Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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the Atomic Scientists
Nuclear power and the public
M. V. Ramana
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2011 67: 43
DOI: 10.1177/0096340211413358
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Nuclear power and the public
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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DOI: 10.1177/0096340211413358
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M. V. Ramana
Abstract
Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not
only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons,
but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely
associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to
break down public resistance to nuclear powerÑincluding information campaigns, risk comparisons, and
efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well,
mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to
continue, making it difficult to site and build new reactors. This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid
expansion of nuclear power.
Keywords
climate change, dread, NIMBY, nuclear power, public opposition, risk, stigma
n April 10 of this year, nearly a
month after a disastrous earthquake and tsunami struck
Japan, thousands of protesters took to
the streets of Tokyo, calling for an end
to nuclear power. In the cityÕs Koenji
neighborhood, a large group of mostly
younger protesters, many in costume,
chanted and banged drums. In Shiba
Park, an older and more sober group
demanded the closure of the Hamaoka
nuclear power plant, located near a
fault line about 200 kilometers (125
miles) southwest of Tokyo.1
These public protests are symptomatic of a general decline in public support for nuclear power in Japan, a
O
country that derived about 30 percent
of its electricity from nuclear power in
2010. Recent polls have suggested that
somewhere between 41 and 54 percent
of Japanese support scrapping, or reducing the numbers of, nuclear power plants
(Kyodo News, 2011; Wallace, 2011;
Yamada, 2011). By comparison, a 2005
poll conducted by the International
Atomic Energy Agency found that 82
percent of Japanese favored building
more plants or maintaining existing
ones (GlobeScan, 2005). Partly in
response to the recent growing opposition, on May 6, Japanese Prime Minister
Naoto Kan instructed the operator of
Hamaoka to shut down all three reactors
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44
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(4)
there. Four days later, Kan called for a
new energy policy with less reliance on
nuclear power.
Japan is by no means alone. Around
the world, nuclear energy has declined
in popularity. In the United States, for
example, a Washington Post-ABC poll
conducted in April 2011 found that 64
percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors (Craighill and
Cohen, 2011). Another poll, conducted by
CBS News in March 2011, soon after the
Fukushima crisis began, found that only
43 percent of those polled would
approve of building new reactors,
down from a 57 percent approval rating
in 2008 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011).
Support for nuclear power was similar
or lower in countries as varied as Chile
(12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent),
Australia (34 percent), and the United
Kingdom (35 percent) (Fowler, 2011;
Green, 2011; van der Zee, 2011). Even in
France, which relies on nuclear power
for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57
percent) were in favor of abandoning
nuclear energy (Buffery, 2011).
These approval ratings are not strictly
comparable because the polls were conducted by different agencies, asking different questions and providing different
kinds of information prior to asking the
questions.2 Nevertheless, there is little
doubt among those who study public
opinion on nuclear power that, by and
large, it does not command much
support.
Nuclear power wasnÕt always so
unpopular. For example, in the United
States in 1977, when CBS News conducted its first poll on nuclear power,
69 percent of those surveyed expressed
support for building more nuclear
plants. Just two years later, after the
Three Mile Island accident, public support had plummeted to 46 percent, and it
dropped further to 34 percent after the
1986 Chernobyl accident. Since the
1980s, a majority of the US population
has consistently opposed the construction of new nuclear reactors (Rosa and
Dunlap, 1994; Bolsen and Cook, 2008).
Not coincidentally, there has been practically no nuclear construction in the
United States since Three Mile Island.
The public perceives nuclear power
as a very risky technology. In some
cases, association with nuclear facilities
is even subject to stigma. The nuclear
industry has tried a variety of strategies
to break down public resistance to
nuclear power, but they havenÕt worked
well. With growing public concern
about global warming, the industry is
experimenting with a new strategyÑplaying up the climate mitigation
potential of nuclear power. While this
has increased the benefit side of the
equation for nuclear power, it hasnÕt
decreased the risk perception associated
with the technology, and nuclear power
remains a reluctant choice at best.
Renewable energy technologies offer
the same benefits, making it unlikely
that a large-scale Ònuclear renaissanceÓ
will materialize.
A dreaded technology
What explains public opposition to
nuclear power? Proponents of nuclear
power often dismiss opposition as a
Ònot in my backyardÓ (NIMBY) phenomenon. There is some evidence for
this assertion: In polls, people typically
express less opposition to nuclear power
in general than to a nuclear plant that
would be constructed in their own vicinity. But this is only part of the storyÑthe
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Ramana
45
majority of those opposing a project are
opposed regardless of whether the project is to be located in their vicinity or
not. Therefore, the NIMBY phenomenon does not really explain opposition
to nuclear power.
A more fundamental reason that the
term NIMBY is inappropriate is that it
overlooks the ethical objections that
many people have to a variety of hazardous facilitiesÑincluding waste incinerators, oil refineries, and chemical plants,
as well as nuclear power plants.
