Defendiendo la Gobernación: Crisis Política, Reformas reactivas y

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Defendiendo la Gobernación: Crisis Política, Reformas reactivas y
Supervivencia Política en las Provincias Argentinas
Ernesto Calvo
Department of Political Science, University of Houston.
[email protected]
Juan Pablo Micozzi
Universidad de Buenos Aires & PEEL, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
[email protected]
Abstract: ¿Qué estrategias deberían adoptar los gobernadores provinciales cuando
grandes crisis nacionales pueden afectar su supervivencia política? ¿Pueden los
gobernadores desligar sus contextos políticos de otros sucesos nacionales que puedan
llegar a afectarlos? El presente trabajo analiza cómo los gobernadores argentinos
emprendieron importantes reformas electorales para consolidar su posición política y
ejecutiva en las provincias argentinas desde la transición democrática de 1983 hasta la
actualidad. Se tratará de explicar cómo en un contexto de fragmentación de los partidos
tradicionales a nivel nacional, tanto los gobernadores como los líderes partidarios
provinciales y, en algunos casos, la Justicia Provincial, emprendieron un proceso de
reestructuración institucional y adaptación, con el objeto de disminuir el faccionalismo
intrapartidario y reducir el número de actores en el sistema político provincial. A nivel
teórico, el presente paper brinda evidencias acerca del comportamiento estratégico de los
ejecutivos provinciales ante las externalidades negativas de los efectos de tracción
nacionales.
Trabajo presentado en el VI Congreso Nacional de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis
Político”, Rosario, 5 al 8 de Noviembre de 2003
Introduction
Between 1983 and 2003, 32 constitutional reforms and 38 electoral reforms
reshaped Argentina’s subnational electoral map, leading to one of the most diverse and,
arguably, complex political systems in the world. By 2003 each Argentine province
selected representatives under different electoral rules, controlled by different electoral
authorities, and for differently structured legislatures. The differences were not subtle and
included single member, multi-member, and mixed member electoral systems; Plurality,
D’Hont, and Hare formulas; complex combinations of majority-PR quotas for winners and
losers; and a wide variety of electoral thresholds and lemas (sublists). On the other hand,
uni- and bicameral legislatures, differently sized, and with quite different constitutional
mandates;1 nourished the representative needs –and political machines- of the Provinces’
citizenry and their parties.
This remarkable diversity of subnational political systems contrasted with the stable
partisan distribution of governors and senators observed at the national level, dominated by
the Peronists since the democratic transition in 1983.2 A large number of institutional
reforms at the province level,3 therefore, facilitated more moderate changes in the partisan
composition of the provinces’ executives and local legislatures. Several authors have
previously explained such local political stability by the broader access governors have to
federal resources critical to finance their political machines. In this article, by contrast, we
focus on the less studied electoral reforms introduced to reduce the emergence of local
challengers within and outside the governor’s party.
1
See Escolar (2001), Calvo & Abal Medina (2001) for a complete description.
Tomassi, Jones, Saguier, and Spiller; 2003; Calvo and Murillo, 2003.
3
Corbacho (1995) enounced those held until 1996.
2
2
As we will argue, while at the national level the political system begun to display
signs of fragmentation and the number of new parties increased; governors, local party
leaders, and in some cases even the provincial courts; begun a slow process of shielding
and accommodation to reduce intra-party factionalism and to limit the number of entrants
in the provinces’ political systems. In the mist of increasing national competition, electoral
and constitutional reforms allowed the provincial elites to successfully disengage their local
political systems from the damaging competitive effects of the presidential and
congressional elections.
The two most significant characteristic of the reforms were (i) the legislation of
majoritarian instruments to reduce party competition in the provinces, attempting to
consolidate the incumbency status of the governing parties and their legislative blocs.
Concurrently, (ii) competitive nomination through sub-lists (lemas), to reduce the
centrifugal pressure of intra-party factionalism that lead to the emergence of new
challengers at the national level. More specifically, thresholds, plurality formulas, and
mixed-member electoral systems were introduced to reduce inter-party competition while
Lemas, redistricting, and electoral code reforms controlled intra-party factionalism.
In a few highly competitive provinces, however, in which the incumbent elites
could not control the reform processes -i.e. the City of Buenos Aires, Tucumán-, the lack of
majoritarian instruments deepened the party system’s fragmentation and proportional
representation was reinforced.
