FRANK SPEECH, FLATTERY AND

Imprint Academic Ltd.
"PARRHESIA" AND THE "DEMOS TYRANNOS": FRANK SPEECH, FLATTERY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS
Author(s): Matthew Landauer
Source: History of Political Thought, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 2012), pp. 185-208
Published by: Imprint Academic Ltd.
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS:
FRANK SPEECH, FLATTERY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS
Matthew Landauer
Abstract: Parrhesia, or frank speech, is usually understood as a practice intimately
connected to Athenian democracy. This paper begins by analysing parrhesia in
non-democratic regimes. Building on that analysis, I suggest that most accounts of
parrhesia overlook the degree to which its practice at Athens implied a comparison of
the demos to an unaccountable ruler — a tyrant. As a practice, parrhesia was
paradigmatically undertaken by speakers addressing an audience with the power to
sanction them in the event that their advice proved uncongenial. As such it could be
useful in both democracies and autocracies, serving as a possible counterweight to
flattering rhetoric. But in both regime types it was in essence a remedial virtue, neces
sitated by a basic structural feature common to both autocratic and Athenian demo
cratic decision procedures: at the centre of both was an unaccountable decision maker
able to hold its advisors to account.
Introduction
The Greek wordparrhesia, literally meaning 'saying everything',3 was deployed
in fifth- and fourth-century Greek literature in two broad senses. On the one
hand, it could connote thoughtless, careless, impudent speech. Thus Isocrates
in the Aeropagiticus, in comparing the contemporary fourth-century democ
racy unfavourably with the regime founded by Solon and Cleisthenes, lists
parrhesia, along with license (akolasia), lawlessness (paranomia) and a gen
eral sense of entitlement among the citizens to do whatever they please
(iexousian ton panta poieiri) as lamentable features of contemporary Athenian
life.4 On the other hand, parrhesia could connote free speech, both as a privi
lege granted by a political regime and as the practice of frank speakers, even
(or especially) in the face of personal risk.
Parrhesia in these positive senses has recently been analysed within a
variety of fifth- and fourth-century Athenian contexts, and the literature
explores the many ways in which the practice was intimately connected to
1 Committee on Social Studies, Harvard University, Hilles Library, 59 Shepard St,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Email: [email protected]
2 The author would like to thank Mary Dietz, Jennifer London, Harvey Mansfield,
Eric Nelson, Emma Saunders-Hastings, Joel Schlosser, Christina Tarnopolsky, Richard
Tuck, and audiences at the MPSA Annual Conference in 2009 and the Harvard Political
Theorv WorkshoD for heloful comments on Drevious versions of this naner
3 The Greek roots are 'pan' (all) and 'rhesis' or 'rhema' (speech).
4 Isocrates, Aeropagiticus, in the Loeb Isocrates, Vol. 2, trans. G. Norlin (Cam
bridge, MA, 1929), para. 20.7. Citations of Isocrates in this paper come from the
three-volume Loeb edition, with some translations modified.
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXXIII. No. 2. Summer 2012
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186
M.
LANDAUER
Athenian democracy.5 Parrhesia i
in the Assembly, serving as a pos
potentially deceptive rhetoric and
crucial to a successful debate.6 Mo
resonated deeply with Athenian p
describes
the
[parrhesia]',
democratic
and
modern
city
as
scholars
democratic Athens.7 Arlene Sax
shamelessness, sees it as funda
regime that 'breaks from the reve
on the present and the future'.8
Athens'
Sara
self-conception',
Monoson,
is
funda
emphasizing
picture of a democratic city
cal, insight with an inverse
parr
teem
imag
again, Plato's Republic offers a w
tion of the tyrannical regime, one
former allies, on the grounds tha
each other and to him, criticizing
of
parrhesia
linked
ens:
to
the
'the
treated
as
under
general
practice
a
sign,
tyranny
and
anti-tyrannic
of
parrhesia
indeed
as
i
proof,
5 Scholarly work has linked parrhe
parrhesia' s relationship to comedy,
Speech in Classical Athens', Journa
J. Henderson, 'Attic Old Comedy F
Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Centur
bridge, MA, 1998), pp. 255-74. For pa
see S. Monoson, Plato's Democratic
R. Balot, 'Free Speech, Courage, and
sical Antiquity, ed. I. SluiterandR.M.
ship to emotions such as shame see
(Princeton, 2010), ch. 3; and A. Saxo
Athens (Cambridge, 2006), esp. ch. 2.
ideology more broadly, see Monoson
along with Elizabeth Markovits, The P
6 Monoson, Entanglements, pp. 60-2;
contrast between parrhesia and rheto
7 Plato, Republic, in Complete Wor
8
Saxonhouse,
Free
Speech,
9 Ibid., p. 214.
10 Plato, Republic, 567c.
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p.
209.
PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 187
home ... and were now in fact living as free citizens'.11 By and large,
ature on parrhesia and democratic Athens offers an attractive pictu
Athenian demos adhering to a popular ideology with a strong, partic
critical ethic of parrhesia at its core. Even scholars critical of some a
this picture, or sceptical of how well parrhesia actually functioned, a
its important place in democratic ideology.12
The flourishing research on parrhesia's relationship to democracy
been matched, however, with sustained consideration of its plac
democratic regimes.13 This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, o
t"~" " —— ...νν..τ.ν.ν ..xxwxx " w xV~v.^ vui;
context. But more importantly, a consideratio
to function in autocracies can and should be
clarify our understanding of how it funct
Parrhesia, I argue, was paradigmatically prac
audience with the power to reward or sanctio
as this is true, parrhesia was not so much a no
as co-equals jointly and freely deciding on a
weighing the possible options, as it was a nor
individual offering advice to a decision make
such it could be practised, in both democrac
virtue, necessitated by a structural feature c
Athenian democratic decision procedures: at
countable decision maker able to hold advisers
tus of this form of parrhesia is underscored w
11 Monoson, Entanglements, p. 55. For a discussio
and self-representation' as pertaining to tyranny
Glue: the Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century
Tyranny, ed. K. Morgan (Austin, 2003), pp. 59-94
12 See, for example, Markovits, Politics of Sincer
from Monoson's account of how Plato and Socrates
parrhesia. She is also sceptical of the value of 'stra
arguing that parrhesia, at its worst, was merely anot
theless, she largely accepts Monoson's account
democratic ideology. See also Saxonhouse, Free Sp
exploration of problems with the practice of parrh
seven), without, however, denying its close associa
13 But see J. London, 'How to do things with Fab
in Stories from KalTla Wa Dimna', History of Politi
ment of a kind of parrhesia in an autocratic (but no
cusses parrhesia's function in Hellenistic courts in h
(Cambridge, 1997). See below, n. 24, for more on K
in autocracies.
