O Controle de Constitucionalidade e o Controle de

ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
AÑO XIX, BOGOTÁ, 2013, PP. 393415, ISSN 23460849
Roberto de Figueiredo Caldas (Brasil)*
O Controle de Constitucionalidade e o Controle
de Convencionalidade no Brasil
RESUMO
A interação entre o controle de constitucionalidade e o de convencionalidade no Brasil
é ainda muito recente. O Supremo Tribunal Federal nunca examinou diretamente essa
dinâmica de julgamento, embora já haja analisado a estatura dos tratados internacionais
sobre direitos humanos no ordenamento jurídico nacional. O Supremo analisou o tema
em julgamento sem maioria absoluta e por diferença de apenas um voto, e decidiu que
o status atribuído aos tratados tem caráter de supralegalidade, um patamar entre as leis
infraconstitucionais e a Constituição, e não grau constitucional atribuído em outros países.
Dois temas julgados pelo Supremo e pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos são
analisados no artigo: a prisão civil de depositário infiel e a validade de aplicação da Lei de
Anistia da época da ditadura também em favor de agentes do Estado. Neles se expressam
conclusões aparentemente colidentes. Uma grande mudança de composição do Supremo, com uma maioria de ministros que não participaram das decisões anteriores, pode
levar a mudanças nos dois casos. Há que se aguardar a maturação das posições a serem
adotadas pelo Supremo do Brasil.
Palavras-chave: direito internacional sobre direitos humanos, Controle de constitucionalidade, controle de convencionalidade, Lei de anistia, direito constitucional, Brasil, Jurisprudencia constitucional, Direitos humanos.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Kontrolle der Verfassungsmäβigkeit des nationalen
Rechts und seiner Vereinbarkeit mit internationalen Verträgen ist in Brasilien erst vor
Kurzem ins Bewusstsein gerückt. Im Rahmen seiner Gerichtsentscheidungen hat das
oberste Bundesgericht Brasiliens diese Dynamik zwar bisher nie direkt untersucht, es hat
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396
O CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE… / ROBERTO DE FIGUEIREDO CALDAS
sich jedoch bereits zur Stellung der internationalen Menschenrechtsverträge in der nationalen Rechtsordnung geäuβert. In einer ohne absolute Mehrheit und mit einer relativen
Mehrheit von gerade einmal einer Stimme getroffenen Entscheidung hat das oberste
Bundesgericht dieses Thema erörtert und ist dabei zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass der
Rang der internationalen Verträge über dem der einfachen Gesetze liegt, zwischen den
einfachen Gesetzen und der Verfassung, dass aber die internationalen Verträge nicht wie in
anderen Ländern selbst Verfassungsrang haben. Zwei vom obersten Gerichtshof und vom
Interamerikanischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte entschiedene Rechtsfragen werden
in dem Artikel erörtert: der Arrest von Personen, die anvertrautes Vermögen veruntreuen,
und die Rechtmäbigkeit der Anwendung des Amnestiegesetzes für die Zeit der Diktatur
zugunsten von Vertretern des Staates. Daraus scheinen sich übereinstimmende Rechtsfolgen zu ergeben. Eine weitgehende Veränderung der Zusammensetzung des obersten
Gerichtshofes mit der Folge, dass die Mehrheit der jetzigen Richter nicht mehr an den
früheren Entscheidungen beteiligt war, kann jedoch zu Rechtsprechungsänderungen in
beiden Fälle führen. Es wird abzuwarten sein, welche Positionen der oberste Gerichtshof
Brasiliens einnehmen wird.
Schlagwörter: Internationales Recht der Menschenrechte, Prüfung der Verfassungsmäigkeit, Prüfung der Vereinbarkeit mit völkerrechtlichen Verträgen, Amnestiegesetz, Verfassungsrecht, Brasilien, Verfassungsrechtsprechung, Menschenrechte.
ABSTRACT
In Brazil, the interaction between constitutionality control and conventionality control is
still very recent. The Supreme Federal Court has never made a direct review of the dynamics
of these judgments, although it has analyzed the importance of international human rights
treaties within the national legal system. The Supreme Court dealt with the topic in a judgment rendered by a majority of only one vote, holding that treaties have supra-legal status,
at a level between infra-constitutional laws and the constitution, and not the constitutional
hierarchy which they are given in other countries. The paper reviews two topics that have
been decided by the Supreme Federal Court and by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: civil imprisonment of unfaithful bailees and the validity of applying the Amnesty
Law of the dictatorship in favor of state agents. Apparently contradictory conclusions are
expressed. A significant change in the composition of the Supreme Court, with a current
majority of judges who did not participate in earlier rulings, may produce a shift in the
way cases are decided. We must await the development of the Supreme Court’s positions.