On a more theoretical level, this paper provides evidence on the strategic behaviour
of governors against the negative externalities of national level coattail effects. It is
noteworthy that such negative externalities were not associated with the likely victory of
competing parties at the national level but, more significantly, with the increasing
3
competitiveness of Presidential and Congressional races. By describing how electoral
reforms can be implemented to moderate the local impact of national level electoral rules
and coattail effects, this article provides further insight into politician’s strategic planning
in multi-tier electoral arenas.
The order of presentation of this article is the following: First, we provide evidence
on the increasing party system fragmentation that characterized the last twenty years of
party politics in Argentina. We then explain, in the second section, how provincial elites
successfully disengaged their provinces from the national trend and the impact that such
reforms had on Argentina’s national level party competition. In the third section we provide
statistical evidence of these reactive reforms and of the aggregate effect of such reforms in
the vote-seat allocation properties of the subnational political systems. Finally, we conclude
discussing the comparative implications of our analysis for understanding the relationship
between sub-national and national party systems.
Political Crises: From the Nation to the Provinces
The presidential election of 1989 could be considered the last election of the
twentieth century in Argentina. It was the last election confronting the Radicals (UCR) and
the Peronists (PJ), in a Duvergerian two national parties competition with a relatively
narrow number of provincial parties as pivotal congressional actors. By contrast, 1991
could be considered the first election of the XXIst century, with a triumphant Peronism that
barely reached 45% of the vote and a plurality of smaller parties fighting for their political
survival. However, the meltdown of the UCR, and later the Alianza coalition, at the
national level was not quite followed by a similar meltdowns in the provinces. Not only the
Peronists held as expected most institutional seats in a majority of the provinces but the
4
UCR also survived as a significant political actor in a majority of provinces. As it occurred
with the conservative Concordancia in the 1930s, however, the UCR survived as an uneven
collection of provincial parties while vanishing from competition at the national level.
The peronists, to a lesser extent, also showed signs of increasing territorial
fragmentation. In the 2003 presidential election, three different peronist candidates won
close to 60% of the vote and three different non-peronist candidates split the remaining
40%. The effective number of competing presidential parties grew to around 5 and the
territorial distribution of their votes was illuminating: the new party politics in Argentina
was no longer that of a nationalized party competition but one of unevenly coordinated
local party machines holding significant political enclaves (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Territorial Distribution of Three Peronist Presidential Candidates
Menem 03
Kirchner
Provincias.shp
Paisdeptos.shp
0.015 - 0.188
0.188 - 0.302
0.302 - 0.432
0.432 - 0.66
0.66 - 0.913
Rodriguez Saa
Provincias.shp
Paisdeptos.shp
0 - 0.137
0.137 - 0.236
0.236 - 0.359
0.359 - 0.58
0.58 - 0.815
Rodriguez Saa
Paisdeptos.shp
0.007 - 0.076
0.076 - 0.153
0.153 - 0.296
0.296 - 0.557
0.557 - 0.914
N
W
E
S
200 Miles
Source: Based on Departamental Data from Escolar (2003), PEEL.
The sum of the Peronists votes still averaged or surpassed its usual numbers at the
national level, but the territorial structure of the different factions showed that a national
5
committee was not only an organizational chimera (Levitsky, 2003) but a substantive
political problem as well.
An historical analysis of the different levels of party competition illuminates the
increasing fragmentation of the party system during the last twenty years of democracy
(Figure 2). From 1983 to 2001, the effective number of competing parties in congressional
elections increased from 2.69 to 4.01. Similarly, the effective number of competing parties
for the presidential elections grew from 2.43 in 1983 to 4.64 in 2003. Meanwhile, the
effective number of competing parties in gubernatorial races declined from 2.69 to 2.4.
An analyses of the provincial governments provides therefore a more rutinary and
unproblematic view of the political system (Table 1). For the last twenty years, the
Peronism controlled close to two thirds of the Argentine provinces.
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
Figure 2: Effective Number of Parties by President, Federal Deputies, Provincial
Deputies and Governor – 1983-2003
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
2,79
3,03
2,64
4,64
ENCPpre 2,43
ENCPdn 2,69 2,86 2,77 3,05 2,97 2,95 3,15 2,76 2,82 4,01
ENCPdp 2,84 2,9 2,93 3,62 2,79 2,92 2,55 2,65 2,72 3,62
2,6
2,56
2,35
2,4
ENCPg 2,69
ENCPpre
ENCPdn
ENCPdp
ENCPg
Source: Own estimation based on PEEL (2003).