14 I am here drawing a distinction between 'delib
the Greeks may not have drawn such a sharp divisi
tinction in mind helps to clarify how parrhesia fun
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188
M.
LANDAUER
usage of the term: parrhesia could
with relative impunity — one tha
ers.15 Supporters of the Athenian
nature of democracies to grant thi
Athenian
democracy
required
it
parrhesia strongly suggests that t
not consistently protected. If it w
risky in the first place? One mig
offering bold counsel in the face
cratic virtue only insofar as the
tyrant.
The argument of the article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I
explore texts in which parrhesia is explicitly discussed in autocratic contexts.
Here I show that Athenians such as Isocrates thought that parrhesia was
important in autocratic as well as democratic settings: parrhesia could serve
as a possible counterweight to flattery, itself engendered by the autocrat's
position as sole, unaccountable decision maker, with the power to reward and
punish his advisers. Having shown that the need for parrhesia in autocracies
arose from the power asymmetry between adviser and decision maker, I argue
in the following sections that a similar asymmetry of power obtained in demo
cratic Athens. In Section II, I turn to an analysis of ancient explorations of
accountability and its absence in both tyrannies and democratic Athens, and
emphasize the structural basis for the rise of the image of the unaccountable
demos, analogized to the tyrant: Voters in the Assembly, and Jurors in the
popular courts, were thoroughly insulated from Athens' otherwise extensive
network of accountability mechanisms, while simultaneously collectively
wielding the power to hold individual citizens accountable. The power asym
metries in the Assembly, I argue, thus parallelled those between the autocrat
and his advisers. This analogy provides the background for the argument of
15 Here I depart somewhat from D.M. Carter's claim that parrhesia was merely an
'attribute', 'something that the citizen of one city was more likely to display than that of
another', and a characteristic that Athenians displayed merely as 'a sort of side effect of
their political enfranchisement'. See D.M. Carter, 'Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A
Conceptual Difference Between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech', in
Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, ed. Sluiter and Rosen, pp. 198-9.1 agree with Carter
that it would be wrong to conceive of parrhesia as a 'right', given that it was not abso
lutely protected by law. Yet parrhesia was also more than just a citizen attribute, since it
was conceived of not merely as a 'side effect' of political enfranchisement, but as some
thing that could be granted and encouraged (or forbidden and discouraged) by the
regime. Moreover, as 1 explore below, many Athenians expected that granting and
encouraging parrhesia would have positive effects. As I argue throughout this article,
the word parrhesia could refer both to a privilege of free speech that could be promoted
or restricted by the regime, and also to a practice or attribute that could be exercised by
citizens, whether or not the privilege of parrhesia was well protected (although, to be
sure, where it was not well protected one might expect to find less of it).
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 189
Section III, where I argue that the discourse surrounding parrh
tery in Athens was predicated on important similarities betwee
cratic Assembly and an autocrat. I conclude with the implica
analysis for how we should understand Athenian Assembly
generally.
Parrhesia in Autocracies
In spite of parrhesia's democratic pedigree and associations, there are a num
ber of discussions in fourth-century Athenian literature of parrhesia in auto
cratic settings. Thus, for example, Aristotle's Constitution of the Athenians
contains a single reference to parrhesia, which, strikingly, is divorced from
the democratic context. As Aristotle tells it, a farmer was busy working one
day on a plot of marginal land when the tyrant Peisistratus happened by:
Peisistratus saw someone working an area that was all stones, and, being
surprised, told his attendant to ask what the land produced. 'Aches and
pains,' the farmer replied; 'Peisistratus ought to take his 10 per cent of the
aches and pains too.' The man made the reply not knowing that he was
speaking to Peisistratus, while the latter was delighted at his frankness
[parrhesia] and industriousness, and exempted him from all taxation.16
Scholars who have commented on this passage tend to downplay its impor
tance or quickly move to interpret it within the context of democratic Athens.
Sara Monoson sees it as playing on the incongruity of parrhesia being found
in a tyranny at all, while Arlene Saxonhouse believes it to reveal more about
the values of Aristotle's fourth-century Athenian contemporaries than the
prevalence of 'frank speaking' under Peisistratus' fifth-century tyranny.17 On
one level, Saxonhouse is surely right. If we take the story as a tale that
fourth-century Athenians told themselves, it says as much or more about their
own self-image as it does about how parrhesia might have functioned in tyr
annies: the Athenians are proud of their reputation for boldness and frank
ness. We cannot extrapolate much from this anecdote. Aristotle presents the
story in the context of a discussion of the moderateness of Peisistratus' tyr
anny; and given the farmer's ignorance of his conversational partner's real
identity, it is questionable whether the farmer's quip should count as an exam
ple of parrhesia at all. Yet the story also opens the question of parrhesia's
function in non-democratic regimes and of the attitudes of autocrats towards
its practice. The tyrant in Plato's Republic thought parrhesia a danger to his
regime, a practice he could not tolerate. Why in contrast did Peisistratus find
the farmer's frankness delightful?
16 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, in The Politics and the Constitution of Athens,
ed. S. Everson (Cambridge, 1996), 16.6.
17 Monoson, Entanglements, p. 55; Saxonhouse, Free Speech, p. 90.
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190
M.
LANDAUER
Two letters, written by Isocrates t
Peisistratus had good reason to be
one to Antipater, who served as Ph
Nicocles, a king on the island of Cy
The letter to Antipater contains th
For
it
stands
to
reason
that
it
is
bec
speak to please [tous aei pros hedo
only monarchies cannot endure —
inevitable dangers — but even con
well, though they enjoy greater secu
speak with absolute frankness in fav
parresiazomenous]
seem
Those
doomed
who
to
that
many
destruction.18
are
accustomed
thin
to
thi
cratic practice, should find Isocrate
both autocratic and democratic regi
be claiming that it is even more imp
on the contrast between those who
parrhesia in favour of what is best
gers', while the advice of the latter
Yet
on
Isocrates'
speakers,
they
are
account,
often
while
seduced
into
Antipater, Isocrates illustrates this
dent, Diodotus, and his experience
'because of his frankness [dia to pa
best interests', was deprived of th
service while 'the flattery of men
his own good services'.19 Similarly,
ter to Nicocles that since most asso
their favour [pros charin homilous
of parrhesia and criticism crucial t
Nicocles and Antipater should be p
to speak with parrhesia, then, prim
advisers
is
to
flatter
the
autocrat.
Th
position as sole unaccountable decis
punish his advisers. Given this posit
to tell him what they think he want
him what they think is the best a
endeavour,
that
18
19 Ibid.
risk:
and
one's
Isocrates,
To
Diodotus'
audience
experien
may
Antipater,
20 Isocrates, To Nicocles, Loeb, Vol. 1, trans. G. Norlin, paras. 3-4.
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not
Loeb,
a
Vol.
PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 191
asymmetry between speaker and audience gives rise to a particularly
cious form of advice-giving — flattering speeches, aiming not at 'the b
'to gratify'. This form of speech nullifies the immediate danger
speaker, since the end result — if the speech is successful — is a gra
audience. Nonetheless, it is ultimately, in Isocrates' view, destructive f
ruler: 'monarchies cannot endure' when advice aims at gratification a
good policy. We can imagine that, at the limit, the flattery endemic t
asymmetric power relations leads to a vicious circle: advisers, fearin
their positions, tell the autocrat what he wants to hear; the autocrat r
those who gratify and flatter him, reinforcing the incentive to flatter.
cess feeds on itself, with advice tending further and further away fro
policy, until the autocrat's rule collapses.
Isocrates' letters offer two potential ways out of the vicious circle. Fi
autocrat can try to mitigate the problem by creating a climate favour
parrhesia, i.e. by allowing and even encouraging his advisers to offer
their best advice frankly rather than to flatter him. This is the main t
Isocrates' advice to Antinater and Nicocles. As Isocrates tells Antioater.
'those who declare the truth should be esteemed more than those who, saying
everything in order to gratify, speak nothing worthy of gratitude'.21 Nicocles,
too, is advised to encourage frank speech. He is counselled to regard as trust
worthy not those who praise everything he says and does, but those who point
out his mistakes. He should 'grant parrhesia' (didou parrhesian) to 'those
with good judgment' (tois eu phronousin) — that is, allow and encourage
those with good judgment to speak freely and frankly — and distinguish
between 'artful flatterers' (tous technei kolakeuontas) and those who 'serve
him with goodwill' (tous met' eunoias therapeuontas).22 Isocrates thus coun
sels both Nicocles and Antipater to make frankness less risky by granting the
privilege of free speech (didonai parrhesian) to at least some advisers and
esteeming and rewarding those who speak frankly rather than those who
flatter.
Yet in recounting the story of Diodotus, who took it upon himself to prac
tice parrhesia even in an inhospitable context, Isocrates offers another, dis
tinct possibility: an adviser can speak up for the best even in situations where
21 Isocrates, To Antipater, para. 7.
22 Isocrates, To Nicocles, paras. 27-8. Cf. Carter, 'Citizen Attribute, Negative
Right', p. 211: Ί am not aware of any accounts of historical tyrants restricting free
speech... a tyrant sees little need actively to discourage free speech when his very person
is discouraging enough... Becauseparrhesia is only an attribute, and not anyone's right,
it is not so much something a tyrant actively restricts, as something his subjects are indis
posed to exercise.' That Isocrates attempts to get Nicocles and Antipater to 'grant
parrhesia' to their advisers suggests that even if we accept Carter's distinction between a
tyrant's 'actively' restricting free speech versus discouraging it (passively?) through his
'very person', parrhesia was still seen as something an autocrat or tyrant could promote,
e.g. by attempting to establish it as a privilege.
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192
M.
LANDAUER
it is likely that the autocrat does
adviser's actions parallel the pract
sider, for example, Demosthenes'
First Philippic·.
I have spoken my plain sentiments
it is to your interest to receive th
were equally certain that to offer
speaker ... But, as it is, in the unce
may be for myself, yet in the con
adopt it, I have ventured to addres
In speaking up bravely in favour o
the autocrat's adviser, like Demos
tary
critique.
Moreover,
in
both
willingness to take on the risk of
itself possible evidence of his trus
and as Demosthenes suggests to h
Yet the presence of risk in the a
in its effects. It is perhaps true th
inherent in speaking frankly to t
This might suggest that the risks
advice is given. On the other han
chief forms of pernicious advice
contingent on pleasing the autocr
Indeed, Isocrates' advice to the au
wise, and his attempts to get Ant
frankness more generally, suggest
speech is, the less likely one is to
lege of parrhesia is not granted fr
practised;
the
risk
of
but
there
speaking
is
no
guarant
frankly.24
It is worth stressing that Isocrat
an idealized portrait of the relati
23
Demosthenes 4.51, quoted in Mon
D. Konstan, Friendship in the
analysis of Isocrates' letter to Antipat
24
Cf.
counselor, who must risk the ire of p
dicted, even if the advice is in their o
that obtains between frank speaker an
speak the truth in such a context repr
prized.' Konstan's focus on friendship
ties between the practice of parrhesia
make the focus of this article.
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 193
here.25 It is true that he is keen to portray his own relationship with Nicocles as
one marked by frankness, not flattery. This can be contrasted with Isocrates'
advice to his pupils, in the Antidosis and elsewhere, that it might sometimes be
necessary to 'pay court' to the demos at Athens, to practise therapeia, flattery.
Indeed, in the Antidosis, Isocrates notes that one of his pupils, the general
Timotheus, failed in his trial before the demos precisely because he refused
to flatter them.26 Yet it would be a mistake to take Timotheus's relationship
to the demos as exemplary of the orator-demos relationship while taking
Isocrates' description of his own relationship with Nicocles as exemplary of
the adviser-autocrat relationship more generally. This would be to overlook
the degree to which Isocrates, throughout his advice to Nicocles and Antipater,
remains aware that the problem of flattery is ever present in, and even built
into the adviser-autocrat relationshio. For everv Timotheus. who ultimatelv
failed at democratic politics because of his refusal to pay court to the demos,
Isocrates offers a Diodotus, whose parrhesia and refusal to flatter autocrats
caused him equal amounts of trouble.
Isocrates has thus offered two possible solutions to the problem of flattery
in autocracies, engendered by the autocrat's position as unaccountable deci
sion maker. But it is not yet clear how this discussion of parrhesia in autocra
cies might bear on the democratic experience. After all, much seems to
differentiate the practice of parrhesia in democracies and autocracies. Not the
least important is the institutional context in which parrhesia is deployed: in a
democracy, the Assembly is the decision-making body, while in an autocracy,
a single man decides. There is also the question of who gets to speak with
parrhesia: it is likely that the circle of advisers to an autocrat would be smaller
than the set of possible advisers to a democratic Assembly, even accepting the
fact that the right to speak at the Assembly, while guaranteed to all citizens,
would have been exercised by relatively few. Moreover, Isocrates' recom
mendation to Nicocles to grant parrhesia to those with good judgment, and
not to all his subjects, reinforces the idea that parrhesia in an autocracy may
well have been more limited in scope than in a democracy.27 Given these dif
ferences, it might be argued that Isocrates, in keeping with his constitutional
pluralism, was simply engaged in transferring some Athenian political know
how to a foreign regime or two — if parrhesia had been so successful at
25 Cf. Κ. Morgan, 'The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates', in Popular
Tyranny, pp. 181-213. In her view, according to Isocrates, 'the king-advisor relationship
is marked by freedom, whereas the orator-demos relationship is marked by flattery
(p. 186).
