relationship between
work performance and goal setting, feedback interventions, organizational behavior
modifications, and personality constructs
(Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). The relationship between self-­efficacy beliefs and work­related performance seems be moderated by
task-­related strategies, task focus, and early
skill acquisition; however, ability was not included as an important potential moderator
in this meta-­analysis (Stajkovic & Luthans,
1998).
Organizations and Societies:
Collective Efficacy
Accomplishing important goals in groups,
organizations, and societies has always depended on group members’ belief that they
can effectively work together to achieve
common goals. Movements such as the
American Revolution, Women’s Suffrage,
and the Civil Rights Movement would not
have been possible without the shared belief
that group members could work together
and overcome obstacles to create lasting
change. Social cognitive theory recognizes
that the individual is embedded in a social
network and a cultural milieu. Groups such
as sports teams, workplace departments,
classrooms, communities, and organizations
have implicit norms, beliefs about the group
and its abilities, and a shared history that
can influence group outcomes.
Collective efficacy captures the concept of
“a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses
of action required to produce given levels of
attainments” (Bandura, 1997, p. 477). Simply stated, collective efficacy is the extent to
which people believe that they can work together effectively to accomplish their shared
goals. Just as personal agency involves beliefs
about personal abilities, collective agency involves a collective sense of efficacy. Similar
to self-­efficacy, collective efficacy influences
shared motivation, planning and decision
making, effective use of group resources, and
persistence in goal pursuit (Bandura, 1997;
Zaccaro, Blair, Peterson, & Zazanis, 1995).
Collective efficacy is important to a number of “collectives.” Greater collective efficacy for academic group projects, for example,
predicts higher actual group performance
and is associated with greater team cohesion
(Lent, Schmidt, & Schmidt, 2006). Applied
to the realm of business and productivity,
collective efficacy is an important predictor
of team performance (Lin & Peng, 2010).
The effectiveness of self-­managing work
teams (Little & Madigan, 1997) and group
“brainstorming” (Prussia & Kinicki, 1996)
is also related to a collective sense of efficacy. Collective family efficacy—­beliefs about
the family members’ ability to work together
to solve problems and manage daily life—­
influences family members’ satisfaction with
family life (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli,
Regalia, & Scabini, 2004). The more efficacious spouses feel about their shared ability
to accomplish important shared goals, the
more satisfied they are with their marriages
(Kaplan & Maddux, 2002). The individual
and collective efficacy of teachers for effective instruction seems to affect the academic
achievement of schoolchildren (Bandura,
1993, 1997).
In urban neighborhoods, higher collective efficacy is associated with lower rates of
violent crime, above and beyond the predictive value of family income; proportions of
minorities, immigrants, and single-­parent
families; and previous homicide rates (Samp-
10. Self-­Efficacy
son, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; see also
Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2009).
Active participation in neighborhood organizations can enhance self-­efficacy among the
urban poor (Ohmer & Beck, 2006). Although
poverty and crime can engender a sense of
less personal agency and control, residents
who become actively involved in community
organizations experience increases in a sense
of empowerment and neighborhood collective efficacy (Ohmer, 2010).
Finally, collective efficacy has become an
important construct in the study of team
sports and has facilitated a shift in research
from a focus on individual motivation to
group motivation (George & Feltz, 1995;
Marks, 1999; Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch,
& Widmeyer, 1999). For example, the collective efficacy of an athletic team can be
raised or lowered by false feedback about
ability and can subsequently influence its
success in competitions (Hodges & Carron,
1992). Of course, personal efficacy and collective efficacy go hand in hand because a
“collection of inveterate self-­doubters is not
easily forged into a collectively efficacious
force” (Bandura, 1997, p. 480).
The distinction between individual self­efficacy and collective efficacy should not
be confused with the dimension of cultural
orientation, usually referred to as individualism versus collectivism. The spectrum of
individualism versus collectivism refers to
the extent to which a culture or individual
values the individual relative to the group,
competition versus cooperation, and individual goals, needs, and achievements versus collective goals, needs, and achievements
(Wagner & Moch, 1986). In even the most
individualistic cultures, collective goals are
still important, and a sense of collective efficacy is essential for the attainment of those
goals. Likewise, in even the most collectivistic cultures, individuals set personal goals
that may not require collective effort and
group cooperation, and self-­efficacy will be
crucial in the attainment of those goals.
As cultural variations become more widely studied, research indicates that collective
efficacy may be a more useful predictor of
emotion and behavior in some cultures than
in others. For example, collective efficacy is
negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, and the desire to leave employment for
215
workers in Hong Kong but not for American
workers (Schaubroeck, Lam, & Xie, 2000).
An explanation for this difference is that
collective efficacy may be a more important
contributor to achievements in groups that
are higher in collectivism (Gibson, 1999).
Nonetheless, individuals will differ in their
collectivist and individualist leanings regardless of the group or cultural norms, and
these individual differences may be more
important than the group or cultural norm
(Bandura, 2001).
Researchers also are beginning to understand how people develop a sense of collective efficacy for promoting social and
political change (Fernandez-­Ballesteros,
Diez-­Nicolas, Caprara, Barbaranelli, &
Bandura, 2000). According to the social
identity model of collective action (SIMCA;
Klandermans, 1997, 2002) and the research
supporting it, social identification predicts
both perceptions of injustice and collective efficacy, which in turn predict collective action toward a goal, such as engaging
in protest-­related activities (van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In other words,
when individuals identify with a group or
cause, they tend to feel more confident that
the group can promote its cause, and that
the need to promote the cause is justified due
to unfair treatment toward the group; the
ultimate outcome of these beliefs is collective action, such as protest or social movements. Collective efficacy to promote change
applies to a wide range of important issues,
including global warming, human rights
violations and social injustice, response to
disasters, and ending wars and conflict. Promoting the shared belief that we can solve
these problems or at least mitigate them is an
important step toward collective action.
The ability of businesses, organizations,
communities, and governments (local, state,
and national) to achieve their goals depends
on their ability to coordinate their efforts,
particularly because their goals often may
conflict. In a world in which communication
across the globe often is faster than communication across the street, and in which
cooperation and collaboration in commerce
and government is becoming increasingly
common and increasingly crucial, understanding collective efficacy will become increasingly important.
216
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Summary
The very little engine looked up and saw the tears
in the dolls’ eyes. And she thought of the good little
boys and girls on the other side of the mountain who
would not have any toys or good food unless she
helped. Then she said, “I think I can. I think I can. I
think I can.”
—Wally P iper , The Little Engine That Could
(1930/1989)
Some of the most powerful truths also are
the simplest—so simple that a child can understand them. The concept of self-­efficacy
deals with one of these truths—one so simple it can be captured in a children’s book of
37 pages (with illustrations), yet so powerful that fully describing its implications has
filled thousands of pages in scientific journals and books over the past 30+ years. This
truth is that strong beliefs in one’s ideas,
goals, and capacity for achievement are essential for success. Strong self-­efficacy beliefs are important because they lead to effective self-­regulation and persistence, which
in turn lead to success. Most people see only
extraordinary accomplishments of athletes,
artists, and others, but do not see “the unwavering commitment and countless hours
of perseverant effort that produced them”
(Bandura, 1997, p. 119; see also Ericcson &
Charness, 1994). They then overestimate the
role of “talent” in these accomplishments,
while underestimating the role of determination and self-­regulation.
As individuals contemplate and evaluate
themselves and their lives, often the most salient points of reference are their accomplishments, challenges, and failures. In setting
goals and trying to attain them, individuals
who have faith in their own abilities give
themselves an advantage that self-­doubters
lack. Because self-­efficacy is concerned with
understanding those factors that people can
control, it is the study of human potential
and possibilities.
References
Abele, A. E., & Spunk, D. (2009). The longitudinal impact of self-­efficacy and career goals on
objective and subjective career success. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 74, 53–62.
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teas-
dale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49–74.
Ahmad, M., & Westra, H. A., (2008). Impact
of a treatment rationale on expectancy and
engagement in cognitive behavioral therapy
for social anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 33, 314–322.
Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, personality, and behavior. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
Alliman-­Brisset, A. E., & Turner, S. L. (2010).
Racism, parent support, and math-based career interests, efficacy and outcome expectations among African American adolescents.
Journal of Black Psychology, 36(2), 197–225.
Antoni, M. H. (2003). Stress management and
psychoneuroimmunology in HIV infection.
CNS Spectrums, 8(1), 40–51.
Arnstein, P., Caudill, M., Mandle, C. L., Norris, A., & Beasley, R. (1999). Self efficacy as
a mediator of the relationship between pain
intensity, disability and depression in chronic
pain patients. Pain, 80, 483–491.
Baird, G. L., Scott, W. D., Dearing, E., & Hamill, S. K. (2009). Cognitive self-­regulation in
youth with and without learning disabilities:
Academic self-­efficacy, theories of intelligence,
learning vs. performance goal preferences, and
effort attributions. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 28, 881–908.
Baldwin, A. S., Rothman, A. J., Hertel, A. W.,
Linde, J. A., Jeffery, R. W., Finch, E. A., et al.
(2006). Specifying the determinants of the initiation and maintenance of behavior change:
An examination of self-­efficacy, satisfaction,
and smoking cessation. Health Psychology,
25, 626–634.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-­efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191–215.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of
thought and action. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Bandura, A. (1992). Social cognitive theory. In
R. Vasta (Ed.), Six theories of child development: Revised formulations and current issues (pp. 1–60). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Bandura, A. (1993). Perceived self-­efficacy in
cognitive development and functioning. Educational Psychologist, 28, 117–148.
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-­efficacy: The exercise of
control. New York: Freeman.
Bandura, A. (1999). A sociocognitive analysis of
substance abuse: An agentic perspective. Psychological Science, 10, 214–217.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An
10. Self-­Efficacy
agentic perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 1–26.
Bandura, A. (2006a). Guide for constructing self­efficacy scales. In F. Pajares & T. Urdan (Eds.),
Self-­efficacy beliefs of adolescents. Charlotte,
NC: Information Age Publishing.
Bandura, A. (2006b). Toward a psychology of
human agency. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 1, 164–180.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., &
Pastorelli, C. (1996). Multifaceted impact of
self-­efficacy beliefs on academic functioning.
Child Development, 67, 1206–1222.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V.,
& Pastorelli, C. (2001). Self-­efficacy beliefs
as shapers of children’s aspirations and career trajectories. Child Development, 72,
187–206.
Bandura, A., Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C.,
Gerbino, M., & Pastorelli, C. (2003). Role
of affective self regulatory efficacy on diverse
spheres of psychosocial functioning. Child
Development, 74, 769–782.
Bandura, A., Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C.,
Regalia, C., & Scabini, E. (2004). Impact of
family efficacy beliefs on quality of family
functioning and satisfaction with family life.
Applied Psychology: An International Journal, 60, 421–448.
Bandura, A., & Jourdan, J. F. (1991). Self­regulatory mechanisms governing the impact
of social comparison on complex decision­making. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 60, 941–951.
Bandura, A., & Locke, E. A. (2003). Negative
self-­efficacy and goal effects revisited. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 88, 87–99.
Bandura, A., Pastorelli, C., Barbaranelli, C., &
Caprara, G. V. (1999). Self-­efficacy pathways
to childhood depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 258–269.
Bandura, A., & Wood, R. E. (1989). Effect of
perceived controllability and performance
standards on self-­regulation of complex
decision-­making. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 56, 805–814.