6
The UCR and its allies, on the other hand, held close to a fifth of the provinces and
a couple of provincial parties maintained their provincial positions with relative ease. High
electoral volatility, executive crises, and congressional gridlock at the national level
contrasts with low electoral volatility, executive stability, and comfortable majorities in the
local legislatures.
How did the provinces successfully disengaged their local political systems from the
national trend towards higher fragmentation and volatility? As we will show in the next
section, different types of reforms allowed local elites to shelter their provinces from the
problematic trends observed at the national level.
Table 1: Party Winning Governor Elections between 1983 and 1999
Province
BsAs
Catamarca
Cordoba
Corrientes
Chaco
Chubut
Entre Rios
Formosa
Jujuy
La Pampa
La Rioja
Mendoza
Misiones
Neuquen
Rio Negro
Salta
San Juan
San Luis
Santa Cruz
Santa Fe
Santiago
1983
UCR
1987
PJ
1991
PJ
1995
PJ
PJ
PJ
Frente Cívico y
Social (UCR)^
Frente Cívico y
Social (UCR)
UCR
Autonomista
Liberal
UCR
Autonomista
Liberal
UCR
UCR
PAL/Pdo.
Nuevo*
PJ
PJ
UCR
UCR
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
UCR
UCR
M.P.N
UCR
PJ
Pdo.
Bloquista
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
M.P.N
UCR
PJ
Pdo.
Bloquista
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
Fed. Intervention
1999
PJ
Frente Cívico
y Social
(UCR)
PJ
PJ
Acción
Chaqueña
UCR
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
M.P.N
UCR
Pdo Ren. Salteño
UCR
UCR
UCR
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
M.P.N
UCR
PJ
Alianza
Alianza
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
Alianza
PJ
M.P.N
UCR
PJ
PJ
PJ
Alianza
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
PJ
7
#
Mopof
Tierra del Fuego #
PJ
PJ
PJ
Tucuman
Total PJ
12
17
14
Total UCR/
Alianza
7
2
4
Sources: Cited in Calvo and Murillo (2003).
^ 1991 Intervention before the election
*PAL from 1993 to 1995 and Partido Nuevo from 1995 to 1997
# Tierra del Fuego was not a province.
Mopof
Fuerza Repub.
14
PJ
PJ
15
5
7
National Crises, Local Reforms
Argentina established a federal republic with a presidential executive and a
bicameral legislature in its 1853 constitution4. Until 1995 the president was elected in an
electoral college voted in the provincial districts. After the 1995 constitutional reform, the
president was elected directly by popular vote in a single national district, requiring at least
45% of the votes to avoid a run-off between the two top candidates.
Representatives to the lower house were also elected in the electoral districts, the
provinces, by simple plurality until 1912, by incomplete list until 1962, and by PR with
variable district magnitudes thereafter. National senators, on the other hand, were elected
indirectly by the provinces’ legislatures until 2001 and directly by the people thereafter,
using a fix majority-minority formula5.
The constitution, however, was silent regarding the workings of the political
systems in the provinces. The development of the provinces’ electoral rules and governing
bodies, in consequence, followed different institutional trajectories, resulting in quite
different political systems.
4
5
See Alberdi (1853) and Botana (1993) for a good description of Argentina´s constitutional origins.
Abal Medina & Suárez Cao (2003) provide details of the whole history of Argentine electoral system.
8
The earliest electoral systems in the metropolitan provinces6 were usually local
hybrids of the simple plurality system that regulated national elections until 1912. While
using different district magnitudes, provinces like Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Cordoba
used similar whole party lists that were allocated in full to the winner of the electoral
contest.7 The houses where often congruent –same median voter- and symmetric –relatively
similar institutional power-; leading to the notion that while not every idea was vented in
Congress, all political men collect their checks from the payroll office.8
The national electoral reform of 1912 spurred a wave of local reforms also, leading
to the generalization of incomplete lists in many of the provinces. Majority-minority
allocation of seats allowed the old conservative factions of the Partido Nacional to retain
institutional resources in the periphery as the UCR dominated the national executive first
and then the national Congress.