26 On Timotheus, see Isocrates, Antidosis, 130-3. See also Morgan, 'Tyranny of the
Audience', pp. 186-7.1 accept Morgan's claim that Isocrates tells his pupils to flatter the
demos, at least sometimes, but do not agree with her that he does not recognize the same
need in autocratic contexts.
27 Although, as I argue below, this is not a clear-cut issue — the Attic orators often
claim that they, and speakers like them, are not granted parrhesia either.
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194
M.
LANDAUER
ensuring good decision making at
to the less egalitarian climate of a
regimes.28 If so, perhaps parrhes
about its practice in a democracy.
quickly dismiss the significance o
cratic case for understanding its p
next section to a broader analysis
absence) in Greek discussions of b
prepare
in
the
ground
for
a
discussio
Athens.
Accountability
As
we
saw
in
the
and
its
previous
A
sect
granted from above or offered fro
problem of flattery, a problem in
tional position and the power asym
section, I explore the tropes in fi
underpinning this description of t
unaccountability of the autocrat,
the wake of these images of the u
claims about the Athenian demos,
has called the 'critical community
analogy
between
fourth-century
ground,
analogy:
argue
and
the
that
so
here
claim
this
demos
critiques
I
that
and
of
tyr
Athe
emphasiz
the
rhetorical
demo
move
analogizing the unaccountability o
a very real fact about the
lighted
ability.
28
On
While
most
Isocratean
forms
of
constitutional
po
plur
pp. 182, 188-91.
29 See J. Ober, Political Dissent in D
30 The literature on the tyrant-d
S. Forsdyke, 'The Uses and Abuses of
Political Thought, ed. R. Balot (Oxford
to the Popular Tyranny volume. The t
Athens was sometimes said to rule o
Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, for ex
getting 'that your empire is a despoti
spirators', in The Landmark Thucydid
The actions of the demos at home wer
dealings
'Uses
with elites. For examples
and Abuses', pp. 239^10.
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an
PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 195
subjected citizens who took part to multiple accountability procedure
and Assemblymen were privileged within this system, holding o
account but accountable to no one.
The 'constitutional debate' in Herodotus' Histories is an important early
source for the trope of autocratic unaccountability. Here, Otanes criticizes
monarchy as the form of government where 'it is possible for the ruler to do
what he pleases without having to render an account [aneuthunoi]'.31 Such
freedom from restraints would render any man a bad ruler: 'give this power to
the best man on earth, and it would stir him to unwonted thoughts'.32 On the
other hand, Otanes identifies the accountability of magistrates as one of the
three hallmarks of 'rule by the majority', along with selection of magistrates
by lot and the referral of all proposals to the public.33 The autocrat's rule, at
least according to Otanes, is thus characterized by his ability to do whatever
he desires, with impunity, and without having to justify those actions.
The autocrat's reputation for unaccountable rule in accordance with his
own desires would become a commonplace, and would crystallize around the
figure of a particular kind of autocrat — the tyrant. Plato's depictions in the
Gorgias and Republic of the tyrant's limitless desires and boundless transgres
sions of custom and law implicitly trade on the tyrant's unaccountability.34 In
the Politics, Aristotle identifies tyranny in the 'fullest degree', 'the counter
part or universal monarcny , as tne sort or tyranny tnat "exercises unaccount
able [anupeuthunos] rule over subjects . . . with a view to its own private
interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled'.35 While both Plato and
Aristotle left some room for the possibility of a good single ruler, democratic
ideology tended to collapse the distinction between tyranny and monarchy.
Yet the critique of the tyrant as an irresponsible, unaccountable ruler repre
sented a crucial point of agreement between the critics of the Athenian
democracy and exponents of its ideology.36 Thus Aeschines, in his speech
Against Ctesiphon, told the jurors, 'There are, as you know, fellow-citizens,
three forms of government in the world tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.
Tyrannies and oligarchies are administered according to the tempers of their
lords, but democratic states according to their own established laws.'37 The
administration of Athens, in contrast with tyrannies, consisted in part in there
being 'nothing in all the state that is exempt from audit [anupeuthunon],
31 Herodotus, Histories, Loeb, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA, 1950), 3.80.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Plato, Gorgias, trans. J.H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca, 1998), 466c^470a.
35 Aristotle, Politics, 1295a.
36 See J. Ober, 'Tyrant Killing as Therapeutic Stasis: A Political Debate in Images
and Texts', in Popular Tyranny, ed. Morgan, p. 215.
37 Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, para. 6.
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196
M.
LANDAUER
investigation,
and
examination'.3
tyrant stood as the antithesis of de
Athens were held accountable, the t
Yet not all observers and participa
Aeschines' claim that nothing and
investigation, and examination'. At l
ics of the democracy pointing to e
Wasps, Philocleon glories in his and
gleefully recounting the benefits
for doing all this we can't be called
other office holders can claim.' Her
unaccountability using the language
of tyrants, begins to blur the line b
Xenophon's account of the illegal
battle of Arginusae (406 BC), for th
triremes had been destroyed, also
analogy. In the aftermath of the b
fault for the disaster began almost
bly that the generals be called to ac
not pick up the shipwrecked men'.
Xenophon contrasts the accountabi
status: when one Euryptolemus tri
try the generals collectively, for h
writes that the majority of the Ass
would be terrible if someone were
wished'.41 As Sara Forsdyke has no
wished' recalls 'the traditional port
wants without being held to accoun
The strangeness of the anecdote —
Assembly, some three-thousand in
unison? — highlights the comparis
demos and tyrant. In Xenophon's v
the asymmetry of accountability a
later, the Athenians repented [the
who had deceived the demos be pr
38 Ibid., para. 22. Indeed, Aeschines tak
rule that he makes the claim twice; cf. 3.
free
39
from
the
audit
Aristophanes,
who
has
Wasps,
in
held
the
any
pu
Loeb
A
bridge, MA, 1998), lines 578-87.
40 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.4.
41
Ibid.,
42
Forsdyke,
1.7.12,
translation
'Uses
and
mine.
Abuses',
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p.
