aplicatiu guia docent provisional

APLICATIU
GUIA DOCENT
PROVISIONAL
1. Dades del mòdul
Racionalidad
Nom del mòdul
Codi
10
Crèdits ECTS
Curs i període en el que
s’imparteix
Segundo semestre
http://www.uab.cat/departament/filosofia/
Horari
Lloc on s’imparteix
Facultat de Filosofia i Lletres
Llengües
Inglés / Castellano / Catalan
Coordinador del mòdul
Nom professor/a
Departament
Universitat/Institució
Despatx
Telèfon (*)
e-mail
Horari de tutories
Thomas Sturm
Filosofía
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
B7/1062
935 868 174
[email protected]
Jueves, 11:00-13:00
2. Equip docent
Nom professor/a
Departament
Universitat/Institució
Despatx
Telèfon (*)
e-mail
Horari de tutories
Josefa Torribio
Filosofía
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
B7/1062
935868174
[email protected]
Martes, 14:00-15:30
Nom professor/a
Antoni Defez
Filosofía
Departament
Universitat/Institució
Universitat de Girona
Despatx
Telèfon (*)
e-mail
Horari de tutories
[email protected]
23 de Mayo & 13 de Junio, 14:00-15:30
3.- Prerequisits
(prerequisits oficials i/o coneixements necessaris per a seguir correctament
l’assignatura)
Este módulo no tiene prerequisitos específicos.
There are no specific prerequisites for this module.
4.- Contextualització i objectius formatius del mòdul
The concept of rationality plays a central role in both theoretical and practical philosophy, and in
the sciences as well. We hope that theories of rationality provide us with appropriate tools for a
number of important tasks: We want to be clear about whether the reasons for our beliefs and
actions are valid. We want to understand also how far we are responsible for our beliefs and
decisions, given that we attempt to support them by reasons which can be evaluated too. At the
same time, many philosophers argue that identifying reasons with considerations that count in
favor of an action or an attitude fails to distinguish between the right and wrong kind of reasons
in certain contexts; and a theory of rationality should deal with this issue too. Furthermore,
rationality seems to be closely related to language: We have to communicate with others about
our beliefs and decisions, we try to convince them or realize our intentions using linguistic
means. To do so, language must itself possess features of rationality, such as normativity or
intentionality.
Can a theory of rationality achieve such ends and solve the tasks we assign to it? On a
closer look, the concept of rationality is highly fragmented, and so are the theories. What do we
mean when we say that something, or someone, is rational (or irrational)? How should a theory
of rationality be built, and what are its potentials and limits? How is rationality related to
language? In the answers to such questions, different thinkers have introduced a bewildering
variety of distinctions – such as theoretical versus practical, instrumental versus noninstrumental, individual versus collective, formal versus content-based, optimizing versus
„bounded“, or procedural versus substantive concepts of rationality. The course presents a
survey of some current debates in which such understandings of rationality emerge; it tries to
figure out whether there is unity behind the manifold; and it aims to instruct how (far) the tasks
of rationality can be solved.
To do so, the course will deal with three selected major topics: (I) The philosophy and
psychology of epistemic rationality; (II) the responsibility for epistemic and/or practical reasons;
and (III) normativity and intentionality in language.
5.- Competències i resultats d’aprenentatge del mòdul
Competència
Resultats d’aprenentatge
Competència
Resultats d’aprenentatge
Competència
Resultats d’aprenentatge
Competència
Analizar, sintetizar y argumentar sobre los principales
debates y posturas en la filosofía de la racionalidad
contemporáneas a partir de su correcta definición y
problematización.
Capacidad de redación de un trabajo escrito en el
que se demuestre el conocimiento de una
problemática relativa a los problemas de la filosofía
de la racionalidad tratados en el módulo, junto con
una capacidad analítica y argumentativa
corrrespondiente a un nivel de estudios avanzados.
Uso correcto y crítico de la terminología filosófica
espcializada
Dominio del lenguaje riguroso en el análisis de los
textos.
Organizar y sintetizar las fuentes de información relevantes
Capacidad de elaborar un aparato crítico-conceptual
correcto, con incorporación de referencias
bibliográficas, siguiendo los estándares
internacionales de citación.
CG3. (CGU: competències generals UAB)
6.- Continguts del mòdul
Part 1. Philosophy and Psychology of Epistemic Rationality
Thomas Sturm
4 sessions: April 8, 9, 10 & 11, 2013
What is epistemic rationality? What norms should guide our rational inferences? How are the
normsrelated to the actual ways in which human beings reason? Can we answer epistemological
questionsby the methods and results of the empirical sciences? To answer these questions, we will
look at aheated debate in cognitive psychology over human rationality, and consider philosophical
reactionsto this debate. The course has three interrelated aims: First, it provides exercises in
epistemicreasoning and fallacies; second, it is a philosophical study of a controversy in cognitive
psychology;thirdly, it aims at an analysis of epistemological naturalism, its potentials and limits.
