On the possibility of periodization of Dworkin`s

-
Linkages Newsletter
July 2008
This is the fifteenth year of Linkage. Several reasons contribute to explain the permanence and
success of the program, but perhaps the most important of all is the ability that Linkage has had to
attract some of the most talented students from its partner universities.
This year, the New Haven portion of the program took place from February 4th to February 22nd.
We received thirteen law students and one law professor from Universidad de Palermo,
Universidad Diego Portales, Universidad de Chile, Universidade de São Paulo and Universidade
do Estado do Rio de Janeiro.
In our belief that Linkage is what it is due to the strong scholarship and great potential of its
participants, twice a year we publish the Linkage Newsletter to disseminate the academic work of
our Linkage students.
In this issue, you will find five articles written by our most recent Linkage students from South
America. These are a product of the academic research that their authors conducted both at their
home institutions and at Yale Law School during February 2008.
We hope you enjoy the reading. During fifteen years, more than 280 students have participated in
Linkage. We want to share with you the progress of the program and the academic achievements
of its students.
1. On the possibility of periodization of Dworkin's criticism of legal positivism
Leonardo Rosa (Universidade de São Paulo)
2. Justificación de la Inobservancia a la Ley y Justificación Jurídica de la Desobediencia Civil
Virginia Fontanarrosa (Universidad de Palermo)
3. Racial Inequalities in Brazilian Education and Affirmative Action.
Nathalie Albieri Laureano (Universidade de São Paulo)
4. Triunfos de papel. A propósito de Viceconte
Joaquín Millón (Universidad de Palermo)
5. Constitutional Tax Law – Notes about the Brazilian Expertise
Hermano Barbosa (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
On the possibility of periodization of Dworkin's criticism of legal positivism
Leonardo Rosa
Universidade de São Paulo
Ronald Dworkin is a well-known critic of legal positivism and indeed perhaps he is the one to whom
people appeal - fairly or not - the most as an anti-positivist. But since 1967, when he published his important The
Model of Rules, he has changed severely the vocabulary he employs when engaging in his enterprise of trying to
defeat those who, as H. L. A. Hart, subscribe a positivist theory of law. In his first collection of essays, published
in 1977 under the title of Taking Rights Seriously, and mainly in its chapter 2, precisely the 1967 paper
republished under the title of The Model of Rules I, he saw Hart's rule of recognition as incapable of identifying
principles of law, that are binding on judges due to their sense of appropriateness, not their fact of enactment,
what so differentiates them from rules, identifiable by the master rule. On the other hand, almost a decade later, in
1986, the arguments that appeared in Law's Empire consisted, among others, in identifying Hart's legal positivism
as a plain fact theory of law 1 , that cannot account for a salient characteristic of legal thought and practice, i.e., the
fact that judges and lawyers disagree not only empirically, but also theoretically 2 . Despite the differences, it is not
altogether clear whether we can take Dworkin's work to be marked by ruptures and turns. In this brief addressing,
I discuss Scott Shapiro's view for the periodization and I mention Dworkin's response together with what may be
regarded as points for the exegesis for the continuity among his writings. It is not my intention, however, either to
evaluate Dworkin's points against legal positivism or to construct a complete account of his legal theory so as to
suggest a conclusive answer to the question. My purpose is only to identify the different views on the issue of
continuity and to indicate what I regard important points to the discussion.
Grounds and conventions
Scott Shapiro has published a very elucidative paper 3 where, after a reconstruction of the debate
Hart/Dworkin, he built a periodization of Dworkin's writings marked by the distinctions between The Model of
Rules I and Law's Empire. According to him, there would be a fissure between Dworkin’s early and later criticism
1
As a preliminary concept, enough for my purposes, Dworkin says that the a plain fact theory of law is the one that accounts
of law “only as a matter of what legal institutions, like legislatures and city councils and courts, have decided in the past”,
Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 7.
2 And more recently, as I discuss below, he has argued that legal positivism and his position are to be seen as different
answers to the questions rose in the “semantic stage” of a general theory of what he called the doctrinal concept of law. See
Introduction – Law and Morals in Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 9-12.
3 The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: a Short Guide for the Perplexed (Public and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 77, March 2007, 54 pp., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968657). Shapiro's paper
will be mentioned as A Short Guide hereinafter
of legal positivism, even though Shapiro finds a central issue of the debate Hart/Dworkin: whether law is
composed by standards socially or morally designated as authoritative 4 .
Indeed, Shapiro argued that legal positivism successful defenses against early challenges fail to do their
job concerning later objections, as the former ones presupposed a convention fixing the grounds of law, precisely
what Dworkin took care to deny when he defended the theoretical character of (some of) legal disagreement 5 . As
the argument follows, Shapiro concludes that what Dworkin thought a hard case to be in the 1960's did not
involve theoretical disagreements, so that positivism could not have been accused of failing to account for such
kind of disagreement. Instead, the objection would be that the grounds of law, well fixed by convention, included
morality. In short: in his early work, Dworkin was committed to a conventional account of the grounds of law, or,
at least, coherent with one.
To put forward the point, Shapiro compares two cases 6 discussed by Dworkin: Henningsen 7 , where the
court found that automobile manufacturers have special obligations concerning their products, and Snail Darter 8 ,
where the Supreme Court of the USA decided that a $100 million project should not be carried out due to the
threat it represented to a small fish. So, continues Shapiro, whereas the former, discussed in The Model of Rules I,
was marked by agreements on the grounds of law 9 , the later is a example of a occasion where judges disagreed
theoretically, i.e., on the grounds of law, and was part of “The Real World”, a group of cases analyzed by Dworkin
in Law’s Empire 10 . Henningsen was a hard case because it was difficult – and so reasonable people could disagree
on – to know whether the grounds of law obtained, i.e., because it was difficult to verify whether what needed to
be the case for a proposition of law be true actually happened; but the fact was that there was a convention that
established the grounds, so no theoretical disagreement took place in the court. As a representative of the early
criticism, Henningsen would be an example of how morality is part of the grounds of law, what, if true, does not
per se authorize one to say that there the law is marked by theoretical disagreement. On the other hand, Snail
Darter would be a counter-example used to point out the failures of legal positivism to account for the theoretical
disagreement that took place in the courts. In short, Henningsen involved questions about a conventional fixation
of the grounds of law, whereas Snail Darter`s discussions were (at least also) about what were the grounds of law.
As a conclusion, Shapiro finds different criticism in Dworkin's writings: one committed to identifying that
morality is part of what makes legal propositions true, and the other committed to stressing the disagreement
4 A Short Guide, op. cit., p. 18.
5 Roughly speaking, theoretical disagreement is about the grounds of law, that are those “more familiar” propositions that
make legal propositions true; the latter, so, are parasitic upon the former. As opposed to theoretical, there are empirical
disagreements in law. If we disagree about which are the conditions that need to be satisfied so that a proposition like “the
speed limit in this State is x km/h” is true, we engage in theoretical disagreement; however, if we agree on the grounds, but
disagree on whether they are satisfied, we are disagreeing only empirically. See Law's Empire, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
6 A Short Guide, op. cit., pp. 36-38.
7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N. J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Dworkin mentios the case in TRS, pp. 23-4. Seriously.
8 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Law's Empire, op. cit., pp. 20-3
9 Shapiro himself reconstructed Dworkin's early objections in the later terminology. See A Short Guide, op. cit., p. 36.
10
Op. cit., pp. 15-30, especially pp. 20-3.
about what the grounds themselves are. Built this way, the former is pretty much a weak point, for, if there is a
convention, it may determine whether morality is part of the grounds of law, and so legal positivism has little to
fear. However, Shapiro identifies “almost no effort” 11 in defending legal positivism from the criticism extracted
from Snail Darter. The judges of that case, as discussed in Law's Empire, shared no convention on which
positivists may base their objections, so that earlier positivist defenses would fail to account for that criticism.
Roughly speaking, the failure against later Dworkin derives from the presupposition of such a convention by legal
positivists when defending themselves in the 1970`s.
In short, Shapiro's argument understands, on the one hand, the The Model of Rules I as preoccupied with
identifying which standards are part of the law, and, on the other, recognizes that Law's Empire addresses a point
not precisely about the content of the grounds of law, but about the disagreement about them. Dworkin did not
agree with this picture of his work, as we shall see.
Concepts of law and legal disagreement
Dworkin himself has taken the care to deny that he has formulated criticisms of legal positivism that are
different one from the other in any “important respect” 12 . He has specifically identified Shapiro, among others, as
a scholar committed to the exegesis of his work that he is willing to reject. In short, Dworkin believes that his
position – either of The Model of Rules I or later writings – is not fairly described as being about what are the
kinds of standards that compose the law understood as a fixed group of rules and principles 13 . So as to defend his
point, he built the distinction between taxonomic and doctrinal concepts of law: according to him, it has never
been his concern to address points about taxonomy of law for his commitments have always been with doctrinal
issues. According to Dworkin, the doctrinal concept of law is the one which is explored as the law of some place
“to a particular effect (...) [i.e., to make claims] about what law requires or prohibits or permits or creates” (p. 2) 14
whereas the taxonomic is the one that “supposes that a community (...) has a collection of discrete rules and other
kinds of standards that are legal standards as opposed to moral or customary or some other kinds of standards” (p.
4). So established the distinction, it is a matter of doctrinal concept of law to know whether torture is authorized
by the law and a matter of taxonomic concept to know whether law has principles of morality as part of it and to
know what constitute an individuated legal norm 15 .
11 A Short Guide, op. cit., p. 38.
12 The Concepts of Law, in JIR, op. cit., pp. 233-4.
13 It is important to notice that this criticism applies also to Shapiro's overall assessment of the debate. See above, footnote 4,
A Short Guide, op. cit., p. 18.
14 The Concepts of Law, in Justice in Robes, op. cit., pp. 233-4.
15 In a reply to Joseph Raz's Legal Principles and the Limits of Law (in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence,
ed. Marshall Cohen, Totowa: Rowman &Allanheld, 1983, pp. 74-87), the early Dworkin said that he had no concern
whatsoever with what constitutes a complete norm and, in addition, that he thought that his view on law expressed in The
This interpretation of his writings is equivalent to his own explanations of The Model of Rules I as they
appeared in The Model of Rules II. Indeed, in The Concepts of Law, Dworkin quotes from The Model of Rules II a
particular passage where he says that he never intended to treat law as a “fixed number of standards”, whether
principles or rules 16 . This quotation is not isolated from other important parts of The Model of Rules II, as
Dworkin employed a very important example in his defense against a criticism not put forward by anyone he
would specifically discuss in the paper, but that underlined many he was willing to discuss. I mean to stress the
example of a vegetarian that claims for a duty not to eat meat. This example is important because it introduces his
criticism of the account legal positivism supposedly gives to theoretical disagreement in law.
According to Dworkin, Hart and others 17 would regard this kind of disagreement as not genuine, for one
of the parties committed to it would make propositions of repair, of what the social rules should be, and not of
what they are. As Dworkin builds his picture of legal positivism 18 , it is a positivist thesis that obligations flow
only from rules whose bidingness are derived either from acceptance or from the rule of recognition (in Hart's
version). Absent a rule, there is no obligation, and, as there is no social rule requiring that one eats no flesh of
animals (except human beings’), there is no such obligation. Therefore, what the vegetarian says is that there
ought to be a rule with that content, i.e., that repair should be carried out. She cannot sensibly argue that it is
forbidden to eat meat. Of course, Dworkin is not committed to the correctness of the vegetarian's claim: he only
means that the disagreement between her and one who denies her claim is genuine because one is not worried
about how things should be and the other how they actually are. This is because we do not need to share social
rules or, put in Law's Empire, the grounds of law so as to disagree genuinely. As this kind of disagreement is
salient in legal practice, we would do better not to regard some of people engaged in them as claiming how law
should be. Dworkin's conclusion is that we need a theory that explains theoretical disagreement, and legal
positivism is not a good candidate because it presupposes conventions forming law which led Hart and others to
subscribe the so called plain fact theory of law.
Back to A Short Guide, it is important to notice that it associates Dworkin’s criticism of the legal
positivist argument based on claims of repair to his argument for the theoretical character of legal disagreement.
That may be indeed a reason why Shapiro puts forward the periodization thesis setting apart The Model of Rules I
Model of Rules I did not commit him to any particular theory on the matter. See The Model of Rules II in Taking Rights
Seriously, op. cit., pp. 74-76
16 The Concepts of Law in Justice in Robes, op. cit., p. 324, quoting Model of Rules II in Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit, p.
76.
17 See Neil MacCormick's account of the disagreement a vegetarian has with those who deny the duty not to eat the flesh of
other animals in H. L. A. Hart (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 32. In this passage, MacCormick defends Hart's
theory of social rules for, as he explains, the vegetarian may well use normative language (“ought”, “must”, “right”, and so
forth) without appealing to a social rule. It seems to me that the argument rather presupposes the theory of social rules than
provides sound defense to it (at least against the Interpretativist arguments outlined either in Taking Rights Seriously or Law's
Empire). But Dworkin's point about vegetarian’s claim being of law rather than of repair seems also not persuasive for some;
see A Short Guide, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
18 The Model of Rules I, p. 17, and The Model of Rules II, pp. 49-50, both in Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit.,
from other Dworkin's writings, and not the whole Taking Rights Seriously from Law's Empire and later papers:
whereas the 1967 paper talks of rules and principles, discussing whether the vegetarian’s arguments are about law
or about what law should be is a issue raised only in 1972. But The Model of Rules II (1972) is paper dedicated to
replying to critics and elucidating the points addressed in the earlier The Model of Rules I (1967). The turn,
however, is not precisely marked by 1972's paper, but by Law's Empire, and indeed Shapiro is careful enough not
to accommodate The Model of Rules II together with the earlier paper because it brings some changes (at least
according to those who favor the turn hypothesis 19 ), perhaps those I have pointed out (the vegetarian example,
etc. 20 ).