Opposition to these facilities arises not
only from a desire to avoid personal
harm but also from the feeling that no
community should be subjected to the
risks that come with such facilities. Many
researchers have suggested that the term
NIMBY be avoided, if not entirely discarded (Burningham, 2000; Freudenburg
and Pastor, 1992; Heiman, 1990; Kraft and
Clary, 1991; Wolsink, 2006).
The question, then, is why so many
people see nuclear facilities as unacceptable, not just in their own backyard but
in anyoneÕs backyard. The public is not
homogeneous, and different individuals
oppose nuclear power for different reasons.3 But for the majority, opposition to
nuclear power seems to be tied to perceptions of the risk of nuclear accidents,
concerns about the disposal of nuclear
waste, and low levels of trust in the
nuclear establishment (Whitfield et al.,
2009).
Of particular importance is the publicÕs perception that nuclear power is a
risky technology. To someone who evaluates risk using metrics such as the
number of major accidents, or the
number of deaths on a day-to-day basis,
this might seem inexplicable. But studies
of risk perception have revealed that
most people have a much more
comprehensive conception of risk that is
based on characteristics such as the familiarity of the hazard; whether exposure to
the hazard is undertaken voluntarily; features of the technology such as the magnitude of accidents it could potentially
give rise to; inequities in risks and benefits; and the long-term implications of
exposure to the hazard (Slovic et al., 1982).
For decades now, psychometric studies based on detailed opinion surveys
have examined how nuclear power
fares in the public mind. Paul Slovic, a
leading practitioner of this methodology
and a pioneer in studying risk perception, has summarized the results of this
research: Ònuclear power had the dubious distinction of scoring at or near the
extreme negative end for most of the
[above-mentioned] characteristics. Its
risks were seen as involuntary, unknown
to those exposed or to science, uncontrollable,
unfamiliar,
catastrophic,
severe (fatal), and dreaded . . . . These
results have since been replicated with
many different populations in numerous
countriesÓ (Slovic, 1994). Given these
problematic perceptions of nuclear
power, opposition to nuclear facilities
is not surprising.
Severe stigma
Studies also find that some aspects of the
technology, especially those involving
radiation, are Òsubject to severe stigmatization,Ó where the term stigma is used
to denote Òsomething that is to be
shunned or avoided not just because it
is dangerous but because it overturns or
destroys a positive conditionÓ (Gregory
et al., 1995). In stigmatized communities,
what may be more dreadful to residents
is not the direct experience of risk but
rather the experience of how they are
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46
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(4)
viewed by others (Gregory and
Satterfield, 2002).
A current example is how people from
Fukushima are treated: Some people
who have left the area since the disaster
have been turned away from hotels, and
their children have been called ÒbaikinÓ
(vermin) and have been bullied (McNeill,
2011). One young woman was reported as
saying, ÒAs a single woman . . . IÕm worried about groundless rumors that
women from Fukushima should not be
chosen as wivesÓ (Ito, 2011).
The stigmatization even extends to
vegetables. Cucumbers from the
Fukushima region had enjoyed a favorable Òbrand imageÓ for decades. Now,
even vegetables grown in areas that are
not subject to government bans are not
saleable. Many farmers have reportedly
not even bothered planting a cucumber
crop this season (Ito, 2011).
Such stigmatized perceptions of produce from areas near nuclear power
plants are not confined to Fukushima
or Chernobyl. People who live near the
Kalpakkam nuclear facility in India
reportedly never buy fish caught from
the sea near the facility; local fishermen
are forced to travel about 80 kilometers
(50 miles) to sell their catch in the city of
Chennai, taking advantage of urban anonymity (Chugoku Newspaper, 1992;
Shivakumar, 2008). Whether or not the
fish are indeed contaminated, the perception that they are unsafe to eat has
very real impacts on the livelihoods of
local people.
Nuclear waste disposal facilities can
also stigmatize a community. During
the years when the United States was
considering NevadaÕs Yucca Mountain
as a disposal site for high-level radioactive waste, nationwide surveys showed
that a majority of people felt that a
repository would reduce the desirability
of Nevada as a state to move to, and
could deter them from visiting for a
vacation or a convention (Flynn and
Slovic, 1995). Thus, regardless of
whether there would be any harm to
the health of the people of Nevada,
they would suffer real economic
damage from having a repository in
their state.
Information or propaganda?
Faced with public antipathy, the nuclear
industry has tried a variety of strategies
to persuade the public to accept nuclear
power. None of these have been very
successful. One of the most common
strategies is to publish numerous Òfact
sheetsÓ that discuss issues of public concern. For example, Unistar Nuclear
Energy, which seeks to build new
nuclear reactors in the United States,
has published Issue Briefs on its website
with titles such as ÒNuclear Energy
Facilities: Safe and Secure,Ó ÒIonizing
Radiation and Public Health,Ó and even
one claiming that ÒStrong Public
Support of Nuclear Energy Continues
its Positive TrendÓ (Unistar, 2011).