Keywords: International human rights law, constitutionality control, conventionality
control, Amnesty law, Constitutional law, Brazil, Constitutional case law, Human rights.
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
397
1. A internalização dos tratados internacionais sobre direitos
humanos no Brasil
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TFKBQBSUF%FBDPSEPDPNFTTFFOUFOEJNFOUPPTUSBUBEPTTPCSFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPTOP
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y
iFYJTUÐODJBEFtrês distintas situaçõesDPODFSOFOUFTBSFGFSJEPTUSBUBEPT
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C
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FNdata posterior à da promulgação da EC nº 45/2004FTTBTDPOWFOÎÜFTJOUFSOBDJPOBJTQBSBTFJNQSFHOBSFN
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7
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9
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'FEFSBUJWBEP#SBTJMTFKBQBSUFw
8
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
401
D
USBUBEPTJOUFSOBDJPOBJTEFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPTDFMFCSBEPTQFMP#SBTJMPVBPT
RVBJTPOPTTP1BÓTBEFSJV
entre a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 e a
superveniência da EC nº 45/2004SFGFSJEPTUSBUBEPTBTTVNFNDBSÈUFSNBUFSJBM
NFOUFDPOTUJUVDJPOBMQPSRVFFTTBRVBMJĕDBEBIJFSBSRVJBMIFTÏUSBOTNJUJEBQPS
FGFJUPEFTVBJODMVTÍPOPCMPDPEFDPOTUJUVDJPOBMJEBEFRVFÏiBTPNBUØSJBEBRVJMP
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FJTRVFPTEJSFJUPTFHBSBOUJBTJOEJWJEVBJTRVBMJĕDBNTFDPNPTBCFNPTDPNPMJ
NJUBÎÜFTNBUFSJBJTBPQPEFSSFGPSNBEPSEP$POHSFTTP/BDJPOBM
y
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UFSFEV[BNPVTVQSJNBNEJSFJUPTFHBSBOUJBTJOEJWJEVBJTUBJTDPNPDPOTBHSBEPT
QFMBQSØQSJB$BSUB1PMÓUJDBoJNQFEJSÈBBQMJDBÎÍPEFTVBTOPSNBTNBJTHSBWPTBTOB
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ţ"TTJNOÍPPCTUBOUFPDBSÈUFSDPOTUJUVDJPOBMEPTUSBUBEPTJOUFSOBDJPOBJTTPCSFEJ
SFJUPTIVNBOPTFTUFTOÍPTFTPCSFQÜFNDPOGPSNFBJOUFSQSFUBÎÍPEPNJOJTUSP$FMTPEF
.FMMPË$POTUJUVJÎÍPFBTFVTWBMPSFTGVOEBNFOUBJTOÍPTFOEPBQMJDBEBTBTEJTQPTJÎÜFT
RVFWFOIBNBDBVTBSSFUSPDFTTPFNSFMBÎÍPËTHBSBOUJBTKÈFTUBCFMFDJEBT1PEFTFEJ[FS
RVFmutatis mutandisQSFWBMFDFSÈB$POWFOÎÍPTFB$POTUJUVJÎÍPGPSNFOPTQSPUFUJWB
Ť%PNFTNPNPEPRVFOÍPIÈQPTJÎÍPEFĕOJUJWBTPCSFBFTUBUVSBEBTOPSNBTJOUFS
OBDJPOBJTTPCSFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPTOPPSEFOBNFOUPKVSÓEJDPJOUFSOPOÍPIÈDPOTFOTP