Then, before Argentina could jump into the wave of PR that engulfed most new
democracies in the first half of the twenty century, the praetorian cycles of military
intervention disrupted the political system. It would not be until 1962 that the political
dominance of the Peronism in the electoral arena convinced the military and the most
important non-peronist parties that strictly majoritarian systems were a political liability.
The PR shift in the national elections, however, was unevenly incorporated into the
provinces’ constitutions. However, most national territories turned into provinces in the
later half of the twenty century did incorporate PR electoral rules.
6
Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Santa Fe, and Córdoba.
Ana Maria Mustapic (1990) has shown that such party lists were actually open list that were allocated by
simple plurality to the winner of the election. The resulting allocation of seats was therefore less controlled by
the party leadership than most scholars recognize. However, the full list with “modifications” elected
candidates for only one party by province.
8
“Si bien no todos las ideas pasan por el congreso, todos los hombre políticos pasan por el presupuesto” .
7
9
From 1983 until 2003, the sub-national electoral map changed significantly. A
different electoral system became now fashionable –Mixed Member Electoral System-, and
the PR system common in the smallest provinces became a liability once fragmentation and
not peronism, became the most significant political threat.
As Table 3 shows, the electoral systems of the Provinces has few similarities with
those of 1983. In fact, only Entre Rios failed to introduce major reforms in the last twenty
years (constitutional or electoral).
Table 3: Electoral Systems in the Argentine Provinces in 2001
DISTRICT
CIUDAD DE
BUENOS
AIRES
BUENOS
AIRES
CATAMARCA
CORDOBA
GEOGRAPHIC
AL UNIT
EFFECTIVE
MAGNITUD
ELECTORAL FORMULA
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
60
D´HONDT WITHOUT TRESHOLD
SENATORS
8 DISTRICTS
46, 8 SECTIONS WITH
VARIABLE
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 3 AND 9
92, 8 SECTIONS WITH
VARIABLE
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEB 6 AND 18
HARE WITH LARGEST
REMAINDER. THRESHOLD:
QUOTA
D´HONDT WITH A TRESHOLD
OF 3% OF REGISTERED VOTERS
UNI/BICAMENA
CHAMBER
L
UNICAMERAL
BICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
8 DISTRICTS
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
41
SENATORS
16
DEPARTMENTS
16 SINGLE MEMBER
DEPARTMENTS
DEPUTIES
MIXEDMEMBER
BICAMERAL
UNICAMERAL
SENATORS
CORRIENTES
CHACO
CHUBUT
ENTRE RIOS
FORMOSA
BICAMERAL
UNICAMERAL
UNICAMERAL
AT LARGE
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
26
D´HONDT WITH A 3%
TRESHOLD OVER REGISTERED
VOTERS
32
D´HONDT WITHOUT TRESHOLD
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
27
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
28
SENATORS
16
DEPARTMENTS
16 SINGLE MEMBER
DISTRICTS
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
30
BICAMERAL
UNICAMERAL
PLURALITY
PLURALITY FOR SINGLE
70. 26 SINGLE MEMBER
MEMBER DISTRICTS, PRDEPARTMENTS AND 44
D´HONDT WITHOUT TRESHOLD
SEATS AT LARGE
FOR MULTY MEMBER DISTRICT
13
DEPUTIES
PROVINCIAL
ES
MAJOR REFORMS
SINCE 1983
INCOMPLETE LIST: 16 SEATS BY
SIMPLE PLURALITY, 11 SEATS
TO THE LOOSING CANDIDATES
BY D´HONDT WITHOUT
TRESHOLD
INCOMPLETE LIST: ABSOLUTE
MAJORITY OF SEATS BY
PLURALITY, REMAINING SEATS
FOR THE LOOSING PARTIES BY
PR HARE. TRESHOLD: QUOTA.
