MODEL FAMILY CODE
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MODEL FAMILY CODE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE MODEL FAMILY CODE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE PROF. DR. INGEBORG SCHWENZER, LL.M. IN COLLABORATION WITH MARIEL DIMSEY, LL.M. Intersentia Antwerpen - Oxford Distribution for the UK: Hart Publishing Salter's Boat Yard Folly Bridge Abingdon Road Oxford OX1 4LB UK Tel: + 44 1865 24 55 33 Fax: + 44 1865 79 48 82 Distribution for North America: Gaunt Inc. Gaunt Building 3011 Gulf Drive Holmes Beach Florida 34217-2199 USA Tel: + 1 941 778 5211 Fax: + 1 941 778 5252 Distribution for Switzerland and Germany: Stämpfli Verlag AG Hallerstrasse 7 Postfach CH-3001 Bern Tel: + 41 31 300 66 77 Fax: + 41 31 300 66 88 Distribution for other countries: Intersentia Publishers Groenstraat 31 2640 Mortsel Belgium Tel: + 32 3 680 15 50 Fax: + 32 3 658 71 21 Model Family Code - From a global perspective Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M.; Mariel Dimsey, LL.M. © 2006 Intersentia Antwerp Oxford http://www.intersentia.com ISBN-10: 90-5095-590-8 ISBN-13: 978-90-5095-590-4 D/ 2006/ 7849/ 50 NUR 822 and 828 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. PREFACE In extensive areas of private law, namely in the law of obligations, endeavours to comprehensively harmonize and unify different legal systems, if not on a global scale, at least Europe-wide, were already commenced in the second half of the twentieth century. For a long time, however, family law has proved resistant to the challenges of internationalization, if not globalization. Until the 1970s, even comparative law in the field of family law was looked upon with suspicion, as this area of law was regarded as being deeply entrenched in distinctive national character. It was not until the Commission on European Family Law was founded in 2001, initiated and chaired by Professor Dr. Katharina Boele-Woelki (University of Utrecht), that the idea of unification, at least harmonization, of family law in Europe, gained momentum.1 The Commission currently consists of 26 experts representing 22 countries. Up until now, the Commission on European Family Law has elaborated and published Principles on questions of Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses,2 a further set will soon be published concerning Parental Responsibilities. As a member of the Expert Group of the Commission on European Family Law, I have been able to profit greatly from the invigorating discussions, which has provided me with the impetus and stimulus to refine my own thoughts on this area. This Model Family Code, however, should be clearly distinguished from the invaluable work of the Commission on European Family Law. Therefore, it should not be seen as a competing endeavour, but rather as a complementary work, supplementing the important discussion on the harmonization of family law with additional viewpoints. Firstly, the Model Family Code is elaborated from a global, rather than a European perspective. In many cases, it was explicitly inspired by solutions offered under Canadian, Australian and New Zealand legal systems, which may sometimes sound utterly revolutionary, especially to continental lawyers, whose family law sometimes remains deeply rooted in Roman law. Secondly, a Model Code means going beyond the common core of all solutions in the search for the best solution. At the same time, the Model Family Code enabled the possibility to remove all discrepancies persisting in national family laws due to different historical levels of – somewhat patchwork – development, and to create a wholly autonomous and consistent system of family law based on modern solutions. Finally, the Model Family Code has attempted to address all aspects of 1 http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl/. BOELE-WOELKI et al., Principles of European Family Law Regarding Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses, Antwerp/Oxford 2004. 2 5 Preface Partnerships and of Parents and Children, which constitute the core areas of any family law. Certainly, it is not yet complete; the law of guardianship, including issues of adult protection, as well as family law proceedings and the organization of family courts, have not yet been addressed and shall be dealt with in a later publication. The Model Family Code offers a mere framework for discussion, a skeleton to be “fleshed out” by national legislators. This enables different family policies and family realities, for example, state family support, availability of public care for children, or employment rates, as well as cultural influences and different value systems, to be incorporated and given appropriate weight. The same holds true for differences in the structures of state administration of justice and bureaucracy. Therefore, the Model Family Code is characterized by general clauses, leaving the details to regulation by national lawmaking entities and the discretion of the courts. The same applies to references in the Model Family Code to the “competent authority”; this is to be replaced as national terminology dictates. The Model Family Code expressly seeks to utilize new terminology, such as “intentional parentage”, “partnership” to refer to any kind of union, “responsabilité parentale”, and “post-partnership solidarity” devoid of any connection with spousal support or alimony, thereby consciously departing from the myriad of national legal terms, which are burdened with historical connotations and whose meanings are shaped and influenced by the respective national legal system. This must be kept in mind when reading this Model Family Code, and the trap of associating terms with their understanding under a particular national legal system should be avoided. The Model Family Code is not footnoted. Firstly, such an endeavour encompassing almost all areas of family law in so many legal systems just would not have been feasible and, secondly, this would not have fitted this form of publication. Instead, we decided to annex a list of statutes and publications from the states that our work on this Model Family Code mostly relied on. I am greatly indebted to Mariel Dimsey, LL.M., Lawyer (NSW, Australia), whose collaboration enabled me to produce this Model Family Code. She not only thoroughly researched and gathered the legal materials from all over the world, but also formulated this Model Family Code together with me. Her active mind and quick criticism was always a challenge and further helped me to refine my ideas. It was a pleasure working with her and we had lots of fun. VI Preface I am also deeply indebted to my dear colleague and friend Professor Dr. Katharina Boele-Woelki and the Organising Committee of the Commission on European Family Law for the possibility to publish this book in The European Family Law series. Finally, many thanks go to the translators of the black letter rules, Professor Miriam Anderson (Barcelona, Spain) and Caroline Pellerin-Rugliano, Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche and Julien Rey, Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche (Lyon, France). They not only translated the black letter rules, but made most valuable comments to the whole work. Last but not least I would like to thank my good friend, Professor Dr. Gerd Brudermüller, for his critical and inspiring discussion of an earlier draft. Basel, August 2006 Ingeborg Schwenzer 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE................................................................................................. V INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 PART I: PARTNERSHIPS........................................................................ 7 Title 1: General Principles ................................................................... 7 Article 1.1 (Partnerships) ....................................................... 7 Article 1.2 (Child of the Family) .......................................... 10 Title 2: Marriage................................................................................. 12 Chapter 1: Formation of Marriage ................................................ 12 Section 1: Prerequisites for Marriage ....................................... 12 Article 1.3 (General Principle) ............................................. 12 Article 1.4 (Consent)............................................................. 13 Section 2: Marriage Impediments............................................. 15 Article 1.5 (Age Requirement) ............................................. 16 Article 1.6 (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) ................ 17 Article 1.7 (Bigamy).............................................................. 19 Chapter 2: Name ............................................................................ 20 Article 1.8 (Family Name) .................................................... 20 Chapter 3: Divorce......................................................................... 22 Section 1: Requirements ........................................................... 23 Article 1.9 (General Principle) ............................................. 23 Article 1.10 (Reflection Period) ........................................... 24 Article 1.11 (Divorce in Cases of Violation of Impediments to Marriage)........................................................................... 26 Section 2: Procedure ................................................................. 28 Article 1.12 (General Principle) ........................................... 28 Article 1.13 (Administrative Divorce) ................................. 29 Article 1.14 (Alternative Dispute Resolution)..................... 31 Title 3: Protection in Partnerships .................................................... 33 Chapter 1: Financial Contributions in Partnerships .................... 33 Article 1.15 (General Principle) ........................................... 33 Article 1.16 (Interim Measures) ........................................... 35 Chapter 2: Family Home and Family Chattels ............................. 37 Article 1.17 (Exercise of Rights)........................................... 37 Article 1.18 (Right of Occupancy) ....................................... 39 Title 4: Financial Consequences Upon Dissolution of Partnerships 40 Chapter 1: General Principles ....................................................... 44 Article 1.19 (Interests of Children) ...................................... 44 9 Table of Contents Article 1.20 (Principle of Self-Sufficiency).......................... 45 Chapter 2: Partnership-Related Benefits and Detriments ........... 46 Section 1: Financial Relief ........................................................ 46 Article 1.21 (Adjustment)..................................................... 46 Section 2: Measuring Benefits................................................... 47 Article 1.22 (Scope of Benefits) ............................................ 47 Article 1.23 (Separate Property)........................................... 49 Section 3: Measuring Detriments ............................................. 51 Article 1.24 (Maintenance of Standard of Living)............... 51 Article 1.25 (Pension Scheme Contributions) ..................... 53 Section 4: Partnership-Relatedness .......................................... 54 Article 1.26 (Presumption) ................................................... 54 Section 5: Division of Benefits and Detriments ....................... 57 Article 1.27 (Equal Division) ................................................ 57 Article 1.28 (Exceptions) ...................................................... 59 Chapter 3: Equitable Adjustment ................................................. 64 Section 1: Compensation Principle .......................................... 64 Article 1.29 (Contributions) ................................................. 64 Article 1.30 (Extent of Financial Relief) .............................. 67 Section 2: Post-Partnership Solidarity ..................................... 68 Article 1.31 (Long-Term Partnerships) ............................... 68 Article 1.32 (Extent of Financial Relief) .............................. 70 Chapter 4: Manner of Financial Relief ......................................... 72 Article 1.33 (Transfer of Property) ...................................... 72 Article 1.34 (Pension Rights) ............................................... 74 Article 1.35 (Family Home and Family Chattels) ............... 76 Article 1.36 (Business Assets) ............................................... 78 Article 1.37 (Periodic Payments) ......................................... 79 Chapter 5: Partnership Agreements ............................................. 82 Article 1.38 (Right to Agree) ................................................ 82 Article 1.39 (Significance of Agreement) ............................ 84 PART II: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ........................................................ 86 Article 2.1 (General Principle) ............................................. 87 Article 2.2 (Measures)........................................................... 89 PART III: PARENTS AND CHILDREN................................................ 91 Title 1: General Principles ................................................................. 92 Article 3.1 (Best Interests of the Child) ............................... 92 Article 3.2 (Views of the Child) ........................................... 93 1 Table of Contents Article 3.3 (Child’s Right to be Heard and to Consent) ... 94 Title 2: Legal Parentage ..................................................................... 96 Chapter 1: Initial Attribution of Parentage.................................. 97 Article 3.4 (Parentage by Birth) ........................................... 97 Article 3.5 (Parentage by Intention) .................................... 98 Chapter 2: Challenging Parentage .............................................. 100 Article 3.6 (Challenge for Mistake).................................... 101 Article 3.7 (Challenge by the Child).................................. 103 Article 3.8 (Challenge by Genetic Parent) ........................ 105 Article 3.9 (Challenge by Birth Mother or Other Legal Parent) ................................................................................. 108 Chapter 3: Adjudication of Parentage ........................................ 111 Article 3.10 (Parentage by Adjudication) .......................... 111 Chapter 4: Adoption .................................................................... 114 Section 1: Prerequisites for Adoption .................................... 114 Article 3.11 (General Principle) ......................................... 114 Article 3.12 (Age and Age Difference) .............................. 116 Article 3.13 (Consent of Legal Parents and Holders of Parental Responsibility)...................................................... 118 Article 3.14 (Consent of the Child).................................... 120 Article 3.15 (Adoption Order)............................................ 121 Section 2: Consequences of Adoption .................................... 122 Article 3.16 (Parentage by Adoption) ................................ 122 Article 3.17 (Child’s Right to Know Origins).................... 124 Section 3: Revocation of Adoption......................................... 125 Article 3.18 (Child’s Right to Revocation) ........................ 125 Article 3.19 (Consequences of Revocation) ....................... 127 Title 3: Name of the Child ............................................................... 128 Article 3.20 (Initial Attribution) ........................................ 128 Article 3.21 (Change of Name)........................................... 130 Article 3.22 (Addition of Other Name) ............................. 132 Article 3.23 (Child’s Right to Change Name) .................... 134 Title 4: Parental Responsibility ....................................................... 136 Chapter 1: General Principles ..................................................... 137 Article 3.24 (Subject) .......................................................... 137 Article 3.25 (Autonomy of the Child) ............................... 138 Article 3.26 (Cooperation).................................................. 139 Chapter 2: Attribution................................................................. 141 11 Table of Contents Article 3.27 (Parental Responsibility of Legal Parents) . 141 Article 3.28 (Parental Responsibility of Third Parties). 143 Article 3.29 (Transfer of Parental Responsibility) ............ 145 Article 3.30 (Re-Transfer of Parental Responsibility) ...... 147 Chapter 3: Content ...................................................................... 149 Article 3.31 (Care for the Child) ........................................ 149 Article 3.32 (Integrity of the Child)................................... 151 Article 3.33 (Administration of the Child’s Property) ...... 152 Article 3.34 (Legal Representation of the Child) .............. 154 Chapter 4: Exercise ...................................................................... 156 Article 3.35 (Joint Exercise) ............................................... 156 Article 3.36 (Decision-Making in Daily Matters) ............. 157 Article 3.37 (Important Decisions) .................................... 158 Title 5: Contact................................................................................. 161 Article 3.38 (Contact Between Child and Other Persons) 161 Article 3.39 (Right to Information) ................................... 164 Title 6: Child Support ...................................................................... 166 Article 3.40 (General Principle) ......................................... 167 Article 3.41 (Support After Majority) ................................ 169 Title 7: Child Protection .................................................................. 170 Article 3.42 (General Principle) ......................................... 170 Article 3.43 (Measures)....................................................... 172 Article 3.44 (Termination of Measures)............................. 175 MODEL FAMILY CODE ..................................................................... 177 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA MODELO (Traducido por Prof. Miriam Anderson)............................................. 193 MODÈLE DE CODE DE LA FAMILLE (Traduit par Caroline Pellerin-Rugliano et Julien Rey) ..................... 211 MODELL-FAMILIEN-GESETZ........................................................... 227 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................. 243 12 INTRODUCTION 1. During the last forty years, family law has undergone profound changes throughout western industrialized countries. With minor lags, the development has been surprisingly even. However, this legal development is but a reflection and, at the same time, part of the developments occurring in society in a whole, as they already become apparent in official statistics. 2. The most salient feature is the rise in the divorce rate. Since the 1970s, it has more than doubled in nearly all countries. The probability of divorce has now reached 40 to 50 per cent. The high number of divorces brings about manifold further developments. These are, on the one hand, the rapid increase of children living in stepfamilies and on the other hand, the growing number of single parent families. This is again closely linked to the phenomenon described generally as the feminization of poverty. Studies on poverty have shown that, in many countries, divorce constitutes a much higher risk factor for women than for men. 3. Developments parallel to the rising divorce rate are the increase in age at first marriage and the general decrease in marriages. Simultaneously, cohabitation has increased in all countries, in some places dramatically. This is consistent with the fact that the number of out-of-wedlock births has increased considerably during the last decades. Recent years have finally observed an increasing “coming-out” and acceptance of same sex relationships. 4. With regard to the number of births, a general, in some countries dramatic decline in fertility rates can be observed. Since about 1965, the reproduction rate of the population has fallen to a below-replacement level in many developed countries. On the other hand, the various options available in the area of medically-assisted procreation are in steadily increasing demand among couples who still remain childless. 5. The socio-demographic developments are closely linked with and strongly based on a profound change in values. This shift can be characterized, on the one hand, as secularization, meaning the long-term societal process of decline in the importance of religion, and, on the other hand, as emancipation. Indeed, the second half of the twentieth century has been marked by the emancipation of women, the levelling-out of gender inequalities, which has brought about fundamental changes in society and, consequently, in the law. The second major emancipation movement of the twentieth century was the 1 Introduction movement of the rights of the child, the major achievement of which is that children are now increasingly perceived as subjects rather than as simple objects. This change in values has significantly contributed toward the development of what one might call the plurality of private living arrangements. Besides the traditional marriage-based nuclear family, there is an increasing diversity of family forms: childless marriages, single parent families, reconstituted families, families constituted by medically-assisted procreation, cohabitation without marriage, same-sex couples and more. 6. Family law could and indeed has not stayed unresponsive to the profound socio-demographic changes. The legal development can be circumscribed as moving ‘from status to contract and relation’. Legal regulation in family law is becoming less and less oriented towards status. The trend is to give priority to the autonomous private regulation of the private sphere, on the one hand and, where an amicable settlement is not possible, to take the actual relationships and not the existing status as a reference point, on the other hand. 7. Up until the middle of the twentieth century, western industrialized legal orders were characterized by their pronounced focus on status. Divorce law typically endeavored to prevent the dissolution of the legal ties of marriage. The power of the spouses to dispose freely of their marriage was, at least formally, strictly rejected. Divorce appeared at the most as a sanction against the spouse who had violated his or her marital duties. This view was mirrored in the legal consequences of divorce: the patrimonial status of the spouse who bore no fault for the failure of the marriage was upheld, decisions on child custody followed rigid criteria. On a procedural level, individual needs were subordinate to the goal of preventing divorce and protecting the superpersonal institution of marriage. In keeping with the exclusive focus on marital status was the ostracism of non-marital family relationships, which generally carried the stigma of immorality. A clear distinction was drawn between children born in and out of wedlock. 8. A fundamental change in values and conceptions beginning in the 1970s has led to a gradual shift of focus from status to the actual relationship regardless of status. In divorce law, this development was first reflected in the abolition of the concept of fault. Nowadays, consensual divorce is at the centre of legal practice. This trend is encouraged on a procedural level through simplified procedures whereby couples agree on divorce and on the inclusion of mediation as an instrument to assist couples in reaching an agreement. The law concerning the consequences of divorce is also characterized by a general withdrawal of the state; again, the primary focus is 2 Introduction on the private autonomy of the parties. At first, this led to the belief that a clean break was to be brought about between spouses insofar as their patrimonial situation subsequent to divorce was concerned. It was not until the 1990s that various legal systems recognized it was illusory to believe that formal equality alone should enable divorced women to provide sufficient income for themselves and their progeny. This realization led to a reorientation of the law of maintenance and matrimonial property, the function of which is increasingly perceived as being the equalization of marriage-related disadvantages. Thus, it is the actual relationship alone that forms the relevant criterion in post-marital law as well. 9. Status has also lost its relevance in child law. Children born in and out of wedlock are largely, if not completely, placed on equal footing in practically all legal systems. The primary focus of the pertinent legal rules is on the welfare of the child. Thus, emphasis is placed on the importance of both parents for the child and, accordingly, on joint parental custody, regardless of whether the parents are married, divorced or not married, whether they live together or not. However, it cannot be ignored that joint custody and the whole underlying concept may lead to further problems in high conflict cases. The actual relationship is also gaining importance as regards the law concerning relations with foster and stepchildren. The increasing recognition of the quality of children as individual subjects in all procedures bearing influence on their interests is another fundamental innovation. The child’s right to be heard and the instrument of child advocacy especially enjoys widespread recognition thanks to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter “CRC”), to which the majority of states focused on here are party. 10. Finally, non-marital cohabitation has undergone a fundamental reassessment. In many countries, the legislator has intervened, partly in order to offer unmarried couples a legally recognized form of cohabitation, partly in order to solve at least the most pressing problems resulting from the dissolution of non-marital relationships. In other countries, this remains the task of the courts. The most recent development with regard to non-marital cohabitation is the legal recognition of same-sex relationships which, where it has not actually been implemented, is at least an issue in the majority of countries. 11. From the core of these recent developments, two central tasks and principles of modern family law can be derived. The first is a principle of non-interference of the state with respect to private individuals, to the extent that they are able to cooperate with one another and regulate their own most 3 Introduction intimate relations and the best interests of children are not endangered. It is not the task of the state to dictate to individuals how they are to live their lives, be it in a marital or non-marital relationship, be it a heterosexual or homosexual lifestyle. This corresponds to the fundamental principle of party autonomy, found in private law in the concept of freedom of contract. However, it is, secondly, the task of family law to ensure that no person may escape responsibility for the type of life he or she is living. The emphasis must be on the actual life lived, rather than on an empty shell. In many legal systems, responsibilities are still linked to formal marriage and may thus be avoided by living in a non-marital relationship. Although, to a large extent, this no longer applies regarding obligations to children, it still finds resonance with respect to obligations towards the other partner upon the failure of the “joint undertaking” entered into by both partners, namely the relationship. 12. These core principles draw logical conclusions in all fields of family law and are reflected in the solutions of the MFC. 13. The prevalence of private regulation, for example, demands, in the field of partnerships, that marriage be opened to same-sex partners, as well as that marriage impediments be restricted and that spouses be given the possibility to liberally choose their surnames. Furthermore, private autonomy governs the law of divorce and its consequences. Cooperation and agreements also govern the parent-child relationship. This firstly applies to the establishment of parentage, where the MFC follows the central concept of intentional parentage. It also applies to the surname of the child, where parents are vested with ample options to choose. The area of parental responsibility also has as its central feature agreement and cooperation between those persons who actually take responsibility for children. 14. The central notion of non-escapable responsibility can, for example, in the area of partnerships, be particularly observed in the context of the consequences of dissolution. Decisive are the legitimate expectations that have been created by the actual relationship between the partners; the substance of the relationship, and not its form, is the crucial question. In the field of parents and children, this principle is apparent, primarily, in requiring duties of parents, rather than granting rights. Furthermore, the principle of intentional parentage, including adoption, is based on this concept, to the extent that an individual who has willingly assumed responsibility for, and thereby an obligation towards a child, may not simply withdraw therefrom at will. 4 Introduction 15. The concept of responsibility as it is elaborated in the MFC also has consequences for the debate concerning the limits and scope of public and private responsibility. A person is responsible only for consequences of his or her own conduct, such as the consequences of the distribution of tasks in the partnership according to the common intention of the partners, for example, partners who live in a partnership in which one partner is gainfully employed, and the other is fulfilling the common task of caring for children and household. However, no responsibility may arise where, for example, need is not partnership- or relationship-related, but is a consequence of external developments, such as in the labor market or health. Here, the principle of responsibility encompasses self-responsibility, namely that the person so affected must bear this risk and may not shift it for the mere reason that he or she was married to another person or is the parent or adult child of another. It also naturally follows from this concept that, for example, grandparents cannot be held responsible for the support of their minor grandchildren. 16. In light of the fact that marriage is no longer decisive, neither for the consequences of partnerships, nor for the relationship between parents and children, it may be questionable whether marriage itself should be legally regulated at all. However, the need to give a relationship significance through a legal act would still appear to be of great importance to many people. Therefore, the MFC maintains certain rules for the formation and dissolution of marriages. However, as the MFC regulates the consequences of marriages as the same as those of partnerships, there was no need to regulate other types of civil unions, such as “registered partnerships” or “civil partnerships”. 17. Neither was there any need to explicitly deal with what the common law describes as common law or de facto marriages. It goes without saying that these relationships are also regulated by the provisions concerning general partnerships. 5 Article 1.1 PART I: PARTNERSHIPS TITLE 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 1.1 (Partnerships) 1Partnerships include marriages. 2Partnerships include non-marital relationships if (a) they have lasted more than three years, (b) there is a common child, or (c) one or each of the partners has made substantial contributions to the relationship or in the sole interests of the other partner. Artículo 1.1 (Uniones de pareja) 1Las parejas casadas se consideran uniones de pareja. 2Las parejas no casadas son consideradas uniones de pareja si (a) su duración supera los tres años, (b) tienen descendencia común, o bien (c) uno o ambos integrantes de la pareja han realizado aportaciones sustanciales a la relación o en interés exclusivo del otro. Article 1.1 (Partenariats) 1Les partenariats incluent les mariages. 2Les partenariats incluent les relations non maritales si (a) elles ont duré plus de trois ans, (b) il y a un enfant commun, ou (c) l’un ou chacun des partenaires a contribué de façon substantielle à la relation ou s’il y a contribué dans le seul intérêt de l’autre partenaire. Artikel 1.1 (Partnerschaften) 1Partnerschaften sind Ehen. 2Partnerschaften sind nichteheliche Gemeinschaften, wenn (a) sie mehr als drei Jahre gedauert haben, (b) ein gemeinsames Kind vorhanden ist oder (c) ein oder beide Partner erhebliche Beiträge für die Gemeinschaft oder im alleinigen Interesse des anderen Partners erbracht hat oder haben. 7 Partnerships COMMENT 1. As has been set out in the Introduction to this MFC, it must be the aim of modern family law to hold persons responsible for the consequences of their relationships. This implies that marriage can no longer be the sole focal point of establishing such responsibility; rather, it should also be connected to nonmarital relationships. In accordance with this reasoning, many legal systems already place non-marital relationships on equal footing in certain areas, especially in the areas of protection of property and financial consequences upon the dissolution of the partnership. 2. However, defining the scope of those non-marital relationships that are to be placed on equal footing with marriages has proven to be a challenging task. The decisive element that distinguishes partnerships, for example, from mere shared residency arrangements is the assumption of responsibility for each other, and the justified mutual reliance thereon. The first important factor is to determine some permanency of the relationship, which, in the case of marriage, may still be prima facie presumed. Therefore, regarding non-marital relationships, the MFC opts for an approach by which, after the lapse of a certain period of time, here three years, a partnership is established for the MFC’s purposes. This is in accordance with many legal systems, in which relationship duration of either two or three years is the general requirement. The MFC has chosen three years, thus ensuring a degree of permanency. However, cases also exist in which one partner may experience serious disadvantages much earlier in the relationship. This is especially the case if there is a common child that is taken care of by only one of the partners. The same holds true if one partner has made substantial contributions to the relationship, be it financially, such as by buying joint property out of sole funds, or by making sacrifices, such as giving up domicile and/or occupation to live with the other partner. Other examples include contributions made in the sole interests of the other partner, such as contributing to the other partner’s business or profession, or caring for the other partner or his or her relatives. 3. Although, at first, assessing whether a partnership exists might seem to be difficult, this task is not insurmountable by courts, as is already shown in various legal systems nowadays. In assessing whether a partnership exists at all, regard is to be given to the duration of the relationship; the nature and extent of common residence; whether or not a sexual relationship exists; the degree of financial dependence or interdependence; the ownership, use and acquisition of property; the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 8 Article 1.1 the performance of household duties; and the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. In determining whether two persons live in a partnership, none of the abovementioned matters, nor any combination of them, shall alone be decisive. 9 Partnerships Article 1.2 (Child of the Family) A child of the family includes (a) a common child of the partners, and (b) a child for whose long-term welfare both partners accept responsibility. Artículo 1.2 (Hijo o hija de la familia) Se considera hijo o hija de la familia (a) al hijo o a la hija común a ambos miembros de la pareja, y (b) al menor respecto de cuyo bienestar a largo plazo han asumido responsabilidad ambos miembros de la pareja. Article 1.2 (Enfant de la famille) L’enfant de la famille inclut (a) un enfant commun des partenaires, et (b) un enfant dont les deux partenaires ont accepté la responsabilité d’assurer le bien-être à long terme. Artikel 1.2 (Kind der Familie) Ein Kind der Familie ist (a) ein gemeinsames Kind der Partner sowie (b) ein Kind, für dessen langfristiges Wohlergehen beide Partner Verantwortung übernehmen. COMMENT 1. The significance of the definition of “child of the family” attains relevance in various provisions of the MFC, but particularly where consequences are attached to caring for such a child and where decisions are to be made that also affect the interests of the child. 2. Primarily, “child of the family” means a common child of the family, be it at the time of birth or later by adoption. However, as this MFC does not focus on status, social parentage must be placed on equal footing with biological and legal parentage. This does not only apply to parent and children issues, as discussed in Part III of the MFC, but also to questions in this Part I concerning partnerships in general and, in particular, consequences of dissolution. However, it is not enough that a child is simply present in the partnership; both partners must have assumed a certain degree of 10 Article 1.2 responsibility for this child. On the other hand, joint parental responsibility is not required. 2 Partnerships TITLE 2: MARRIAGE CHAPTER 1: FORMATION OF MARRIAGE Section 1: Prerequisites for Marriage Article 1.3 (General Principle) A marriage may be entered into by two persons of the same or of a different sex before the competent authority in the recognized marriage proceeding. Artículo 1.3 (Principio general) Pueden contraer matrimonio dos personas del mismo o de distinto sexo, siempre que ello tenga lugar ante la autoridad competente y por medio del procedimiento establecido al efecto. Article 1.3 (Principe général) Un mariage peut être célébré entre deux personnes de sexe identique ou de sexe différent, par l’autorité compétente selon la procédure permettant la célébration d’un mariage valable. Artikel 1.3 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Eine Ehe kann von zwei Personen desselben oder verschiedenen Geschlechts vor der zuständigen Behörde im Rahmen des anerkannten Eheschlussverfahrens geschlossen werden. COMMENT 1. Many legal systems today recognize, at the least, some sort of registered same-sex partnerships, and in an increasing number of countries, same-sex marriages as well. This modern solution is followed by the MFC. 2. This Article, furthermore, makes it clear that marriage may only be entered into through a civil process, and that a religious marriage, in itself, attains no effect for civil purposes. Any purported marriage that is not entered into before the competent authority is automatically void ab initio. A court proceeding to declare annulment or the like is not necessary for this result. 3 Article 1.4 Article 1.4 (Consent) Marriage requires the consent of two persons to be the spouse of each other. Artículo 1.4 (Consentimiento) El matrimonio requiere que dos personas consientan en convertirse en cónyuges el uno del otro. Article 1.4 (Consentement) Le mariage requiert le consentement de deux personnes pour devenir époux l’une de l’autre. Artikel 1.4 (Zustimmung) Die Ehe erfordert die Zustimmung beider Personen, die Ehe miteinander eingehen zu wollen. COMMENT 1. In accordance with all legal systems, under the MFC, marriage is treated as a contract, thus necessitating the consent of both parties. Consent comprises firstly the legal capacity to enter a marriage, and secondly, the mental faculty to adequately understand the act of entering a marriage. 2. If there is no consent at all by one or both of the partners (e.g. if one party is absent from the marriage proceeding or fails to declare his or her consent), then no marriage comes into existence. However, if vitiated consent is given (e.g. through mistake, intoxication, fraud or duress), then a valid marriage nevertheless comes into existence. Under such circumstances, many legal systems still provide for annulment of the marriage instead of divorce. This can be traced back to Canon law, which does not allow divorce at all, but still seeks to provide a “way out” in these cases. 3. This approach is not followed in the MFC as it does not represent a modern solution. Firstly, the consequences of dissolution of marriage must be consistent, regardless of the reasons for such dissolution, be they vitiated consent or a breakdown of the relationship. Furthermore, in the case of defects in consent, there is no need for alternative dissolution proceedings to divorce if divorce itself can be obtained without posing severe obstacles. 4 Partnerships 4 The question of sham marriages (i.e. marriages entered into for sole reasons of citizenship, residency or tax purposes) is not explicitly dealt vvith in the MFC. Although there are a few legal systems that deal vvith this question in the context of formation of marriage, the right place to regulate such issues would appear to be the law concerning the relative administrative questions. 5 Partnerships Section 2: Marriage Impediments COMMENT 1. The MFC retains certain marriage impediments that are common to all legal systems based on the Christian faith. These impediments aim at protecting the spouses, on the one hand; on the other hand, however, they are the expression of public policy principles deeply rooted in western societies. In recent years, the number of marriage impediments has been cut down. In light of the fact that marriage itself is no longer ascribed any great significance under the MFC, there was no need to provide for further marriage impediments that may still be recognized by some legal systems, such as the prohibition against marrying one’s cousin, aunt or uncle. This is in line with the approach of cutting back interference by the state with private individuals’ lives. 2. In case of violation of marriage impediments, most legal systems still provide for annulment of marriage as a means, separate and distinct from divorce, of dissolving the marriage. This is in accordance with the concept that an illegal contract – here, the marriage – is generally deemed to be null and void. Thus, in principle, annulment leads to the marriage being dissolved with retroactive, ab initio, effect. However, the legal systems cannot deny the fact that the marriage has been carried out by the parties. In any case, where children are involved, the marriage is predominantly regarded as having existed, at least for the purpose of holding them to be legitimate. Additionally, many legal systems make annulment subject to the same procedures and consequences as those for divorce. 3. The MFC, consequently, abandons the concept of annulment and regards divorce as the uniform legal consequence of dissolution, even for initial “defects” in the formation of the marriage, namely the marriage impediments discussed in this Section. 6 Section 2 Article 1.5 (Age Requirement) No marriage may be entered into by persons who have not reached the age of eighteen. Artículo 1.5 (Requisito de edad) No podrán contraer matrimonio las personas que no hayan alcanzado la edad de dieciocho años. Article 1.5 (Condition d’âge) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre deux personnes n’ayant pas atteint l’âge de dix-huit ans. Artikel 1.5 (Alterserfordernis) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die das achtzehnte Lebensjahr noch nicht vollendet haben. COMMENT 1. This article links the possibility to marry to the now widely-followed age of eighteen as the age of majority. This marriage impediment aims at protecting, on the one hand, minors, and on the other hand, reflects the public policy principle against child marriages. Although many legal systems still provide for the possibility to make exceptions to this general rule, especially in case of pregnancy, the MFC does not follow this approach because marriage, as such, does not receive any special status under its provisions and legal protection to the child, as well as to the mother, is granted in any case. 2. If it turns out that one of the partners was not eighteen at the time of marriage, the marriage is not void ab initio, but rather, in addition to the parties’ ongoing right to institute divorce proceedings themselves, can be subject to divorce proceedings initiated by the competent authority under Article 1.11 up until the point in time at which both partners attain the age of majority. 7 Partnerships Article 1.6 (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) No marriage may be entered into by persons who are related lineally, including by adoption, or as siblings or half-siblings. Artículo 1.6 (Prohibición de parentesco) No podrán contraer matrimonio entre sí los parientes en línea recta, incluyendo el parentesco por adopción, ni los hermanos, sean de doble vínculo o de vínculo sencillo. Article 1.6 (Degrés de parenté prohibés) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre des personnes ayant un lien de parenté en ligne directe - incluant l’adoption -, ou appartenant à une même fratrie, qu’elle soit issue d’un seul ou de deux parents communs. Artikel 1.6 (Verbotene Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die in gerader Linie miteinander verwandt sind, auch aufgrund Adoption, sowie zwischen Geschwistern und Halbgeschwistern. COMMENT 1. This marriage impediment corresponds to the prevailing approach in most legal systems and reflects the general impediment against incestuous relationships, which comprises the aim of protecting the spouses themselves from an intimate personal relationship where a blood relationship also exists (be it as parent, child, sibling etc.), and also for eugenic reasons. 2. In the first place, marriages between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, etc. are prohibited. This also applies to cases of mere intentional parentage not based on a blood relationship, as well as to adoption, because what was once a parent-child relationship should not, for the sake of the dependent person, transform into a marriage of two persons on equal footing. 3. In the second place, marriages between siblings and half-siblings are prohibited. This marriage impediment, however, only applies to blood relations and children related due to initial intentional parentage, not to adopted persons, because otherwise one would have to draw a much broader line, encompassing, for example, step-siblings as well. 8 Article 1.6 4. With respect to adoption, although according to Article 3.16(2), the legal familial ties to the former legal parents and their respective relatives are severed, the blood relationship still remains. Consequently, the marriage impediment should still apply to adopted children and their original legal parents and siblings. The wording “lineally” in this Article sufficiently reflects this principle. 5. Again, a violation of this impediment does not render the marriage void ab initio, but the marriage can rather, in addition to the parties’ ongoing right to institute divorce proceedings themselves, be subject to divorce proceedings initiated by the competent authority under Article 1.11. 9 Partnerships Article 1.7 (Bigamy) No marriage may be entered into by persons who are already married to another person. Artículo 1.7 (Bigamia) No podrá contraer matrimonio quien esté previamente ligado por vínculo matrimonial a otra persona. Article 1.7 (Bigamie) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre deux individus dont l’un est déjà marié avec une autre personne. Artikel 1.7 (Bigamische Ehe) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die bereits mit einer anderen Person verheiratet sind. COMMENT 1. This Article is in accordance with all western legal systems that forbid bigamous marriages, e.g. in all parts of America, Europe, Australia and those parts of Asia and Africa, where neither a tribal law nor any religious laws allowing polygamy dominate. At this stage, although there is an ongoing process of assimilation of Islamic and Christian values in many parts of the world, the time does not seem to be ripe to abandon the principle of monogamy. 2. Again, a violation of this impediment does not render the marriage void ab initio, but the marriage can rather, in addition to the parties’ ongoing right to institute divorce proceedings themselves, be subject to divorce proceedings initiated by the competent authority under Article 1.11. 10 Partnerships CHAPTER 2: NAME Article 1.8 (Family Name) 1The spouses to a marriage may retain their respective surnames or choose a common family name. 2The family name can be the surname used by one partner at the time of entering into the marriage, or any combination of the surnames of the two partners, not exceeding two single names. 3If the family name is the surname of only one spouse, the other spouse has the right to add his or her previously carried name to the family name. Artículo 1.8 (Apellido familiar) 1Los cónyuges pueden conservar sus respectivos apellidos o bien escoger un apellido familiar común. 2El apellido familiar puede ser el apellido de cualquiera de los dos esposos al tiempo de contraer matrimonio o bien cualquier combinación de los apellidos de ambos, siempre que el escogido no exceda de dos apellidos simples. 3Si el apellido familiar elegido es el de uno solo de los cónyuges, el otro tiene derecho a añadir al apellido familiar el que llevase con anterioridad. Article 1.8 (Nom familial) 1Les époux peuvent conserver leurs noms de famille respectifs ou choisir un nom familial commun. 2Le nom familial peut être le nom de famille utilisé par l’un des partenaires au moment de la célébration du mariage, ou toute combinaison des noms de famille des deux partenaires, dans la limite de deux noms simples. 3Si le nom familial est le nom de famille d’un seul des époux, l’autre époux a le droit d’ajouter le nom qu’il portait précédemment à ce nom familial. Artikel 1.8 (Familienname) 1Die Ehegatten können ihre jeweiligen Nachnamen behalten oder einen gemeinsamen Familiennamen wählen. 2Der Familienname kann der im Zeitpunkt der Eheschliessung von einem Partner geführte Nachname sein oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen beider Partner, die jedoch zwei Einzelnamen nicht übersteigen darf. 3Besteht der Familienname nur aus dem Nachnamen eines Ehegatten, so hat der andere Ehegatte das Recht, den von ihm oder ihr bislang getragenen Namen dem Familiennamen hinzuzufügen. 20 Article 1.8 COMMENT 1. Although many legal systems do not provide for a common family name, couples may want to make their marital union known to the public by the use of a common family name. Therefore, the MFC recognizes the right of the spouses to choose a common name, although this is not obligatory, unlike in a few legal systems. 2. The parties to a marriage shall have the utmost freedom in constructing their family name in the way they see fit. In particular, they should have the possibility to use a combination of both of their names. This applies especially to those couples who, on the one hand, feel inclined to the tradition of a common family name, but, on the other hand, wish to emphasize the equality of both spouses in the relationship through their family name. However, for administrative purposes, names that are longer than the combination of two single names should be avoided. If, for example, Smith-Watson marries Mueller-Meier, the couple may choose Smith-Mueller, Smith-Meier, Watson-Mueller, Watson-Meier, and vice versa, but not Smith-WatsonMueller-Meier. 3. If one spouse chooses to formally adopt the surname of the other spouse, he or she should be allowed to continue to use his or her previously carried name in addition to the family name. The previous surname can be placed before or after the common family name. 21 Partnerships CHAPTER 3: DIVORCE COMMENT 1. Divorce is now generally possible under the vast majority of legal systems. Nevertheless, considerable differences exist between the approaches under different legal systems regarding the view of marriage and the aim to protect it as an institution. This is closely correlated with the respective impact of the Church in different countries. 2. Originally, divorce was only possible based upon fault. Nowadays, virtually all legal systems provide for a no-fault procedure; however, under many systems, divorce is still only granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. This is a concept that still aims to place the institution of marriage itself above the actual will of the spouses. How “irretrievable breakdown” is defined is also subject to differences in interpretation. Originally in many systems, the breakdown had to be established by the court; nowadays, presumptions prevail, upon which the breakdown is established by, in particular, focusing on the lapse of a period of judicial or factual separation as the key requirement. There are, however, already a few legal systems that provide that the will of the parties alone is the sole ground for divorce. The CEFL Principles (Principle 1:4) follow this modern approach if there is mutual consent between the spouses. In case of divorce without the consent of one of the spouses, a factual separation of one year is generally required (Principle 1:8). In accordance with the principal aims of the MFC, only the will of the parties can be decisive. It is not the task of the family law to protect the institution of marriage, but only to protect the weaker parties. This protection cannot be realized by simply maintaining the legal bond of marriage, but only by appropriately regulating the consequences of its dissolution. 3. In accordance with Canon law, which only recognizes judicial separation but not divorce, many legal systems still provide for the possibility of a judicial separation independent to divorce, or as a possible preliminary step to obtaining a divorce. Again, this appears to be a mere mechanism to uphold the institution of marriage, for which there is no room in a modern divorce system. The MFC, therefore, abandons the concept of judicial separation. 