A constant theme in such publications
is that risk from nuclear power is low in
quantitative terms. UnistarÕs Issue Brief
on radiation, for example, has a highlighted box informing the reader:
ÒCompared to your risk of dying from
cancer caused by living near a nuclear
generating facility, you are 630,000
times more likely to die from an auto
accident . . . 50,000 times more likely to
die from drowning . . . 450 times more
likely to die from overexertion,Ó and so
on (UniStar, 2011). The implicit assumption is that since most people do not shy
away from buying an automobile or
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Ramana
47
working hard on occasion, they should
not be wary of UnistarÕs proposed
nuclear reactors. Such comparisons,
however, do not address the many qualities that people believe to be important
to an evaluation of risk, such as familiarity and control. For example, most
people are familiar with the risks of driving and can substantially control their
own chances of dying in an auto accident.4 Simplistic numerical risk comparisons, therefore, are not entirely
appropriate and are more likely to produce anger than enlightenment (Slovic,
1996). Indeed, many members of the
public see the information provided by
the nuclear industry as propaganda.
The implicit assumption behind many
efforts to provide Òfactual informationÓ
about nuclear power is that public opposition results from ignorance, often
termed the knowledge-deficit model.
Although this assumption is widely
asserted, evidence for it is weak, and
several studies have found no significant
relationship between levels of knowledge about nuclear issues and support
for nuclear power (OTA, 1984). This is
true not just of nuclear power. In a wide
variety of arenas, it has been observed
that local resistance is often greatest
where education levels and access to
information are highest, and many project opponents are well-armed with facts
and figures (Heiman, 1990).
The importance of trust
A number of studies have found that
knowledge is a less important factor
than trust in determining peopleÕs attitudes toward nuclear power. For example, two psychologists at the California
Polytechnic State University who studied how students at the university felt
about the nearby Diablo Canyon nuclear
power plant found no significant relationship between the studentsÕ nuclear
power knowledge and their attitudes or
behavior (Levi and Holder, 1988).
However, the psychologists found that
Òthose who supported nuclear energy
expressed more trust in the credibility
of information received from government and industry officials and were
more trusting that the officials would
protect the publicÓ (Levi and Holder,
1988: 445).
Distrust of the social institutions
that manage nuclear energy is widespread. A 2001 survey by the European
Commission, for example, found
that only 10.1 percent of Europeans
trusted the nuclear industry (EC, 2002).
In another survey, 68 percent of
Americans disagreed with this statement:
ÒThe US Department of Energy can be
trusted to provide prompt and full disclosure of any accidents or serious problems
with their nuclear-waste management
programsÓ (Slovic et al., 1991). Even
when it comes to local government officials, 62 percent of Americans surveyed
in one poll were unlikely to trust the opinion of a local government official
(Johnson and Scicchitano, 2000).5
There are many reasons for this
absence of trust. In the case of nuclear
waste disposal at the Yucca Mountain
site, for example, the reasons included
a site selection process that was perceived as unfair, attempts to coerce the
state of Nevada, manipulation of regulatory criteria to make them fit the chosen
site, and treating the public as if its concerns were irrational (Tuler and
Kasperson, 2010).
The major challenge for the nuclear
industry today is regaining trust. Once
lost, trust is extremely difficult to
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48
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(4)
regainÑa characteristic that has been
termed the Òasymmetry principleÓ
(Slovic, 1993). This can be seen even in
everyday life: Just because someone acts
in a trustworthy manner today, there is
no reason to believe that he or she will
always do so. However, if a person has
betrayed someone even once, there is
clear proof that this person can (at
least in some circumstances) be untrustworthy (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004). It
would likely take a long time for this
person to re-establish her or his
trustworthiness.
Unfortunately for the nuclear industry, distrust is periodically reinforced
by evidence of safety violations by
nuclear companies, or of ineffectiveness
or corruption on the part of regulatory
authorities. After the Fukushima crisis began, for example, newspapers reminded readers that the Tokyo
Electric Power Company had continued
to operate the Daiichi plant for two years
after a safety inspector discovered in
2000 that a piece of equipment had
become cracked (Onishi and Belson,
2011). Worse, the regulatory authorities
knew about the safety issue but did not
force the company to shut down the
plant and fix the problem.
In the United States, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission responded to
the Fukushima accidents by assuring
members of the public that US reactors
were safe. ÒUS nuclear power plants are
built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis,Ó said a statement released by
the Commission on March 12 (NRC,
2011). But subsequent checks at all 104
nuclear reactors in the country revealed
that, at a significant number of those
reactors, there were problems that
would have made some emergency
equipment unusable in the event of an
accident (Wald, 2011). This discrepancy
between reassuring statements and reality does not make for greater trust.