PLURALITY
D´HONT WITH A 3% LIST
TRESHOLD OVER POSITIVE
VOTES. LEY DE LEMAS
10
JUJUY
UNICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
48
LA PAMPA
UNICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
26
LA RIOJA
UNICAMERAL
MENDOZA
BICAMERAL
MISIONES
UNICAMERAL
18 MULTY MEMBER
DEPARTAMENTS,
18
VARIABLE EFECTIVE
DEPUTIES
DEPARTMENTS
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 1 AND 4
38. 4 SECTIONS WITH
VARIABLE
SENATORS
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 4 AND 6
4 DISTRICTS
48. 4 SECTIONS WITH
VARIABLE
DEPUTIES
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 5 AND 8
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
40
NEUQUÉN
UNICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
RIO NEGRO
SALTA
SAN LUIS
UNICAMERAL
BICAMERAL
BICAMERAL
SAN JUAN
UNICAMERAL
SANTA CRUZ
UNICAMERAL
SANTA FE
SANTIAGO
DEL ESTERO
AT LARGE
35
MIXEDMEMBER: AT 43. 24 IN 8 SECCIONES
DEPUTIES
LARGE
OF 3 SEATS AND 19
DISTRICT AND
SEATS AT LARGE
8 SECCIONES
23 SINGLE MEMBER
SENATORS
DEPARTAMENTS
23
60. MULTY MEMBER
DEPARTMENTS DISTRICTS, VARIABLE
DEPUTIES
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 1 AND 9
9 SINGLE MEMBER
SENATORS
DEPARTMENTS
23
43. MULTY-MEMBER
DEPARTMENTS DISTRICTS, VARIABLE
DEPUTIES
MAGNITUDES
BETWEEN 2 AND 10
MIXEDMEMBER:
45. 19 SINGLE MEMBER
MULTY
DEPARTMENTS AND 26
MEMBER
DEPUTIES
SEATS AT LARGE
DISTRICT AND
19
DEPARTMENTS
MIXEDMEMBER: ONE
24. 14 SINGLE MEMBER
MULTY
TOWNS AND 10 SEATS
DEPUTIES
MEMBER
AT LARGE
DISTRICT AND
14 TOWNS
D´HONDT WITH A 3%
TRESHOLD OVER REGISTERED
VOTERS
D´HONDT WITH A 3%
TRESHOLD OVER REGISTERED
VOTERS
D´HONDT WITHOUT TRESHOLD
D´HONDT WITH A 3%
TRESHOLD OVER VALID VOTES
SECCIONES: D´HONDT WITH A
22% TRESHOLD OVER VALID
VOTES. AT LARGE: PR:,
D´HONDT WITH A 5%
TRESHOLD.
PLURALITY
D´HONDT WITH A TRESHOLD
OF 5% OF VALID VOTES
PLURALITY
D´HONDT WITHOUT TRESHOLD
PLURALITY FOR SINGLE
MEMBER DISTRICTS (WITH LEY
DE LEMAS) , D´HONDT WITH A
TRESHOLD OF 3% OF LOS
VALID VOTES FOR MULTY
MEMBER DISTRICT PR
D´HONDT WITH A TRESHOLD
OF 3% OF REGISTERED VOTERS
SENATORS
19 DISTRICTS
19 SINGLE MEMBER
DEPARTMENTS
PLURALITY (LEY DE LEMAS)
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
50
INCOMPLETE LIST: 28 SEATS TO
THE PLURALITY WINNER, 22
SEATS FOR OTHER PARTIES
USING PR D'HONT WITH 3%
TRESHOLD. LEY DE LEMAS.
BICAMERAL
UNICAMERAL
D´HONDT WITH A 5%
THRESHOLD OVER
REGISTERED VOTERS. LEY DE
LEMAS
D´HONDT WITH A 3%
TRESHOLD OVER REGISTERED
VOTERS
DEPUTIES
INCOMPLETE LIST: TWO
50, 28 IN MULTY
MIXEDTHIRDS OF THE SEATS TO THE
MEMBER DISTRICTS OF
MEMBER:
PLURALITY WINNER, ONE
VARIABLE
WHOLE
THIRD OF THE SEATS FOR THE
DISTRICT AND MAGNITUDES (4-8) AND
OTHER PARTIES USING PR
22 SEATS AT LARGE
4 SECTIONS
HARE.
11
TIERRA DEL
FUEGO
UNICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
AT LARGE
15
D´HONDT WITH A TRESHOLD
OF 5% OF VALID VOTES.
TUCUMAN
UNICAMERAL
DEPUTIES
3 DISTRICTS
40. 2 SECTIONS OF 11
SEATS, 1 SECTION OF 18
SEATS.