22 Article 1.9 Section 1: Requirements Article 1.9 (General Principle) Divorce is granted upon either the joint application of both spouses or the unilateral application of one spouse to the marriage. Artículo 1.9 (Principio general) Se concederá el divorcio cuando lo soliciten ambos cónyuges de modo conjunto o bien cuando lo solicite unilateralmente uno de ellos. Article 1.9 (Principe général) Le divorce est accordé soit sur demande conjointe de chacun des époux, soit à la demande unilatérale de l’un d’eux. Artikel 1.9 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Die Scheidung wird aufgrund des gemeinsamen Antrags beider Ehegatten oder aufgrund des einseitigen Antrags eines Ehegatten gewährt. COMMENT 1. This Article expresses the general principle that there is only one sole ground for divorce, namely the will of both, or one, of the spouses. The divorce application to the court constitutes the tangible expression of this will. If such an application is presented to the court, it does not have the right to further investigate whether the marriage has broken down, or upon what grounds the will to divorce is based. One could even imagine the case in which spouses are still happily living together, but no longer wish to remain married. Under the system of the MFC, they can even obtain a divorce under these circumstances. 2. It is not only the joint will of the parties that gives rise to a divorce, but also the unilateral will of only one spouse. Thus, the MFC follows the principle that each spouse has an independent right to obtain a divorce, notwithstanding any other requirements. 23 Partnerships Article 1.10 (Reflection Period) If there are minor children of the family, or if the spouses cannot agree on the divorce itself, or any of its consequences, the court may grant the divorce only if the parties or party renew the application after a period of six months. Artículo 1.10 (Período de reflexión) En caso de que haya hijos o hijas menores de la familia o bien si los cónyuges no alcanzan un acuerdo respecto del divorcio o respecto de cualquiera de sus consecuencias, el tribunal sólo podrá conceder el divorcio si las partes o la parte actora renuevan la solicitud transcurrido un período de seis meses. Article 1.10 (Période de réflexion) S’il existe des enfants de la famille encore mineurs, ou si les époux ne peuvent s’accorder sur le principe du divorce ou sur l’une de ses conséquences, le tribunal ne peut accorder le divorce que si la ou les parties renouvellent leur demande après une période de six mois. Artikel 1.10 (Überlegungsfrist) Wenn minderjährige Kinder der Familie vorhanden sind, oder wenn sich die Ehegatten bezüglich der Scheidung oder ihrer Folgen nicht einigen können, gewährt das Gericht die Scheidung nur, wenn die Parteien oder die Partei ihren Antrag nach einer Frist von sechs Monaten erneuern oder erneuert. COMMENT 1. This Article provides for a reflection period of six months in cases where the parties are in disagreement and/or where minor children of the family are present. This implies the converse, namely that where the parties are in agreement on all points surrounding the divorce and no minor children are involved, the parties may obtain an instantaneous divorce. Depending on the length of the marriage, the parties may then even be able to obtain a facilitated administrative divorce according to Article 1.13. 2. The purpose of the reflection period is twofold: where the parties are in agreement, but there are nevertheless minor children of the family involved, it serves the purpose of preventing a hasty divorce for the sake of the children; where there is disagreement between the spouses about the divorce itself or any of its consequences, the reflection period further aims at 24 Article 1.10 enabling the parties to achieve consensus, possibly through a process of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). In this way, the necessary protection of the weaker parties in the divorce is ensured. Furthermore, the requirement to renew the application after this period leaves no doubt as to the ongoing will of the party or parties. 3. Similar purposes to those pursued by the reflection period are realized in many legal systems through the requirement of a period of separation. The CEFL Principles (Principle 1:8) also favor this solution. The MFC does not follow this approach because factual separation may be difficult to realize in the same residence, can be difficult to prove, and may be disputed in conflictual cases. The lapse of a reflection period of six months that is calculated from the first application to its renewal is, therefore, to be preferred as a non-disputable objective criterion. The concept of a foregoing judicial separation, which could serve the purpose of fixing a non-disputable objective date, has been abandoned altogether, as it imposes a hurdle to obtaining a divorce that is unnecessarily high. 4. The length of the reflection period is set at six months. On the one hand, this seems to be enough time to “cool off”, carefully consider the decision to divorce, and also to negotiate with the respective other spouse. On the other hand, even under grave circumstances, a spouse should be expected to wait six months before he or she can obtain a divorce. Thus, the MFC refrains from incorporating a so-called “hardship clause” in the general provisions for divorce, under which no waiting period is necessary in special circumstances. Conditions of hardship that might arise in specific areas, such as domestic violence, must be dealt with in the relevant legislation on that specific area. 5. A renewal of application and, thus, a reflection period does not apply in cases of violation of an impediment to marriage (cf. Article 1.11 MFC), as this would be counterproductive to the aim of dissolving an “illegal” marriage. 25 Partnerships Article 1.11 (Divorce in Cases of Violation of Impediments to Marriage) 1Where a marriage has been entered into in violation of an impediment to marriage under Articles 1.5 to 1.7, the competent authority, in addition to the spouses, may apply for divorce. Article 1.10 does not apply. 2 However, in case of a violation of Article 1.5, the application by the competent authority may only be brought while one of the spouses is still a minor. Artículo 1.11 (Divorcio en caso de matrimonio celebrado con impedimento matrimonial) 1Celebrado el matrimonio concurriendo alguno de los impedimentos matrimoniales establecidos en los artículos 1.5 a 1.7, podrá solicitar el divorcio, además de los cónyuges, la autoridad competente. El artículo 1.10 no rige en este caso. 2No obstante, en caso de infracción del artículo 1.5, la autoridad competente sólo podrá instar el divorcio mientras alguno de los cónyuges sea menor de edad. Article 1.11 (Divorce pour violation des empêchements à mariage) 1Lorsqu’un mariage a été célébré en violation de l’un des empêchements à mariage prévus par les articles 1.5 à 1.7, l’autorité compétente, en sus des époux, peut introduire une demande en divorce. L’article 1.10 ne s’applique pas dans ce cas. 2Toutefois, en cas de violation de l’article 1.5, la demande de l’autorité compétente ne peut être introduite que pendant la minorité de l’un des époux. Artikel 1.11 (Scheidung wegen Verstosses gegen Ehehindernisse) 1Wurde eine Ehe trotz Vorliegens eines Ehehindernisses nach Artikel 1.5-1.7 geschlossen, so kann ausser den Ehegatten auch die zuständige Behörde die Scheidung beantragen. Artikel 1.10 findet keine Anwendung. 2Im Falle eines Verstosses gegen Artikel 1.5 kann der Antrag von der zuständigen Behörde jedoch nur während der Minderjährigkeit eines Ehegatten gestellt werden. 26 Article 1.11 COMMENT 1. The marriage impediments are an expression of a general public policy approach to marriage. Thus, the decision to dissolve an illegal relationship by divorce cannot be left to the spouses alone, but rather, the competent authority must also be given the possibility to initiate divorce proceedings in its official capacity. In any event, a reflection period does not apply to this case. 2. However, the different impediments need to be distinguished. The impediment for marriage applying to persons under-age exists primarily for their own protection. Consequently, once both spouses have attained the age of majority, this need to protect is rendered redundant. The possibility to obtain a divorce solely upon the request of either or both spouses then seems sufficient. 11 Partnerships Section 2: Procedure Article 1.12 (General Principle) Divorce is granted either by the court or by the competent administrative body. Artículo 1.12 (Principio general) El divorcio puede ser declarado por un tribunal de justicia o bien por la autoridad administrativa competente. Article 1.12 (Principe général) Le divorce est prononcé soit par un tribunal soit par l’autorité administrative compétente. Artikel 1.12 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Die Scheidung wird entweder vom Gericht oder von der zuständigen Verwaltungsbehörde gewährt. COMMENT 1. This Article emphasizes that a divorce is a secular matter. Most legal systems still require divorce to be granted solely in a judicial process. It is for this reason that judicial divorce is given predominant importance here. 2. However, there are an increasing number of legal systems that allow for a facilitated administrative divorce under certain circumstances. On the one hand, such divorces save time and money and free up the resources of the courts. On the other hand, as marriage is not entered into before a court, the question must be posed as to why a court alone should be authorized to dissolve it. Whereas in former times, this could be attributed to the need to protect the institution of marriage, this concern is no longer valid today. The only reason to require a judicial divorce nowadays is to ensure the protection of the weaker parties. This modern trend is reflected in the MFC. 12 Article 1.13 Article 1.13 (Administrative Divorce) Divorce is granted by the competent administrative body provided that the spouses agree upon the divorce itself, any of its consequences as well as the administrative procedure; there are no minor children of the family; and the length of the marriage does not exceed ten years. Artículo 1.13 (Divorcio administrativo) Podrá declararse el divorcio por vía administrativa siempre que los cónyuges estén de acuerdo en divorciarse, en las consecuencias del divorcio y en la sumisión al procedimiento administrativo. Además, es preciso que no haya hijos o hijas menores de la familia y que el matrimonio no haya durado más de diez años. Article 1.13 (Divorce administratif) Le divorce n’est prononcé par l’autorité administrative compétente qu’à condition que les époux s’accordent sur le principe du divorce, sur toutes ces conséquences, ainsi que sur le fait de soumettre leur divorce à une procédure administrative; qu’il n’y ait aucun enfant de la famille mineur; et que la durée du mariage n’ait pas excédé dix ans. Artikel 1.13 (Administrative Scheidung) Die Scheidung wird von der zuständigen Verwaltungsbehörde gewährt, wenn sich die Ehegatten über die Scheidung, ihre Folgen sowie über das administrative Verfahren geeinigt haben, keine minderjährigen Kinder der Familie vorhanden sind und die Ehe nicht länger als zehn Jahre gedauert hat. COMMENT 1. This Article draws the line between those cases where an administrative divorce is reasonable, as the parties themselves are in the position to adequately guard their respective interests, and those cases in which there is a need for a court to step in, either to reach a decision where the parties cannot agree, or to scrutinize any agreement between the partners to ensure the preservation of the interests of the weaker parties. 2. It could be argued that non-married partners never have to go to court at all if they are able to agree on everything. It has to be conceded that this represents differential treatment in comparison to married partners that 13 Partnerships cannot be supported by any differences in the factual situation. However, the inability of the courts to protect the potentially weaker party upon the dissolution of a non-marital relationship does not justify – on a purely formal basis of equality between marriages and partnerships – disregarding potential protection issues in case of divorce. Thus, agreement of the partners is only one, but not the only, prerequisite for administrative divorce. 3. At the outset, an administrative divorce is only viable if there is an agreement between the parties concerning not only the divorce and any of its consequences, but also concerning the administrative process itself. If one party prefers to go to court, this, in itself, is an indication that the agreement is somehow flawed or that the party in question needs, or at least wants, judicial assistance. 4. Administrative divorce is not to be considered where there are minor children of the family involved. Court proceedings should secure not only the interests of these children, but also those of the weaker spouse. In these cases, there is a presumption that one of the spouses has incurred partnershiprelated detriments, such as is commonly the case, through caring for the children. 5. Another case that does not qualify for administrative divorce is where the spouses have been married for longer than ten years. Primarily, under such circumstances, there is a greater risk that one spouse has incurred partnership-related detriments, through caring for the children and household or, for example, supporting the other spouse in his or her business or profession. Furthermore, after ten years of marriage, not only has the marriage shaped the course of each spouse’s life, but the spouses have also reached an age at which it may be difficult to re-adjust to a change of circumstances; for the weaker spouse, this presents particular concerns with re-entering the workforce. 30 Article 1.14 Article 1.14 (Alternative Dispute Resolution) 1Once an application for divorce has been made to the court, if, under the circumstances, the court deems it appropriate, it shall use its best endeavors to persuade the parties to reach agreement on the matters of divorce and its consequences. 2The court shall advise the parties as to possible alternative dispute resolution options in this regard. Artículo 1.14 (Medios alternativos de composición de conflictos) 1Una vez presentada la solicitud de divorcio al tribunal, éste, si así lo aconsejan las circunstancias y lo considera adecuado, empleará todos los medios a su disposición para procurar que las partes alcancen un acuerdo sobre el divorcio y sus consecuencias. 2El tribunal asesorará a las partes respecto de la existencia de medios alternativos de resolución de conflictos en este ámbito. Article 1.14 (Résolution alternative du conflit) 1Lorsqu’une demande de divorce a été formée devant un tribunal, celui-ci, si il le juge opportun eu égard aux circonstances, doit s’efforcer de persuader les parties de trouver un accord sur les questions du divorce et de ses conséquences. 2Le tribunal doit aviser les parties des modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits prévus à cet effet. Artikel 1.14 (Alternative Streitbeilegung) 1Wurde ein Antrag auf Scheidung bei Gericht eingereicht, soll das Gericht, soweit es dies unter den gegebenen Umständen für angemessen hält, die Parteien zu überzeugen suchen, eine Einigung bezüglich der Scheidung und ihrer Folgen herbeizuführen. 2Das Gericht soll die Parteien insoweit auf mögliche Verfahren alternativer Streitbeilegung hinweisen. COMMENT 1. It has been commonly understood for almost half a century that it must be the aim of any divorce law and procedure “to enable the empty legal shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation” (English Law Commission “Field of Choice” (1966), No. 15). This aim is best achieved if the parties themselves reach an 31 Partnerships agreement on the outcome of their divorce, rather than the court authoritatively deciding on the consequences for them. Nowadays, the prevailing view is also in agreement that judicial proceedings, in themselves, are not conducive to reaching agreement due to the very nature of the adversarial process. Therefore, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have evolved, and are continuing to evolve to respond to this criticism in all aspects of the judicial process. Practical experience makes it clear that, through this procedure, the post-divorce relationship between the parties can be ameliorated, which, above all, is desirable not only for the parties, but also for the sake of any children of the family. 2. Thus, this Article expresses the explicit aim that the court must endeavor to enable the parties to reach their own agreement, and is to make the parties aware of ADR options in this regard. However, it refrains from making ADR compulsory, as experience has shown that mandatory ADR proceedings do not have any positive effects or likely prospects of success. 3. The details surrounding these issues are dealt with in Part V of this MFC, which addresses questions of the family courts and proceedings in family law matters. 32 Article 1.15 TITLE 3: PROTECTION IN PARTNERSHIPS CHAPTER 1: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN PARTNERSHIPS Article 1.15 (General Principle) 1Partners shall contribute to the maintenance of their joint and personal needs. 2They agree upon their respective contributions. Artículo 1.15 (Principio general) 1Los integrantes de la pareja deben contribuir a la satisfacción de sus necesidades comunes y personales. 2Los integrantes de la pareja establecen de mutuo acuerdo sus respectivas contribuciones. Article 1.15 (Principe général) 1Les partenaires doivent contribuer à la satisfaction de leurs besoins conjoints et personnels. 2Ils s’accordent sur leurs contributions respectives. Artikel 1.15 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Die Partner sollen zum Unterhalt für ihre gemeinsamen und persönlichen Bedürfnisse beitragen. 2Sie verständigen sich über ihre jeweiligen Beiträge. COMMENT 1. All legal systems provide for the duty of spouses to maintain each other. The same is true for those legal systems that recognize some kind of formalized civil union or registered partnership. However, for de facto partnerships, such a duty exists only in selected legal systems. 2. In line with the general principle that responsibility must be ensured where legitimate expectations have been created by one’s own conduct, all partners within the sense of Article 1.1, not just spouses, have a duty to contribute to the maintenance of the joint and personal needs. 3. The concretization of such a duty only becomes relevant in cases of conflict between the partners. In an ongoing functioning relationship, it goes 33 Partnerships without saying that this duty is fulfilled, regardless of whether the partners are married or not. The relationship of trust established between these partners gives rise to a legitimate expectation that this status quo is not abruptly discontinued. This fact justifies placing non-marital partnerships on equal footing with marriages in this area. The formulation of a duty of maintenance, as is done in this Article, forms the basis of realizing and enforcing this legitimate expectation in cases of conflict. 4. This Article is not intended to place the partners under an obligation to contribute equally. Instead, it is left to the partners themselves to distribute the tasks of the partnership as they see fit. However, as a consequence, they may not abruptly renege on their agreement to the detriment of the other partner. 5. The direct consequences of violation of this duty are dealt with in Article 1.16. 34 Article 1.16 Article 1.16 (Interim Measures) If one partner neglects his or her duty to maintain, the court may order, as an interim measure, that partner to make payments of maintenance to the other partner for a certain period of time, having regard to the circumstances set out in Article 1.28. Artículo 1.16 (Medidas transitorias) Si uno de los integrantes de la pareja incumple su obligación de contribuir a los gastos comunes, el tribunal puede, como medida temporal, imponerle la realización de pagos a favor del otro, por un plazo de tiempo determinado y teniendo presentes las circunstancias previstas en el artículo 1.28. Article 1.16 (Mesures provisoires) Si l’un des partenaires néglige son devoir de contribution, le tribunal peut le contraindre, à titre de mesure provisoire, à verser une contribution à l’autre partenaire durant une période déterminée, eu égard aux circonstances mentionnées à l’article 1.28. Artikel 1.16 (Vorläufige Massnahmen) Vernachlässigt ein Partner seine oder ihre Pflicht zum Unterhalt, kann das Gericht im Wege einer vorläufigen Massnahme diesen Partner für eine bestimmte Zeit zu Unterhaltsleistungen an den anderen Partner verpflichten, wobei es die in Artikel 1.28 genannten Umstände berücksichtigt. COMMENT 1. This Article enables one partner to obtain maintenance from the other party in case of conflict, where the other partner ceases to contribute to the partnership in deviation from the agreed way in which he or she did previously. Thus, in this way, the legitimate expectations of the recipient partner are protected. The operation of this provision can be best illustrated by two examples. If, in a partnership, only one partner is gainfully employed and the other partner cares for the children and the household, the allocation of tasks may not be simply overthrown from one day to the next. The same applies even in a case where the dependent partner does not contribute to joint expenses and tasks at all, but rather follows creative pursuits that cannot be ascribed a monetary value. 35 Partnerships 2. However, this Article only enables the court to order maintenance for a limited period of time. The length of this period and the amount of maintenance highly depend upon the individual circumstances of the case. In determining these factors, the criteria laid down in Title 4, especially the factors listed in Article 1.28, have to be considered by the court. 3. If, after these interim measures have been exhausted, the partners have not reunited or reached an amicable solution, recourse is to be had to the provisions on financial consequences upon dissolution of partnerships. 36 Article 1.17 CHAPTER 2: FAMILY HOME AND FAMILY CHATTELS Article 1.17 (Exercise of Rights) A partner may not exercise any rights over the family home and family chattels without the consent of the other partner or judicial authorization. Artículo 1.17 (Ejercicio de derechos) Será preciso el consentimiento del otro miembro de la pareja o autorización judicial para el ejercicio de derechos relativos al hogar familiar y demás bienes muebles de uso familiar. Article 1.17 (Exercice des droits) Un partenaire ne peut exercer aucun droit sur le logement et les biens de la famille sans le consentement de l’autre, ou sans une autorisation judiciaire. Artikel 1.17 (Verfügungen) Ein Partner kann über das Familienheim und das Familiengut nur mit Zustimmung des anderen Partners oder mit gerichtlicher Ermächtigung verfügen. COMMENT 1. The family home and the family chattels are central to every partnership. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of legal systems provide for a protection of these assets even during the ongoing partnership, at least marriage, regardless of ownership or other prima facie entitlement to them. The MFC follows this general approach. Who receives the assets upon dissolution of the partnership is another question altogether. 2. “Family home” comprises real property, including a building or part of a building, that one or both partners own, lease, or have a right to use if it is intended as the joint dwelling of the partners. “Family chattels” refer to furniture, domestic appliances, and corporeal chattels, including pets, for the joint use of the partners. Goods exclusively for the use of one partner are not family chattels. The partners’ family home and family chattels do not include property used mainly for recreational purposes, such as a holiday apartment or sailing boat. 37 Partnerships 3. Regardless of whether a partner has the capacity of owner, tenant, or lessee, he or she may not simply deal with the property as he or she pleases. Rather, it must be ensured that this property cannot be disposed of in the partnership without the consent of the other partner. In other words, the owner may neither sell, lease nor otherwise encumber the property in question; the tenant or lessee may not terminate the tenancy or lease; and neither party may do any legal act that might endanger the existing property interests, without the consent of the other partner. 4. If the other partner does not consent to an alteration of the property interests, the first partner may apply to the court for judicial authorization to do so. The court will authorize such an alteration of interests if the refusing partner has no legitimate basis for his or her refusal, such as, for example, where family chattels are no longer used or needed, or where the encumbrance of real property does not endanger its use for joint purposes. The same applies where consent simply cannot be obtained from the other partner because he or she is ill or absent. 38 Article 1.18 Article 1.18 (Right of Occupancy) Each partner has the right not to be evicted or excluded from the family home by the other partner except with leave of the court. Artículo 1.18 (Derecho de uso) Ambos integrantes de la pareja tienen derecho a no ser privados del uso del hogar familiar por el otro, salvo que concurra autorización judicial. Article 1.18 (Droit d’occupation) Chaque partenaire a le droit de n’être pas évincé ou exclu du logement de la famille par l’autre partenaire, sauf autorisation judiciaire. Artikel 1.18 (Benutzungsrecht) Jeder Partner hat das Recht, vom Familienheim weder ausgeschlossen noch zur Räumung desselben gezwungen zu werden, es sei denn dies geschieht aufgrund gerichtlicher Ermächtigung. COMMENT 1. It is not enough to preserve the property rights in the family home; furthermore, the right of the partner, who does not own or is not otherwise legally entitled to the dwelling, to remain there must be secured. Again, this right is, however, subject to individual considerations; thus, when leave of the court deems the circumstances to be such, an eviction or exclusion of one of the partners can be warranted. This might be especially the case where domestic violence is present, or where the family home is assigned to one partner as a result of financial relief upon the dissolution of the partnership. 2. Of course, this right can only be asserted against the other partner; it does not, in general, preclude entitled third parties, e.g. landlords, from evicting or excluding the partners from the dwelling, such as where a partner has defaulted under a lease. However, upon the dissolution of the partnership, the family home may be judicially assigned to one of the partners even against the will of a landlord. 39 Partnerships TITLE 4: FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES UPON DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS COMMENT 1. Most legal systems nowadays provide for three separate and distinct mechanisms of financial consequences upon dissolution of marriages; some of these also provide for the same consequences in case of non-marital relationships. These three mechanisms are property distribution, maintenance after divorce and, as a recent development not yet present in most legal systems, division of pension rights. The CEFL Principles also follow this approach by providing for maintenance between former spouses in their Part II. Principles on questions of property division or pension splitting are yet to be elaborated. 2. Benefits in the form of property that accrued to each partner during the partnership are dealt with by the applicable property regimes. At the outset, the state of the law was characterized by two starkly contrasting regimes: that of separate property, and that of common property. However, the majority of legal systems is now based upon some concept of equal sharing of benefits acquired during marriage. In many civil law countries, a system of community of acquests or deferred community of acquests exists. In common law countries, which were originally based upon the notion of separate property – sometimes called title states –, the prevailing view is now also that of, at least, equitable distribution. Whereas in the first group of systems, equal distribution is the norm regardless of whether the benefits received are marriage-related or not, in the second group, all the circumstances may be taken into account, especially the distribution of tasks between the partners. 3. The provision of maintenance originally aimed at ensuring that the “innocent wife”, who, against her will, was forced to face the winding up of her marriage, did not forego her entitlement to life-long alimony. A subsequent approach focused on post-divorce solidarity, recognizing a right to maintenance for the spouse in need, irrespective of the reasons for such need. However, from a modern perspective nowadays, maintenance is primarily aimed at redressing the detriments incurred as a consequence of marriage with respect to the ability of one of the parties to earn his or her own living. Under some systems, maintenance may also serve to equalize marital contributions, such as in the often-cited cases of “medical student syndrome”. 40 Title 4 4. In recent years, the importance of so-called “new property” has been increasingly stressed, encompassing, in particular, intangibles such as pension rights. More often than not, this “new property” is the only asset available for distribution upon the dissolution of the partnership. Thus, an increasing number of countries now provide for pension-splitting, usually under the principle of equal division, regardless of the distribution of tasks during the partnership. 5. In most countries, these three mechanisms are kept carefully separate and distinct from one another, which can often be traced back to mere historical whimsicalities. On the one hand, this means that the requirements for, and the process of carrying out, each mechanism are different. There are differences which cannot be logically reconciled, such as, for example, the respective relevance of fault; the question of which of these mechanisms might be shaped and altered by party agreement and which not; whether adjustment is to be made by lump-sum or periodic payments; whether an agreement or an order is subject to variation; how remarriage or a nonmarital relationship affects the claim; and the manner by which distribution takes place. On the other hand, each mechanism is discretely compartmentalized, with the general consequence that deficiencies in one area cannot be compensated by an excess in another. This lack of flexibility often leads to dissatisfactory results. 6. In accordance with the MFC’s basic approach of treating all partnerships equally, financial relief is granted upon dissolution of a partnership in the sense of Article 1.1, which includes, but is not limited to marriage. 7. It must be clarified here that the MFC, in providing for financial consequences upon dissolution of partnership, does not, however, provide for any sort of property regime. As a consequence thereof, neither the existence of a marriage nor of any non-marital relationship has an influence on any questions of ownership. These questions remain to be addressed by property law. 8. The MFC aims to “smooth out” the differences between the three systems found in domestic laws and to provide for a uniform system of financial relief. Thus, there is only one set of prerequisites for financial relief and the mechanism for providing it does not depend on classifying the relief sought in a particular way, such as under notions of “property division” or “maintenance”. The greatest degree of flexibility is thereby granted not only to the partners themselves, but also to the courts. 41 Partnerships 9. Whereas most legal systems do not set out clear grounds for financial relief, but instead mingle principles of community, post-partnership solidarity, clean break, and adjustment of benefits and detriments, the MFC draws a clear distinction between, on the one hand, partnerships where the benefits and detriments have been and will continue to be incurred due to the division of tasks in the ongoing partnership, as well as due to common tasks that are to be carried out in the future by only one partner, and, on the other hand, cases in which there may be a discrepancy in income and assets due to other circumstances not relevant to the partnership. In line with the core principle that family law must ensure assumption of responsibility, it is the conviction of the MFC that, in the first group of cases, the consequences of the partnership have to be borne by both partners. However, in the second group, there is no reason why possible differences in the standard of living should be equalized upon the dissolution of the partnership. Here, the responsibility shifts to the partner who is now in need. In these cases, financial relief can only be granted under exceptional circumstances, such as, where special contributions to the other partner have been made, or on grounds of post-partnership solidarity. 10. Thus, the MFC divides financial relief into two groups, firstly, partnership-related benefits and detriments, and secondly, equitable adjustment. In the first group, the central concept is that all benefits and detriments that are partnership-related are to be equally shared and borne between and by the partners. This should be achieved by a general adjustment of all partnership-related benefits and detriments. Relief in cases where there are no partnership-related benefits and detriments is restricted to exceptional circumstances, which are provided for in the second group. Where partnership-related benefits and detriments do not exist, financial relief may, in general, only be granted as compensation for extraordinary contributions. In very isolated cases and to a very limited extent, financial relief may be granted on the basis of post-partnership solidarity after the end of a long-term partnership. 11. However, the manner in which financial relief is granted can be addressed for both of the above groups together. The same applies with respect to how the partners may regulate financial relief by agreement. 12. Many legal systems provide seemingly precise rules for calculating benefits and detriments and their distribution, thereby compelling the courts to engage in complicated mathematical calculations. This may be advocated from a sociological research background, which has shown that clear and 42 Title 4 distinct rules help the weaker party, whereas vague rules have been shown to benefit the stronger party. However, this approach fails to consider that, in many cases, it is not possible to precisely evaluate factors such as the value of a property fifteen years ago, or even today, or the real income of a selfemployed person, or the income that a person might earn in five years when he or she re-enters the workforce after having cared for the children. Thus, any calculation based upon figures that were, initially, only estimated, cannot logically yield exact and just results. This is why the MFC abstains from the use of formulae to achieve an only seemingly exact result. Instead, it relies heavily on a wide discretion of the courts, whose decisions may be expected to be equitable, provided that such decision-making is based upon sufficiently clear guidelines. The aim of the MFC is to disclose and clarify the decisionmaking process through the establishment of such guidelines. This not only makes the work of the courts and parties involved much easier, but can also be expected to produce satisfying results, which, in the end result, will not noticeably differ from those obtained under a “precise” calculation method. 43 Partnerships CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 1.19 (Interests of Children) When granting financial relief, primary regard is to be given to the interests of any minor child of the family. Artículo 1.19 (Interés de los menores) El primer parámetro a tener en cuenta a la hora de proveer económicamente en caso de disolución de la unión es el interés de todo hijo o hija menor de la familia. Article 1.19 (Intérêts de l’enfant) L’octroi d’une prestation financière doit tenir compte, en premier lieu, de l’intérêt de tout enfant mineur de la famille. Artikel 1.19 (Kindeswohl) Bei der Gewährung finanziellen Ausgleichs ist vorrangig das Kindeswohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie zu berücksichtigen. COMMENT 1. In accordance with the basic approach of the whole MFC, the interests of minor children of the family are to be given primary consideration. The interests of children may not only influence whether, if at all, financial relief is to be granted, but also the amount of financial relief, and, most importantly, the manner in which it is to be realized, for example, in assessing the question of which property assets are to be attributed to which partner. 44 Article 1.20 Article 1.20 (Principle of Self-Sufficiency) The parties shall be placed in a position to become self-sufficient as soon as possible. Artículo 1.20 (Principio de autosuficiencia) Se proveerá para que las partes estén en posición de ser autosuficientes a la mayor brevedad. Article 1.20 (Principe d’autosuffisance) Les parties doivent être placées en position de devenir autosuffisantes le plus tôt possible. Artikel 1.20 (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit) Die Parteien sollen so gestellt werden, dass sie so schnell als möglich unabhängig werden. COMMENT 1. It cannot be the aim of a modern family law to promote life-long dependency of a person on their former partner. Rather, wherever possible, the parties should be placed in a position of self-sufficiency. Therefore, most legal systems promulgate the notion of a “clean break” when regulating financial consequences upon dissolution of a relationship. In this way, the risk that parties continue to remain financially “attached” to each other over a period of several years is minimized. 2. “Clean break”, first and foremost, means that financial relief is realized at the point of dissolution by way of allocation of property assets or through lump-sum payments. However, this cannot have the consequence, often present in many legal systems, that relief for detriments incurred, such as caring for the children, is neglected, leaving the partner concerned with nothing. Where, however, there are no partnership-related benefits and detriments, clean break means that a partner can only be held responsible in very exceptional cases and to a very limited extent, on the basis of postpartnership solidarity (see Article 1.31). In these cases, it is not the task of the former partner, but that of the state to provide the basis for self-sufficiency through family politics, the labor market and other public means. 20 Partnerships CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIP-RELATED BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS Section 1: Financial Relief Article 1.21 (Adjustment) Upon the dissolution of a partnership, partnership-related benefits and detriments are adjusted by financial relief. Artículo 1.21 (Distribución) Los beneficios y perjuicios derivados de la unión de pareja se distribuyen por medio de compensación económica en caso de disolución de la unión. Article 1.21 (Compensation) Lors de la dissolution du partenariat, les bénéfices et les pertes liés au partenariat sont compensés par l’octroi d’une prestation financière. Artikel 1.21 (Bereinigung) Bei Auflösung einer Partnerschaft sind partnerschaftsbedingte Vor- und Nachteile durch finanziellen Ausgleich zu bereinigen. COMMENT 1. For the reasons set out in the introductory comment to Title 4, the MFC favors a uniform system of financial relief, thereby doing away with the intricacies of most current systems. 2. The core requirement for financial relief is the existence of partnershiprelated benefits and/or detriments. Under this uniform system, in the same way as in a business partnership, all gains and losses are to be equally borne by and divided between both partners. It goes without saying that such relief cannot generally be linked to notions of fault. Special forms, such as financial misconduct or domestic violence, however, may be a factor to be taken into account (see Article 1.28(j), (k)). 21 Article 1.22 Section 2: Measuring Benefits Article 1.22 (Scope of Benefits) 1Benefits include (a) property acquired by each partner during the partnership, and (b) pension rights of each partner accumulated during the partnership. 2Benefits do not include separate property. Artículo 1.22 (Concepto de beneficio) 1Se consideran beneficios (a) los bienes adquiridos por cualquiera de los integrantes de la pareja mientras ésta duró, y (b) los derechos a pensiones adquiridos por cualquiera de los integrantes de la pareja mientras ésta duró. Article 1.22 (Champ des bénéfices) 1Les bénéfices incluent (a) les biens acquis par chaque partenaire durant le partenariat, et (b) les droits de pension de chaque partenaire accumulés durant le partenariat. 2Les bénéfices n’incluent pas les biens personnels. Artikel 1.22 (Bereich der Vorteile) 1Vorteile umfassen (a) das von jedem Partner während der Partnerschaft erworbene Vermögen sowie (b) während der Partnerschaft erworbene Vorsorgeanwartschaften. 2Vorteile umfassen nicht das Eigengut. COMMENT 1. In accordance with the legal systems prevailing nowadays, marriage – or even partnership – should not lead to a community of property per se, with the consequence that everything owned before, and – or at least – everything acquired during the partnership has to be divided equally, but rather only benefits acquired during the partnership are subject to division. Thus, in order to assess the benefits that each partner has upon the dissolution of their 22 Partnerships partnership, one might borrow from the traditional definitions of “gains” and “marital property” that have been developed in the context of property division upon divorce in many legal systems. 2. In assessing the relative benefits of each partner at the point of dissolution of the partnership, a comparison must be drawn between what that partner had at the commencement and at the end of the partnership. 3. The commencement of a partnership, even one that later becomes a marriage, is to be determined by reference to Article 1.1(2) of the MFC. This has the consequence that pre-marital acquisitions may be considered “benefits” within the sense of this article, to the extent that they were acquired during the pre-marital partnership. For the purposes of property acquired “during” the partnership, the end of the partnership is to be determined as the point in time at which an application for financial relief is made, at the latest, as the point in time when an application for divorce is made. In cases where there has been a longer factual separation before applying for financial relief, which warrants disregarding benefits accrued during this time, it could be argued that property acquired after such factual separation should be treated as separate property. However, the case-by-case determinations under such an approach introduce considerable uncertainty and potential for litigation that is disproportionate to its benefits. Under the MFC, this issue can be dealt with under Article 1.28, under which the length of the partnership may be taken into account when assessing the adjustment to be undertaken between the partners. 4. In accordance with the approach to “new property” explained in the introductory comments, pension rights are to be placed, as benefits, on an equal footing with tangible property. It goes without saying that only those pension rights acquired during the partnership are to be taken into account when assessing the scope of benefits. Again, for the purposes of adjustment, the presence of factors listed in Article 1.28 could provide grounds for considering the possibility of each party to acquire future pension rights. 5. Paragraph 2 makes it clear that not all property belonging to one partner constitutes benefits, but that the property set out in Article 1.23 is to be excluded from this scope. 23 Partnerships Article 1.23 (Separate Property) Separate property includes (a) property owned before the partnership, (b) inheritance, (c) gifts, (d) damages for pain and suffering, (e) property of a purely personal character, and (f) income and proceeds from separate property. Artículo 1.23 (Bienes privativos) Se consideran bienes privativos (a) los adquiridos con anterioridad a la unión de pareja, (b) los adquiridos por vía sucesoria, (c) los adquiridos por donación, (d) las indemnizaciones por daño moral, (e) los bienes de uso puramente personal, y (f) los frutos y rendimientos de los bienes privativos. Article 1.23 (Biens personnels) Les biens personnels incluent (a) les biens dont les partenaires avaient la propriété antérieurement au partenariat, (b) les biens acquis par succession, (c) les biens acquis par donations, (d) l’indemnisation des souffrances physiques et morales, (e) les biens à caractère purement personnel, et (f) les fruits et revenus des biens personnels. Artikel 1.23 (Eigengut) Das Eigengut umfasst (a) Vermögen, das einem Partner schon vor der Partnerschaft gehörte, (b) Erbschaften, (c) Geschenke, (d) Genugtuungsansprüche, (e) Gegenstände zum ausschliesslichen persönlichen Gebrauch sowie (f) Einkommen und Ertrag aus Eigengut. 24 Partnerships COMMENT 1. This Article contains a definition of what is to be regarded as separate property, which is thus excluded from the scope of benefits under Article 1.22. This definition aims at protecting certain property from being taken into consideration when calculating the respective benefits and detriments of the partnership. As a general principle and subject to Article 1.33, the other partner should not be entitled to share in the separate property of the first partner. This is in general accord with most legal systems that nowadays distinguish between so-called “marital” property and separate property. 2. The exclusion of property owned before the partnership should be obvious; it follows from the general principle that only benefits accruing during the partnership are to be made subject to a possible division, thus protecting initial contributions to the partnership. Any inheritance received by a partner during the partnership should similarly remain immune from a possible division, as such gain is incurred independent of the existence of the partnership and can, thus, never be partnership-related. Damages for pain and suffering also fall under the scope of this article because they are intended as a compensatory measure solely for the injured person and should never benefit the other partner. Finally, property of a purely personal character is property for exclusive personal use by one partner, such as clothing, jewelry, recreational goods, wheelchairs, hobby materials, etc. In excluding income and proceeds from separate property from a potential division, the MFC follows the general approach under most legal systems. 50 Article 1.24 Section 3: Measuring Detriments Article 1.24 (Maintenance of Standard of Living) Detriments are held to exist where one partner is unable to maintain, by his or her own means, the standard of living enjoyed during the partnership after its dissolution, notwithstanding separate property. Artículo 1.24 (Mantenimiento del nivel de vida) Se entiende que una de las partes ha resultado perjudicada cuando, tras la disolución, no pueda mantener, por sus propios medios, el nivel de vida disfrutado durante la unión de pareja, con independencia de que cuente con bienes privativos. Article 1.24 (Maintien du niveau de vie) Les pertes sont réputées exister lorsqu’un partenaire est dans l’incapacité de conserver, par ses propres moyens, le niveau de vie dont il jouissait durant le partenariat après sa dissolution, et ce, en dépit de ses biens personnels. Artikel 1.24 (Aufrechterhaltung des Lebensstandards) Nachteile liegen vor, wenn ein Partner nicht in der Lage ist, den während der Partnerschaft genossenen Lebensstandard nach deren Auflösung aufgrund eigener Mittel, ungeachtet des Eigenguts, aufrecht zu erhalten. COMMENT 1. The division of one household into two typically creates financial losses for the partners. Without re-allocation, these losses are not likely to fall equitably between them. Thus, measuring detriments as the “difference” in standard of living enjoyed by a partner before and after the dissolution of the partnership seeks to reconcile any inequitable allocation that fails to consider this significant change in circumstances with an approach in which both partners are to be treated equally. 2. In calculating these detriments, one must examine the respective needs of each partner compared to his or her respective – and potential – income, having regard to any requirements for children, etc., according to the standard of living enjoyed during the partnership. Decisive is the respective earning capacity of each partner. This implies that many of the factors laid 51 Partnerships down in Article 1.28, such as ongoing care obligations, age, health, and employability, must be taken into account in determining whether detriments exist. 3. Detriments will be held to exist notwithstanding separate property. The MFC, thereby, aims to ensure that, upon the dissolution of a partnership, a partner who actively contributed throughout the partnership is not excluded from his or her share of partnership-related benefits and detriments simply because he or she is able to maintain, alone due to separate property, the previous standard of living after the end of the partnership. The example comes to mind of a partner who raises three children of the partnership alone, and then, shortly before the partnership dissolves, receives a large inheritance. To then determine that this partner has not suffered detriment simply due to a windfall unrelated to the partnership would be inequitable and against the general principles of this MFC. Thus, detriments are to be determined without regard to the existence of separate property. 4. In light of this approach, whether or not a partner can sustain the previous standard of living by “his or her means” after the dissolution of the partnership is to be determined disregarding any separate property. 52 Article 1.25 Article 1.25 (Pension Scheme Contributions) In assessing detriments, regard is also to be had to the possibility of each partner to build up a sustainable pension scheme after the dissolution of the partnership. Artículo 1.25 (Contribuciones a planes de pensiones) Al valorar los perjuicios sufridos, se tomarán en consideración las posibilidades de cada parte para sufragar las contribuciones a un plan de pensiones sostenible tras la disolución de la unión. Article 1.25 (Contributions au régime de pension) L’évaluation des pertes doit également prendre en considération la possibilité pour chaque partenaire de constituer un régime de pension viable après la dissolution du partenariat. Artikel 1.25 (Vorsorgebeiträge) Bei der Bestimmung von Nachteilen ist auch die Möglichkeit jedes Partners, nach Auflösung der Partnerschaft eine nachhaltige Vorsorge aufzubauen, zu berücksichtigen. COMMENT 1. Although it might go without saying that the needs of a partner encompass the outlays required to build up a pension scheme, it is often not consciously considered by courts and commentators in various legal systems when assessing detriments of the partnership that must be remedied. It thus seemed advisable to expressly provide for this necessity in the MFC. 2. What is necessary to build up a sustainable pension scheme in each individual case depends largely on, firstly, what was able to be built up in the past, and secondly, how the existing pension rights are split between the partners according to Article 1.34. 53 Partnerships Section 4: Partnership-Relatedness Article 1.26 (Presumption) There is a presumption that benefits and detriments are partnership-related if one partner has abstained or abstains, wholly or in part, from gainful employment in order to (a) care for a child of the family, (b) care for the household, (c) care for the other partner, (d) care for a third person in fulfillment of a moral obligation of the other partner or of both partners, or (e) contribute to the other partner’s business or profession. Artículo 1.26 (Presunción) Se presume que los beneficios y los perjuicios derivan de la unión de pareja cuando uno de sus integrantes se ha abstenido o se abstiene, en todo o en parte, de realizar una actividad laboral remunerada para (a) cuidar a un hijo o a una hija de la familia, (b) atender al hogar, (c) cuidar del otro integrante de la unión de pareja, (d) cuidar de un tercero en cumplimiento de una obligación moral del otro integrante de la pareja o de ambos, o bien (e) contribuir al negocio o profesión del otro. Article 1.26 (Présomption) Les bénéfices et les pertes sont présumés être liés au partenariat si l’un des partenaires s’est abstenu ou s’abstient, partiellement ou totalement, d’occuper un emploi rémunéré afin de (a) prendre soin d’un enfant de la famille, (b) prendre soin du ménage, (c) prendre soin de l’autre partenaire, (d) prendre soin d’une tierce personne en exécution d’une obligation morale qui incombe à chacun des partenaires ou à l’autre partenaire, ou (e) contribuer aux affaires ou à la profession de l’autre partenaire. Artikel 1.26 (Vermutung) Es wird vermutet, dass Vor- und Nachteile partnerschaftsbedingt sind, wenn ein Partner ganz oder teilweise nicht erwerbstätig war oder ist, um (a) für ein Kind der Familie zu sorgen, 54 Article 1.26 (b) für den Haushalt zu sorgen, (c) für den anderen Partner zu sorgen, (d) in Erfüllung einer moralischen Verpflichtung des Partners oder beider Partner für eine dritte Person zu sorgen oder (e) zu Gewerbe oder Beruf des anderen Partners beizutragen. COMMENT 1. Only benefits and detriments that are partnership-related shall be adjusted under the MFC. The question of which benefits and detriments can be classified as “partnership-related” thus becomes crucial. An alternative to this approach would be to determine whether benefits and detriments were “partnership-related” under the circumstances of each individual case. However, for the sake of practicability, this Article lays down the prima facie circumstances that give rise to a presumption that benefits and detriments are related to the partnership. This implies that, in an individual case, this presumption may be rebutted. 