2
PARRHES1A AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 197
until they were tried; and among them was Callixeinus. Callixein
found guilty, and although he escaped before his trial during the tum
period of oligarchic revolution, he is reputed to have starved to deat
his return to Athens, apparently universally detested for the role he p
the affair. It is uncontroversial that the demos was responsible for the
to try the generals collectively; indeed, the Assemblymen's resp
Euryptolemus that they should not be prevented from doing what the
suggests that the members of the Assembly viewed themselves as the
sible agents, at least at this point in time. Nonetheless, when the decision
the generals collectively comes to be recognized as a poor oiie, the d
not held accountable. Rather, the demos holds others to account: acc
ity is borne solely by the proposers of the decree, who are charg
deceiving the people.44
Aeschines' claims for the comprehensiveness of Athenian instituti
accountability notwithstanding, the analogy to tyranny — at least with
to this issue — was not inapt. The crucial point was not whether accoun
was central to Athenian democratic theory and practice (it was),
answer to the following question: who at Athens was accountable to
In both the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy, institutions
to hold citizens participating in politics accountable to the polis; and f
mid-fifth century on, accountability to the polis increasingly meant
ability to the people, in the Assembly and in the Courts, even while
participating in these forums were themselves unaccountable.45
In keeping with Otanes' description of 'rule by the majority', mag
were subject to a number of procedures before, after, and, in excep
cases, during, their term of office. At the dokimasia ton archon, a po
magistrate selected by election or sortition could subsequently be reje
not meeting citizenship or age requirements, or if he had been found
a crime punishable with atimia (loss of citizenship rights). Held befo
ular jury, the dokimasia procedure also allowed any citizen to come
and require the prospective magistrate to explain and defend his past
43 Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.35, translation mine.
44 See also my discussion of Diodotus' speech in Thucydides' Peloponnesia
below, fn. 72, and of Aristotle's account of final democracy and its relatio
below, p. 206.
45 The rise of popular institutions of accountability was an important aspec
development of popular sovereignty at Athens throughout the fifth century. Man
accountability institutions discussed in this paragraph had pre-democratic, non
precursors. For example, it is likely that archons originally faced their dokima
the Aereopagus, rather than popular courts. For an attempt at reconstructing the
cal development of the institutions of accountability in the fifth century, see M.
From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 40-
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198
M.
LANDAUER
and way of life.46 Upon completio
through the euthunai. At the euth
all public funds used and disbursed
actions more generally. Both citiz
sations against an outgoing magis
positive malfeasance, and charges
Finally, during their tenure mag
ment procedures such as the eisan
of public trust, such as treason, s
result in a trial before the Assemb
successful eisangelia trial was dea
Orators in the Assembly, holding
the dokimasia ton archon or euth
served to hold them accountable
about immediate audience respons
ous response of the demos which c
mally, orators were potentially s
mid-fifth century on, were also l
name
of
unlawful
the latter charge sugge
or unconstitutional prop
had been found to be un
proposal
Tried before a popular
the annulment of the
court, a suc
decree and
from the merely nominal to the c
tially accountable for the advice t
their actions and could be punished
tion of a popular jury.
Individual Athenians actively par
selves called upon to give an accou
by
their
fellow
citizens
should
Nonetheless, there were two impo
side — or better yet, above — th
tions.
46
In
As
the
Philocleon
wake
of
the
boasted,
oligarchic
an
revo
their later dokimasia for harbourin
Democracy, pp. 218-20.
47 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, p.
48
The
rise
of
the
graphe
paranomon
a
by some scholars to the decline of o
non-magistrates accountable. See J. T
ernment (Madison, 1982), pp. 153-8.
49 On the graphe paranomon, see H
50 Cf. Peter Euben's analysis of the
Youth (Princeton, 1997), n.21, p. 97.
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 199
voting in the ekklesia and the large panels of citizen Jurors were u
able, both individually and collectively. Citizens could not be cal
explain their votes in either forum, nor could they be held responsible
they voted. While decisions of the Assembly could be overturned, t
dure for doing so (as with the graphe paranomon) assigned responsib
the poor decision to the orator who made the proposal, not the demos
of the demos) that voted for it (as we saw in Xenophon's account of
math of Arginusae). Thus, at least on the level of formal institutio
prominent political actors — the Assemblyman and the Juror — wer
hold political actors to account without themselves being made acco
Why this should have been so is an interesting question with multi
sible explanations. Hansen and others have sought to explain it by inv
epistemic assumption central to democratic ideology about the superi
the judging demos: the demos is never blamed, individually or colle
because it is very unlikely — or impossible — that it is truly at faul
given case of bad decision-making.51 Yet quite apart from any episte
fication of the practice, blaming the demos or juries for poor decis
well have been considered incompatible with the Athenian understa
democracy as a system that empowered the people. On this view, th
leged position of the judging demos within the institutions of account
Athens was consonant with — perhaps required by — the basic
democracy. It is also possible that the Athenians did not believe that
vidual's voting behaviour could be so egregious as to rise to the level
ishable offence.52 And if it would not have made sense to hold any i
accountable for his vote, neither would it have been particularly fe
hold the demos or a jury collectively responsible. First, most, if not
anisms of accountability at Athens were directed at holding ind
rather than corporate bodies, accountable; this principle was what m
collective trial of the generals after Arginusae so shocking and so u
teristic.53 Nor is it clear how one could effectively hold the Assembly
collectively accountable; to punish thousands of citizens for how th
51 Hansen, Athenian Democracy, p. 207.
52 The status of Jurors and Assemblymen as idiotai ('private citizens'), as o
politeuomenoi or archontes (citizens taking very active roles in politics and m
is crucial, in my view, to understanding how and why Athenians thought it legi
leave them unaccountable. Judicial rhetoric abounds with references to an in
status as an idiotes as a reason to treat him leniently or not to prosecute
Demosthenes 19.182, 24.66; Aeschines 1.195). To the degree that Jurors and A
men were seen as idiotai, then, they were not taken to be fit objects of Athens' f
machinery of accountability.
53 See Hansen, Athenian Democracy, p. 221, for one possible exception
rule — magistrates sitting on boards could be collectively suspended from off
ing a vote of the Assembly until a Court could convene to consider any charg
them (apocheirotonia).
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200
in
M.
LANDAUER
making
absurd.
a
poor
Thus,
decision
while
would
there
may
ha
h
Jurors and Assemblymen, individu
system of accountability, their spe
general rule.
Some scholars might argue that the contrast between an unaccountable
demos and a host of other accountable political actors is overdrawn. Elizabeth
Markovits, for example, claims that Athenian democracy was characterized
by a spirit of mutual accountability, whereby all citizens felt accountable to one
another. She adduces as evidence for her claim the 'spirit of civic-mindedness'
among Athenian citizens; the dokimasia that all citizens underwent when
enrolling in their demes at age eighteen; ostracism, which could be used
against any citizen whatsoever; the requirement of Jurors to give oaths; and
the informal power of gossip, with potential social sanctions for those who
mignt act poorly in tne Assemoiy or tne Law Lourts. reter Luoen nas like
wise argued that Athens possessed a 'generalized culture of accountability',
pointing to the dokimasia and the euthunai as its main institutional embodi
ments.55 While all of these factors may have shaped citizen behaviour, it is
clear that Jurors and Assemblymen faced a very different sort of scrutiny than
the one faced by other citizens active in politics.56 This asymmetry in the
accountability relationship had real political effects, in particular when mass
groups of unaccountable citizens had the power to hold others accountable. It
is against the backdrop of the Athenian demos' s privileged position within the
system of accountability — the fact that they were themselves unaccountable
while able to hold others to account — that the practice of parrhesia at Ath
ens, and the discourse surrounding it, must be understood.