The point about the periodization therefore involves knowing whether Dworkin accurately described his
own paper. We cannot ignore that he encouraged a different interpretation as he spent The Model of Rules I
discussing how the role played by principles, a kind of standard logically distinct from rules, cannot be explained
by Hartian legal positivism because its master rule of recognition fails to capture those principles which are part
of the law; it really seems a taxonomic enterprise 21 . But, at the same time, Dworkin explicitly argued for the
rejection of the rule of recognition as a fairly stable rule 22 , what indicates a denial of the existence of any
convention of the sort Shapiro found underlying the judges' discussion in Henningsen. If principles enter and
leave law too fast to be catalogued, how could it be coherent with Dworkin's position to see a convention on the
grounds of law among judges who decided the case? And even if a convention possibly existed, would it be
essential to the correctness of our claims of law? Indeed, issues related to the nature of legal disagreement
mattered to Dworkin in The Model of Rules I even though he did not work out the point extensively. This is
simply because the question 'When two sides disagree, as often happens, about a proposition “of law”, what are
they disagreeing about?' 23 was among the embarrassing questions that Dworkin identified as problems of
jurisprudence in the very beginning of the paper.
What is more, in an Introduction he wrote to a collection of essays mainly of other authors, Dworkin
provided a picture of his debate with legal positivism based on the polemic between realism and anti-realism in
law 24 , understood as theories on the sense assigned to legal propositions. According to him, an anti-realist position
19 A Short Guide, op. cit., p. 26.
20 At least another point may be stressed. After discussing the vegetarian example, Dworkin accuses legal positivism of
being incapable of distinguishing concurrent morality from conventional morality, two kinds of social morality. When we
agree on something in a concurrent basis, we do not regard the agreement as relevant to the soundness of our opinion (i.e. of
what Dworkin calls “normative rule”, opposed to “social rule”). The example provided is the duty not to lie: we may all agree
on it, and yet one could (correctly) keep claiming the wrongness of lying even though everyone else disagreed. On the other
hand, the agreement is essential to a claim of conventional morality, and that kind of social morality is, therefore, well
explained by Hart's social rules theory. See The Model of Rules II, in Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit., p. 53.
21
This is a point Dworkin acknowledges (to some extent): see Introducton – Law and Morals in Justice in Robes, op. cit, n. 6
p. 264.
22 The Model of Rules I in Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit., p. 42
23 The Model of Rules I in Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit., p. 14.
24 Introduction to The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 7-9.
was assumed by legal positivists because “they think that no sense can be assigned to a proposition unless those
who use that proposition are all agreed about how the proposition could, at least in theory, be proved
conclusively” 25 . The point is to stress the need to deny the relevance of consensus or agreements to the
elucidation of law. As Dworkin's argument is built in Law's Empire, legal positivism cannot account for legal
disagreement because a convention is assumed to settle the grounds of law. A conclusion of that sort is consistent
if not entailed by his arguments in The Model of Rules II, as seen in his example of the vegetarian, for the alleged
incapacity of legal positivism to understand that her claims are not of repair derives from the assumption that we
need to share a social rule so as to disagree sensibly about the duties that are its outcome.
So, the periodization exegesis of Dworkin's work may be undermined if a certain stress is given to his use
of the vegetarian example in The Model of Rules II. The problem with this argument is that if it is to succeed, we
need to regard as correct Dworkin's own interpretation of what he wrote in Model of Rules I, as he tried to explain
his point when challenged by Joseph Raz, Jules Coleman and others. But there is not necessary to follow that
path, as the opinion of an author about his own work does not preclude us from interpreting him otherwise. In
short, the opinion Dworkin addressed in Justice in Robes is very similar to the one he put forward in The Model of
Rules II (and indeed he quoted from Taking Rights Seriously in The Concepts of Law), but it brings no conclusive
answer to the question on what did he defend in The Model of Rules I. And it may yet be of no help to say that the
issue of legal disagreement was a embarrassing question to Dworkin in the 1960’s because it may well be that it
was not developed in 1962. On the other hand, The Model of Rules I had some excerpts (the mention to the
supposedly positivistic “fairly stable master rule”, for instance) that seem to challenge any reading of Dworkin
that finds conventions of the sort Shapiro finds in Henningsen.
Conclusion
Anyway, my aim is not either to deny that there may be changes in Dworkin's critiques of legal positivism
or to indicate conclusively an alternative exegesis of Taking Rights Seriously as a whole or mainly of its chapters
2 and 3. So, this is not to say that either Dworkin's account of legal positivism is correct or that his so-called
interpretative positions in legal theory are sound. Surely, if Shapiro is correct and early positivists defenses, that
presuppose a convention, are ineffective against later dworkinian arguments, and if he is wrong about the
periodization, they are perhaps to be regarded as ineffective to earlier as well. But a more timid conclusion is
anyway clearer. Shapiro says that it is incredible that almost no attention has been given to the objections
concerning theoretical disagreement that Dworkin developed in Law’s Empire. So, roughly speaking, if The Model
of Rules II has brought novel points, then the mistake concerning the interpretation of Ronald Dworkin's legal
theory dates back to 1972, fourteen years before Law's Empire appearing.
25 Introduction to The Philosophy of Law, op. cit., p. 8.
Justificación de la Inobservancia a la Ley
y Justificación Jurídica de la Desobediencia Civil
Virginia Fontanarrosa
Universidad de Palermo
Cuando nos referimos a la desobediencia civil estamos haciendo alusión a la inobservancia de una “norma
jurídica”, de manera que creo conveniente, en primer lugar, poner de resalto que para mí el derecho está integrado
por componente morales, derivados de la construcción que de la moral hace la sociedad, es decir de la moral
social
1
y, en segundo lugar, aclarar que una norma sólo podrá ser entendida como jurídica si pertenece a un
sistema jurídico 2 .
Así pues, el análisis de la inobservancia de una norma jurídica y su justificación debe efectuarse poniendo
la vista no sólo en la disposición legal transgredida sino en el resto del ordenamiento, debiendo tomarse como
principal referente a la Constitución Nacional.
En este contexto donde la constitución, como vamos a ver más adelante, tomará un rol muy importante es
necesario destacar, siguiendo a Nino, que no sólo la concibo como un conjunto de normas que prescribe la
organización básica del poder político y la relación entre el Estado y el individuo, imponiendo límites a la
actividad legislativa 3 , sino como práctica social 4 lo cual implica valorar las conductas de los jueces y de los
ciudadanos en general al identificar a las normas que cumplen con ciertas condiciones como legítimas y al criticar
a quienes no observan o aplican esas normas o avalar a quienes lo hacen.
Asimismo, me parece absolutamente trascendente destacar que el contenido de la carta magna no me
resulta irrelevante, antes bien, me considero una fundamentalista constitucional, lo cual implica reconocer la
existencia de derechos humanos inalienables preexistentes a la misma y que ésta debe reconocer para ser tal.
Por otro lado, creo que sólo a través de una democracia deliberativa puede lograrse la participación
efectiva de los distintos sectores sociales, específicamente me refiero a las minorías, sin embargo, y acá está el
meollo del asunto, los mecanismos pueden fallar y aparecer la patología de la sordera estatal, debiendo estos
sectores más desaventajados recurrir a otros medios para hacerse oír, como el que a continuación vamos a
estudiar.
1
Carlos NINO, “Etica y Derechos Humanos”. Página. 92
C. NINO, “Introducción al análisis del derecho”, pag. 92 y 101.
3
C. NINO, “La Constitución de la Democracia Deliberativa”, pag. 17.
4
C. NINO, “Fundamentos de Derecho Constitucional”, pag. 47. También J. HABERMAS, nos habla de una “concepción
dinámica de la Constitución como un proyecto inconcluso” de J. I. UGARTEMENDIA ECEIZABARRENA, “La
Desobediencia Civil en el Estado Constitucional democrático”, Editorial Marcial Pons, Madrid, 1999, pag. 66.
2
Con todo esto quiero dejar en claro mi línea de largada, la cual se apoya en un suelo conformado por
valores, prácticas sociales, participación ciudadana y derechos fundamentales sistemáticamente receptados.
Sin inmiscuirme –por el momento- con la discusión de la justificabilidad jurídica, creo que desde otros
planos como el moral, el de los derechos fundamentales, el de la democracia aparecen casos en que la
desobediencia, entendida genéricamente, merece ser aceptada.
Desde un punto de vista individualista puede darse que un sujeto contraponga sus propios valores morales
frente a la norma y decida así no obedecerla; estos son los casos conocidos como objeción de conciencia.
Coincido con Nino 5 en que en “la mayoría” de los casos de objeción de conciencia ésta no tiene efectos
importantes respecto de terceros, esto es, que la norma jurídica que impone la conducta contraria a la pauta moral
individual sólo afecta el principio de autonomía de la persona al restringir la libre elección de pautas morales para
conformar su vida -v. g. saludar a los símbolos patrios 6 - y, por ende, su desobediencia no tendrá efectos sobre
ningún otro sujeto.
Dentro del concepto de desobediencia civil que considero más atinado, las manifestaciones contrarias a la
norma basadas en consideraciones personales e individuales no tienen lugar. Mi visión procura cambiar aquella
que comúnmente se tiene respecto de la relación entre el individuo y la ley, al incluir como dato ineludible a la
realidad social.
En este sentido el trabajo de Arendt me pareció relevante porque intentó recomponer la mirada
desobediente de los clásicos, como Henry David Thoreau 7 (1817-1862), Mohands Karamchand Ghandi (18691948) 8 , Martín Luther King 9 , dejando atrás la íntima relación moral que debería tener un ciudadano con la ley,
para atender al fenómeno de la acción colectiva. Esta nueva forma de ver a la desobediencia no la observa como
una actitud frente a la injusticia, sino como un determinado acto -de protesta- conforme la sostenían los teóricos
de la visión ortodoxa 10 : Hugo Adam Bedau, Cristian H. Bay, Carl Cohen, John Rawls y Rex Martin.
A diferencia de los ortodoxos (tanto neoconservadores como libertarios -según estos últimos la
responsible law-breaking 11 se ve como algo beneficioso para la democracia-) para quienes el concepto de
desobediencia civil es algo ‘restrictivo’ en virtud de que establece requisitos constitutivos de la misma bajo
sanción de inadmisibilidad, el concepto que propongo barajar encaja mejor en el período posterior de la
5
C. NINO, Etica y Derechos Humanos, pag. 407.
Caso “West Virginia Broad of Education v. Barnette” 319 US 624, en donde se reconoció el derecho de los Testigos de
Jehová de oponerse al saludo a la bandera.
7
H.D. THOREAU “El deber de la desobediencia civil”, Ed. Del Valle y Dissur. Bs. As. 1997.
8
GHANDI relató su campaña de resistencia no-violenta contra las leyes discriminatorias contra los indios en Natal en su obra
Satyagraha en Sudáfrica. Luego de veinte años en Sudáfrica volvió a la India y trabajó allí siguiendo siempre la voz de la
conciencia.
9
M. L. KING habló sobre la desobediencia civil en su famosa Carta desde la cárcel de Birmingham del 16/4/63.
10
Uno de los primeros teóricos en explicitar the Orthodox view fue H. A. Bedau a raíz de su Comentario a una obra de C.
Cohen. J. I. UGARTEMENDIA ECEIZABARRENA, op. cit. pag. 36, nota 63.
11
Op. cit. pag. 39
6
heterodoxia conceptual 12 , cuya denominación proviene de la utilización amplia y general de la expresión
“desobediencia civil” y, debido a ello, la imposibilidad de hallar una única definición, todo lo cual, si bien agrega
un poco de confusión a este ya intrincado tema, me da más libertad de opinión.
Entonces, visto el desapego a la ley desde una óptica colectiva, considero que sólo la desobediencia
fundada en movimientos populares sustentados en principios morales comunes puede ser considerada como
desobediencia civil.
El poder social de la desobediencia radica en la formación de una conciencia colectiva más allá de la
unión de conciencias individuales 13 .
Las formas de llamar la atención masivamente necesitan de varias personas. Sería difícil imaginar a un
solo hombre intentado cortar una ruta, o impidiendo la interacción de un gran número de personas. Cuando varias
personas reclaman algo su petición parece más creíble, necesariamente tiene más impacto (aunque no siempre
efectos) en los oídos de los políticos y legisladores.
El desobediente, a diferencia del objetor, no alega que se restringen acciones autónomas de su parte, sino
que pretende la derogación de una norma que considera injusta o el cambio de una política de gobierno.
La democracia es un sucedáneo imperfecto del discurso moral que realizan los ciudadanos que puede no
funcionar lo imperfectamente bien que debería, por lo tanto, en algunas ocasiones ocurre que no se les da a las
minorías el lugar que les corresponde para participar en el discurso positivo y, en consecuencia, no hallan
representatividad en las leyes que se sancionan y en las políticas estatales que se implementan. Por el contrario,
cuando un individuo se alza contra el ordenamiento movido ya no por su conciencia individual sino por su propio
autointerés, estaremos ante una desobediencia criminal, la que no puede justificarse desde ningún punto de vista.
Esta finalidad de cambiar ciertas pautas sociales determinan la publicidad del acto desobediente, y es ésta
característica la que traza otra diferencia con el criminal en tanto éste procura siempre actuar clandestinamente
para lograr la impunidad 14 . Con esto no quiero decir que luego del acto público los desobedientes no puedan
pretender lograr su impunidad, sea abstrayéndose del sistema punitivo y bien esgrimiendo todas las defensas
posibles para no ser penados, lo que quiero destacar es que si el objetivo de la transgresión a la ley es llamar la
atención social, obviamente, el acto desobediente debe ser conocido por los demás.
Por otro lado, entre las dos clases de desatención al derecho que pueden darse, esto es la directa: cuando
se desobedece la ley que se considera injusta, o la indirecta 15 : que se da cuando se transgrede una ley cuya
legitimidad no se cuestiona sino que se utiliza esa vía como medio para llamar la atención de la mayoría, de los
12
Op cit. pag. 41
G. FONDEVILLA, “Desobediencia civil y obligación jurídica a fines de siglo”, pag.299.
14
J. A. ESTEVEZ ARAUJO, “La Constitución como proceso y la desobediencia civil”, op. cit. pag. 27.
15
“En la desobediencia civil “indirecta” lo que se cuestiona no es la norma jurídica desobedecida, pero ésta se convierte en
“objeto” de protesta desobediente de manera simbólica e instrumental para denunciar o dar a conocer una determinada
situación injusta” J.I.UGARTEMENDIA ECEIZABARRENA, op. cit. pag. 135.