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DPOTUJUVDJPOBM"PUSBUBSEBQSJTÍPDJWJMEPEFQPTJUÈSJPJOĕFMPNJOJTUSP(JMNBS.FOEFT
GBMBFNFGFJUPQBSBMJTBOUFEPTUSBUBEPTTPCSFBMFHJTMBÎÍPPSEJOÈSJB0NJOJTUSP$FMTPEF
.FMMPQPSTFVUVSOPFOUFOEFRVFPTEJTQPTJUJWPTMFHBJTDPOUSÈSJPTË$POWFOÎÍP"NF
SJDBOBOÍPGPSBNSFDFCJEPTQFMPPSEFOBNFOUPDPOTUJUVDJPOBMFNWJHPS12+ÈPNJOJTUSP
10
$FMTPEF.FMMP7PUP3FDVSTP&YUSBPSEJOÈSJPOşŠťţŜşŝQQţťšţťţ
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12
i(...) o Decreto-Lei n. 911/69 – no ponto em que, mediante remissão ao que consta no Capítulo II,
do Título I, do Livro IV, do CPC (art. 904 e respectivo parágrafo único), permite a prisão civil do deve11
402
O CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE… / ROBERTO DE FIGUEIREDO CALDAS
.BSDP"VSÏMJPFNCPSBOÍPTFĕMJFBOFOIVNBEBTEVBTDPSSFOUFTTFNBOJGFTUPVOP
TFOUJEPEFRVFBTOPSNBTJOGSBDPOTUJUVDJPOBJTGPSBNSFWPHBEBTQFMP1BDUPEF4ÍP+PTÏ13
ť/PUBTFRVFFNCPSBBQPTJÎÍPBSFTQFJUPEBJNQPTTJCJMJEBEFEBQSJTÍPDJWJMEP
EFQPTJUÈSJPJOĕFMTFUFOIBDPOTPMJEBEPQFSNBOFDFNJNQPSUBOUFTEJWFSHÐODJBTTPCSFB
IJFSBSRVJBEPTUSBUBEPTTPCSFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPTFTVBTDPOTFRVÐODJBT"QFTBSEFBNBJPSJB
EPTWPUPTFNŞŜŜŤUFSTJEPDPOUSÈSJBBDPOTJEFSBSPTSFGFSJEPTUSBUBEPTDPNPEFFTUBUVSB
DPOTUJUVDJPOBMÏJNQPSUBOUFSFTTBMUBSRVFBQFOBTRVBUSPEPTOPWFQBSUJDJQBOUFTEPKVMHB
NFOUPFNCPSBBDPNQPTJÎÍPUPUBMTFKBPO[FNJOJTUSPTEPJTOÍPQBSUJDJQBSBN
WPUBSBN
QFMBUFTFEBTVQSBMFHBMJEBEFBMÏNEFVNWPUPRVFTFTPNPVËDPSSFOUFOPTFOUJEPEFFO
UFOEFSRVFUBJTUSBUBEPTOÍPUÐNOBUVSF[BDPOTUJUVDJPOBMNBTFTQFDJBM.JOJTUSP.FOF[FT
%JSFJUP
%PPVUSPMBEPGPSBNRVBUSPWPUPTQPSDPOTJEFSBSEFFTUBUVSBDPOTUJUVDJPOBM
VNBNBJPSJBDPMIJEBQPSBQFOBTVNWPUPEFEJGFSFOÎB%BRVFMBDPNQPTJÎÍPRVFWPUPV
BUVBMNFOUFBQFOBTTFJTNJOJTUSPTQFSNBOFDFNOP45'14TFOEPRVFEPJTEFMFTBJOEBOÍP
TFNBOJGFTUBSBNTPCSFPBTTVOUPPTNJOJTUSPT.BSDP"VSÏMJPF+PBRVJN#BSCPTB1516ŝţ
dor fiduciante – não foi recebido pelo vigente ordenamento constitucional, considerada a existência de
incompatibilidade material superveniente entre o referido diploma legislativo e a vigente Constituição
da República.”$FMTPEF.FMMP7PUP3FDVSTP&YUSBPSEJOÈSJPOşŠťţŜşŝQŤŞŞ
13
iEm síntese, com a introdução, no cenário jurídico nacional, do Pacto Referido, restaram derrogadas as normas estritamente legais definidoras da prisão do depositário infiel.w.BSDP"VSÏMJP
7PUP)BCFBT$PSQVTOŤţšŤšQŞŠŜ
14