D´HONDT WITHOUT
TRESHOLD. LEY DE LEMAS
By 2003 five provinces implemented majoritarian mixed-member electoral systems
which do not contemplate any adjustments between the different tiers (Shugart and
Wattemberg, 2001), and many others are planning to introduce similar ones9. Most
provinces raised the formula threshold above the usual 3% used for the congressional
elections. Three provinces increased the threshold to 5%, Buenos Aires used the seat quota
to elevate the threshold beyond 6% of the votes while Río Negro chose a fixed 22%
electoral threshold in each electoral section. Another interesting new “interpretation” of the
electoral law was to impose the threshold over the total registered voters rather than over
the effective votes. With compulsory registration and turnout rates below 60%, the effective
threshold has increase well beyond 3% for the congressional and legislative elections.
Interesting cases are the province of Tucumán, where while the nominal threshold has been
eliminated, the effective threshold has increases significantly as a result of the use of
smaller district magnitudes.10
A Federal Court rulling in the City of Buenos Aires led to the only example in
which the nominal threshold was eliminated, a decision resisted by the most important
parties of the district. The information provided in Tables 2 and 3 shows other types of
reforms introduced to reduce the number of entrants in the political arena and reduce intraparty factionalism. Formosa, Jujuy, San Juan, Santa Fe, and Tucumán enacted Lemas
9
At the moment (August 2003) Salta, Corrientes and Mendoza are discussing whether they will eliminate
their high chambers and adopt a mixed-member system in their Legislatures.
10
Tucumán now elects the local representatives in three instead of two electoral districts.
12
(sublists) to allow internal factions to compete openly in the elections, reducing the
likelihood of some candidates running outside the official party lists.11 The use of lemas
allowed the incumbent governors to receive votes from different party sub-lists while
blocking likely challengers from the opportunity to form extra-party coalitions to dispute
their seats.
Local elites also attempted to minimize the adverse effect of the cottail effects of the
presidential and congressional elections. Even, some provincial Constitutions include the
express prohibition of holding federal and provincial elections at the same time12. Figure 3
shows the number of presidential or congressional elections that coincide with the local
legislative elections. As it is possible to observe, while in 1983 all national elections and
local elections were held simultaneously, by 2003 only 4 provinces held concurrent
gubernatorial elections with the presidential elections. Of those four provinces, two
attempted to benefit from the coattail effects that a presidential candidate from their own
province could bring, as it was the case with La Rioja (Menem), and San Luis (Rodrigues
Saa).
Figure 3: Percentage of Concurrent and Non-Concurrent Elections for Federal and
Provincial Deputies – 1983-2003
11
Other provinces that also introduced Lemas for at least some elections during the last 20 years include La
Rioja, Misiones, Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Santiago del Estero.
12
Chaco and Tierra del Fuego are typical cases.
13
100%
80%
60%
%
40%
20%
0%
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
2001
2003
YEAR
Concurrent
Non-concurrent
To summarize, by introducing majoritarian reforms, Lemas, and “administering”
cottail effects; most provinces maintained relatively narrow levels of party competition and
extremely low effective number of legislative parties (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Effective Number of Legislative Parties in Provincial
Congresses – 1983-2001
Effective Number of Legislative Parties
5
4
3
2
1
0
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
Year
The Majoritarian Properties of the Electoral Reforms
14
Is it possible to verify the majoritarian effect of the reforms introduced in the
Argentine provinces? In the following section we use an electoral dataset which includes
electoral data for every party in all elections that took place over the last twenty years to
measure the majoritarian bias introduced by the Provinces´ reforms.
In order to estimate the impact of multiple reform instruments, we pooled electoral
data from the Argentine provinces. The dataset includes all vote shares and total seats
obtained by every party in every legislative election from 1983 to 2001. It also includes
variables indicating whether constitutional reforms and/or electoral reforms where
implemented, the incumbency status of governors and the president, as well as control
variables for the election year and province.
