economía de la regulación

ECONOMÍA DE LA REGULACIÓN
Mario Bergara: [email protected]
Jorge Polgar: [email protected]
Horas/Créditos: 40/8
Forma de evaluación: prueba escrita al final del curso
PROGRAMA
I – INTRODUCCIÓN
II – ACERCA DEL CONCEPTO DE MONOPOLIO NATURAL
II.1 – Algunas consideraciones previas
II.2 – Subaditividad y monopolio natural
III – REGULACIÓN DE PRECIOS
III.1 – Primer y segundo óptimos
III.2 – La regla de Ramsey
III.3 – La regulación de la tasa de retorno
III.4 – Mecanismos regulatorios alternativos
III.4.1 – La regulación del retorno sobre el nivel del producto
III.4.2 – La regulación del retorno sobre las ventas
III.4.3 – La regulación del retorno sobre los costos
III.5 – Discriminación de precios
III.6 – La regulación de precios tope
III.7 – El mecanismo de Vogelsang y Finsinger
IV – REGULACIÓN Y SUBASTAS
V – REGULACIÓN E INFORMACIÓN ASIMÉTRICA
VI – REGULACIÓN CON MERCADOS ANÁLOGOS
VII – MONOPOLIO NATURAL Y ACTIVIDADES COMPETITIVAS
VIII – REGULACIÓN Y LEYES DE COMPETENCIA
IX – LA DEMANDA POR REGULACIÓN
X – EL MARCO INSTITUCIONAL Y EL PROCESO ECONÓMICO
X.1 – Conceptos básicos del análisis institucional
X.2 – La economía de los costos de transacción
XI – EL MARCO INSTITUCIONAL Y LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS
XI.1 – El problema de la credibilidad
III.2 – Referencias empíricas
III.3 – Las instituciones y el régimen regulatorio
XII – REGULACIÓN BANCARIA
XII.1 – Introducción
XII.2 – Especificidad de la firma bancaria
XII.3 – Racionalidad económica de la regulación prudencial
XII.4 – Instituciones, diseño e instrumentos de la regulación prudencial
XII.4.1 – Diseño de la red de seguridad
XII.4.2 – El seguro de depósitos
XII.4.3 – El prestamista de última instancia
XI I.5 – Crisis bancarias y regulación
REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRAFICAS
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Bibliografía Módulo XII Regulación bancaria
The Economics of Banking Regulation (Bhattacharya, Boot, Thakor: Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking vol. 30, nro.4, 1998)
The Rationale for Financial Regulation (Llewellyn: FSA, 1999)
Financial Intermediation (Gorton, Winton: NBER WP 8928, 2002)
The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation (Benston, Kaufman: The Economic Journal,
106, 688-697, 1996)
Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A review of the literature (
Santos, BIS WP 90, 2000)
Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation (Diamond, Dybvig: Journal
of Business, vol. 59, nro.1, 1986)
The role of capital in financial institutions (Berger, Herring, Szego: Journal of Banking
and Finance 19, 1995)
An overall Perspective on Banking Regulation (Freixas, Santomero: FED Philadelphia,
WP nro. 02-1, 2002).
Economía Bancaria (Freixas, Rochet : Bosch, Capítulos 2, 7 y 9, 1997)
Santos, J. (2000): “Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A
Review of the Literature”, BIS Working Papers, nro. 90.