Flattery and Parrhesia at Athens
Recall that there were two ways in which parrhesia could feature in the
autocrat-adviser relationship, given the power asymmetry between the two.
Parrhesia could be granted from above, as when Isocrates urges Nicocles to
54 Markovits, Politics of Sincerity, pp. 54-5,60-1. Markovits also draws on an argu
ment by Adrianne Lanni, who shows that the corona of spectators surrounding each jury
trial had an effect on the behaviour of both litigators and jurors, and served the function of
holding the jurors at least informally accountable. See A. Lanni, 'Spectator Sport or Seri
ous Politics? Hoi periestekotes and the Athenian lawcourts', Journal of Hellenic Studies,
117 (1997). Yet the informal corona stands in marked contrast to the formal mechanisms
that served to scrutinize and hold accountable most other actors in Athenian political life.
55 Euben, Corrupting Youth, p. 97.
56 Indeed, even those arguing for generalized accountability at Athens acknowledge
this. In spite of Euben's claim that, at Athens, 'people were scrutinized and held account
able anytime they proposed or opposed an action or decision', he also admits that 'for
better or worse, members of the juries and nonspeakers in the Athenian Assembly [i.e.
voters] . .. were not subject to the same intense scrutiny' (ibid., pp. 97-8).
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 201
'grant parrhesia' to his trusted advisers. Parrhesia could also be practised
independently of such a privilege, as when Diodotus spoke frankly to the
'Asian potentates' he advised, even though to do so carried the risk that he
would be ignored, unrewarded for his efforts or, worse, punished for his frank
ness. Given the parallels between unaccountable demos and unaccountable
autocrat established in the previous section, we can now see that parrhesia at
Athens could feature in the orator-demos relationship in the same two ways.
In his display speech On the Peace, Isocrates imagines critically rebuking
his fellow citizens:
I know that it is hazardous to oppose your views and that, although this
is a free government [demokratia], there exists no 'freedom of speech'
[parrhesia] except that which is enjoyed in this Assembly by the most
senseless orators, who care nothing for you [tois aphronestatois kai meden
humonphrontizousin], and in the theater by the comic poets.57
Isocrates identifies the cause of this state of affairs in the preceding passages
of the speech, echoing the language of his warnings to Nicocles and Antipater.
The Athenians have refused to hear speeches from anyone except those 'who
accede in what [they] desire'.58 They recognize the dangers 'flatterers [ton
kolakeuontonY pose in their personal lives but place 'greater confidence in
them [mallon toutois pisteuontesY than in their franker fellow citizens 'when
it comes to public matters'.59 As Isocrates argues:
You have made the orators care for and investigate, not what will be advan
tageous for the city, but how they can speak to win your favor. And the
majority of them are now inclined to speak in that way. For it is clear to all
that you will take pleasure in those calling you to war rather than in those
counseling peace.60
Thus, just as in autocratic regimes, a vicious circle arises, with political advis
ers telling the demos what they think it wants to hear, and the demos reinforc
ing this habit by only listening to those speakers. Isocrates had advised
Nicocles to 'grantparrhesia' to trusted advisers; in noting that 'there exists no
parrhesia' in Athens, he stresses that the demos has failed to do so. The con
sequences for the democracy are potentially grave: in the case Isocrates has in
mind, the Athenians refuse to listen to those speakers advocating peace with
their enemies, and instead are persuaded to carry on a costly war. The institu
tional context is also worth stressing: Isocrates claims that parrhesia does not
exist because the demos — freed like the autocrat from the burdens of being
held accountable, and able to punish and reward its advisers at will — has
57 Isocrates, On the Peace, ]
58 Ibid., para. 3.
59 Ibid., para. 4.
60 Ibid., para. 5.
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202
M.
begun
LANDAUER
to
fall
prey
to
the
kind
breeds.
In his lectures onparrhesia, Foucault interprets Isocrates' speech as a sign
of a 'crisis of democratic institutions'. In his view, by Isocrates' time,
parrhesia had ceased to function properly. Flattering orators, telling audi
ences only what they wanted to hear, left no space for the 'honest orator' who
'has the ability, and is courageous enough, to oppose the demos'. There is a
fundamental opposition between the will of the demos and the best interests of
the city; because of this, 'real parrhesia, parrhesia in its positive, critical
sense, does not exist where democracy exists'.61 Foucault's interpretation cor
rectly identifies many of the key features of Isocrates' argument — the prob
lem of flattery and the tension between the will of the people and what
Isocrates takes to be the best interests of the city — but his conclusion strikes
me as misguided. Isocrates' speech, I think, is better read not as evidence for
the decline of parrhesia in the fourth century but as highlighting an important
way in which parrhesia operated: parrhesia, understood as the virtue of bold,
risky speech, was necessary precisely because the unaccountable demos was
unwilling — or unable — to grant orators parrhesia, i.e. to guarantee them the
privilege of speaking frankly. Our understanding of parrhesia as a corner
stone of democratic ideology has to be supplemented by emphasizing that, at
least in the Assembly, it was often a kind of remedial practice necessitated by
the institutional power of the demos.
This view also underscores the need for a reappraisal of the role of risk in
the practice of parrhesia in Athens. The dangers of speaking in the Assembly
are often portrayed in contemporary scholarship as a means of making orators
accountable to the demos for the advice that they gave.62 Monoson, Markovits
and others have argued that parrhesia played an important vetting role in this
system of accountability: an orator speaking with parrhesia willingly shoul
dered the burden of that risk in the best interests of the city, and his willing
ness to do so counted as evidence for his public-spiritedness. The conclusion
drawn, then, is that ' [t]he risks [the orators faced] were not thought by the
Athenians to undermine or even conflict with the practice of frank speech.