$PNQPTJÎÍPEP45'FNŞŜŜŤ(JMNBS.FOEFT$FMTPEF.FMMP.BSDP"VSÏMJP&MMFO(SBDJF
$F[BS1FMVTP$BSMPT#SJUUP&SPT(SBV3JDBSEP-FXBOEPXTLJ$ÈSNFO-ÞDJB.FOF[FT%JSFJUPF
+PBRVJN#BSCPTB$PNQPTJÎÍPBUVBMKVOIPEFŞŜŝş
+PBRVJN#BSCPTB3JDBSEP-FXBOEPXTLJ
$FMTPEF.FMMP.BSDP"VSÏMJP(JMNBS.FOEFT$ÈSNFO-ÞDJB%JBT5PČPMJ-VJ['VY3PTB8FCFS
5FPSJ;BWBTDLJF-VÓT3PCFSUP#BSSPTP
15
0NJOJTUSP$FMTPEF.FMMPSFTVNJVPRVBESPEFWPUPTEBTFHVJOUFNBOFJSB“Houve, no julgamento anterior, clara dispersão dos fundamentos que deram suporte às correntes que se formaram,
nesta Corte, no exame da controvérsia em referência. De um lado, e conferindo natureza constitucional
aos tratados internacionais de direitos humanos, situam-se os votos dos Ministros ELLEN GRACIE,
CEZAR PELUSO, EROS GRAU, além do meu próprio. De outro lado, estão os votos dos Ministros que
atribuem hierarquia especial (Ministro MENEZES DIREITO) ou conferem caráter de supralegalidade
às referidas convenções internacionais (Ministros GILMAR MENDES, RICARDO LEWANDOWSKI, CÁRMEN LÚCIA e CARLOS BRITTO). O eminente Ministro MARCO AURÉLIO não perfilhou
qualquer dessas duas orientações. (…) Observo, por relevante, que, embora majoritária (cinco votos),
a tese da supralegalidade ainda não foi acolhida pela maioria absoluta do Supremo Tribunal Federal,
eis que a corrente que confere natureza constitucional aos tratados internacionais em referência foi
sufragada por 04 (quatro) votos (o meu próprio e os votos dos Ministros ELLEN GRACIE, CEZAR
PELUSO e EROS GRAU). Vê-se, desse modo, que somente 09 (nove) Ministros se pronunciaram sobre
as 02 (duas) posições debatidas nesta causa, pois, além do Ministro MARCO AURÉLIO – que entendeu
desnecessário aderir a qualquer das 02 (duas) correntes em discussão (critério da supralegalidade x
critério da constitucionalidade) para resolver a controvérsia jurídica -, também o eminente Ministro
JOAQUIM BARBOSA não se pronunciou sobre essa específica questão.” $FMTPEF.FMMP7PUP)BCFBT
$PSQVTOťŞšŢŢťQQŠŢŢFŠŢţ
16
7BMFSFTTBMUBSRVFPNJOJTUSP.BSDP"VSÏMJPBPSFMBUBSP)$O¡ťŞšŢŢFYQSFTTPVFOUFOEJ
NFOUPJOJDJBMEFRVFB$POWFOÎÍP"NFSJDBOBQPTTVJstatusEFMFHJTMBÎÍPPSEJOÈSJB“Assim, a nova
disciplina da matéria, ocorrida a partir de 6 de novembro de 1992, implicou a derrogação das normas
estritamente legais disciplinadoras da prisão do depositário infiel. Em síntese, o preceito da Convenção
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
403
CFNDPNPPTNJOJTUSPT%JBT5PČPMJ-VJ['VY3PTB8FCFS5FPSJ;BWBTDLJF-VÓT3P