13
medios de comunicación 16 y de los órganos del Estado, la realidad argentina evidencia habitualmente el recurso a
esta segunda modalidad, tal vez porque, a diferencia de lo que ocurría en Estados Unidos, la injusticia no proviene
de una ley determinada que estipula comportamientos, sino de una política gubernamental.
En este esquema, la desobediencia civil aparece como una forma de asociación voluntaria lícita, que
merece ser diferenciada de la desobediencia radical 17 o uncivil desobedience 18 , por cuyo intermedio no se
pretende atacar una norma particular sino todo el sistema normativo y político -este supuesto sería asimilable a la
revolución-.
La conducta civil, desobediente o no, es aquella acorde con los postulados y requerimientos establecidos
por la Constitución y los principios de justicia que la fundamentan y nutren 19 .
Una democracia constitucional no sólo debe prever los procedimientos necesarios para la participación en
el diálogo popular, sino que debe asegurar la garantía de los derechos fundamentales de todos los hombres.
Podría criticarse que este tipo de actos atenta contra el principio mayoritario democrático, sin embargo
ello puede rebatirse afirmando, por un lado, que las decisiones que toma la mayoría no son infalibles y, por otro,
que al final de cuentas el desobediente no procurará imponer sus ideas por la fuerza sino que buscará volver a
formar parte del sistema de comunicación popular.
Acá es donde toma más relevancia la idea que inicialmente esbozaba en torno al concepto de constitución
como práctica social. La desobediencia civil sería en este croquis una forma de participar, desde los principios que
informan la legitimidad constitucional, en la construcción, apertura y defensa constitucional.
Ahora bien, en este marco ideológico creo que la legalización de la desobediencia civil importa un doble
contrasentido: 1) por parte del ordenamiento jurídico mismo, puesto que no se trata de definir una conducta como
ilícita y luego justificarla como ocurre con las causales de justificación contenidas en el art. 34 del Código Penal
Argentino, sino de afirmar que es legal incumplir la ley que fue dictada para ser cumplida, y 2) dentro de la propia
definición de desobediencia civil, dado que con tal precepto permisivo la conducta ya no sería des-obediente sino
el ejercicio de una acción permitida por el Estado, se equipararía a todos los demás medios legales preestablecidos
para el control del ejercicio de los poderes públicos, como por ejemplo la acción de inconstitucionalidad.
Por otra parte, la legalización de la desobediencia civil anularía precisamente el efecto alarmante que se
pretende lograr con la transgresión a una norma. Atemperando un poco la idea de la ilegalidad, quiero aclarar que
estoy del lado de los que piensan que la desobediencia civil es sólo prima facie ilegal 20 , lo cual implica que luego
de realizado el acto éste puede hallar una justificación: A) constitucional: 1) por vía de la declaración de
16
J. A. ESTÉVEZ ARAUJO, “En el límite de los Derechos ” EUB, Barcelona, 1996, pag. 206. y en “La Constitución como
proceso y la desobediencia civil”, Ed. Trotta. Madrid. 1994, pag. 145.
17
J. AXAT “La Desobediencia Civil ante la criminalización de la protesta”. Trabajo publicado en “La criminalización de la
Protesta Social”. Ed. Grupo La Grieta. Bs. As. 2003.
18
J.I. UGARTEMENDIA ECEIZABARRENA, op. cit. pag. 80.
19
Op. cit. pag. 63.
20
J. A. ESTEVEZ ARAUJO, op. cit. pag. 212 y op cit. 35.. J. AXAT. Op. cit. pag. 5
inconstitucionalidad de la norma violada y 2) a través de su inclusión dentro de los derechos fundamentales, o B)
en un marco normativo inferior, mediante las causales excepcionales de la teoría del delito.
A) 1) La desobediencia al derecho como test de constitucionalidad si bien fue propuesto por Dworkin
para los objetores de conciencia de las leyes de reclutamiento, bien puede trasladarse ese esquema a la forma de
protesta que estamos estudiando.
Desde este punto de vista, si los que desobedecen son un grupo considerable de personas el test de
inconstitucionalidad de las leyes actúa en un doble sentido: 1) como trampolín para el inicio de una acción de
inconstitucionalidad, y 2) como un indicio fuerte de la inconstitucionalidad de la ley.
Sin embargo, aún si se pensara que el acto desobediente tiende a demostrar que esa conducta no es ilegal,
la ilegitimidad prima facie no dejaría de verificarse por más que a la postre resultara declarada la
inconstitucionalidad de la norma desatendida, toda vez que al momento de su conculcación ésta era válida, y sólo
luego del procedimiento instado a partir de la desobediencia es que se logró ex post evidenciar la incongruencia
normativa. “El acto inicialmente legal resulta, así, “legalizado” a posteriori” 21 . Por el contrario, si la decisión
judicial resulta adversa el acto no perdería su ilegitimidad (en este aspecto Dworkin opina –siempre en el caso de
los objetores de conciencia- que los ciudadanos deberían seguir sus propios criterios aún frente a una decisión
adversa de la Corte si la cuestión le sigue pareciendo razonablemente dudosa 22 ).
A) 2) Cuando se cuestiona la justicia de un acto de gobierno indirectamente mediante la transgresión de
una norma no controvertida, algunos autores, como R. Dreier 23 , justifican la desobediencia civil bajo el rótulo de
ejercicio legítimo de un derecho fundamental, como la libertad de expresión, de reunión y de manifestación, pero
sin que ello signifique una automática justificación, de manera que sólo lo estará siempre que el resultado de la
‘ponderación’ entre el bien jurídico protegido por la norma violada y el derecho fundamental ejercido, se
evidencie una superioridad de este último por sobre el primero.
B) Como antes señalé, existen por fuera de estos argumentos constitucionales otros mecanismos propios
del sistema del derecho penal.
Existen dos grandes cursos de acción que podría poner en marcha el Estado para evitar la criminalización
de los desobedientes: apelar al principio de oportunidad en el ejercicio de la acción dejando de ejercerla
discrecionalmente en estos casos, o bien, legitimar a posteriori las conductas por ellos llevadas a cabo.
En nuestro sistema la viabilidad de la implementación de una función diferencial como la que propongo
como primer hipótesis de despenalización de la protesta encuentra importantes obstáculos.
En primer lugar, el encuadramiento de las protestas sociales en el esquema de la desobediencia civil no es
algo que realicen los operadores del sistema, tal vez por miedo a despertar verdaderamente al gigante popular que
21
Op. cit. pag. 216.
R. DWORKIN, Op. cit. pag. 310.
23
R. DREIER “Widerstandsrecht im Rechtsstaat”, en Festschrift H. U. Scupin, Berlin, 1983, pp. 573-593. Dato tomado del
libro de J. A. ESTEVEZ ARAUJO, “La Constitución como proceso y la desobediencia civil”, pag. 38, nota 77.
22
aún no ha abandonado los brazos de Morfeo, dándole mayores justificativos para su accionar y reforzar sus
posturas frente al gobierno. Debo admitir que nuestra Corte Suprema ha elaborado una doctrina en torno del art.
19 de la Constitución Nacional, luego del fallo dictado en 1989 “Portillo Alfredo s/infacción art. 44 ley 17531” 24 ,
en cuya oportunidad se analizó la obligatoriedad del servicio militar ante la objeción de conciencia y se decidió a
favor de esta última, lo cual, si bien apuntó a la moral individual, a mi juicio puede tomarse como un antecedente
en la transformación de la desobediencia hacia la óptica pluralista que propongo.
En segundo lugar, la solución que importo de norteamérica necesariamente implica un cambio radical en
la Política Criminal relativa a la oficiosidad en el ejercicio de las acciones públicas, consagrada en el art. 71 del
Código Penal, toda vez que, mientras sigamos empecinados en pretender lograr el inalcanzable objetivo de
judicializar todos los conflictos penales que caigan en la órbita de las denominadas acciones públicas, será
imposible darle a los fiscales discrecionalidad en el ejercicio de la acción.
Reconozco que esta hipótesis de solución tiene doble filo, puesto que deja al libre albedrío de los órganos
del Estado la decisión de penalizar o no el acto que atenta contra el mismo. Para mitigar este efecto propongo,
conjuntamente con la instauración de la discrecionalidad, la creación de juntas populares, especialmente
integradas por los diversos sectores de la sociedad involucrados en el conflicto y representantes del Estado, con el
objetivo de que decidan en estos casos sobre los beneficios del ejercicio de la acción; sería una especie de jurado
popular pre-judicial.
Y desde la óptica del derecho penal que presento como segunda vía de solución del conflicto, lo más
relevante, antes que analizar detalladamente los recursos normativos con los que cuenta cada ordenamiento, me
parece más importante destacar la necesidad de un cambio de paradigma en las estructuras dogmáticas, y
determinar si es posible la aplicación de una sanción a una fuerza social, y cuál sería el sentido de la pena en este
caso.
En resumen: En línea con Claus Roxín 25 , y teniendo en cuenta especialmente la experiencia argentina
donde la desobediencia al derecho generalmente se realiza no por la injusticia que se considera tiene la norma
violada, sino simbólicamente como protesta social contra las políticas inhumanas implementadas por los
gobiernos, considero que difícilmente hallemos razones preventivoespeciales ni preventivogenerales para imponer
una pena, porque los ciudadanos que realizan conjuntamente los actos están preocupados por el bien común, por
superar las falencias del sistema de gobierno, porque no son criminales, no tienen un desprecio por la norma
violada y, además, al hacer públicos estos fines no hay razón para mostrarle al resto de las personas que tal
transgresión no se debe hacer, el mismo acto reconoce que está mal transgredir, que hay que respetar al derecho,
pero que no hay que dejar de analizar la actuación de los legisladores y de nuestros administradores, y reaccionar
frente a las injusticias.
24
25
“Portillo Alfredo s/infracción art. 44 ley 17531”. CSJN: 136:56 del 18/04/1989. J.A. 1989-II-658.
C. ROXIN, “Derecho Penal. Parte General.”, Ed. Civitas. Madrid, 1999, pag. 954
Racial Inequalities in Brazilian Education and Affirmative Action.
Nathalie Albieri Laureano
Universidade de São Paulo
1. Introduction.
Racial inequalities have always existed even with the end of the slavery system in Brazilian society,
including in education opportunities and representation in Universities. However, the race issue has always been
masked by the racial democracy myth, which worsens the dealing with the problem and its resolution.
The racial discrimination problem in the United States and the implementation of affirmative action
especially in the educational field initiated the discussion among the black organizations about the adoption of
such policies in Brazil as well. The discussion was spread to the whole society in a very polemic way, challenging
the idea that Brazil does not embrace racial bias and breaking the silence upon racial issues, which always seemed
to be a forbidden topic.
2. Racial issues in Brazilian society.
Abolition of slavery and the myth of racial democracy.
The abolition of the slavery system in Brazil was declared on May 13th of 1888. Although there was never
a legal and official segregation of the freedmen likewise there was in the United States, several mechanisms held
the black population in a lower economic, social and cultural position in society. Nevertheless, such mechanisms
were hidden under the idea of a mixed people, equal under the protection of law, leading to the belief that no
problems in terms of race existed in Brazil and this was a racially democratic country.
However, racism is undeniably part of Brazilian society and culture. According to the Brazilian
sociologist Fernandes (1978), the end of slavery and the dissociation of the caste system that was related to it did
not have a direct effect on the racial relations established in the past and the mechanisms of racial domination
remained. Fernandes also recognizes that, not having existed any sort of open, conscious and organized resistance
that put the different races in opposite positions of a fight, it was the white omission that led to the perpetuation of
the status quo ante, and that the racial democracy myth was the source of stagnation and tightness, destroying any
innovative and democratic tendencies related to such human relations. Carneiro (1994) affirms that the racism in
Brazil is camouflaged, which can be even more dangerous than the declared one, as it cannot be identified from
where it comes, idea also expressed by Caplan (1997), according to whom “like a virus, discrimination is most
dangerous when its symptoms are concealed” 1 .
According to Guimarães (2006), the mechanisms that led to the belief of a racial democracy were based in
the anti-racialism, the idea that racial categories do not exist or are not relevant. Due to miscegenation, it was
believed that there were no racial categories and differences in Brazil, being the inequalities only social-based.
Through social sciences, literature and industrial culture, the ideal of racial harmony among the races and the
absence of the idea of superiority of one over the others were enforced and planted in the Brazilian way of life and
imaginary. The image of a mixed Brazil, where the racial harmony and peace reigned, was internationally spread
by the Government between the 1930’s and 1970’s, even resulting in the encouragement of UNESCO, in the ’50’s
to finance a research on Brazilian racial relations, postulating as a role-model for all the countries in the world,
specially United States and South Africa.
Nevertheless, though not in an explicit way, some discrimination mechanisms were implemented against
the black population, such as the so-called whitening policy, by which European immigration was officially
fostered by Brazilian government, even stated in Brazilian Constitution of 1937 as one of Brazilian Republic
objectives. This policy reflects the idea of white superiority, by assuming that the European labor was better to the
country than the one provided by the ex-slaves, which were left unemployed in their majority, and also by
establishing that a more mixed population (and therefore, whiter or “less black”) was desirable to the country.
Also, subtle and hidden ways of discrimination and demonstration of prejudice as usual jokes, comments, day-byday unequal treatment, demonstrate that Brazil was never and still is not a racial democracy at all.
Bias, discrimination and economic status.
Undoubtedly, race and economic status intermingle in Brazil. This fact is shown by 2006 statistics 2 ,
according to which within the 10% poorest portion of Brazilian society, 66,6% are black people and within the
10% richest portion, only 15,8% are composed by black people 3 . Still according to IBGE statistics, in regard to
the schooling years, the data is the following: among the white people, 26,4% has up to 4; 23,9%, from 5 to 8;
30,8%, from 9 to 11; and 18,3%, 12 or more schooling years; while among the black population, 42,6% has up to
4; 26,7%, from 5 to 8; 24,4%, from 9 to 11; and 5,8% has 12 or more schooling years.