Lack of trust will also likely render
unsuccessful the attempts by nuclear
proponents to regain public support by
offering newer reactor designs that are
claimed to be safer. Examples are designs
that incorporate passive safety, and Small
Modular Reactors.6 While these reactor
designs are intended to inspire trust, they
may have an unintended effect: creating
distrust of older reactors that lack the
touted safety features.
More fundamentally, the general
public cannot be expected to evaluate
detailed technical designs and convince
themselves that these designs are accident-proof. To the contrary, the public
can only decide that the newer designs
are safe by trusting ÒexpertÓ opinions. In
a number of cases, however, accidents
and safety violations have occurred at
reactors deemed safe by Òexperts.Ó
Under such circumstances, there is
little reason for the general public to
trust statements about safety.
Climate change
The urgent need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and prevent drastic climate change is possibly the most
important argument for expanding
nuclear power today. Proponents of
nuclear power hope that it can be rebranded as a solution to climate change
and thereby gain legitimacy (Stoett,
2003). The empirical evidence from a
number of public opinion surveys, however, is that concern about climate
change has at best a modest impact on
public support for building new nuclear
power plants. A survey by Accenture
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Ramana
49
Corporation in 2009 asked: ÒWhat
actions should be considered to reduce
your countryÕs reliance on fossil-fueled
power generation (i.e. coal, oil or gas
generated power)?Ó Of those who
responded, only 9 percent called for an
increase in nuclear power alone, while
34 percent called for increases in both
renewable energy and nuclear power.
By contrast, 57 percent called for an
increase only in renewable energy, without expanding nuclear power.
Such a predilection for renewable
energy has been demonstrated in a
wide variety of polls. Several US polls
from 2003 to 2008 showed that the
public had a clear preference for renewable sources of energy and major reservations about coal and nuclear fuel to
generate electricity (Greenberg, 2009).
In the United KingdomÑafter a sustained campaign by the government,
the nuclear industry, and major scientific leaders and professional societies
to reframe nuclear power as necessary
to reduce carbon emissionsÑone
study, which used a survey and focus
groups to evaluate the impact of this
attempt, found Òreluctant acceptanceÓ
at best (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Pidgeon
et al., 2008). The researchers found that
people were concerned about climate
change, but radioactive waste trumped
climate change in dread. There was
also great mistrust of the competence
of the nuclear-power establishment and
the government to manage nuclear
power safely. Again, renewable energy
came out looking much better than
nuclear power.
Conclusion
In 1976, Alvin Weinberg, former director
of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
observed: ÒThe public perception and
acceptance of nuclear energy . . . has
emerged as the most critical question
concerning the future of nuclear energyÓ
(Weinberg, 1976: 19). This question continues to dog nuclear power, making
the technology a problematic choice
for
electricity
generation.
The
Fukushima accidents reinforce the publicÕs concern about the potential for
severe accidents and long-lasting harm
to health and the environment. The
ongoing revelations about unreported
safety problems in Japan, the United
States, and other countries offer proof
that the nuclear industry and the regulatory authorities cannot be trusted when
it comes to assertions of safety. As a
result, public opposition to nuclear
power is unlikely to disappear anytime
soon. If democracy is to be respected, it
would take a miracle to effect a Ònuclear
renaissance.Ó
Notes
1. Short video clips can be seen on YouTube at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼4biD0_
0SoXM and http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v¼tZW7M0CIbRM.
2. For example, a poll that begins with a reference to the Fukushima disaster would find
lower levels of support for nuclear power
than a poll that begins by informing participants that nuclear power has no greenhouse
gas emissions.
3. There are also striking differences in
public preferences when categorized by
age, ethnicity, race, gender, and other demographic characteristics (Greenberg, 2009).
A widely observed phenomenon is the
Òwhite male effect,Ó that is, a preference
for nuclear power among educated and
relatively affluent white males in part
because they tend to have greater levels of
trust in authority.
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50
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(4)
4. Wearing a seat belt, for example, reduces
the chances of fatal accidents significantly.
In contrast, those living in the vicinity of the
Chernobyl reactor had no control over the
accident that occurred in 1986.
5. In contrast, about 50 percent of the people
were unlikely to trust a university scientist
on nuclear power.
6. Passive safety features are those based on
natural forces such as convection and gravity, rather than on active systems and components such as pumps and valves.
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Author biography
M. V. Ramana is currently appointed jointly
with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the
Program on Science and Global Security, both
at Princeton University, and works on the
future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament. He is
the author of The Power of Promise:
Examining Nuclear Energy in India, to be published later this year by Penguin. Ramana is a
member of the International Panel on Fissile
Materials and the BulletinÕs Science and
Security Board.
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