April 8: Introduction and “Heuristics and biases”: A psychological research program
April 9: Two early philosophical reactions to “Heuristics and biases”
April 10: The “rationality wars" in psychology
April 11: Philosophical reactions to the “rationality wars”
Part 2. Responsibility for Epistemic and/or Practical Reasons
Josefa Torribio
1 session: May 21, 2013
It is an essential part of our idea of rationality that we believe for reasons (perhaps not necessarily
good reasons). It is also part and parcel of our idea of rationality that we are responsible for our beliefs
in virtue of the reasons for which we hold them. At the same time, most philosophers contend that we
cannot believe at will, i.e., that believing is not voluntary. But, if believing is not voluntary, it may seem
that we have to give up the idea that we are responsible for our beliefs and thus rationality and
responsibility come apart. This session of the module will address this issue and compare it with a
similar scenario in which the reasons are reasons, not for believing, but for acting. Key in the
discussion will be whether or not the underlying assumption that we can be responsible only for what
is voluntary can or cannot be defended.
May 21, 2013: Responsibility for Epistemic and/or Practical Reasons
Part 3. Normativity and intentionality in language
Antoni Defez
5 sessions: May 20, 22, 23 and June 12 & 13, 2013
Language is an intentional activity subject to rules: language always speaks about something different
to itself, and it is a social activity regulated by semantic, syntactic and contextual constraints. So, no
wonder that some philosophical explanation of its intentional and normative character is required. In
this sense, the propose of this course is to explore the way in which two classic antithetical positions
have attempted to deal with these issues: the so-called Cartesian explanation and the alternative
position of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
May 20: The theory of judgment and intensional contexts in the origins of Analytic Philosophy:
Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein
May 22: Learning, rules and private language
May 23: Learning, rules and private language
June 12: Knowledge and belief in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
June 13: Knowledge and belief in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
7.- Metodologia docent i activitats formatives
(metodologia docent)
El módulo se estructura en 10 sesiones de 3½ horas organizadas en 3 bloques.
Las sesiones tienen un formato mixto de clase magistra y seminario. Los estudiantes tendrán
una parte activa tanto con su presencia, como con su participación a través de presentaciones
sobre trabajos designados.
Los profesores implicadas supervisarán la elaboración del trabajo de módulo.
This module is structured in 10 sessions of 3½ hours, and it is organized into three main blocks.
The sessions have a mixed format of master course and seminar. Students have to prepare
themselves and take part actively in discussions, and also prepare presentations about
assigned works.
The professors involved will supervise the work in the module.
TIPUS D’ACTIVITAT ACTIVITAT HORES
RESULTATS D’APRENENTATGE Dirigides
Clases
35
Capacidad de análisis crítico de
problemas filosóficos.
Capacidad de comunicación y
presentación de argumentos.
Supervisades
Tutorías
17
Rigor en el análisis de los textos
filosóficos estudiados. Capacidad
para elaborar un aparato críticoconceptual, con incorporación de
referencias bibliográficas de
acuerdo con estándares
internacionales relativos al texto
original.
Autònomes
Estudio, lecturas y obtención de
información
Avaluació
66
Capacidad para elaborar un
aparato crítico-conceptual, con
incorporación de referencias
bibliográficas de acuerdo con
estándares internacionales
relativos al texto original.
Elaboración del trabajo escrito
32
Redacción de un trabajo escrito
en el que se demuestre la
capacidad para elaborar un
análisis crítico sobre algunos de
los temas discutidos en el
programa del módulo. La
capacidad analítica, sintética y
argumentativa será la
correspondiente a un nivel de
estudios avanzado.
8.- Avaluació
Para ser evaluado, el estudiante habrá de presentar un trabajo original por escrito. La
dirección de este trabajo corresponderá a una de las profesoras del módulo.
To be evaluated, the student has to present an original written paper. This work will be
directed by one of the professors of the module.
ACTIVITAT D’AVALUACIÓ Elaboración del trabajo escrito
HORES
32
RESULTATS D’APRENENTATGE
Capacidad de redacción de un trabajo escrito
en el que se demuestre el conocimiento y el
análisis crítico de uno de los temas cubiertos
en el temario.
9- Bibliografia i enllaços web
Bibliography/list of readings:
Unless otherwise noted, all readings are required!