It is claimed by many, specially by those who still defend the existence of a racial democracy in Brazil,
that the racial inequalities in Brazil depend exclusively on social inequalities. In other words, Afro-Brazilian
people are in a worse situation in society only because they happen to be in its poorest part, among with other
1
Up Against the Law: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court. New York : Twentieth Century Fund Press, p. 41.
Síntese dos Indicadores Sociais do IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). Available in
http://www.ibge.gov.br.
3
What we refer as black people is what in Brazil is the so-called group composed by “pretos” and “pardos”, the later
referring to people with an intermediate color of skin, due to miscegenation.
2
white people, who suffer from the same disadvantages brought by poverty. Thus, inequalities in Brazil would be
based only in class differences, because “all races are equal”. This belief is a great setback to implementing racialbased affirmative action instead of class-based ones.
Nevertheless, Guimarães (2006) teaches that Thales de Azevedo developed the theory that there are two
overlapped hierarchies in the Brazilian social structure: one economic and social-based and another based in
status and preferences, characterized by ideas such as color and family origin. This idea can be empirically
supported by the IBGE data, which bring about the wage gap between Afro-Brazilians and whites with the same
schooling years. First of all, the average income per hour for the white people is R$5,9 and R$3,2 for the black
people. When divided by schooling years groups, the gap is clearer: those with 4 or less schooling years, whites
have an income of R$2,5 per hour while the blacks have R$1,9 per hour; in the group of 5 to 8 schooling years,
white average income per hour is R$3,5 and black, R$2,5; and in the groups of 9 to 11 years, whites usually earn
R$3,7 and blacks, R$2,8 an hour. In the higher-educated group, the one with 12 or more schooling years, the bias
against black people is even more noticed: white average income per hour is R$9,1, while black’s is R$5,5.
In a research carried out by Datafolha Research Institute in 1995, it was concluded that the majority of
Brazilians do not believe in the racial democracy: 89% of the population thinks that whites hold “color prejudice”
towards blacks. Other questions revealed the subtle and even unconscious way by which such a prejudice is often
manifested: only 10% of the non-black population admitted holding “color prejudice” towards blacks, but through
a series of questions and phrases that characterize the racial prejudice, 87% of this non-black population
manifested some prejudice 4 .
Thus, there is a strong relation between race and economics in Brazil, but the social inequalities are not
only based on class as some claim, but also in race, through racist mechanisms and bias against Afro-Brazilian,
sticking them in a less favored position in society than the majority of whites.
3. Racial discrimination in education.
Segregation de facto and public education.
Although there was never a segregation of blacks in Brazilian schools following the American “separate
but equal” doctrine model, it is possible to say that black children in Brazil are subject to segregation de facto,
regarding to both its agglomeration in public schools and the racism they suffer from white classmates and
teachers.
Before the abolition of slavery in 1888, the education of slaves was provided by their masters and it was
4
Turra, C.; Venturi, G. (orgs.) (1998). Racismo cordial: a maior e mais completa análise sobre o preconceito de cor no Brasil.
2 ed. São Paulo: Ed. Ática.
characterized by practices that intended to make them ignorants and dopeys, in order to make them more
susceptible of domination (Fonseca, 2002). An Act from 1854 (Act n. 1331) forbad the access of slaves to public
education. Besides that, another Act (n. 7031-A) from 1878 restricted the access of freedmen to night period
education and also imposed other sorts of difficulties in the education of blacks (Romão, 2000). Having the
slavery came to its end in 1888, the education was not denied to ex-slaves, but instead recognized as their right
and used to perpetuate the social and racial hierarchy and relations developed in the previous years, through
mechanisms and strategies of dominations as religion and labor (Fonseca, 2002).
Free education is nowadays a constitutional right in Brazil and it is sponsored by government. Recently,
there was a progress in terms of the universal access to this right. However, the major problem lies in the quality
of this public and free education, which is almost invariably incomparable with that of the private institutions,
usually very expensive and attended by everyone with a better economic background. Therefore, as in Brazil race
is related to poverty and the black people is allocated in its majority in the poorest portion of the population,
public and free schools are highly attended by black children, while private institutions are mostly attended by
white children, which can be characterized as a de facto segregation in schools. The majority of black families has
no means to pay for a private education for their children, who correspond to almost 50% of the students who
auto-declared the color of their skin at the registration in public schools 5 .
Discrimination within the schools.
Due to the so-called myth of racial democracy in Brazil, based on which the majority of society takes
racial disparate treatment and impact as natural, inoffensive or a simple consequence of economic issues, there are
almost no legal cases regarding to educational discrimination. Furthermore, the majority of the people who are
victims of such treatment or impact are very poor, which makes the access of the complicated and too
bureaucratic Brazilian justice even more difficult. Besides that, Brazilian people do not really have knowledge of
the extensive and technical legislative statutes, neither of their rights 6 .
As already stated, although Brazil is believed to be a “racial democracy”, due to the absence of such legal
segregation and the strong miscegenation that took place there, prejudice and discrimination are strongly present
in that society, in a subtler way. This can also be noticed in the schools, where the performance of black students
is in average lower than the one of students of other races. Teixeira (1992), cited by Rosemberg, (1992) and
Durham (2003) explain this gap with the black families lower incomes, parents’ schooling, conditions of their
5
Data from Censo Escolar da Educação Básica 2005. Instituto Educacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Nacionais Anísio Teixeira
(INEP), Informativo, ano 4, n. 142, 4 jul. 2006. Available at http://www.inep.gov.br/informativo/informativo142.htm.
6
There are 250 articles only in the Brazilian Constitution, enacted in 1988 and amended more than 40 times since then.
residential area, prejudice and discrimination suffered in school by those children, which is said to affect selfesteem and accentuate inequalities and violence.
However, it is very hard to find stories and testimonials about racism demonstrations, because it is
sometimes unnoticed and most of the times dealt with as though it did not exist. The most usual way by which
prejudice and racial discrimination is demonstrated in classrooms is the teacher’s silence (Cavalleiro, 2000; Silva
Jr., 2002) when something comes down to racial issues or they receive complaints of black kids or listen to racist
jokes, regarded as “inoffensive”. According to Silva Jr., the usual responses of the teachers at students’ complaints
of being called “niggers” by their classmates are described: silence, “stop crying, never mind, he’s silly”, “don’t
care about this, we are all equals”, “tell him that our blood is all the same color”, “forget about that, God made us
all, we are all brothers”; “cut this crap and go back to you sit”, “inveigh against him too”, “tell me a little more
about this”, never turning to the offender, but only to the offended. This kind of reaction only makes the problem
worse, making attempts to pretend that the racial problem does not exist.
Afro-Brazilian representation in Higher Education.
The most competitive and qualitative Higher Education institutions in Brazil are the public ones. While in
United States the top-ten institutions are those with the most expensive tuition fee, in Brazil, they are, ironically,
the absolutely free ones, with no tuition charges at all, completely sponsored by government. On the other hand,
the best elementary and high schools are the private ones, as already stated before. Thus, what happens is that the
education and training necessary for someone to be successful in the paper-pencil test - which is the only criterion
used in the colleges admission process in Brazil - and then be accepted by the best institutions is only available to
who can afford it. And they are not cheap at all.
Thus, those students whose parents cannot afford a private institution that provides a good education and
proper training to those standardized tests are bound to study in public elementary and high schools, not
qualitative, and will very improbably have a chance to join a public University. Their chances are bigger in private
and not so competitive institutions, but then, they are private and their tuition fees are very high, not affordable by
many.
Brazilian higher education is, thus, an elitist privilege. Free qualitative education in Universities is
available pretty much to those who had the money to afford private schools. The poor population and, as
consequence, the Afro-Brazilians are underrepresented in Universities. A recent research carried out by Andifes
(Associação Nacional dos Dirigentes das Instituições Federais de Ensino Superior) 7 revealed that while white
people compound 52,1% of brazilian society and 59,4% of enrollments in Federal Universities, afro-brazilians
(“negros” and “pardos”) are 47,3% in society, but 34,2% in those Univerisities. The supra mentioned IBGE data
7
Data published by Veja magazine in 03/23/2005.
also bring about that 46,6% of 18-24 year-old white students are enrolled in Higher Education institutions (public
and private), while only 16,5% of the Afro-Brazilian students in this age go to Universities.
4. Affirmative action in Education.
Proposals of race-based affirmative action in public employment and universities were attempted by the
black movements since the 1990’s. Nevertheless, the Brazilian debate only took global relevance in 2001, when
the government presented some proposals in the III World Conference Against Racism, in Durban, South Africa.
Silva (2002) underlines the fundamental role played by the Movimento Negro (MN) or Black Movement and the
Movimento das Mulheres Negras (MMN) or Black Women Movement in pressing and negotiating with the
Brazilian government in order to adopt some policies against the racial inequalities even before the conference.
Although the Brazilian Constitution is silent about the adoption of affirmative action policies, it is
believed that they are actually fostered by it. Besides the implementation, since the 1930’s, of some laws which
differentiated and protected specific groups but were not called affirmative action yet –such as the Statute Law
5465 of 1968, which reserved 50% of the places in Higher Educational Institutions of Agriculture to landowners’
children - , the current Constitution itself establishes several of the so-called “positive discrimination” mainly to
women (in labor field) and handicapped people. Still in terms of constitutional issues, there are basically two main
arguments that can be used in favor or against the affirmative action proposals. One of them is the principle of
equality, present in its formal aspect in article 5, which states that “All persons are equal before the law, without
any distinction whatsoever(…)”, and in its material aspect in article 3, in which “The fundamental objectives of
the Federative Republic of Brazil are: (…) III - to eradicate poverty and substandard living conditions and to
reduce social and regional inequalities; IV - to promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race,
sex, color, age and any other forms of discrimination.” The principle of equality is used as an argument both by
those who believes that a “reverse discrimination” cannot be implemented because it would be discriminatory
against whites or other majority groups and by those who believe that affirmative action must be implemented in
order to promote real equality among groups in different situation and conditions. The second important argument
is the meritocracy, stated in article 208: “The duty of the State towards education shall be fulfilled by ensuring the
following: (…) V - access to higher levels of education, research and artistic creation according to individual
capacity (…)”. Those who are opposed to affirmative actions in Universities admission allege that it is not
compatible with the meritocracy, while those who defend such policies believe that the vestibular 8 is not a
trustworthy method to measure merit and it does not take into account the unequal education and background of
the applicants.
The debate in favor of affirmative action in Education in Brazil is based both in the compensatory and
8
Name of the standardized test that applicants take in order to get into college.
distributive justice. For the first it is stated that the current generations must repair the mistakes made by the
previous ones and no person can be excused of the responsibility of the treatment given to the black population
since slavery until nowadays 9 . But it can be also stated as a means of fighting the structural racial discrimination
through the redistribution of burden and benefits in the whole society.
Quotas and other proposals.
Undoubtedly, quotas in Universities admissions is the most known and proposed sort of affirmative action
in Brazilian discussion. Actually, the term “affirmative action” is even unknown by large part of the population
and the debate is reduced to quotas. Silva (2003) considers this confusion – which is sometimes made on purpose
and sometimes result of ignorance - one of the major mistakes in the debate.
Some Universities have already adopted the quotas system. The pioneers were the Universidade Estadual
do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense (UENF), having the system introduced
by the Rio de Janeiro State Statute Law 4151 of 2003 10 . The law reserves 20% of the places to applicants who
studied in public high schools, 20% to black people and 5% to handicapped people and other members of
minorities groups. Its constitutionality was challenges and is being discussed in the Supreme Court. Other
Universities which implement the quotas system, but through their own policies instead of a statute law, and
establish other percentages and combine the criteria in different ways can be cited: Universidade Estadual da
Bahia (UNEB), Universidade de Brasilia (UnB), Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA), Escola Paulista de
Medicina (UNIFESP), Universidade Federal do Parana (UFPR), Universidade Federal de Alagoas (UFAL),
Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso (UFMT), Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL), Universidade do
Estado de Minas Gerais (UEMG) and Universidade Estadual de Montes Claros (Unimontes), underlining that all
of these are public Universities.
Other sorts of affirmative action are also being implemented around the country. The Statute Law 11.096
in 2005 institutionalized the federal program called Programa Universidade para Todos (ProUni) 11 , which
concedes scholarships to low income students of private Universities. There are also some initiatives of prepcourses for the admissions standardized tests in special aid of black and low-income students. Other smaller
projects, such as the Projeto Geração XXI e Projeto Afro-Ascendentes, take a small number of black students and
sponsor their studies since elementary or high school until Higher Education graduation. There are also
affirmative action policies in admissions processes being implemented alternatively to the quotas system, such as
in Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp), in which extra points are conceded to members of minorities
9
Barros, A. A divisão já existe há muito tempo. O Estado de São Paulo. São Paulo, 9 jul. 2006. Caderno Aliás, p. 5.
The system was first implemented by the State Statute Laws 3524 in 2000 and 3708 in 2001, but they were both revoked in
2003 by the referred Statute Law.
11
http://www.mec.gov.br/prouni
10
and low-income students, and in Universidade de São Paulo (USP), which implemented in the 2007 selection the
system by which a bonus of 3% will be given to the grades of applicants who have studied in public high schools.
The most polemic proposal in this moment is the one brought by the so-called Racial Equality Statute,
which is being discussed by Congress. If it is approved, the quotas system will become mandatory in all Brazilian
Federal Universities, in a proportion of 50% to applicants who have studied in public high schools, and part of
these places reserved to black applicants 12 . The discussion of the project has been constantly in the media and in
the public opinion. It could be observed through the news various manifests held and signed by intellectuals,
scholars, artists and activists, positioning themselves in favor or against the State approval. The debate also led to
the possibility of substituting the racial criterion by the social criterion.