2. The sense and purpose of this Article is to protect the legitimate expectations of the partner who has, on the basis of a mutual decision regarding the division of common tasks, “given up” work-related opportunities for the greater good of the partnership or the other partner. 3. The predominant case is usually where one partner retreats from the workforce or reduces his or her workload in order to care for a child of the family, be it a common child or a child for whose long-term welfare both partners accept joint responsibility. It would actually be the common task of both partners to care for such a child; consequently, any benefits that the partner who is relieved from this task is able to acquire are partnershiprelated. The same holds true, conversely, for any detriments incurred by the caring partner. 4. Another case is where one partner exclusively undertakes the role of caring for the household to the detriment of his or her career. This partner thereby “relieves” the other partner from these otherwise joint tasks and thus, this situation again gives rise to the presumption that benefits and detriments are partnership-related. 5. Not to be forgotten is the case where one partner abstains from pursuing his or her career in order to care for the other partner, not only, for example, because the other partner is sick or disabled, but also in cases where the 55 Partnerships partnership requires accompanying the other partner for such extended periods of time that pursuing an independent career seems impossible, such as a partnership with a person in the entertainment profession, or the like. 6. A similar case is where one partner foregoes career chances to care for a sick, elderly or disabled third party in fulfillment of a moral obligation of the other partner or of both partners jointly, such as caring for the parents of the partner or one’s own parents who have, in some way, contributed to the partnership. However, this should not be confined to the care of blood relatives. 7. Finally, a presumption that benefits and detriments are partnership-related arises where one partner foregoes his or her own career potential to contribute to the other’s business or profession, such as where one partner gives up his or her job to work in the other’s business or profession. However, this article only applies in cases where the partner works in such a business or profession for a below-market rate, or even for nothing, on the grounds of the partnership itself. There are no reasons to presume partnership-related benefits or detriments in cases where one partner is gainfully employed in the other’s business or profession under normal market conditions. 56 Article 1.27 Section 5: Division of Benefits and Detriments Article 1.27 (Equal Division) Partnership-related benefits are to be equally divided and detriments equally borne between the partners upon dissolution of the partnership. Artículo 1.27 (División en partes iguales) En caso de disolución de la pareja, sus integrantes se repartirán en partes iguales los beneficios obtenidos y soportarán del mismo modo los perjuicios sufridos. Article 1.27 (Égale répartition) Les bénéfices liés au partenariat doivent être répartis à parts égales et les pertes supportées également par les partenaires lors de la dissolution du partenariat. Artikel 1.27 (Gleiche Teilung) Bei Auflösung der Partnerschaft sind partnerschaftsbedingte Vor- und Nachteile gleichmässig auf die Partner zu verteilen. COMMENT 1. Nowadays, the overwhelming majority of property regimes aim at an equal division between the spouses. Even in England, which had long resisted such a notion, the modern trend has evolved in recent years so as to tend to equal sharing of the “gains” of the partnership. 2. Equal division does not only apply to traditional notions of “property”, but also to the respective pension rights of the partners under those legal systems that provide for pension-splitting upon divorce or – as is the case in certain legal systems – dissolution of registered partnerships. 3. However, not only under property regimes, but also under maintenance laws, it is generally accepted that the adjustment for partnership-related detriments pre-supposes that, after the dissolution of the partnership, both partners must, by way of maintenance, be placed on an equal footing, thus ensuring more or less the same standard of living. 57 Partnerships 4. This general approach is reflected in this Article. However, only those benefits and detriments that are partnership-related as defined under Article 1.26 are to be divided equally. Thereby, it is stressed that, in the still-typical case in which one partner is the main breadwinner and the other partner predominantly cares for the household and the children, the respective contributions that the partners have made are to be ascribed equal value. Thus, the partners are to be treated equally in sharing the fruits of the partnership upon dissolution. 5. However, although equal division is the starting point and the general aim, this does not mean that it must be slavishly adhered to under all circumstances. The following article ensures such necessary flexibility. 58 Article 1.28 Article 1.28 (Exceptions) The court may depart from the principle of equal division in order to take into account (a) the interests of a minor child of the family, (b) the future care for a minor child of the family by one of the partners, (c) the future care for persons in the interest of the other partner, (d) the length of the partnership, (e) financial and non-financial contributions to the partnership, (f) contributions to the other partner’s property, business or profession, (g) enhanced earning capacity, (h) income, earning capacity, property, and future assets, (i) age, mental and physical health, (j) financial misconduct, or (k) domestic violence. Artículo 1.28 (Excepciones) El tribunal puede apartarse del criterio de la división en partes iguales para otorgar la oportuna consideración a (a) los intereses de cualquier hijo o hija menor de la familia, (b) el cuidado futuro de un hijo o de una hija menor de la familia que esté a cargo de uno de los integrantes de la pareja, (c) el cuidado futuro de personas en interés del otro integrante de la pareja, (d) la duración de la unión, (e) las contribuciones, económicas o no, a la unión, (f) las contribuciones a los bienes, profesión o negocio del otro, (g) la mejora en la capacidad de generar ingresos, (h) los ingresos, la capacidad de generarlos, el patrimonio y los activos futuros, (i) la edad y la salud física y mental, (j) las irregularidades en la gestión económica, o (k) la violencia doméstica. 59 Partnerships Article 1.28 (Exceptions) Le tribunal peut se départir du principe d’égale répartition afin de prendre en compte (a) l’intérêt de l’enfant mineur de la famille, (b) le futur entretien de l’enfant mineur de la famille par l’un des partenaires, (c) le futur entretien d’autres personnes dans l’intérêt de l’autre partenaire, (d) la durée du partenariat, (e) les contributions patrimoniales et extrapatrimoniales au partenariat, (f) les contributions aux biens, aux affaires ou à la profession de l’autre partenaire, (g) l’amélioration de la capacité de générer des revenus, (h) les revenus, la capacité d’en générer, le patrimoine et les futurs actifs, (i) l’âge, la santé physique et mentale, (j) l’inconduite financière, ou (k) les violences domestiques. Artikel 1.28 (Ausnahmen) Das Gericht kann vom Prinzip der gleichen Teilung abweichen, um folgende Umstände berücksichtigen zu können: (a) das Wohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie, (b) die künftige Sorge für ein minderjähriges Kind der Familie durch einen Partner, (c) die künftige Sorge für Personen im Interesse des anderen Partners, (d) die Dauer der Partnerschaft, (e) finanzielle und nicht finanzielle Beiträge für die Partnerschaft, (f) Beiträge für das Vermögen, Gewerbe oder den Beruf des anderen Partners, (g) erhöhte Karrierechancen, (h) Einkommen, Erwerbsfähigkeit, gegenwärtiges und künftiges Vermögen, (i) Alter, geistige und körperliche Gesundheit, (j) finanzielles Fehlverhalten oder (k) häusliche Gewalt. COMMENT 1. In common law countries, property law distribution and maintenance are largely left to the discretion of the courts, to the extent that a distinction is drawn between these two areas of relief. Typically, the statutes on both property distribution and maintenance contain lists of similar criteria to be considered in making any order. 60 Article 1.28 2. However, according to the property regimes in civil law countries, exact division is undertaken as a matter of course. The same applies to pensionsplitting. However, the discretion of the courts to take individual circumstances into account on the basis of lists of criteria is, if at all, only found for the question of maintenance. 3. The MFC uses such a list of criteria, not as the starting point of property division or maintenance, but rather as grounds for deviating from the general principle of the equal division of benefits and detriments set out in Article 1.27. In applying these criteria, it may well occur that 100% of the benefits of one partner are transferred to the other partner. Equally plausible is the scenario in which one partner receives nothing from the other partner owing to his or her own enhanced earning capacity. The criteria themselves are, more or less, identical to those found in domestic legal systems and thus reflect a general consensus. It is important to note that each criterion is not intended to be considered in isolation, but rather, that each might influence the remainder and that, to the extent that an equal division is to be departed from at all, a just order for financial relief requires, indeed, the joint consideration of every factor. 4. (a) In accordance with the approach of the entire MFC, first and foremost, regard is to be had to the interests of a minor child of the family. If, for example, financial means are limited, more than 50% of the distributable assets could be attributed to the partner with whom the minor children live. 5. (b) (c) The length of future care required for a minor child of the family determines the question of when the caring partner will be able to re-enter the workforce. Thus, in the first place, this question has to be considered when determining the existence of detriment to one partner. However, it must also fall within the court’s consideration when deciding whether to depart from the principle of equal division. The same holds true for the future care of persons in the interests of the other partner. 6. (d) In all legal systems, the length of the relationship is ascribed great significance. The idea behind this concept is that, after only a “short” partnership, where the expectations of each partner are simply not “engrained” to the extent to be worthy of protection through equal division, this is a factor to be taken into account. Thus, upon the dissolution of a short partnership, it may be appropriate to refer to the standard of living enjoyed before the commencement of the partnership. However, in calculating the length of a partnership for this purpose, again, the factors enunciated in (b) and (c) must be considered. 61 Partnerships 7. (e) The criterion aims at ensuring justice for the case that one of the partners has contributed “more than their share” to the partnership, be it in a financial or a non-financial sense, such as both caring for the children and simultaneously working close to full-time. The problem in such a case is that the partnership-related detriments will be less than if this partner had “just” done his or her share. This must, therefore, be compensated by an unequal division of benefits and detriments in that partner’s favor. At the other end of the scheme, where one partner neither works nor in another way contributes to the household, etc., the issue of adjustment does not even arise in the first place, as the element of “partnership-relatedness” under Article 1.26 is not present in such a case. 8. (f) This criterion is based upon the same basic idea as (e), namely that, in cases in which an equal division of benefits and detriments would be repugnant to justice because of one partner’s contributions to the other’s property, business or profession, the court is empowered to depart from the principle of equal division. The typical case is where contributions have been made to the other partner’s separate property, which is not subject to adjustment, or possess a value which would otherwise remain outside consideration. 9. (g) The question of enhanced earning capacity primarily deals with the case where one partner’s earning potential has been increased due to the contributions – or even sacrifices – of the other partner, leaving one partner with great career prospects and the possibility to draw tremendous rewards at the end of the partnership, and the other with rather grim possibilities to enhance his or her own earning capacity. Such a situation may be compensated by an order for financial relief that departs from the principle of equal division. 10. (h) (i) In exceptional cases, a gross disparity in income, earning capacity, property or future assets, considered in light of the remaining criteria, might require an unequal division of benefits and detriments. The same holds true where it is clear that one partner, because of his or her age, mental or physical health, will not be able to adequately sustain his or her own needs, whereas the other partner is in a very comfortable financial position. Here, it would be manifestly unconscionable to stubbornly abide by the principle of equal division. 11. (j) Although fault is not a criterion influencing the division of property after dissolution, financial misconduct is still considered a factor by most 62 Article 1.28 legal systems. Thus, the MFC retains this criterion. The notion of financial misconduct primarily refers to the willful or reckless dissipation of assets (e.g. through gambling or willful termination of employment for the purpose of defeating an order for financial relief), with the consequence that the amount available for division at all is much less than what it should be. Thus, the dissipating partner should not be entitled to equal participation in the remainder. 12. (k) Although the MFC, in accordance with most legal systems, disregards marital fault as a factor to determine the division of benefits and detriments, extreme situations, such as domestic violence, have to be taken into account. Quite a few legal systems provide in these cases, on the one hand, for an exclusion of possible maintenance claims, and on the other hand, allow the aggrieved person a right to increased financial relief, or to claim damages in tort. The MFC follows this approach; thus, the partner culpable of domestic violence will usually receive less than half, and the aggrieved party more. 63 Partnerships CHAPTER 3: EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT Section 1: Compensation Principle Article 1.29 (Contributions) If there are no partnership-related benefits and detriments, financial relief may still be granted to compensate for extraordinary contributions in the interest of the other partner or for bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of the partnership. Artículo 1.29 (Contribuciones) Aunque no existan beneficios y perjuicios derivados de la unión de pareja, se puede proveer económicamente a favor de uno de sus integrantes para compensar las contribuciones extraordinarias realizadas en interés del otro o el hecho de haber sufragado los gastos generados por la unión de modo desproporcionado. Article 1.29 (Contributions) S’il n’y a pas de bénéfices ou de pertes liés au partenariat, une prestation financière peut néanmoins être allouée pour compenser des contributions extraordinaires faites dans l’intérêt de l’autre partenaire, ou pour avoir supporté un partage disproportionné des coûts du partenariat. Artikel 1.29 (Beiträge) Auch wenn keine partnerschaftsbedingten Vor- und Nachteile vorliegen, kann finanzieller Ausgleich gewährt werden, um aussergewöhnliche Beiträge im Interesse des anderen Partners oder unverhältnismässige Beiträge an die Kosten der Partnerschaft zu kompensieren. COMMENT 1. This Article is intended to prevent injustice in cases where a significant – be it financial or non-financial – contribution has been made by one partner to the other, but, upon dissolution of the partnership, no partnership-related benefits or detriments exist which could lead to financial relief under Chapter 2. If partnership-related benefits and detriments are present, extraordinary contributions are a factor to be taken into account under Article 1.28(e), (f) and may give rise to a departure from equal division. 64 Article 1.29 2. Only a few legal systems provide for financial relief under family law in the case of extraordinary contributions. However, many legal systems address these problems in the context of remedies taken from other areas, such as contract law, the law of economic partnership, trust law, restitution for unjust enrichment or the like. 3. Cases that call for compensation are well known from case law all over the world, and encompass, in particular, the so-called “medical student syndrome”, where one partner finances the other’s studies, a situation which, on its own, does not give rise to benefits or detriments when the partnership ends. Especially in cases where the partnership ends before the fruits of such studies can be reaped by both partners, to then leave the “financing” partner with nothing would be manifestly inequitable. 4. Further cases falling under this provision can be imagined in which one partner invests in or otherwise contributes to any property belonging to the other partner. This includes property acquired both before and during the partnership. For example, such a case could be where the house of one partner is refurbished and renovated by the other partner during his or her spare time. As the value of the house itself is not subject to division between the partners in this case owing to lack of partnership-relatedness, the latter partner must be otherwise protected. 5. The same holds true for extraordinary contributions by one partner made to the business or profession of the other, for example, where one partner takes care of the bookkeeping for the other partner’s business on weekends. It must follow from equitable principles that at least some kind of remuneration be given when the partnership dissolves. 6. Finally, in exceptional cases, disproportionate contributions to the partnership itself should give a right to redress to the contributing partner. This does not mean that, after the dissolution of the partnership, each single amount should be worked into the calculation, but rather that this mechanism is to be confined to extreme situations. For example, in a longterm relationship where both partners have had more or less the same income, one partner has continually paid the partnership expenses whilst the other has been able to save and invest his or her income and thereby build up considerable wealth, or where one partner, in addition to gainful employment, has solely cared for the children, but has not incurred partnership-related detriments. For the sake of clarity, this case is expressly addressed in this article, although a reasonable court could also understand 65 Partnerships such a contribution as being an extraordinary contribution in the interests of the other party. 66 Article 1.30 Article 1.30 (Extent of Financial Relief) Financial relief is to reflect the amount of such contributions, but may also reflect any fruits obtained as a result thereof. Artículo 1.30 (Alcance de la compensación económica) La compensación económica alcanzará a las contribuciones referidas, pero puede alcanzar también a los frutos obtenidos como resultado de las mismas. Article 1.30 (Importance de la prestation financière) La prestation financière doit refléter le montant de ces contributions, mais peut également refléter les fruits résultants de celles-ci. Artikel 1.30 (Umfang finanziellen Ausgleichs) Der finanzielle Ausgleich soll der Höhe solcher Beiträge entsprechen, er kann aber auch die daraus erzielten Erträge berücksichtigen. COMMENT 1. As already mentioned, it cannot be the aim of these provisions to simply account for the value of what each partner has brought into the partnership. Rather, it follows as a just and equitable solution that not only the initial contribution, but also its purpose and any gains acquired as a result thereof, are also taken into consideration. 2. The amount of the contribution itself may, at best, be a rough starting point for determining what the contributing partner should receive back upon dissolution. However, this general approach receives new definition when applied in conjunction with the circumstances of the individual case. It might just be the case that a contribution cannot be retrieved at all due to its purpose, or because the donee partner was unable to realize any profit thereon. On the other hand, if the contribution enables the donee to reap great profits, the donor partner should, at least partially, share in this windfall, which should be reflected in financial relief. 67 Partnerships Section 2: Post-Partnership Solidarity Article 1.31 (Long-Term Partnerships) In all other cases, financial relief may only be granted in exceptional cases after a long-term partnership. Artículo 1.31 (Uniones de larga duración) En los demás casos, sólo se concederá compensación económica, de modo excepcional, en supuestos de disolución de uniones de pareja de larga duración. Article 1.31 (Partenariats de longue durée) Dans tous les autres cas, la prestation financière ne peut être octroyée que dans des situations exceptionnelles après un partenariat de longue durée. Artikel 1.31 (Lange Partnerschaften) In allen anderen Fällen kann finanzieller Ausgleich nur ausnahmsweise nach langer Partnerschaft gewährt werden. COMMENT 1. As has been mentioned earlier, it cannot be the aim of this MFC to grant financial relief in just any case where one of the partners is in need after the dissolution of the partnership. Indeed, partners cannot be held responsible for the health or age of the respective other partner or the state of the labor market. It is the task of the state, and not that of the former partner, to provide the basis for self-sufficiency through family politics, the labor market and other public means. To the extent that there are no partnership-related detriments, each partner has to bear the sole responsibility for these risks. Neither can it be the aim of financial relief to level pure – not partnershiprelated – disparities in income between the two partners, nor, for example, in the case of a partnership between elderly persons, disparities in pension benefits. 2. However, a long-lasting partnership certainly justifies some expectations of the financially weaker partner to be given adequate opportunity to re-arrange his or her life after the dissolution of the partnership. The ground for granting relief in this case can only be seen as post-partnership solidarity. How long the partnership must have lasted before giving rise to financial relief under this provision cannot be stated exactly. Again, this will depend 68 Article 1.31 upon the circumstances of the individual case, such as the financial disparity between the partners and the reason for the neediness of one partner, among others. As a rule of thumb, a partnership shorter than five years would rarely qualify under this Article, whereas one lasting longer than ten years might give rise to at least some kind of equitable financial relief. 3. However, in any case, exceptional circumstances must be present. This means that the partner seeking financial relief must be able to show that it was reasonable for him or her to rely on the ongoing contributions from the other partner. Basically, this Article seeks to temporarily uphold the status quo in cases of detrimental reliance, where the abrupt change of circumstances would result in unfair and unexpected detriment to the weaker partner. 4. Here, again, any questions of fault are to be disregarded. This provision may not be abused to punish the financially better-off partner for abandonment. Therefore, a narrow and strict interpretation is required. 69 Partnerships Article 1.32 (Extent of Financial Relief) Financial relief is limited to the extent necessary to allow the other partner reasonable time to adjust to the new circumstances. Artículo 1.32 (Alcance de la compensación económica) El alcance de la compensación económica se encuentra limitado a lo que sea necesario para que el otro integrante de la pareja tenga tiempo suficiente para adaptarse a la nueva situación. Article 1.32 (Importance de la prestation financière) La prestation financière est limitée à ce qui est nécessaire pour allouer à l’autre partenaire un délai raisonnable afin de s’adapter aux nouvelles circonstances. Artikel 1.32 (Umfang finanziellen Ausgleichs) Der finanzielle Ausgleich ist insoweit begrenzt, als er notwendig ist, um dem anderen Partner die Anpassung an die neuen Umstände innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist zu erlauben. COMMENT 1. According to the principle of granting post-partnership solidarity to the financially weaker party of a long-term relationship, the only aim of financial relief in this case is to allow this partner a – at least to the greatest extent possible – smooth transition to the new circumstances after the dissolution of the partnership. Thus, financial relief must be limited with respect not only to amount, but also to time. Again, how a “reasonable” time for the partner in question to adjust to the new circumstances is to be determined, and what financial amount will be needed for this, will be dependent upon the circumstances of the case, especially the length of the partnership. Also not to be overlooked are the circumstances leading up to the dissolution and whether the financially weaker partner could be expected to “prepare” for the possible dissolution of the partnership. All of these factors are imminent to the notion of reasonable time under this Article. 2. For example, granting financial relief on grounds of post-partnership solidarity seeks to avoid the situation in which, after a “sudden” dissolution, the weaker partner is forced to pawn off his or her assets in order to survive. It can also lead to an obligation on the financially stronger partner to support 70 Article 1.32 his or her former partner, who is, for example, temporarily unable to work due to illness. 3. If financial relief is not possible by the re-allocation of property, but only by periodic payments in such cases, this form of relief is to be strictly limited in time, in any case, even after a very long-lasting partnership, to a maximum of three years. This is not only consistent with the notion of “clean break”, but would also appear to be the limit of what can fairly be expected under the notion of post-partnership solidarity. The need of the financially stronger party to adjust and move on must also be taken into account. 71 Partnerships CHAPTER 4: MANNER OF FINANCIAL RELIEF Article 1.33 (Transfer of Property) In granting financial relief, any property belonging to both or one of the partners, including separate property but except for purely personal property, may be transferred to one of the partners, as the court deems just and equitable. Artículo 1.33 (Transmisión de bienes) Al establecer las medidas económicas, el tribunal, según estime justo y equitativo, podrá acordar la transmisión al beneficiario de bienes de titularidad conjunta o de titularidad exclusiva de uno solo de los integrantes de la pareja, incluidos los bienes privativos, salvo que se trate de bienes de uso puramente personal. Article 1.33 (Transfert de propriété) Au titre de l’octroi de la prestation financière, tout bien appartenant à chacun des partenaires ou seulement à l’un d’eux, incluant les biens personnels, mais à l’exception des biens à caractère purement personnel, peut être transféré à l’un des partenaires si le tribunal l’estime juste et équitable. Artikel 1.33 (Übertragung von Vermögen) Im Rahmen des finanziellen Ausgleichs kann das Gericht nach billigem Ermessen Vermögen, das beiden oder einem der Partner gehört, einschliesslich des Eigenguts, aber unter Ausschluss der Gegenstände zum ausschliesslichen persönlichen Gebrauch, auf einen Partner übertragen. COMMENT 1. Whereas many civil law countries only narrowly permit a transfer of property upon dissolution of marriage, and, in particular, exclude separate property from any potential change of ownership, many common law legal systems differ greatly in this respect. There, any property, regardless of ownership, may be distributed between the partners. 2. The MFC follows this latter approach in order to achieve the general goal of a “clean break” upon dissolution of the partnership. Thus, the first step is the determination of the respective quota of each partner’s entitlement. This is to be determined under the provisions set out in Chapters 2 and 3. Once 72 Article 1.33 this evaluation has been undertaken, the actual division of individual assets takes place under this Chapter. 3. The court is granted a wide discretion in adjusting the property interests involved. If sufficient property is available to satisfy the respective quotas, then it goes without saying that, prima facie, actual ownership must be given priority. If property is owned by both partners in joint ownership, distribution can effect the transfer of such property to the ownership of only one partner. However, more often than not, one of the partners owns more property than the other, with the consequence that distribution can only be fulfilled by transferring ownership of certain assets. This does not mean that personal interests of the owner are to be disregarded. For example, if the distribution can be undertaken by transferring a share portfolio, there is obviously no need to transfer the inherited real property that the owning partner was born in. The legal basis must also be taken into account. If distribution is to take place due to an adjustment of partnership-related benefits and detriments, the owning partner can be expected to make concessions more easily than in a case of post-partnership solidarity. 4. Although separate property, such as inheritance or assets owned before entering into the partnership, are not excluded from being transferred to the other partner, there is an exception for purely personal property. Examples of purely personal property include clothing, jewelry, items having sentimental value, or, as the case may be, a pet. 5. The respective attribution of ownership interests is, of course, primarily a matter for regulation by the partners themselves according to Chapter 5 below. Only in cases where the partners are hopelessly at odds with one another will the court be required to step in. 73 Partnerships Article 1.34 (Pension Rights) Pension rights may be transferred from one partner to the other, or may be split as they accrue in the future. Artículo 1.34 (Pensiones) Los derechos derivados de planes de pensiones pueden ser atribuidos al miembro de la pareja no titular, o bien se puede establecer el reparto de sus rendimientos a medida que se devenguen en el futuro. Article 1.34 (Droits de pension) Les droits de pension peuvent être transférés d’un partenaire à l’autre, ou être partagés comme ils s’accroissent dans l’avenir. Artikel 1.34 (Vorsorgeanwartschaften) Vorsorgeanwartschaften können von einem auf den anderen Partner übertragen oder ihre künftige Teilung angeordnet werden. COMMENT 1. As has been set out above, in many cases nowadays, pension rights are, more or less, the only assets owned by the partners upon dissolution of their partnership. Taking these assets into consideration upon calculating, on the one hand, the respective assets, and on the other hand, the respective quotas, does not suffice. It is indispensable that they be taken into account in the actual distribution itself. 2. Thus, pension rights already accrued may be transferred from one partner to the other, with the consequence that the acquiring partner obtains an independent claim to the contents of the pension fund. In transferring pension rights, regard is to be had, firstly, to whether the existing pension rights of each partner are sufficient for old age or disability, secondly, the extent to which the pension fund can be built up in the future, and finally, to how the property has otherwise been distributed between the partners. For example, if one partner is granted a house that earns adequate monthly rent to provide financial security in old age, the pension rights transferred should be accordingly less than in a case where no property is available. 3. The transfer of pension rights is not limited to those existing at the time of dissolution; rather, pension rights to be accrued in the future can also be made subject to division. Here, an especially relevant case is where, after 74 Article 1.34 dissolution of the partnership, one partner cares for a child of the family and is thus unable to build up his or her own pension fund for a certain period of time. 4. The technical details concerning the transfer of pension rights must be regulated by the respective laws on social security and pension schemes. 75 Partnerships Article 1.35 (Family Home and Family Chattels) In attributing the family home and the family chattels, primary regard is to be had to the interests of a minor child of the family, and whether one partner is dependent upon the use of these for business or other purposes. Artículo 1.35 (Hogar familiar y bienes muebles de uso familiar) A la hora de atribuir el hogar y los bienes muebles de uso familiar, debe prestarse atención prioritaria al interés de todo hijo o hija menor de la familia y al hecho de que alguno de los integrantes de la pareja pueda depender de su uso para el desarrollo de su negocio u otras finalidades. Article 1.35 (Le logement et les biens de la famille) Pour l’attribution du logement et des biens de la famille, il doit être tenu compte, en premier lieu, de l’intérêt de l’enfant mineur de la famille et du fait que l’un des partenaires dépende de l’utilisation de ceux-ci dans ses affaires ou à d’autres fins. Artikel 1.35 (Familienheim und Familiengut) Bei der Zuteilung des Familienheims und von Familiengut ist vorrangig das Wohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie zu berücksichtigen, sowie ob ein Partner auf deren Benutzung für seinen Beruf oder aus anderen Gründen angewiesen ist. COMMENT 1. Practically all legal systems provide for separate rules dealing with the allocation of the family home and the family chattels upon marriage dissolution. This even applies to such – predominantly civil law – legal systems that otherwise fail to provide for a transfer of solely-owned chattels to the non-owning partner. 2. Under Article 1.33, the court is granted a wide discretion in allocating any property. This Article, concerning the family home as well as the family chattels, aims to provide guidance to the courts in exercising this discretion. 3. In allocating the family home and family chattels, in accordance with the general principle of the MFC, primary regard is to be given to a minor child of the family. It must be a prevailing interest that, even though the 76 Article 1.35 partnership has dissolved, the child be protected from losing his or her home and, on top of this, his or her familiar environment. If such interests of the child do not necessitate the attribution of the family home and family chattels in a certain way, regard should be given to the respective needs of the partners. Thus, if one partner, for example, carries out a practice in the home, this should be a factor advocating the allocation of the family home to this partner. Another example would be where a disabled person depends upon the family home and the family car specially adjusted for his or her needs. 4. In individual cases where, after a balancing of the respective interests, the owner partner cannot be expected to give up his or her ownership permanently, a temporary right of use might be sufficient to satisfy the needs of any children and the other partner. 5. Where the family home and family chattels are not the sole or common property of one partner, but are merely leased, it must be possible for the court to order the transfer of rights under the lease to the partner to whom the family home and family chattels should be allocated according to the above-mentioned principles, with legal effect in favor of and against the lessor. 35 Partnerships Article 1.36 (Business Assets) Business assets should be allocated in such a way so as not to destroy an economic entity. Artículo 1.36 (Efectos empresariales) Los bienes afectos a una actividad comercial o empresarial deben ser adjudicados de manera que no se destruya la unidad económica del negocio. Article 1.36 (Actifs de l’entreprise) Les actifs de l’entreprise doivent être attribués de façon à ne pas démanteler les entités économiques. Artikel 1.36 (Geschäftsvermögen) Geschäftsvermögen soll so zugeteilt werden, dass Wirtschaftseinheiten nicht zerstört werden. COMMENT 1. Again, this Article constitutes a mere guideline – already present in selected legal systems, especially those of common law background where the courts are granted a wide discretion – to be utilized by the courts in exercising their discretion under Article 1.33. It is not only in the interest of partners that own a business, but also in line with general societal expectations that business entities be protected from destruction through allocation. 2. If, owing to this principle of protecting economic entities, insufficient property remains to satisfy the quota requirements, this should be redressed by granting periodic payments according to Article 1.37. 36 Article 1.37 Article 1.37 (Periodic Payments) 1If there is not enough property for redistribution at the time of dissolution of the partnership, financial relief may be made by future periodic payments. 2Except in the case of post-partnership solidarity according to Article 1.31, future periodic payments are not subject to variation. Artículo 1.37 (Pagos periódicos) 1Si no hay patrimonio suficiente para su redistribución al tiempo de la disolución, la compensación económica puede consistir en el pago de prestaciones periódicas en el futuro. 2Salvo cuando sea de aplicación el principio de solidaridad recogido en el artículo 1.31, las prestaciones periódicas no serán susceptibles de variación. Article 1.37 (Versements périodiques) 1S’il n’y a pas assez de biens pour les redistribuer au jour de la dissolution du partenariat, la prestation financière peut être exécutée sous forme de paiements périodiques futurs. 2Les paiements périodiques futurs ne sont pas sujets à variation, sauf en cas de solidarité post partenariat prévu par l’article 1.31. Artikel 1.37 (Periodische Leistungen) 1Ist im Zeitpunkt der Auflösung der Partnerschaft kein ausreichendes Vermögen zur Verteilung vorhanden, hat der finanzielle Ausgleich durch künftige periodische Leistungen zu erfolgen. 2Ausser im Falle nachpartnerschaftlicher Solidarität gemäss Artikel 1.31 sind künftige periodische Leistungen nicht der Abänderung unterworfen. COMMENT 1. Those legal systems that differentiate between property distribution, splitting of pension rights and maintenance usually provide for periodic payments to be made in the context of maintenance. Maintenance given in the form of a lump-sum payment appears to be an exception in these legal systems, in the same way that periodic payments in satisfaction of a property distribution order are also rare. 37 Partnerships 2. As the MFC has abandoned the three-way approach in favor of a unitary one, and as it follows from the principle of a “clean break”, periodic payments should be an exception in any case. Where there is sufficient property, be it in the form of tangible property or pension rights, its distribution immediately upon the dissolution of the partnership is given priority over any future ongoing payments that cause the partners to continue to remain financially “bound” to one another. 3. Periodic payments only come into play where there is not enough property, or where, for example, the requirements of Article 1.35 or Article 1.36 necessitate the allocation of property in such a way that the inequity thereby caused can only be resolved by the making of periodic payments. 4. In the case of periodic payments for maintenance, most legal systems provide for variation where certain circumstances change. The typical case is where the claim to maintenance extinguishes upon re-marriage. However, this still reflects the old-fashioned view, whereby the husband had a continuing obligation to maintain his wife until someone else relieved him of his role. 5. Under the MFC, the basis for granting financial relief is not generally an ongoing obligation, but the adjustment of partnership-related benefits and detriments. This assessment has to be undertaken at the point of dissolution of the partnership; any subsequent change of circumstances fails to have an impact. Thus, it is hardly conceivable why a subsequent partner, for example, should indirectly assume the financial responsibility for the upbringing of the former partner’s children. In addition, for example, an inheritance received by one partner after dissolution should not change the duty of the former partner to be obliged to make adequate adjustment for the partnershiprelated benefits. The same holds true for the case where financial relief is granted on the basis of compensation for extraordinary financial contributions in the sense of Article 1.29, as the underlying reasons for such compensation have already arisen and cannot be “undone” by future circumstances. In cases in which the obligor, for example, loses his or her job and is, thus, financially no longer in a position to fulfill the obligation of periodic payments, the general mechanisms in place to protect a debtor in enforcement of judgment proceedings must suffice. 6. Under the MFC’s approach of redressing past events and not just “need”, there is also no room for a variation if, for example, the claimant spouse unexpectedly loses his or her job at a later stage, as these risks have to be borne by the respective partner. 80 Article 1.37 7. However, in those rare cases where financial relief is granted on the basis of post-partnership solidarity, such considerations do not apply. Here indeed, the payment order is based on future needs, rather than on individual events in the past. The sole requirement in these cases is the existence of the longterm partnership itself. It appears just and equitable that a change of circumstances on behalf of either partner, be it to the benefit of the obligee or to the detriment of the obligor, should be able to influence the continuation and the amount of such payments. 81 Partnerships CHAPTER 5: PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS Article 1.38 (Right to Agree) The partners may, at any time, regulate the financial consequences of the dissolution of their partnership by an agreement in writing. Artículo 1.38 (Derecho a pactar) Los integrantes de la pareja pueden, en cualquier momento, regular las consecuencias económicas de la disolución de la unión por medio de acuerdo escrito. Article 1.38 (Droit de conclure des accords) Les partenaires peuvent, à tout moment, régler les conséquences patrimoniales de la dissolution du partenariat par la conclusion d’un accord écrit. Artikel 1.38 (Recht zum Abschluss von Vereinbarungen) Die Partner können jederzeit die finanziellen Folgen der Auflösung ihrer Partnerschaft im Wege einer schriftlichen Vereinbarung regeln. COMMENT 1. Under common law, it was, up until recently, virtually impossible for married couples to privately regulate their financial affairs upon divorce in advance. Even divorce agreements were looked upon skeptically by legislators and the courts. On the other hand, there were a few legal systems – especially Germany – that allowed complete freedom of contract to the parties to a marriage in regulating all aspects, especially allowing them to negate any right to division of property or pensions, or to receive maintenance in any case. In other legal systems, although the possibility of forming marital agreements existed, these agreements were always subject to control by the courts. In recent years, a noticeable convergence of approaches in the different legal systems can be observed. An increasing number of common law countries today recognize the possibilities of pre- or postnuptial agreements, which are given due regard by the court when it makes orders on financial relief. On the other hand, the German Constitutional Supreme Court has finally set limits to the previously nearly unrestricted principle of freedom of contract. 82 Article 1.38 2. Agreements by non-marital partners have always been recommended as a means of regulating any consequences of dissolution, but have never been as hotly debated as pre- or post-nuptial agreements. The boundaries of freedom of contract in these cases have not yet been thoroughly discussed in any legal system. 3. The MFC expressly recognizes the possibility of the partners, be they in a marital relationship or not, to contractually agree upon any financial consequences, regardless of whether the agreement is made before or during the partnership, or upon its dissolution. As no distinction is made between property division, pension splitting and maintenance, it goes without saying that all aspects of financial relief can be regulated in such an agreement. 4. The only pre-requisite is that the agreement be in writing, mainly for reasons of proof and the avoidance of uncertainty. In some legal systems, such agreements need to be notarized, or both partners are required to obtain independent legal advice. The MFC refrains from such formal requirements, as even the receipt of legal advice is no guarantee of conscionability for these agreements. Therefore, instead of setting hurdles for entering such agreements, their content should be controlled by the court at the point in time at which their applicability is relied upon. 83 Partnerships Article 1.39 (Significance of Agreement) The court gives due regard to the agreement of the parties, as long as the overall result of the agreement seems just and reasonable in light of the foregoing provisions. Artículo 1.39 (Relevancia del pacto) El tribunal tomará en consideración el acuerdo alcanzado por las partes, siempre que su resultado global aparezca como justo y razonable a la luz de lo establecido en las disposiciones precedentes. Article 1.39 (Portée de l’accord) Le tribunal prend pleinement en considération l’accord des parties tant que le résultat global de cet accord semble juste et raisonnable eu égard aux dispositions qui précèdent. Artikel 1.39 (Rechtliche Bedeutung einer Vereinbarung) Das Gericht berücksichtigt die Vereinbarung der Parteien gebührend, soweit das Gesamtergebnis der Vereinbarung im Lichte der vorgenannten Bestimmungen angemessen und vernünftig erscheint. COMMENT 1. It follows from the mere possibility to contract that these agreements must be given some significance before the courts. Therefore, on all levels, namely in dividing partnership-related benefits and detriments, in making equitable adjustment, and in the manner in which financial relief is to take place, primary consideration is to be given to the parties’ agreement. 2. Keeping in mind that there may be disparities in bargaining power between the partners, and that such agreements may be superseded by the actual arrangement of the partnership, legal systems nowadays more or less agree that it must be the task of the court to examine, and finally judge, whether the outcomes of such agreements are just and equitable. The standard for assessing just and equitable is to be derived from the foregoing articles. Where the outcome of an agreement would be repugnant to justice, the court must intervene, disregard the agreement, as necessary, and make the appropriate orders. 3. In the case of administrative divorce proceedings, there are no grounds for the competent administrative body to scrutinize the agreement between the 84 Article 1.39 partners under Article 1.13, not in the least due to the fact that the administrative body does not have the necessary information available to it. The minimum that may be expected from the party disadvantaged by such an agreement is that he or she disputes its content, with the consequence that the administrative procedure is not applicable and the case is brought before the court. 85 Domestic Violence PART II: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMMENT 1. The ambit of this Part is not limited to violence between partners, but also includes violence against children and elderly persons. Although it is conceded that its main relevance can be found within partnerships, in addition, violence against children and elderly persons increasingly forms part of the discussion on domestic violence. Therefore, most modern legal systems deal with this issue in a separate piece of legislation that deals with all possible cases of domestic violence. 86 Article 2.1 Article 2.1 (General Principle) 1In case of domestic violence, the aggrieved person can apply to the court for a protection order. 2 Domestic violence includes all acts of physical and psychological violence. 3In principle, such an order may not exceed two years. Artículo 2.1 (Principio general) 1En caso de violencia doméstica, la víctima puede solicitar al tribunal una orden de protección. 2Se considera violencia doméstica todo acto de violencia física o psíquica. 3En principio, las órdenes de protección no excederán de los dos años. Article 2.1 (Principe général) 1En cas de violence domestique, la victime peut introduire une action en justice aux fins d’obtenir une ordonnance de protection. 2La violence domestique inclut tous les actes de violence physique ou psychologique. 3En principe, pareille ordonnance ne peut excéder deux ans. Artikel 2.1 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Im Falle häuslicher Gewalt kann die betroffene Person beim Gericht den Erlass einer Schutzmassnahme beantragen. 2Häusliche Gewalt umfasst alle Fälle physischer und psychischer Gewalt. 3Grundsätzlich soll die Dauer einer solchen Massnahme zwei Jahre nicht übersteigen. COMMENT 1. During recent years, domestic violence has been thrown into the spotlight of public sensitivity. As a consequence, most legal systems have enacted statutes enabling the courts with family law, and not merely criminal, jurisdiction to make hitherto unknown protection orders for the benefit of victims. 2. In accordance with most legal systems, domestic violence is not to be interpreted restrictively. It comprises, above all, acts of willful injury; damage to the other person’s property including pets; intimidation or harassment of the other person by any type of undesired contact; indecent behavior without 87 Domestic Violence the other person’s consent; deprivation of liberty; and any threat to commit any of the foregoing acts. 3. In accordance with most legal systems that allow protection orders for only a limited period of time, and in light of the fact that such an order represents a severe impingement upon the respondent’s liberty, the protection order, in principle, should not exceed two years. However, if special circumstances so warrant, the court may make an order for a longer period at the outset, and in any case, consecutive orders or variations are possible. This is in accordance with the approach in most legal systems of allowing the courts a wide discretion when making such orders. 88 Article 2.2 Article 2.2 (Measures) In particular, the court may order that the respondent (a) leave, remain away and refrain from entering the dwelling of the aggrieved person, (b) refrain from approaching the aggrieved person, (c) refrain from establishing contact with the aggrieved person in any way, and (d) refrain from being in certain locations. Artículo 2.2 (Medidas) En particular, el tribunal puede ordenar que el acusado (a) abandone, permanezca alejado o se abstenga de entrar en el domicilio de la víctima, (b) se abstenga de acercarse a la víctima, (c) se abstenga de comunicarse con la víctima en modo alguno, y (d) se abstenga de permanecer en determinados lugares. Article 2.2 (Mesures) Le tribunal peut notamment ordonner au défendeur de (a) quitter, demeurer à distance ou s’abstenir d’entrer au domicile de la victime, (b) s’abstenir d’approcher la victime, (c) s’abstenir d’établir des contacts d’aucune sorte avec la victime, et (d) s’abstenir de se trouver dans certains lieux. Artikel 2.2 (Massnahmen) Insbesondere kann das Gericht anordnen, dass der Beklagte (a) die Wohnung der betroffenen Person verlässt, ihr fern bleibt und es unterlässt, diese zu betreten, (b) es unterlässt, sich der betroffenen Person zu nähern, (c) es unterlässt, auf irgendeine Art Kontakt mit der betroffenen Person aufzunehmen, und (d) es unterlässt, sich an bestimmten Örtlichkeiten aufzuhalten. COMMENT 1. All legal systems that have enacted domestic violence legislation are in agreement concerning the central measures that may be ordered by the court. 89 Domestic Violence 2. First and foremost, the aggrieved person’s right to live in his or her dwelling without disturbance must be ensured. Therefore, by way of protection order, the respondent may be ordered to leave, remain away and refrain from entering the dwelling of the aggrieved person. However, it must be emphasized that such an order exists independent of the issue as to who is legally entitled to the dwelling. The final decision as to the allocation of the dwelling, which would usually be made subsequent to any protection order, would have to be made under the provisions on financial consequences upon dissolution of partnership. 3. Further measures are designed to ensure that the aggrieved person does not come into any contact whatsoever with the respondent. Thus, the respondent may, above all, be prohibited from approaching the aggrieved person. Furthermore, the prohibition against establishing contact with the aggrieved person comprises all communications, be they by telephone, post or electronically. The prohibition against being in certain locations particularly encompasses streets, areas, or other public places (e.g. restaurants or theaters) that the aggrieved person frequents. 