Rather, the risks affirmed that the speaker could be held accountable for the
advice ventured.'63 But as Isocrates' analysis suggests, the riskiness of speak
ing to the demos, which was the consequence of the power asymmetry
between the demos and its advisers, could just as easily lead to flattery as it
could to parrhesia. Monoson recognizes this problem in the autocratic case:
61 M. Foucault, Fearless Speech (Los Angeles, 2001), pp. 82-3.
62 See Monoson, Entanglements, p. 55; Markovits, Politics of Sincerity, ch. 2.
63 Monoson, Entanglements, p. 55. Cf. Balot, 'Free Speech', pp. 244-6, who argues
that the thorubos, viewed positively by a number of scholars, could have detrimental
effects on democratic debate for reasons similar to those I discuss here in reference to the
asymmetrical accountability relationship between the orators and the demos.
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o
PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 203
'a tyrant's arbitrary, unaccountable, and absolute power virtually p
that individuals would risk saying anything other than what the tyran
to hear'.64 Yet she does not recognize the parallels between the tyran
tion and the situation of the demos, and thereby does not grasp the co
of the relationship between parrhesia and Athenian democracy.
One might argue that Isocrates' presentation of the parallel dynam
parrhesia in autocracies and Athens comprises a warped, 'Isocratean'
the democracy that Athenian democrats themselves would not have a
Yet the analysis of these parallels was not limited to critics of the dem
In many respects, Demosthenes' analysis of parrhesia's presence (and
in the Athenian Assembly shares much with the Isocratean view. In t
Philippic, Demosthenes complains — speaking with parrhesia —
ens, famous for allowing a measure of parrhesia even to slaves and
ers, nonetheless has banished it from Assembly debate. Rather than l
to good advice, the demos is flattered by pleasant speeches, with th
that the city runs great risks:
I think, men of Athens, that if I speak something of the truth frankly [m
parrhesia], none of you will on that account become angry with m
look at it this way. In other matters you think it is so necessary for there
general freedom of speech [parrhesian .. . koinen] for everyone in the
that you even allow aliens and slaves to share in it... but from your de
ations you have banished it altogether. Hence the result is that in
Assembly your self-complacency is flattered by hearing none but plea
speeches, but your policy and your practice are already involving you i
gravest peril.65
In this passage, Demosthenes invokes both of the senses of parrhesia
have explored throughout this article. On the one hand, Demosthen
that granting the privilege of parrhesia is a practice the Athenians pr
selves on, to the extent that perhaps even foreigners and slaves share
Demosthenes also points out that this privilege is not properly secure
Assembly — indeed, it is 'banished altogether'. Yet this does not me
Demosthenes cannot speak frankly (after all, he is doing so, or claim
doing so, in this very speech). But it does mean that he has to practis
tue of parrhesia from below, in the face of potential censure, and mus
the risk that entails. And it is far from clear that Demosthenes thinks t
64 Monoson, Entanglements, p. 55.
65 Demosthenes, Loeb, Vol. 1, Orations, trans. J.H. Vince (Cambridge, M
9.3-9.4. Cf. Carter's discussion of this passage in 'Citizen Attribute, Negati
pp. 208-9.
66 Cf. Demosthenes, Orations, 15.1: Ί think it necessary, men of Athens, when
deciding about such great matters, to grant parrhesia (didonai parrhesian) to each of
your advisers.' In this passage, too, Demosthenes takes parrhesia to be a privilege that
can be granted, using the same language (didonai parrhesian) as Isocrates offers to
Nicocles (see note 22, above).
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204
M.
LANDAUER
helps to ensure good debate; rather
encouraged flattery, at least on the
Despite these similarities, Demosth
in
two
respects.
First,
unlike
Isocr
Demosthenes directly challenges
parrhesia in the Assembly even
speech is not encouraged and may
pic and On the Chersonese, Demost
the flattery of his fellow orators,
that Isocrates merely preached. Sec
analysis of what he takes to be t
debate: the corruption of the de
repeats his critique of Assembly d
batim in On the Chersonese, he blam
of
to
Assembly
such
a
debate:
frame
of
'by
mind
persuasive
that
in your
and have no ear but for complimen
you are at this moment running th
to hold the demos primarily respon
the demos has all but forced the ora
the orators are to blame.
Demosthenes further explores the dynamics of oratorical corruption of the
demos in the Third Olynthiac. The problems the Athenians face can be traced
back to the 'popularity hunting [pros charin demegorein]' of some of the ora
tors.69 Rather than proposing good public policy, the orators ply the demos
with questions such as 'what would you like? What shall I propose? How can
I oblige you?'.70 One might be tempted to take such an assertion as support for
an Isocratean analysis of the power asymmetry between demos or autocrat
and advisers. The obsequious questions the orators ask could be seen as the
natural response to their inferior position — they can profit only by offering
67 The claim that the demos will only listen to flatterers finds perhaps its most famous
exposition in Plato's Gorgias, where Socrates identifies rhetoric as a 'part of flattery' and
argues that this kind of persuasive speech finds its natural home in the presence of large,
uninformed audiences (Plato's characterization of the dikasteria and ekklesia)·, see
Gorgias, 459a-466a. I am not merely arguing that the flattery of the orators has to be
understood within the context of the asymmetric accountability relationship between
demos and orator; I am also arguing that parrhesia, at least in its manifestation as risky
speech, has to be understood as arising from this same context. The risky practice of
parrhesia is an alternative to flattery, and a potential remedy to it, but its very riskiness
underlines the fact that it is a product of the institutional circumstances that too often pro
duce flattery, not frank speech.
68 Demosthenes, Orations, 8.34.
69 Ibid., 3.3.
70 Ibid., 3.22.
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 205
the demos exactly what it wants. Strikingly, however, Demosthenes seems
draw the opposite conclusion. Contrasting Assembly debate before the proc
of corruption began and its current state, Demosthenes says the following:
What is the cause of all this, and why, pray, did everything go well then that
now goes amiss? Because then the people, having the courage to act and to
fight, were the master [despotes] of the politicians and were themselves the
dispensers of all favours [kurios autos hapanton ton agathon}·, the rest were
well content to accept at the people's hand honour and authority and
reward. Now, on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and
manage everything, while you, the people, robbed of nerve and sinew,
stripped of wealth and of allies, have sunk to the level of lackeys and hangers
on [en huperetou kai prosthekes merei gegenesthe] ...71
The flattery and obsequiousness of the orators, Demosthenes claims, is no
sign of the demos's power but rather of that power's usurpation by a few.
some extent, Demosthenes is exaggerating the powerlessness of the demos
here for rhetorical effect: using the image of a debased and weakened dem
Demosthenes hopes to shame the Assembly into adopting his activist a
energetic policies against the Macedonians. His argument is still ultimatel
premised on the demos being the chief decision maker: the obsequious que
tions of the orators only make sense given this premise, as does the very oc
sion for Demosthenes to give the speech. If the demos could not change i
policies as it saw fit, there would be no point in Demosthenes attempting
persuade it. Yet by highlighting the orators' role in starting up the vicious
cle of flattery, Demosthenes both minimizes the responsibility the demo
bears in the situation and points to a way forward: if the orators were not out
corrupt, and the demos were more jealous of its own sovereignty and mindf
of its own good, the vicious circle could be avoided.72 Demosthenes is also
making an important observation here about the power dynamics betwee
71 Ibid., 3.30-31.
72 It is worth contrasting Demosthenes' and Isocrates' responses to the pathologies
Assembly debate with Diodotus' in Thucydides' account of the Mytilenean debate.