It is important to underscore that a very important achievement has also been reached in the basic
education level: the enactment of the Statute law 10639 in 2003, which consists in the mandatory inclusion of the
discipline Afro-Brazilian History and Culture in elementary and high public and private schools, as well as the
inclusion of the Black Consciousness Day, celebrated on November 20th, in the schools calendar. The enactment
of such statute was considered a great victory for the Afro-Brazilian population, hoping that it will enable some
changes in the education of the next generations and in the teacher’s mentality and way to deal with racial issues
in classroom as well.
5. Conclusion.
The silence that came down to racial issues in Brazil with the ideology of racial democracy was the major
factor that led to the perpetuation of the structural racial inequalities and the maintenance of the status quo ante,
even in the absence of a legal and declared discrimination, but actually under a system that declared the equality
of all under the law.
The affirmative action debate in Brazilian society is still very controversial. However, the Brazilian
Supreme Court is about to give its position about the topic and decide about the constitutionality of two proposals,
the Statute Law that fixed quotas in the Rio de Janeiro State Universities admission process and the scholarship
federal program called ProUni .Thus, it will be possible to analyze how the legal theories and arguments in the
racial discrimination and inequality issue will be used by the Supreme Court Justices.
Anyway, in spite of the constant efforts of Brazilian black movements and also of intellectuals to bring
about the racial discussion and to demystify the idea of racial democracy, a very considerable part of society still
believes in this myth. In this way, the radical proposals and demands of the black movements were very important
to really inflame this discussion over the whole society, including the press and scholars, among which very few
12
Quotas in Higher Education is only one of the policies imposed by the Statute of Racial Equality, which establishes several
other measures to fight against racial inequalities in other societal branches.
have developed studies on racial issues so far.
Therefore, even though Afro-Brazilian demands may seem sometimes way too radical, even though they
may be claimed to be worsening the racial gap and enhancing a sort of hatred and intolerance between them, and
even though much probably the racial-based proposals are to be substituted by class-based ones, the debate was
brought up. No problem can be dealt with if it is denied itself and the affirmative action discussion broke the
racial silence in Brazil. The future of such policies is still unknown.
6. References.
- Anache, A. A. (2002). Reflexoes sobre o diagnostico psicologico da deficiencia mental utilizado em educacao
especial. Available at
http://www.educacaoonline.pro.br/reflexoes_sobre_diagnostico.asp?f_id_artigo=363.
- Caplan, L. (1997). Up Against the Law: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court. New York : Twentieth
Century Fund Press.
- Carneiro, M. L. T. (1999). O racismo na história do Brasil: mito e realidade. São Paulo: Ática.
- Cavalleiro, E. (2000). Do silêncio do lar ao silêncio escolar: racismo, preconceito e discriminacao na educação
infantil. São Paulo: Contexto.
- Covin, D. (2006). The Unified Black Movement in Brazil, 1978-2002. Jefferson, N.C. : McFarland & Co.
- Durham, E. R. Desigualdade educacional e cotas para negros nas Universidades. Novos Estudos CEBRAP, n. 66,
jul/2003.
- Dworkin, R. (2001). Taking rights seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Fernandes, F. (1978). A integração do negro na sociedade de classes. 3. ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2 vols.
- Fonseca, M. V.(2002). A educação dos negros: uma nova fase do processo de abolição da escravidão no Brasil.
São Paulo: Editora Universidade São Francisco.
- Gomes, J. B. B. (2001). Ação afirmativa e princípio constitucional da igualdade: o direito como instrumento de
transformação social. A experiência dos EUA. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar.
- Guimarães, A. S. A. (1999). Racismo e anti-racismo no Brasil. São Paulo: Editora 34.
- Hasenbalg, C.; Silva, N. V. (1988). Estrutura social, mobilidade e raça. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Universitário
de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro.
- Moura, C. (1998). Sociologia do negro brasileiro. São Paulo: Ed. Ática.
- Queiroz, D. M. (coord.) (2002). O negro na universidade. Salvador: Novos Toques.
- Romão, J. (2000). Educação democrática como política de reversão da educação racista. Salvador: Instituto de
Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais.
- Rosemberg. F. (1998). Raça e desigualdade educacional no Brasil. Diferenças e preconceito na escola:
alternativas teóricas e práticas. São Paulo: Summus.
- Silva, C. (org.) (2003). Ações afirmativas em educação: experiências brasileiras. São Paulo: Summus.
- Silva Jr., Hedio (2002). Discriminação Racial nas Escolas. Editora: Unesco.
- Turra, C.; Venturi, G. (orgs.) (1998). Racismo cordial: a maior e mais completa análise sobre o preconceito de
cor no Brasil. 2 ed. São Paulo: Ed. Ática.
Triunfos de papel. A propósito de Viceconte
Joaquín Millón
Universidad de Palermo
I. Introducción
Hace más de un decenio muchos activistas de derechos humanos y gran parte de la doctrina “progresista”
Argentina, han venido realizando denodados esfuerzos para justificar la judiciabilidad de los derechos económicos
sociales y culturales (DESC). Sin embargo algo importante quedó fuera de discusión. Tras varios años desde que
las teorías que abogan por la exigibilidad de estos derechos fueran llevadas a la práctica y tras su considerable
acogida favorable en los tribunales, no se ha sabido problematizar debidamente las complejidades que implican la
implementación de estos derechos luego de las decisiones judiciales. 1
Esta brecha entre teoría y praxis trajo aparejada muchos costos. La afamada causa Viceconte 2 , paradigma
de la exigibilidad de los derechos sociales, es un claro ejemplo de esta brecha y de sus costos. Este será mi caso
de prueba y la ocasión para abordar algunos problemas de la ejecutabilidad de las sentencias de DESC. Aquí pues
no me interesa discutir las complejidades teóricas que encierran la exigibilidad de estos derechos. Asumiré que
ellos son exigibles para concentrarme en el problema práctico de la implementación de los DESC tras su
reconocimiento en sede judicial. Escudriñaré particularmente si las más reconocidas articulaciones teóricas acerca
de la exigibilidad han signado las dificultades de ejecución en su puesta en práctica. 3
II. Objeto
En Viceconte el Poder Judicial ordenó al Estado a producir y suministrar una vacuna, Candid 1, que
combate con bastante efectividad la Fiebre Hemorrágica Argentina (FHA). Esta enfermedad ataca a una amplia
extensión de poblaciones rurales Argentina. 4 La causa fue fallada en 1998. Desde aquella fecha hasta hoy, el fallo
1
Talvez en el caso de los DESC el desacoplamiento entre la teoría y la práctica pueda estar justificado por falta de
experiencia generalizada en la materia. Quizás, talvez, había razones estratégicas que ordenaban discutir y justificar
teoréticamente a los fines de desbancar las otrora imperantes posiciones negatorias, imponerse en la doctrina y en la
jurisprudencia, para recién después del “triunfo académico y jurisprudencial” pensar en las cuestiones prácticas postsentencia. Lo cierto es que esta –tan común- despreocupación por los resultados prácticos de las articulaciones teóricas,
opacaron las complejidades que traían aparejadas la implementación judicial de estos derechos.
2
“Vicenconte M. c. Estado Nacional s. amparo”, Cámara Nacional Federal Contencioso Administrativa, Sala IV, del
2/6/1998, publicado en JA 1999-I-485.
3
Obviamente, ambas discusiones no corren por carriles separados, pero he decidido presentar el tema que me ocupa de modo
aislado principalmente por motivos propedéuticos. Por razones de espacio, no puedo aquí detenerme a analizar las
implicancias conceptuales entre una y otra problemática (exigibilidad/ejecutabilidad).
4
La FHA es una enfermedad viral aguda grave caracterizada por un síndrome febril con alteraciones hematológicas,
es estudiado en universidades de Derecho y considerado por muchos activistas y doctrinarios como un éxito. Sin
embargo, largo tiempo trascurrió hasta que la vacuna Candid 1 se produzca. Recién en agosto del 2006 el
procedimiento de desarrollo de la droga habría sido concretado.
¿Cuáles fueron las causas que dificultaron por tantos años la ejecución de Vicenconte? Para responder a esta
pregunta, examinaré si las más reconocidas teorías de la exigibilidad de los DESC determinaron esta aletargada
implementación de la sentencia. Para ello desdoblaré la etapa de ejecución en dos partes, antes y después del
2001, reflexionando en cada una acerca de esta hipótesis.
III.i. La intervención mandar a cumplir (desde 1998 a 2001):
María Cecilia Viceconte, con patrocinio del Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) 5 , requería al
Estado que se completara la producción de Candid 1 y se suministre de inmediato a la población potencialmente
afectada. Al obtener resultado desfavorable en 1ra instancia, la actora y la Defensoría del pueblo de la Nación
apelaron el fallo en Cámara. 6 El 2 de julio de 1998, la Sala IV de la Cámara Contencioso Administrativa Federal
revocó el fallo de 1ra instancia y determinó que el Estado se encontraba obligado a continuar el desarrollo y
suministro de Candid 1. 7 Estableció como términos de cumplimiento, los plazos de un cronograma que el propio
Ministerio de Salud de la Nación (MSN) tenía elaborados a tal efecto (según este cronograma la vacuna debía ser
liberada para el uso a fines de 1999). Asimismo, responsabilizó personalmente a los MSN, al Ministerio de
Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos y a los organismos a su cargo al cumplimiento de los plazos legales y
neurológicas, renales y cardiovasculares, que evoluciona hacia la curación o la muerte en un lapso de una a dos semanas. El
agente etiológico es el virus Junín, cuyos huéspedes naturales son algunas especies de roedores silvestres que habitan zonas
de cultivo. Sin tratamiento, la mortalidad es muy elevada oscilando entre el 15 y el 30%. Su administración temprana
disminuye la mortalidad al 1%. El área endémica de la FHA abarca el Sureste de la provincia de Córdoba, Noreste de la
provincia de La Pampa, Sur de Santa Fe y Norte de Buenos Aires. En 1991 se descubre la vacuna contra FHA: Candid 1. Por
un convenio entre Argenina y E.E.U.U., esta fue producida en el Instituto Salk-Swiftwater, de Pensylvania. Las dosis se
obtuvieron en parte por donación y en parte a precio de costo de producción. Al momento del fallo quedaba un remanente de
80.000 unidades y la cantidad de habitantes de la zona endémica rondaba los 3.500.000.
5
El Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales es una de las organizaciones civiles de mayor trascendencia en Argentina en
materia de protección de derechos humanos y una de las pioneras en el litigio de interés público.
6
El Ministerio de Salud al contestar la demanda en primera instancia, había anunciado la consignación de partidas
presupuestarias en la ley de presupuesto del año 1997 para completar las obras del Instituto Maiztegui, lugar donde se
desarrollaría la vacuna. Esta respuesta, fue determinante para que luego en 2da instancia se considere al Estado obligado a
producir la vacuna (ver luego nota siguiente). A pedido de las partes se citó al Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación. De allí la
intervención del Defensor del Pueblo en la apelación.
7
La orden judicial se baso en el deber de los Estados de prevenir y tratar las enfermedades epidémicas y endémicas que
prescribe artículo 12 del Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, de jerarquía constitucional, y tuvo en especial
consideración la asunción por parte del Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social de la Nación la obligación de producir la vacuna
contra la FHA conforme al presupuesto de 1997 que había previsto partidas presupuestarias destinadas a reactivar el
proyecto. Dado el carácter pragmático de este escrito, no puedo detenerme a valorar los fundamentos del decisorio. Diré sin
embargo, que aún si no hubiera existido aquella partida presupuestaría, una posición que defienda una concepción de
igualdad estructural como la propuesta por L. Grosman justificarían la exigibilidad del requerimiento impetrado. Ver
GROSMAN, L., “Equality and Scarcity. Social Rights in the Argentine Constitution”, Yale Law School, New Haven, 2006.
Resulta también de enorme interés el aporte realizado por el mismo autor en “La igualdad estructural de oportunidades en la
Constitución argentina”, en “El Derecho a la Igualdad”, M. Alegre y R. Gargarella (coordinadores), Lexis Nexis, Bs. As.,
2007.
reglamentarios. Finalmente se encomendó al Defensor del Pueblo el seguimiento y control del referido
cronograma.
El caso representaba, sin duda, un triunfo para quienes abogaban por tornar a los DESC exigibles en
tribunales. Ciertamente, el tipo de intervención llevada a cabo en Viceconte es defendida por los más reconocidos
impulsores de las teorías de la exigibilidad, C. Courtis y V. Abramovich (en adelante CyA). Allí la justicia se
limita a hacer cumplir obligaciones de la administración fijadas por una ley o por la propia administración en
ejercicio de sus competencias reglamentarias. 8 El juez respetuoso de principio republicano de gobierno,
simplemente detecta el incumplimiento de una obligación asumida por el Estado a través de un acto legislativo o
administrativo y ordena su cumplimiento.
Ahora bien, este tipo de intervenciones parecen no dar cuenta de las dificultades de implementación de la
sentencias y tiende a fracasar, por ello, por no detectar -para luego desarticular- las causas que determinan el obrar
contrario a Derecho por parte del Estado. Nótese, que en la primer etapa de Viceconte, el único paso previo a la
determinación del remedio, fue una visita in loco del laboratorio del Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Virales
Humanas - “Instituto Maiztegui” (INEVH), que el Camarista A. Uslenghi realizó a fin de constatar el estado de
las obras y un informe provisto por la directora de este instituto que se refería al atraso de las mismas.
9
Determinando así el incumplimiento, se exigió simplemente al Estado que cumpla. Así, sin un conocimiento de lo
que se estaba ordenando y cuáles eran las razones que determinaban el incumplimiento, probablemente cualquier
orden fracasaría.