4. The enumeration of possible orders that can be made under this Article is not exhaustive, as is expressed by the introductory words “in particular”. The different measures do not exclude one another, but rather may be cumulated if necessary. 90 Part III PART III: PARENTS AND CHILDREN COMMENT 1. During the last century, fundamental changes have taken place in the area of the law of the child. The 1990s were even called the “decade of the child”. Whereas, initially, the child was merely regarded as an object of parental claims and rights, after the middle of the last century, the role of the “interests of the child” began to take scope. This trend culminated in the enactment of the CRC, which specifically gave children rights as autonomous individuals. 2. Originally, the parent-child relationship was also dominated by notions of status. Legitimate parentage was the primary concept. In the 1970s, the concept of “social parentage” gained significance, whilst the 1990s, with their medical advancements, saw a return to a focus on the genetic parentage. However, now, the distinction between “marital” and “non-marital” children has all but been abandoned. The revival of genetic parentage has not only been justified from the viewpoint of parents, but also in light of the right of each child to information about its heritage. 3. Against this background, there can be no doubt that, in accordance with all legal systems, the main focus in child law must be the best interests of the child. It goes without saying that, nowadays, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children is quite simply defunct. However, balancing the conflicting concepts of social and genetic parentage for the welfare of the child is an important task. In this regard, it is important to “pierce the veil” and carefully scrutinize whether particular provisions really have the child’s best interests, or merely a “disguised” version of the interests of the parents, at heart. 91 Parents and Children TITLE 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 3.1 (Best Interests of the Child) In all matters concerning parents and children, paramount regard is to be had to the best interests of the child. Artículo 3.1 (Interés superior del menor) El interés superior del menor debe presidir toda decisión que afecte a los padres y madres y a sus hijos o hijas. Article 3.1 (Intérêt supérieur de l’enfant) Dans toutes les questions concernant les parents et les enfants, il doit être porté la plus grande attention à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Artikel 3.1 (Wohl des Kindes) In allen Eltern und Kinder betreffenden Angelegenheiten ist vorrangig das Kindeswohl zu berücksichtigen. COMMENT 1. Many legal systems and international instruments now establish a general principle that the child’s best interests are to be considered. The MFC goes one step further, and even extends the approach taken in Article 3 CRC: the child’s best interests are not merely to be one of many considerations, or a primary consideration, but rather the primary consideration. However, this does not exclude also taking the interests of parents into account, as often the best interests of the child can only be achieved through cooperation with the best interests of his or her parents. What is important is that, in cases of conflicting interests, those of the child always take priority. 2. The meaning of “best interests” has been the subject of many attempts at interpretation. In any case, it is not the task of legal theory to define the best interests of the child; this can only be attempted in close cooperation with those in the field of human sciences, especially pediatrics, development psychology and child psychiatry. In order to ensure the necessary flexibility and to ensure that the concept remains adaptable to changing societal perceptions and trends, the MFC has consciously avoided defining it further. 92 Article 3.2 Article 3.2 (Views of the Child) Consideration is always to be given to the views expressed by the child, taking into account his or her age and maturity. Artículo 3.2 (La opinión del menor) La opinión del menor debe ser siempre considerada, en atención a su edad y madurez. Article 3.2 (Avis de l’enfant) Les avis exprimés par l’enfant doivent toujours être pris en considération, en tenant compte de son âge et sa maturité. Artikel 3.2 (Meinung des Kindes) Eine vom Kind geäusserte Meinung ist immer zu beachten, wobei sein Alter und seine Reife zu berücksichtigen sind. COMMENT 1. Long after the “best interests” of the child had been recognized as worthy of consideration, it was nevertheless still clearly adults who determined what these best interests were. It was not until the CRC, and the advancement of the idea that children are autonomous individuals of their own, that the actual views and wishes of the child, as a distinct concept to his or her “best interests”, were widely acknowledged. 2. In line with Article 12 CRC, this Article places an obligation on any judicial or administrative body dealing with matters concerning children to consider the views and wishes expressed by the child. Such views can only be considered if the child is able to express them, and is encouraged to do so freely and without inhibition. Therefore, the child has an express right to be heard, as is stated in Article 3.3. 3. However, in considering the views of the child, age and maturity are to be taken into account. In order to give judicial and administrative bodies some guidelines, Article 3.3 below sets out specific age limits concerning the detailed rights of children to be heard and the weight to be attributed to their statements. 93 Parents and Children Article 3.3 (Child’s Right to be Heard and to Consent) 1Above the age of five, the child must be heard in all matters concerning him or her. 2 Above the age of twelve, no action may be taken or decisions made against the wishes of the child. 3Above the age of fifteen, the child has the right to make independent decisions in all matters of a purely personal nature. Artículo 3.3 (Derechos de audiencia y de consentimiento) 1A partir de la edad de cinco años, el menor debe ser oído en todo asunto que le concierna. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, no se emprenderá acción alguna ni se tomarán decisiones contrarias a los deseos expresados por el menor. 3A partir de la edad de quince años, el menor tiene derecho a decidir de modo independiente en todas las cuestiones de carácter puramente personal. Article 3.3 (Le droit de l’enfant à être entendu et à consentir) 1Au-delà de l’âge de cinq ans, l’enfant doit être entendu dans toutes les questions le concernant. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, aucune action ne peut être menée ni aucune décision prise contre les souhaits de l’enfant. 3Au-delà de quinze ans, l’enfant a le droit de prendre des décisions indépendantes dans toutes les questions à caractère purement personnel. Artikel 3.3 (Recht des Kindes auf Anhörung und Zustimmung) 1Ab fünf Jahren muss das Kind in allen es betreffenden Angelegenheiten angehört werden. 2Ab zwölf Jahren soll keine Massnahme oder Entscheidung gegen den Willen des Kindes getroffen werden. 3Ab fünfzehn Jahren hat das Kind das Recht, selbständig Entscheidungen in allen höchst persönlichen Angelegenheiten zu treffen. COMMENT 1. In order to give due regard to the views of the child, the child must necessarily be given the right to be heard. It is undisputed today that even a child of two to three years old can express his or her views and can thus be heard by a competent person. It is for this reason that children should be heard from the earliest age possible. However, there are, of course, many 94 Article 3.3 cases, in which judicial or administrative bodies come to the correct conclusion that the hearing of the child would be unnecessary or counterproductive under the circumstances. 2. However, the right of a child to always be heard above a particular age must be ensured. In accordance with many modern legal systems, the MFC sets this limit at the age of five. Here, the concern is actually hearing the child at all; what weight is to be attributed to the views is still left to the assessment of the hearing body. 3. In recognition of the increasing promotion of the autonomy and independence of the child, it must be ensured that, from a certain age, no measures that run contrary to the will of the child are undertaken. Therefore, in many provisions, the consent of the child is required above a certain age. In line with modern insights into child development psychology, the MFC has chosen the age of twelve as appropriate. Only in cases of a need for child protection measures, where following the wishes of the child would endanger his or her best interests or even life, may such wishes be disregarded. 4. Finally, in many legal systems, minor children receive a limited legal capacity at a certain age. This encompasses the right to decide without the consent of parents or any other legal representatives. The right to decide is especially recognized for matters of a purely personal nature, particularly for medical treatment and questions of religious and political persuasion. 95 Parents and Children TITLE 2: LEGAL PARENTAGE COMMENT 1. Throughout centuries, parentage has been firmly based upon the presumption of pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant. This meant that the husband of the woman giving birth to the child was automatically presumed to be the father. The question of whether the husband of the birth mother was the genetic father of the child only became relevant on a second level, namely, with respect to the issue of whether parentage could be challenged. In many legal systems, it was the father alone who could, within strict timelimits and subject to strict requirements, challenge his paternity. This legal rule must be viewed in light of the following historical background: on the one hand, there were virtually no scientific possibilities of determining a lack of paternity, let alone means of positively determining paternity itself. On the other hand, a successful challenge of legitimate paternity resulted in grave detriments for the child, as illegitimacy was still heavily stigmatized. Today, these two roots of the pater est presumption no longer exist. Modern DNA testing has made it possible to ascertain fatherhood in almost all cases with nearly 100% certainty. Similarly, legitimacy is no longer a value in itself and the concept has thus been rendered redundant. Therefore, the MFC abandons the concept of the pater est presumption altogether. 2. Up until the recent past, there was no need to even discuss the question of motherhood, as the birth mother was always the genetic mother and no presumption was even appropriate. This, too, has changed with developments in medically-assisted procreation technology, whereby the genetic mother need not necessarily be the gestational, or birth mother. A modern law of parentage must take this possibility of “split motherhood” into account, notwithstanding that, in quite a few legal systems, the methods leading to split motherhood are expressly forbidden. 96 Article 3.4 CHAPTER 1: INITIAL ATTRIBUTION OF PARENTAGE Article 3.4 (Parentage by Birth) Legal parent is the woman who gives birth to the child. Artículo 3.4 (Filiación determinada por nacimiento) La mujer que da a luz a un niño o a una niña tiene legalmente determinada la filiación respecto de él o ella. Article 3.4 (Filiation par la naissance) Le parent légal est la femme qui a donné naissance à l’enfant. Artikel 3.4 (Elternschaft aufgrund Geburt) Rechtlicher Elter ist die Frau, die das Kind gebiert. COMMENT 1. Most legal systems today provide that the birth-giving mother is the legal parent of the child, regardless of whether or not she is also the genetic mother of the child. The MFC follows this approach. However, parentage in this case is not sacrosanct; it may still be challenged under Articles 3.6 to 3.8. 2. The MFC does not recognize the possibility for a woman to give birth anonymously, and thus escape legal parentage, in contrast to the situation in some legal systems. This would contravene the right of the child to know his or her own origins. 97 Parents and Children Article 3.5 (Parentage by Intention) Legal parent is the person who, with the consent of the birth mother, intentionally assumes parentage for the child. Artículo 3.5 (Filiación determinada por asunción voluntaria) La filiación queda determinada legalmente en cabeza de quien, con el consentimiento de la madre por nacimiento, asume voluntariamente la filiación del nacido. Article 3.5 (Filiation intentionnelle) Le parent légal est la personne qui, avec le consentement de la mère qui a donné naissance à l’enfant, assume intentionnellement la filiation de l’enfant. Artikel 3.5 (Intentionale Elternschaft) Rechtlicher Elter ist die Person, die mit Zustimmung der Geburtsmutter intentional Elternschaft für das Kind übernimmt. COMMENT 1. Parentage by intention is not a novel concept at all. We are already confronted with it nowadays in cases where the husband of the mother does not challenge his fatherhood, although he knows he is not the genetic father. The same holds true for a man who marries a pregnant woman although aware of the fact that he is not the genetic father of the child. A further example is fatherhood by acknowledgement, a possibility recognized in most legal systems, despite a lack of genetic fatherhood. In addition, modern regulations on medically-assisted procreation prohibit the consenting partner of a woman who is inseminated with donor semen from subsequently denying his fatherhood. The most modern legal developments also place lesbian partners on an equal footing. 2. It seems only consistent to go one step further and to place the common intention of the birth mother and another person to jointly assume the parentage of a child at the centre of parentage. The concept of intentional parentage preserves the best interests of the child, as it is the persons who actually want the child who are granted the legal parentage of him or her. The requirements are twofold: firstly, the desire of the person who actually wants parentage must be expressed. This intent can be expressed before the birth of the child, for example, by giving consent to medically-assisted procreation of the birth mother. In the majority of cases, the intention will 98 Article 3.5 be expressed by the person’s own application to be registered in the birth register as parent of the child. However, the intention of this person alone cannot suffice; legal parentage must not simply exist on paper, it is only in the best interests of the child if it is also lived-out in reality as social parentage. This, in turn, is generally only possible in cooperation with the birth mother. Thus, in any case, the consent of the birth mother is indispensable. In most cases, she also is the one who knows best who the genetic father of the child is. 3. If the birth mother does not consent to an intentional assumption of parentage by a second person, parentage can only be established by adjudication based on genetic descent according to Article 3.10. 99 Parents and Children CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGING PARENTAGE COMMENT 1. Although the MFC aims to promote intentional parentage as the primary consideration in determinations of parentage, genetic ties cannot be totally disregarded. Consequently, the possibility to challenge the initial attribution of parentage must be made available. However, the interests of adults must be meticulously balanced against and, if need be, made subordinate to the best interests of the child. 2. In many legal systems, the acknowledgement of non-marital children by the father may be broadly challenged by anybody who could have an interest, in particular, also by the state. Most recently, the possibility to challenge acknowledgement by the state has been introduced in some legal systems to protect against false acknowledgement of parentage for the sole purpose of conveying citizenship on a non-genetic child, devoid of any intention to assume social parentage. Although this is undoubtedly a significant problem, the MFC refrains from granting the state the right to challenge parentage. This problem must be dealt with under the general doctrine of fraus legis. 100 Article 3.6 Article 3.6 (Challenge for Mistake) 1The person who has mistakenly presumed that he or she is the genetic parent of the child may challenge his or her parentage. 2 The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the error. Artículo 3.6 (Impugnación por error) 1Quien haya creído equivocadamente en su paternidad o maternidad genética, puede impugnar la filiación. 2La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año desde que se tenga conocimiento del error. Article 3.6 (Contestation en cas d’erreur) 1La personne qui a présumé par erreur être le parent génétique de l’enfant peut contester sa filiation. 2La contestation doit être soulevée dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de l’erreur. Artikel 3.6 (Anfechtung wegen Irrtums) 1Die Person, die irrtümlich davon ausgegangen ist, genetischer Elter des Kindes zu sein, kann ihre Elternschaft anfechten. 2Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung des Irrtums erfolgen. COMMENT 1. In accordance with what is nowadays the rule, the MFC allows the person who has mistakenly presumed himself to be the genetic parent of the child, and alone for this reason has assumed intentional parentage, to deny his parentage. This primarily concerns the male partner of the birth mother. However, it might also be conceivable in cases of medically-assisted procreation if the wrong embryo is implanted in the birth mother. In such a case, the birth mother must be allowed to challenge her parentage in the same way. The situation could also arise in lesbian partnerships, where one partner donates an egg to be implanted in the other and this egg is the subject of a mix-up. 2. A challenge of parentage under this Article is only available in cases of mistake. Thus, the partner of the birth mother who consents to medically- 101 Parents and Children assisted procreation or insemination by a third party cannot later challenge his or her parentage, despite a lack of genetic ties to the child. 3. However, challenges can only be made subject to the best interests of the child. The possibility to challenge parentage must be exercised within a certain time limit after the intentional parent becomes aware of the error. In accordance with many legal systems, the MFC has taken one year as an appropriate period. If the challenge is not made within this period, the parent is deemed to have expressed a renewed intention of parentage. 4. The MFC refrains from establishing an absolute time bar. Firstly, the lack of genetic ties can nowadays still be proven decades later, and even after the death of a person concerned. Secondly, if the presumed parent were to be denied the right to challenge his or her parentage, he or she still could not be compelled to maintain the social parent-child relationship. Mere ‘legal’ parentage that is no longer lived out, however, does not necessarily correspond to the best interests of the child. 102 Article 3.7 Article 3.7 (Challenge by the Child) 1The child may challenge the legal parentage established under Articles 3.4 or 3.5. 2 Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. 3The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the possible lack of genetic parentage. 4However, if the parentage has not been challenged during the minority of the child, the child may lodge a challenge within three years of the child reaching the age of majority, or within one year of becoming aware of the possible lack of genetic parentage, whichever is later. Artículo 3.7 (Impugnación por el hijo o la hija) 1El hijo o la hija pueden impugnar la filiación establecida de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 3.4 ó 3.5. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, es necesario el consentimiento personal del menor. 3La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año desde que se tenga conocimiento de la posible inexistencia de filiación genética. 4Si la filiación no ha sido impugnada durante la minoría de edad, el hijo o la hija pueden impugnar en el plazo de tres años contados desde la mayoría de edad, o bien en el plazo de un año desde que tuvieron conocimiento de la possible inexistencia de filiación genética. Prevalece el plazo que llegue más tarde. Article 3.7 (Contestation par l’enfant) 1L’enfant peut contester la filiation légale établie par les articles 3.4 ou 3.5. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. 3La contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de la possible absence de lien de filiation génétique. 4Si la filiation n’a pas été contestée durant la minorité de l’enfant, l’enfant peut soulever une contestation dans les trois ans à partir de sa majorité, ou dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de la possible absence de lien génétique de filiation, selon la date qui est la plus tardive. 103 Parents and Children Artikel 3.7 (Anfechtung durch das Kind) 1Das Kind kann die nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5 begründete rechtliche Elternschaft anfechten. 2Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. 3Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise fehlenden genetischen Elternschaft erfolgen. 4Wurde die Elternschaft während der Minderjährigkeit des Kindes nicht angefochten, kann das Kind innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise fehlenden genetischen Elternschaft anfechten, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. COMMENT 1. It is commonly acknowledged today that the child has a right to know his or her own origins. Consequently, the MFC recognizes the child’s right to challenge any parentage that is not in line with genetic descent. Here, in accordance with Article 3.1, any interests of the parents must take a back seat to those of the child. However, the interests of the parties involved, particularly the maintenance of a social parent-child relationship, advocate prompt action after gaining awareness of the facts that raise doubts about the genetic parentage. 2. During his or her minority, the child’s right to challenge must be exercised by his or her legal representative. In accordance with Article 3.3(2), the child’s consent is required above the age of twelve. It has to be noted, however, that holders of parental responsibility will usually be excluded from legally representing the child because of a potential conflict of interest according to Article 3.34(2). In any case, as challenging parentage is certainly a significant matter, the authorization of the competent authority according to Article 3.34(3) would be required. 3. If the legal representative does not challenge parentage during the minority of the child, the child’s right to personally challenge legal parentage after reaching the age of majority must be ensured. However, the child should be given a reasonable time to consider the grave step of challenging parentage. Three years after coming-of-age seems appropriate. Again, if the child becomes aware of the possible lack of genetic parentage after this time, the one-year period applies. In this case as well, if the child does not lodge a challenge within the set timeframes, he or she will be deemed to have intentionally accepted the existing legal parentage. 104 Article 3.8 Article 3.8 (Challenge by Genetic Parent) 1The person who alleges that he or she is the genetic parent of the child may, during the child’s minority, challenge the parentage of legal parents established under Articles 3.4 or 3.5 and have his or her own parentage established by adjudication under Article 3.10. 2 The challenge must be lodged within six months of the birth of the child. 3A later challenge is only admissible where there is no active family relationship between the child and the legal parent challenged. In this case, the challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of both the possible genetic parentage and the lack of an active family relationship. Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. 4No challenge may be lodged by an intentional donor of genetic material. Artículo 3.8 (Impugnación por el padre o la madre genéticos) 1Quien alegue la paternidad o maternidad genética del hijo o hija puede, durante su minoría de edad, impugnar la filiación legalmente determinada de conformidad con los artículos 3.4 ó 3.5 y obtener el establecimiento de su paternidad o maternidad en aplicación del artículo 3.10. 2La impugnación debe interponerse dentro de los seis meses posteriores al nacimiento del menor. 3Con posterioridad, sólo se admitirán estas pretensiones si no existe relación familiar activa entre el menor y quien tenga legalmente determinada la paternidad o maternidad a su favor. En este caso, la impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año, contado desde que se tiene conocimiento tanto de la posible filiación genética como de la inexistencia de relación familiar activa. A partir de la edad de doce años, se requiere el consentimiento personal del menor. 4No podrá impugnar la filiación quien haya donado voluntariamente material genético. Article 3.8 (Contestation par le parent génétique) 1La personne qui allègue qu’elle est le parent génétique de l’enfant peut, pendant la minorité de l’enfant, contester la filiation des parents légaux 105 Parents and Children établie par les articles 3.4 ou 3.5 et faire établir sa propre filiation par déclaration judiciaire en vertu de l’article 3.10. 2La contestation doit être soulevée dans les six mois qui suivent la naissance de l’enfant. 3Une contestation plus tardive est admissible uniquement s’il n’y a pas de relations familiales actives entre l’enfant et le parent légal dont la filiation est contestée. Dans ce cas, la contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an à partir de la découverte à la fois de la possible filiation génétique et de l’absence de relations familiales actives. Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. 4Aucune contestation ne peut être soulevée par un donneur volontaire de matériel génétique. Artikel 3.8 (Anfechtung durch den genetischen Elter) 1Die Person, die behauptet, der genetische Elter des Kindes zu sein, kann während der Minderjährigkeit des Kindes die nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5 begründete Elternschaft rechtlicher Eltern anfechten und ihre eigene Elternschaft nach Artikel 3.10 gerichtlich feststellen lassen. 2Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach der Geburt des Kindes erfolgen. 3Eine spätere Anfechtung ist nur zulässig, wenn zwischen dem Kind und dem rechtlichen Elter, dessen Elternschaft angefochten wird, keine gelebte Familienbeziehung besteht. In diesem Fall muss die Anfechtung innerhalb eines Jahres sowohl ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise bestehenden genetischen Elternschaft als auch der fehlenden gelebten Familienbeziehung erfolgen. Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. 4Eine Person, die wissentlich genetisches Material gespendet hat, kann nicht anfechten. COMMENT 1. Although intentional parentage is the focus of the MFC, rights of genetic parents cannot be ignored altogether. The usual scenario is that of a genetic father claiming parentage; however, a challenge by a genetic parent is also conceivable in cases of surrogacy with egg donation. 2. The approach of most modern legal systems is to give genetic fathers the right to challenge fatherhood otherwise presumed. However, in such cases, the interests of the child need to be carefully balanced against those of the genetic father. Challenges of this type place great stress on the partners with 106 Article 3.8 legal parentage, and thereby also on the child, and thus, can only be allowed under very strict requirements. The first requirement is that a challenge is not possible where the result would simply be to deprive the child of an existing legal parent; rather, the challenge must be combined with adjudication and the establishment of new legal parentage based upon genetic descent. This should only be possible during the child’s minority; after reaching the age of majority, it should be left to the child to decide whether or not he or she wishes to lodge a challenge, thus enabling the possibility of another legal parentage arising. 3. Furthermore, to protect the growing family, a challenge may only be made within the first six months of the child’s life. The idea behind this time limit is that the social connection between the legal parents and the child is not, at this early stage, advanced to such an extent that the effects of a challenge would be catastrophic for the child. This time limit runs regardless of whether or not the genetic father is even aware of the birth at all. 4. However, in cases in which there is no, or no longer any active family relationship between the legal parents and the child, the best interests of the child do not contravene a challenge by the genetic parent; for example, where a child has been released for adoption. On the contrary, the interests of the child might even favor a challenge in this case, as it could provide the child with the opportunity to establish family ties to the genetic parent. Again, however, the one-year time-limit is to be observed in order to guarantee certainty of status. After the expiry of this period, the genetic parent is deemed to have waived his right to legal parentage. In accordance with Article 3.3(2), the personal consent of a child above the age of twelve is required in order to protect his or her interests. 5. Congruent with the general concept that intention is of paramount importance when determining parentage, the intentional donor of genetic material must be bound to his or her intention not to become a parent and is thus estopped from asserting any parentage. 107 Parents and Children Article 3.9 (Challenge by Birth Mother or Other Legal Parent) 1Despite having given her consent, the birth mother may, until the child reaches the age of fifteen, challenge the parentage of the legal parent established under Article 3.5 if there is no active family relationship between the child and the legal parent challenged. 2 Under the same circumstances, the legal parent established under Article 3.5 or 3.10 may challenge the parentage of the birth mother. 3The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the lack of an active family relationship. 4Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. Artículo 3.9 (Impugnación por la madre determinada por nacimiento o por quien tenga legalmente determinada la filiación) 1A pesar de haber consentido a la asunción voluntaria de la filiación, la madre por nacimiento puede impugnar la filiación legalmente establecida de conformidad con el artículo 3.5, siempre que el hijo o la hija no haya alcanzado todavía la edad de quince años y que no exista relación familiar activa entre el menor y quien ostente la filiación que se impugna. 2Con sujeción a los mismos requisitos, quien tenga legalmente determinada la filiación de conformidad con los artículos 3.5 ó 3.10 podra impugnar la maternidad por nacimiento. 3La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año contado desde que se tenga conocimiento de la inexistencia de relación familiar activa. 4A partir de la edad de doce años, se requiere el consentimiento personal del menor. Article 3.9 (Contestation par la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant ou par un autre parent légal) 1Même si elle a donné son consentement, la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant peut, jusqu’à ce que l’enfant atteigne l’âge de quinze ans, contester la filiation du parent légal établie en vertu de l’article 3.5 s’il n’y a pas de relations familiales actives entre l’enfant et le parent légal dont la filiation est contestée. 2Dans les mêmes circonstances, le parent légal désigné par l’article 3.5 ou 3.10 peut contester la filiation de la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant. 108 Article 3.9 3 La contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de l’absence de relations familiales actives. 4Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. Artikel 3.9 (Anfechtung durch die Geburtsmutter oder den anderen rechtlichen Elter) 1Die Geburtsmutter kann trotz Zustimmung die nach Artikel 3.5 begründete Elternschaft des rechtlichen Elter bis zum fünfzehnten Lebensjahr des Kindes anfechten, wenn zwischen dem Kind und dem rechtlichen Elter, dessen Elternschaft angefochten wird, keine gelebte Familienbeziehung besteht. 2Unter denselben Voraussetzungen kann der rechtliche Elter nach Artikel 3.5 oder 3.10 die Elternschaft der Geburtsmutter anfechten. 3Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der fehlenden gelebten Familienbeziehung erfolgen. 4Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. COMMENT 1. Nowadays, in almost all legal systems, the mother has the right to challenge fatherhood. However, in these systems, presumptions as to fatherhood exist. The birth mother is neither involved in the application of these presumptions, nor does she have to give her consent to fatherhood that does not correspond to genetic descent. The system of the MFC is different. Intentional parentage presupposes the consent of the birth mother. If she consents to the parentage of a person who is not the genetic parent of the child, she must be held to her word and, in general, cannot challenge this parentage. This protects the growing familial tie between the intentional parent and the child. 2. However, allowance must be made for a change of circumstances. If, contrary to expectations and intentions, there is no, or no longer, any active family relationship between the intentional parent and the child, it is also in the child’s best interest to challenge such legal parentage that is not reflected in social parentage. It is not enough to give the child the right to challenge in these cases; the mother must also be given an independent right to challenge the parentage of the other person, as her own legal situation in relation to the child is influenced by this. 3. Again, this should only be possible until the child reaches the age of fifteen; thereafter, it should be left to the child to decide whether or not he 109 Parents and Children or she wishes to lodge a challenge, as this is a matter of purely personal nature. 4. As in all other cases, a one-year time-limit and the necessity of the consent of a child above the age of twelve must be observed. 110 Article 3.10 CHAPTER 3: ADJUDICATION OF PARENTAGE Article 3.10 (Parentage by Adjudication) 1Legal parent is the person determined by judicial adjudication to be the genetic parent of the child. 2A request for adjudication may be brought by (a) the child, or (b) the person alleging to be the genetic parent of the child. 3If parentage under Article 3.4 or 3.5 exists, adjudication may only be initiated together with a challenge under Article 3.7 or 3.8. Artículo 3.10 (Filiación por determinación judicial) 1La filiación queda legalmente determinada respecto de quien resulte judicialmente declarado padre o madre genético. 2Pueden solicitar la atribución judicial (a) el hijo o la hija, o (b) quien alegue ser genéticamente el padre o la madre del menor. 3Si hay de la filiación de conformidad con el artículo 3.4 o 3.5, la determinación judicial sólo se podrá solicitar conjuntamente con la impugnación prevista en aplicación del artículo 3.7 o 3.8. Article 3.10 (Filiation par déclaration judiciaire) 1Le parent légal est la personne déterminée par une déclaration judiciaire comme étant le parent génétique de l’enfant. 2Une demande en déclaration peut être formée par (a) l’enfant, ou (b) la personne alléguant être le parent génétique de l’enfant. 3Si une filiation existe conformément à l’article 3.4 ou 3.5 existe, la déclaration ne peut être introduite qu’avec une contestation conforme a l’article 3.7 ou 3.8. Artikel 3.10 (Elternschaft aufgrund gerichtlicher Feststellung) 1Rechtlicher Elter ist die Person, deren genetische Elternschaft gerichtlich festgestellt wurde. 2Antragsberechtigt sind (a) das Kind, oder (b) die Person, die behauptet, genetischer Elter des Kindes zu sein. 111 Parents and Children 3 Besteht eine Elternschaft nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5, kann eine gerichtliche Feststellung nur in Zusammenhang mit einer Anfechtung nach Artikel 3.7 oder 3.8 beantragt werden. COMMENT 1. Although intentional parentage is the core principle of the MFC, there will still be cases where only motherhood under Article 3.4, but no second intentional parentage under Article 3.5 is established. In these cases, reliance on genetic ties is appropriate and the possibility to establish fatherhood by adjudication must be ensured. Two cases have to be distinguished. The first one is where the genetic father does not want to assume parentage. Here, it would be the mother and the child who would generally request adjudication in order to determine fatherhood. Alternatively, where the mother does not consent to the father’s intentional assumption of parentage, it may then be the father and the child who request that the fatherhood be determined by adjudication. 2. As the focus is on intentional parentage, adjudication can only be considered where any intentional parentage is not present. Adjudication could otherwise interfere with the active family relationships based upon intentional parentage and, thus, contravene the best interests of the child. Therefore, in the latter case, parentage by adjudication can only come into play under the restrictive conditions for challenging parentage under Chapter 2. 3. Requests for adjudication may be made, firstly, by the child. During minority, this will be done by his or her legal representative (but see Article 3.34(2), (3)) whereby, above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is necessary. As the establishment of parentage is a purely personal matter for the child, under Article 3.3(3), the child must make an independent decision above the age of fifteen. There are no further restrictions placed upon the possibility of the child to request adjudication; thus, proceedings may even be brought after decades. 4. If the genetic father does not agree to intentional parentage, the mother also has a limited right to request adjudication. Firstly, her right only exists until the child is fifteen years old and is dependent on the consent of the child after it reaches the age of twelve. Secondly, it is also subject to a timelimit of five years. This period starts to run from the birth of the child or, if 112 Article 3.10 the father’s identity is unknown at this time, from when his identity is discovered. 5. If the mother does not agree to the genetic father’s intentional assumption of parentage, his only way to establish parentage is by adjudication. He, too, has an unlimited right to request adjudication. 6. In very rare cases, this Article may also apply in cases of a challenge of the parentage of the birth mother. 113 Parents and Children CHAPTER 4: ADOPTION Section 1: Prerequisites for Adoption Article 3.11 (General Principle) A minor child may be adopted by two persons jointly or by one person alone. Artículo 3.11 (Principio general) Un menor puede ser adoptado por dos personas conjuntamente o por una sola. Article 3.11 (Principe général) Un enfant mineur peut être adopté par deux personnes conjointement ou par une personne seule. Artikel 3.11 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Ein minderjähriges Kind kann von zwei Personen gemeinsam oder von einer Person allein adoptiert werden. COMMENT 1. Nowadays, adoption has become primarily a measure of protection for children whose legal parents, owing to various circumstances, are not able or willing to care for them, although the institution of adoption might have once been used to provide childless couples with progeny. In accordance with the now prevailing aim of child protection, adoption is intended to establish something akin to a natural parent-child relationship in virtually all legal systems. 2. Most legal systems nowadays only provide for adoption of minors. A widely-recognized exception is where the child has, during his or her minority, lived with the adoptive parents in a factual parent-child relationship. In such a case, many legal systems allow adoption even after the child has reached the age of majority. However, the MFC has made a conscious choice against this possibility, as it intends to limit adoption to a protective measure in the best interests of the child. 3. Adoption, in the first place, is possible by two persons jointly. According to this Article, not only a married couple is allowed to adopt; any two persons, 114 Article 3.11 whether married or not, cohabiting or not and of the same or of different sex may adopt a child. Although this possibility is currently only recognized in a select few legal systems, it is solely this approach that corresponds to the concept followed by the MFC, namely, that of non-discrimination according to status or sexual preferences and placing intentional parentage at the forefront. 4. Consistent with most legal systems, the MFC recognizes the possibility that a single person may adopt a child, although in most cases, a joint adoption by two persons will be given preference at the selection stage. Single-person adoption will most often occur within the broader family framework, such as after the death of the legal parents. Single-person adoption should not be confused with step-parent adoption, which the MFC does not allow (see comment to Article 3.16). 5. It goes without saying that, in line with the MFC’s general approach, adoption presupposes that it is in the best interests of the child. The best interests must be ascertained in every individual case; therefore, the MFC refrains from establishing further requirements, such as, for example, a foregoing period of care. In all other cases of intentional parentage, no previous period of care is required; if, as in these cases, it subsequently becomes apparent that the adoption is not in the best interests of the child, child protection measures can be applied in any case. 6. In line with most legal systems, the MFC does not prohibit a second adoption of an already-adopted child. As the failure of the factual relationship to the adopters cannot be denied or glossed over, it is consistent with the best interests of the child and his or her protection not to categorically exclude the possibility of a second adoption. 115 Parents and Children Article 3.12 (Age and Age Difference) 1At the time of adoption, the adopter must have reached the age of twenty-five. 2 The age difference between the adopter and the child must be at least eighteen, and not more than forty years. Artículo 3.12 (Edad y diferencia de edad) 1El adoptante debe haber alcanzado la edad de veinticinco años al tiempo de la adopción. 2La diferencia de edad entre el adoptante y el menor no puede ser inferior a los dieciocho años ni exceder de los cuarenta. Article 3.12 (Âge et différence d’âge) 1Au moment de l’adoption, l’adoptant doit avoir atteint l’âge de vingt-cinq ans. 2La différence d’âge entre l’adoptant et l’enfant doit être au moins égale à dixhuit ans, et ne peut excéder quarante ans. Artikel 3.12 (Alter und Altersunterschied) 1Zum Zeitpunkt der Adoption muss die adoptierende Person das fünfundzwanzigste Lebensjahr vollendet haben. 2Der Altersunterschied zwischen der adoptierenden Person und dem Kind muss mindestens achtzehn Jahre und darf höchstens vierzig Jahre betragen. COMMENT 1. Most legal systems provide for certain age requirements of the adopter. These are designed to secure, to the greatest extent possible, a certain level of maturity and willingness to assume responsibility. Certainly here, a difference can be discerned regarding parentage under Articles 3.4 and 3.5 – there is nothing to prevent an eighteen-year-old from giving birth to a child and another eighteen-year-old from assuming intentional parentage with her consent –; however, the “artificial” founding of a parent-child relationship, as is the case with adoption, should be based on ideal prerequisites, which cannot necessarily be ensured in genetic parentage. 2. As already mentioned, the aim of adoption is to establish a relationship akin to the natural parent-child relationship. In light thereof, the MFC has set the scope of the age difference between the adopter and the child at 116 Article 3.12 between eighteen and forty years. Again, genetic parentage may, in some cases, divert from these limits; however, the MFC’s emphasis on the best interests of the child saw it fit to establish an ideal situation for cases of adoption. 117 Parents and Children Article 3.13 (Consent of Legal Parents and Holders of Parental Responsibility) 1Legal parents and current holders of parental responsibility must consent to the adoption. 2The consent may be dispensed with if it cannot be obtained or is refused if such refusal endangers the best interests of the child. Artículo 3.13 (Consentimiento de quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación y de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental) 1Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y los titulares actuales de la responsabilidad parental deben consentir la adopción. 2Cabe prescindir del consentimiento si no es posible obtenerlo o si se deniega, siempre que este rechazo ponga en peligro el interés superior del menor. Article 3.13 (Consentement des parents légaux et titulaires de la responsabilité parentale) 1Les parents légaux et les titulaires actuels de la responsabilité parentale doivent consentir à l’adoption. 2On peut être dispensé de ce consentement s’il ne peut être obtenu ou s’il est refusé dans la mesure où ce refus met en danger l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Artikel 3.13 (Zustimmung der rechtlichen Eltern und der Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Rechtliche Eltern und derzeitige Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung müssen der Adoption zustimmen. 2Von der Zustimmung kann abgesehen werden, wenn sie nicht eingeholt werden kann oder wenn sie verweigert wird und diese Verweigerung das Kindeswohl gefährdet. COMMENT 1. Congruent with all legal systems, the consent of the existing legal parents to release the child for adoption is necessary. It goes without saying that this consent is required independent of the status of the legal parents and how they obtained legal parentage, whether under Articles 3.4 and 3.5, or by adjudication under Article 3.10. The MFC consciously avoids providing toodetailed provisions as to how and when such consent is required, and 118 Article 3.13 whether it needs to be renewed; the competent authority must examine each individual case to ascertain that free and fully informed consent has been given. 2. As the MFC recognizes the possibility of conferring parental responsibility upon third persons according to Article 3.28, their consent to adoption of the child also remains indispensable, as there naturally exists a close parent-child relationship between holders of parental responsibility and the child. 3. However, as adoption is aimed at realizing the best interests of the child, there must be a mechanism for dispensing with consent under certain circumstances. Firstly, there may be cases in which it is not possible to obtain the consent of the legal parents at all, such as, for example, if the whereabouts of a parent is unknown or he or she is not in a position to give consent, such as due to ongoing severe mental illness. Secondly, circumstances may arise in which the legal parent refuses consent, where such refusal endangers the best interests of the child. This may be the case where the state of the existing parent-child relationship is such that an active family relationship has never existed at all, or no longer exists, and there is no chance of it being revived in the future. Other cases could include the parent’s complacency towards to the child, or where the parent-child relationship has been severely disturbed, such as where the parent has abused his or her parental responsibility or has grossly neglected the care and upbringing of the child. 13 Parents and Children Article 3.14 (Consent of the Child) Above the age of twelve, the child must personally consent to his or her adoption. Artículo 3.14 (Consentimiento del menor) A partir de la edad de doce años, el menor debe consentir personalmente la adopción. Article 3.14 (Consentement de l’enfant) Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, l’enfant doit personnellement consentir à son adoption. Artikel 3.14 (Zustimmung des Kindes) Ab zwölf Jahren muss das Kind der Adoption persönlich zustimmen. COMMENT 1. Consistent with the general principle in Article 3.3(2), the personal consent of a child that has reached the age of twelve is necessary for the adoption. This is in addition to the parental consent required under Article 3.13. It goes without saying that, below the age of twelve, the wishes of the child must be given due regard in ascertaining his or her best interests. 120 Article Article 3.15 (Adoption Order) Upon the application of the adopter, the competent authority pronounces the adoption if this is in the best interests of the child. Artículo 3.15 (Constitución de la adopción) A solicitud del adoptante, la autoridad competente decretará la adopción, siempre que ello responda al interés superior del menor. Article 3.15 (Ordonnance d’adoption) Sur demande de l’adoptant, l’autorité compétente prononce l’adoption, si elle est convaincue que c’est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Artikel 3.15 (Adoptionsbeschluss) Auf Antrag der adoptierenden Person spricht die zuständige Behörde die Adoption aus, wenn diese dem Kindeswohl entspricht. COMMENT 1. Nowadays, in almost all legal systems, adoption must be legally pronounced by the competent authority. Gone are the days in which adoption was based upon a private agreement between the adopter and adoptee. As the assumption of parentage through adoption is of an extremely personal nature and brings with it onerous responsibilities, it is obvious that the adopter must actively make an adoption application; adoption cannot simply be “conferred”. 2. For clarification, this Article, again, stresses that adoption may only be pronounced if it is in the best interests of the child. This presupposes an overall review of the child’s situation, especially of the current family ties and of the options that would be available to the child were the adoption not to take place. 121 Parents and Children Section 2: Consequences of Adoption Article 3.16 (Parentage by Adoption) 1The adopter becomes the legal parent of the child. 2 Legal familial ties to any previous legal parent and his or her respective relatives cease to exist. Artículo 3.16 (Filiación adoptiva) 1La filiación legal del menor queda determinada respecto del adoptante. 2La adopción rompe todo vínculo familiar entre el menor y aquéllos a cuyo favor estuviese legalmente determinada la filiación con anterioridad, así como respecto de sus parientes. Article 3.16 (Filiation par adoption) 1L’adoptant devient le parent légal de l’enfant. 2Les liens familiaux légaux cessent d’exister avec tout parent légal antérieur et avec sa propre famille. Artikel 3.16 (Elternschaft aufgrund Adoption) 1Die adoptierende Person wird rechtlicher Elter des Kindes. 2Die rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen zu bisherigen rechtlichen Eltern und ihren jeweiligen Verwandten erlöschen. COMMENT 1. In accordance with most legal systems, the MFC opts for a so-called “full” adoption. This involves that the adopter becomes the full legal parent with all obligations and rights towards the child. Furthermore, it encompasses that all legal familial ties to the former legal parents and their respective relatives are severed upon the adoption being pronounced. Simple adoption, as is still possible in some countries, is not provided for. 2. In recent times, even in systems that favor full adoption, there have been discussions concerning the view that the best interests of the child may advocate the possibility of the child’s ongoing contact to his or her former legal parents or other relatives, especially grandparents. However, this question does not challenge the concept of full adoption itself; rather, it has to be dealt with under issues of contact (see Title 5 below). 122 Article 3.16 3. Many legal systems allow, as an exception to full adoption, the step-parent adoption by married and registered partners, or even any partner of a parent. Thereby, only the legal familial ties to the absent parent are severed and the ties to the step-parent’s partner remain. However, in recent times, stepparent adoption has been heavily criticized. Patchwork families are common in modern societies and the main goal of step-parent adoption, namely to closely imitate a “normal” family based on marriage, is no longer valid. Furthermore, patchwork families are even more likely to break down than “original” families. Justified concerns about the legal position of a step-parent and the recognition of him or her as a factual parent to the child have to be dealt with as they arise, especially in the areas of parental responsibility, child support and contact. Whereas nowadays, step-parent adoption is used in cases where the same-sex partner wishes to become a parent to the natural child of his or her partner, the MFC addresses this case through use of the concept of intentional parentage laid down in Article 3.5; thus, a separate concept of step-parent adoption is not necessary for this special case, either. Therefore, the MFC refrains from providing for special rules on step-parent adoption. 16 Parents and Children Article 3.17 (Child’s Right to Know Origins) Upon reaching the age of fifteen, an adopted child has the right to access all information concerning his or her origins. Artículo 3.17 (El derecho del adoptado a conocer sus orígenes) Cuando haya alcanzado la edad de quince años, el adoptado tiene derecho a acceder a toda la información concerniente a sus orígenes. Article 3.17 (Droit de l’enfant à connaître ses origines) En atteignant l’âge de quinze ans, un enfant adopté a le droit d’accéder à toutes les informations concernant ses origines. Artikel 3.17 (Recht des Kindes auf Kenntnis seiner Abstammung) Mit Erreichen des fünfzehnten Lebensjahrs hat das Kind ein Recht auf Zugang zu sämtlichen Informationen, die seine Abstammung betreffen. COMMENT 1. There are differences between the legal systems with respect to the question of access by parents consenting to the adoption, and the adopters themselves, to information concerning the identities of the respective other parties to the adoption. There can be no clear-cut rule for all cases. Whether an adoption should be treated as open or confidential will always depend on the best interests of the child in the individual case and should be decided accordingly. 