CFSUP#BSSPTPRVFQBTTBSBNBJOUFHSBSB$PSUFFNQFSÓPEPQPTUFSJPSBPKVMHBNFOUPEBT
BÎÜFTFNDPNFOUP&NTVNBPCTFSWBTFRVFOBBUVBMDPNQPTJÎÍPEP4VQSFNPBQFOBT
RVBUSPTFNBOJGFTUBSBNFTFUFOÍPTFQSPOVODJBSBNTPCSFPstatusDPOTUJUVDJPOBMPVOÍP
EBTOPSNBTJOUFSOBDJPOBJTTPCSFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPT181718
ŝŜ%FRVBMRVFSTPSUFEFJYBOEPEFMBEPPEFCBUFTPCSFB$"%)TFSEFFTUBUVSBDPOTUJ
UVDJPOBMPVTVQSBMFHBMÏJNQPSUBOUFPCTFSWBSRVFP45'MFWPVFNDPOTJEFSBÎÍPPTUFSNPT
EB$POWFOÎÍP"NFSJDBOBFBEPUPVBKVSJTQSVEÐODJBEB$PSUF*OUFSBNFSJDBOBEFNPEPB
JOUFSQSFUBSBMFHJTMBÎÍPPSEJOÈSJBFUBNCÏNBQSØQSJB$POTUJUVJÎÍP4JNQPSRVFNFTNP
BPBĕSNBSRVFB$POTUJUVJÎÍPQSFWBMFDFFNSFMBÎÍPBPTUSBUBEPTJOUFSOBDJPOBJTTPCSF
EJSFJUPTIVNBOPTFOÍPQPEFQPSFTUFTTFSSFWPHBEBFOUFOEFVRVFPTUSBUBEPTJOUFSOB
DJPOBJTQBSBMJTBNBMFHJTMBÎÍPPSEJOÈSJBEFSFHVMBNFOUBÎÍPEB$POTUJUVJÎÍPFJNQFEFN
PTVSHJNFOUPEFMFJTOPWBTOFTUFTFOUJEPQPSDPMJTÍPDPNB$POWFOÎÍPFDPNP1BDUP
*OUFSOBDJPOBMEPT%JSFJUPT$JWJTF1PMÓUJDPT"PBENJUJSBJNQPTTJCJMJEBEFEFSFHVMBNFO
UBÎÍPEB$POTUJUVJÎÍP(art. 5º, LXVII: “não haverá prisão civil por dívida, salvo a do
responsável pelo inadimplemento voluntário e inescusável de obrigação alimentícia e a do
depositário infiel”)DVKPTUFSNPTDPOUSBSJBNB$"%)QBSBMJTPVBFĕDÈDJBUBNCÏNEB
$POTUJUVJÎÍPQBSBUPEPPTFNQSFFNCPSBTFNSFEVÎÍPEFUFYUP%FTUBGPSNBP4VQSFNP
SFBMJ[PVWFSEBEFJSPDPOUSPMFEFDPOWFODJPOBMJEBEFFEFVQSFWBMÐODJBQSÈUJDBBPTUFSNPT
EB$"%)FEBKVSJTQSVEÐODJBEB$PSUF*%)FNGBDFEB$POTUJUVJÎÍP
ŝŝ&NDPODMVTÍPQFMPGBUPEFB
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DPOTUJUVDJPOBMC
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TFSSFWFSUJEBFNVNOPWPKVMHBNFOUP
Americana sobre Direitos Humanos limitador de prisão por dívida passou a viger com estatura de
legislação ordinária, suplantando, assim, enfoques em contrário.” .JO."3$0"63²-*07PUP
)BCFBT$PSQVTOťŞšŢŢQŠšŢ. /ÍPUPSOPVDPOUVEPBFYQSFTTBSFTTFQPTJDJPOBNFOUPOPTWPUPT
EPTEFNBJTQSPDFTTPTFNBOÈMJTFPQUBOEPQPSBDPNQBOIBSPWPUPEP.JOJTUSP(JMNBS.FOEFT
OP3&OşŠťţŜşŝ0CTFSWBTFFOUÍPRVFP.JOJTUSPUFNJNQMJDJUBNFOUFTFĕMJBEPËDPSSFOUFEB
TVQSBMFHBMJEBEFPRVFUBNCÏNQPEFTFSFYUSBÓEPEPTFHVJOUFUSFDIPEPWPUPRVFQSPGFSJVOP3&O
ŠŢŢşŠşi(…) subscrevemos o Pacto de San José da Costa Rica. Fizemo-lo não para tê-lo no mesmo
patamar dos dispositivos constitucionais, porque há uma exigência maior, indispensável para que se
alcance essa envergadura, que se observe o mesmo procedimento alusivo às emendas constitucionais.