Sin embargo, por lo común, se tiende a explicar las dificultades de ejecución de este tipo de casos, se
8
“Un "primer tipo de casos" consiste en aquellas intervenciones judiciales que tienden a dotar de valor jurídico a medidas
de política pública asumidas por el Estado, sin entrar en la valoración de la propia política pública —esto es, a transformar
medidas formuladas por el Estado dentro de su marco de discrecionalidad en obligaciones legales y, por tanto, sujetas a
sanciones jurídicas en caso de incumplimiento—. En su análisis, el tribunal acepta la medida diseñada por los otros poderes
del Estado, pero transforma su carácter de mera decisión discrecional en obligación legal. El Poder Judicial se transforma
así en garante de la ejecución de esa medida. En muchos de estos casos la medida que el Estado ha formulado coincide
con la que reclaman los demandantes, sólo que ahora su adopción ha cobrado carácter obligatorio y su ejecución no queda
librada solamente a la voluntad del órgano que la formuló. Un ejemplo de estas situaciones es el caso Viceconte (...) En
estos supuestos no es el tribunal el que debe fijar comportamientos o políticas, sino que se limita a hacer cumplir, a
ejecutar lo establecido en la legislación vigente; (...) En estos casos no hay discusión acerca de la existencia de una
obligación —en sentido jurídico— de brindar la prestación, sino que tan sólo se examina el incumplimiento por parte de la
administración. Si bien todo acto de interpretación de la ley resulta, en cierta medida, un acto de creación de derecho, la
actuación judicial sigue los lineamientos y pautas fijadas por el Congreso, que es, en la teoría clásica de división de poderes,
expresión de la voluntad política de los intereses mayoritarios. Lo mismo ocurre cuando la justicia es convocada a ejecutar
reglamentaciones o actos emanados de la propia administración, de los que se derivan obligaciones jurídicas para ésta. La
posible intromisión en áreas o esferas de actuación reservadas a los demás poderes no es una cuestión que pueda plantearse
válidamente en estos casos. La justicia se limita a hacer cumplir obligaciones de la administración fijadas por una ley o
por la propia administración en ejercicio de sus competencias reglamentarias.” ABRAMOVICH, V., “La exigibilidad de
los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales”, en “Derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en América Latina. Del
invento a la herramienta.” A. Yamin (coordinadora), Plaza y Valdés, México DF, 2006, p.152-153. El énfasis es mío.
También puede verse COURTIS, C. y ABRAMOVICH, V., “Los derechos sociales como derechos exigibles”, Ed. Trotta,
Madrid, 2002.
9
Conf. CELS, “Derechos Humanos en la Argentina. Informe Anual”, enero-diciembre, Bs. As., 1998, p. 330.
esgrimen los argumentos acerca de la falta de mecanismos compulsivos de los jueces para hacer acatar sus
sentencias. Puede que haya algo de verdad en estos planteos. Por mi parte, pienso que las razones que dificultan la
implementación de los DESC están mucho más relacionadas con el tipo de intervención judicial llevada adelante
que con esta ausencia de herramientas compulsivas.
Ciertamente, entiendo que muchas veces el obrar contrario a Derecho por parte del Estado, no se debe a la
falta de voluntad política de un grupo de agentes administrativos que puedan ser impulsados a cumplir por algún
medio judicial coactivo. Lo que puede determinar las dificultades de ejecución tiene que ver con las intrincadas
dinámicas internas entre las agencias estaduales que anquilosan la eficacia de las decisiones de la administración,
determinado el incumplimiento de beneficios sociales, entre otros. Estas lógicas difícilmente puedan ser
erradicadas por una simple orden judicial de cumplimiento o aún por medidas coactivas.
Me explico, muchas veces, para hacer efectivos los beneficios concedidos por el Estado se suelen requerir
que complejas y engorrosas cadenas burocráticas sean puestas en movimiento. Una inadecuada comunicación y
coordinación de las agencias que forman parte de estos canales administrativos terminará frustrando los beneficios
otorgados. Hay, también, un déficit de información que torna a muchas de las decisiones de la administración en
inefectivas. La ausencia de información de las agencias públicas jerárquicas las lleva a tomar decisiones
espasmódicas o ciegas a los complejos contextos sociales a donde éstas se implementan. Asimismo, las lógicas
que imperan en cada uno de los eslabones de estas cadenas administrativas suelen ser diversas. Las agencias
superiores suelen responder más a las dinámicas del juego político, que a los requerimientos específicos de las
reparticiones inferiores. Estas escisiones generan, desde luego, ineficacia.
De esta manera, apelar a la propia dinámica de la administración para lograr el acatamiento de las
obligaciones por ella contraídas, puede hacer que tras la intervención judicial sólo se mantenga la inercia del
incumplimiento. 10
El caso Viceconte, es un claro ejemplo del tipo de ineficacia administrativa señalada que tornan
10
Aún más problemática encuentro las intervenciones en donde CyA recomiendan al tribunal examinar la compatibilidad de
una política pública en cuestión con un estándar jurídico como la igualdad, razonabilidad, etc. y luego determinada la
inidoneidad de la política para satisfacer un DESC, reenviar a la administración para que esta sea revisada. En este tipo de
decisiones no solo podemos encontramos con la ineficacia de la intervención mandar a cumplir sino que pueden agregarse
los problemas de erradicación de la discriminación estructural respecto de prestaciones de beneficios sociales por parte de la
administración a determinados grupos sociales. Estas suelen darse en distintos planos y estratos jerárquicos que perpetúan el
status quo de exclusión y que difícilmente suelen poder ser reformados por la propia administración y difícilmente puedan ser
captadas por una recomendación como la sugerida por estos autores. Aún es dable de preguntarse si una intervención más
activa del juez podría captar la complejidad de estas dinámicas de exclusión y construir un remedio que las erradique.
Piénsese, por ejemplo en una norma emitida por el Congreso de la Nación o una legislatura local donde una de sus posibles
interpretaciones resulta contrarias a derecho. Estas normas no solo son interpretadas por los jueces, sino por agencias
estaduales tales como Registros Civiles, Defensorías y otras tantas reparticiones públicas. Esta interpretación o práctica se
reproduce y se estabiliza. Esta estabilización se extiende a los actores estatales inferiores tales como asistentes sociales,
médicos, por ejemplo. Asimismo la propia ciudadanía suelen naturalizar estas prácticas, manteniendo así las lógicas de
exclusión, dificultando de este modo la erradicación y por tanto la prestación de beneficios sociales y otros derechos. En
estos casos incluso las reformas legales parecen ser insuficientes para lidiar eficientemente con el trato discriminatorio
estratificado.
infructíferos el tipo de intervenciones judiciales que aquí analizo. Efectivamente, el procedimiento de producción
de la Candid 1 involucraba a diversas agencias bajo la órbita del MSN donde no existía una fluida comunicación y
coordinación entre las mismas. Ésto, y no la falta de voluntad política, según entiendo, determinó las dificultades
de ejecución de la sentencia. La incomunicación entre las dependencias estaduales superiores e inferiores y de
estas últimas entre si, puede verse al analizar la deficiente coordinación y apertura de canales formales de diálogo
que existían en la Administración Nacional de Laboratorios e Institutos de Salud (ANLIS), que articulaba la
relación entre el laboratorio del Instituto Maiztegui y el MSN.
Cabe aquí señalar que la ANLIS había sido creada bajo la dependencia del MSN en 1996 para integrar,
coordinar y supervisar a diversos institutos vinculados con la investigación, la producción, el mantenimiento y
restauración de la salud. Antes de la creación del ANLIS, estos institutos de investigación y desarrollo, entre ellos
el Instituto Maiztegui,
operaban de forma inmediata y bajo la órbita del MSN con distintos rangos y
articulaciones. La debilidad y deficiencias de esta novel agencia es esbozada en un análisis de diagnóstico de los
institutos que conformaban la ANLIS que data de 1998. Éste confirma lo aquí afirmado. 11
Como más abajo se verá en detalle, existían más deficiencias de comunicación y funcionamiento entre
estas y otras dependencias administrativas que determinarían el retraso de la producción de Candid 1. Encuentro
en este punto, oportuno para reflexionar acerca del tipo de litigio de DESC llevado adelante en Argentina. Lo
cierto es que muchos activistas de “interés público” parecen haber tomado las líneas de CyA de manera literal.
Así, suelen litigar solo casos en los que el ejecutivo o el legislativo hayan asignado partidas presupuestarias o
dado especiales órdenes sobre la concreción de un derecho. El problema es que al hacerlo, depositan demasiada
confianza en la legitimidad de su requerimiento (por estar basado en esas órdenes estaduales que justifican
democráticamente la intervención judicial) y no articulan -o requieren cuanto menos- remedios que permitan
penetrar y desarticular las causas que determinan el obrar omiso del Estado. De esta manera las sentencia a su
favor, solo denuncia el accionar contrario a derecho y exige cumplimiento de las obligaciones contraídas por ley o
acto administrativo, manteniendo luego, en caso del incumplimiento de lo ordenado, idénticas intimaciones de
manera unidireccional. Por ello, seguidamente, las sanciones conminatorias e incluso los monitoreos a este tipo de
sentencias están en la línea recta de este recorrido que parece inconducente.
Efectivamente, éste fue el camino que siguió “Viceconte”. Pues, ante el vencimiento del plazo del
cronograma del MSN, la jueza de 1ra instancia intimaría nuevamente al Poder Ejecutivo Nacional al
11
HAMILTON, M. et al, “Análisis Diagnóstico de los Institutos que integran la ANLIS”, Marzo, Bs. As., 1998, pp.19. Allí
los investigadores detectan que la ANLIS era una agencia no plenamente conformada en el plano funcional y que se
encontraba –en algunas áreas- en una etapa de gestación y/o consolidación. No contaba con una imagen consolidada que se
reflejaba en la ausencia de coordinación estratégica y global intra-instituto y en la falta de un espacio establecido donde
pueda diseñarse una estrategia de coordinación mínima de actividades a nivel de la ANLIS en su conjunto. También
remarcan que esas debilidades también se presentaban en los institutos y centros y se manifestaba al observar que su
producción respondía a imposiciones externas derivadas de demandas erráticas, puntuales e inesperadas o bien surgen de la
voluntad de algún investigador o grupos de investigadores (sin que ello forme parte de una estrategia mínimamente
coherente.)
cumplimiento estableciendo un nuevo aplazamiento. Más tarde, ante el vencimiento de este nuevo plazo, la
actora: i) requirió la indisponibilidad de los fondos previstos en la partida presupuestaria afectada a la producción
de la vacuna, conforme a la Ley de Presupuesto de 2000, para ser aplicados al cumplimiento de lo ordenado en la
sentencia: producción y suministro de la vacuna; ii) se requirieron sanciones conminatorias por cada día de
incumplimiento de la sentencia; iii) finalmente, se solicitó “se notifique en forma personal a los actuales
Ministros de Salud y de Economía la parte resolutiva de la referida sentencia y se les ordene que dispongan los
medios necesarios según sus respectivas competencias para el efectivo cumplimiento de lo ordenado en ella”, y se
requirió que “la sentencia se ponga en conocimiento del Presidente de la Nación y del actual Jefe de Gabinete de
Ministros.” 12
En contestación, el Ministerio de Salud y el Ministerio de Economía presentaron informes señalando
expresamente las dificultades que impedían la prosecución del proceso de producción. Por su parte el Instituto
Maiztegui también hizo su descargo. En esté remarcaron la falta de apoyo del Estado y reconocieron
expresamente que el retraso del cronograma estimado para la liberación del producto podría hacerse efectivo
durante el transcurso de 2001 y sólo, si el Estado afectara los recursos necesarios. 13
Luego de estos informes que demostraban el nuevo estado de incumplimiento de los plazos, las medidas
requeridas por la parte actora obtuvieron acogimiento favorable por la jueza de 1ra instancia. 14
Por lo arriba dicho esta nueva sentencia padecía de los mismos problemas de superficialidad de lo
resuelto en 1998. Pues, replica la lógica irreflexiva de señalar el incumplimiento y ordenar cumplir. Incluso, a
pesar de haberse obtenido algo de información por parte del Ministerios y de las agencias administrativas no se
elaboró un remedio que utilice esta -aún escasa-información para alcanzar la ejecución eficiente de la sentencia.
El devenir del caso indicaría que la indisponibilidad de los fondos de la partida presupuestaria, la
aplicación de sanciones conminatorias y las notificaciones al Presidente y al Jefe de Gabinete no hubieran
conducido a la administración a un obrar eficiente. Los futuros hechos de Viceconte permiten hoy decir que esta
nueva sentencia hubiese tenido igual suerte que los anteriores decisorios que programaron y reprogramaron el
cronograma de cumplimiento. 15
12
CELS, “Derechos Humanos en la Argentina. Informe Anual”, 2001, p. 330.
“…de persistir la actual situación de falta de apoyo de este proyecto, no podrá continuarse y se habrá realizado un gran
esfuerzo que no redundará en beneficio de la población.” Ibid. Este punto interesante confirma la existencia de posturas
maniqueas no solo por parte de los activistas y beneficiarios sino incluso por parte de las propias agencias implicadas, que
suelen confundir incumplimiento con ausencia de voluntad política. Por lo dicho en el cuerpo del texto estoy más inclinado a
pensar que el nivel de desconexión de las agencias del Estado suelen determinar estados de cosas similares a los de Viceconte.
14
Hasta el 2005, ni el juzgado que instruyo la causa, ni la Cámara, se habían expedido sobre la aplicación de esta sanción
conminatoria. Conf. SIGAL, M., MAURINO, G. y NINO E., “Las acciones colectivas”, Lexis Nexis, Bs. As., 2005, p. 322.
15
Por un lado respecto a lo fondos, la escasez datos acerca de las complejidades financieras de la producción de la vacuna
hacía difícil discernir con exactitud cuanto presupuesto se requería. Prueba de ello es que luego en el 2002, se debió recurrir a
subsidios de distintos organismos nacionales e internacionales. En el ámbito local, en 2002 la Secretaría de Ciencia y
Tecnología de la Nación otorgó una parte del subsidio para el financiamiento del desarrollo de la droga ($701.613 conforme
a un convenio del 3/9/02). Asimismo se obtuvo el apoyo económico del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el
13
Esto no ocurrió, pues la administración Argentina llevaría al caso a un nivel de intervención judicial más
intenso. Aunque no por ello mucho más efectivo.