2. However, it is undisputed nowadays that the child has a right to know its own origins, a right which has already received statutory recognition in Article 8(1) CRC. First, it is up to the adopter to inform the child from an early age about his or her origins and the fact that he or she has been adopted. In line with Article 3.3(3), when the child reaches the age of fifteen, he or she must be given direct access to this information. 17 Article 3.18 Section 3: Revocation of Adoption Article 3.18 (Child’s Right to Revocation) 1The adoption may be revoked by the competent authority upon the application of the child. 2The application must be lodged within three years of the child reaching the age of majority, or within one year of becoming aware of the adoption, whichever is later. Artículo 3.18 (El derecho del adoptado a revocar) 1La autoridad competente podrá revocar la adopción a instancia del hijo o hija. 2La solicitud de revocación deberá producirse dentro de los tres años siguientes a la mayoría de edad del adoptado, o bien dentro del año siguiente al conocimiento de la adopción. Entre estos dos plazos, prevalece el que llegue más tarde. Article 3.18 (Droit de l’enfant à la révocation) 1L’adoption peut être révoquée par l’autorité compétente sur demande de l’enfant. 2La demande doit être soulevée dans le délai de trois ans suivant la majorité de l’enfant, ou dans l’année qui suit la découverte par l’enfant de son adoption, selon la date qui est la plus tardive. Artikel 3.18 (Recht des Kindes auf Aufhebung) 1Die Adoption kann auf Antrag des Kindes von der zuständigen Behörde aufgehoben werden. 2Der Antrag muss innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der Tatsache der Adoption gestellt werden, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. COMMENT 1. As adoption is primarily viewed as a measure of child protection, it is unanimously held that it should not be possible to revoke it easily. Some legal systems provide for revocation in cases of irregularity in the adoption process, especially in cases of vitiated consent. However, most legal systems allow revocation either upon the joint application of the adopter and the adoptee, or upon the sole application of the adoptee. The MFC chose the latter 18 Parents and Children possibility, as it is consistent with the concept of intentional parentage that only the child be able to challenge parentage and not the intentional parent. As with the adoption order, the competent authority alone can declare the revocation of an adoption. 2. Similarly, in accordance with the challenge of intentional parentage by the child (Article 3.7(4)), the application for revocation must be made within certain time limits in order to ensure legal certainty and finality. The MFC has chosen such generous time limits as to allow the child enough time to consider his or her course of action before taking this significant step. 3. If the best interests of the child are endangered during his or her minority, there is still no room for revocation of the adoption; instead, the appropriate child protection measures are to be taken. 19 Parents and Children Article 3.19 (Consequences of Revocation) 1Upon revocation of the adoption, legal familial ties between the adopter and the child and their respective relatives cease to exist. 2Legal familial ties that ceased to exist as a result of the adoption revive as a result of the revocation. Artículo 3.19 (Consecuencias de la revocación) 1Revocada la adopción, cesa todo vínculo jurídico-familiar entre adoptante y adoptado, así como respecto de sus respectivos parientes. 2Como resultado de la revocación, reviven los vínculos jurídico-familiares que se hubieran extinguido por causa de la adopción. Article 3.19 (Conséquences de la révocation) 1Lors de la révocation de l’adoption, les liens familiaux légaux entre l’adoptant et l’enfant et leur famille respective cessent d’exister. 2Les liens familiaux légaux qui ont cessé d’exister suite à l’adoption, renaissent suite à sa révocation. Artikel 3.19 (Rechtsfolgen der Aufhebung) 1Mit der Aufhebung der Adoption erlöschen die rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen zwischen der adoptierenden Person und dem Kind und ihren jeweiligen Verwandten. 2Die aufgrund der Adoption erloschenen rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen leben mit der Aufhebung wieder auf. COMMENT 1. As revocation has the effect of “undoing” the adoption, the legal familial ties between the adoptee and the adopter cease to exist. In the same way, the legal familial ties between the adoptee and his or her original family are restored to as they were before the adoption took place. 20 Article 3.19 TITLE 3: NAME OF THE CHILD Article 3.20 (Initial Attribution) 1 Legal parents with parental responsibility choose the surname of the child at birth. 2They may choose the surname borne by one legal parent or any combination of the surnames of the two parents, not exceeding two single names. Artículo 3.20 (Atribución inicial) 1Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y sean titulares de la responsabilidad parental eligen el apellido del hijo o hija al tiempo del nacimiento. 2Pueden elegir el apellido que lleve uno de ellos o cualquier combinación de sus apellidos, siempre que el escogido no exceda de dos apellidos simples. Article 3.20 (Attribution initiale) 1Les parents légaux ayant la responsabilité parentale choisissent le nom de famille de l’enfant à sa naissance. 2Ils peuvent choisir le nom de famille porté par un parent légal ou toute combinaison des noms de famille de ses deux parents, dans la limite de deux noms simples. Artikel 3.20 (Erstzuordnung) 1Die rechtlichen Eltern mit elterlicher Verantwortung wählen den Nachnamen des Kindes bei der Geburt. 2Sie können den von einem Elter geführten Nachnamen wählen oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen beider Eltern, die jedoch zwei Einzelnamen nicht übersteigen darf. COMMENT 1. The MFC seeks to establish uniform rules for the name of the child which do not depend on questions of the status of parents. It is up to the legal parents with parental responsibility to choose the surname for their children. 2. In accordance with the approach taken to marriage law above, according to which the spouses are not obliged to choose a common family name, the MFC did not include this rule for the names of children either. Even if 21 Parents and Children spouses carry a common family name, they are free to choose another surname for their child. The same holds true for different siblings; the parents are free to choose different surnames for different children. This has the positive side-effect that, from the surname alone, one can no longer discern whether the family is established by marriage, or by any kind of patchwork family arrangement. This actively contributes to a reduction in discrimination against “abnormal” conceptions of family. 3. As in marriage law, the parents have the utmost freedom in “constructing” a name for their child, either using one surname, or any combination of the surnames of both parents. This latter possibility specifically enables the name of the child to reflect his or her connection with both, and not merely one of the parents. 4. If parents with joint parental responsibility cannot agree upon a surname for the child, the competent authority can transfer the decision-making power to one parent for this purpose according to Article 3.37(2). 22 Parents and Children Article 3.21 (Change of Name) Legal parents with parental responsibility may change the surname of the child until the child reaches the age of five if (a) the surname of the legal parent whose name the child bears changes, (b) the person whose name the child bears is no longer a legal parent, or (c) another person’s legal parentage has been established. Artículo 3.21 (Cambio de apellido) Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y sean titulares de la responsabilidad parental pueden cambiar el apellido del hijo o hija, en tanto no haya alcanzado la edad de cinco años, si (a) el apellido paterno o materno que lleva el menor cambia, (b) la persona cuyo apellido lleva el menor ha dejado de tener legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor, o (c) se ha determinado la filiación legal respecto de otra persona. Article 3.21 (Changement de nom) Les parents légaux ayant la responsabilité parentale peuvent changer le nom de famille de l’enfant jusqu’à ce que l’enfant atteigne l’âge de cinq ans si (a) le nom de famille du parent légal, porté par l’enfant, change, (b) la personne dont l’enfant porte le nom n’est plus le parent légal, ou (c) la filiation légale d’une autre personne a été établie. Artikel 3.21 (Änderung des Namens) Die rechtlichen Eltern mit elterlicher Verantwortung können den Nachnamen des Kindes bis zum Erreichen des fünften Lebensjahrs ändern, wenn (a) sich der Nachname des rechtlichen Elter, dessen Name das Kind trägt, ändert, (b) die Person, deren Name das Kind trägt, nicht mehr rechtlicher Elter ist oder (c) die rechtliche Elternschaft einer anderen Person begründet wurde. COMMENT 1. In legal systems that propagate the uniformity of the family name, it follows as a logical consequence that every change in the status of the parents 130 Article 3.21 prompts a corresponding change of the child’s name, or at least, the desire to do so. As a result thereof, children in these systems are often subjected to multiple name-changes during minority. This discontinuity of name, however, contravenes the best interests of the child. 2. Therefore, the MFC only allows a change of name under narrow conditions. Firstly, it is only possible until the child reaches the age of five. From this age, it is usual for official records, such as school reports, to be kept about the child, thus making continuity of name significant and desirable. Below the age of five, a change of name presupposes either a change of surname of the legal parent whose name the child bears, or a change in legal parentage, be it that the legal bond to the parent whose name the child bears is no longer present, or a new legal parentage arises, for example, after adoption. 131 Parents and Children Article 3.22 (Addition of Other Name) 1If the child has lived, over an extended period of time, with persons bearing a different surname, he or she has the right to add this surname to his or her own surname. 2Above the age of twelve, the child must personally consent to the addition of the other name. Artículo 3.22 (Adición de otro apellido) 1Si el menor ha vivido, durante un dilatado período, con personas que lleven un apellido distinto, el menor tiene derecho a añadir este apellido al suyo propio. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, el menor debe consentir personalmente a la adición. Article 3.22 (Ajout d’un autre nom) 1Si l’enfant a vécu, pendant une durée prolongée, avec des personnes portant un nom de famille différent, il a le droit d’ajouter ce nom de famille à son propre nom de famille. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, l’enfant doit consentir personnellement à l’ajout de l’autre nom de famille. Artikel 3.22 (Hinzufügung eines Namens) 1Lebt das Kind über längere Zeit mit Personen, die einen anderen Nachnamen führen, hat es das Recht, diesen Nachnamen seinem eigenen Nachnamen hinzuzufügen. 2Ab zwölf Jahren muss das Kind der Hinzufügung des Namens persönlich zustimmen. COMMENT 1. Even though the necessity of continuity of name is important, equally important may be the need of a child to have his or her name reflect an active familial relationship to persons bearing a different surname, such as the surname of a legal parent whose name he or she does not share, or that of an adoptive parent, but also that of a step-parent or foster parent. The added name can be placed either before or after the child’s own surname. 2. The addition of another surname is only possible if the child has lived with the bearer of this surname over an extended period of time. This prerequisite 132 Article 3.22 ensures that names cannot be changed too easily, without first providing for some degree of continuity. However, the definition of what an extended period of time should be is left to the individual circumstances of each case, having particular regard to the age of the child and the nature of the parentchild relationship. 3. Consistent with the general principle in Article 3.3(2), the personal consent of a child that has reached the age of twelve is necessary. 133 Parents and Children Article 3.23 (Child’s Right to Change Name) 1Upon reaching the age of majority, the child has the right to change his or her surname. 2 The child may choose any surname borne by a legal parent at the time he or she reaches majority or any combination of the surnames in accordance with Article 3.20(2). 3 The application must be lodged within three years of the child reaching the age of majority or within one year of becoming aware of reasons which would justify a change of name under Article 3.21(b) and (c), whichever is later. Artículo 3.23 (Derecho del hijo o hija a cambiar de apellido) 1Al alcanzar la mayoría de edad, el hijo o la hija tienen derecho a cambiar su apellido. 2El hijo o la hija pueden elegir el apellido de cualquiera de los que hubieran tenido legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor al alcanzar la mayoría de edad o cualquier combinación de sus apellidos, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 3.20(2). 3La solicitud debe realizarse dentro de los tres años siguientes a aquel en que el hijo o la hija haya alcanzado la mayoría de edad o en el año siguiente a tener conocimiento de las razones que justificarían un cambio de apellido según el artículo 3.21 (b) y (c). Prevalece el plazo que llegue más tarde. Article 3.23 (Droit de l’enfant de changer de nom) 1Lorsqu’il atteint l’âge de la majorité, l’enfant a le droit de changer son nom de famille. 2L’enfant peut choisir n’importe quel nom de famille porté par un parent légal au moment où il atteint la majorité ou toute combinaison de noms de famille prévue par l’article 3.20(2). 3La demande doit être formée dans le délai de trois ans après la majorité de l’enfant ou dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte des raisons qui justifieraient un changement de nom d’après l’article 3.21(b) et (c), selon la date qui est le plus tardive. Artikel 3.23 (Recht des Kindes zur Änderung des Namens) 1Mit Erreichen der Volljährigkeit hat das Kind das Recht, seinen Nachnamen zu ändern. 134 Article 3.23 2 Das Kind kann jeden Nachnamen wählen, den ein rechtlicher Elter im Zeitpunkt seines Erreichens der Volljährigkeit trägt, oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen entsprechend Artikel 3.20(2). 3Der Antrag muss innerhalb von drei Jahren ab Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Kenntnis der Tatsachen, die eine Namensänderung nach Artikel 3.21(b) und (c) rechtfertigen würden, gestellt werden, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. COMMENT 1. On the one hand, the right of a child to change his or her own name upon majority reflects a liberal approach; on the other hand, it is necessary in light of the principle of continuity of name during the minority of the child. Thereby, the child may modify the surname chosen by the parents and may choose the surname of either parent or, for example, otherwise “construct” a double name from both surnames. Thereby, the child is given the possibility to drop the surname of a legal parent to whom, for example, no active familial relationship exists, or to whom the legal familial ties have ceased. This also enables the child, for example, to assume the name of his or her adoptive parents if he or she was adopted after the age of five, with the consequence that no change of name was possible in accordance with Article 3.21. 2. In order to secure continuity of name, the application to change surname must be made within certain time limits. The MFC, again, has chosen such generous time limits as to allow the child enough time to consider his or her course of action before taking this significant step. After the age of twentyone, a change of name is only admissible if legal parentage has changed. 135 Parents and Children TITLE 4: PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMENT 1. In former times, the parent-child relationship was defined by rights of the parents over the children. More to the point, it was specifically the father who had all the power and authority over the members of the family. Even when this power and authority was extended to the mother, the focus of the familial relationship remained centered around the parents. With the increasing sensitivity towards the concept of the “best interests of the child”, changes in the law of parental responsibility have now taken place. The terminological shift from “parental authority” or “custody” to “parental responsibility” clearly shows the shift in focus from the parents to the child. 2. Fundamental changes have also taken place in the areas of attribution of parental responsibility and its exercise. Whereas in former times, parental authority could only be exercised by married parents – a non-married woman who gave birth to a child was even often limited in her exercise of parental authority – the concept of joint parental custody was first promulgated in the context of post-divorce custody over children. In most legal systems, that divorced parents have joint parental responsibility is nowadays the rule. Subsequent thereto, non-married parents were granted joint parental authority. In this day and age, with the increase of patchwork families and the growing recognition of the role of factual parents, modern trends have advanced to the extent that the attribution of parental responsibility can also encompass third parties, should the best interests of the child so dictate. Nowadays, in some legal systems, it is even conceivable that more than two people can be holders of parental responsibility. 3. The MFC mirrors these modern developments and further advances the concepts contained therein. It uses a consistent and strict approach which ensures that the best interests of the child always remain paramount. 136 Article 3.24 CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 3.24 (Subject) A minor child is subject to parental responsibility. Artículo 3.24 (Ámbito) Los hijos e hijas menores están sujetos a responsabilidad parental. Article 3.24 (Objet) Un enfant mineur est soumis à la responsabilité parentale. Artikel 3.24 (Gegenstand) Ein minderjähriges Kind steht unter elterlicher Verantwortung. COMMENT 1. This Article states the general principle that parental responsibility only applies to minor children. It goes without saying that parental responsibility ends upon the death of the child and upon him or her reaching the age of majority. 2. The scope of parental responsibility is set out in more detail in Chapter 3 below. 24 Parents and Children Article 3.25 (Autonomy of the Child) Parental responsibility is aimed at promoting the increasing autonomy of the child. Artículo 3.25 (Autonomía del menor) La responsabilidad parental se dirige a promover la creciente autonomía del menor. Article 3.25 (Autonomie de l’enfant) La responsabilité parentale vise à favoriser une autonomie croissante de l’enfant. Artikel 3.25 (Selbständigkeit des Kindes) Die elterliche Verantwortung hat zum Ziel, die zunehmende Selbständigkeit des Kindes zu fördern. COMMENT 1. It must be the aim of any upbringing of a child to ensure that the child is equipped with the necessary personal skills to enable him or her to lead an autonomous and responsible life as an adult. Holders of parental responsibility must create favorable conditions for the child’s full and harmonious development, so that the child will be able to live independently in society and develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relationships. This is achieved by gradually teaching and leading the child to accept and assume responsibility for him- or herself, as well as for others. 2. As already expressed in Article 3.3, this general principle and aim also, and primarily, applies to parental responsibility. Thereby, the holders of parental responsibility should, at the earliest point in time possible, take the views of the child into account and encourage him or her to express opinions. Above a certain age, they should not act against the wishes of the child in matters concerning him or her, and, at an even later point in time, the child should be in a position to make decisions independently, and be allowed to do so. 25 Article 3.26 Article 3.26 (Cooperation) 1Holders of parental responsibility cooperate to enhance the best interests of the child. 2 In case of conflict, the competent authority shall use its best endeavors to persuade the parties to reach agreement. 3The competent authority shall advise the parties as to possible alternative dispute resolution options in this regard. Artículo 3.26 (Cooperación) 1Los titulares de la responsabilidad parental deben cooperar para la consecución del interés superior del menor. 2En caso de conflicto, la autoridad competente empleará todos los medios a su disposición para procurar que las partes alcancen un acuerdo. 3La autoridad competente asesorará a las partes respecto de la existencia de medios alternativos de resolución de conflictos en este ámbito. Article 3.26 (Coopération) 1Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale coopèrent pour garantir le respect de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. 2En cas de conflit, l’autorité compétente doit s’efforcer de persuader les parties d’aboutir à un accord. 3L’autorité compétente doit aviser les parties des modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits prévus à cet effet. Artikel 3.26 (Zusammenarbeit) 1Die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung arbeiten zusammen, um das Kindeswohl zu fördern. 2Im Falle eines Konfliktes soll die zuständige Behörde die Parteien zu überzeugen suchen, eine Einigung herbei zu führen. 3Die zuständige Behörde soll die Parteien insoweit auf mögliche Verfahren alternativer Streitbeilegung hinweisen. COMMENT 1. Psychological studies concerning, in particular, post-divorce children have shown that the children are best off if the level of dispute between the parents remains at an achievable minimum. Consequently, the MFC commands holders of parental responsibility to cooperate in order to enhance the best interests of the child. 26 Article 2. However, the MFC does not seek to deny the reality that disputes between holders of parental responsibility can and do often arise. In these cases – as in the case of divorce – the competent authority must endeavor to enable the parties to reach an agreement, and is to make the parties aware of ADR options in this regard. The MFC, however, does not go so far as to make ADR compulsory, as experience has shown that mandatory ADR proceedings do not have any positive effects or likely prospects of success. 140 Article 3.27 CHAPTER 2: ATTRIBUTION Article 3.27 (Parental Responsibility of Legal Parents) Any legal parent of a child is vested with parental responsibility. Artículo 3.27 (Responsabilidad parental de quienes tienen legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor) Todo el que tenga legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor tiene atribuida la responsabilidad parental sobre el menor. Article 3.27 (Responsabilité parentale des parents légaux) Tout parent légal d’un enfant est investi de la responsabilité parentale. Artikel 3.27 (Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung) Jedem rechtlichen Elter eines Kindes steht die elterliche Verantwortung zu. COMMENT 1. The MFC links parental responsibility to legal parentage; thus, any legal parent shall have parental responsibility, regardless of whether the parents are married to one another, live in a registered partnership, merely cohabit, or do not cohabit at all. As adoptive parents become legal parents under Article 3.16, it goes without saying that they automatically become holders of parental responsibility. 2. It is not only parentage by intention that gives rise to parental responsibility, but also parentage by adjudication. The only prerequisite is that legal parentage is established. It might well be argued that, if parentage is not intentionally assumed, but has to be adjudicated, that the parent denying parentage should not be vested with parental responsibility. However, there are cases where parentage can only be established by adjudication, for example, if the birth mother does not consent to the genetic parent assuming intentional parentage. Thus, a categorization could violate the best interests of the child. Therefore, the MFC does not take this approach, but instead, where it is not in the best interests of the child that this person has parental responsibility, parental responsibility can be transferred to the other parent under Article 3.29. 3. In accordance with most legal systems, the dissolution, divorce, separation or other breakdown of the relationship between legal parents, as such, does 141 Parents and Children not have any effect whatsoever on the attribution of parental responsibility. However, in cases where the holders of parental responsibility can no longer cooperate, this may give rise to a transfer of parental responsibility under Article 3.29. 4. Parental responsibility ends upon the death of a legal parent. This does not affect the legal status of other holders of parental responsibility. However, under this change of circumstances, a legal parent who does not currently hold parental responsibility may apply for a re-transfer of parental responsibility to him or her under Article 3.30. 5. Furthermore, parental responsibility automatically ends in case of adoption, where the legal familial ties to the previous legal parent are severed according to Article 3.16(2). 142 Article 3.28 Article 3.28 (Parental Responsibility of Third Parties) The competent authority can vest parental responsibility in a third party, in addition to or instead of legal parents, (a) if the child has lived with that third party for more than three years and the third party requests parental responsibility, or (b) as a measure of child protection. Artículo 3.28 (Responsabilidad parental de terceros) La autoridad competente puede atribuir responsabilidad parental a terceros, en adición o en lugar de la que corresponde a los que tengan legalmente determinada la filiación, (a) si el menor ha vivido con ese tercero durante más de tres años y esta misma persona solicita que se le atribuya responsabilidad parental, o (b) como medida de protección del menor. Article 3.28 (Responsabilité parentale d’un tiers) L’autorité compétente peut conférer la responsabilité parentale à un tiers, en plus ou à la place des parents légaux (a) si l’enfant a vécu avec ce tiers pendant plus de trois ans et si ce tiers demande la responsabilité parentale, ou (b) comme mesure de protection de l’enfant. Artikel 3.28 (Elterliche Verantwortung dritter Personen) Die zuständige Behörde kann die elterliche Verantwortung einer dritten Person, die an die Stelle der oder neben die rechtlichen Eltern tritt, einräumen, (a) wenn das Kind mit dieser dritten Person mehr als drei Jahre gelebt hat und die dritte Person die elterliche Verantwortung beantragt, oder (b) als Kindesschutzmassnahme. COMMENT 1. Since the 1970s, developments in the science of development psychology have made clear that the factual parent-child relationship is paramount, regardless of genetic ties. Therefore, in the interests of the child, the concern must be to protect the factual parent-child relationship, for example, in patchwork families or foster families. Firstly, the position of a factual parent must be, in terms of capability, akin to the legal parent-child relationship, 143 Parents and Children and secondly, in the event of any conflict between the legal and factual parents, it must be possible for the child to remain with the factual parent if the best interests of the child so command. 2. In recognition of this principle, the MFC enables parental responsibility to be attributed to a third party. In line with modern developments, a conscious decision was made to allow third parties parental responsibility, rather than mere guardianship, in order to emphasize the equality of a factual parentchild relationship with that of a legal one. 3. Third parties may acquire parental responsibility in two cases. Firstly, if the child has lived with a third party for more than three years, a presumption then arises that a factual parent-child relationship has been established. Of course, an attribution of parental responsibility in such a case only comes into consideration if the factual parent actively expresses his or her willingness to accept this responsibility. The second case arises as a measure of child protection. Here, the three-year cohabitation requirement does not apply, but the remaining conditions are more onerous: an attribution of parental responsibility to a third party can only be considered if, otherwise, the best interests of the child would be endangered. 4. The attribution of parental responsibility to a third party is not dependent upon the consent of the legal parent. Nonetheless, attribution upon request will often be accompanied by the consent of the legal parent. However, it is also possible to attribute parental responsibility even where conflict has arisen between the legal and factual parent, for example, upon dissolution of a patchwork family by separation or death of the legal parent, or if the legal parent wants to retrieve the child from a foster family. 5. Parental responsibility can be attributed to a third party in addition to, or instead of, to the legal parents. Wherever possible, such attribution of parental responsibility should be in addition to that of the legal parents; however, especially in the case of child protection measures, it may be necessary to transfer parental responsibility to the third party, and simultaneously divest the legal parent of all or part of his or her parental responsibility. 144 Article 3.29 Article 3.29 (Transfer of Parental Responsibility) 1If holders of parental responsibility do not live together and cannot cooperate, the competent authority transfers parental responsibility as the best interests of the child require. 2The request to the competent authority may be made by any holder of parental responsibility or by the child above the age of twelve. Artículo 3.29 (Transmisión de la responsabilidad parental) 1Si los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no viven juntos y no pueden cooperar, la autoridad competente transmite la responsabilidad parental como mejor proceda atendiendo al interés superior del menor. 2La solicitud a la autoridad competente puede ser formulada por cualquiera de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental o por el menor a partir la edad de doce años. Article 3.29 (Transfert de la responsabilité parentale) 1Si les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ne vivent pas ensemble et ne peuvent pas coopérer, l’autorité compétente transfère la responsabilité parentale en fonction de ce que l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant commande. 2La demande présentée à l’autorité compétente peut être formée par tout titulaire de la responsabilité parentale ou par l’enfant âgé de plus de douze ans. Artikel 3.29 (Übertragung elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Wenn die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung nicht zusammen leben und nicht kooperieren können, überträgt die zuständige Behörde die elterliche Verantwortung entsprechend den Erfordernissen des Kindeswohls. 2Der Antrag an die zuständige Behörde kann von jedem Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung und vom Kind ab dem zwölften Lebensjahr gestellt werden. COMMENT 1. Although it is not necessary for joint holders of parental responsibility to live together, it is necessary that they cooperate with one another. In cases of conflict, holders of parental responsibility should, as a first step, be reminded of their duty to cooperate according to Article 3.26. However, where there is no prospect of reaching agreement and cooperation is out of the question, the best interests of the child require that it be removed from the “line of fire”, 145 Parents and Children which necessitates clear instructions as to who is to exercise parental responsibility. Consequently, the MFC provides for the possibility of transferring parental responsibility based on concerns for the child’s welfare. Such cases could include, for example, very messy divorces, or where the mother vehemently refuses to grant the genetic father, who was a mere fleeting acquaintance, any contact to the child. 2. This Article usually applies where there are two legal parents who jointly hold parental responsibility, but can no longer cooperate with one another; however, it also applies in cases in which third parties, in addition to legal parents, are holders of parental responsibility. For example, if a child lives in a foster family where the foster parents have parental responsibility in addition to the legal parents and a conflict arises, the circumstances could dictate that it is desirable to allow the child to remain with the foster family and to grant the foster parents exclusive parental responsibility. 3. The competent authority may transfer parental responsibility either wholly, or only in part, as the best interests of the child require. Thus, it is conceivable that, for example, parental responsibility may be transferred for a limited purpose, such as to administer the child’s property, or to determine the residence of the child. 146 Article 3.30 Article 3.30 (Re-Transfer of Parental Responsibility) 1Under changed circumstances, the competent authority retransfers parental responsibility to a former holder of parental responsibility if the best interests of the child so require. 2The request to the competent authority may be made by the former holder of parental responsibility. Artículo 3.30 (Restablecimiento de la responsabilidad parental) 1Si cambian las circunstancias, la autoridad competente puede volver a atribuir la responsabilidad parental a un titular anterior cuando así lo requiera el interés superior del menor. 2La solicitud a la autoridad competente puede ser formulada por el titular anterior de la responsabilidad parental. Article 3.30 (Rétablissement de la responsabilité parentale) 1Si les circonstances changent, l’autorité compétente transfère à nouveau la responsabilité parentale à l’un de ses précédents titulaires si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant le commande. 2La demande présentée à l’autorité compétente peut être formée par le précédent titulaire de la responsabilité parentale. Artikel 3.30 (Rückübertragung elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Haben sich die Umstände verändert, überträgt die zuständige Behörde die elterliche Verantwortung auf einen früheren Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung zurück, wenn das Kindeswohl dies erfordert. 2Der Antrag an die zuständige Behörde kann vom früheren Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung gestellt werden. COMMENT 1. The best interests of the child are not static, but are continually changing and adjustment must be made for changed circumstances. Consequently, the MFC does not provide for a fixed, irreversible attribution of parental responsibility, but instead makes allowance for individual measures, such as a re-transfer to a former holder of parental responsibility. 2. Cases which might lead to a re-transfer of parental responsibility could be where, after the transfer to one legal parent due to lack of cooperation between the parents, cooperation subsequently again becomes possible. Other 147 Parents and Children cases could include the death of the legal parent holding parental responsibility, where the best interests of the child would command a retransfer of parental responsibility to the other legal parent. If, for example, the mother, who refused cooperation with the father of the child, dies where no third party concurrently holds parental responsibility, it could be in the best interests of the child to place it under the parental responsibility of the father as legal parent. In a given case, this Article can also apply to re-transfer parental responsibility to a former third-party holder. 3. Of course, a re-transfer of parental responsibility only comes into consideration if the former holder actively expresses his or her willingness to re-accept parental responsibility. 148 Article 3.31 CHAPTER 3: CONTENT Article 3.31 (Care for the Child) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to care for and raise a minor child. 2Care and upbringing include the care and responsibility for the mental and corporal well-being of the child and fostering the development of his or her personality. Artículo 3.31 (Cuidado del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el derecho y el deber de cuidado y formación del menor. 2El cuidado y la formación comportan el deber de atender al bienestar físico y psíquico del menor y de responder del mismo, así como de promover el desarrollo de su personalidad. Article 3.31 (Soin de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de prendre soin et d’élever un enfant mineur. 2Le soin et l’éducation incluent la responsabilité et le souci du bien-être mental et physique de l’enfant et le soutien au développement de sa personnalité. Artikel 3.31 (Sorge für das Kind) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, für ein minderjähriges Kind zu sorgen und es aufzuziehen. 2Sorge und Erziehung beinhalten die Fürsorge und Verantwortung für das geistig-seelische und körperliche Wohlergehen des Kindes und die Unterstützung der Entwicklung seiner Persönlichkeit. COMMENT 1. In line with the modern understanding, the MFC emphasizes the dual character of parental responsibility as simultaneously both a duty and a right. 2. In accordance with all legal systems, the essential element of parental responsibility is the care of the child. This comprises the duty and the right to provide basic daily care for a child, including maintaining a loving, protective, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship, providing 149 Parents and Children nourishment, shelter, hygiene, and tending to his or her other basic daily needs, medical care, education that corresponds to his or her wishes and talents, etc. According to Article 3.25, all endeavors in the care and upbringing of the child must always be undertaken in pursuance of fostering the development of his or her personality and promoting the increasing autonomy of the child. In this regard, the age limits set out in Article 3.3 have to be observed. Thus, a child who has reached the age of fifteen, makes independent decisions on questions of religion or certain medical treatments, such as, for example, contraception or abortion. 3. Parental responsibility also comprises the determination of the name of the child according to Article 3.20, as well as the determination of his or her residence and all questions of contact, subject to Article 3.38. 150 Article 3.32 Article 3.32 (Integrity of the Child) No child may be subjected to corporal punishment, emotional abuse or other degrading treatment. Artículo 3.32 (Integridad del menor) No se sujetará a ningún menor a castigos corporales, abuso emocional o cualquier otro trato degradante. Article 3.32 (Intégrité de l’enfant) Aucun enfant ne peut être soumis à des punitions corporelles, des violences psychologiques ou d’autres traitements dégradants. Artikel 3.32 (Unversehrtheit des Kindes) Kein Kind darf körperlichen Strafen, emotionalem Missbrauch oder einer anderen herabwürdigenden Behandlung unterworfen werden. COMMENT 1. In line with most legal systems nowadays, corporal punishment of children is prohibited by the MFC. Emotional abuse is placed on an equal footing and can, for example, take the form of despise or disdain towards to the child and other degrading treatment, including, for example, measures that seek to damage the esteem of the child in the eyes of others, and also his or her selfesteem and feelings of self-worth. 151 Parents and Children Article 3.33 (Administration of the Child’s Property) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to administer the child’s property. 2 A child who has reached the age of fifteen has the right to administer his or her own earnings. 3For significant financial transactions, the authorization of the competent authority is required. Artículo 3.33 (Administración de los bienes del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el deber y el derecho a administrar los bienes del menor. 2Cuando el menor haya alcanzado la edad de quince años, podrá administrar por sí mismo sus propios ingresos. 3Para transacciones económicas de importancia, se requerirá autorización de la autoridad competente. Article 3.33 (Gestion du patrimoine de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de gérer le patrimoine de l’enfant. 2Un enfant qui a atteint l’âge de quinze ans a le droit de gérer ses propres revenus. 3Pour les transactions financières importantes, l’autorisation de l’autorité compétente est requise. Artikel 3.33 (Verwaltung des Kindesvermögens) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, das Vermögen des Kindes zu verwalten. 2Ein Kind, das das fünfzehnte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, hat das Recht, seine eigenen Einkünfte zu verwalten. 3Für bedeutende finanzielle Geschäfte ist die Genehmigung der zuständigen Behörde erforderlich. COMMENT 1. In most legal systems, the holders of parental responsibility have the duty and the right to administer the child’s property, although this question is sometimes dealt with in other areas of law, such as under notions of guardianship or the law of trusts. It goes without saying that this duty and right must be acted upon in the best interests of the child. This includes an 152 Article 3.33 obligation on the holders of parental responsibility to act with due care and diligence in administering the child’s property and not to diminish, but wherever possible, increase its value, and to protect the child from indebtedness once it comes of age. 2. Consistent with the age-limits set out in Article 3.3(3) and with many legal systems, a child who has reached the age of fifteen has the right to administer his or her own earnings, as the salary is earned through the child’s own efforts and, in accordance with Article 3.25, his or her increasing independence has to be secured. 3. All legal systems that recognize the duty and right of holders of parental responsibility to administer the child’s property do not allow for unlimited powers in this regard, but provide for more or less far-reaching restrictions. Some legal systems exclude from the ambit of parental responsibility those transactions that are deemed to be “too risky”, such as, for instance, all transactions concerning real property. Others, again, set limits based on the financial amount of the transaction in question, excluding, for example, all transactions above EUR 10,000.00. In line with the general approach, the MFC requires “significant transactions” to be authorized by the competent authority. Here, setting a value limit would appear to be the appropriate way to restrict the powers of holders of parental responsibility and to protect the child’s property. Setting a specific limit, however, should not be spelled out in a family code itself, but should be left to regulation. In addition to the “best interests” requirement and the value limit, no further restrictions would appear to be necessary. 4. The necessity of authorization by the competent authority applies not only to the administration of the child’s property by the holders of parental responsibility, but also to the child’s own right to administer his or her earnings. In a given case, such as a child movie star or sports champion, a child may have earnings of such an amount that additional protection by the competent authority is warranted. 153 Parents and Children Article 3.34 (Legal Representation of the Child) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to legally represent the child. 2 Holders of parental responsibility are excluded from legally representing the child where there is a potential conflict of interest. 3 For legal representation in significant matters, the authorization of the competent authority is required. Artículo 3.34 (Representación legal del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el deber y el derecho a representar legalmente al menor. 2Los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no ostentarán la representación legal del menor en caso de potencial conflicto de intereses. 3La representación legal en asuntos de especial trascendencia requerirá autorización de la autoridad competente. Article 3.34 (Représentation légale de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de représenter légalement l’enfant. 2Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale sont exclus de la représentation légale de l’enfant s’il y a un risque de conflit d’intérêts. 3Pour la représentation légale dans les affaires importantes, l’autorisation de l’autorité compétente est requise. Artikel 3.34 (Rechtliche Vertretung des Kindes) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, das Kind rechtlich zu vertreten. 2Die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung sind von der rechtlichen Vertretung des Kindes ausgeschlossen, wenn ein möglicher Interessenkonflikt besteht. 3Für die rechtliche Vertretung in bedeutenden Angelegenheiten ist die Genehmigung der zuständigen Behörde erforderlich. COMMENT 1. Although the concept of legal representation of the child as an element of parental responsibility is only expressly recognized in civil law systems, in common law systems, the right and duty of a holder of parental responsibility to act as a legal representative of the child is also acknowledged under 154 Article 3.34 notions of “guardian ad litem”, “next friend” or “litigation friend”. The MFC opts for the broader notion of parental responsibility, which also encompasses the right and duty of legal representation. 2. There are two distinct areas where legal representation of children comes into play. The first one concerns legal representation for transactions concluded in the name of the child, whereas the second concerns legal representation in court or administrative proceedings. Whilst the latter is recognized by civil and common law systems, the former is unknown to common law. Although, in practice, the cases are rare in which the holders of parental responsibility need to act in the name of the child outside the scope of legal proceedings, they cannot be entirely disregarded. Therefore, the MFC follows the civil law concept, which enables holders of parental responsibility to act on behalf of the child in all matters, subject, however, to the restrictions in paras. 2 and 3. 3. Where there is a conflict between the interests of the child and the holders of parental responsibility, legal representation of the child must be excluded. Such a conflict may primarily arise in personal matters, such as in actions to determine parentage or disputes over contact, but is also conceivable in respect of questions concerning the administration of property. If holders of parental responsibility are, as a result, excluded from legally representing the child, the competent authority has to appoint a tutor to act on behalf of the child in the matter in question. This is not to be confused with the general right of the child to have an independent legal representative in matters concerning him or her, as is recognized in most legal systems today. 4. As already stated within the scope of the administration of property, the ability of holders of parental responsibility to legally represent the child must be subject to certain restrictions. Thus, the MFC requires the authorization of the competent authority for the holders of parental responsibility to be able to legally represent the child in significant matters, such as conducting a business in the child’s name, or entering into a long-term contract. For the sake of legal certainty and predictability, the threshold for “significant” should, again, be set by regulation. The competent authority then examines whether the holders of parental responsibility are capable of representing the child; should it come to a negative result, the competent authority is empowered to appoint a tutor as a child protection measure. 34 Parents and Children CHAPTER 4: EXERCISE Article 3.35 (Joint Exercise) Several holders of parental responsibility exercise parental responsibility jointly. Artículo 3.35 (Ejercicio conjunto) Existiendo pluralidad de titulares de la responsabilidad parental, ejercerán sus funciones conjuntamente. Article 3.35 (Exercice conjoint) Les différents titulaires de la responsabilité parentale l’exercent en commun. Artikel 3.35 (Gemeinsame Ausübung) Mehrere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung üben die elterliche Verantwortung gemeinsam aus. COMMENT 1. This Article corresponds to the approach in all legal systems that, if there are several holders of parental responsibility, they all act on an equal footing without one prevailing over the others. 2. The important point here is that, as far as possible, joint holders of parental responsibility primarily act in concert, communicate with and inform one another, and respect and take each other’s views into account. 35 Article 3.36 Article 3.36 (Decision-Making in Daily Matters) The holder of parental responsibility with whom the child is currently living has the right to act alone with respect to the daily matters of the child. Artículo 3.36 (Toma de decisiones en asuntos cotidianos) El titular de la responsabilidad parental que conviva con el menor tiene derecho a actuar por sí solo respecto de los asuntos cotidianos del menor. Article 3.36 (Prise de décision dans les affaires quotidiennes) Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale avec lesquels l’enfant vit actuellement, ont le droit de régler seuls les affaires quotidiennes de l’enfant. Artikel 3.36 (Entscheidungen in täglichen Angelegenheiten) Der Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung, bei dem sich das Kind gegenwärtig aufhält, hat das Recht, im Hinblick auf die täglichen Angelegenheiten des Kindes allein zu handeln. COMMENT 1. Even if all persons involved co-habit, it goes without saying that not every holder of parental responsibility must become active on every single decision concerning the child, but that certain holders may be responsible for different aspects of the child’s life. 2. This is all the more true for holders of parental responsibility who do not co-habit; it would, quite simply, be impossible for them to confer on every single mundane matter in the child’s daily life. Consequently, the MFC provides that the holder of parental responsibility with whom the child is currently living is empowered to act alone regarding the daily matters of the child. “Currently living” in this context refers to both permanent and temporary residence with a holder of parental responsibility. 3. Such daily matters that one holder of parental responsibility may independently decide upon include, but are not limited to, issues of when the child has to go to bed, clothing to be bought, possibility to socialize with friends and family, watch TV, what the child eats, normal medical treatment, such as in case of measles, etc. In contrast to daily matters, important decisions remain to be made jointly according to Article 3.37. 36 Parents and Children Article 3.37 (Important Decisions) 1Several holders of parental responsibility must make important decisions jointly. 2 Where the holders of parental responsibility cannot agree on an important matter, the competent authority, upon the application of a holder of parental responsibility or the child who has reached the age of twelve, transfers the decision-making power for this matter, or makes a decision itself, as the best interests of the child require. 3In urgent cases, a holder of parental responsibility may act alone and must inform the other holders as soon as possible thereafter. Artículo 3.37 (Decisiones de importancia) 1Existiendo pluralidad de titulares de la responsabilidad parental, las decisiones de importancia se tomarán conjuntamente. 2En caso de que los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no lleguen a acuerdo respecto de una decisión de importancia, la autoridad competente, a instancia de uno de ellos o del menor, siempre que haya alcanzado la edad de doce años, puede determinar a quién corresponde la facultad de decidir sobre este extremo o bien decidir por sí misma, como mejor proceda atendiendo al interés superior del menor. 3En casos de urgencia, cualquiera de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental puede actuar por sí solo y debe informar de su actuación a los restantes titulares a la mayor brevedad. Article 3.37 (Décisions importantes) 1Les différents titulaires de la responsabilité parentale doivent prendre les décisions importantes conjointement. 2Lorsque les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ne peuvent se mettre d’accord sur une question importante, l’autorité compétente, sur demande d’un des titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ou de l’enfant qui a atteint l’âge de douze ans, transfère le pouvoir de prendre la décision sur cette question, ou prend la décision elle-même, en fonction de ce que l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant commande. 3Dans les affaires urgentes, un titulaire de la responsabilité parentale peut agir seul et doit par la suite en informer les autres titulaires aussi tôt que possible. 37 Parents and Children Artikel 3.37 (Wichtige Entscheidungen) 1Mehrere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung müssen wichtige Entscheidungen gemeinsam treffen. 