Analyzing pooled data from different electoral systems is a complicated fate. In
effect, the relationship between votes and seats is both the result of mechanical properties
of the electoral rules (i.e. simple plurality formulas, small magnitudes, etc.) and of the
political dynamics that regulate inter party competition (i.e. increasing fragmentation,
cottail effects). And, while moving from single member districts to multi-member districts
will certainly approximate proportional representation, the effect of more moderate changes
will be usually harder to evaluate.13
In order to test the majoritarian bias introduced by the reforms we estimate King
and Browning (1987) statistical model of majoritarian representation, which uses a grouped
logistic procedure to estimate the relationship between the percent votes of a party and its
13
For example, medium sized PR districts with moderate thresholds (3%) display small majoritarian effects
when competition is concentrated in a few large parties but they can induce large majoritarian biases when
fragmentation is high. Therefore, reforms that concentrate the vote in a few large parties –i.e. Lemas-, will
both reduce the majoritarian bias of the system and the number of relevant parties. By contrast, increasing the
legal threshold will have diffuse effect in the number of parties, given that parties do not gain as much from
running “in the coalition”, and a more concentrated majoritarian effect, as the number of seats going to small
parties will mechanically fall.
15
seat count. In pooled multi-member districts of different sizes, each of which allocates
different numbers of seats representing different ratios of each provincial legislature,
grouped logistic methods are particularly versatile. In what follows, we describe the
dependent variable, the independent variables and their expected signs. The technical
details of the model are in the appendix.
The dependent variable is the number of seats allocated to Party i, in Province j, in
the year y -Sijy -, as a function of a matrix of explanatory variables whose most important
component is the log-odds share of vote Vijy. In King and Browning’s (1987) model, an
strictly proportional representation electoral system will estimate Vijy=1, while values
between 0 and 1 describe submajoritarian systems and values biger than one, Vijy > 1,
describe more seats than votes for the winning parties and less seats than votes for the
losing parties.
In order to estimate the impact of the electoral reforms we introduce several
independent variables that describe (i) whether an electoral reform has been implemented,
(ii) whether a constitutional reform has been implemented, (iii) whether the province uses
Ley de Lemas (sublists), whether there are (iv) presidential or (v) goubernatorial cottail
effects, and control variables for the different elections.
The electoral reform variable has the value of 0 if there have been no reforms since
1983, a value of 1 for every election after the first reform has been implemented, a value of
2 for every election after a second reform was introduced and higher orders if necessary.14
The Constitutional reform variable also has a value of 0 if no constitutional reform was
implemented after 1983, a value of 1 for every election after the first constitutional reform
has been implemented, a value of 2 for every election after a second reform, and higher
14
Salta, San Juan, and La Rioja, for example, implemented 4 electoral reforms each.
16
orders if necessary. The Ley de Lemas variable takes the value of 1 if the province uses Ley
de Lemas and 0 otherwise. The cottail effect variables for president and governors take the
value of 1 if concurrent with the legislative elections and 0 otherwise. An alterantive model
also includes a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent governor seeks reelection
and another variable indicating whether the governor held more than 1 non-consecutive
term.
The Results
Table 4 displays the results of the different models. As it is possible to observe, the
majoritarian estimates of the province’s electoral systems are relatively moderate ( =1.4). A
more intuitive understanding of the model results is provided in figure 6, which shows the
relationship between seats and votes displaying the percent of votes in the horizontal axis
and the number of seats obtained by a Party in a legislature of 100 seats. As it is possible to
observe, on average, a party that obtains 25% of the vote will gain 17 seats (equal to 17%
of the virtual legislature depicted in Figure 6). On the other hand, a party that obtains 60%
of the vote will gain 63 seats out of one hundred. The effect of the electoral reforms is
statistically significant but moderate .06, which should result in about two seats more for
the winning parties and 2 seats less for the losers. The effect of Ley de Lemas, on the other
hand, is quite substantive.
Table 4: Majoritarian Representation in the Province´s Elections
Vote Share (LNVP)
Bicameral Legislature
Legislative Lemas
Constitutional Reform
Number of Seats
obtained by Party i
1.395***
(.022)
-.009
(.0395)
-.299***
(.055)
.018
Number of Seats
obtained by Party I
1.402***
(.022)
-.003
(.039)
-.333***
(.056)
.032
17
Electoral Reform
Presidential Coattail
Gubernatorial Coattail
Peronist President
Log-Likelihood
(.044)
.063**
(.03)
.105
(.068)
.23***
(.06)
-8177.9623
(.044)
.071**
(.029)
.095
(.069)
.186***
(.067)
.098
(.035)***
-8150.195
N
46890
46890
Note: Grouped Logistic estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. *Significant at
the .1 level, **Significant at the .05 level, *** Significant at the .01 level. Year
dummies not reported in the table.