III.ii. Monitoreando la ineficacia administrativa (de 2001 a 2006):
Efectivamente el Estado cuestionó las sanciones conminatorias dispuestas en 1ra instancia y concedida la
apelación, la causa se radicó en Cámara. Allí los jueces, no sólo se abocaron al cuestionamiento de las sanciones
conminatorias, sino que se inmiscuyeron a través de diversas órdenes, audiencias y monitoreos en el proceso de
ejecución de la sentencia.
Como primera medida y a los efectos de develar las causas y responsabilidades del incumplimiento de las
sentencias, se convocó a las partes a una audiencia. Esta audiencia no llegó a buen puerto, pues no hubo acuerdo
entre las diversas agencias del gobierno acerca del estado de ejecución del proceso de desarrollo de la vacuna. Por
ello, se resolvió citar en una nueva audiencia al Ministro de Salud de la Nación para que personalmente
identifique los obstáculos que impedían la ejecución de la sentencia y de las etapas faltantes en el proceso de
producción.
Luego de la audiencia, a requerimiento del tribunal, el Ministro presentó un nuevo cronograma de
cumplimiento donde se detallaban los pasos a seguir para el desarrollo de la vacuna. Este plan sería luego
homologado por el tribunal, ordenando, asimismo, medidas de monitoreo del mismo. Por un lado, se requirió al
Defensor del Pueblo, el seguimiento de las medidas y el informe de los resultados obtenidos. Se ordenó, también,
a la Sindicatura General de la Nación (SIGEN) el control presupuestario del cronograma.
Asimismo, se conformo una “Comisión Asesora” para llevar adelante el estudio de los resultados en el
proyecto de investigación para la obtención de la vacuna. 16 Asimismo, en el transcurso del caso hasta el 2006, se
realizaron aproximadamente dos audiencias por año en donde las partes informaban de los avances del proceso de
elaboración de la droga.
La información recabada en estas audiencias y en los informes de los auditores judiciales nos permiten
tener un paneo de las razones que aletargaban la ejecución de la sentencia.
Así, en 2002, el Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación incorporaba al expediente judicial una nota
Desarrollo (PNUD) y técnico de la Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS).
En lo que se refiere a sanciones conminatorias y notificaciones a ministerios, Jefe de Gabinete y al Presidente, puede
adelantarse que el caso presentaba mucho más que problemas de ausencia de voluntad política del Gobierno.
16
“La Sala IV dispuso entonces la conformación de una Comisión de expertos, con el propósito de observar la labor
realizada por el INEVH con relación a las fases cumplidas de la vacuna CANDID l, producida en los EEUU y disponer las
medidas tendientes a su definitivo desarrollo y producción en la Argentina. Designó como Observadores del proceso a
funcionarios de la Defensoría del Pueblo de la Nación. La Comisión realizó sucesivas reuniones para establecer las pautas
de trabajo, avanzando pese a la resistencia de distintos funcionarios integrantes de organismos dependientes de la cartera
sanitaria.” DEL CERRO, “Un logro: Una vacuna Argentina para un mal Argentino”. Esta comisión tuvo una corta vida,
funciono hasta producir un informe en 2001.
“donde se declaraba que la escalada de la producción no se había iniciado por la falta de insumos
requeridos....” 17 En base a esto, uno podría pensar que el retraso de la ejecución se debía a cuestiones de escasez
de presupuesto. Ciertamente, la crisis financiera Argentina del 2001 puede haber afectado la viabilidad del
emprendimiento.
Sin embargo, si se continúa leyendo la nota de la defensoría, se descubre que había mucho más
que problemas de presupuesto: “…y que durante el año 2001 no se había vacunado con el remanente de la
vacuna Candid 1 disponible –fabricada en los Estados Unidos- a la población adulta bajo riesgo de adquirir
FHA, ya que no se habían recibido instrucciones específicas del MSN que revocarán la anterior decisión de
suspender la vacunación.” 18 Esta afirmación es sintomática de la incomunicación entre las agencias que genera
una mecánica irracional que ya he señalado.
Asimismo, también en 2001, podemos notar la ausencia de articulación eficiente del MSN respecto de sus
agencias dependientes. En ese año, sorprendentemente, el ministro responsabilizaba a uno de los organismos bajo
su propia órbita del retraso de la ejecución. 19
Pero aún hay más, estas irracionalidades se solapaban a un obrar poco transparente del MSN. El
informe de agosto de 2002 de la SIGEN también demostraría que había importantes irregularidades de gestión y
logística que trascienden el supuesto problema del financiamiento. 20
Las deficiencias detectas por la SIGEN no fueron corregidas por la administración como lo
determina otra auditoria realizada en 2005 por el mismo organismo. 21 A esto cabe agregar que cada uno de los
años desde que el caso fuera fallado, la ley de presupuesto asignó una partida especial para el subprograma de
producción de vacunas contra la FHA.
IV. Conclusiones
Como puede verse en la primera etapa de Viceconte la intervención que sólo ordenaba el cumplimiento de
una obligación contraída por una norma o acto del gobierno, como lo exigen CyA, parece haber sido bastante
ineficaz. Incluso la posterior intervención ordenando monitoreos periódicos y audiencias informativas de partes,
17
SIGAL, et al, op. cit., p. 118. El énfasis me pertenece.
Ibid. Los énfasis me pertenecen.
19
Allí se afirma que el Instituto Maiztegui no había iniciado trámite alguno para gestionar ante su habilitación como
laboratorio productor de biológicos de uso humano. “Informe de la ANLIS”, citado por DEL CERRO, T., op. cit.. La autora
comenta críticamente estas injustificadas afirmaciones del MSN. El informe del Defensor del Pueblo también hace mención
acerca de esta situación (sobre esto ver lo dicho al final de la nota 13).
20
SIGAL, et al, op. Cit., p. 119.
21
En la “Evaluación del Sistema de Control Interno 2005 al ANLIS” de la SIGEN se detectan un cúmulo de irregularidades
entre las que destacan: importantes debilidades de gestión financiera que evidencian la falta de controles y la posibilidad de
ocurrencia de irregularidades en perjuicio del erario del Organismo (p.3). En cuanto a los subsidios que la ANLIS se
destacó que no existía un registro centralizado de la totalidad de los mismos, y otra serie graves irregularidades de
procedimientos administrativos (p. 19-20). También se denuncia la ausencia de una planificación estratégica en el proceso de
formulación presupuestaria, inexistencia de estudios de costos que permitan conocer la incidencia financiera que generará la
ejecución de cada una de las metas físicas programadas para cada año, deficiencias de elaboración de presupuestos (p. 23).
18
no hizo mucho más que exponer algunas de las irregularidades que determinaban el incumplimiento de un
beneficio. Tal vez, la transparencia otorgada por estas medidas, constriño a la administración al cumplimiento. Sin
embargo, estas intervenciones no corrigieron las dinámicas de la administración, la incomunicación entre ellas, el
alto grado de centralización de las agencias, etc. Esto parece haber sido lo que determinó lentos y angustiosos
procedimiento de ejecución.
No puedo aquí analizar que tipo de intervención puede desestructurar estas dinámicas
institucionales y llevarlas a un obrar eficiente. Lo que sí me atrevo a afirmar es que de no someterse a crítica las
intervenciones como las sugeridas por CyA continuaremos encontrando casos con dificultades de ejecución como
las que Viceconte debió enfrentar.
Pero este análisis solo podrá ser llevado adelante cuando quienes han sabido construir e imponer una
teoría que justifique la exigibilidad de los DESC comiencen a concentrarse intensamente en las consecuencias
prácticas de sus elaboraciones. Para ello deberán recurrir a una evaluación pragmática de sus -aparentes“conquistas”. Un adecuado análisis empírico de sus intervenciones y el estudio del funcionamiento interno de la
administración y de los contextos políticos, económicos y sociales que circundan cada caso permitirá elaborar
mejores estrategias, descubrir las falencias que presentan la forma en que sus reclamos fueron construidos y/o
receptados por los jueces. 22 Todo esto podría enriquecer su práctica y permitir articulaciones de los DESC más
efectivas, que prometan algo más que el mero efecto simbólico -si es que lo tienen-de los triunfos de papel.
22
Paola Bergallo ha venido requiriendo “generar más investigación empírica cuantitativa y cualitativa sobre los remedios
[judiciales] empleados hasta ahora y su eficacia relativa en el impacto en la administración … La investigación empírica
debería servir, a su turno, para informar discusiones teóricas y, eventualmente, propuestas de reformas legislativas
procedimentales que mejoren las modalidades remediales.” BERGALLO, P., “Justicia y experimentalismo: la función
remedial del poder judicial en el litigio de derecho público en Argentina”, SELA 2006, Editores del Puerto, Bs. As., 2007.
Constitutional Tax Law – Notes about the Brazilian Expertise
Hermano Barbosa
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
The purpose of this article is to present and to examine some relevant formal and material aspects of the
Brazilian tax system that may give rise to discussions of legitimacy and adequacy, especially if compared with
foreign constitutional expertise.
The traditional doctrine on legal systems classifies the same pursuant to criteria that are based on their
essential characteristics. The option of classifying certain subjects under different constitutional sub-systems is
not made for mere academic reasons, but also and especially due to effective legal purposes.
1
In fact, just like the recognition of a unitary constitutional system allows to find out concrete solutions to
many problems related to general cases of constitutional interpretation – including, for example, the questions
related to how to harmonize opposed principles, how to promote and effect fundamental values, how to identify
the most appropriate meaning for the language adopted by the Constitution, and how to deal with apparent
normative silences or gaps –, the identification of sub-systems within the Constitution itself consists in a equally
precious instrument for dealing with problems related to particular subjects, as it permits the organization of the
theoretical and dogmatic tools that are applicable in view of specific aspects of a legal reality.
A clear example of sub-constitutional system in Brazilian law is the constitutional tax system, which
individualization and essential characteristics have been attracting, now and then, the attentions of an expressive
section of Brazilian doctrine. 2
Actually, the set of rules that compose the Brazilian (constitutional) tax system (i) are autonomous (to the
best possible extent) and self organized, being indeed almost all of them schematically included in a separate
section of the Brazilian Federal Constitution (articles 145 to 162), (ii) regulate a subject that can be dogmatically
1
CANARIS, Claus Wilhelm. Pensamento Sistemático e Idéia de Sistema na Ciência do Direito (Systemdenken und
Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz) (3rd ed.) (trad. António Menezes Cordeiro). Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2002,
10, 103 and 130.
2
Among the important contributions in this regard, we refer to a classical essay in Brazilian Tax Law by Professor GERALDO
ATALIBA, Sistema Constitucional Tributário Brasileiro. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1968, as well as to the recent study
of Professor HUMBERTO ÁVILA, Sistema Constitucional Tributário. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2004. It is interesting to note how do
the Brazilian tax system has made an historically coherent constitutional evolution during such time, to the point that,
notwithstanding all changes experienced by Public Law in general, and constitutional law in particular, since the 1960s (a 24
years of political dictatorship was experienced in Brazil in this meanwhile), the essential characteristics that were identified
by Professor GERALDO ATALIBA, in 1965, remain fully and perfectly valid and accurate, and, therefore, actual. This is opinion
in shared by the Brazilian administrative expert MARÇAL JUSTEN FILHO in Sistema Constitucional Tributário: Uma
Aproximação Ideológica, in Interesse Público. Porto Alegre: Notadez, 1999, 79.
individualized from other constitutional subjects, and (iii) are oriented by and subject to specific principles. 3
A relevant aspect in the characterization of the tax system as a constitutional sub-system is based on the
fact that many of the principles that it is subject to, although also applicable to other sections of the constitutional
system in general, reveal particular meanings whenever relating to tax matters. 4
One should also note that the “constitutionalization” is one of the most notable aspects of the Brazilian tax
system, which rules, in many of cases, have direct grounds in express provisions of the Brazilian Federal
Constitution dated as of October 5th, 1988 (“BFC”). 5
The Brazilian tax system is, therefore, fundamentally constitutional. The creation of taxes as well as the
definition of each of the essential elements that are required for the identification and charge of taxes (taxpayer,
taxable event, basis of calculation, among others) derive from the exercise of a public “right” granted to each of
the political entities that compose the Brazilian Federation (Federal Union, States and Municipalities) to be used
in accordance with and pursuant to the limitations provided for in BFC, which is the fundamental statue for tax
and fiscal matters. 6
According to the Brazilian constitutional tradition, upon founding the political grounds of the Brazilian
State, BFC does not “create” or “establish”, per se, any taxes, but only provides for the limited and exclusive
circumstances in which each of the political entities that compose the Federation may create or establish the same,
as well as the formal and material parameters to be observed by the lawmaker for the use of said competence, the
“taxing power”.
Each political entity receives from BFC certain tax competences to be used according to limitations that
are set forth in BFC itself, and ruled by complimentary law. The creation of a tax is a discretionary decision of the
political entity of the entity to which the power to tax was granted and it is used pursuant to the democratic
principle.
3
The methodological individualization of Tax Law as an autonomous system for the study of its characteristics is a frequent
practice in Civil Law doctrine, in Brazil and abroad. TORRES, Ricardo Lobo. Tratado de Direito Tributário Brasileiro, Tomo
2 – Sistemas Constitucionais Tributários. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1986; BELTRANE, Pierre. Os Sistemas Fiscais (Trad. J.
L. Da Cruz Vilaça). Coimbra: Almedina, 1976; VALLÉE, Annie. Les Systèmes Fiscaux. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2000.
4
This is the case, for example, of the principles of (i) strict legality (“legalidade” or lex stricta, art. 150, item I of BFC),
which does not accept restraints that one could expect in Administrative Law, and even in Criminal Law; (ii) non-confiscation
(“não-confisco”) art. 150, item IV), which has particular meanings if compared to the general legal prohibition of illegal
enrichment, and the protection of property rights; (iii) typicity (“tipicidade”)4, which, due to progresses of doctrine and case
law, reveals own characteristics in Tax Law if compared to its similar expression in Criminal Law; and (iv) precedence
(“anterioridade”, art. 150, item III), a typical and traditional Tax Law instrument for effecting legal certainty with an ultimate
purpose to protect the individual’s trust, an issue that is currently being widely discussed by Brazilian doctrine in other fields
of both Private and Public Law.