2Können sich die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung in einer wichtigen Angelegenheit nicht einigen, überträgt die zuständige Behörde auf Antrag eines Inhabers elterlicher Verantwortung oder des Kindes, das das zwölfte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, die Entscheidungsbefugnis für diese Angelegenheit oder entscheidet selbst, je nachdem, was das Kindeswohl erfordert. 3In dringenden Fällen kann ein Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung allein handeln, er muss die anderen Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung sobald als möglich informieren. COMMENT 1. Although each holder of parental responsibility with whom the child is currently living may act alone with respect to daily matters of the child, there must be certain areas of the child’s life with respect to which all holders of parental responsibility must consent. Otherwise, joint parental responsibility would be rendered a redundant concept. Thus, important decisions must be made jointly by all holders of parental responsibility. 2. Important decisions encompass all matters having a long-lasting effect on the child. These include fundamental questions of name, residence, and education, such as choice of school, significant medical treatment, such as an operation, etc. In deciding what an important decision is, the age of the child must also be taken into account, for example, if a toddler or a teenager is taken on a jungle safari in Africa. 3. However, provision must be made for deadlock situations, in which joint holders of parental responsibility cannot reach consensus on an important matter. In such a case, each holder of parental responsibility, as well as the child having reached the age of twelve, may apply to the competent authority. The competent authority is then faced with two possibilities: either, it may confer decision-making power on one or, in exceptional cases where there are more than two holders of parental responsibility, on certain holders of parental responsibility, who then may decide upon the important matter in question. The other possibility is that the competent authority resolves the disputed matter itself. The competent authority will transfer parental responsibility amongst the existing holders where it is not in a position to resolve the matter itself due to lack of objective criteria for ascertaining what is in the best interests of the child, for example, where a 38 Parents and Children name for the child must be chosen. In other objectively-determinable cases, such as a dispute over medical treatment, the competent authority may decide itself according to the best interests of the child. 4. This Article can also be applied in cases of dispute over residence. It goes without saying that questions of this nature should be primarily left to the holders of parental responsibility themselves; they may choose that the child mainly live with only one of them, or they may also opt for alternating residence. It is the position of the MFC that, as long as all persons involved are agreeable to the arrangement, the competent authority neither regulates this agreement nor requires a parenting plan. If, however, the holders of parental responsibility are not capable of reaching agreement, or if the child, having reached the age of twelve, voices his or her serious discontent, the competent authority may step in to resolve the dispute and decide upon the residence of the child. Thereby, the competent authority takes factors into consideration such as the question of continuity for the child in light of his or her educational and social needs, the age and wishes of the child, the distance between the residences of each holder of parental responsibility, the respective home situations there, the ability and willingness of the holders of parental responsibility to cooperate, etc. The MFC does not express any opinion on the currently highly-disputed question as to whether the competent authority may impose an alternating residence arrangement on the persons involved. This question has to be resolved under the individual circumstances of each case, having regard to the factors mentioned above. 5. The same considerations apply to questions of relocation. Again, primarily the holders of parental responsibility must come to an agreement. If it is necessary for the competent authority to step in and to decide upon a change of the child’s residence in or outside its jurisdiction, in addition to the abovementioned criteria, the following circumstances must be given special weight: the extent to which contact with and access to the other holders of parental responsibility can be maintained having regard to the availability and financial viability of means of transport, as well as to the personal situation of all holders of parental responsibility. 6. In urgent cases concerning important decisions, where immediate action is required and it is not viable to contact the remaining holders of parental responsibility, each holder of parental responsibility may act alone in the best interests of the child. Here, the main area of applicability will arise in cases of urgent medical treatment of the child. However, other holders of parental responsibility must be informed as soon as possible and practicable thereafter. 160 Article 3.38 TITLE 5: CONTACT Article 3.38 (Contact Between Child and Other Persons) 1 The child and current and former holders of parental responsibility have a right to maintain contact with each other unless this is contrary to the best interests of the child. 2The child has a right to maintain contact with third persons with whom he or she has a close personal relationship if the best interests of the child so require. Artículo 3.38 (Contacto entre el menor y otras personas) 1El menor y los titulares actuales y anteriores de la responsabilidad parental tienen derecho a mantener contacto entre sí salvo cuando ello sea contrario al interés superior del menor. 2El menor tiene derecho a mantener contacto con terceros con los cuales haya tenido una relación personal estrecha, cuando así lo requiera el interés superior del menor. Article 3.38 (Contact entre l’enfant et d’autres personnes) 1L’enfant et les titulaires actuels et antérieurs de la responsabilité parentale ont le droit de maintenir des contacts entre eux à moins que ce ne soit contraire à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. 2L’enfant a le droit de maintenir des contacts avec les tiers avec lesquels il entretient de proches relations personnelles si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant le commande. Artikel 3.38 (Umgang des Kindes mit anderen Personen) 1Das Kind und gegenwärtige sowie frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung haben ein Recht zum Umgang miteinander, sofern dies dem Kindeswohl nicht widerspricht. 2Das Kind hat ein Recht zum Umgang mit dritten Personen, zu denen es eine enge persönliche Beziehung besitzt, sofern dies das Kindeswohl erfordert. COMMENT 1. All legal systems, as well as a number of international instruments, recognize the right of the child and his or her parents to maintain personal relationships by contact. Nowadays, this is seen as a reciprocal right, and not, as in former days, as a sole right of the parents against the child. This right of 161 Parents and Children contact is significant for the child in order to maintain the emotional ties that he or she has developed within the scope of a parent-child relationship. From the perspective of the child, it makes no difference whether a parent-child relationship based on genetic descent, legal parentage, or on a factual relationship is to be maintained by contact. Thus, the approach of the MFC is that contact is not restricted to parents, but is extended to those other persons who currently hold or formerly held parental responsibility, which presupposes the current or former existence of a factual parent-child relationship. For reasons of clarification, current holders of parental responsibility are also mentioned here, although it might be argued that the right to contact is implicit in parental responsibility. 2. The usefulness of contact between the child and current and former holders of parental responsibility can generally be presumed; therefore, it should only be excluded where the best interests of the child so require. However, the MFC does not take a position on the issue of whether it is in the best interests of the child to build up a relationship by way of contact to a legal parent who never actually exercised parental responsibility. This must be decided in light of the concrete circumstances of the case, having regard to the personal situation of the current holders of parental responsibility and the child, as well as the scope of any conflict with the genetic parent who is seeking contact. The same holds true for contact after adoption. 3. Most legal systems nowadays also provide for contact of the child to persons other than the parents of the child; grandparents, in particular, as well as siblings, are often specifically mentioned. Here as well, the concern is preserving the emotional ties between the child and persons with whom he or she has a close personal relationship. The MFC follows this approach. The persons with whom the child may have a close personal relationship are not confined to relatives; they may also be, for example, third persons with whom the child has lived without parental responsibility ever being attributed, step-siblings and the like. In contrast to contact between the child and current and former holders of parental responsibility, the usefulness of contact in these cases cannot be presumed per se, but in cases of conflict, it has to be established that such contact is required by the best interests of the child. It is for these reasons, as well, that this is only formulated as a unilateral right of the child, and not as a reciprocal right of third persons. 4. The right of contact has a broad meaning. In accordance with most legal systems, as well as several international instruments, it means any form of communication. In the first place, it comprises the right to meet and spend time with one another; furthermore, it encompasses all other forms of 162 Article 3.38 communication, such as writing, calling by telephone, or sending letters by mail, fax, email, or SMS. 5. The MFC refrains from regulating questions of enforcement of the contact right. Three different situations have to be distinguished. The first is where the adult person is seeking contact with the child. In this regard, contact should never be enforced against the wishes of the child, especially, in accordance with Article 3.3(2), if the child has reached the age of twelve and is opposed to contact. The second situation is where both the child and the adult person want contact with each other, but the current holder of parental responsibility does not allow it. In this case, contact may be enforced against the will of the current holder of parental responsibility. The last scenario is where the child wants to have contact to an adult who is not interested in contact with the child. Enforcement against the adult’s wishes, in such a case, would be fruitless as satisfying contact presupposes its voluntary nature. 163 Parents and Children Article 3.39 (Right to Information) Current and former holders of parental responsibility have the right to be informed about all personal matters concerning the child unless this is contrary to the best interests of the child. Artículo 3.39 (Derecho de información) Los actuales y anteriores titulares de la responsabilidad parental tienen derecho a ser informados sobre todas la cuestiones personales que afecten al menor, salvo cuando ello sea contrario al interés superior del menor. Article 3.39 (Droit à l’information) Les titulaires actuels et antérieurs de la responsabilité parentale ont le droit d’être informés de toutes les questions personnelles concernant l’enfant à moins que cela ne soit contraire à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Artikel 3.39 (Recht auf Information) Gegenwärtige und frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung haben das Recht, über alle das Kind betreffenden persönlichen Angelegenheiten informiert zu werden, sofern dies dem Kindeswohl nicht widerspricht. COMMENT 1. According to many legal systems and several international instruments, the principle of contact between parents and children encompasses the right of the parent to be informed about personal matters of the child, such as, for example, educational and health-related issues. Some legal systems even recognize that this right exists independent of the right of contact. The aim of the right to information is similar to that of contact; namely, to protect the child’s emotional ties in his or her existing relationships. This right operates in concert with the right of contact, as only in this way can current and former holders of parental responsibility obtain a full picture of the development of the child and respond to him or her. 2. The right to information may not only be exercised against the current holder of parental responsibility, but may also extend to third parties, such as teachers and the like. 3. It goes without saying that the right to information must be subject to the child’s best interests. Thus – just as with contact – the right to information may be restricted or excluded if it is contrary to the best interests of the child. 164 Article 3.39 In particular, a child who has reached the age of twelve may veto the dissemination of information concerning him or her. 165 Parents and Children TITLE 6: CHILD SUPPORT COMMENT 1. In an approach that dates back to Roman law rules, a number of civil law systems recognize a general reciprocal duty of support on children, parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents who stand in direct lineage to one another. In contrast thereto, common law and Scandinavian legal systems confine support obligations, apart from those towards a spouse, to those of parents towards their minor children. There, it is only in recent times that the obligation of parental support has been extended to children who have reached the age of majority, but who are still pursuing their education. Here, however, these legal systems usually set a cut-off age limit. The MFC follows the latter approach, as socio-demographic developments nowadays would appear to make the unrestricted duty to support one’s linear relatives inappropriate. Furthermore, the restriction of support obligations to parents and persons in loco parentis is in accordance with the general concept of responsibility for one’s own conduct. Therefore, support is restricted to minor children, and is supplemented only by a limited support obligation during ongoing education after the child reaches majority. 166 Article 3.40 Article 3.40 (General Principle) 1Legal parents must provide for the support of their minor children, including, up until the child has reached the age of three, costs for a personal caregiver. 2The duty to support applies equally to any holder of parental responsibility who is not a legal parent of the child. Artículo 3.40 (Principio general) 1Quienes tienen legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor están obligados a proveer al mantenimiento de sus hijos e hijas menores, lo cual incluye, hasta la edad de tres años, el coste de una atención personalizada. 2La referida obligación se extiende también a cualquier titular de responsabilidad parental, aunque no tenga legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor. Article 3.40 (Principe général) 1Les parents légaux doivent pourvoir à l’entretien de leur enfant mineur, incluant, jusqu’à ce que l’enfant ait atteint l’âge de trois ans, les coûts liés aux personnes prenant soin de l’enfant. 2L’obligation d’entretien incombe pareillement à tout titulaire de la responsabilité parentale qui n’est pas le parent légal de l’enfant. Artikel 3.40 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Rechtliche Eltern sind zum Unterhalt ihrer minderjährigen Kinder verpflichtet, einschliesslich der Kosten für eine persönliche Betreuungsperson bis das Kind das dritte Lebensjahr vollendet hat. 2Die Unterhaltspflicht besteht auch für einen Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung, der nicht rechtlicher Elter ist. COMMENT 1. In accordance with all legal systems, the MFC places a support obligation on all legal parents for their minor children, regardless of whether they are holders of parental responsibility or not. Likewise, the duty to support does not depend on the question of whether the obligor has, or ever had contact to the child. It is sufficient that legal parentage is established, be it by birth, intentional parentage, adjudication, or adoption. If legal parentage ceases, for example retroactively after a successful challenge of parentage or by adoption, the support obligation comes to an end. 167 Parents and Children 2. Support comprises all costs of care and upbringing of the minor child, including costs of all needs, such as shelter, nourishment, medical care, clothing, kindergarten, education, recreation, etc. Significantly, the needs of the child also include the costs for a personal caregiver during the first three years of the child’s life, where personal care, ideally by a parent, is to be given priority over institutional care by, for example, childcare facilities. 3. The starting point in most legal systems is to calculate support according to needs and means. However, in recent times, legislators have increasingly moved towards applying mathematical formulae. Here, there are many possibilities, but the predominant approach takes the respective incomes of the parents as the primary factor in making the calculation, with allowance made for deviations from the mathematical result on account of the special circumstances of the case. The use of mathematical formulae is to be preferred to the unlimited discretion of the court in assessing child support, as, again, legal certainty and equality among children and the need to secure the basic needs of the child on the basis of the parents’ means is safeguarded. This objective calculation method also facilitates the constellation, often the case, where the state advances support payments for the child and subsequently collects these from the debtor parent. The MFC, however, refrains from setting out any methods of calculation, as this appears to be more a matter to be determined by regulation. 4. The MFC does not explicitly state how child support is to be paid; usually, as is the case in all legal systems, it will be effected by periodic payments in advance. However, in a given case, where either the best interests of the child or the justified interests of the obligor parent so advocate, a lump-sum might also be appropriate, such as, for example, if the obligor parent wishes to emigrate. 5. The duty to support does not stop at legal parents alone. Many legal systems nowadays recognize similar duties with respect to step-parents. The MFC chooses, as a connecting factor, to extend support obligations to any holders of parental responsibility who are not legal parents of the child. Thereby, an approach devoid of issues of status is preserved; furthermore, if a person is a holder of parental responsibility, the connection to the child is close enough for one to expect this person to be liable for the support of the child. However, it is the legal parents who are primarily liable for child support payments; the support obligation of other holders of parental responsibility is merely subsidiary. 168 Article 3.41 Article 3.41 (Support After Majority) If, after reaching the age of majority, the child has not yet completed his or her education, the duty to support persists until, at the latest, the child has reached the age of twenty-four. Artículo 3.41 (Alimentos para hijos e hijas mayores de edad) Si, alcanzada la mayoría de edad, el hijo o la hija todavía no ha finalizado su formación, el deber de alimentos pervive, como máximo, hasta que haya alcanzado la edad de veinticuatro años. Article 3.41 (Entretien après la majorité) Si, après avoir atteint l’âge de la majorité, l’enfant n’a pas encore terminé ses études, l’obligation d’entretien perdure jusqu’à ce que l’enfant ait atteint, au plus tard, l’âge de vingt-quatre ans. Artikel 3.41 (Unterhalt nach Volljährigkeit) Hat das Kind nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit seine Ausbildung noch nicht abgeschlossen, so besteht die Unterhaltspflicht fort, längstens bis das Kind das vierundzwanzigste Lebensjahr vollendet hat. COMMENT 1. As has been outlined above, most legal systems today provide for at least limited support obligations to allow the child to complete his or her education after reaching the age of majority. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the age of majority has been lowered in most systems to eighteen; secondly, with growing divorce rates, many fathers no longer wanted to voluntarily support their children after they reached majority. The MFC adopts the approach of limited support continuing after majority, but only for the purpose of allowing the child sufficient opportunity to complete his or her education, including university studies, without being obliged to provide for his or her own needs. However, there should be an age limit set on this duty. The MFC has chosen the age of twenty-four, as in most legal systems, the child should have adequate opportunity to complete a first tertiary course of studies by this age. It cannot be expected that the obligation to support the child continues through further education or through a prolonged course of study, prolonged merely due to the fact of the child not having studied with the utmost diligence. 169 Parents and Children TITLE 7: CHILD PROTECTION Article 3.42 (General Principle) If the best interests of the child are endangered, the competent authority takes the appropriate measures to protect the child. Artículo 3.42 (Principio general) Cuando el interés superior del menor se vea amenazado, la autoridad competente tomará las medidas adecuadas para protegerle. Article 3.42 (Principe général) Si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant est menacé, l’autorité compétente prend les mesures appropriées pour protéger l’enfant. Artikel 3.42 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Ist das Kindeswohl gefährdet, erlässt die zuständige Behörde die angemessenen Massnahmen, um das Kind zu schützen. COMMENT 1. All legal systems agree on the general principles of child protection, with the differences lying in the detail with which such principles are enunciated. 2. In accordance with all legal systems, considerably serious requirements must be met before child protection measures can be considered. First and foremost, it is the task of legal parents or other holders of parental responsibility to decide what is best for the child. This approach also underlies the so-called principle of non-intervention. Thus, child protection measures can only be taken by the competent authority where the best interests of the child are endangered. 3. The best interests of a child, in the first place, encompass his or her physical, psychological and intellectual well-being. If any of these aspects of the child’s life are put at risk of severe harm, endangerment will be deemed to exist. This may occur in cases of abandonment, neglect, maltreatment, physical abuse, sexual abuse, domestic violence, emotional or psychological abuse, threats, exploitation, or other harm. It is irrelevant, firstly, whether the harm stems from the holder of parental responsibility or from a third party, or secondly, whether the holder may be blamed or held responsible for its occurrence. 170 Article 3.42 4. Child protection measures may also be taken where the child’s property is endangered. These may be necessary where the child’s property is poorly administered, or even wantonly dissipated. 5. The competent authority must act on its own initiative after becoming aware that the best interests of the child are endangered; no external request is necessary. Whether certain professionals, such as police, teachers, doctors and counselors, are obligated to report suspected cases for child protection measures to the competent authority is another issue altogether. Usually, the competent authority will be informed by such professionals, relatives, friends, neighbors, or even the child him- or herself. In this context, it goes without saying that the age limits under Article 3.3 do not apply. 171 Parents and Children Article 3.43 (Measures) In particular, the competent authority may (a) give instructions and directions, (b) appoint a tutor, (c) remove the child from his or her current residence, (d) divest parental responsibility from current holders, and (e) vest parental responsibility in former holders of parental responsibility or third parties. Artículo 3.43 (Medidas) En particular, la autoridad competente puede (a) dictar recomendaciones e instrucciones, (b) nombrar un tutor, (c) apartar al menor de su actual lugar de residencia, (d) privar a los titulares actuales de responsabilidad parental, y (e) atribuir la responsabilidad parental a sus titulares anteriores o a terceros. Article 3.43 (Mesures) L’autorité compétente peut notamment (a) donner des instructions et des indications, (b) nommer un tuteur, (c) retirer l’enfant de sa résidence actuelle, (d) retirer la responsabilité parentale à ses titulaires actuels, et (e) conférer la responsabilité parentale aux titulaires antérieurs de cette responsabilité ou à un tiers. Artikel 3.43 (Massnahmen) Insbesondere kann die zuständige Behörde (a) Belehrungen und Anweisungen erteilen, (b) einen Vormund bestellen, (c) das Kind von seinem gegenwärtigen Aufenthaltsort entfernen, (d) gegenwärtigen Inhabern die elterliche Verantwortung entziehen und (e) früheren Inhabern elterlicher Verantwortung oder dritten Personen die elterliche Verantwortung einräumen. COMMENT 1. In accordance with all legal systems, the MFC sets forth a list of possible measures that may be taken by the competent authority. Congruent with the 172 Article 3.43 principle of non-intervention, it follows that, in the implementation of child protection measures, only measures that impinge in the least possible way on the self-determination of the family should be taken. This corresponds to the principle of proportionality, which always underlies such protective provisions. This not only applies to the specific measures that should be taken, but also to how long each measure should last. It goes without saying that, if the best interests of the child are no longer endangered, or the risk of harm has been reduced, the measure in place must be terminated or replaced with a less onerous one under Article 3.44. 2. The issuance of instructions and directions is the least intrusive child protection measure by the competent authority. Such instructions and directions may not only be intended for current or former holders of parental responsibility, but also for caregivers without parental responsibility, such as foster parents, or other third parties. These may comprise directions as to the upbringing of the child, special education for the child, therapeutic treatment, instructions as to how to administer the child’s property, a request to holders of parental responsibility to facilitate contact with certain persons, a request to a person with contact to the child to desist from undertaking certain activities with the child, such as frequenting night clubs or the like, etc. 3. If the circumstances so require, the competent authority appoints a tutor who supports the holders of parental responsibility in the caring and upbringing of the child. The competent authority may also transfer certain powers to the tutor, particularly regarding decision-making, as a child protection measure. This possibility is especially conceivable in cases in which it is necessary for the child to have alternate legal representation in court proceedings or concerning the administration of property due to his or her parents not being suited to the task, but also in cases of supervised visits or giving consent to medical treatment. In all these cases, the nomination of a tutor can, but does not necessarily, go hand in hand with restricting the respective powers of the holders of parental responsibility. 4. As intervention into family life should always be the minimum necessary to ensure a child’s safety and protection, whenever possible, child protection measures should aim at making it possible for the child to stay in his or her familiar environment. However, where the best interests of the child cannot be ensured in these surroundings, the child must be placed in another, more appropriate location. This may include placing the child with other or former holders of parental responsibility, foster parents or in an institution. 173 Parents and Children 5. If lesser child protection measures have been unsuccessful or do not have any prospects of success from the outset, the competent authority may divest, in total or in part, parental responsibility from a current holder. This measure will usually be accompanied by a placement order, but it is also conceivable in cases in which holders of parental responsibility wish to retrieve a child from foster parents or other third parties and such retrieval would seriously endanger the development of the child. In the same way that parental responsibility can be divested, the right to contact can also be terminated if the best interests of the child so require. 6. Congruent with the right to divest parental responsibility is, of course, the power to vest parental responsibility. This may be done concurrently, such as, for example, by transferring parental responsibility from a legal parent to foster parents, or independently, such as by vesting a former holder of parental responsibility or a third party with parental responsibility after the death of the current holder, in order to secure the best interests of the child. 174 Article 3.44 Article 3.44 (Termination of Measures) 1The competent authority terminates child protection measures if the best interests of the child are no longer endangered. 2 Any current or former holder of parental responsibility and the child, who has reached the age of twelve, may request the competent authority to terminate a child protection measure. Artículo 3.44 (Cese de las medidas) 1La autoridad competente decretará el cese de las medidas cuando el interés superior del menor deje de correr peligro. 2Cualquier titular actual o anterior de responsabilidad parental y el menor que haya alcanzado la edad de doce años, pueden solicitar a la autoridad competente el cese de las medidas. Article 3.44 (Fins des mesures) 1L’autorité compétente met fin aux mesures de protection de l’enfant si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant n’est plus menacé. 2Tout titulaire actuel ou antérieur de la responsabilité parentale et l’enfant, qui a atteint l’âge de douze ans, peuvent demander à l’autorité compétente de mettre fin à une mesure de protection de l’enfant. Artikel 3.44 (Aufhebung der Massnahmen) 1Die zuständige Behörde hebt die Kindesschutzmassnahmen auf, wenn das Kindeswohl nicht mehr gefährdet ist. 2Jeder gegenwärtige und frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung und das Kind, das das zwölfte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, kann die Aufhebung einer Kindesschutzmassnahme durch die zuständige Behörde beantragen. COMMENT 1. It follows from the principle of proportionality that the competent authority must continually investigate whether the reasons for initially implementing the child protection measures in question are still present and valid. Should the competent authority come to the conclusion that the best interests of the child are no longer endangered, it must terminate the child protection measures in place and, if the circumstances so require, replace them with milder measures. The competent authority has to monitor the case constantly and must act on its own volition as changed circumstances so demand. 175 Parents and Children 2. As child protection measures impinge upon the rights of parents and other holders of parental responsibility, these persons, in particular, must be given a specific right to request the examination of the ongoing appropriateness of the measures taken and their possible termination. The same applies to a child who has reached the age of twelve. 176 MODEL FAMILY CODE PART I: PARTNERSHIPS TITLE 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 1.1 (Partnerships) 1Partnerships include marriages. 2Partnerships include non-marital relationships if (a) they have lasted more than three years, (b) there is a common child, or (c) one or each of the partners has made substantial contributions to the relationship or in the sole interests of the other partner. Article 1.2 (Child of the Family) A child of the family includes (a) a common child of the partners, and (b) a child for whose long-term welfare both partners accept responsibility. TITLE 2: MARRIAGE CHAPTER 1: FORMATION OF MARRIAGE Section 1: Prerequisites for Marriage Article 1.3 (General Principle) A marriage may be entered into by two persons of the same or of a different sex before the competent authority in the recognized marriage proceeding. Article 1.4 (Consent) Marriage requires the consent of two persons to be the spouse of each other. Section 2: Marriage Impediments Article 1.5 (Age Requirement) No marriage may be entered into by persons who have not reached the age of eighteen. 177 Model Family Code Article 1.6 (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) No marriage may be entered into by persons who are related lineally, including by adoption, or as siblings or half-siblings. Article 1.7 (Bigamy) No marriage may be entered into by persons who are already married to another person. CHAPTER 2: NAME Article 1.8 (Family Name) 1The spouses to a marriage may retain their respective surnames or choose a common family name. 2The family name can be the surname used by one partner at the time of entering into the marriage, or any combination of the surnames of the two partners, not exceeding two single names. 3If the family name is the surname of only one spouse, the other spouse has the right to add his or her previously carried name to the family name. CHAPTER 3: DIVORCE Section 1: Requirements Article 1.9 (General Principle) Divorce is granted upon either the joint application of both spouses or the unilateral application of one spouse to the marriage. Article 1.10 (Reflection Period) If there are minor children of the family, or if the spouses cannot agree on the divorce itself, or any of its consequences, the court may grant the divorce only if the parties or party renew the application after a period of six months. Article 1.11 (Divorce in Cases of Violation of Impediments to Marriage) 1Where a marriage has been entered into in violation of an impediment to marriage under Articles 1.5 to 1.7, the competent authority, in addition to the spouses, may apply for divorce. Article 1.10 does not apply. 2However, in case of a violation of Article 1.5, the application by the competent authority may only be brought while one of the spouses is still a minor. 178 Model Family Code Section 2: Procedure Article 1.12 (General Principle) Divorce is granted either by the court or by the competent administrative body. Article 1.13 (Administrative Divorce) Divorce is granted by the competent administrative body provided that the spouses agree upon the divorce itself, any of its consequences as well as the administrative procedure; there are no minor children of the family; and the length of the marriage does not exceed ten years. Article 1.14 (Alternative Dispute Resolution) 1Once an application for divorce has been made to the court, if, under the circumstances, the court deems it appropriate, it shall use its best endeavors to persuade the parties to reach agreement on the matters of divorce and its consequences. 2The court shall advise the parties as to possible alternative dispute resolution options in this regard. TITLE 3: PROTECTION IN PARTNERSHIPS CHAPTER 1: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN PARTNERSHIPS Article 1.15 (General Principle) 1Partners shall contribute to the maintenance of their joint and personal needs. 2They agree upon their respective contributions. Article 1.16 (Interim Measures) If one partner neglects his or her duty to maintain, the court may order, as an interim measure, that partner to make payments of maintenance to the other partner for a certain period of time, having regard to the circumstances set out in Article 1.28. CHAPTER 2: FAMILY HOME AND FAMILY CHATTELS Article 1.17 (Exercise of Rights) A partner may not exercise any rights over the family home and family chattels without the consent of the other partner or judicial authorization. 179 Model Family Code Article 1.18 (Right of Occupancy) Each partner has the right not to be evicted or excluded from the family home by the other partner except with leave of the court. TITLE 4: FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES UPON DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 1.19 (Interests of Children) When granting financial relief, primary regard is to be given to the interests of any minor child of the family. Article 1.20 (Principle of Self-Sufficiency) The parties shall be placed in a position to become self-sufficient as soon as possible. CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIP-RELATED BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS Section 1: Financial Relief Article 1.21 (Adjustment) Upon the dissolution of a partnership, partnership-related benefits and detriments are adjusted by financial relief. Section 2: Measuring Benefits Article 1.22 (Scope of Benefits) 1Benefits include (a) property acquired by each partner during the partnership, and (b) pension rights of each partner accumulated during the partnership. 2Benefits do not include separate property. Article 1.23 (Separate Property) Separate property includes (a) property owned before the partnership, (b) inheritance, (c) gifts, (d) damages for pain and suffering, (e) property of a purely personal character, and (f) income and proceeds from separate property. 180 Model Family Code Section 3: Measuring Detriments Article 1.24 (Maintenance of Standard of Living) Detriments are held to exist where one partner is unable to maintain, by his or her own means, the standard of living enjoyed during the partnership after its dissolution, notwithstanding separate property. Article 1.25 (Pension Scheme Contributions) In assessing detriments, regard is also to be had to the possibility of each partner to build up a sustainable pension scheme after the dissolution of the partnership. Section 4: Partnership-Relatedness Article 1.26 (Presumption) There is a presumption that benefits and detriments are partnership-related if one partner has abstained or abstains, wholly or in part, from gainful employment in order to (a) care for a child of the family, (b) care for the household, (c) care for the other partner, (d) care for a third person in fulfillment of a moral obligation of the other partner or of both partners, or (e) contribute to the other partner’s business or profession. Section 5: Division of Benefits and Detriments Article 1.27 (Equal Division) Partnership-related benefits are to be equally divided and detriments equally borne between the partners upon dissolution of the partnership. Article 1.28 (Exceptions) The court may depart from the principle of equal division in order to take into account (a) the interests of a minor child of the family, (b) the future care for a minor child of the family by one of the partners, (c) the future care for persons in the interest of the other partner, (d) the length of the partnership, (e) financial and non-financial contributions to the partnership, (f) contributions to the other partner’s property, business or profession, (g) enhanced earning capacity, 181 Model Family Code (h) income, earning capacity, property, and future assets, (i) age, mental and physical health, (j) financial misconduct, or (k) domestic violence. CHAPTER 3: EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT Section 1: Compensation Principle Article 1.29 (Contributions) If there are no partnership-related benefits and detriments, financial relief may still be granted to compensate for extraordinary contributions in the interest of the other partner or for bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of the partnership. Article 1.30 (Extent of Financial Relief) Financial relief is to reflect the amount of such contributions, but may also reflect any fruits obtained as a result thereof. Section 2: Post-Partnership Solidarity Article 1.31 (Long-Term Partnerships) In all other cases, financial relief may only be granted in exceptional cases after a long-term partnership. Article 1.32 (Extent of Financial Relief) Financial relief is limited to the extent necessary to allow the other partner reasonable time to adjust to the new circumstances. CHAPTER 4: MANNER OF FINANCIAL RELIEF Article 1.33 (Transfer of Property) In granting financial relief, any property belonging to both or one of the partners, including separate property but except for purely personal property, may be transferred to one of the partners, as the court deems just and equitable. Article 1.34 (Pension Rights) Pension rights may be transferred from one partner to the other, or may be split as they accrue in the future. 182 Model Family Code Article 1.35 (Family Home and Family Chattels) In attributing the family home and the family chattels, primary regard is to be had to the interests of a minor child of the family, and whether one partner is dependent upon the use of these for business or other purposes. Article 1.36 (Business Assets) Business assets should be allocated in such a way so as not to destroy an economic entity. Article 1.37 (Periodic Payments) 1If there is not enough property for redistribution at the time of dissolution of the partnership, financial relief may be made by future periodic payments. 2Except in the case of post-partnership solidarity according to Article 1.31, future periodic payments are not subject to variation. CHAPTER 5: PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS Article 1.38 (Right to Agree) The partners may, at any time, regulate the financial consequences of the dissolution of their partnership by an agreement in writing. Article 1.39 (Significance of Agreement) The court gives due regard to the agreement of the parties, as long as the overall result of the agreement seems just and reasonable in light of the foregoing provisions. PART II: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Article 2.1 (General Principle) 1In case of domestic violence, the aggrieved person can apply to the court for a protection order. 2Domestic violence includes all acts of physical and psychological violence. 3In principle, such an order may not exceed two years. Article 2.2 (Measures) In particular, the court may order that the respondent (a) leave, remain away and refrain from entering the dwelling of the aggrieved person, (b) refrain from approaching the aggrieved person, 183 Model Family Code (c) refrain from establishing contact with the aggrieved person in any way, and (d) refrain from being in certain locations. PART III: PARENTS AND CHILDREN TITLE 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 3.1 (Best Interests of the Child) In all matters concerning parents and children, paramount regard is to be had to the best interests of the child. Article 3.2 (Views of the Child) Consideration is always to be given to the views expressed by the child, taking into account his or her age and maturity. Article 3.3 (Child’s Right to be Heard and to Consent) 1Above the age of five, the child must be heard in all matters concerning him or her. 2Above the age of twelve, no action may be taken or decisions made against the wishes of the child. 3Above the age of fifteen, the child has the right to make independent decisions in all matters of a purely personal nature. TITLE 2: LEGAL PARENTAGE CHAPTER 1: INITIAL ATTRIBUTION OF PARENTAGE Article 3.4 (Parentage by Birth) Legal parent is the woman who gives birth to the child. Article 3.5 (Parentage by Intention) Legal parent is the person who, with the consent of the birth mother, intentionally assumes parentage for the child. 184 Model Family Code CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGING PARENTAGE Article 3.6 (Challenge for Mistake) 1The person who has mistakenly presumed that he or she is the genetic parent of the child may challenge his or her parentage. 2The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the error. Article 3.7 (Challenge by the Child) 1The child may challenge the legal parentage established under Articles 3.4 or 3.5. 2Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. 3The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the possible lack of genetic parentage. 4If the parentage has not been challenged during the minority of the child, the child may lodge a challenge within three years of the child reaching the age of majority, or within one year of becoming aware of the possible lack of genetic parentage, whichever is later. Article 3.8 (Challenge by Genetic Parent) 1The person who alleges that he or she is the genetic parent of the child may, during the child’s minority, challenge the parentage of legal parents established under Articles 3.4 or 3.5 and have his or her own parentage established by adjudication under Article 3.10. 2The challenge must be lodged within six months of the birth of the child. 3A later challenge is only admissible where there is no active family relationship between the child and the legal parent challenged. In this case, the challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of both the possible genetic parentage and the lack of an active family relationship. Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. 4No challenge may be lodged by an intentional donor of genetic material. Article 3.9 (Challenge by Birth Mother or Other Legal Parent) 1Despite having given her consent, the birth mother may, until the child reaches the age of fifteen, challenge the parentage of the legal parent established under Article 3.5 if there is no active family relationship between the child and the legal parent challenged. 2Under the same circumstances, the legal parent established under Article 3.5 or 3.10 may challenge the parentage of the birth mother. 3The challenge must be lodged within one year of becoming aware of the lack of an active family relationship. 4Above the age of twelve, the child’s personal consent is required. 185 Model Family Code CHAPTER 3: ADJUDICATION OF PARENTAGE Article 3.10 (Parentage by Adjudication) 1Legal parent is the person determined by judicial adjudication to be the genetic parent of the child. 2A request for adjudication may be brought by (a) the child, or (b) the person alleging to be the genetic parent of the child. 3If parentage under Article 3.4 or 3.5 exists, adjudication may only be initiated together with a challenge under Article 3.7 or 3.8. CHAPTER 4: ADOPTION Section 1: Prerequisites for Adoption Article 3.11 (General Principle) A minor child may be adopted by two persons jointly or by one person alone. Article 3.12 (Age and Age Difference) 1At the time of adoption, the adopter must have reached the age of twentyfive. 2The age difference between the adopter and the child must be at least eighteen, and not more than forty years. Article 3.13 (Consent of Legal Parents and Holders of Parental Responsibility) 1Legal parents and current holders of parental responsibility must consent to the adoption. 2The consent may be dispensed with if it cannot be obtained or is refused if such refusal endangers the best interests of the child. Article 3.14 (Consent of the Child) Above the age of twelve, the child must personally consent to his or her adoption. Article 3.15 (Adoption Order) Upon the application of the adopter, the competent authority pronounces the adoption if this is in the best interests of the child. 186 Model Family Code Section 2: Consequences of Adoption Article 3.16 (Parentage by Adoption) 1The adopter becomes the legal parent of the child. 2Legal familial ties to any previous legal parent and his or her respective relatives cease to exist. Article 3.17 (Child’s Right to Know Origins) Upon reaching the age of fifteen, an adopted child has the right to access all information concerning his or her origins. Section 3: Revocation of Adoption Article 3.18 (Child’s Right to Revocation) 1The adoption may be revoked by the competent authority upon the application of the child. 2The application must be lodged within three years of the child reaching the age of majority, or within one year of becoming aware of the adoption, whichever is later. Article 3.19 (Consequences of Revocation) 1Upon revocation of the adoption, legal familial ties between the adopter and the child and their respective relatives cease to exist. 2Legal familial ties that ceased to exist as a result of the adoption revive as a result of the revocation. TITLE 3: NAME OF THE CHILD Article 3.20 (Initial Attribution) 1Legal parents with parental responsibility choose the surname of the child at birth. 2They may choose the surname borne by one legal parent or any combination of the surnames of the two parents, not exceeding two single names. Article 3.21 (Change of Name) Legal parents with parental responsibility may change the surname of the child until the child reaches the age of five if (a) the surname of the legal parent whose name the child bears changes, (b) the person whose name the child bears is no longer a legal parent, or (c) another person’s legal parentage has been established. 187 Model Family Code Article 3.22 (Addition of Other Name) 1If the child has lived, over an extended period of time, with persons bearing a different surname, he or she has the right to add this surname to his or her own surname. 2Above the age of twelve, the child must personally consent to the addition of the other name. Article 3.23 (Child’s Right to Change Name) 1Upon reaching the age of majority, the child has the right to change his or her surname. 2The child may choose any surname borne by a legal parent at the time he or she reaches majority or any combination of the surnames in accordance with Article 3.20(2). 3The application must be lodged within three years of the child reaching the age of majority or within one year of becoming aware of reasons which would justify a change of name under Article 3.21(b) and (c), whichever is later. TITLE 4: PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 3.24 (Subject) A minor child is subject to parental responsibility. Article 3.25 (Autonomy of the Child) Parental responsibility is aimed at promoting the increasing autonomy of the child. Article 3.26 (Cooperation) 1Holders of parental responsibility cooperate to enhance the best interests of the child. 2In case of conflict, the competent authority shall use its best endeavours to persuade the parties to reach agreement. 3The competent authority shall advise the parties as to possible alternative dispute resolution options in this regard. CHAPTER 2: ATTRIBUTION Article 3.27 (Parental Responsibility of Legal Parents) Any legal parent of a child is vested with parental responsibility. 188 Model Family Code Article 3.28 (Parental Responsibility of Third Parties) The competent authority can vest parental responsibility in a third party, in addition to or instead of legal parents, (a) if the child has lived with that third party for more than three years and the third party requests parental responsibility, or (b) as a measure of child protection. Article 3.29 (Transfer of Parental Responsibility) 1If holders of parental responsibility do not live together and cannot cooperate, the competent authority transfers parental responsibility as the best interests of the child require. 2The request to the competent authority may be made by any holder of parental responsibility or by the child above the age of twelve. Article 3.30 (Re-Transfer of Parental Responsibility) 1 Under changed circumstances, the competent authority re-transfers parental responsibility to a former holder of parental responsibility if the best interests of the child so require. 2The request to the competent authority may be made by the former holder of parental responsibility. CHAPTER 3: CONTENT Article 3.31 (Care for the Child) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to care for and raise a minor child. 2Care and upbringing include the care and responsibility for the mental and corporal well-being of the child and fostering the development of his or her personality. Article 3.32 (Integrity of the Child) No child may be subjected to corporal punishment, emotional abuse or other degrading treatment. Article 3.33 (Administration of the Child’s Property) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to administer the child’s property. 2A child who has reached the age of fifteen has the right to administer his or her own earnings. 3For significant financial transactions, the authorisation of the competent authority is required. 189 Model Family Code Article 3.34 (Legal Representation of the Child) 1Parental responsibility comprises the duty and the right to legally represent the child. 2Holders of parental responsibility are excluded from legally representing the child where there is a potential conflict of interest. 3For legal representation in significant matters, the authorisation of the competent authority is required. CHAPTER 4: EXERCISE Article 3.35 (Joint Exercise) Several holders of parental responsibility exercise parental responsibility jointly. Article 3.36 (Decision-Making in Daily Matters) The holder of parental responsibility with whom the child is currently living has the right to act alone with respect to the daily matters of the child. Article 3.37 (Important Decisions) 1Several holders of parental responsibility must make important decisions jointly. 2Where the holders of parental responsibility cannot agree on an important matter, the competent authority, upon the application of a holder of parental responsibility or the child who has reached the age of twelve, transfers the decision-making power for this matter, or makes a decision itself, as the best interests of the child require. 