Barone, D., Maddux, J. E., & Snyder, C. R. (1997).
Social cognitive psychology: History and current domains. New York: Plenum Press.
Bassi, M., Steca, P., Delle Fave, A., & Caprara,
G. V. (2007). Academic self-­efficacy beliefs
and quality of experience in learning. Journal
of Youth and Adolescence, 36, 301–312.
Benight, C. C., & Bandura, A. (2004). Social
cognitive theory of posttraumatic recovery:
217
The role of perceived self-­efficacy. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 42, 1129–1148.
Berry, J. M., & West, R. L. (1993). Cognitive
self-­efficacy in relation to personal mastery
and goal setting across the life span. International Journal of Behavioral Development,
16, 351–379.
Betz, N. E. (1997). What stops women and minorities from choosing and completing majors
in science and engineering? In D. Johnson
(Ed.), Minorities and girls in school: Effects
on achievement and performance. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Betz, N. E. (2007). Career self-­efficacy: Exemplary recent research and emerging directions.
Journal of Career Assessment, 15, 403–422.
Blazer, D. G. (2002). Self-­efficacy and depression
in late life: A primary prevention proposal.
Aging and Mental Health, 6, 315–324.
Bong, M., & Skaalvik, E. M. (2003). Academic
self-­concept and self-­efficacy: How different
are they really? Educational Psychology Review, 15, 1–40.
Bryan, A. D., Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1997).
Young women’s condom use: The influence
of acceptance of sexuality, control over the
sexual encounter, and perceived susceptibility to common STDs. Health Psychology, 16,
468–479.
Byars-­Wilson, A., Estrada, Y., Howard, C.,
Davis, D., & Zalapa, J. (2010). Influence of
social cognitive and ethnic variables on academic goals of underrepresented students in
science and engineering: A multiple-­groups
analysis. Journal of Counseling Psychology,
57, 205–218.
Cain, A. S., Bardone-Cone, A. M., Abramson,
L. Y., Vohs, K. D., & Joiner, T. H. (2010). Refining the relationships of perfectionism, selfefficacy, and stress to dieting and binge eating:
Examining the appearance, interpersonal, and
academic domains. International Journal of
Eating Disorders, 41, 713–721.
Caprara, G. V., Pastorelli, C., Regalia, C., Scabini, E., & Bandura, A., (2005). Impact of
adolescents’ filial self-­efficacy on quality of
family functioning and satisfaction. Journal
of Research on Adolescence, 15, 71–97.
Caprara, G. V., Scabini, E., Barbaranelli, C.,
Pastorelli, C., Regalia, C., & Bandura, A.
(1998). Impact of adolescents’ perceived self­regulatory efficacy on familial communication
and antisocial conduct. European Psychologist, 3, 125–132.
Caprara, G. V., & Steca, P. (2005). Self-­efficacy
218
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
beliefs as determinants of prosocial behavior conducive to life satisfaction across ages.
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 24,
191–217.
Cervone, D. (2000). Thinking about self-­efficacy.
Behavior Modification, 24, 30–56.
Cervone, D., Shadel, W. G., Smith, R. E., &
Fioir, M. (2006). Self-­regulation: Reminders
and suggestions from personality science. Applied Psychology: An International Review,
55, 333–385.
Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new general self-­efficacy scale. Organizational Research Methods, 4, 62–83.
Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2004).
General self-­efficacy and self-­esteem: Toward
theoretical and empirical distinction between
correlated self-­evaluations. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 25, 375–395.
Chen, Z., Dornbusch, S. M., & Liu, R. X (2007).
Direct and indirect pathways between parental
constructive behavior and adolescent affiliation with achievement-­oriented peers. Journal
of Child and Family Studies, 16, 837–858.
Ciani, K. D., Easter, M. A., Summers, J. J., &
Posada, M. L. (2009). Cognitive biases in the
interpretation of autonomic arousal: A test of
the construal bias hypothesis. Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 34, 9–17.
Dawson, K. A., & Brawley, L. R. (2000). Examining the relationship between exercise goals,
self-­efficacy, and overt behavior with beginning exercisers. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 315.
Doerr, C. E., & Baumeister, R. F. (2010). Self­regulatory strength and psychological adjustment: Implications of the limited resource
model of self-­regulation. In J. E. Maddux & J.
P. Tangney (Eds.), Social psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 71–83).
New York: Guilford Press.
Donnay, D. A. C., & Borgen, F. H. (1999). The
incremental validity of vocational self-­efficacy:
An examination of interest, self-­efficacy, and
occupation. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 46, 432–447.
Duffy, S. A., Scheumann, A. L., Fowler, K. E.,
Darling-Fisher, C., & Terrell, J. E. (2010).
Perceived difficulty quitting predicts enrollment in a smoking-cessation program for patients with head and neck cancer. Oncology
Nursing Forum, 37, 349–356.
Dweck, C. S., & Elliot-­Moskwa, E. S. (2010).
Self-­theories: The roots of defensiveness. In
J. E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Social
psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 136–156). New York: Guilford
Press.
Epel, E. S., Bandura, A., & Zimbardo, P. (1999).
Escaping homelessness: The influences of self­efficacy and time perspective on coping with
homelessness. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29, 575–596.
Ericcson, K. A., & Charness, N. (1994). Expert
performance: Its structure and acquisition.
American Psychologist, 49, 725–747.
Ewart, C. K. (1995). Self-­efficacy and recovery
from heart attack: Implications for a social­cognitive analysis of exercise and emotion. In
J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation,
and adjustment: Theory, research, and application (pp. 203–226). New York: Plenum
Press.
Fan, W., & Williams, C. M. (2010). The effects
of parental involvement on students’ academic
self-­efficacy, engagement and intrinsic motivation. Educational Psychology, 30, 53–74.
Fernandez-­Ballesteros, R., Diez-­Nicolas, J.,
Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., & Bandura,
A. (2000). Determinants and structural relation of personal efficacy to collective efficacy.
Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA.
Ferrari, M. (1996). Observing the observer:
Self-­regulation in the observational learning
of motor skills. Developmental Review, 16,
203–240.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude,
intention, and behavior: An introduction to
theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison­Wesley.
Forcehimes, A. A., & Tonigan, J. S. (2008). Self­efficacy as a factor in abstinence from alcohol/
other drug abuse: A meta-­analysis. Alcholism
Treatment Quarterly, 26, 480–489.
Forsyth, A. D., & Carey, M. P. (1998). Measuring self-­efficacy in the context of HIV risk reduction: Research challenges and recommendations. Health Psychology, 17, 559–568.
Frank, J. D., & Frank, J. B. (1991). Persuasion
and healing: A comparative study of psychotherapy (3rd ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Gaab, J., Rohleder, N., Nater, U. M., & Ehlert,
U. (2005). Psychological determinants of the
cortisol stress response: The role of anticipatory cognitive appraisal. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30, 599–610.
George, T. R., & Feltz, D. L. (1995). Motivation
in sport from a collective efficacy perspective.
10. Self-­Efficacy
International Journal of Sport Psychology,
26, 98–116.
Gibson, C. B. (1999). Do they do what they believe they can?: Group efficacy and group effectiveness across tasks and cultures. Academy
of Management Journal, 42(2), 138–125.
Goodrick, G. K., Pendleton, V. R., Kimball, K.
T., Poston, W. S. C., Reeves, R. S., & Foreyt,
J. P. (1999). Binge eating severity, self-­concept,
dieting self-­efficacy and social support during treatment of binge eating disorder. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 26,
95–300.
Hackett, G., & Betz, N., (1995). Self-­efficacy
and career choice and development. In J. E.
Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation, and
adjustment: Theory, research, and application
(pp. 249–280). New York: Plenum Press.
Hackett, G., & Byars, A. M. (1996). Social cognitive theory and the career development of
African American women. Career Development Quarterly, 44, 322–340.
Hodges, L., & Carron, A. V. (1992). Collective
efficacy and group performance. International
Journal of Sport Psychology, 23, 48–59.
Holman, H. R., & Lorig, K. (1992). Perceived
self-­efficacy in self-­management of chronic
disease. In R. Schwarzer (Ed.), Self-­efficacy:
Thought control of action (pp. 305–324).
Washington: Hemisphere.
Hoyle, R. H. (2006). Personality and self­regulation: Trait and information-­processing
perspectives. Journal of Personality, 74,
1507–1525.
Ianotti, R. J., Schneider, F., Nansel, T. R., Haynei, D. L., Plotnick, L., Clark, L. M., et al.
(2006). Self-­efficacy, outcome expectancy, and
diabetes self-­management in adolescents with
type 1 diabetes. Journal and Developmental
and Behavioral Pediatrics, 27, 98–105.
Jafari, M., & Shahidi, A. A. (2007). Comparing the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral
therapy and trans-­theoretical model on improving abstinence self-­efficacy in substance
dependent adolescents. Journal of Research in
Behavioural Sciences, 7, 1–12.
Jones, M. V., Bray, S. R., Mace, R. D., MacRae,
A. W., & Stockbridge, C. (2002). The impact
of motivational imagery on the emotional
state and self-­efficacy levels of novice climbers.
Journal of Sport Behavior, 25, 57–73.
Jones, T. L., & Prinz, R. J. (2005). Potential roles
of parental self-­efficacy in parent and child
adjustment: A review. Clinical Psychology Review, 25, 341–363.
219
Judge, T. A., Locke, E. A., Durham, C. C., &
Kluger, A. N. (1998). Dispositional effects
on job and life satisfaction: The role of core
evaluations. Journal of Applied Psychology,
83, 17–34.
Kaplan, M., & Maddux, J. E. (2002). Goals and
marital satisfaction: Perceived support for personal goals and collective efficacy for collective goals. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 21(2), 157–164.
Karademus, E. C. (2005). Self-­efficacy, social
support and well-being: The mediating role of
optimism. Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 1281–1290.
Kelly, J. F., Magill, M., & Stout, R. L., (2009).
How do people recover from alcohol dependence?: A systematic review of the research on
mechanisms of behavior change in Alcoholics
Anonymous. Addiction Research and Theory,
17, 236–259.
Kirsch, I. (1985). Self-­efficacy and expectancy:
Old wine with new labels. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 824–830.
Kirsch, I. (Ed.). (1999). How expectancies shape
behavior. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Klandermans, B. (1997). The social psychology
of protest. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Klandermans, B. (2002). How group identification helps to overcome the dilemma of collective action. American Behavioral Scientist,
45(5), 887–900.
Knudstrup, M., Segrest, S. L., & Hurley, A. E.
(2003). The use of mental imagery in the simulated employment interview situation. Journal
of Managerial Psychology, 18, 573–591.
Kross, E., Mischel, M., & Shoda, Y. (2010).
Enabling self-­control: A cognitive-­affective
processing systems approach to problematic
behavior. In J. E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney
(Eds.), Social psychological foundations of
clinical psychology (pp. 379–394). New York:
Guilford Press.
Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1995). The
self-­presentation model of social phobia. In R.
G. Heimberg, M. R. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, &
F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment (pp. 94–112).
New York: Guilford Press.
Lent, R. W., Brown, S. D., & Hackett, G. (1994).
Toward a unifying social cognitive theory of
career and academic interest, choice, and performance. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 45,
79–122.
Lent, R. W., Schmidt, J., & Schmidt, L. (2006).