Quando subscrevemos esse Pacto, a legislação regulamentadora do texto constitucional quanto ao depositário infiel ficou suplantada.w.BSDP"VSÏMJP7PUP3FDVSTP&YUSBPSEJOÈSJPOŠŢŢşŠşQŝŞŜŤ
17
0NJOJTUSP+PBRVJN#BSCPTBFNCPSBOÍPUFOIBTFQSPOVODJBEPTPCSFBRVFTUÍPKÈGF[EF
DMBSBÎÍPOPTTFHVJOUFTUFSNPTi(...) na hipótese de eventual conflito entre regras domésticas e normas
emergentes de tratados internacionais, a prevalência (…) há de ser outorgada à norma mais favorável
ao indivíduow+PBRVJN#BSCPTB7PUP3FDVSTP&YUSBPSEJOÈSJPOŠŢŢşŠşQŝŞŜŝ
18
%PTNJOJTUSPTRVFKÈTFQSPOVODJBSBN(JMNBS.FOEFT$ÈSNFO-ÞDJBF3JDBSEP-FXBOEPXTLJ
TÍPBGBWPSEBTVQSBMFHBMJEBEFMFNCSBOEPRVFFTUFTEPJTÞMUJNPTBQFOBTBDPNQBOIBSBNPWPUPEP
NJOJTUSP(JMNBS.FOEFTFPNJOJTUSP$FMTPEF.FMMPÏBGBWPSEBDPOTUJUVDJPOBMJEBEF
404
O CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE… / ROBERTO DE FIGUEIREDO CALDAS
ŝŞ&YQPTUPPFTUBEPEBBSUFOP4VQSFNPEPTUSBUBEPTTPCSFEJSFJUPTIVNBOPTTFHVF
BOÈMJTFEFVNJNQPSUBOUFDBTPTPCSFBQMJDBÎÍPEB$POTUJUVJÎÍP/BDJPOBMFEB$POWFOÎÍP
"NFSJDBOBTPCSF%JSFJUPT)VNBOPTBMVTJWBNFOUFËWBMJEBEFPVOVMJEBEFEB-FJEF"OJT
UJBEPSFHJNFNJMJUBSŝťţť
QBSBGBWPSFDFSBHFOUFTEP&TUBEPFNRVFÏQPTTÓWFMPCTFSWBS
BTJNQMJDBÎÜFTQSÈUJDBTEFTTFRVBESPJOEFĕOJEP
2. Controle de constitucionalidade vs. controle
de convencionalidade: a Lei de Anistia de 1979
2.1. O Supremo Tribunal Federal e a Arguição de Descumprimento
de Preceito Fundamental nº 153
ŝş&NŞŜŜŤP$POTFMIP'FEFSBMEB0SEFNEPT"EWPHBEPTEP#SBTJM0"#
QSPQÙT"S
HVJÎÍPEF%FTDVNQSJNFOUPEF1SFDFJUP'VOEBNFOUBM"%1'Oŝšş
19DPNPPCKFUJWPEF
WFSEFDMBSBEPPOÍPSFDFCJNFOUPEPBSUJHPŝfŝEB-FJOŢŢŤşEFŝťEFEF[FNCSPEF
ŝťţť-FJEF"OJTUJB
20QFMB$POTUJUVJÎÍP'FEFSBMEFŝťŤŤ"0"#SFRVFSFVBJOEBRVFP
19
""SHVJÎÍPEF%FTDVNQSJNFOUPEF1SFDFJUP'VOEBNFOUBMBCBSDBUBOUPPDPOUSPMFDPODFOUSB
EPDPNPPDPOUSPMFEJGVTPEFDPOTUJUVDJPOBMJEBEFFQPTTVJDBSÈUFSTVCTJEJÈSJP5FNQPSPCKFUPFWJUBS
PVSFQBSBSMFTÍPBQSFDFJUPGVOEBNFOUBMSFTVMUBOUFEFBUPEP1PEFS1ÞCMJDP04VQSFNP5SJCVOBM
'FEFSBMOÍPQPTTVJVNDPODFJUPGFDIBEPTPCSFRVBJTTFSJBNPTQSFDFJUPTGVOEBNFOUBJT&OUSFUBOUP
BEPUBDPNPJOEJDBUJWPPWPUPEPNJOJTUSP(JMNBS.FOEFTOB"%1'Oşşš1"RVFQPTTVJPTFHVJOUF
UFPSiÉ muito difícil indicar, BQSJPSJ, os preceitos fundamentais da Constituição passíveis de lesão tão
grave que justifique o processo e o julgamento da arguição de descumprimento. Não há dúvida de que
alguns desses preceitos estão enunciados, de forma explícita, no texto constitucional. Assim, ninguém
poderá negar a qualidade de preceitos fundamentais da ordem constitucional aos direitos e garantias
individuais (art. 5º, dentre outros). Da mesma forma, não se poderá deixar de atribuir essa qualificação
aos demais princípios protegidos pela cláusula pétrea do art. 60, § 4º, da Constituição, quais sejam, a
forma federativa de Estado, a separação de Poderes e o voto direto, secreto, universal e periódico. Por
outro lado, a própria Constituição explicita os chamados “princípios sensíveis”, cuja violação pode dar
ensejo à decretação de intervenção federal nos Estados-membros (art. 34, VII).w(JMNBS.FOEFT7PUP
"SHVJÎÍPEF%FTDVNQSJNFOUPEF1SFDFJUP'VOEBNFOUBMOşşQŝŝ5BMQPTJDJPOBNFOUPGPJJOWPDBEP
QFMP.JOJTUSP&SPT(SBVTOPKVMHBNFOUPEB"%1'OŝšşBTFSBOBMJTBEBNBJTBEJBOUF7BMFSFTTBMUBS
QPSÏNRVFSFGFSJEPDPODFJUPOÍPÏVOÉOJNFFOUSFPTNFNCSPTEP45'UBMDPNPFYQMJDJUBPNJOJT
USP$BSMPT"ZSFT#SJUUPiÉ que tenho a tendência de fixar constitucionalmente a expressão “preceito