3In urgent cases, a holder of parental responsibility may act alone and must inform the other holders as soon as possible thereafter. TITLE 5: CONTACT Article 3.38 (Contact Between Child and Other Persons) 1The child and current and former holders of parental responsibility have a right to maintain contact with each other unless this is contrary to the best interests of the child. 2The child has a right to maintain contact with third persons with whom he or she has a close personal relationship if the best interests of the child so require. 190 Model Family Code Article 3.39 (Right to Information) Current and former holders of parental responsibility have the right to be informed about all personal matters concerning the child unless this is contrary to the best interests of the child. TITLE 6: CHILD SUPPORT Article 3.40 (General Principle) 1Legal parents must provide for the support of their minor children, including, up until the child has reached the age of three, costs for a personal caregiver. 2The duty to support applies equally to any holder of parental responsibility who is not a legal parent of the child. Article 3.41 (Support After Majority) If, after reaching the age of majority, the child has not yet completed his or her education, the duty to support persists until, at the latest, the child has reached the age of twenty-four. TITLE 7: CHILD PROTECTION Article 3.42 (General Principle) If the best interests of the child are endangered, the competent authority takes the appropriate measures to protect the child. Article 3.43 (Measures) In particular, the competent authority may (a) give instructions and directions, (b) appoint a tutor, (c) remove the child from his or her current residence, (d) divest parental responsibility from current holders, and (e) vest parental responsibility in former holders of parental responsibility or third parties. Article 3.44 (Termination of Measures) 1The competent authority terminates child protection measures if the best interests of the child are no longer endangered. 2Any current or former holder of parental responsibility and the child, who has reached the age of twelve, may request the competent authority to terminate a child protection measure. 191 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA MODELO (Traducido por Prof. Miriam Anderson) PARTE I: UNIONES DE PAREJA TÍTULO 1: PRINCIPIOS GENERALES Artículo 1.1 (Uniones de pareja) 1Las parejas casadas se consideran uniones de pareja. 2Las parejas no casadas son consideradas uniones de pareja si (a) su duración supera los tres años, (b) tienen descendencia común, o bien (c) uno o ambos integrantes de la pareja han realizado aportaciones sustanciales a la relación o en interés exclusivo del otro. Artículo 1.2 (Hijo o hija de la familia) Se considera hijo o hija de la familia (a) al hijo o a la hija común a ambos miembros de la pareja, y (b) al menor respecto de cuyo bienestar a largo plazo han asumido responsabilidad ambos miembros de la pareja. TÍTULO 2: MATRIMONIO CAPÍTULO 1: CELEBRACIÓN DEL MATRIMONIO Sección 1: Requisitos del matrimonio Artículo 1.3 (Principio general) Pueden contraer matrimonio dos personas del mismo o de distinto sexo, siempre que ello tenga lugar ante la autoridad competente y por medio del procedimiento establecido al efecto. Artículo 1.4 (Consentimiento) El matrimonio requiere que dos personas consientan en convertirse en cónyuges el uno del otro. 193 Código de Familia Modelo Sección 2: Impedimentos matrimoniales Artículo 1.5 (Requisito de edad) No podrán contraer matrimonio las personas que no hayan alcanzado la edad de dieciocho años. Artículo 1.6 (Prohibición de parentesco) No podrán contraer matrimonio entre sí los parientes en línea recta, incluyendo el parentesco por adopción, ni los hermanos, sean de doble vínculo o de vínculo sencillo. Artículo 1.7 (Bigamia) No podrá contraer matrimonio quien esté previamente ligado por vínculo matrimonial a otra persona. CAPÍTULO 2: APELLIDO Artículo 1.8 (Apellido familiar) 1Los cónyuges pueden conservar sus respectivos apellidos o bien escoger un apellido familiar común. 2El apellido familiar puede ser el apellido de cualquiera de los dos esposos al tiempo de contraer matrimonio o bien cualquier combinación de los apellidos de ambos, siempre que el escogido no exceda de dos apellidos simples. 3Si el apellido familiar elegido es el de uno solo de los cónyuges, el otro tiene derecho a añadir al apellido familiar el que llevase con anterioridad. CAPÍTULO 3: DIVORCIO Sección 1: Requisitos Artículo 1.9 (Principio general) Se concederá el divorcio cuando lo soliciten ambos cónyuges de modo conjunto o bien cuando lo solicite unilateralmente uno de ellos. Artículo 1.10 (Período de reflexión) En caso de que haya hijos o hijas menores de la familia o bien si los cónyuges no alcanzan un acuerdo respecto del divorcio o respecto de cualquiera de sus consecuencias, el tribunal sólo podrá conceder el divorcio si las partes o la parte actora renuevan la solicitud transcurrido un período de seis meses. 194 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 1.11 (Divorcio en caso de matrimonio celebrado con impedimento matrimonial) 1Celebrado el matrimonio concurriendo alguno de los impedimentos matrimoniales establecidos en los artículos 1.5 a 1.7, podrá solicitar el divorcio, además de los cónyuges, la autoridad competente. El artículo 1.10 no rige en este caso. 2No obstante, en caso de infracción del artículo 1.5, la autoridad competente sólo podrá instar el divorcio mientras alguno de los cónyuges sea menor de edad. Sección 2: Procedimiento Artículo 1.12 (Principio general) El divorcio puede ser declarado por un tribunal de justicia o bien por la autoridad administrativa competente. Artículo 1.13 (Divorcio administrativo) Podrá declararse el divorcio por vía administrativa siempre que los cónyuges estén de acuerdo en divorciarse, en las consecuencias del divorcio y en la sumisión al procedimiento administrativo. Además, es preciso que no haya hijos o hijas menores de la familia y que el matrimonio no haya durado más de diez años. Artículo 1.14 (Medios alternativos de composición de conflictos) 1Una vez presentada la solicitud de divorcio al tribunal, éste, si así lo aconsejan las circunstancias y lo considera adecuado, empleará todos los medios a su disposición para procurar que las partes alcancen un acuerdo sobre el divorcio y sus consecuencias. 2El tribunal asesorará a las partes respecto de la existencia de medios alternativos de resolución de conflictos en este ámbito. TÍTULO 3: PROTECCION EN LAS UNIONES DE PAREJA CAPÍTULO 1: CONTRIBUCIONES ECONÓMICAS EN UNIONES DE PAREJA Artículo 1.15 (Principio general) 1Los integrantes de la pareja deben contribuir a la satisfacción de sus necesidades comunes y personales. 2Los integrantes de la pareja establecen de mutuo acuerdo sus respectivas contribuciones. 195 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 1.16 (Medidas transitorias) Si uno de los integrantes de la pareja incumple su obligación de contribuir a los gastos comunes, el tribunal puede, como medida temporal, imponerle la realización de pagos a favor del otro, por un plazo de tiempo determinado y teniendo presentes las circunstancias previstas en el artículo 1.28. CAPÍTULO 2: HOGAR FAMILIAR Y BIENES MUEBLES DE USO FAMILIAR Artículo 1.17 (Ejercicio de derechos) Será preciso el consentimiento del otro miembro de la pareja o autorización judicial para el ejercicio de derechos relativos al hogar familiar y demás bienes muebles de uso familiar. Artículo 1.18 (Derecho de uso) Ambos integrantes de la pareja tienen derecho a no ser privados del uso del hogar familiar por el otro, salvo que concurra autorización judicial. TÍTULO 4: EFECTOS PATRIMONIALES DE LA DISOLUCION DE LA UNION DE PAREJA CAPÍTULO 1: PRINCIPIOS GENERALES Artículo 1.19 (Interés de los menores) El primer parámetro a tener en cuenta a la hora de proveer económicamente en caso de disolución de la unión es el interés de todo hijo o hija menor de la familia. Artículo 1.20 (Principio de autosuficiencia) Se proveerá para que las partes estén en posición de ser autosuficientes a la mayor brevedad. CAPÍTULO 2: BENEFICIOS Y PERJUICIOS DERIVADOS DE LA UNIÓN DE PAREJA Sección 1: Compensaciones económicas Artículo 1.21 (Distribución) Los beneficios y perjuicios derivados de la unión de pareja se distribuyen por medio de compensación económica en caso de disolución de la unión. 196 Código de Familia Modelo Sección 2: Estimación de los beneficios Artículo 1.22 (Concepto de beneficio) 1Se consideran beneficios (a) los bienes adquiridos por cualquiera de los integrantes de la pareja mientras ésta duró, y (b) los derechos a pensiones adquiridos por cualquiera de los integrantes de la pareja mientras ésta duró. 2No se consideran beneficios los bienes privativos. Artículo 1.23 (Bienes privativos) Se consideran bienes privativos (a) los adquiridos con anterioridad a la unión de pareja, (b) los adquiridos por vía sucesoria, (c) los adquiridos por donación, (d) las indemnizaciones por daño moral, (e) los bienes de uso puramente personal, y (f) los frutos y rendimientos de los bienes privativos. Sección 3: Estimación de los perjuicios Artículo 1.24 (Mantenimiento del nivel de vida) Se entiende que una de las partes ha resultado perjudicada cuando, tras la disolución, no pueda mantener, por sus propios medios, el nivel de vida disfrutado durante la unión de pareja, con independencia de que cuente con bienes privativos. Artículo 1.25 (Contribuciones a planes de pensiones) Al valorar los perjuicios sufridos, se tomarán en consideración las posibilidades de cada parte para sufragar las contribuciones a un plan de pensiones sostenible tras la disolución de la unión. Sección 4: Cuándo un beneficio o un perjuicio deriva de la unión de pareja Artículo 1.26 (Presunción) Se presume que los beneficios y los perjuicios derivan de la unión de pareja cuando uno de sus integrantes se ha abstenido o se abstiene, en todo o en parte, de realizar una actividad laboral remunerada para (a) cuidar a un hijo o a una hija de la familia, (b) atender al hogar, (c) cuidar del otro integrante de la unión de pareja, 197 Código de Familia Modelo (d) cuidar de un tercero en cumplimiento de una obligación moral del otro integrante de la pareja o de ambos, o bien (e) contribuir al negocio o profesión del otro. Sección 5: División de beneficios y perjuicios Artículo 1.27 (División en partes iguales) En caso de disolución de la pareja, sus integrantes se repartirán en partes iguales los beneficios obtenidos y soportarán del mismo modo los perjuicios sufridos. Artículo 1.28 (Excepciones) El tribunal puede apartarse del criterio de la división en partes iguales para otorgar la oportuna consideración a (a) los intereses de cualquier hijo o hija menor de la familia, (b) el cuidado futuro de un hijo o de una hija menor de la familia que esté a cargo de uno de los integrantes de la pareja, (c) el cuidado futuro de personas en interés del otro integrante de la pareja, (d) la duración de la unión, (e) las contribuciones, económicas o no, a la unión, (f) las contribuciones a los bienes, profesión o negocio del otro, (g) la mejora en la capacidad de generar ingresos, (h) los ingresos, la capacidad de generarlos, el patrimonio y los activos futuros, (i) la edad y la salud física y mental, (j) las irregularidades en la gestión económica, o (k) la violencia doméstica. CAPÍTULO 3: COMPENSACIÓN EQUITATIVA Sección 1: El principio de compensación Artículo 1.29 (Contribuciones) Aunque no existan beneficios y perjuicios derivados de la unión de pareja, se puede proveer económicamente a favor de uno de sus integrantes para compensar las contribuciones extraordinarias realizadas en interés del otro o el hecho de haber sufragado los gastos generados por la unión de modo desproporcionado. Artículo 1.30 (Alcance de la compensación económica) La compensación económica alcanzará a las contribuciones referidas, pero puede alcanzar también a los frutos obtenidos como resultado de las mismas. 198 Código de Familia Modelo Sección 2: Solidaridad posterior a la disolución de la unión de pareja Artículo 1.31 (Uniones de larga duración) En los demás casos, sólo se concederá compensación económica, de modo excepcional, en supuestos de disolución de uniones de pareja de larga duración. Artículo 1.32 (Alcance de la compensación económica) El alcance de la compensación económica se encuentra limitado a lo que sea necesario para que el otro integrante de la pareja tenga tiempo suficiente para adaptarse a la nueva situación. CAPÍTULO 4: MEDIDAS DE COMPENSACIÓN ECONÓMICA Artículo 1.33 (Transmisión de bienes) Al establecer las medidas económicas, el tribunal, según estime justo y equitativo, podrá acordar la transmisión al beneficiario de bienes de titularidad conjunta o de titularidad exclusiva de uno solo de los integrantes de la pareja, incluidos los bienes privativos, salvo que se trate de bienes de uso puramente personal. Artículo 1.34 (Pensiones) Los derechos derivados de planes de pensiones pueden ser atribuidos al miembro de la pareja no titular, o bien se puede establecer el reparto de sus rendimientos a medida que se devenguen en el futuro. Artículo 1.35 (Hogar familiar y bienes muebles de uso familiar) A la hora de atribuir el hogar y los bienes muebles de uso familiar, debe prestarse atención prioritaria al interés de todo hijo o hija menor de la familia y al hecho de que alguno de los integrantes de la pareja pueda depender de su uso para el desarrollo de su negocio u otras finalidades. Artículo 1.36 (Efectos empresariales) Los bienes afectos a una actividad comercial o empresarial deben ser adjudicados de manera que no se destruya la unidad económica del negocio. Artículo 1.37 (Pagos periódicos) 1Si no hay patrimonio suficiente para su redistribución al tiempo de la disolución, la compensación económica puede consistir en el pago de prestaciones periódicas en el futuro. 199 Código de Familia Modelo 2 Salvo cuando sea de aplicación el principio de solidaridad recogido en el artículo 1.31, las prestaciones periódicas no serán susceptibles de variación. CAPÍTULO 5: PACTOS DE PAREJA Artículo 1.38 (Derecho a pactar) Los integrantes de la pareja pueden, en cualquier momento, regular las consecuencias económicas de la disolución de la unión por medio de acuerdo escrito. Artículo 1.39 (Relevancia del pacto) El tribunal tomará en consideración el acuerdo alcanzado por las partes, siempre que su resultado global aparezca como justo y razonable a la luz de lo establecido en las disposiciones precedentes. PARTE II: VIOLENCIA DOMÉSTICA Artículo 2.1 (Principio general) 1En caso de violencia doméstica, la víctima puede solicitar al tribunal una orden de protección. 2Se considera violencia doméstica todo acto de violencia física o psíquica. 3En principio, las órdenes de protección no excederán de los dos años. Artículo 2.2 (Medidas) En particular, el tribunal puede ordenar que el acusado (a) abandone, permanezca alejado o se abstenga de entrar en el domicilio de la víctima, (b) se abstenga de acercarse a la víctima, (c) se abstenga de comunicarse con la víctima en modo alguno, y (d) se abstenga de permanecer en determinados lugares. PARTE III: PADRES Y MADRES Y SUS HIJOS O HIJAS TÍTULO I: PRINCIPIOS GENERALES Artículo 3.1 (Interés superior del menor) El interés superior del menor debe presidir toda decisión que afecte a los padres y madres y a sus hijos o hijas. 200 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 3.2 (La opinión del menor) La opinión del menor debe ser siempre considerada, en atención a su edad y madurez. Artículo 3.3 (Derechos de audiencia y de consentimiento) 1A partir de la edad de cinco años, el menor debe ser oído en todo asunto que le concierna. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, no se emprenderá acción alguna ni se tomarán decisiones contrarias a los deseos expresados por el menor. 3A partir de la edad de quince años, el menor tiene derecho a decidir de modo independiente en todas las cuestiones de carácter puramente personal. TÍTULO 2: FILIACION LEGAL CAPÍTULO 1: DETERMINACIÓN INICIAL DE LA FILIACIÓN Artículo 3.4 (Filiación determinada por nacimiento) La mujer que da a luz a un niño o a una niña tiene legalmente determinada la filiación respecto de él o ella. Artículo 3.5 (Filiación determinada por asunción voluntaria) La filiación queda determinada legalmente en cabeza de quien, con el consentimiento de la madre por nacimiento, asume voluntariamente la filiación del nacido. CAPÍTULO 2: IMPUGNACIÓN DE LA FILIACIÓN Artículo 3.6 (Impugnación por error) 1Quien haya creído equivocadamente en su paternidad o maternidad genética, puede impugnar la filiación. 2La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año desde que se tenga conocimiento del error. Artículo 3.7 (Impugnación por el hijo o la hija) 1El hijo o la hija pueden impugnar la filiación establecida de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 3.4 ó 3.5. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, es necesario el consentimiento personal del menor. 3La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año desde que se tenga conocimiento de la posible inexistencia de filiación genética. 4Si la filiación no ha sido impugnada durante la minoría de edad, el hijo o la hija pueden impugnar en el plazo de tres años contados desde la mayoría de 201 Código de Familia Modelo edad, o bien en el plazo de un año desde que tuvieron conocimiento de la possible inexistencia de filiación genética. Prevalece el plazo que llegue más tarde. Artículo 3.8 (Impugnación por el padre o la madre genéticos) 1Quien alegue la paternidad o maternidad genética del hijo o hija puede, durante su minoría de edad, impugnar la filiación legalmente determinada de conformidad con los artículos 3.4 ó 3.5 y obtener el establecimiento de su paternidad o maternidad en aplicación del artículo 3.10. 2La impugnación debe interponerse dentro de los seis meses posteriores al nacimiento del menor. 3Con posterioridad, sólo se admitirán estas pretensiones si no existe relación familiar activa entre el menor y quien tenga legalmente determinada la paternidad o maternidad a su favor. En este caso, la impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año, contado desde que se tiene conocimiento tanto de la posible filiación genética como de la inexistencia de relación familiar activa. A partir de la edad de doce años, se requiere el consentimiento personal del menor. 4No podrá impugnar la filiación quien haya donado voluntariamente material genético. Artículo 3.9 (Impugnación por la madre determinada por nacimiento o por quien tenga legalmente determinada la filiación) 1A pesar de haber consentido a la asunción voluntaria de la filiación, la madre por nacimiento puede impugnar la filiación legalmente establecida de conformidad con el artículo 3.5, siempre que el hijo o la hija no haya alcanzado todavía la edad de quince años y que no exista relación familiar activa entre el menor y quien ostente la filiación que se impugna. 2Con sujeción a los mismos requisitos, quien tenga legalmente determinada la filiación de conformidad con los artículos 3.5 ó 3.10 podra impugnar la maternidad por nacimiento. 3La impugnación debe interponerse en el plazo de un año contado desde que se tenga conocimiento de la inexistencia de relación familiar activa. 4A partir de la edad de doce años, se requiere el consentimiento personal del menor. CAPÍTULO 3: DETERMINACIÓN JUDICIAL DE LA FILIACIÓN Artículo 3.10 (Filiación por determinación judicial) 1La filiación queda legalmente determinada respecto de quien resulte judicialmente declarado padre o madre genético. 2Pueden solicitar la atribución judicial 202 Código de Familia Modelo (a) el hijo o la hija, o (b) quien alegue ser genéticamente el padre o la madre del menor. 3Si hay de la filiación de conformidad con el artículo 3.4 o 3.5, la determinación judicial sólo se podrá solicitar conjuntamente con la impugnación prevista en aplicación del artículo 3.7 o 3.8. CAPÍTULO 4: ADOPCIÓN Sección 1: Requisitos de la adopción Artículo 3.11 (Principio general) Un menor puede ser adoptado por dos personas conjuntamente o por una sola. Artículo 3.12 (Edad y diferencia de edad) 1El adoptante debe haber alcanzado la edad de veinticinco años al tiempo de la adopción. 2La diferencia de edad entre el adoptante y el menor no puede ser inferior a los dieciocho años ni exceder de los cuarenta. Artículo 3.13 (Consentimiento de quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación y de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental) 1Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y los titulares actuales de la responsabilidad parental deben consentir la adopción. 2Cabe prescindir del consentimiento si no es posible obtenerlo o si se deniega, siempre que este rechazo ponga en peligro el interés superior del menor. Artículo 3.14 (Consentimiento del menor) A partir de la edad de doce años, el menor debe consentir personalmente la adopción. Artículo 3.15 (Constitución de la adopción) A solicitud del adoptante, la autoridad competente decretará la adopción, siempre que ello responda al interés superior del menor. Sección 2: Consecuencias de la adopción Artículo 3.16 (Filiación adoptiva) 1La filiación legal del menor queda determinada respecto del adoptante. 2La adopción rompe todo vínculo familiar entre el menor y aquéllos a cuyo favor estuviese legalmente determinada la filiación con anterioridad, así como respecto de sus parientes. 203 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 3.17 (El derecho del adoptado a conocer sus orígenes) Cuando haya alcanzado la edad de quince años, el adoptado tiene derecho a acceder a toda la información concerniente a sus orígenes. Sección 3: Revocación de la adopción Artículo 3.18 (El derecho del adoptado a revocar) 1La autoridad competente podrá revocar la adopción a instancia del hijo o hija. 2La solicitud de revocación deberá producirse dentro de los tres años siguientes a la mayoría de edad del adoptado, o bien dentro del año siguiente al conocimiento de la adopción. Entre estos dos plazos, prevalece el que llegue más tarde. Artículo 3.19 (Consecuencias de la revocación) 1Revocada la adopción, cesa todo vínculo jurídico-familiar entre adoptante y adoptado, así como respecto de sus respectivos parientes. 2Como resultado de la revocación, reviven los vínculos jurídico-familiares que se hubieran extinguido por causa de la adopción. TÍTULO 3: APELLIDO DEL MENOR Artículo 3.20 (Atribución inicial) 1Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y sean titulares de la responsabilidad parental eligen el apellido del hijo o hija al tiempo del nacimiento. 2Pueden elegir el apellido que lleve uno de ellos o cualquier combinación de sus apellidos, siempre que el escogido no exceda de dos apellidos simples. Artículo 3.21 (Cambio de apellido) Quienes tengan legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor y sean titulares de la responsabilidad parental pueden cambiar el apellido del hijo o hija, en tanto no haya alcanzado la edad de cinco años, si (a) el apellido paterno o materno que lleva el menor cambia, (b) la persona cuyo apellido lleva el menor ha dejado de tener legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor, o (c) se ha determinado la filiación legal respecto de otra persona. 204 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 3.22 (Adición de otro apellido) 1Si el menor ha vivido, durante un dilatado período, con personas que lleven un apellido distinto, el menor tiene derecho a añadir este apellido al suyo propio. 2A partir de la edad de doce años, el menor debe consentir personalmente a la adición. Artículo 3.23 (Derecho del hijo o hija a cambiar de apellido) 1Al alcanzar la mayoría de edad, el hijo o la hija tienen derecho a cambiar su apellido. 2El hijo o la hija pueden elegir el apellido de cualquiera de los que hubieran tenido legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor al alcanzar la mayoría de edad o cualquier combinación de sus apellidos, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 3.20(2). 3La solicitud debe realizarse dentro de los tres años siguientes a aquel en que el hijo o la hija haya alcanzado la mayoría de edad o en el año siguiente a tener conocimiento de las razones que justificarían un cambio de apellido según el artículo 3.21 (b) y (c). Prevalece el plazo que llegue más tarde. TÍTULO 4: RESPONSABILIDAD PARENTAL CAPÍTULO 1: PRINCIPIOS GENERALES Artículo 3.24 (Ámbito) Los hijos e hijas menores están sujetos a responsabilidad parental. Artículo 3.25 (Autonomía del menor) La responsabilidad parental se dirige a promover la creciente autonomía del menor. Artículo 3.26 (Cooperación) 1Los titulares de la responsabilidad parental deben cooperar para la consecución del interés superior del menor. 2En caso de conflicto, la autoridad competente empleará todos los medios a su disposición para procurar que las partes alcancen un acuerdo. 3La autoridad competente asesorará a las partes respecto de la existencia de medios alternativos de resolución de conflictos en este ámbito. 205 Código de Familia Modelo CAPÍTULO 2: ATRIBUCIÓN Artículo 3.27 (Responsabilidad parental de quienes tienen legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor) Todo el que tenga legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor tiene atribuida la responsabilidad parental sobre el menor. Artículo 3.28 (Responsabilidad parental de terceros) La autoridad competente puede atribuir responsabilidad parental a terceros, en adición o en lugar de la que corresponde a los que tengan legalmente determinada la filiación, (a) si el menor ha vivido con ese tercero durante más de tres años y esta misma persona solicita que se le atribuya responsabilidad parental, o (b) como medida de protección del menor. Artículo 3.29 (Transmisión de la responsabilidad parental) 1Si los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no viven juntos y no pueden cooperar, la autoridad competente transmite la responsabilidad parental como mejor proceda atendiendo al interés superior del menor. 2La solicitud a la autoridad competente puede ser formulada por cualquiera de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental o por el menor a partir la edad de doce años. Artículo 3.30 (Restablecimiento de la responsabilidad parental) 1Si cambian las circunstancias, la autoridad competente puede volver a atribuir la responsabilidad parental a un titular anterior cuando así lo requiera el interés superior del menor. 2La solicitud a la autoridad competente puede ser formulada por el titular anterior de la responsabilidad parental. CAPÍTULO 3: CONTENIDO Artículo 3.31 (Cuidado del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el derecho y el deber de cuidado y formación del menor. 2El cuidado y la formación comportan el deber de atender al bienestar físico y psíquico del menor y de responder del mismo, así como de promover el desarrollo de su personalidad. 206 Código de Familia Modelo Artículo 3.32 (Integridad del menor) No se sujetará a ningún menor a castigos corporales, abuso emocional o cualquier otro trato degradante. Artículo 3.33 (Administración de los bienes del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el deber y el derecho a administrar los bienes del menor. 2Cuando el menor haya alcanzado la edad de quince años, podrá administrar por sí mismo sus propios ingresos. 3Para transacciones económicas de importancia, se requerirá autorización de la autoridad competente. Artículo 3.34 (Representación legal del menor) 1La responsabilidad parental incluye el deber y el derecho a representar legalmente al menor. 2Los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no ostentarán la representación legal del menor en caso de potencial conflicto de intereses. 3La representación legal en asuntos de especial trascendencia requerirá autorización de la autoridad competente. CAPÍTULO 4: EJERCICIO Artículo 3.35 (Ejercicio conjunto) Existiendo pluralidad de titulares de la responsabilidad parental, ejercerán sus funciones conjuntamente. Artículo 3.36 (Toma de decisiones en asuntos cotidianos) El titular de la responsabilidad parental que conviva con el menor tiene derecho a actuar por sí solo respecto de los asuntos cotidianos del menor. Artículo 3.37 (Decisiones de importancia) 1Existiendo pluralidad de titulares de la responsabilidad parental, las decisiones de importancia se tomarán conjuntamente. 2En caso de que los titulares de la responsabilidad parental no lleguen a acuerdo respecto de una decisión de importancia, la autoridad competente, a instancia de uno de ellos o del menor, siempre que haya alcanzado la edad de doce años, puede determinar a quién corresponde la facultad de decidir sobre este extremo o bien decidir por sí misma, como mejor proceda atendiendo al interés superior del menor. 3En casos de urgencia, cualquiera de los titulares de la responsabilidad parental puede actuar por sí solo y debe informar de su actuación a los restantes titulares a la mayor brevedad. 207 Código de Familia Modelo TÍTULO 5: CONTACTO Artículo 3.38 (Contacto entre el menor y otras personas) 1El menor y los titulares actuales y anteriores de la responsabilidad parental tienen derecho a mantener contacto entre sí salvo cuando ello sea contrario al interés superior del menor. 2El menor tiene derecho a mantener contacto con terceros con los cuales haya tenido una relación personal estrecha, cuando así lo requiera el interés superior del menor. Artículo 3.39 (Derecho de información) Los actuales y anteriores titulares de la responsabilidad parental tienen derecho a ser informados sobre todas la cuestiones personales que afecten al menor, salvo cuando ello sea contrario al interés superior del menor. TÍTULO 6: DEBER DE ALIMENTOS PARA MENORES Artículo 3.40 (Principio general) 1Quienes tienen legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor están obligados a proveer al mantenimiento de sus hijos e hijas menores, lo cual incluye, hasta la edad de tres años, el coste de una atención personalizada. 2La referida obligación se extiende también a cualquier titular de responsabilidad parental, aunque no tenga legalmente determinada la filiación a su favor. Artículo 3.41 (Alimentos para hijos e hijas mayores de edad) Si, alcanzada la mayoría de edad, el hijo o la hija todavía no ha finalizado su formación, el deber de alimentos pervive, como máximo, hasta que haya alcanzado la edad de veinticuatro años. TÍTULO 7: PROTECCIÓN DE MENORES Artículo 3.42 (Principio general) Cuando el interés superior del menor se vea amenazado, la autoridad competente tomará las medidas adecuadas para protegerle. Artículo 3.43 (Medidas) En particular, la autoridad competente puede (a) dictar recomendaciones e instrucciones, (b) nombrar un tutor, 208 Código de Familia Modelo (c) apartar al menor de su actual lugar de residencia, (d) privar a los titulares actuales de responsabilidad parental, y (e) atribuir la responsabilidad parental a sus titulares anteriores o a terceros. Artículo 3.44 (Cese de las medidas) 1La autoridad competente decretará el cese de las medidas cuando el interés superior del menor deje de correr peligro. 2Cualquier titular actual o anterior de responsabilidad parental y el menor que haya alcanzado la edad de doce años, pueden solicitar a la autoridad competente el cese de las medidas. N. de la T.: La versión española de las reglas integrantes del Código de Familia Modelo se ha llevado a cabo procurando respetar al máximo no sólo los contenidos, sino también la filosofía que subyace a este proyecto. Justamente por ello, y al igual que sucede con la versión original inglesa, las reglas no pueden ser leídas con independencia del texto que las explica, puesto que de otro modo es fácil que quien se aproxime a ellas por vez primera identifique apriorísticamente la norma modelo con categorías de su propio derecho interno, que no tienen por qué coincidir netamente con las que el proyecto quiere recoger. La traducción tiene como objetivo facilitar una visión rápida del Código, pero sin que pueda erigirse en elemento único para su interpretación. En la traducción al español he procurado emplear, donde ha sido posible, términos que, manteniendo su sentido jurídico –como se hace en el original con el inglés jurídico-, expresen del modo más neutral posible las categorías que se incluyen en el Código. Pero, insisto una vez más, es peligroso dejarse llevar por expresiones como “beneficios” derivados de una situación de pareja o “alimentos” debidos a menores, puesto que los primeros no coinciden en absoluto con las partidas del art. 1.347 del Código Civil español –aunque en ocasiones puedan producirse solapamientos- y los segundos, aunque sí respondan al concepto de alimentos conocido en el sistema espñol, no debe remitirnos a la idea de alimentos legales o autónomos, sino a uno de los deberes inherentes a la relación paterno-filial o similares, es decir, a uno de los tipos de alimentos institucionales. Por otro lado, la traducción tropieza irremediablemente con el tradicional escollo de la “imposibilidad de traducir”, especialmente recurrente en el ámbito de la traducción jurídica. De ello es ejemplo ilustrativo la palabra que abre el Código, “partnership”. En el Código se incluyen bajo esta expresión tanto las parejas casadas como las no casadas; no obstante, se trata de un término acuñado recientemente por el legislador (así, el británico de 2004) para hacer referencia únicamente a parejas de hecho integradas por personas del mismo sexo, pero que sólo gradualmente va haciendo mella en el lenguaje cotidiano, puesto que sus claros orígenes societarios no invitan a pensar en una relación afectiva. A la hora de traducir, he optado por seguir una metodología parecida a la de las autoras de estas reglas: he optado por una expresión (“uniones de pareja”) que remite a los operadores jurídicos españoles a la noción de relación afectiva no matrimonial, por aparecer de este modo y con más o menos matices en la legislación autonómica, aunque en nuestro contexto haya que incluir también entre ellas a las uniones matrimoniales. Finalmente, quisiera referirme brevemente a la cuestión de la utilización políticamente correcta del lenguaje, cuya virtualidad como herramienta para eliminar la discriminación parece estar fuera de duda. En este sentido, el castellano, como tantas otras lenguas distintas del inglés, tiene la gran desgracia de no contar con el uso generalizado del neutro. De ahí que los textos políticamente correctos resulten farragosos e incluso antiestéticos. No obstante, el original inglés no ofrece dudas en este sentido, de modo que mis esfuerzos se han centrado en intentar hallar las alternativas que, manteniéndose fieles al sentido de la regla, descargasen un poco la lectura (así, por ejemplo, me refiero a “filiación” para evitar reiterar maternidad/paternidad a cada frase). En 209 C6digo de Familia Modelo definitiva, espero que esta versiOn castellana del C6digo facilite una aproximaci6n <igil a este proyecto. 210 MODÈLE DE CODE DE LA FAMILLE (Traduit par Caroline Pellerin-Rugliano et Julien Rey) PARTIE I: PARTENARIATS TITRE 1: PRINCIPES GENERAUX Article 1.1 (Partenariats) 1Les partenariats incluent les mariages. 2Les partenariats incluent les relations non maritales si (a) elles ont duré plus de trois ans, (b) il y a un enfant commun, ou (c) l’un ou chacun des partenaires a contribué de façon substantielle à la relation ou s’il y a contribué dans le seul intérêt de l’autre partenaire. Article 1.2 (Enfant de la famille) L’enfant de la famille inclut (a) un enfant commun des partenaires, et (b) un enfant dont les deux partenaires ont accepté la responsabilité d’assurer le bien-être à long terme. TITRE 2: MARIAGE CHAPITRE 1: FORMATION DU MARIAGE Section 1: Conditions préalables au mariage Article 1.3 (Principe général) Un mariage peut être célébré entre deux personnes de sexe identique ou de sexe différent, par l’autorité compétente selon la procédure permettant la célébration d’un mariage valable. Article 1.4 (Consentement) Le mariage requiert le consentement de deux personnes pour devenir époux l’une de l’autre. 211 Modèle de Code de la Famille Section 2: Empêchements à mariage Article 1.5 (Condition d’âge) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre deux personnes n’ayant pas atteint l’âge de dix-huit ans. Article 1.6 (Degrés de parenté prohibés) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre des personnes ayant un lien de parenté en ligne directe - incluant l’adoption -, ou appartenant à une même fratrie, qu’elle soit issue d’un seul ou de deux parents communs. Article 1.7 (Bigamie) Aucun mariage ne peut être célébré entre deux individus dont l’un est déjà marié avec une autre personne. CHAPITRE 2: NOM Article 1.8 (Nom familial) 1Les époux peuvent conserver leurs noms de famille respectifs ou choisir un nom familial commun. 2Le nom familial peut être le nom de famille utilisé par l’un des partenaires au moment de la célébration du mariage, ou toute combinaison des noms de famille des deux partenaires, dans la limite de deux noms simples. 3Si le nom familial est le nom de famille d’un seul des époux, l’autre époux a le droit d’ajouter le nom qu’il portait précédemment à ce nom familial. CHAPITRE 3: DIVORCE Section 1: Conditions Article 1.9 (Principe général) Le divorce est accordé soit sur demande conjointe de chacun des époux, soit à la demande unilatérale de l’un d’eux. Article 1.10 (Période de réflexion) S’il existe des enfants de la famille encore mineurs, ou si les époux ne peuvent s’accorder sur le principe du divorce ou sur l’une de ses conséquences, le tribunal ne peut accorder le divorce que si la ou les parties renouvellent leur demande après une période de six mois. 212 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 1.11 (Divorce pour violation des empêchements à mariage) 1Lorsqu’un mariage a été célébré en violation de l’un des empêchements à mariage prévus par les articles 1.5 à 1.7, l’autorité compétente, en sus des époux, peut introduire une demande en divorce. L’article 1.10 ne s’applique pas dans ce cas. 2Toutefois, en cas de violation de l’article 1.5, la demande de l’autorité compétente ne peut être introduite que pendant la minorité de l’un des époux. Section 2: Procédure Article 1.12 (Principe général) Le divorce est prononcé soit par un tribunal soit par l’autorité administrative compétente. Article 1.13 (Divorce administratif) Le divorce n’est prononcé par l’autorité administrative compétente qu’à condition que les époux s’accordent sur le principe du divorce, sur toutes ces conséquences, ainsi que sur le fait de soumettre leur divorce à une procédure administrative; qu’il n’y ait aucun enfant de la famille mineur; et que la durée du mariage n’ait pas excédé dix ans. Article 1.14 (Résolution alternative du conflit) 1Lorsqu’une demande de divorce a été formée devant un tribunal, celui-ci, si il le juge opportun eu égard aux circonstances, doit s’efforcer de persuader les parties de trouver un accord sur les questions du divorce et de ses conséquences. 2Le tribunal doit aviser les parties des modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits prévus à cet effet. TITRE 3: PROTECTION AU SEIN DES PARTENARIATS CHAPITRE 1: CONTRIBUTIONS FINANCIERES AU SEIN DES PARTENARIATS Article 1.15 (Principe général) 1Les partenaires doivent contribuer à la satisfaction de leurs besoins conjoints et personnels. 2Ils s’accordent sur leurs contributions respectives. 213 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 1.16 (Mesures provisoires) Si l’un des partenaires néglige son devoir de contribution, le tribunal peut le contraindre, à titre de mesure provisoire, à verser une contribution à l’autre partenaire durant une période déterminée, eu égard aux circonstances mentionnées à l’article 1.28. CHAPITRE 2: LE LOGEMENT ET LES BIENS DE LA FAMILLE Article 1.17 (Exercice des droits) Un partenaire ne peut exercer aucun droit sur le logement et les biens de la famille sans le consentement de l’autre, ou sans une autorisation judiciaire. Article 1.18 (Droit d’occupation) Chaque partenaire a le droit de n’être pas évincé ou exclu du logement de la famille par l’autre partenaire, sauf autorisation judiciaire. TITRE 4: EFFETS PATRIMONIAUX LIES A LA DISSOLUTION DES PARTENARIATS CHAPITRE 1: PRINCIPES GENERAUX Article 1.19 (Intérêts de l’enfant) L’octroi d’une prestation financière doit tenir compte, en premier lieu, de l’intérêt de tout enfant mineur de la famille. Article 1.20 (Principe d’autosuffisance) Les parties doivent être placées en position de devenir autosuffisantes le plus tôt possible. CHAPITRE 2: BENEFICES ET PERTES LIES AU PARTENARIAT Section 1: Prestation financière Article 1.21 (Compensation) Lors de la dissolution du partenariat, les bénéfices et les pertes liés au partenariat sont compensés par l’octroi d’une prestation financière. Section 2: Détermination des bénéfices Article 1.22 (Champ des bénéfices) 1Les bénéfices incluent 214 Modèle de Code de la Famille (a) les biens acquis par chaque partenaire durant le partenariat, et (b) les droits de pension de chaque partenaire accumulés durant le partenariat. 2Les bénéfices n’incluent pas les biens personnels. Article 1.23 (Biens personnels) Les biens personnels incluent (a) les biens dont les partenaires avaient la propriété antérieurement au partenariat, (b) les biens acquis par succession, (c) les biens acquis par donations, (d) l’indemnisation des souffrances physiques et morales, (e) les biens à caractère purement personnel, et (f) les fruits et revenus des biens personnels. Section 3: Détermination des pertes Article 1.24 (Maintien du niveau de vie) Les pertes sont réputées exister lorsqu’un partenaire est dans l’incapacité de conserver, par ses propres moyens, le niveau de vie dont il jouissait durant le partenariat après sa dissolution, et ce, en dépit de ses biens personnels. Article 1.25 (Contributions au régime de pension) L’évaluation des pertes doit également prendre en considération la possibilité pour chaque partenaire de constituer un régime de pension viable après la dissolution du partenariat. Section 4: Liens avec le partenariat Article 1.26 (Présomption) Les bénéfices et les pertes sont présumés être liés au partenariat si l’un des partenaires s’est abstenu ou s’abstient, partiellement ou totalement, d’occuper un emploi rémunéré afin de (a) prendre soin d’un enfant de la famille, (b) prendre soin du ménage, (c) prendre soin de l’autre partenaire, (d) prendre soin d’une tierce personne en exécution d’une obligation morale qui incombe à chacun des partenaires ou à l’autre partenaire, ou (e) contribuer aux affaires ou à la profession de l’autre partenaire. 215 Modèle de Code de la Famille Section 5: Répartition des bénéfices et des pertes Article 1.27 (Égale répartition) Les bénéfices liés au partenariat doivent être répartis à parts égales et les pertes supportées également par les partenaires lors de la dissolution du partenariat. Article 1.28 (Exceptions) Le tribunal peut se départir du principe d’égale répartition afin de prendre en compte (a) l’intérêt de l’enfant mineur de la famille, (b) le futur entretien de l’enfant mineur de la famille par l’un des partenaires, (c) le futur entretien d’autres personnes dans l’intérêt de l’autre partenaire, (d) la durée du partenariat, (e) les contributions patrimoniales et extrapatrimoniales au partenariat, (f) les contributions aux biens, aux affaires ou à la profession de l’autre partenaire, (g) l’amélioration de la capacité de générer des revenus, (h) les revenus, la capacité d’en générer, le patrimoine et les futurs actifs, (i) l’âge, la santé physique et mentale, (j) l’inconduite financière, ou (k) les violences domestiques. CHAPITRE 3: COMPENSATION EQUITABLE Section 1: Principe de compensation Article 1.29 (Contributions) S’il n’y a pas de bénéfices ou de pertes liés au partenariat, une prestation financière peut néanmoins être allouée pour compenser des contributions extraordinaires faites dans l’intérêt de l’autre partenaire, ou pour avoir supporté un partage disproportionné des coûts du partenariat. Article 1.30 (Importance de la prestation financière) La prestation financière doit refléter le montant de ces contributions, mais peut également refléter les fruits résultants de celles-ci. Section 2: Solidarité post partenariat Article 1.31 (Partenariats de longue durée) Dans tous les autres cas, la prestation financière ne peut être octroyée que dans des situations exceptionnelles après un partenariat de longue durée. 216 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 1.32 (Importance de la prestation financière) La prestation financière est limitée à ce qui est nécessaire pour allouer à l’autre partenaire un délai raisonnable afin de s’adapter aux nouvelles circonstances. CHAPITRE 4: MODALITES DE LA PRESTATION FINANCIERE Article 1.33 (Transfert de propriété) Au titre de l’octroi de la prestation financière, tout bien appartenant à chacun des partenaires ou seulement à l’un d’eux, incluant les biens personnels, mais à l’exception des biens à caractère purement personnel, peut être transféré à l’un des partenaires si le tribunal l’estime juste et équitable. Article 1.34 (Droits de pension) Les droits de pension peuvent être transférés d’un partenaire à l’autre, ou être partagés comme ils s’accroissent dans l’avenir. Article 1.35 (Le logement et les biens de la famille) Pour l’attribution du logement et des biens de la famille, il doit être tenu compte, en premier lieu, de l’intérêt de l’enfant mineur de la famille et du fait que l’un des partenaires dépende de l’utilisation de ceux-ci dans ses affaires ou à d’autres fins. Article 1.36 (Actifs de l’entreprise) Les actifs de l’entreprise doivent être attribués de façon à ne pas démanteler les entités économiques. Article 1.37 (Versements périodiques) 1S’il n’y a pas assez de biens pour les redistribuer au jour de la dissolution du partenariat, la prestation financière peut être exécutée sous forme de paiements périodiques futurs. 2Les paiements périodiques futurs ne sont pas sujets à variation, sauf en cas de solidarité post partenariat prévu par l’article 1.31. CHAPITRE 5: ACCORDS DE PARTENARIAT Article 1.38 (Droit de conclure des accords) Les partenaires peuvent, à tout moment, régler les conséquences patrimoniales de la dissolution du partenariat par la conclusion d’un accord écrit. 217 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 1.39 (Portée de l’accord) Le tribunal prend pleinement en considération l’accord des parties tant que le résultat global de cet accord semble juste et raisonnable eu égard aux dispositions qui précèdent. PARTIE II: VIOLENCE DOMESTIQUE Article 2.1 (Principe général) 1En cas de violence domestique, la victime peut introduire une action en justice aux fins d’obtenir une ordonnance de protection. 2La violence domestique inclut tous les actes de violence physique ou psychologique. 3En principe, pareille ordonnance ne peut excéder deux ans. Article 2.2 (Mesures) Le tribunal peut notamment ordonner au défendeur de (a) quitter, demeurer à distance ou s’abstenir d’entrer au domicile de la victime, (b) s’abstenir d’approcher la victime, (c) s’abstenir d’établir des contacts d’aucune sorte avec la victime, et (d) s’abstenir de se trouver dans certains lieux. PARTIE III : PARENTS ET ENFANTS TITRE 1 : PRINCIPES GENERAUX Article 3.1 (Intérêt supérieur de l’enfant) Dans toutes les questions concernant les parents et les enfants, il doit être porté la plus grande attention à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Article 3.2 (Avis de l’enfant) Les avis exprimés par l’enfant doivent toujours être pris en considération, en tenant compte de son âge et sa maturité. Article 3.3 (Le droit de l’enfant à être entendu et à consentir) 1Au-delà de l’âge de cinq ans, l’enfant doit être entendu dans toutes les questions le concernant. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, aucune action ne peut être menée ni aucune décision prise contre les souhaits de l’enfant. 3Au-delà de quinze ans, l’enfant a le droit de prendre des décisions indépendantes dans toutes les questions à caractère purement personnel. 218 Modèle de Code de la Famille TITRE 2 : FILIATION LEGALE CHAPITRE 1 : ATTRIBUTION INITIALE DE LA FILIATION Article 3.4 (Filiation par la naissance) Le parent légal est la femme qui a donné naissance à l’enfant. Article 3.5 (Filiation intentionnelle) Le parent légal est la personne qui, avec le consentement de la mère qui a donné naissance à l’enfant, assume intentionnellement la filiation de l’enfant. CHAPITRE 2 : CONTESTATION DE FILIATION Article 3.6 (Contestation en cas d’erreur) 1La personne qui a présumé par erreur être le parent génétique de l’enfant peut contester sa filiation. 2La contestation doit être soulevée dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de l’erreur. Article 3.7 (Contestation par l’enfant) 1L’enfant peut contester la filiation légale établie par les articles 3.4 ou 3.5. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. 3La contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de la possible absence de lien de filiation génétique. 4Si la filiation n’a pas été contestée durant la minorité de l’enfant, l’enfant peut soulever une contestation dans les trois ans à partir de sa majorité, ou dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de la possible absence de lien génétique de filiation, selon la date qui est la plus tardive. Article 3.8 (Contestation par le parent génétique) 1La personne qui allègue qu’elle est le parent génétique de l’enfant peut, pendant la minorité de l’enfant, contester la filiation des parents légaux établie par les articles 3.4 ou 3.5 et faire établir sa propre filiation par déclaration judiciaire en vertu de l’article 3.10. 2La contestation doit être soulevée dans les six mois qui suivent la naissance de l’enfant. 3Une contestation plus tardive est admissible uniquement s’il n’y a pas de relations familiales actives entre l’enfant et le parent légal dont la filiation est contestée. Dans ce cas, la contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an 219 Modèle de Code de la Famille à partir de la découverte à la fois de la possible filiation génétique et de l’absence de relations familiales actives. Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. 4Aucune contestation ne peut être soulevée par un donneur volontaire de matériel génétique. Article 3.9 (Contestation par la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant ou par un autre parent légal) 1Même si elle a donné son consentement, la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant peut, jusqu’à ce que l’enfant atteigne l’âge de quinze ans, contester la filiation du parent légal établie en vertu de l’article 3.5 s’il n’y a pas de relations familiales actives entre l’enfant et le parent légal dont la filiation est contestée. 2Dans les mêmes circonstances, le parent légal désigné par l’article 3.5 ou 3.10 peut contester la filiation de la mère ayant donné naissance à l’enfant. 3 La contestation doit être soulevée dans un délai d’un an à partir de la découverte de l’absence de relations familiales actives. 4Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, le consentement personnel de l’enfant est requis. CHAPITRE 3 : DECLARATION JUDICIAIRE DE FILIATION Article 3.10 (Filiation par déclaration judiciaire) 1Le parent légal est la personne déterminée par une déclaration judiciaire comme étant le parent génétique de l’enfant. 2Une demande en déclaration peut être formée par (a) l’enfant, ou (b) la personne alléguant être le parent génétique de l’enfant. 3Si une filiation existe conformément à l’article 3.4 ou 3.5 existe, la déclaration ne peut être introduite qu’avec une contestation conforme a l’article 3.7 ou 3.8. CHAPITRE 4 : ADOPTION Section 1 : Conditions préalables de l’adoption Article 3.11 (Principe général) Un enfant mineur peut être adopté par deux personnes conjointement ou par une personne seule. 220 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 3.12 (Âge et différence d’âge) 1Au moment de l’adoption, l’adoptant doit avoir atteint l’âge de vingt-cinq ans. 2La différence d’âge entre l’adoptant et l’enfant doit être au moins égale à dixhuit ans, et ne peut excéder quarante ans. Article 3.13 (Consentement des parents légaux et titulaires de la responsabilité parentale) 1Les parents légaux et les titulaires actuels de la responsabilité parentale doivent consentir à l’adoption. 2On peut être dispensé de ce consentement s’il ne peut être obtenu ou s’il est refusé dans la mesure où ce refus met en danger l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Article 3.14 (Consentement de l’enfant) Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, l’enfant doit personnellement consentir à son adoption. Article 3.15 (Ordonnance d’adoption) Sur demande de l’adoptant, l’autorité compétente prononce l’adoption, si elle est convaincue que c’est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Section 2 : Conséquences de l’adoption Article 3.16 (Filiation par adoption) 1L’adoptant devient le parent légal de l’enfant. 2Les liens familiaux légaux cessent d’exister avec tout parent légal antérieur et avec sa propre famille. Article 3.17 (Droit de l’enfant à connaître ses origines) En atteignant l’âge de quinze ans, un enfant adopté a le droit d’accéder à toutes les informations concernant ses origines. Section 3 : Révocation de l’adoption Article 3.18 (Droit de l’enfant à la révocation) 1L’adoption peut être révoquée par l’autorité compétente sur demande de l’enfant. 2La demande doit être soulevée dans le délai de trois ans suivant la majorité de l’enfant, ou dans l’année qui suit la découverte par l’enfant de son adoption, selon la date qui est la plus tardive. 221 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 3.19 (Conséquences de la révocation) 1Lors de la révocation de l’adoption, les liens familiaux légaux entre l’adoptant et l’enfant et leur famille respective cessent d’exister. 2Les liens familiaux légaux qui ont cessé d’exister suite à l’adoption, renaissent suite à sa révocation. TITRE 3 : NOM DE L’ENFANT Article 3.20 (Attribution initiale) 1Les parents légaux ayant la responsabilité parentale choisissent le nom de famille de l’enfant à sa naissance. 2Ils peuvent choisir le nom de famille porté par un parent légal ou toute combinaison des noms de famille de ses deux parents, dans la limite de deux noms simples. Article 3.21 (Changement de nom) Les parents légaux ayant la responsabilité parentale peuvent changer le nom de famille de l’enfant jusqu’à ce que l’enfant atteigne l’âge de cinq ans si (a) le nom de famille du parent légal, porté par l’enfant, change, (b) la personne dont l’enfant porte le nom n’est plus le parent légal, ou (c) la filiation légale d’une autre personne a été établie. Article 3.22 (Ajout d’un autre nom) 1Si l’enfant a vécu, pendant une durée prolongée, avec des personnes portant un nom de famille différent, il a le droit d’ajouter ce nom de famille à son propre nom de famille. 