220
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Collective efficacy beliefs in student work
teams: Relation to self-­efficacy, cohesion, and
performance. Journal of Vocational Behavior,
68(1), 73–84.
Leslie, A. M. (1982). The perception of causality
in infants. Perception, 11, 173–186.
Lin, C. C., & Peng, T. K. (2010). From organizational citizenship behavior to team performance: The mediation of group cohesion and
collective efficacy. Management and Organization Review, 6(1), 55–75.
Little, B. L., & Madigan, R. M. (1994). The relationship between collective efficacy and performance in manufacturing work teams. Small
Group Research, 28, 517–534.
Little, B. R., Lecci L., & Watkinson, B. (1992).
Personality and personal projects: Linking Big
Five and PAC units of analysis. Journal of Personality, 60, 501–525.
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). A theory
of goal setting and task performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ludwig, K. B., & Pittman, J. F. (1999). Adolescent prosocial values and self-­efficacy in relation to delinquency, risky sexual behavior, and
drug use. Youth and Society, 30, 461–482.
Maddux, J. E. (1993). Social cognitive models of
heath and exercise behavior: An introduction
and review of conceptual issues. Journal of
Applied Sport Psychology, 5, 116–140.
Maddux, J. E. (1999a). The collective construction of collective efficacy: Comment on Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch, and Widmeyer. Group
Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3,
223–226.
Maddux, J. E. (1999b). Expectancies and the
social-­cognitive perspective: Basic principles,
processes, and variables. In I. Kirsch (Ed.),
How expectancies shape behavior (pp. 17–
40). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Maddux, J. E., Brawley, L., & Boykin, A. (1995).
Self-­efficacy and healthy decision making:
Protection, promotion, and detection. In J. E.
Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation, and
adjustment: Theory, research, and application
(pp. 173–202). New York: Plenum Press.
Maddux, J. E., & DuCharme, K. A. (1997). Behavioral intentions in theories of health behavior. In D. Gochman (Ed.), Handbook of
health behavior research I: Personal and social determinants (pp. 133–152). New York:
Plenum Press.
Maddux, J. E., & Lewis, J. (1995). Self-­efficacy
and adjustment: Basic principles and issues. In
J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation,
and adjustment: Theory, research, and application (pp. 37–68). New York: Plenum Press.
Maddux, J. E., & Meier, L. J. (1995). Self-­efficacy
and depression. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self­efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment: Theory,
research and application (pp. 143–169). New
York: Plenum Press.
Maddux, J. E., Norton, L. W., & Leary, M. R.
(1988). Cognitive components of social anxiety: An investigation of the integration of self­presentation theory and self-­efficacy theory.
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 6,
180–190.
Maddux, J. E., & Rogers, R. W. (1983). Protection motivation and self-­efficacy: A revised
theory of fear appeals and attitude change.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
19, 469–479.
Major, B., & O’Brien, L. T. (2005). The social
psychology of stigma. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 393–421.
Mandler, J. M. (1992). How to build a baby: II.
Conceptual primitives. Psychological Review,
99, 587–604.
Marks, M. (1999). A test of the impact of collective efficacy in routine and novel performance environments. Human Performance,
12, 295–309.
Marks, R., Allegrante, J. P., & Lorig, K. (2005).
A review and synthesis of research evidence for
self-­efficacy-­enhancing interventions for reducing chronic disability: Implications for health
education practice (Parts I and II). Health Promotion Practice, 6, 37–43, 148–156.
Marlowe, N. (1998). Self-­efficacy moderates the
impact of stressful events on headache. Headache, 38, 662–667.
Mattanah, J. F., Pratt, M. W., Cowan, P. A., &
Cowan, C. P. (2005). Authoritative parenting,
parental scaffolding of long-­division mathematics, and children’s academic competence
in fourth grade. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 26, 85–106.
Mausbach, B. T., Roepke, S. K., Ziegler, M. G.,
Milic, M., von Känel, R., Dimsdale, J. E., et al.
(2010). Association between chronic caregiving stress and impaired endothelial function in
the elderly. Journal of the American College of
Cardiology, 55, 2599–2606.
Maxwell, E. (1998). “I can do it myself!”: Reflections on early self-­efficacy. Roeper Review,
20, 183–187.
McAuley, E., Konopack, J. F., Motl, R. W., Morris, K. S., Doerksen, S. E., & Rosengren, K.
10. Self-­Efficacy
R. (2006). Physical activity and quality of life
in older adults: Influence of health status and
self-­efficacy. Annals of Behavioral Medicine,
31, 99–103.
McAvay, G., Seeman, T. E., & Rodin, J. (1996).
A longitudinal study of change in domain­specific self-­efficacy among older adults. Journals of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences
and Social Sciences, 51B, 243–253.
McClelland, D. C., Atkinson, J. W., Clark, R.
W., & Lowell, E. L. (1953). The achievement
motive. New York: Appleton-­Century-Croft.
McCrae, R. R., & Lökenhoff, C. E. (2010).
Self-­regulation and the five-­factor model of
personality traits. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), The
handbook of self-­regulation and personality.
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
McKellar, J., Ilgin, M., Moos, B. S., & Moos,
B. (2007). Predictors of changes in alcohol­related self-­efficacy over 16 years. Journal of
Substance Abuse Treatment, 35, 148–155.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social
learning reconceptualization of personality.
Psychological Review, 80, 252–284.
Moos, R. H. (2008). Active ingredients of substance use-­focused self-help groups. Addiction, 103, 387–396.
Morenoff, J. D., Sampson, R. J., & Raudenbush,
S. W. (2009). Neighborhood inequality, collective efficacy, and the spatial dynamics or urban
violence. Criminology, 39(3), 517–558.
National Science Board. (2010). Science and engineering indicators 2010. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (NSB 10-01). Retrieved from www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/
pdf/seind10.pdf.
Nickel, D., & Spink, K. S. (2010). Attributions
and self-­regulatory efficacy for health-­related
physical activity. Journal of Health Psychology, 15, 53–63.
Ohmer, M., & Beck, E. (2006). Citizen participation in neighborhood organizations in poor
communities and its relationship to organizational and neighborhood collective efficacy.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 33,
179–202.
Ohmer, M. L. (2010). How theory and research
inform citizen participation in poor communities: The ecological perspective and theories
on self- and collective efficacy and sense of
community. Journal of Human Behavior in
the Social Environment, 20(1), 1–19.
O’Leary, A., & Brown, S. (1995). Self-­efficacy
and the physiological stress response. In J. E.
Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation, and
221
adjustment: Theory, research and application
(pp. 227–248). New York: Plenum Press.
O’Leary, A., Jemmot, L. S., & Jemmot, J. B.
(2008). Medicational analysis of an effective
sexual risk-­reduction intervention for women:
The importance of self-­efficacy. Health Psychology, 27, S180–S184.
Pajares, F. (1996). Self-­efficacy beliefs in academic settings. Review of Educational Research,
66, 543–578.
Paskevich, D. M., Brawley, L. R., Dorsch, K. D.,
& Widmeyer, W. N. (1999). Relationship between collective efficacy and team cohesion:
Conceptual and measurement issues. Group
Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3,
210–222.
Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2010). Attitude change.
In R. F. Baumeister & E. J. Finkel (Eds.), Advanced social psychology: The state of the science (pp. 217–259). New York: Oxford University Press.
Pinquart, M., & Sorensen, S. (2003). Differences
between caregivers and noncaregivers in psychological health and physical health: A meta­analysis. Psychology and Aging, 18, 250–267.
Piper, W. (1989). The little engine that could.
New York: Platt & Monk. (Original work
published 1930)
Pollock, P. H. (1997). Self-­efficacy and sexual
offending against children: Construction of
a measure and changes following relapse prevention treatment. Legal and Criminology
Psychology, 1, 219–228.
Prochaska, J. O., & Prochaska, J. M. (2010). Self­directed change: A transtheoretical model. In
J. E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Social
psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 331–340). New York: Guilford Press.
Prussia, G. E., & Kinicki, A. J. (1996). A motivational investigation of group effectiveness
using social cognitive theory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 187–198.
Rabinowitz, Y. G., Mausbach, B. T., Thompson,
L. W., & Gallagher-­T hompson, D. (2007).
The relationship between self-­efficacy and cumulative health risk associated with health behavior patterns in female caregivers of elderly
relatives with Alzheimer’s dementia. Journal
of Aging and Health, 19, 946–964.
Reuter, T., Ziegelmann, J., Wiedemann, A. U.,
Geiser, C., Lippke, S., Schüz, B., et al. (2010).
Changes in intentions, planning, and self­efficacy predict changes in behaviors: An application of latent true change modeling. Journal of Health Psychology, 15, 935–947.
222
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Ricco, R., Sabet, S., & Clough, C. (2009). College mothers in the dual roles of student and
parent: Implications for their children’s attitudes toward school. Merrill–­Palmer Quarterly, 55, 79–110.
Riskind, J., Alloy, L. B., & Iacoviello, B. M.
(2010). Social cognitive vulnerability to depression and anxiety. In J. E. Maddux & J.
P. Tangney (Eds.), Social psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 272–296).
New York: Guilford Press.
Rogers, R. W., & Prentice-Dunn, S. (1997). Protection motivation theory. In D. Gochman
(Ed.), Handbook of health behavior research
I: Personal and social determinants (pp. 113–
132). New York: Plenum Press.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies
for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(1,
Whole No. 609).
Rudolph, D. L., & McAuley, E. (1995). Self­efficacy and salivary cortisol responses to
acute exercise in physically active and less active adults. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17, 206–213.
Russell, B. (1954). A history of western philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Russell, J. E. A. (2008). Promoting subjective
well-being at work. Journal of Career Assessment, 16(1), 117–131.
Ryan, A. M., Gheen, M. H., & Midgley, C.
(1998). Why do some students avoid asking
for help?: An examination of the interplay
among students’ academic efficacy, teachers’
social-­emotional role, and the classroom goal
structure. Journal of Educational Psychology,
90, 528–535.
Ryan, D. R., & Dzewaltowski, D. A. (2002).
Comparing the relationships between different types of self-­efficacy and physical activity
in youth. Health Education and Behavior, 29,
491–504.
Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F.
(1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: A
multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science,
277, 918–924.
Samuels, S. M., & Gibbs, R. W. (2002). Self­efficacy assessment and generalization in
physical education courses. Journal of Applied
Social Psychology, 32, 1314–1327.
Schaubroeck, J., Lam, S. S. K., & Xie, J. L.
(2000). Collective efficacy versus self-­efficacy
in coping responses to stressors and control: A
cross-­cultural study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 512–525.
Schlehofer, M. M., Thompson, S. C., Ting, S.,
Ostermann, S., Nierman, A., & Skenderian, J.
(2010). Psychological predictors of college students’ cell phone use while driving. Accident
Analysis and Prevention, 42, 1107–1112.
Scholz, U., Keller, R., & Perren, P. (2009). Predicting behavioral intentions and physical
exercise: A test of the health action process
approach at the intrapersonal level. Health
Psychology, 28, 702–708.
Schunk, D. H. (1995). Self-­efficacy and education
and instruction. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self­efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment: Theory,
research, and application (pp. 281–304). New
York: Plenum Press.
Schunk, D. H., Hanson, A. R., & Cox, P. D.
(1987). Peer-model attributes and children’s
achievement behaviors. Journal of Educational Psychology, 79(1), 54–61.