Mary Dietz has noted, Diodotus is speaking within 'an already corrupted situation
which his desire not to be punished by the demos and his agonal struggle with Cleo
supervene on his attempt to persuade the Athenians of what he takes to be the best cou
of action. See M. Dietz, Turning Operations (New York, 2002), p. 157. Diodotus'
cussion of accountability in diagnosing the 'corrupted' state of Assembly debate is
ticularly salient. As he tells the demos: 'we, your advisers, are responsible, while yo
our audience are not so. For if those of you who gave the advice, and those who took
suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into whi
the whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single person of your adviser,
upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.' (Thucydides, 3.43.5). Strikingl
Diodotus, while recognizing the asymmetry of accountability between demos and o
tor, seems to call less for relaxing the potential sanctions on orators (although cf. 3.4
than for extending such sanctions to the demos. Diodotus' solution, then, might be for
burdens of accountability to be shared more equally, rather than to be sloughed
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206
M.
LANDAUER
flattering
ruler's
adviser
own
and
power.
a
decision
This
ma
happens
policies, but also because once the
starts up, it becomes difficult to s
demos using the orators or is it bei
The ambiguity of the power relati
reminiscent of Aristotle's analysis,
ship between the demos and demag
Aristotle's account, while confirm
points to its limits. In the final for
consider Athens an example — Ari
tude [to plethos], have the suprem
law by their decrees' ,73 In Aristotl
that leads to demagoguery and fla
then demagogues arise'. Aristotle go
the power of the demos closely res
regimes, flatterers are honoured.74
to the tyrannical demos, the analysi
blurred: 'For it happens that they [
demos has the supreme power over
power
over
the
opinion
of
the
p
them.'75 In such regimes, Aristotl
tvrant and tool of the orators.
Both Aristotle and Demosthenes,
ambiguities of the orator-demos r
on the institutional basis for that r
voluntarist solution to the problem
reined in by the demos; rather, Ar
such a relationship between demos
flawed. Where the demos has unlim
ters,
Aristotle
claims,
flattery
is
t
itly deny that, even under such cir
challenge the demos and speak wit
this would be a likely outcome.
Of course, if Aristotle's solution t
democracy,
entirely.
subordinate
Unfortunately,
I
do
to
not
the
have
l
th
to discuss its implications. See also Sax
sion of Diodotus' and Cleon's speeches a
Silence and Democracy (University Pa
Diodotus' speech and the question of co
73 Aristotle, Politics, 1292a5-8.
74
75
Ibid., 1292al8-20.
Ibid., 1292a26-28.
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PARRHESIA AND THE DEMOS TYRANNOS 207
matters, then his solution is not one an Athenian democrat co
Indeed, a good democrat would reject Aristotle's framing of the pr
counter that the people, judging matters in the courts and the Ass
actually the best guardians of the rule of law, not its undermine
Aeschines' argument from his Against Ctesiphon, where the dem
to judge matters and hold elites accountable are held up as great
defending the rule of law:
Tyrannies and oligarchies are administered according to the tem
their lords, but democratic states according to their own establishe
Let no man among you forget this, but let each bear distinctly in m
when he enters a court-room to sit as juror in a suit against an illega
[graphe paranomon], on that day he is to cast his vote for or against
freedom of speech [parrhesia].76
Aeschines, in calling on the Athenians here to defend the rule of
tinuing to hold elites accountable, may have been correct that the p
ordinary citizens — understood as the privilege of speaking
frankly, and which Athens prided itself on promoting — depend
robust popular control of elites, who might otherwise attempt to su
cratic norms and institutions. But in defending the graphe paranom
also calling for the preservation of an institution that made the
frank speech in the Assembly rarer, riskier and more difficult.
Conclusion
The contrast between flattery and parrhesia, and the parallels between the
institutional positions of the tyrant and the demos, complicate our understand
ing of the conceptualization and practice of parrhesia in Athens. Far from
marking off a clear boundary between tyrannical and democratic regimes, the
discourse surrounding parrhesia in Athens often highlighted the similarities
between the demos and the autocrat. While both the autocrat and the demos
could 'grant parrhesia' to their advisers, such freedom was not a foregone
conclusion. Absent this privilege, advisers could still practise the virtue of
risky parrhesia in addressing their audiences, but parrhesia in this sense is
therefore a remedial mode of advising unaccountable decision makers who
have the power to hold their advisers to account. The above analysis thus
emphasizes the ways in which the practice of parrhesia in many contexts was
predicated on inequalities and asymmetries of power. Our understanding of
parrhesia's egalitarian, democratic overtones should be accordingly modified.
Placing that power asymmetry at the centre of the analysis of parrhesia
suggests a distinction important for our understanding Athenian Assembly
debate more generally. Parrhesia is less a norm for deliberation than it is a
norm for counsel. Athens was not a deliberative democracy but a democracy
76
Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, para. 6.
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208
M.
LANDAUER
with a sovereign demos and a host
between autocratic and democratic
ing advice they both invite, suggests
cal discussion and strong popular con
Quite to the contrary, there was a p
of elites, as institutionalized in the
and high quality political debate, if t
of flattery. It is true that even whe
granted, parrhesia was still a practic
of flattery — but this required an or
ply of orators willing to take those
a problem endemic to the Assembly
to popular control of elites and to d
does not mean that these commitme
Matthew Landauer HARVARD UNIVERSITY
77 What I have been calling flattery in this article als
with what Simone Chambers has recently called 'pleb
bers, 'Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberativ
Democracy?', Political Theory, 37 (2009), pp. 323-5
understanding of plebiscitary rhetoric, exemplified in
the lack of 'dialogic accountability' between orator
dialogic accountability does not mean that the relations
lack of accountability; instead, the accountability relations
assembled citizens able to hold the orators accountabl
may have precluded the citizens from enjoying the epist
opposed to rhetoric-infused counsel), it did allow them
cal elites. Thus one way of understanding my analysis of p
is as an attempt to explore the relationship between instit
thriving practice of plebiscitary rhetoric in the Atheni
point, the relevance of the Athenian case to contempor
for we too have institutions of accountability that may be
plebiscitary rhetoric — elections and campaigns come t
should be mindful of the potential tradeoff between h
and encouraging sound political discussion, particularly
ability and high-quality debate sometimes seem to be in
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