fundamental” enquanto direito ou garantia que a própria Constituição chama de fundamental. E a
Constituição só usa o adjetivo “fundamental” em duas oportunidades: para caracterizar os princípios
(Título I – Dos Princípios Fundamentais); e para caracterizar certos direitos e garantias (Título II – Dos
Direitos e Garantias Fundamentais). Por isso é que me inclino a pensar, cada vez mais, que “preceito
fundamental” é apenas aquele inserto no Título II da Constituição, é aquela regra que está a serviço
de um princípio fundamental da República.w"ZSFT#SJUUP7PUP.FEJEB$BVUFMBSOB"SHVJÎÍPEF
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ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
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zendo em si mesma o resultado específico pretendido, ao qual se dirigem”23"TTJNOÍP
IBWFSJBFTQBÎPQBSBVNBJOUFSQSFUBÎÍPBUVBMEPTJHOJĕDBEPEBBOJTUJBB“Lei de Anistia
veicula uma decisão política naquele momento – o momento da transição conciliada de
1979 – assumida”. A “Lei nº 6.683 é uma lei-medida, não uma regra para o futuro, dotada
de abstração e generalidade. Há de ser interpretada a partir da realidade no momento em
que foi conquistadaw24
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ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
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Brasília - A Lei de Anistia brasileira de 1979 pode sofrer modificações e até ser revogada se houver uma demanda, afirmou nesta quinta-feira (28) o presidente do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF)
Joaquim Barbosa.
Durante coletiva de imprensa com correspondentes estrangeiros na capital federal, Barbosa
destacou que esteve ausente durante a ratificação da lei em 2010, mas garantiu que votaria contra. Ele
ressaltou que os magistrados de agora não são os mesmos daquele período, assim como as condições
414
O CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE… / ROBERTO DE FIGUEIREDO CALDAS
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3. Conclusão
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atuais são outras. “Se existisse um requerimento para mudar essa normativa, o STF o faria”, afirmou
Barbosa.
O máximo representante do Supremo estimou que uma variação ou anulação da lei poderia
ocorrer nos próximos cinco anos. O pronunciamento de Barbosa ocorre um ano depois que o governo
federal descartou qualquer tipo de discussão, nacional ou internacional sobre a Lei de Anistia que
exonerou os responsáveis de abusos de direitos humanos cometidos durante a ditadura militar entre
1964 e 1985
47
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ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO
415
Referências Bibliográficas
"įĿ˞ļ1BVMPi%JSFJUPËWFSEBEFFËKVTUJÎBOBUSBOTJÎÍPQPMÓUJDBCSBTJMFJSBwFN1BVMP
"CSÍPF5BSTP(FOSPOs direitos da transição e a democracia no Brasil. Estudos sobre
a Justiça de Transição e a Teoria da Democracia#FMP)PSJ[POUF&EJUPSB'ØSVNŞŜŝŞ
1IJĿIJĶĿĮ"OUIPOZ8Ditadura e repressão: o autoritarismo e o estado de direito no Brasil,
no Chile e na Argentina4ÍP1BVMP1B[F5FSSBŞŜŝŜ
.IJĹĶŁļ-#BSCPTBBĕSNBRVFB-FJEF"OJTUJBQPEFTFSNPEJĕDBEB1PSUBM&#$EJT
QPOÓWFMFNIUUQXXXFCDDPNCSDJEBEBOJBŞŜŝşŜŞCBSCPTBBĕSNBRVFBMFJ
EFBOJTUJBQPEFTFSNPEJĕDBEB"DFTTPFNţEFKVOIPEFŞŜŝş
Jurisprudência
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