Schunk, D. H., & Meece, J. L. (2006). Self­efficacy development in adolescence. In F. Pajares & T. Urdan (Eds.), Self-­efficacy beliefs
of adolescents (pp. 71–96). Greenwich, CT:
Information Age Publishing.
Schwarzer, R. (1992). Self-­efficacy in the adoption and maintenance of health behaviors:
Theoretical approaches and a new model. In
R. Schwarzer (Ed.), Self-­efficacy: Thought
control of action (pp. 217–243). Washington,
DC: Hemisphere.
Schwarzer, R., Baessler, J., Kwiatek, P., Schroeder, K., & Zhang, J. X. (1997). Assessment
of optimistic self-­beliefs: Comparison of the
German, Spanish, and Chinese versions of
the General Self-­Efficacy Scale. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 46, 69–
88.
Schwarzer, R., & Renner, B. (2000). Social­cognitive predictors of health behavior: Action
self-­efficacy and coping self-­efficacy. Health
Psychology, 19, 487–495.
Schwerdtfeger, S. A., Konermann, L., & Schoenhofen, K. (2008). Self-­efficacy as a health­protective resource in teachers?: A biopsychological approach. Health Psychology, 27,
358–368.
Serios, F. M. (2003). Procrastination and intentions to perform health behaviors: The role of
self-­efficacy and the consideration of future
consequences. Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 115–128.
Sevigny, P. R., & Loutzenhiser, L. (2010). Predictors of parenting self-­efficacy in mothers and
fathers of toddlers. Child: Care, Health, and
Development, 36, 179–189.
10. Self-­Efficacy
Shadel, W. G. (2010). Clinical assessment of
personality: Perspectives from contemporary
personality science. In J. E. Maddux & J. P.
Tangney (Eds.), Social psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 329–348).
New York: Guilford Press.
Shenassa, E. D. (2001). Society, physical health
and modern epidemiology. Epidemiology, 12,
467–470.
Sherer, M., Maddux, J. E., Mercandante, B.,
Prentice-Dunn, S., Jacobs, B., & Rogers, R.
W. (1982). The self-­efficacy scale: Construction and validation. Psychological Reports,
51, 633–671.
Sherman, N. W. (2002). Motivation, attributions, and self-­efficacy in children. Journal of
Physical Education, Recreation and Dance,
73, 10–13.
Sheu, H. B., Lent, R. W., Brown, S. D., Miller,
M. J., Hennessy, K. D., & Duffy, R. D. (2010).
Testing the choice model of social cognitive
career theory across Holland themes: A meta­analytic path analysis. Journal of Vocational
Behavior, 76(2), 252–264.
Shields, C. A., Brawley, L. R., & Lindover, T. I.
(2006). Self-­efficacy as a mediator of the relationship between causal attributions and
exercise behavior. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 36, 2785–2802.
Shiffman, S., Balabanis, M. H., Paty, J. A.,
Engberg, J., Gwaltney, C. J., Liu, K. S., et al.
(2000). Dynamic effects of self-­efficacy on
smoking lapse and relapse. Health Psychology, 19(4), 315–323.
Short, S. E., Bruggeman, J. M., Engel, S. G.,
Marback, T. L., Wang, L. J., Willadsen, A., et
al. (2002). The effect of imagery function and
imagery direction on self-­efficacy and performance on a golf-­putting task. Sport Psychologist, 16, 48–67.
Singer, J. L. (1998). Imaginative play in early
childhood: A foundation for adaptive emotional and cognitive development. International Medical Journal, 5, 93–100.
Skinner, E. A. (1995). Perceived control, motivation, and coping. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Smith, R. F. (2008). Biological bases of psychopathology. In J. E. Maddux & B. W. Winstead
(Eds.), Psychopathology: Foundations for a
contemporary understanding (pp. 67–82).
New York: Taylor & Francis.
Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., & Quinn, D. M.
(1999). Stereotype threat and women’s math
performance. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 4–28.
223
Spink, K. S., & Nickel, D. (2009). Self-­regulatory
efficacy as a mediator between attributions
and intention for health-­related physical ac­
tivity. Journal of Health Psychology, 15,
75–84.
Stack, D. M., & Poulin-­Dubois, D. (2002). Socioemotional and cognitive competence in infancy: Paradigms, assessment strategies, and
implications for intervention. In D. Pushkar,
W. M. Bukowski, A. E. Schwartzman, D. M.
Stack, & D. R. White (Eds.), Improving competence across the lifespan: Building interventions based on theory and research (pp. 37–
57). New York: Plenum Press.
Stajkovic, A. D., & Luthans, F. (1998). Self­efficacy and work-­related performance: A
meta-­analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 124,
240–261.
Stajkovic, A. D., & Summer, S. M. (2000). Self­efficacy and causal attributions: Direct and reciprocal links. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 707–737.
Strecher, V. J., Champion, V. L., & Rosenstock,
I. M. (1997). The health belief model and
health behavior. In D. Gochman (Ed.), Handbook of health behavior research I: Personal
and social determinants (pp. 71–92). New
York: Plenum Press.
Tabernero, C., & Wood, R. E. (2009). Implicit
theories versus the social construal of ability in
self-­regulation and performance on a complex
task. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 78, 104–127.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and
well-being: A social psychological perspective
on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 2,
193–210.
Tipton, R. M., & Worthington, E. L. (1984).
The measurement of generalized self-­efficacy:
A study of construct validity. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 545–548.
Tolli, A. P., & Schmidt, A. M. (2008). The role of
feedback, causal attributions, and self-­efficacy
in goal revision. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 692–701.
Urdan, T., & Schoenfelder, E. (2006). Classroom effects on student motivation: Goal
structures, social relationships, and competence beliefs. Journal of School Psychology,
44, 331–349.
Usher, E. L., & Pajares, F. (2008). Sources of
self-­efficacy in school: Critical review of the
literature and future directions. Review of
Educational Research, 78, 751–796.
van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R.
224
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
(2008). Toward an integrative social identity
model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-­psychological
perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134(4),
504–535.
Vancouver, J. B., More, K. M., & Yoder, R. J.
(2008). Self-­efficacy and resource allocation:
Support for a nonmonotonic, discontinuous
model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93,
35–45.
Vecchio, G. V., Gerbino, M., Pastorelli, C., Del
Bove, G., & Caprara, G. V. (2007). Multi­faceted self-­efficacy beliefs as predictors of life
satisfaction in late adolescence. Personality
and Individual Differences, 43, 1807–1818.
Vessey, G. N. A. (1967). Volition. In P. Edwards
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (pp. 258–
260). New York: MacMillan.
Vinokur, A. D., van Ryn, M., Gramlich, E. M.,
& Price, R. H. (1991). Long-term follow-up
and benefit–cost analysis of the jobs program:
A preventive intervention for the unemployed.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, 213–219.
Wagner, J. A., & Moch, M. K. (1986).
Individualism-­collectivism: Concept and measure. Group and Organization Management,
11(3), 280–304.
Wanberg, C. R., Kanfer, R., & Rotundo, M.
(1999). Unemployed individuals: Motives,
job-­search competencies, and job-­search constraints as predictors of job seeking and reemployment. Journal of Applied Psychology,
84(6), 897–910.
Weinstein, N. D. (1993). Testing four competing
theories of health-­protective behavior. Health
Psychology, 12, 324–333.
Welch, D. C., & West, R. L. (1995). Self-­efficacy
and mastery: Its application to issues of environmental control, cognition, and aging. Developmental Review, 15, 150–171.
West, R. L., Bagwell, D. K., & Dark-­Freudeman,
A. (2008). Self-­efficacy and memory aging:
The impact of a memory intervention based
on self-­efficacy. Aging, Neuropsychology, and
Cognition, 15(3), 302–329.
White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered:
The concept of competence. Psychological Review, 66, 297–333.
Williams, S. L. (1995). Self-­efficacy, anxiety, and
phobic disorders. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self­efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment: Theory,
research and application (pp. 69–107). New
York: Plenum Press.
Williams, T., & Williams, K. (2010). Self-­efficacy
and performance in mathematics: Reciprocal
determinism in 33 nations. Journal of Educational Psychology, 102(2), 453–466.
Windle, G., Markland, D. A., & Woods, R. T.
(2008). Examination of a theoretical model
of psychological resilience in older age. Aging
and Mental Health, 12, 285–292.
Wood, R. E., & Bandura, A., (1989). Impact
of conceptions of ability on self-­regulatory
mechanisms and complex decision making.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
56, 407–415.
Yang, M., Chuang, H., & Chiou, W. (2009).
Long-terms costs of inflated self-­estimate on
academic performance among adolescent
students: A case of second-­language achievements. Psychological Reports, 105, 727–737.
Zaccaro, S., Blair, V., Peterson, C., & Zazanis,
M. (1995). Collective efficacy. In J. E. Maddux (Ed.), Self-­efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment: Theory, research, and application
(pp. 305–330). New York: Plenum Press.
Zhao, H., Siebert, S. E., & Hills, G. E. (2005).
The mediating role of self-­efficacy in the development of entrepreneurial intentions. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 90, 1265–1272.
Zimmerman, B. J., & Cleary, T. J. (2006). Adolescents’ development of personal agency: The
role of self-­efficacy beliefs and self-­regulatory
skill. In F. Pajares & T. Urdan (Eds.), Self­efficacy beliefs of adolescents (pp. 45–69).
Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Chapter 11
Multiple Identities within a Single Self
A Self-­Determination Theory Perspective
on Internalization within Contexts and Cultures
Richard M. Ryan
Edward L. Deci
When a human being first emerges into the
world, it has no identity; that is, the neonate
is not yet defined in terms of institutional
affiliations, self-­representations, and social
roles by which others recognize it. Any identities this child will later have, perhaps as an
athlete, a religious adherent, a physician, a
heterosexual, a collectivist, or all of these,
therefore result from a developmental process that takes place within a cultural context. Plainly put, individuals acquire identities over time, identities whose origins and
meanings derive from their interactions with
the social groups and organizations that surround them. In turn, these identities, once
adopted, play a significant role in the organization and regulation of people’s everyday
lives.
Identity Formation
in the Modern World
The problem of identity is more salient
today than at any time in history. In market­oriented societies, which now dominate the
globe, the range of possible identities available to most individuals is larger than ever,
and the latitude given to individuals to pursue or enact different identities “appears”
vast. Whereas in many traditional cultures
identities were conferred as a function of
relatively fixed factors such as birthrights,
social and religious orders, or parental status, within modern cultures identities have
become more fluid and dynamic. Most people are expected to select identities involving
school and work to succeed in, and this helps
prime a culture of competition and achievement orientation. And regardless of success,
individuals within a consumer culture can at
least superficially define themselves through
their selection of cars, clothes, commodities,
media idols, and other markers of interests,
status, and affiliation. In other words people
can consume their way into identities. Adding to this fluidity is an exponentially expanded exposure to varied role models and
value systems through mass media and Webbased communications. In summary, in the
absence of strong identity constraints, the
presence of self-­commodification, and the
widening of models and apparent (though
not always truly accessible) options, the developmental task of defining oneself within
a social world is among the most salient and
difficult of life’s challenges.