The effect of the Ley de Lemas is large and statistically significant. As expected, the
enactment of Leyes de Lemas reduces the level of majoritarianism, given that it decreases
the effective number of competing parties. More majoritarian competition, therefore, leads
to a more proportional allocation of seats given that many small parties that would not
obtain seats are reabsorbed into the broader coalitions. One of the interesting findings of the
model is the majoritarian effect that comes from running elections separate from the
Presidential and Gubernatorial races.
Figure 6: Seat-Vote Allocation of Provincial Legislative Seats
(Table 4, Model 1 estimates)
18
The Aggregate Effect
The argument presented in this paper is that the electoral reforms were implemented
in order to shelter governors and elites from the increasing fragmentation observed in the
political system. A different way to test this argument is to estimate the likelihood of an
electoral reform given an increase in the level of party competition. With this objective, we
aggregate the database used in the previous section to run a simple ordered logistic model
estimating the likelihood of an electoral reform given changes in the number of effective
competing parties, the number of effective legislative parties, whether a constitutional
reform was implemented, a variable indicating the district magnitudes, and dummy
variables indicating whether the legislature is bicameral.
Finally, electoral rules for bicameral legislatures are considerably harder to modify
and, therefore, we expect this variable to be negatively associated with the reforms. We
also introduce a variable indicating the district magnitude as a control.
Theoretically, we should expect that as the number of electoral parties increases,
electoral reforms are implemented to prevent the new competitors from seating their
candidates in the legislature. However, in order to successfully modify the electoral system,
the reformers need control of the current congress. The number of effective legislative
parties, therefore, needs to be negatively related to the likelihood of reform. A large number
of electoral reforms were introduced while reforming the constitution. In fact, many of the
legislative reforms where implemented together with new constitutions that authorized the
reelection of governors. We should expect, therefore, that constitutional reforms should
facilitate the implementation of electoral reforms.
Table 5 shows the results of our analyses. It is noteworthy that the effect of the
effective number of legislative parties is considerably larger than that of the effective
19
number of competing parties. This would appear to indicate that control of the reform
process is more relevant in explaining reforms than the pressure from new competitors. The
most significant explanatory variable is again whether the electoral reform is part of a
constitutional reform process, a faith more easily accomplished under unicameral
legislatures.
Table 5: Estimating the Probability of an Electoral Reform
Number of Effective
Parties in Votes
(Provincial Deputies)
Number of Effective
Parties in Seats
(Provincial Deputies)
District Magnitude
(Provincial Deputies)
Bicameral Legislature
Electoral Reform
Electoral Reform
.33**
(.15)
.46***
(.16)
-.89***
(.32)
-.60*
(.33)
.013***
(.001)
-.47
(.35)
1.94***
(.25)
Cut 1
.18-.67
.012
(.10)
.35
(.40)
1.82***
(.27)
-2.46***
(.92)
4.85***
(.96)
2.16-.78
Cut 2
.21-.67
2.21-.78
Cut 3
2.15-.69
4.60-.86
Cut 4
3.6-.72
6.39-.92
6.7-1.2
10.57-1.32
Constitutional Reform
Lemas Ejecutivo
Lemas Legislativos
Cut 5
-
2
Pseudo R
.177
.294
N
169
46760
Note: Ordered Logit estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. *Significant at the .1
level, **Significant at the .05 level, *** Significant at the .01 level. Year dummies not
reported in the table.
20
Concluding Remarks
In 1983 no governor could be reelected consecutively for a second term. By 2003,
every single governor could be reelected for two consecutive terms or more, and in six
provinces indefinite reelections where legal. Of the six provinces with indefinite reelection,
two included Kirchner (Santa Cruz) and Rodriguez Saa (San Luis), and a third one was
home to former president Carlos Menem (La Rioja). Those three candidates were the three
top vote getters in the presidential race of 2003. In this article we show that electoral
reforms in the provinces not only allowed governors to reelect but they also provided the
means to regulate political competition within their provinces. Majoritarian reforms and
Leyes de Lemas where the two most significant tools used to reduce the number of entrants
into the legislatures and to manage intra-party faccionalism. The result of these reforms was
a more controlled political environment in the mist of major political realignments at the
national level.
21
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