2Au-delà de l’âge de douze ans, l’enfant doit consentir personnellement à l’ajout de l’autre nom de famille. Article 3.23 (Droit de l’enfant de changer de nom) 1Lorsqu’il atteint l’âge de la majorité, l’enfant a le droit de changer son nom de famille. 2L’enfant peut choisir n’importe quel nom de famille porté par un parent légal au moment où il atteint la majorité ou toute combinaison de noms de famille prévue par l’article 3.20(2). 3La demande doit être formée dans le délai de trois ans après la majorité de l’enfant ou dans le délai d’un an à partir de la découverte des raisons qui justifieraient un changement de nom d’après l’article 3.21(b) et (c), selon la date qui est le plus tardive. 222 Modèle de Code de la Famille TITRE 4 : RESPONSABILITE PARENTALE3 CHAPITRE 1 : PRINCIPES GENERAUX Article 3.24 (Objet) Un enfant mineur est soumis à la responsabilité parentale. Article 3.25 (Autonomie de l’enfant) La responsabilité parentale vise à favoriser une autonomie croissante de l’enfant. Article 3.26 (Coopération) 1Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale coopèrent pour garantir le respect de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. 2En cas de conflit, l’autorité compétente doit s’efforcer de persuader les parties d’aboutir à un accord. 3L’autorité compétente doit aviser les parties des modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits prévus à cet effet. CHAPITRE 2 : ATTRIBUTION Article 3.27 (Responsabilité parentale des parents légaux) Tout parent légal d’un enfant est investi de la responsabilité parentale. Article 3.28 (Responsabilité parentale d’un tiers) L’autorité compétente peut conférer la responsabilité parentale à un tiers, en plus ou à la place des parents légaux (a) si l’enfant a vécu avec ce tiers pendant plus de trois ans et si ce tiers demande la responsabilité parentale, ou (b) comme mesure de protection de l’enfant. Article 3.29 (Transfert de la responsabilité parentale) 1Si les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ne vivent pas ensemble et ne peuvent pas coopérer, l’autorité compétente transfère la responsabilité parentale en fonction de ce que l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant commande. 2La demande présentée à l’autorité compétente peut être formée par tout titulaire de la responsabilité parentale ou par l’enfant âgé de plus de douze ans. 3 NdT : La « responsabilité parentale » telle qu’entendue dans le présent code, doit être distinguée du droit français de la responsabilité civile et ne fait donc nullement référence à la responsabilité des parents du fait de leurs enfants mineurs. 223 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 3.30 (Rétablissement de la responsabilité parentale) 1Si les circonstances changent, l’autorité compétente transfère à nouveau la responsabilité parentale à l’un de ses précédents titulaires si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant le commande. 2La demande présentée à l’autorité compétente peut être formée par le précédent titulaire de la responsabilité parentale. CHAPITRE 3: CONTENU Article 3.31 (Soin de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de prendre soin et d’élever un enfant mineur. 2Le soin et l’éducation incluent la responsabilité et le souci du bien-être mental et physique de l’enfant et le soutien au développement de sa personnalité. Article 3.32 (Intégrité de l’enfant) Aucun enfant ne peut être soumis à des punitions corporelles, des violences psychologiques ou d’autres traitements dégradants. Article 3.33 (Gestion du patrimoine de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de gérer le patrimoine de l’enfant. 2Un enfant qui a atteint l’âge de quinze ans a le droit de gérer ses propres revenus. 3Pour les transactions financières importantes, l’autorisation de l’autorité compétente est requise. Article 3.34 (Représentation légale de l’enfant) 1La responsabilité parentale comprend le devoir et le droit de représenter légalement l’enfant. 2Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale sont exclus de la représentation légale de l’enfant s’il y a un risque de conflit d’intérêts. 3Pour la représentation légale dans les affaires importantes, l’autorisation de l’autorité compétente est requise. CHAPITRE 4 : EXERCICE Article 3.35 (Exercice conjoint) Les différents titulaires de la responsabilité parentale l’exercent en commun. 224 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 3.36 (Prise de décision dans les affaires quotidiennes) Les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale avec lesquels l’enfant vit actuellement, ont le droit de régler seuls les affaires quotidiennes de l’enfant. Article 3.37 (Décisions importantes) 1Les différents titulaires de la responsabilité parentale doivent prendre les décisions importantes conjointement. 2Lorsque les titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ne peuvent se mettre d’accord sur une question importante, l’autorité compétente, sur demande d’un des titulaires de la responsabilité parentale ou de l’enfant qui a atteint l’âge de douze ans, transfère le pouvoir de prendre la décision sur cette question, ou prend la décision elle-même, en fonction de ce que l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant commande. 3Dans les affaires urgentes, un titulaire de la responsabilité parentale peut agir seul et doit par la suite en informer les autres titulaires aussi tôt que possible. TITRE 5 : CONTACT Article 3.38 (Contact entre l’enfant et d’autres personnes) 1L’enfant et les titulaires actuels et antérieurs de la responsabilité parentale ont le droit de maintenir des contacts entre eux à moins que ce ne soit contraire à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. 2L’enfant a le droit de maintenir des contacts avec les tiers avec lesquels il entretient de proches relations personnelles si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant le commande. Article 3.39 (Droit à l’information) Les titulaires actuels et antérieurs de la responsabilité parentale ont le droit d’être informés de toutes les questions personnelles concernant l’enfant à moins que cela ne soit contraire à l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. TITRE 6 : ENTRETIEN DE L’ENFANT Article 3.40 (Principe général) 1Les parents légaux doivent pourvoir à l’entretien de leur enfant mineur, incluant, jusqu’à ce que l’enfant ait atteint l’âge de trois ans, les coûts liés aux personnes prenant soin de l’enfant. 2L’obligation d’entretien incombe pareillement à tout titulaire de la responsabilité parentale qui n’est pas le parent légal de l’enfant. 225 Modèle de Code de la Famille Article 3.41 (Entretien après la majorité) Si, après avoir atteint l’âge de la majorité, l’enfant n’a pas encore terminé ses études, l’obligation d’entretien perdure jusqu’à ce que l’enfant ait atteint, au plus tard, l’âge de vingt-quatre ans. TITRE 7 : PROTECTION DE L’ENFANT Article 3.42 (Principe général) Si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant est menacé, l’autorité compétente prend les mesures appropriées pour protéger l’enfant. Article 3.43 (Mesures) L’autorité compétente peut notamment (a) donner des instructions et des indications, (b) nommer un tuteur, (c) retirer l’enfant de sa résidence actuelle, (d) retirer la responsabilité parentale à ses titulaires actuels, et (e) conférer la responsabilité parentale aux titulaires antérieurs de cette responsabilité ou à un tiers. Article 3.44 (Fins des mesures) 1L’autorité compétente met fin aux mesures de protection de l’enfant si l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant n’est plus menacé. 2Tout titulaire actuel ou antérieur de la responsabilité parentale et l’enfant, qui a atteint l’âge de douze ans, peuvent demander à l’autorité compétente de mettre fin à une mesure de protection de l’enfant. 226 MODELL-FAMILIEN-GESETZ TEIL I: PARTNERSCHAFTEN TITEL 1: ALLGEMEINE PRINZIPIEN Artikel 1.1 (Partnerschaften) 1Partnerschaften sind Ehen. 2Partnerschaften sind nichteheliche Gemeinschaften, wenn (a) sie mehr als drei Jahre gedauert haben, (b) ein gemeinsames Kind vorhanden ist oder (c) ein oder beide Partner erhebliche Beiträge für die Gemeinschaft oder im alleinigen Interesse des anderen Partners erbracht hat oder haben. Artikel 1.2 (Kind der Familie) Ein Kind der Familie ist (a) ein gemeinsames Kind der Partner sowie (b) ein Kind, für dessen langfristiges Wohlergehen beide Partner Verantwortung übernehmen. TITEL 2: EHE KAPITEL 1: EHESCHLIESSUNG Abschnitt 1: Ehevoraussetzungen Artikel 1.3 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Eine Ehe kann von zwei Personen desselben oder verschiedenen Geschlechts vor der zuständigen Behörde im Rahmen des anerkannten Eheschlussverfahrens geschlossen werden. Artikel 1.4 (Zustimmung) Die Ehe erfordert die Zustimmung beider Personen, die Ehe miteinander eingehen zu wollen. 227 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Abschnitt 2: Ehehindernisse Artikel 1.5 (Alterserfordernis) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die das achtzehnte Lebensjahr noch nicht vollendet haben. Artikel 1.6 (Verbotene Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die in gerader Linie miteinander verwandt sind, auch aufgrund Adoption, sowie zwischen Geschwistern und Halbgeschwistern. Artikel 1.7 (Bigamische Ehe) Eine Ehe kann nicht eingegangen werden von Personen, die bereits mit einer anderen Person verheiratet sind. KAPITEL 2: NAME Artikel 1.8 (Familienname) 1Die Ehegatten können ihre jeweiligen Nachnamen behalten oder einen gemeinsamen Familiennamen wählen. 2Der Familienname kann der im Zeitpunkt der Eheschliessung von einem Partner geführte Nachname sein oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen beider Partner, die jedoch zwei Einzelnamen nicht übersteigen darf. 3Besteht der Familienname nur aus dem Nachnamen eines Ehegatten, so hat der andere Ehegatte das Recht, den von ihm oder ihr bislang getragenen Namen dem Familiennamen hinzuzufügen. KAPITEL 3: SCHEIDUNG Abschnitt 1: Voraussetzungen Artikel 1.9 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Die Scheidung wird aufgrund des gemeinsamen Antrags beider Ehegatten oder aufgrund des einseitigen Antrags eines Ehegatten gewährt. Artikel 1.10 (Überlegungsfrist) Wenn minderjährige Kinder der Familie vorhanden sind, oder wenn sich die Ehegatten bezüglich der Scheidung oder ihrer Folgen nicht einigen können, gewährt das Gericht die Scheidung nur, wenn die Parteien oder die Partei ihren Antrag nach einer Frist von sechs Monaten erneuern oder erneuert. 228 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 1.11 (Scheidung wegen Verstosses gegen Ehehindernisse) 1Wurde eine Ehe trotz Vorliegens eines Ehehindernisses nach Artikel 1.5-1.7 geschlossen, so kann ausser den Ehegatten auch die zuständige Behörde die Scheidung beantragen. Artikel 1.10 findet keine Anwendung. 2Im Falle eines Verstosses gegen Artikel 1.5 kann der Antrag von der zuständigen Behörde jedoch nur während der Minderjährigkeit eines Ehegatten gestellt werden. Abschnitt 2: Verfahren Artikel 1.12 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Die Scheidung wird entweder vom Gericht oder von der zuständigen Verwaltungsbehörde gewährt. Artikel 1.13 (Administrative Scheidung) Die Scheidung wird von der zuständigen Verwaltungsbehörde gewährt, wenn sich die Ehegatten über die Scheidung, ihre Folgen sowie über das administrative Verfahren geeinigt haben, keine minderjährigen Kinder der Familie vorhanden sind und die Ehe nicht länger als zehn Jahre gedauert hat. Artikel 1.14 (Alternative Streitbeilegung) 1Wurde ein Antrag auf Scheidung bei Gericht eingereicht, soll das Gericht, soweit es dies unter den gegebenen Umständen für angemessen hält, die Parteien zu überzeugen suchen, eine Einigung bezüglich der Scheidung und ihrer Folgen herbeizuführen. 2Das Gericht soll die Parteien insoweit auf mögliche Verfahren alternativer Streitbeilegung hinweisen. TITEL 3: SCHUTZ IN PARTNERSCHAFTEN KAPITEL 1: FINANZIELLE BEITRÄGE IN PARTNERSCHAFTEN Artikel 1.15 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Die Partner sollen zum Unterhalt für ihre gemeinsamen und persönlichen Bedürfnisse beitragen. 2Sie verständigen sich über ihre jeweiligen Beiträge. 229 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 1.16 (Vorläufige Massnahmen) Vernachlässigt ein Partner seine oder ihre Pflicht zum Unterhalt, kann das Gericht im Wege einer vorläufigen Massnahme diesen Partner für eine bestimmte Zeit zu Unterhaltsleistungen an den anderen Partner verpflichten, wobei es die in Artikel 1.28 genannten Umstände berücksichtigt. KAPITEL 2: FAMILIENHEIM UND FAMILIENGUT Artikel 1.17 (Verfügungen) Ein Partner kann über das Familienheim und das Familiengut nur mit Zustimmung des anderen Partners oder mit gerichtlicher Ermächtigung verfügen. Artikel 1.18 (Benutzungsrecht) Jeder Partner hat das Recht, vom Familienheim weder ausgeschlossen noch zur Räumung desselben gezwungen zu werden, es sei denn dies geschieht aufgrund gerichtlicher Ermächtigung. TITEL 4: FINANZIELLE FOLGEN DER AUFLÖSUNG VON PARTNERSCHAFTEN KAPITEL 1: ALLGEMEINE PRINZIPIEN Artikel 1.19 (Kindeswohl) Bei der Gewährung finanziellen Ausgleichs ist vorrangig das Kindeswohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie zu berücksichtigen. Artikel 1.20 (Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit) Die Parteien sollen so gestellt werden, dass sie so schnell als möglich unabhängig werden. KAPITEL 2: PARTNERSCHAFTSBEDINGTE VOR- UND NACHTEILE Abschnitt 1: Finanzieller Ausgleich Artikel 1.21 (Bereinigung) Bei Auflösung einer Partnerschaft sind partnerschaftsbedingte Vor- und Nachteile durch finanziellen Ausgleich zu bereinigen. 230 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Abschnitt 2: Bemessung von Vorteilen Artikel 1.22 (Bereich der Vorteile) 1Vorteile umfassen (a) das von jedem Partner während der Partnerschaft erworbene Vermögen sowie (b) während der Partnerschaft erworbene Vorsorgeanwartschaften. 2Vorteile umfassen nicht das Eigengut. Artikel 1.23 (Eigengut) Das Eigengut umfasst (a) Vermögen, das einem Partner schon vor der Partnerschaft gehörte, (b) Erbschaften, (c) Geschenke, (d) Genugtuungsansprüche, (e) Gegenstände zum ausschliesslichen persönlichen Gebrauch sowie (f) Einkommen und Ertrag aus Eigengut. Abschnitt 3: Bemessung von Nachteilen Artikel 1.24 (Aufrechterhaltung des Lebensstandards) Nachteile liegen vor, wenn ein Partner nicht in der Lage ist, den während der Partnerschaft genossenen Lebensstandard nach deren Auflösung aufgrund eigener Mittel, ungeachtet des Eigenguts, aufrecht zu erhalten. Artikel 1.25 (Vorsorgebeiträge) Bei der Bestimmung von Nachteilen ist auch die Möglichkeit jedes Partners, nach Auflösung der Partnerschaft eine nachhaltige Vorsorge aufzubauen, zu berücksichtigen. Abschnitt 4: Partnerschaftsbedingtheit Artikel 1.26 (Vermutung) Es wird vermutet, dass Vor- und Nachteile partnerschaftsbedingt sind, wenn ein Partner ganz oder teilweise nicht erwerbstätig war oder ist, um (a) für ein Kind der Familie zu sorgen, (b) für den Haushalt zu sorgen, (c) für den anderen Partner zu sorgen, (d) in Erfüllung einer moralischen Verpflichtung des Partners oder beider Partner für eine dritte Person zu sorgen oder (e) zu Gewerbe oder Beruf des anderen Partners beizutragen. 231 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Abschnitt 5: Teilung von Vor- und Nachteilen Artikel 1.27 (Gleiche Teilung) Bei Auflösung der Partnerschaft sind partnerschaftsbedingte Vor- und Nachteile gleichmässig auf die Partner zu verteilen. Artikel 1.28 (Ausnahmen) Das Gericht kann vom Prinzip der gleichen Teilung abweichen, um folgende Umstände berücksichtigen zu können: (a) das Wohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie, (b) die künftige Sorge für ein minderjähriges Kind der Familie durch einen Partner, (c) die künftige Sorge für Personen im Interesse des anderen Partners, (d) die Dauer der Partnerschaft, (e) finanzielle und nicht finanzielle Beiträge für die Partnerschaft, (f) Beiträge für das Vermögen, Gewerbe oder den Beruf des anderen Partners, (g) erhöhte Karrierechancen, (h) Einkommen, Erwerbsfähigkeit, gegenwärtiges und künftiges Vermögen, (i) Alter, geistige und körperliche Gesundheit, (j) finanzielles Fehlverhalten oder (k) häusliche Gewalt. KAPITEL 3: AUSGLEICH AUFGRUND BILLIGKEIT Abschnitt 1: Kompensationsprinzip Artikel 1.29 (Beiträge) Auch wenn keine partnerschaftsbedingten Vor- und Nachteile vorliegen, kann finanzieller Ausgleich gewährt werden, um aussergewöhnliche Beiträge im Interesse des anderen Partners oder unverhältnismässige Beiträge an die Kosten der Partnerschaft zu kompensieren. Artikel 1.30 (Umfang finanziellen Ausgleichs) Der finanzielle Ausgleich soll der Höhe solcher Beiträge entsprechen, er kann aber auch die daraus erzielten Erträge berücksichtigen. Abschnitt 2: Nachpartnerschaftliche Solidarität Artikel 1.31 (Lange Partnerschaften) In allen anderen Fällen kann finanzieller Ausgleich nur ausnahmsweise nach langer Partnerschaft gewährt werden. 232 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 1.32 (Umfang finanziellen Ausgleichs) Der finanzielle Ausgleich ist insoweit begrenzt, als er notwendig ist, um dem anderen Partner die Anpassung an die neuen Umstände innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist zu erlauben. KAPITEL 4: ART UND WEISE DES FINANZIELLEN AUSGLEICHS Artikel 1.33 (Übertragung von Vermögen) Im Rahmen des finanziellen Ausgleichs kann das Gericht nach billigem Ermessen Vermögen, das beiden oder einem der Partner gehört, einschliesslich des Eigenguts, aber unter Ausschluss der Gegenstände zum ausschliesslichen persönlichen Gebrauch, auf einen Partner übertragen. Artikel 1.34 (Vorsorgeanwartschaften) Vorsorgeanwartschaften können von einem auf den anderen Partner übertragen oder ihre künftige Teilung angeordnet werden. Artikel 1.35 (Familienheim und Familiengut) Bei der Zuteilung des Familienheims und von Familiengut ist vorrangig das Wohl eines minderjährigen Kindes der Familie zu berücksichtigen, sowie ob ein Partner auf deren Benutzung für seinen Beruf oder aus anderen Gründen angewiesen ist. Artikel 1.36 (Geschäftsvermögen) Geschäftsvermögen soll so zugeteilt werden, dass Wirtschaftseinheiten nicht zerstört werden. Artikel 1.37 (Periodische Leistungen) 1Ist im Zeitpunkt der Auflösung der Partnerschaft kein ausreichendes Vermögen zur Verteilung vorhanden, hat der finanzielle Ausgleich durch künftige periodische Leistungen zu erfolgen. 2Ausser im Falle nachpartnerschaftlicher Solidarität gemäss Artikel 1.31 sind künftige periodische Leistungen nicht der Abänderung unterworfen. KAPITEL 5: PARTNERSCHAFTSVEREINBARUNGEN Artikel 1.38 (Recht zum Abschluss von Vereinbarungen) Die Partner können jederzeit die finanziellen Folgen der Auflösung ihrer Partnerschaft im Wege einer schriftlichen Vereinbarung regeln. 233 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 1.39 (Rechtliche Bedeutung einer Vereinbarung) Das Gericht berücksichtigt die Vereinbarung der Parteien gebührend, soweit das Gesamtergebnis der Vereinbarung im Lichte der vorgenannten Bestimmungen angemessen und vernünftig erscheint. TEIL II: HÄUSLICHE GEWALT Artikel 2.1 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Im Falle häuslicher Gewalt kann die betroffene Person beim Gericht den Erlass einer Schutzmassnahme beantragen. 2Häusliche Gewalt umfasst alle Fälle physischer und psychischer Gewalt. 3Grundsätzlich soll die Dauer einer solchen Massnahme zwei Jahre nicht übersteigen. Artikel 2.2 (Massnahmen) Insbesondere kann das Gericht anordnen, dass der Beklagte (a) die Wohnung der betroffenen Person verlässt, ihr fern bleibt und es unterlässt, diese zu betreten, (b) es unterlässt, sich der betroffenen Person zu nähern, (c) es unterlässt, auf irgendeine Art Kontakt mit der betroffenen Person aufzunehmen, und (d) es unterlässt, sich an bestimmten Örtlichkeiten aufzuhalten. TEIL III: ELTERN UND KINDER TITEL 1: ALLGEMEINE PRINZIPIEN Artikel 3.1 (Wohl des Kindes) In allen Eltern und Kinder betreffenden Angelegenheiten ist vorrangig das Kindeswohl zu berücksichtigen. Artikel 3.2 (Meinung des Kindes) Eine vom Kind geäusserte Meinung ist immer zu beachten, wobei sein Alter und seine Reife zu berücksichtigen sind. Artikel 3.3 (Recht des Kindes auf Anhörung und Zustimmung) 1Ab fünf Jahren muss das Kind in allen es betreffenden Angelegenheiten angehört werden. 2Ab zwölf Jahren soll keine Massnahme oder Entscheidung gegen den Willen des Kindes getroffen werden. 234 Modell-Familien-Gesetz 3 Ab fünfzehn Jahren hat das Kind das Recht, selbständig Entscheidungen in allen höchst persönlichen Angelegenheiten zu treffen. TITEL 2: RECHTLICHE ELTERNSCHAFT KAPITEL 1: ERSTZUORDNUNG VON ELTERNSCHAFT Artikel 3.4 (Elternschaft aufgrund Geburt) Rechtlicher Elter ist die Frau, die das Kind gebiert. Artikel 3.5 (Intentionale Elternschaft) Rechtlicher Elter ist die Person, die mit Zustimmung der Geburtsmutter intentional Elternschaft für das Kind übernimmt. KAPITEL 2: ANFECHTUNG DER ELTERNSCHAFT Artikel 3.6 (Anfechtung wegen Irrtums) 1Die Person, die irrtümlich davon ausgegangen ist, genetischer Elter des Kindes zu sein, kann ihre Elternschaft anfechten. 2Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung des Irrtums erfolgen. Artikel 3.7 (Anfechtung durch das Kind) 1Das Kind kann die nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5 begründete rechtliche Elternschaft anfechten. 2Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. 3Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise fehlenden genetischen Elternschaft erfolgen. 4Wurde die Elternschaft während der Minderjährigkeit des Kindes nicht angefochten, kann das Kind innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise fehlenden genetischen Elternschaft anfechten, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. Artikel 3.8 (Anfechtung durch den genetischen Elter) 1Die Person, die behauptet, der genetische Elter des Kindes zu sein, kann während der Minderjährigkeit des Kindes die nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5 begründete Elternschaft rechtlicher Eltern anfechten und ihre eigene Elternschaft nach Artikel 3.10 gerichtlich feststellen lassen. 2Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach der Geburt des Kindes erfolgen. 235 Modell-Familien-Gesetz 3 Eine spätere Anfechtung ist nur zulässig, wenn zwischen dem Kind und dem rechtlichen Elter, dessen Elternschaft angefochten wird, keine gelebte Familienbeziehung besteht. In diesem Fall muss die Anfechtung innerhalb eines Jahres sowohl ab Entdeckung der möglicherweise bestehenden genetischen Elternschaft als auch der fehlenden gelebten Familienbeziehung erfolgen. Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. 4Eine Person, die wissentlich genetisches Material gespendet hat, kann nicht anfechten. Artikel 3.9 (Anfechtung durch die Geburtsmutter oder den anderen rechtlichen Elter) 1Die Geburtsmutter kann trotz Zustimmung die nach Artikel 3.5 begründete Elternschaft des rechtlichen Elter bis zum fünfzehnten Lebensjahr des Kindes anfechten, wenn zwischen dem Kind und dem rechtlichen Elter, dessen Elternschaft angefochten wird, keine gelebte Familienbeziehung besteht. 2Unter denselben Voraussetzungen kann der rechtliche Elter nach Artikel 3.5 oder 3.10 die Elternschaft der Geburtsmutter anfechten. 3Die Anfechtung muss innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der fehlenden gelebten Familienbeziehung erfolgen. 4Ab zwölf Jahren ist die persönliche Zustimmung des Kindes erforderlich. KAPITEL 3: GERICHTLICHE FESTSTELLUNG DER ELTERNSCHAFT Artikel 3.10 (Elternschaft aufgrund gerichtlicher Feststellung) Rechtlicher Elter ist die Person, deren genetische Elternschaft gerichtlich festgestellt wurde. 2Antragsberechtigt sind (a) das Kind, oder (b) die Person, die behauptet, genetischer Elter des Kindes zu sein. 3Besteht eine Elternschaft nach Artikel 3.4 oder 3.5, kann eine gerichtliche Feststellung nur in Zusammenhang mit einer Anfechtung nach Artikel 3.7 oder 3.8 beantragt werden. 1 KAPITEL 4: ADOPTION Abschnitt 1: Voraussetzungen der Adoption Artikel 3.11 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Ein minderjähriges Kind kann von zwei Personen gemeinsam oder von einer Person allein adoptiert werden. 236 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 3.12 (Alter und Altersunterschied) 1Zum Zeitpunkt der Adoption muss die adoptierende Person das fünfundzwanzigste Lebensjahr vollendet haben. 2Der Altersunterschied zwischen der adoptierenden Person und dem Kind muss mindestens achtzehn Jahre und darf höchstens vierzig Jahre betragen. Artikel 3.13 (Zustimmung der rechtlichen Eltern und der Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Rechtliche Eltern und derzeitige Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung müssen der Adoption zustimmen. 2Von der Zustimmung kann abgesehen werden, wenn sie nicht eingeholt werden kann oder wenn sie verweigert wird und diese Verweigerung das Kindeswohl gefährdet. Artikel 3.14 (Zustimmung des Kindes) Ab zwölf Jahren muss das Kind der Adoption persönlich zustimmen. Artikel 3.15 (Adoptionsbeschluss) Auf Antrag der adoptierenden Person spricht die zuständige Behörde die Adoption aus, wenn diese dem Kindeswohl entspricht. Abschnitt 2: Rechtsfolgen der Adoption Artikel 3.16 (Elternschaft aufgrund Adoption) 1Die adoptierende Person wird rechtlicher Elter des Kindes. 2Die rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen zu bisherigen rechtlichen Eltern und ihren jeweiligen Verwandten erlöschen. Artikel 3.17 (Recht des Kindes auf Kenntnis seiner Abstammung) Mit Erreichen des fünfzehnten Lebensjahrs hat das Kind ein Recht auf Zugang zu sämtlichen Informationen, die seine Abstammung betreffen. Abschnitt 3: Aufhebung der Adoption Artikel 3.18 (Recht des Kindes auf Aufhebung) 1Die Adoption kann auf Antrag des Kindes von der zuständigen Behörde aufgehoben werden. 2Der Antrag muss innerhalb von drei Jahren nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Entdeckung der Tatsache der Adoption gestellt werden, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. 237 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 3.19 (Rechtsfolgen der Aufhebung) 1Mit der Aufhebung der Adoption erlöschen die rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen zwischen der adoptierenden Person und dem Kind und ihren jeweiligen Verwandten. 2Die aufgrund der Adoption erloschenen rechtlichen Familienbeziehungen leben mit der Aufhebung wieder auf. TITEL 3: NAME DES KINDES Artikel 3.20 (Erstzuordnung) 1Die rechtlichen Eltern mit elterlicher Verantwortung wählen den Nachnamen des Kindes bei der Geburt. 2Sie können den von einem Elter geführten Nachnamen wählen oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen beider Eltern, die jedoch zwei Einzelnamen nicht übersteigen darf. Artikel 3.21 (Änderung des Namens) Die rechtlichen Eltern mit elterlicher Verantwortung können den Nachnamen des Kindes bis zum Erreichen des fünften Lebensjahrs ändern, wenn (a) sich der Nachname des rechtlichen Elter, dessen Name das Kind trägt, ändert, (b) die Person, deren Name das Kind trägt, nicht mehr rechtlicher Elter ist oder (c) die rechtliche Elternschaft einer anderen Person begründet wurde. Artikel 3.22 (Hinzufügung eines Namens) 1Lebt das Kind über längere Zeit mit Personen, die einen anderen Nachnamen führen, hat es das Recht, diesen Nachnamen seinem eigenen Nachnamen hinzuzufügen. 2Ab zwölf Jahren muss das Kind der Hinzufügung des Namens persönlich zustimmen. Artikel 3.23 (Recht des Kindes zur Änderung des Namens) 1Mit Erreichen der Volljährigkeit hat das Kind das Recht, seinen Nachnamen zu ändern. 2Das Kind kann jeden Nachnamen wählen, den ein rechtlicher Elter im Zeitpunkt seines Erreichens der Volljährigkeit trägt, oder eine Kombination der Nachnamen entsprechend Artikel 3.20(2). 3Der Antrag muss innerhalb von drei Jahren ab Erreichen der Volljährigkeit oder innerhalb eines Jahres ab Kenntnis der Tatsachen, die eine Namens- 238 Modell-Familien-Gesetz änderung nach Artikel 3.21(b) und (c) rechtfertigen würden, gestellt werden, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt später eintritt. TITEL 4: ELTERLICHE VERANTWORTUNG KAPITEL 1: ALLGEMEINE PRINZIPIEN Artikel 3.24 (Gegenstand) Ein minderjähriges Kind steht unter elterlicher Verantwortung. Artikel 3.25 (Selbständigkeit des Kindes) Die elterliche Verantwortung hat zum Ziel, die zunehmende Selbständigkeit des Kindes zu fördern. Artikel 3.26 (Zusammenarbeit) 1Die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung arbeiten zusammen, um das Kindeswohl zu fördern. 2 Im Falle eines Konfliktes soll die zuständige Behörde die Parteien zu überzeugen suchen, eine Einigung herbei zu führen. 3Die zuständige Behörde soll die Parteien insoweit auf mögliche Verfahren alternativer Streitbeilegung hinweisen. KAPITEL 2: ZUORDNUNG Artikel 3.27 (Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung) Jedem rechtlichen Elter eines Kindes steht die elterliche Verantwortung zu. Artikel 3.28 (Elterliche Verantwortung dritter Personen) Die zuständige Behörde kann die elterliche Verantwortung einer dritten Person, die an die Stelle der oder neben die rechtlichen Eltern tritt, einräumen, (a) wenn das Kind mit dieser dritten Person mehr als drei Jahre gelebt hat und die dritte Person die elterliche Verantwortung beantragt, oder (b) als Kindesschutzmassnahme. Artikel 3.29 (Übertragung elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Wenn die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung nicht zusammen leben und nicht kooperieren können, überträgt die zuständige Behörde die elterliche Verantwortung entsprechend den Erfordernissen des Kindeswohls. 2Der Antrag an die zuständige Behörde kann von jedem Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung und vom Kind ab dem zwölften Lebensjahr gestellt werden. 239 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 3.30 (Rückübertragung elterlicher Verantwortung) 1Haben sich die Umstände verändert, überträgt die zuständige Behörde die elterliche Verantwortung auf einen früheren Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung zurück, wenn das Kindeswohl dies erfordert. 2Der Antrag an die zuständige Behörde kann vom früheren Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung gestellt werden. KAPITEL 3: INHALT Artikel 3.31 (Sorge für das Kind) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, für ein minderjähriges Kind zu sorgen und es aufzuziehen. 2Sorge und Erziehung beinhalten die Fürsorge und Verantwortung für das geistig-seelische und körperliche Wohlergehen des Kindes und die Unterstützung der Entwicklung seiner Persönlichkeit. Artikel 3.32 (Unversehrtheit des Kindes) Kein Kind darf körperlichen Strafen, emotionalem Missbrauch oder einer anderen herabwürdigenden Behandlung unterworfen werden. Artikel 3.33 (Verwaltung des Kindesvermögens) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, das Vermögen des Kindes zu verwalten. 2Ein Kind, das das fünfzehnte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, hat das Recht, seine eigenen Einkünfte zu verwalten. 3Für bedeutende finanzielle Geschäfte ist die Genehmigung der zuständigen Behörde erforderlich. Artikel 3.34 (Rechtliche Vertretung des Kindes) 1Die elterliche Verantwortung umfasst die Pflicht und das Recht, das Kind rechtlich zu vertreten. 2Die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung sind von der rechtlichen Vertretung des Kindes ausgeschlossen, wenn ein möglicher Interessenkonflikt besteht. 3Für die rechtliche Vertretung in bedeutenden Angelegenheiten ist die Genehmigung der zuständigen Behörde erforderlich. KAPITEL 4: AUSÜBUNG Artikel 3.35 (Gemeinsame Ausübung) Mehrere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung üben die elterliche Verantwortung gemeinsam aus. 240 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 3.36 (Entscheidungen in täglichen Angelegenheiten) Der Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung, bei dem sich das Kind gegenwärtig aufhält, hat das Recht, im Hinblick auf die täglichen Angelegenheiten des Kindes allein zu handeln. Artikel 3.37 (Wichtige Entscheidungen) 1Mehrere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung müssen wichtige Entscheidungen gemeinsam treffen. 2Können sich die Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung in einer wichtigen Angelegenheit nicht einigen, überträgt die zuständige Behörde auf Antrag eines Inhabers elterlicher Verantwortung oder des Kindes, das das zwölfte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, die Entscheidungsbefugnis für diese Angelegenheit oder entscheidet selbst, je nachdem, was das Kindeswohl erfordert. 3In dringenden Fällen kann ein Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung allein handeln, er muss die anderen Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung sobald als möglich informieren. TITEL 5: UMGANG Artikel 3.38 (Umgang des Kindes mit anderen Personen) 1Das Kind und gegenwärtige sowie frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung haben ein Recht zum Umgang miteinander, sofern dies dem Kindeswohl nicht widerspricht. 2Das Kind hat ein Recht zum Umgang mit dritten Personen, zu denen es eine enge persönliche Beziehung besitzt, sofern dies das Kindeswohl erfordert. Artikel 3.39 (Recht auf Information) Gegenwärtige und frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung haben das Recht, über alle das Kind betreffenden persönlichen Angelegenheiten informiert zu werden, sofern dies dem Kindeswohl nicht widerspricht. TITEL 6: KINDESUNTERHALT Artikel 3.40 (Allgemeines Prinzip) 1Rechtliche Eltern sind zum Unterhalt ihrer minderjährigen Kinder verpflichtet, einschliesslich der Kosten für eine persönliche Betreuungsperson bis das Kind das dritte Lebensjahr vollendet hat. 2Die Unterhaltspflicht besteht auch für einen Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung, der nicht rechtlicher Elter ist. 241 Modell-Familien-Gesetz Artikel 3.41 (Unterhalt nach Volljährigkeit) Hat das Kind nach Erreichen der Volljährigkeit seine Ausbildung noch nicht abgeschlossen, so besteht die Unterhaltspflicht fort, längstens bis das Kind das vierundzwanzigste Lebensjahr vollendet hat. TITEL 7: KINDESSCHUTZ Artikel 3.42 (Allgemeines Prinzip) Ist das Kindeswohl gefährdet, erlässt die zuständige Behörde die angemessenen Massnahmen, um das Kind zu schützen. Artikel 3.43 (Massnahmen) Insbesondere kann die zuständige Behörde (a) Belehrungen und Anweisungen erteilen, (b) einen Vormund bestellen, (c) das Kind von seinem gegenwärtigen Aufenthaltsort entfernen, (d) gegenwärtigen Inhabern die elterliche Verantwortung entziehen und (e) früheren Inhabern elterlicher Verantwortung oder dritten Personen die elterliche Verantwortung einräumen. Artikel 3.44 (Aufhebung der Massnahmen) 1Die zuständige Behörde hebt die Kindesschutzmassnahmen auf, wenn das Kindeswohl nicht mehr gefährdet ist. 2Jeder gegenwärtige und frühere Inhaber elterlicher Verantwortung und das Kind, das das zwölfte Lebensjahr vollendet hat, kann die Aufhebung einer Kindesschutzmassnahme durch die zuständige Behörde beantragen. 242 BIBLIOGRAPHY In order to be able to properly understand the laws and written works cited in this bibliography, a brief overview of the structure and of the nature of the references is certainly helpful! We have divided this bibliography into three parts: the first cites international conventions that were of useful reference, the second comparative works that were of significance, and the third the statutes and academic literature of individual countries that provided interesting approaches for our work. If the statutes from “civil law” countries perhaps appear a little on the lean side, this is due to the nature of the codified system of law, whereby many new laws may be enacted, which, however, ultimately result in a “mere” amendment to the civil code already in existence, as family law comprises a part of most of these codes. Not only with respect to these codes, but also with respect to other codified statutes, such as the California Family Code, we have always used the 2006 consolidated version. In contrast, the traditionally “common law” legal systems recognize no such overarching codification of civil law; thus, the laws cited for those countries are enacted individually and consequently appear much more numerous. For these laws, we make reference to the year in which they were enacted. Particularly where the legislative competence is divided between the federal and state bodies, such as in the USA, Canada and Australia, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to cite every law pertaining to every family law matter from every state/province in existence. We have thus made a selection from the laws of these countries, citing those that provide innovative and modern approaches which were of use to us in stimulating our creative thought processes for this Model Family Code. Where no state or province is stated, the law in question is one enacted at federal level. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS European Convention on Contact Concerning Children 2003 European Convention on Human Rights 1953 European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Custody and on Restoration of Custody of Children 1980 European Convention on the Adoption of Children 1967 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights 1996 Hague Convention for the Protection of Children 1996 243 Bibliography Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption 1993 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations 1973 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 White Paper on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of Parentage 2002 COMPARATIVE WORKS Bates, Frank (ed.), The Child and the Law. New York: Oceana, 1976 Bergmann, Alexander/Ferid, Murad/Henrich, Dieter, Internationales Eheund Kindschaftsrecht. (6th ed.), Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Standesamtswesen, looseleaf publication, updated periodically Boele-Woelki, Katharina (ed.), Common Core and Better Law in European Family Law. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2005 Boele-Woelki, Katharina (ed.), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2003 Boele-Woelki, Katharina/Braat, Bente/Sumner, Ian (eds.), Grounds for Divorce, vol. I, European Family Law in Action, Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2003 Boele-Woelki, Katharina/Braat, Bente/Sumner, Ian (eds.), Maintenance between Former Spouses, vol. II, European Family Law in Action, Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2003 Boele-Woelki, Katharina/Braat, Bente/Sumner, Ian (eds.), Parental Responsibilities, vol. III, European Family Law in Action, Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2005 Boele-Woelki, Katharina/Ferrand, Frédérique/González Beilfuss, Cristina/Jänterä-Jareborg, Maarit/Lowe, Nigel/Martiny, Dieter/Pintens, Walter, Principles of European Family Law Regarding Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2004 244 Bibliography Boele-Woelki, Katharina/Fuchs, Angelika (eds.), Legal Recognition of SameSex Couples in Europe. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2003 Bonomi, Andrea/Steiner, Marco (eds.), Les regimes Matrimoniaux en Droit Comparé et en Droit International Privé. Geneva: Libraire Droz, 2006 Braat, Bente, Indépendance et interdépendance des époux dans le régime matrimonial légal des droits français, néerlandais et Suisse. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2004 Coester, Michael, Das Kindeswohl als Rechtsbegriff. Die richterliche Entscheidung über die elterliche Sorge nach Zerfall der Familiengemeinschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1983 Cretney, Stephen, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: a History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 Curry-Sumner, Ian, All’s well that ends registered? The Substantive and Private International Law Aspects of Non-Marital Registered Relationships in Europe. Antwerp/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2005 Dewar, John/Parker, Stephen (eds.), Family Law, Processes, Practices and Pressures. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003 Dopffel, Peter (ed.), Kindschaftsrecht im Wandel. Zwölf Länderberichte mit einer vergleichenden Summe. Tübingen: Mohr, 1994 Eekelaar, John M./Katz, Sanford N. (eds.), Family Violence: an International and Interdisciplinary Study. Toronto: Butterworths, 1978 Eekelaar, John M./Katz, Sanford N. (eds.), Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies - Areas of Legal, Social and Ethical Change: An International and Interdisciplinary Study. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980 Eekelaar, John M./Katz, Sanford N. (eds.), The Resolution of Family Conflict: Comparative Legal Perspectives. Toronto: Butterworths, 1984 Eekelaar, John M./Nhlapo, Thandababtu (eds.), The Changing Family: Family Forms and Family Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998 Eekelaar, John M./Pearl, David (eds.), An Ageing World: Dilemmas and Challenges for Law and Social Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 Eekelaar, John M./Sarcevic, Peter (eds.), Parenthood in Modern Society. Tübingen: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993 Glendon, Mary Ann (ed.), Persons and Family. vol. IV, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Tübingen: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973-2006 245 Bibliography Hamilton, Carolyn/Perry, Alison, Family Law in Europe. (2nd ed.), London: Butterworths, 2002 Henrich, Dieter/Schwab, Dieter (eds.), Der Schutz der Familienwohnung in Europäischen Rechtsordnungen. Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1995 Hofer, Sibylle/Schwab, Dieter/Henrich, Dieter (eds.), From Status to Contract? – Die Bedeutung des Vertrages im europäischen Familienrecht. Bielefeld: Gieseking, 2005 Hofer, Sibylle/Schwab, Dieter/Henrich, Dieter (eds.), Scheidung und nachehelicher Unterhalt im europäischen Vergleich. Bielefeld: Gieseking, 2003 International Society of Family Law (ed.), The International Survey of Family Law. (1996-2006), Bristol: Jordan Publishing Limited, updated annually Katz, Sanford N./Eekelaar, John M./Maclean, Mavis (eds.) Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 Lødrup, Peter/Modvar, Eva (eds.), Family Life and Human Rights. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2004 Lowe, Nigel/Douglas, Gillian (eds.), Families Across Frontiers. Tübingen: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996 Meulders-Klein, Marie-Thérèse/Eekelaar, John M. (eds.), Family, State and Individual Economic Security. vols. I & II, Brussels: Story Scientia and Kluwer, 1988 Schwab, Dieter/Henrich, Dieter (eds.), Entwicklungen des europäischen Kindschaftsrechts. (2nd ed.), Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1996 Schwab, Dieter/Henrich, Dieter (eds.), Eheliche Gemeinschaft, Partnerschaft und Vermögen im europäischen Vergleich, vol. 6, Beiträge zum europäischen Familienrecht, Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1999 Schwab, Dieter/Henrich, Dieter (eds.), Familiäre Solidarität. Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1997 Schwenzer, Ingeborg, Restitution of Benefits in Family Relationships, in Schlechtriem, Peter (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. X: Restitution, Frankfurt am Main: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997 Schwenzer, Ingeborg, Vom Status zur Realbeziehung. Familienrecht im Wandel. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987 246 Bibliography Stephan, Jan (ed.), International Survey of Laws on Assisted Procreation. Zurich: Schulthess, 1990 Süss, Rembert/Ring, Gerhard (eds.), Eherecht in Europa. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006 Wintemute, Robert/Andenæs, Mads, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001 AUSTRALIA STATUTES Adoption Act 2000 (New South Wales) Child Protection Act 1999 (Queensland) Child Protection Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (New South Wales) Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (New South Wales) Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976 (New South Wales) Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Queensland) Family Law Act 1975 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Victoria) Family Law Reform Act 1996 Family Violence Act 2004 (Tasmania) Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (Western Australia) Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Victoria) Marriage Act 1961 Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania) Status of Children Act 1978 (Queensland) Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Queensland) 247 Bibliography MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Altobelli, Tom, Family law in Australia: principles and practice. Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003 Dickey, Anthony, Family Law. (4th ed.), Sydney: Law Book Company, 2002 Monahan, Geoff/Young, Lisa, Family Law in Australia. (6th ed.), Sydney: Butterworths, 2006 AUSTRIA STATUTES Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) Ehegesetz (Marriage Act) 1938 Erlass des Bundesministeriums für Justiz über Babynest und anonyme Geburt (Order of the Federal Ministry for Justice on Baby Nest and Anonymous Birth) 2001 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz (Act on Assisted Reproduction) 1992 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Deixler-Hübner, Astrid, Das neue Eherecht. Vienna: WUV, 1999 Schwimann, Michael, Familienrecht: mit dem neuen KindschaftsrechtsÄnderungsgesetz 2001. (4th ed.), Vienna: Orac, 2002 BELGIUM STATUTES Code Civil / Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code) Code Judiciaire / Gerechtelijk Wetboek (Judicial Code) MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Verwilghen, Michel/De Valkeneer, Roland (eds.), Relations familiales internationales. Brussels: Bruylant, 1993 248 Bibliography CANADA STATUTES Adoption Information Disclosure Act 2005 (Ontario) Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 Child and Family Services Act 1990 (Ontario) Children’s Law Reform Act 1990 (Ontario) Civil Code (Québec) Civil Marriage Act 2005 Divorce Act 1986 Family Law Act 1990 (Ontario) Marriage Act 1990 (Ontario) Parental Responsibility Act 2000 (Ontario) MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Kronby, Malcolm C., Canadian Family Law. (9th ed.), Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd., 2006 Zuker, Marvin/Hammond, Randolph C./Flynn, Roderick C., Children's Law Handbook. Toronto: Carswell, 2005 CROATIA STATUTES Family Act 2003 Protection Against Family Violence Act 2003 DENMARK STATUTES Adoptionsloven (Adoption Act) 1999 Ægteskabslov (Marriage Act) 1999 Børnelov (Children Act) 2007 (not yet in force) 249 Bibliography Børnelov (Children Act) 2001 Lov om forældremyndighed og samvær (Act on Parental Authority and Contact) 1995 Lov om kunstig befrugtning (Artificial Reproduction Act) 1997 Lov om registreret partnerskab (Registered Partnership Act) 1989 Værgemålslov (Guardianship Act) 1995 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Lund-Andersen, Ingrid/Munck Noe/Nørgaard, Irene, Familieret. (5th ed.), Copenhagen: DJØF, 2003 ENGLAND STATUTES Adoption and Children Act 2002 Children Act 1989 Child Support Act 1991 Civil Partnership Act 2004 Family Law Act 1996 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004 Marriage Act 1949 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Bainham, Andrew, Children: The Modern Law. (3rd ed.), Bristol: Jordan Publishing Limited, 2005 Cretney, Stephen M., Same-Sex Relationships, From ‘Odious Crime’ to Gay Marriage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 Cretney, Stephen M./Masson, Judith M./Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, Principles of Family Law. (7th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 250 Bibliography Cretney, Stephen M./Probert, Rebecca, Cretney’s Family Law. (5th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 Fortin, Jane, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law. (2nd ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 Hershman, David/McFarlane, Andrew, Children Act Handbook 2006/07. Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2006 Lowe, Nigel/Douglas, Gillian, Bromley’s Family Law. (10th ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 FINLAND STATUTES Adoption Act 1985 Child Custody and the Right of Access Act 1983 Child Maintenance Act 1975 Marriage Act 1929 Paternity Act 2002 Registered Partnership Act 2001 FRANCE STATUTES Code Civil (Civil Code) MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Bénabent, Alain, Droit civil: La Famille. (11th ed.), Paris: Litec, 2003 Boulanger, François, Droit civil de la famille. (4th ed.), Paris: Économica, 2000 Colomer, André, Droit civil – régimes matrimoniaux. (11th ed.), Paris: Litec, 2002 Études Offertes à Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi, Des Concubinages – Droit interne, droit international, droit comparé. Paris: Litec, 2002 Malaurie, Philippe/Aynès, Laurent, Les régimes matrimoniaux. Paris: Defrénois, 2004 251 Bibliography Terré, François/Simler, Philippe, Droit civil: Les régimes matrimoniaux. (3rd ed.), Paris: Dalloz, 2001 GERMANY STATUTES Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz (Adoption Placement Act) 2002 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) Embryonenschutzgesetz (Embryo Protection Act) 1990 Gewaltschutzgesetz (Protection Against Violence Act) 2001 Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz (Registered Partnership Act) 2001 Verordnung über die Behandlung der Ehewohnung und des Hausrats (Regulation on the Treatment of the Marital Home and Contents) 1944 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Gernhuber, Joachim/Coester-Waltjen Dagmar, Lehrbuch des Familienrechts. (5th ed.), Munich: Beck, 2006 Grziwotz, Herbert, Nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaft. (4th ed.), Munich: Beck, 2006 Johannsen, Kurt H./Henrich, Dieter, Eherecht. Scheidung - Trennung – Folgen. (4th ed.), Munich: Beck, 2003 Lüderitz, Alexander/Dethloff, Nina, Familienrecht. (28th ed.), Munich: Beck, 2006 Schwab, Dieter, Familienrecht. (14th ed.), Munich: Beck, 2006 Schwab, Dieter, Handbuch des Scheidungsrechts. (5th ed.), Munich: Vahlen, 2004 THE NETHERLANDS STATUTES Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code) Embryowet (Embryo Act) 2002 Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting (Assisted Reproduction (Donor Information) Act) 2004 252 Bibliography Wet op de jeugdzorg (Juvenile Care Act) 2005 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Vlaardingerbroek, P. (ed.), Het hedendaagse personen- en familierecht. Deventer: Kluwer, 2004 NEW ZEALAND STATUTES Adoption Act 1955 Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 Care of Children Act 2004 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 Child Support Act 1991 Civil Union Act 2004 Domestic Violence Act 1995 Family Courts Act 1980 Family Proceedings Act 1980 Guardianship Act 1968 Human Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act 2004 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 Status of Children Act 1969 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Henaghan, Mark/Atkin, Bill, Family Law Policy in New Zealand. (2nd ed.), Wellington: Butterworths, 2002 Webb, Dick/Atkin, Bill/Caldwell, John/Adams, John/Henaghan, Mark/Clarkson, Dale/Partridge, Dianne/Treadwell, Paul, Family Law in New Zealand. (12th ed.), Wellington: Butterworths, 2005 253 Bibliography NORWAY STATUTES Barneloven (Children Act) 1981 Lov om adopsjon (Adoption Act) 1986 Lov om ekteskap (Marriage Act) 1993 Lov om registrert partnerskap (Registered Partnership Act) 1993 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Smith, Lucy/Lødrup, Peter, Barn og foreldre : forholdet mellom barn og foreldre etter barneloven av 1981 med senere endringer. Oslo: Ad Notam Forlag, 2004 SERBIA STATUTES Family Act 2005 SPAIN STATUTES Código Civil (Civil Code) MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Lacruz Berdejo, José Luis/Sancho Rebullida, Francisco de Asís/Luna Serrano, D. Agustín/Delgado Echeverría, Jesús/Rivero Hernández, Francisco/Rams Albesa, Joaquín José, Elementos de Derecho de Civil. Tomo IV. Familia. Madrid: Dykinson, 2005 SWEDEN STATUTES Äktenskapsbalken (Marriage Code) 1987 Föräldrabalken (Code on Parents, Children and Guardians) 1949 Lag om befruktning utanför kroppen (In-vitro Fertilisation Act) 1988 254 Bibliography Lag om insemination (Act on Insemination) 1984 Lag om registrerat partnerskap (Registered Partnership Act) 1994 Lagrådsremiss Assisterad befruktning och föräldraskap (Government Bill on Assisted Procreation) 2005 Sambolag (Cohabitation Act) 2003 SWITZERLAND STATUTES Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz (Act on Assisted Reproduction) 1998 Partnerschaftsgesetz (Registered Partnership Act) 2004 Zivilgesetzbuch (Civil Code) MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS Deschenaux, Henri/Steinauer, Paul-Henri/Baddeley, Margareta, Les effets du mariage. Berne: Stämpfli, 2000 Hegnauer, Cyril, Grundriss des Kindesrechts. (5th ed.), Berne: Stämpfli, 1999 Hegnauer, Cyril/Breitschmid, Peter, Grundriss des Eherechts. (4th ed.), Berne: Stämpfli, 2000 Meier, Philippe/Stettler, Martin, Droit civil VI/1: L’établissement de la filiation. (2nd ed.), Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 2002 Meier, Philippe/Stettler, Martin, Droit civil VI/2: Les effets de la filiation. (2nd ed.), Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 2002 Schwenzer, Ingeborg (ed.), FamKomm Scheidung: Kommentar zum Familienrecht. Berne: Stämpfli, 2005 Werro, Franz, Concubinage, mariage et démariage. Berne: Stämpfli, 2000 USA STATUTES Act Relating to Civil Unions 2000 (Vermont) Civil Union Law 2005 (Connecticut) Domestic Partnership Act 2004 (New Jersey) 255 Bibliography Family Code (California) Uniform Adoption Act 1994 Uniform Marital Property Act 1983 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 1970/1973 Uniform Parentage Act 2000/2002 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 1983 Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act 1988 Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 1988 MAJOR FAMILY LAW WORKS American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. Newark: Matthew Bender, 2002 Katz, Sanford N., Family Law in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 Krause, Harry D./Meyer, David D., Black Letter on Family Law. (3rd ed.), St. Paul: West Group, 2004 Krause, Harry D./Meyer, David D., Family Law: In a Nutshell. (4th ed.), St. Paul: West Group, 2003 Weyrauch, Walter O./Katz, Sanford N., American Family Law in Transition. 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