That identity formation has become, for
historical, cultural, and economic reasons, a
central developmental task in our age also
225
226
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
has some dark sides (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011). As traditionalists have long
maintained, identity struggles can lead to
lost souls. Many of today’s youth fail to negotiate the not-so-clear pathways to the adult
roles, responsibilities, and relationships that
secure identities afford. Often, in the face of
this struggle, many end up adopting darker
identities, such as drug abuser, sexual risk
taker, compulsive shopper, or gambler, as a
compensatory method of experiencing aliveness or staving off depression and meaninglessness. Thus, although identity has been
a perennial issue for individuals within all
human groups, the concept is more salient
and the struggle more obvious today, precisely because identity is so frequently an
open question.
Identity formation is a process that continues throughout life, one that comes especially to the foreground when individuals
shift social contexts, such as changing jobs
or going from single to married. However,
the major struggles of identity fall upon
adolescents, for whom the establishment of
secure identities is critical for passage into
the adult world (Adams & Marshall, 1996;
Erikson, 1968). Through the peer groups
toward which they gravitate, the celebrities
they admire, the logos they wear, the lifestyles they emulate, and the career interests
they espouse, adolescents attempt to define
themselves within society. Both the motivation and capacity for grappling with different
identities are potentiated by the advent of adolescent egocentrism (Elkind, 1985; Piaget,
1967). Specifically with adolescence comes
the propensity to view oneself from the perspective of others and thus to be conscious of
the “place” one has within social contexts.
This leads to greater self-­awareness, but it
also engenders considerable anxiety and
conformity in order to avoid shame (Ryan &
Kuczkowski, 1994). Thus, it is often within
an atmosphere of social pressures, both real
and imagined, that teens attempt to lay the
roots of adult identity.
In Search of Need Satisfaction
To discover why some available identities
are adopted and maintained by individuals,
while others are ignored or rejected, we must
ask first why identities are adopted at all.
What functions does identity adoption serve
for individuals? The most general answer is
that identities are adopted in the service of
basic psychological needs.
First and foremost, people develop identities to help them secure, maintain, and
solidify a sense of relatedness (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan,
1993). In acquiring identities individuals
become more connected with others and
fit better into social niches, adopting roles,
beliefs, and practices that are recognized
and appreciated by others. This begins with
early identifications based on family values
and aspirations but shifts as development
proceeds to a wider set of influences and
models. Throughout the lifespan, a principal function of identity adoption remains
the fostering of experiences of secure relatedness and belonging.
Identities can satisfy other basic needs as
well and, optimally, they do. In some cases
identities are selected and maintained because they support feelings of competence;
that is, people gravitate toward identities
within which they can gain skills and knowledge and, more generally, feel effective. In
fact, among the identities people are most
likely to claim explicitly are those associated with developed competencies, skills, or
achievements.
Identities also fulfill the need for autonomy and thus provide a venue through which
people can develop and express personal
interests and abiding values. In fact, important identities for many people express central concerns relating to religion, lifestyle,
politics, or nationality, to name a few. These
identities facilitate satisfaction of the need
for autonomy to the degree that people have
wholeheartedly accepted and concurred
with the identities as their own.
In other cases, however, identities are
taken on more defensively, such as when a
person adopts an identity or group affiliation to avoid feelings of vulnerability, or to
gain power over others; and identities may be
taken on reactively, as when a person adopts
the identity of, say, a class clown in order
to oppose the values of controlling parents
(Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Because identities are typically selected
and formed in the service of people’s psychological needs (or in reaction to need thwarting), their acquisition and maintenance is
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
dynamic and must be understood as a complex expression of the interaction between
needs and affordances, and of the motives to
which this interaction gives rise.
Self‑Determination Theory
In this chapter our focus is on the processes
through which identities are acquired and
organized within the individual, and on the
relations of identity internalization to optimal functioning and well-being. We begin
with the recognition that each individual
has multiple identities, and that each of these
identities is, to a greater or lesser extent,
well assimilated to the self of the individual.
Thus, we do not view identity as a holistic
concept in which all that a person believes
him- or herself to be represents that person’s
identity. Instead, we examine the degree to
which a person’s multiple identities have
been integrated to that person’s self. This
perspective is central to self-­determination
theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan
& Deci, 2000), a theory of motivation and
personality within social contexts, that is
concerned with the relative assimilation
of goals, values, and identities. SDT specifies variations in the relative degree of assimilation of identities to the self and argues
that these variations have empirically testable and clinically relevant implications for
human functioning (Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011).
More specifically, SDT proposes that the
identities we “wear” can vary from being
forced on us by the contingencies of our social context, to being partially assimilated
as introjects, to being well ­integrated to the
self. In the latter case, they can serve as personally meaningful and abiding guides to
life; in the former cases, they can represent
oppressive and destructive forces within the
individual. In fact, SDT suggests that the
more one’s life roles and pursuits remain
only partially assimilated to the self, the
more they fail to fulfill psychological needs,
which accounts for the relationship between
less internalization and poorer psychological well-being (e.g., Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).
We believe that this conceptualization of
internalization, and the empirical findings
associated with it, have relevance to the understanding of identity development and to
227
practical approaches to socialization, education, and psychotherapy.
To introduce this perspective and the hypotheses that derive from it, we proceed as
follows. First, we outline the SDT theoretical model of internalization and integration
of identities. Second, we review empirical
evidence concerning the functional outcomes associated with different types of internalization. Third, we examine the social
contextual factors that facilitate the assimilation of identities, values, and goals, as well
as those that forestall it. Fourth, we consider
the cross-­cultural and cross-­gender generalizability of our model of internalization and
autonomy in the regulation of values and
identities. A fifth issue we address is that of
multiple identities, and how the relative integration versus compartmentalization of personal identifications influences action and
well-being. Finally, we examine relations between needs for relatedness and autonomy
as they dynamically shape the concerns and
occupations of the self.
Acquiring Identities: The “Why” Behind
Our Goal Strivings
The acquisition of identities, like the acquisition of any other psychological structure,
occurs primarily through the process of integration or assimilation. People are naturally
inclined to imitate, explore, and take on ambient social roles and practices and integrate
them. However, because people cannot take
on and integrate every ambient identity, and
because families and societies discourage
some roles for some individuals, the process
of identity acquisition is clearly a complex
one that is codetermined by individual proclivities and interests as they interact with
social pressures, constraints, and reward
contingencies (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2011).
In some cases identities appear to grow
directly from natural inclinations, interests,
and curiosities. In other words, the enactment of some identities seems to be intrinsically motivated (Deci, 1992). Intrinsic
motivation is the prototype for autonomous
or self-­determined activity. When people
are intrinsically motivated, they experience
their actions as inherently enjoyable or satisfying (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Although
intrinsic motivation is often a spontaneous
228
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
experience associated with novel and interesting activities, it is nonetheless relevant to
the selection and maintenance of identities.
Thus, a child who enjoys building and manipulating objects may become a craftsperson; one who loves to climb, run, and jump
could become an athlete; and a musically
inclined child might become a musician. In
these examples, early experiences of intrinsic
motivation supply the impetus for a person’s
choice of an avocation, career, or lifestyle
that ultimately becomes part of his or her
identity (Krapp, 2002). Thus, opportunities
to experience intrinsic motivation can play
an important role in how people find and
maintain some of the identities they adopt.
The transformation of inclinations, interests, and curiosities into identities is no
simple process, however. Even activities that
are intrinsically motivated require definite
environmental affordances and supports if
they are to be sustained over time, and over
life’s natural obstacles. Thus, children’s general curiosity and fascination with the world
around will gradually become channeled
into interests in particular subject areas or
activities with which they come to identify,
whether those activities be reading psychology, studying art history, or playing music.
This, however, will be most likely to happen only when the person has found the activities optimally challenging, has received
effectance-­related supports and positive
feedback, and has not been overly controlled
by others in relation to the activities; that is,
interpersonal supports facilitate the elaboration of inclinations and curiosities, allowing
them to develop into identities. Within SDT
we refer to this process as the differentiation
of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; Deci &
Ryan, 1985b).
However, although early inclinations
and intrinsic interests can sometimes be the
source of, or impetus toward, subsequent
identities, many if not most of the identities
adults adopt are not direct outgrowths of
the things they loved to do as children. In
fact, nearly every adult identity carries with
it certain roles, responsibilities, and tasks
that are not, in themselves, intrinsically
motivated (Ryan, 1995). Instead, over the
course of socialization, people are exposed
to identities, or aspects of them, that may
or may not be intrinsically appealing, but
that may have instrumental value or impor-
tance. As these roles, tasks, and duties are
modeled and taught, children take them in
or accept them to different degrees. Within
SDT we refer to this process of “taking in”
external regulations and socially transmitted values and then transforming them into
self-­regulations and personally endorsed values as internalization (Deci & Ryan, 1985b;
Ryan & Connell, 1989; Vallerand, 1997).
SDT posits that variations in the extent or
quality of internalization explain the differences between authentic, vital, and committed living that some individuals exhibit, and
the alienated, halfhearted, or conflicted enactment of identities that afflict others.
To illustrate, consider that a majority of
Americans identify themselves as Christians.
Among them, however, there is considerable
variability in the extent to which that identity is experienced as authentic and autonomous (Batson, 1976; Ryan, Rigby, & King,
1993). It is, in fact, easy to find Christians
for whom the label is merely skin deep and
describes little of what they really value or
do, just as one can find persons for whom
the label captures their core values and thus
deeply describes their abiding concerns and
lifestyles. Those who have more fully internalized the religious beliefs tend both to be
more open in their interpretation of the religion and to display greater psychological
well-being (Neyrinck, Vansteenkiste, Lens,
Hutsebaut, & Duriez, 2006). In fact, take
any identity—­worker, spouse, liberal, sports
fan—and the following rule will apply: Identities vary in the extent to which they are
actually assimilated to the self of the individual and therefore receive the person’s full
endorsement and volitional engagement.
A Model of Internalization
and Integration of Goals and Identities
When one observes multiple individuals engaged in a similar domain of activity, one
cannot help but be impressed by variations
in spirit and motivation among them. For
instance, when two adolescent girls take on
the identity of gymnast, one might be doing
it to please her athletically oriented parents,
in which case she would compliantly go
through the motions of practice and performance with minimal enthusiasm or inspiration, and perhaps with feelings of pressure or
conflict. The other girl might fully embrace
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
the identity of gymnast, viewing it as a valued avocation, and engage in it energetically
on an everyday basis. Both examples are of
people who, from the outside, have an identity as a gymnast but clearly have adopted
this identity differently, resulting in different
manners of engagement and degrees to which
the identity has permeated their lives. From
the perspective of SDT, the different reasons
for enacting a behavior influence the extent
to which the behavioral regulations are internalized and accepted as the individual’s
own. In this sense, the distinctions between
regulations and identities being more or less
assimilated are motivational—they concern
the regulatory processes that underlie action
and the qualities that accompany them.
Internalization and Regulation of Identities
According to SDT, any characteristic behavior, role, or identity, if it is adopted at all,
can be understood as underpinned by different reasons or motives that reflect differing
degrees of internalization or assimilation of
the behavior or identity to the self. These
reasons may either be explicitly understood
or operate at an implicit level, but in either
case, they have distinct characteristics and
systematic interrelations.
Amotivation
At the lower end of a continuum of internalization sits an absence of any interest or motivation, which we label amotivation. There
are two general types of amotivation—that
in which the person experiences no competence in relation to the identity and thus does
not persist at it (Pelletier, Dion, Tuson, &
Green-­Demers, 1999), and that in which the
person sees no interest or value in the identity (Ryan, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000b).