April 8: Introduction and “Heuristics and biases”: A psychological research program
Botterill, G. & Carruthers. P. (1999). The philosophy of psychology (pp. 105-130, "Reasoning and
irrationality"). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science,
185, 1124-1131.
April 9: Two early philosophical reactions to “Heuristics and biases”
Cohen, L.J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 4, 317-331 (comments and responses, 331-59).
Stich, S. (1985). Could man be an irrational animal? Some notes on the epistemology of
rationality. Synthese, 64, 115-135.
April 10: The “rationality wars" in psychology
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond heuristics and biases.
European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review,
103, 582-591.
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and
Tversky. Psychological Review, 103, 592-596.
April 11: Philosophical reactions to the “rationality wars”
Samuels, R., Stich, S. & Bishop, M., 2002. Ending the rationality wars: How to make disputes
about human rationality disappear. In: R. Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236–268.
Goldman, A. (2008). Human rationality: Epistemological and psychological perspectives. In: A.
Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen (pp. 230-247).
Paderborn: Mentis.
Bishop, M. (2008). Reflections on a normative psychology. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter
(eds.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen (pp. 249-262). Paderborn: Mentis.
May 21, 2013: Responsibility for Epistemic and/or Practical Reasons
OBLIGATORY for this session:
Hieronymi, P. (2008). Responsibility for believing. Synthese, 161, 357-373.
Recommended further readings for this session:
Hieronymi, P. (2005). The wrong kind of reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 102, 437–457.
Adams, R. (1985). Involuntary sins. Philosophical Review, 94, 3-31.
Dennett, D. (1982). Mechanism and responsibility. in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford: OUP, pp.
127–173.
Owens, D. (2000). Reason Without Freedom. The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. London:
Routledge.
Smith, A. M. (2005). Responsibility for attitudes: activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics, 115,
236-271.
May 20: The theory of judgment and intensional contexts in the origins of Analytic
Philosophy: Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein
Frege, G., "El Pensamiento. Una investigación lógica", en Escritos lógicosemánticos. Madrid: Tecnos, 1974.
Russell, B., Els problemes de la filosofia. Girona: Accent, 2008. Cap. XII.
Russell, B., "Coneixement per relació i coneixement per descripció", en
Misticisme i Lògica. Barcelona: Edic. 62. Barcelona, 1969.
Russell; B., La filosofia de l’atomisme lògic (Cap. IV), en Lógica i
coneixement. Barcelona: Laia, 1985.
Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus lógico-philosophicus. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1989. (#5.54-5.5422).
May 22: Learning, rules and private language
May 23: Learning, rules and private language
Wittgenstein, L., Cuadernos de notas (1914-1916). Madrid: Síntesis, 2009.
Wittgenstein, L., Investigacions filosòfiques. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1997.
(I, #142, 243-315, 317, 350- 363, 384, 398-421; II, iv, ix).
June 12: Knowledge and belief in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
June 13: Knowledge and belief in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
Wittgenstein, L. De la certesa. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1983.
Enlaces relevantes (contenidos):
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
Rationality and Cognitive Science. Selected bibliography:
http://philpapers.org/browse/rationality-and-cognitive-science
Enlaces relevantes (metodología):
Writing a Philosophy Paper (Peter Horban):
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/writing.htm
Guide to the Study of Philosophy (Garth Kemerling):
http://www.philosophypages.com/sy.htm
Tips on Writing a Philosophy Paper (Douglas Portmore):
www.public.asu.edu/~dportmor/tips.pdf
Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (James Pryor):
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html
ACTIVITATS D’APRENENTATGE
DATA
ACTIVITAT
LLOC
18-21 març,
13-16 maig,
5-6 juny; de
15:30 a 19h
Classes
Facultat de
Filosofia i
Lletres de
la UAB
Segon
semestre, a
hores
concertades.
Tutories
Despatxos
dels
professors.
DATA/ES
MATERIAL
RESULTATS
D’APRENENTATGE
Domini del
llenguatge rigorós
de l’àmbit de la
filosofia en l’anàlisi
de textos.
Capacitat d’elaborar
un aparat criticoconceptual, amb la
incorporació de
referències seguint
els estàndards
internacionals,
relatiu a un text
original escrit.
LLIURAMENTS
DATA
Juny 2012
LLIURAMENT
Treball escrit
LLOC
Despatx
DATA/ES
MATERIAL
RESULTATS
D’APRENENTATGE
Capacitat de
redacció d’un treball
escrit on es demostri
el coneixement
d’una problemàtica
relativa a les teories
contemporànies de
la justícia, junt amb
una capacitat
analítica, sintètica i
argumentativa del
nivell d’uns estudis
avançats.