5
FILHO, Marçal Justen, Sistema..., p.39; ÁVILA, Humberto. Sistema..., 107.
6
We expressly refer to “tax” and “fiscal” to the extent that BFC does not regulate exclusively the matter respecting to the
imposition and collection of taxes (“tax issues”), but also to general budgetary requisites, as well as the criteria for the
sharing of tax revenues (in a broader sense, “fiscal issues”). See, JARACH, Dino. Finanzas Públicas y Derecho Tributário
(3rd ed.). Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2004, 73.
In other words, by sharing the tax competence and establishing the general rules related to its use, the
constitutional lawmaker did not impose to the ordinary lawmakers the duty to establish any tax, but only admitted
that it could do so, under a general degree of freedom, and in accordance with its political convenience, within a
set of formal and material limitations.
BFC, therefore, provides for a complex and organized tax system, which is based in the granting of the so
called tax competences, combined with the setting up of limitations to be observed by the ordinary lawmakers.
Notwithstanding the fact that precise qualification is not unanimous in Brazilian doctrine, the possible
types of taxes foreseen in BFC include imposts (“impostos”), fees (“taxas”), and contributions (“contribuições”). 7
Basically, the differences among them are that (i) imposts are taxes on wealth in the form of capital,
income and consumption for the financing of general public expenditures, which establishment is not linked to
any specific State activity, and which proceeds cannot be subject to a predetermined budgetary destination; (ii)
fees are imposed to remunerate the public administration for the exercise of a police power vis-à-vis the effective
use of specific public services; and (iii) contributions, which taxable event is not linked to any particular State
activity, are used for the predetermined financing of government activities in respect of several different purposes,
such as social policies, maintenance of unions and professional boards, and State intervention in economy.
As a general rule, contributions can only be created by the Federal Union, but fees can be imposed by any
of the political entities, provided that it has the competence to render the service to be remunerated.
The power to create imposts is subject to a more complex distribution among the Federal Union, States,
and Municipalities. Pursuant to the BFC, the Federal Union can tax the import and export of goods, income of any
kind, industrialized products (Federal value added – “VAT” tax), security trade, credit, foreign exchange and
insurance transactions, rural real estate property, and great fortunes. The States can tax heritages and gifts,
circulation of goods and the rendering of communication or inter-State or inter-municipal transportation services
(State VAT tax), property of vehicles. Finally, the Municipalities can tax urban real estate property, onerous
transfer of real estate property and related rights, and services in general. 8
Besides granting the power to tax and establishing detailed rules in this respect, BFC also provides for the
7
Those are the three types of taxes generally used in Brazil. Notwithstanding so, BFC also foresees the possibility of the
establishment of (i) improvement contributions (“contribuições de melhoria”) (BFC, art. 145, item III) that may be charged
by the Federal, State or Municipal Governments from taxpayers whose properties had their value increased as a result of
specific public works; and (ii) compulsory loans (“empréstimos compulsories”), which may be charged by the Federal
Government to finance extraordinary expenses related to external wars or public calamity, and urgent and nationally relevant
public investments. For a description (in English language) of general aspects regarding the types of Brazilian taxes, we also
refer to DOMINGUES, José Marcos. Environmental Fees and Compensatory Tax in Brazil, in Law and Business Review of
the Americas, Vol. 2, N. 2, SMU Dedman School of Law, Spring 2007, 282.
8
States and Municipalities can only create the taxes that are expressly foreseen in BFC. Article 154 of BFC, however,
provides for a residual competence for the Federal Union to create other taxes that it does not expressly foresee, (i) in case of
war, or (ii) in any circumstances, provided that such new tax is created by a Complimentary Law (subject to more restrict
approval requirements), non-cumulative and does not have the same tax triggering event or basis of calculation of other taxes
described in the Federal Constitution. So far, such constitution has never been used by the Brazilian Congress.
basis of the tax principles in general, as well as tax competence limitations regarding specific types of taxpayers
or transactions in view of values to be ultimately promoted. This is the case of constitutional exemptions (so
called “immunities”) on income, equity or services of the political entities, temples and churches of any kind,
political parties, labor unions and non-profit social associations and educational institutions, among others.
BFC also provides for a set of different matters to be detailed or regulated by the Brazilian Congress by
the enactment of “Complimentary Laws” – a particularity of Brazilian Law, which consists in a special type of
law that is destined to regulate particular issues foreseen in BFC, and is subject to a legislative proceeding that is
formally stricter if compared to the ordinary one. 9 Those subjects include, among others, regulation of conflicts
on tax competence between the Federal Union, States and Municipalities, regulation of constitutional limitations
of the taxing power, establishment of general tax rules on the definition, taxable events, basis of calculation and
taxpayers of the taxes described in BFC, as well as on tax obligations, imposing, credits, and statues of limitation.
Different from many other foreign jurisdictions, where the tax system was developed in a nonconstitutional basis, the Brazilian constitutional lawmaker, for political reasons which precise investigation should
not be covered in this study, has traditionally opted to rule in a detailed and complex way many of the important
aspects related to the establishment and charge of taxes, granting of tax competence, distribution and criteria for
the public use of the resources collected by he tax authorities, and, specially, limitations imposed to the State
taxing power. 10
11
Such characteristic may be reputed to an historical distrust or to a lack of legitimacy in view of the
9
The existence of “complimentary laws” or “constitutional laws”, although considerably rare, maybe be found in some other
Civil Law jurisdictions.
10
In a very brief overview, the Brazilian constitutional history started in 1824, following to the country’s independence from
Portugal in 1821. In 1891, the first Republican constitution replaced the one from 1824, as a result of the fall of the Brazilian
monarchy regime in 1989. Following to that, new Constitutions were approved in 1934, 1937, 1946, characterizing interim
periods of dictatorship in the country’s struggle for democracy. Although all those constitutions dealt with, and progressively
in more details, with taxation matters, the first major Brazilian tax reform was approved in Constitutional Amendment 5 of
1965 to the Constitution of 1947. Since then, Brazil experienced the Constitution of 1967 and its 1st Amendment in 1969,
which were the legal grounds of the dictatorship that was established in 1964 and lasted up to the beginning of the decade of
1980. The present Brazilian Constitution (that we are referring to herein as “BFC”) is the one of 1988, which encompass
different political, economic and social views of the parties that appeared in the country’s re-democratization.
11
The whole BFC is characterized by extremely detailed provisions. This phenomenon is significantly due to political
influences occurred during the works of the Constitutional Assembly that followed to more than 2 decades of dictatorship.
Surprising examples in this regard include a rule according to which a specific public school in the City of Rio de Janeiro
(Colégio Pedro II) shall be subject to Federal administration (art. 242, paragraph), or another rule, according to which
specific rural workers from the Amazon region should receive, in case of social need, a life monthly pension in the amount of
2 minimum official wages (art. 54). Besides such extreme and odd examples, some bizarre others, potentially more dangerous
for the nation in general, although historically never applied by the Brazilian courts, have already been removed by
Constitutional Amendments in the course of our recent history. The most notable example in this regard is the case of
paragraph 3rd of Article 191, originally included in text of BFC and (fortunately) removed by the 40th Amendment of 2003,
which provided for that effective interest rates related to credit transactions should be of 12%.
From a tax standpoint, the Brazilian Constitutions are also historically detailed. This characteristic, however, in this case,
should not be regarded as a disadvantage, since it frequently plays a role in favor of the taxpayers, by granting constitutional
hierarchical status to provisions that were originally included in the Brazilian National Tax Code. Notwithstanding so, some
extreme examples may still be pointed out so as to indicate the level of details that was often adopted in BFC, such as
establishment of minimum tax rates and specific methods for registering and using tax credits in VAT taxes.
excesses committed by a State that was frequently in deficit, and that is expressed in claims for more certainty in
the establishment of taxes in general.
In what respects to limitations to the power to tax, while in many States the whole system of fundamental
principles related to taxpayers’ guarantees is based on case law, in Brazil there was a clear concern about
expressly including those rules in BFC (without prejudice to additional guarantees progressively recognized by
the courts), either by means of general tax principles, but also as specific tax rules that aim to such purpose.
In many circumstances, indeed, the constitutional lawmaker was redundant by repeating exclusively in
respect of taxpayer protection some of the principles that had been already formulated in broader terms in view of
the protection of citizens in general.
This is the case, for example, of the principles of legality and equality. As to the first one, although Article
th
5 of BFC, upon listing individual rights and guarantees, establishes in item II that “nobody will be obliged to do
or not do anything except by virtue of law”, a particular provision was included for dealing with tax purposes,
according to which “the Federal Union, States and Municipalities (…) are forbidden to impose or increase taxes
without a law that establishes so” (art. 150, item I). With respect to equality, despite of 5th foreseeing that
“everybody is equal before the law, without distinctions of any kind”, an Article 150, item II, included in BFC the
guarantee that the Federal Union, States and Municipalities “may not establish unequal treatment between
taxpayers that are in equivalent situations, being forbidden any kind of distinction in virtue of profession or labor
function, irrespectively of the legal designation of the earnings, properties or rights”.
Considering its essential characteristics, the Brazilian constitutional tax system is classified as opened,
both in the sense that it is capable of permanent development 12 , and that its rules may direct the interpreter to
concepts or to other rules that are strange to that sub-system, and sometimes even to the Brazilian general
constitutional system itself. 13
That “opened” character of BFC is also particularly evidenced in respect of individual rights (from which
taxpayers rights are a part of), as far as BFC automatically incorporates all rights arising out of the regime and
principles that it adopts, or from the treaties concluded by Brazil (art. 5th, paragraphs 1st to 3rd). 14
12
BFC provides for rules establishing formal and material amendment requisites, and, as a result of the Constitution being
such a detailed document, the current exercise of political administration requires the enactment of Amendments on a
frequent basis by the Brazilian Congress. Up to January 31st, 2008, BFC, which is dated as of October 1988, had 6 Revision
Amendments, and 56 Amendments.
13
As examples of envoy to concepts that are strange to the tax sub-system, we refer, among many others, to accounting, civil,
commercial, and criminal rules and institutions. Concepts not belonging to the Brazilian general constitutional system itself
include those that are not formally constitutional, or even not positive or exclusively legal (“good faith”, technical terms
adopted by other sciences). Additional discussions in this respect are referred to in ÁVILA, Humberto. Sistema..., 108.
14
Article 5th of the Brazilian Federal Constitution lists in 78 detailed items the individual rights and guarantees. Paragraph 1st
of such Article clarifies that “the rules defining fundamental rules and guarantees are immediately applicable”. Paragraph 2nd,
for its turn, establishes that “the rules defining rights and guarantees expressed in this Constitution do not exclude others
deriving from the regime and principles that it adopts, or from the international treaties that the Federative Republic of Brazil
is a party of”. Finally, paragraph 3rd state that “the international treaties and conventions on human rights that are approved in
Besides that “opened” aspect that generally characterizes the Brazilian constitutional system, a second
notable aspect of the constitutional tax system in particular is its rigidity.
Such characteristic is due to the fact that competence rules (including those related to the definition of the
taxes and their specific normative requisites) and the share of tax revenues are ruled in detail by BFC and may not
be contradicted by commands of non-constitutional degrees. 15
Although representing a right and offering certainty to taxpayers, the ranking of tax rules with
constitutional status evidences a possible downside, related to the fact that those rules can only be changed by an
amendment to BFC itself, which is subject to limitations that are not only formal, but also material (art, 60,
paragraph 4th), therefore causing the changing of certain rules to be regularly difficult, and sometimes impossible
to be achieved.
On the bottom line, the rigidity of the Brazilian constitutional tax system derives from the fact that: (i) the
power to tax can only be used (a) subjectively, when the tax competence in hand was granted by BFC, and (b)
materially, to the extent that the tax to be created is foreseen in the Federal Constitution 16 ; and (ii) any change to
the rules related to the creation of taxes depend on a previous constitutional amendment, which, for its turn, must
observe formal and material requirements established in BFC that includes a list of subjects in respect of which no
amendments are absolutely allowed 17 .
Considered as a fact, the excessive completeness of BFC leads to two general conclusions: (i) from one
perspective, it offers confidence and protection to taxpayers vis-à-vis potential excesses incurred by the public
administration in the use of their power to tax; (ii) although it reduces the possibility of the tax system being
changed or adapted in accordance with the political intentions of particular governments that were democratically
elected.
Furthermore, a detailed Constitution imposes a particular onus to the interpreter since, as almost any
discussion may be ultimately conducted to a constitutional argument, one should try to avoid that the risk of such
excess of constitutional restraints minimizing the strength of the constitutional discourse itself.
each house if the Brazilian Congress, in two rounds, by three fifths of the votes of the respective members will be considered
as equivalent to Constitutional Amendments”.
15
ATALIBA, Geraldo, op. cit., 36: “Among the more important Brazilian tax principles, the more characteristic and peculiar
is that of toughness of the tax system” (free translation by the Author). This idea is stressed by the same author, in other part
of its essay (p. 37): “The toughness of the constitutional tax system consists is an implicit constitutional principle, which may
be ascribed together with the other constitutional tax principles. The consequences of this principle, in theory and in practice,
are the most important and extensive, reaching every sectors of tax subjects and playing a role of influence in the structuring,
interpretation and application of all fiscal institutes. (...) The taxpayer – one may infer from the analysis of the Brazilian tax
system, specially if compared to others – maintained full tax power, granting to the law making entities competences that are
merely specific, limited and circumstanced.” See also ÁVILA, Humberto. Sistema..., 109.
16
Except is made to the already mentioned residual competence for the Federal Union to create other taxes not expressly
foreseen in BFC.
17
According to Article 60, paragraph 4th of the Federal Constitution, no amendments aiming abolish the following issues can
be approved: (i) federative form of the State; (ii) direct, secret, universal and periodic vote; (iii) separation of powers; and (iv)
individual rights and guarantees. The latter include many of the taxpayer rights. The protection to the federative form of State
prevents changes to the distribution of the tax competence between the Federal Union, States and Municipalities.