Amotivation can be benign or it can be a
serious problem. For example, taking on the
identity of tennis player is typically a voluntary matter, and many people either do not
have the facility for it or do not find tennis
interesting. They would be amotivated with
respect to the game, but, provided they had
other venues for constructive activity, tennis
amotivation would have little consequence
for their wellness. With some identities,
however, significant others, such as parents,
teachers, and maybe even society as a whole,
229
care very much about whether youth internalize them. Thus, a given culture might
weigh in heavily on the side of specific identities, such as being a good student, a heterosexual, or a loyal soldier. In such cases, successfully adopting the favored identities (or
failing to take them on) may have a variety
of immediate and long-term negative consequences for an individuals’ place in the culture and for their feelings about themselves.
For example, large numbers of young people
feel unable to engage the activities of school,
and they suffer throughout their lives because of their failure to adopt the identity of
student when they were young.
In a study of unemployed individuals,
Vansteenkiste, Lens, De Witte, De Witte,
and Deci (2004) uncovered both adaptive
and maladaptive forms of searching and not
searching for a job. Some people who needed a job felt amotivated to search because
they felt incompetent at finding one. These
individuals did not spend much time searching, and they reported high negative affect,
low general health, and poor life satisfaction. Some unemployed people, however,
who were not spending much time searching
were actually autonomously motivated not to
search, presumably because they wanted to
pursue other aspects of their lives, and these
individuals reported high positive affect and
life satisfaction. In short, people who wanted to be employed but felt incompetent to attain that identity showed negative outcomes,
whereas people who autonomously identified with being unemployed showed more
positive outcomes.
The distinction between amotivation due
to felt incompetence versus amotivation because of lack of interest is thus an important
one. Motivation theories built on efficacy
alone recognize amotivation as helplessness,
but amotivation stemming from lack of interest in an identity can be very adaptive for
a person whose desired place in the world
may not fully mesh with what society specifies as the appropriate identities.
External Regulation
Some identities are adopted because people
feel compelled to enact them. People can be
mandated to become soldiers, or parents can
coerce children into being musicians, doctors, or clerics. In addition, people take on
230
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
roles for rewards—they enact the identities
of a “boss,” a “waiter,” or a “professor,” but
they do it only for the money. Because of their
dependence on external forces and incentives
to play such roles, this external regulation
of identities is the least internalized form of
active motivation. This type of regulation
involves intentionality and behavioral enactment, but the initiation and causation of the
action is largely external to individuals and
is not part of their true sense of self. Thus,
when people are externally regulated, they
act in accord with, and because of, rewards
and punishments administered by others.
When their actions are controlled through
such contingencies, the only internalization
required for such engagement is the internalization of information relevant to negotiating the contingencies successfully. From an
attributional standpoint the perceived locus
of causality (de Charms, 1968) of the activity is fully external and is therefore dependent upon the continued presence of the external causes for its persistence.
External regulation is a powerful form of
motivation, a fact that has been amply demonstrated in more than half a century of operant research. However, as research in both
that tradition and the SDT tradition has
shown, the problem with external regulation
is maintenance and transfer (Deci & Ryan,
1985b). To the extent that behavior has become dependent on externally controlled reward or punishment contingencies, there is a
lesser tendency for internalization to occur
and the behavior is less likely to be enacted
in new situations at future times. In other
words, with external regulation, adherence
will be poor when rewards are withdrawn.
Indeed, there is an inverse relation between the strength of someone’s experience
of being externally controlled and the likelihood that the person will personally identify
with and persist at the relevant behavior or
value over the long term. For example, Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, and Brière (2001)
studied elite swimmers—­athletes who were
committed to the sport at a high level—over
an 22-month interval. They found that those
who reported being externally regulated for
their sport were much more likely to drop
out of this avocation than were swimmers
who had more fully internalized this identity
and were therefore more autonomously motivated to engage it. Furthermore, Lonsdale,
Hodge, and Rose (2009) found that elite
athletes in many varied sports who were
more controlled in their motivation for their
sport identity showed greater burnout from
the sport. As predicted by SDT, when people
are externally regulated, they are less likely
to adhere once the controls are removed. As
such, external controls undermine the development of personally valuing the endeavor,
which is the basis for sustained identification and persistent engagement. External
regulation of behavior therefore represents
motivated engagement, but it is controlled
by forces outside the person and therefore
represents a relative absence of internalization.
Introjection
Somewhat greater internalization is represented by the motivational state of introjection. When a person has introjected a regulation, he or she engages in the activity or
adopts the role in order to enhance, maintain, or avoid losing self-­esteem. In other
words, introjected regulation is based on
contingencies of self- and other-­approval. A
teen who attends religious services because
not doing so would prompt guilt and anxiety is thus regulated through introjection.
Similarly, a medical student whose pursuits
are based upon receiving accolades, status,
and the feelings of self-­aggrandizement that
accompany a professional status is similarly
operating from introjection. Unlike external
regulation, introjected regulation implies
that a partial internalization of values and
identities has occurred such that people apply
intrapersonally that which had been applied
interpersonally by socializing agents. In so
doing, they experience rewards and punishments, typically in the form of self-­esteemrelated feelings and appraisals, and it is these
contingent self-­evaluations and their affective consequences that regulate their identity. Introjection represents only partial internalization because people have not accepted
the identity as truly their own but instead
are controlled by the contingent self-­esteem
that originated as conditional love and esteem by important others, such as parents
(Assor, Roth, & Deci, 2004).
Introjection is often betrayed by discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes. For example, Weinstein, Ryan, and
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
colleagues (in press) found that a subset
of individuals who had expressed explicit
identities as heterosexuals also has implicit
sexual orientation scores that differed from
the explicit ones. These discrepancies, which
implied that the explicit identity had been introjected, in turn predicted both homophobic attitudes—­likely representing reaction
formation to a potential inner threat (Freud,
1936)—and greater willingness to legally restrict or punish gays and lesbians.
Identification
Fuller internalization is signified by an individual personally identifying with a value
or life role. In SDT, identified regulation is
characterized by conscious endorsement or
assent to the value and importance of a role
or attribute. Teenagers who identify with
going to college engage in studying more volitionally and with greater initiative because
they consciously evaluate that activity as important and meaningful. Activities regulated through identification are therefore to a
large degree autonomous, and accompanied
by an experience of volition and freedom in
acting. According to SDT, being regulated
in this more volitional way, relative to external and introjected motives, results in
not only higher-­quality engagement (greater
persistence, effort, etc.) but also more positive experiences such as enjoyment, sense of
purpose, and well-being (Niemiec, Lynch, et
al., 2006).
SDT further acknowledges, however, that
identifications can be relatively isolated or
compartmentalized within the psyche, as
opposed to being relatively integrated and
unified with other identifications, values,
and needs of the self (Ryan & Deci, 2004;
Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan, 2011). For instance, suppose that in the workplace a man
identifies with the role of “ruthless entrepreneur,” then in his home life aspires to being a
generous and loving father and spouse. Both
might be values or roles that he personally
holds and deems important, but their inconsistency requires that he keep them compartmentalized from one another—being generous and loving at work would, he no doubt
believes, constrain his entrepreneurial possibilities, while awareness of his cutthroat activities in business might engender guilt and
anxiety when he is in his more loving mode
231
of identity. Thus, SDT suggests that identifications can be thought of as more versus less
compartmentalized, and only those that are
well integrated within the psyche represent
the full endorsement of the self. Accordingly, integrated regulation represents the most
autonomous form of intentional, extrinsically motivated, behavior. Integrated regulation is related to intrinsic motivation in
that both are characterized by high levels of
autonomy, but intrinsic motivation involves
doing an activity because the activity itself
is interesting, whereas integrated regulation
involves doing an activity because of the importance of its instrumental benefit for personally valued, congruent, and self-­selected
outcomes.
Considerable research has shown that
being autonomous and being high in integrated regulation are strongly related. The
more one integrates identities and regulation,
the more autonomous one will be in those
domains. Furthermore, the more autonomous a person is, the more able the person
will be to integrate additional identities. Research by Weinstein, Deci, and Ryan (2011)
has shown, for example, that when people
have a high autonomy orientation (e.g., Deci
& Ryan, 1985a) or are primed to make autonomy more accessible, they are more likely
to integrate past negative identities than is
the case for those high in controlled orientation or who are primed with control.
The Relative Autonomy Continuum
It is obvious from the descriptions of the
various regulations and the degrees of internalization that people differ in the relative
autonomy they experience when enacting
different identities. A person who is amotivated for an identity has a complete lack of
autonomy with respect to it, while a person
who is externally regulated for an identity­related behavior experiences very little autonomy in its enactment. The person who
has introjected a regulation experiences
some autonomy, but not a lot. In contrast,
the person who has identified with the importance of the behavior or role experiences
greater autonomy; and the person who either has integrated an initially external identity or had it develop from intrinsically motivated behavior experiences a high degree
of autonomy. As such, underlying this tax-
232
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
onomy of motives or regulatory processes
is a continuum of relative autonomy. This
continuum is displayed in the first column of
Table 11.1, arranged vertically such that the
regulatory process described in the first row
is the least autonomous, that in the second
row is slightly more autonomous, and so on.
One caveat, however, is that both integrated
regulation and intrinsic motivation are considered highly autonomous, with intrinsic
motivation not requiring internalization
per se, whereas integrated regulation is the
result of the most complete internalization.
The double line in the table between integrated regulation and intrinsic motivation is
intended to convey this; the double line between amotivation and external regulation
is similarly intended to distinguish lack of
motivation from the various types of extrinsic motivation.
Empirical support for the continuum nature of these types of regulation has been
TABLE 11.1. The Relative Autonomy Continuum with Types of Identity-­Related Regulation,
the Processes through Which They Develop, and the Contexts That Promote Their
Development and Operation
Complete lack Types of regulation
Developmental processes
of autonomy
Amotivation: Lacking
Complete absence of
intentionality; behaving as a internalization.
function of an unregulated
drive, emotion, or external
force.
External regulation:
Intentional responding
controlled primarily by
external contingencies.
Internalization only of
information relevant
to operating within the
controlling contingencies.
Social contextual facilitators
Inconsistent responses from
others; noncontingencies
between behavior and
outcomes; indicators of
incompetence; irrelevance of
behavior or outcomes.
Coercive or strongly
pressuring practices that
emphasize reward and
punishment contingencies.
Introjected regulation:
Internalization of
Relatively controlling
Behavior controlled by
contingencies of worth
contexts characterized by
internal contingencies related and information about the conditional affection and
to self-worth and generalized activities and attributes that regard.
approval, accompanied by are instrumental for approval
the experience of pressure
from significant others.
and anxiety.
Identified regulation:
Internalization of the
Relatively volitional action personal importance of the
regulated by one’s sense of activity through consciously
the importance of the activityidentifying with its meaning
or role for one’s values and and value.
self-­selected goals.
Highly
autonomous
Autonomy supportive
context relating to target
individual from his or her
perspective and supporting
choice and initiation.
Integrated regulation:
Acting autonomously from
an integrated sense of self,
in accord with a coherent
identity.
The reciprocal assimilation
of the target identification
with other identities, needs,
and aspects of an integrated
self.
Intrinsic motivation:
Volitional engagement in
activities out of interest and
spontaneous satisfaction.
Differentiation of one’s
Affordances provided that
general interests and skills allow one’s interests to be
within specific activities or pursued and sharpened in the
domains and then integrationcontext of optimal challenge,
of those with other aspects of informational feedback, and
the self.
supports for exploration and
autonomy in action.
Autonomy supportive
context that not only
supports initiating
but also encourages a
mindful consideration and
exploration of values, needs,
and regulatory processes.
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
manifold. For example, in an initial demonstration, Ryan and Connell (1989) assessed children’s regulatory styles for both
prosocial and school-­related activities, and
showed that these motivational states conformed to a quasi-­simplex or “ordered correlational” pattern, providing evidence for
an underlying continuum. The conceptual
continuum with the simplex-like pattern has
been replicated numerous times, in domains
as diverse as sport, religion, school, health
care, and politics, among others (see, e.g.,
Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000b;
Vallerand, 1997) and has been supported
by multiple statistical methods (e.g., Roth,
Kanat-­Maymon, Assor, & Kaplan, 2006;
Wang, Hagger, & Liu, 2009).
Consequences of the Types
of Internalization
Rather than reiterate comprehensive reviews
of this research (see, e.g., Deci & Ryan,
2011), we draw on a few examples of internalization studies to show the import of this
model for identity formation and its enactment. In particular, we focus on the contrast
of introjected versus identified or integrated
forms of internalizations, for among these
three types of internal motivation can be
found the most theoretically interesting, yet
subtle, differences in internalization styles.
The first of these examples concerns
people’s religious identities. Ryan and colleagues (1993) assessed several diverse samples of individuals who described themselves
as Christian. The focus of these assessments
was the extent to which the motivation underlying their Christian activities, such as
going to church, praying, or evangelizing,
was introjected or identified using the SDTbased definitions. Findings revealed that
Christians did indeed vary in their reasons
for religious participation, with both introjected and identified regulation appearing to foster church attendance, as expected. However, whereas introjected religiosity
was associated with more negative psychological adjustment, identified religiosity was
associated with greater mental health. This
fits with the notion that, particularly for important life identities, the more they are assimilated to the self, the more positively they
will be related to psychological well-being.
Similar results were obtained by Strahan
233
and Craig (1995) in a large-scale study of
Seventh Day Adventists. Here, too, introjection was associated with more inner conflict
and poorer well-being, relative to identified
regulation for religious behaviors. Those researchers also found that having had parents who were more autonomy-­supportive
(rather than controlling) was associated
positively with identification and negatively
with introjection.
Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, and Carducci
(1996) compared people whose involvement
in political concerns was based in either
introjected or identified forms of internalization. They found that identification was
associated with more actively seeking out
information relevant to decisions, having a
more complex or differentiated viewpoint,
and being more likely to actually vote. Introjected regulation was associated with
vulnerability to persuasion, reliance on
others’ opinions, and conflicting emotions
about outcomes. Thus, identified versus introjected ways of embracing politics yielded
different qualities of experience and involvement.
The relation between style of internalization and the quality of involvement has
been shown most clearly in the domain of
education. Studies have repeatedly shown
self-­esteem, academic confidence, perceived
competence, self-­motivation, and well-being
to be positively associated with autonomous
forms of motivation (see, e.g., Ryan & Deci,
2009, for a review). These same relations
between autonomous regulation and school
engagement, learning, and well-being have
also been shown in non-­Western nations
(Chirkov & Ryan, 2001; Hayamizu, 1997;
Tanaka & Yamauchi, 2000; Yamauchi &
Tanaka, 1998; Zhou, Ma, & Deci, 2009).
An illustrative study of this type that has
relevance to identity issues was conducted
by Black and Deci (2000) in the context
of university organic chemistry classes, a
traditional gateway to professions, such as
medicine, that have salient corresponding
identities. It was found that more students
were autonomously regulated in engaging
the class the more they perceived themselves
to be competent, the more interest they had
in the course material, and the less anxiety
they experienced. This motivational pattern,
in turn, accounted for better course performance, even when controlling for ability.
234
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Autonomy and Helping
Recent studies guided by SDT have examined the relation of autonomy to the identity
of giving to others. For example, Weinstein
and Ryan (2010) reported studies in which
college students engaged in prosocial helping. Some did so in a relatively autonomous
way, whereas others did so in a more controlled way. The studies consistently showed
that individuals who were helped benefited
significantly more if the helper had been
autonomous when engaging in the prosocial act rather than controlled. In fact, both
helper and helpee experienced more positive
consequences when the helper was autonomously motivated.
Related studies focused on the degree to
which members of a close-­friend dyad helped
their partners by providing autonomy support within the relationship (Deci, La Guardia, Moller, Scheiner, & Ryan, 2006). These
researchers found that when one person supported the autonomy of the other within the
relationship, not only did the receiver benefit in terms of both relationship satisfaction
and well-being from receiving the autonomy
support but the giver of the autonomy support also benefited from the act of giving it.
In fact, these relations were found to be mutual, with benefits accruing to both partners
from the giving by each of them. Together,
these studies suggest that helping others can
be very beneficial to both the helper and the
receiver so long as the helper is acting autonomously and is supporting the autonomy
of the other.
Internalization and Well‑Being
Well-being is a complex construct, differentially construed by different theorists. A
mainstream position in this area has been
labeled the hedonic viewpoint (Kahneman,
Diener, & Schwarz, 1999), in which wellbeing is equated with happiness or pleasure.
A second, and somewhat divergent position,
is the eudaimonic viewpoint (Waterman,
1993), in which well-being is construed in
terms of self-­realization and meaning. There
does, however, appear to be a convergence
of results concerning the relation of identity
and its regulation to well-being. Specifically,
we have repeatedly found that the greater
the internalization of one’s values, practices,
and goals—that is, those things that comprise identity—the greater one’s well-being,
as reflected both in hedonic indicators, such
as positive affect and life satisfaction, and
in the more eudaimonic outcomes, such as
vitality, self-­actualization, freedom from
inner conflict, and various qualities of relationships and experience (Ryan & Deci,
2001; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008). In line
with these general findings, several studies
have also shown that the relation between
controlled (as opposed to autonomous) regulation of identities and poorer well-being
is in part a function of defensiveness (e.g.,
Hodgins, Brown, & Carver, 2007; Hodgins
et al., 2010). Indeed, physiological measures, as well as self-­reports, have shown
controlled motivation to be associated with
greater defensiveness, which results in poorer well-being and performance (Hodgins et
al., 2010).
Regulation and Identities
To summarize, the SDT perspective suggests that the more fully a value or role—
that is, an identity—has been internalized
and thus accepted as one’s own, the more it
will represent a deeply held, nondefensive,
and flexibly enacted aspect of one’s self. It is
useful to recognize, however, that the term
identity gets used to refer to roles or values
that differ in their degree of generality. For
example, one person might have an identity as the person who distributes the mail
in a psychology department, and another
might have the identity of being a professor,
the latter of which is a much more general
identity than the former and is likely to have
several components, such as teacher of psychology, researcher, grants-­getter, counselor, and author, for example. Of course, one
could argue that each of these is a separate
identity, but the important point we wish
to make is that an identity can have different components, and it is possible that the
behaviors associated with these different
components or aspects of an identity can be
regulated differently. Thus, the psychologist might, for example, do research with a
sense of “should” to attain generalized approval and respect (introjection), teach out
of interest (intrinsic), reluctantly go through
the motions of applying for grants with no
intentions and little effort (amotivation),
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
see clients with a sense of its being important and valuable (identification), and write
books just because it will likely get him or
her tenure (external). Thus, within a general
identity, which will have been more or less
fully assimilated to the person’s self, there
can be different components that, themselves, vary in the degree to which they have
been integrated and thus will be regulated
through different processes.
Socializing Environments
and the Regulation of Identity
As noted, internalization refers to the processes through which individuals take in and
transform to varying degrees what is transmitted by their culture (Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Ryan & Connell, 1989). When that same
process is considered from the standpoint of
the social environment, the applicable term is
socialization; that is, socialization is the act
of fostering internalization and, accordingly,
we expect an etiological correspondence between the ways a social group regulates its
members and the forms of regulation those
practices precipitate.
As already noted, SDT views internalization as a motivated process, based in human
psychological needs. That is to say, identities,
which represent organized systems of goals
and affiliations, are formed and adopted in
the service of basic human needs (Deci &
Ryan, 2000). Through forging their identities, individuals find their places within social organizations, and by internalizing and
identifying with group values—that is, by
making the values part of their identities—
group members achieve a greater sense of
belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995)
or relatedness (Ryan, 1993). Accordingly,
people typically internalize those beliefs,
practices, and values endorsed by people or
groups whom they want to emulate or to
whom they wish to be more closely connected. SDT suggests, therefore, that in order
for any internalization to occur there must
be some form of individual attraction or
attachment to socializing agents or institutions. Beyond that, it is largely the dynamic
interplay of relatedness and autonomy that
determines the form of internalization likely
to occur.
SDT recognizes that some identities are
not internalized at all; in other words, some
235
people remain amotivated with respect to
various societally valued identities. To the
extent that parents, for example, place no
value on the relevant activities, are inconsistent in endorsing them, are punishing in response to their children’s attempts to do the
activities, or convey incompetence with respect to the children’s engagement in them,
the children are likely not to internalize the
values and behaviors as part of their identity. They may even be amotivated with respect to these activities.
Furthermore, SDT postulates that controlling forms of social regulation, such as
the use of rewards and punishments to elicit
behaviors, will engender some motivation
for the relevant behaviors but will result
in quite impoverished forms of internalizing both specific behaviors and the more
general organization of behaviors associated with identity. If socialization practices
are highly controlling, people are likely to
enact identity-­relevant behaviors only when
they are directly controlled to do so. That
is, controlling socialization practices tend to
occasion external regulation as their internalized counterpart, represented by compliance when the demands or contingencies are
operative. However, such practices also tend
to forestall further identification with and
assimilation of the activity’s regulation.
SDT further postulates that relatively controlling socialization practices such as those
involving what Rogers (1951) would have
labeled “conditions of worth” are likely to
promote introjection but not the fuller forms
of internalization. In other words, if socializers contingently bestow and withdraw
love or emotional security as a way of motivating particular behaviors and attributes,
SDT proposes that introjected regulation is
likely to follow, such that enactment of these
identity-­relevant behaviors will be pressured
by self-­esteem contingencies. In fostering
introjection, affection and regard are made
contingent upon one’s success, however defined, thus providing intermittent satisfaction of the relatedness need. In the process,
however, autonomy suffers a serious blow.
In short, the conditions of worth tend to pit
the autonomy need against the relatedness
need, and neither gets well satisfied.
Finally, SDT hypothesizes that both identified and integrated regulation are fostered by
autonomy-­supportive socializing practices.
236
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
Such practices involve minimal use of external controls, significant concern for the socializee’s frame of reference, empathic limit
setting, provision of rationales for requested
behaviors, and affordance of relevant choices
with respect to the behaviors or roles being
cultivated (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997;
Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984;
Reeve, Bolt, & Cai, 1999). Indeed, facilitation of commitment and interest in an activity is predicted to occur when socialization
agents are more autonomy supportive and
unconditionally related or connected to their
children, students, or subordinates.
Dynamically, identification is a particularly interesting form of internalization.
Characterized by a conscious endorsement
of a value or action, identified regulation is
accompanied by the phenomenological experience of autonomy. Thus, we expect identification to be fostered under autonomy­supportive conditions. Yet it is important to
recognize that some identifications are little
more than “introjects in disguise,” for they
are adopted as positive representations of a
way to be but are not necessarily holistically
representative of the self. In other words,
SDT suggests that identifications can be
more or less integrated into personality. The
process of integration—of assimilating one’s
identifications into a more coherent sense of
self—­requires awareness of a person’s multiple identities and mindful consideration of
their relations to one another. We return to
this issue when we discuss compartmentalized identifications in the section on multiple
identities.
Considerable research has explicated how
environments support or undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan,
1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Research has
suggested that conditions of autonomy support, optimal challenge, and informational
(noncontrolling) feedback help foster and
maintain intrinsic motivation for any given
pursuit. Regarding identities, we predict
that when an intrinsic interest flowers into
an identity, considerable nutriments in the
form of supports for autonomy and competence will likely have been afforded.
This overall model depicting relations
between environmental supports and internalization outcomes is presented in Table
11.1. As indicated, there is considerable isomorphism between socializing forms on the
one hand, and self-­regulatory forms on the
other.
Empirical Support
for the Socializing Model
A growing body of evidence supports the
SDT model (see, Deci & Ryan, 2000, 2011).
In early work, Grolnick and Ryan (1989)
interviewed parents in a rural community
concerning their socialization practices with
respect to school and achievement, and they
also obtained teachers’ and children’s ratings of the children’s motivation and performance. The researchers found that children
whose parents were rated by interviewers as
more autonomy supportive, relative to controlling, expressed greater autonomy with
respect to school. Specifically, these children
were higher in both identified and intrinsic
regulation than were children of controlling parents, and that led to higher grades
and better achievement test scores in school.
Subsequently, Grolnick, Ryan, and Deci
(1991) used children’s reports about their of
parents rather than interviewer ratings, and
replicated the findings in both urban and
suburban samples.
In a different domain, Gagné, Ryan, and
Bargmann (2003) conducted a longitudinal
diary-based study of young female gymnasts. These girls were participants in a club
where many aspired to bright futures in the
sport. Those who perceived their coaches
or parents as more autonomy supportive,
versus controlling, reported more identification and intrinsic motivation with respect
to gymnastics, as well as greater well-being.
In contrast, the athletes whose socializing
adults were more controlling reported greater external regulation and lower well-­being.
Parental and coach involvement—that is,
their dedication of time, resources, and
support to the girl’s endeavor—were also
positively associated with identification and
intrinsic motivation. In turn, the athletes’
internalization level predicted their attitudes
with respect to practice, performance, and
teammates, as well as well-being outcomes.
A laboratory experiment by Deci, Eghrari,
Patrick, and Leone (1994) yielded comparable results. Specifically, they found first that
a relatively controlling induction, in which
the experimenter used controlling language,
failed to provide a rationale for doing a
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
computer-­tracking concentration task, and
did not acknowledge the students’ feelings
about the task, led to less internalization and
behavioral enactment of the concentration­related task than did a relatively autonomy­supportive induction; and second, that internalization of the regulation that occurred in
the relatively controlling context was merely
introjected, whereas internalization that occurred in the relatively autonomy-­supportive
context was more integrated, as reflected in
positive correlations between the subsequent
behavior and self-­reported attitudes and
feelings.
In a study by Assor and colleagues (2004),
college students reported on the degree to
which their parents’ regard had been condition in relation to various identities. The
researchers found that when offspring experienced their parents’ attention and affection as being conditional upon certain
behavioral accomplishments, they enacted
the relevant identity-­specific behaviors in a
more pressured, self-­esteem-contingent way.
In other words, this relatively controlling socialization approach promoted introjection
rather than fuller integration of values and
regulations. Accompanying the introjection
were reports of feeling compelled to act,
greater “contingent” self-­esteem (Deci &
Ryan, 1995; Kernis & Paradise, 2002), and
only fleeting satisfaction following successful enactment of the behaviors. As well, the
more parents were experienced as contingent in their approval and regard, the more
the children felt rejection by the parents,
and the more negative were their feelings
toward their parents. In short, this study
confirmed that contingent regard can lead
to internalization, as Sears, Maccoby, and
Levin (1957) predicted, but the form of internalization was introjection, with its relative rigidity of action (Hoffmann, 1970) and
a variety of emotional costs. A second study
by Assor and colleagues provided evidence
for the intergenerational transmission of
introjection. Specifically, when one generation of parents used conditional regard as a
socializing strategy, their children paid psychological costs, and when they grew up,
those children also used conditional regard
with their own children—the grandchildren
of the original parents.
A further study by Roth, Assor, Niemiec,
Ryan, and Deci (2009) examined the rela-
237
tion of positive conditional regard (i.e., giving extra affection when children do as the
parents desire), negative conditional regard
(i.e., withdrawing love when the children do
not), and autonomy support regarding their
children’s emotion regulation. They found
that when parents were autonomy supportive, their children better internalized and
integrated the regulation of their negative
emotions; when the parents used positive
conditional regard, the children tended to
suppress negative emotions; and when the
parents used love withdrawal, the children
were dysregulated and ineffective in managing their negative emotions. In short, even
providing praise to children in a conditional
way turned out to be controlling and to have
negative psychological consequences.
A paradox of controlling socialization is
that the more controlling or authoritarian its
form, the poorer the internalization that results. Thus, controlling parents, rather than
anchoring identities solidly in their offspring,
at best seem to produce introjected or external forms of regulation for the values they
transmit. The control also appears in many
instances to catalyze “negative” identities—
that is, it results in the children moving away
from those things the parents had tried to
promote. For example, we have found that
cold and controlling parents have children
who are susceptible to peer pressures (Ryan
& Lynch, 1989), act out in school (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989), engage in risky sex and
drug use (Williams, Cox, Hedberg, & Deci,
2000), and place higher value on materialism and lower value on prosocial behaviors
(Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995). In
other words, control seems to rupture relationships with socializers, leading children
to seek out peers for guidance and approval,
and/or to engage in compensatory activities
that cover the need deprivation they experienced in non-­nurturing home environments.
Similarly, we have repeatedly found that excessive control by teachers, bosses, and other
socializers leads people, at best, to be externally regulated or introjected in their roles
and, at worst, to reject the roles and responsibilities expected of them. In large part, this
is a simple reflection of people’s needs. The
more that controlled processes are the basis
for role performance, the less the role will
satisfy the person’s psychological need for
autonomy. The result will typically be either
238
I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION
passive compliance or active resistance to
the transmitted identity.
In short, SDT has hypothesized and found
support for a somewhat unconventional
idea. The more pressure and control that is
used in the socialization of identity, the less
well anchored that identity will be in the self
of the individual. For any internalization to
occur, people must experience relatedness,
and for more integrated internalization to
occur they must also experience support for
autonomy. Heavy external control, by contrast, produces poor internalization, alienation, and sometimes outright resistance to
what socializers intend to foster.
Cross‑Cultural Issues Regarding
Autonomy and Internalization
The SDT view of internalization is built
around the continuum of autonomy. We have
found that people are more engaged, committed, and healthy if the roles they adopt
are more fully assimilated into the self so as
to provide the basis for more autonomous
enactment of those identities. Our emphasis
on autonomy with respect to internalization
has not, however, been without controversy.
For example, SDT has been portrayed by
some as a Western theory, applicable only
to individualistic cultures which, the critics
say, are the only ones that value autonomy.
Markus, Kitayama, and Heiman (1996), for
example, maintained that SDT is not applicable to collectivistic cultures where autonomy is considered a less salient social concern
and is not related to well-being outside of a
very few highly individualistic nations, and
Iyengar and DeVoe (2003) argued that individual autonomy is culturally bound, such
that its positive effects are likely to be manifest primarily in the Western world.
Interestingly, however, those arguments,
based to a large extent on a relativist, constructivist view of cultures and human nature, are not squaring well with an increasing amount of data. As already mentioned,
research generated by scholars in Japan,
which values collectivism, suggests that
greater autonomy predicts better role-­related
performance and higher well-being (Hayamizu, 1997; Tanaka & Yamauchi, 2000; Yamauchi & Tanaka, 1998). Similar results
were obtained in comparisons of Asian
Americans and European Americans (Asaka-
wa & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Regarding
the argument that autonomy is unlikely to
predict positive outcomes in totalitarian cultures (e.g., Miller, 1997), Chirkov and Ryan
(2001) examined the parenting and teaching
styles experienced by both Russian and U.S.
youth. As expected, they found controlling
styles of socialization to be more pervasive
among Russians, but more importantly, in
both Russian and U.S. samples the effects of
autonomy support versus control were the
same. More controlling parent and teacher
styles were associated with more external
regulation and less autonomous regulation,
and in both nations parental autonomy support was positively related to overall mental
health.
We understand the basis for this theoretical conflict between SDT and some cultural
relativistic perspectives in two ways. First,
we find that some cross-­cultural theorists
conflate autonomy with individualism and
independence. Thus, they view autonomy
as self-­assertion, doing an activity alone, or
“resisting the influence of others” (see, e.g.,
Oishi, 2000). Although autonomy can be
so defined, that definition fails to capture
the meaning of autonomy as volition and
self-­endorsement, which is how it is defined
within SDT. For us, people can just as easily
be autonomously collectivistic as they can
be autonomously individualistic. In other
words, people can fully internalize and assimilate collectivistic beliefs and goals to the
self just as they can fully integrate individualistic beliefs and goals, and, therefore, they
could experience full volition or autonomy
when acting in accord with either set of beliefs and goals. As such, we see no inherent
conflict between collectivism and autonomy.
There are clearly salient differences in the
cultural values and patterns of living expressed within different societies, but SDT
maintains that fuller versus lesser internalization of any cultural values is universally
relevant.
Second, and at another level, because
SDT posits basic and universal psychological needs—­namely, the needs for autonomy,
competence, and relatedness—we stand
at odds with the “standard social science
model,” as it is referred to by Tooby and
Cosmides (1992), in which human nature is
seen as culturally constructed, highly plastic, and contextually relative. That view thus
11. Multiple Identities within a Single Self
maintains that any needs displayed within a
culture are a function of the culture rather
than of people’s inherent nature. In our
view, however, despite manifold differences
in the manifestation and opportunities to
fulfill needs in different cultures, we view
the basic psychological needs as invariantly influential in all countries and contexts.
Thus, we know of no nation where the absence of feelings of belongingness, competence, or autonomy would not have negative
consequences for the well-being of cultural
members. No matter how different the content of a culture, a culture’s capacity to meet
the basic psychological needs of its members
is critical if the content is to be effectively
transmitted (Inghilleri, 1999).
In an illustrative project, Chirkov, Ryan,
Kim, and Kaplan (2003) examined the relative internalization of cultural practices in
four samples drawn from Korea, Turkey,
Russia, and the United States. They found,
as expected by cultural theorists such as
Triandis (1995), that these samples differed
in terms of the perceived ambient practices
dominant within their cultures. For example, Koreans and Russians were more collectivistic than Americans, and Russians
perceived their culture to be vertically oriented, whereas Americans emphasized more
horizontal practices. Yet despite differences
in the mean level of certain practices, in all
four nations, to equal degrees, greater internalization predicted greater mental health.
Thus, being introjected as a collectivist yields
negative outcomes much like those associated with being an introjected individualist. In
summary, results suggested that in all four
nations, and for men and women alike, the
relative autonomy of culturally prescribed
behaviors mattered greatly for people’s wellbeing.
Identities and Their Coherence
within the Self
Although people