Estudios políticos - Aleph Ciencias Sociales

DOCUMENTO
DE
TRABAJO
NÚMERO 163
GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO
Minonty Presidents and Types of Government
in Latin America
DIVISIÓN DE
Estudios políticos
CIDE
NÚMERO 163
GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO
Minority Presidents and Types of Government
in Latín America
ENERO
2004
CIDE
www.cide.edu
Las colecciones de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE representan
un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investigación, y
para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su
publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los comentarios se hagan
llegar directamente al (los) autor(es).
• D.R. ® 2004. Centro de investigación y Docencia Económicas,
carretera México-Toluca 3655 (Km. 16.5), Lomas de Santa Fe,
01210, México, D.F.
Tel. 5727.9800 exts. 2202, 2203, 2417
Fax: 5727.9885 y 5292.1304.
Correo electrónico: [email protected]
www.cide.edu
Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es), por lo que tanto el contenido
así como el estilo y la redacción son su responsabilidad.
Abstract
A widely accepted argument among students of presidential regimes is that
inter-branch cooperation is impaired when president's party holds a
minority of legislative seats and the leve/ of party fractionalization in
congress is fiigh. This argument fails to tal<e into account t/iree variables
tfiat should affect tlie performance of minority presidential governments:
the location of the president's party in the policy space, the capacity of the
president to sustain a veto, and the formation and nature of cabinet
coalitions. Based on a new typology of presidential regimes, I propose the
hypothesis that the most conflictive form of minority government is that in
which the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the
veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative
seats or including the median legislative party is formed. This hypothesis is
supported with data on executive-legislative conflicts and on the premature
termination of constitutional terms in Latín America during the period 19792002.
Resumen
Un argumento ampliamente aceptado entre los estudiosos de regímenes
presidenciales es que la cooperación entre ramas de gobierno se ve
negativamente afectada cuando el partido del presidente se encuentra en
minoría y el nivel de fragmentación partidaria en el congreso es alto. Este
argumento no toma en cuenta tres variables que deberían tener impacto
sobre el funcionamiento de gobiernos presidenciales minorítarios: la
ubicación del partido del presidente en el espacio de políticas legislativas, la
capacidad del presidente de sostener un veto, y la formación y naturaleza
de las coaliciones. Fundado en una nueva tipología de regímenes
presidenciales, propongo la hipótesis de que la forma más conflictiva de
gobierno minorítarío es aquélla en la cual el partido del presidente carece de
apoyo del legislador mediano y del legislador con veto y no se forman
coaliciones de gabinete que sumen una mayoría de asientos legislativos o
incluyan al partido mediano en el congreso. La hipótesis se sostiene en
datos sobre conflictos ejecutivo-legislativos y casos de terminación
anticipada de períodos constitucionales en América Latina, durante el
período 1979-2002.
Minority Presidents and Types of Government in Latín America
Introduction
A rich literature on presidential regimes has repeatedly associated party
fragmentation, and its likely effect, minority presidencies, with ineffective
government, high levéis of executive-legislative conflict, and even dennocratic
instability. So far, however, neither single-case studies provide a general
explanation of this association ñor large-n statistical studies prove beyond
doubt that the relevant variables are significantly correlated. The absence of
conclusive results is due to the lack of attention to variables other than the
share of seats of the president's party in congress or the level of legislative
fractionalization to explain the different performance of minority presidential
governments.
This paper proposes that there are several logical categories of minority
government in presidential regimes; each leading to different expected levéis
of inter-branch cooperation. Using an analytic model of executive-legislative
relations, I argüe that the most conflictive form of minority government is
that in which the president's party lacks the support of both the median and
the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative
seats or including the median legislative party is formed. This hypothesis is
supported with data on executive-legislative conflicts and on the premature
termination of presidencies in Latin America during the period 1979-2002.
The argument is presented as follows. In section I, I review the literature
on minority presidential governments. Section II proposes a new typology of
governments in presidential regimes and a series of hypotheses about levéis of
inter-branch cooperation based on whether or not the party of the president
controls the pivotal legislators necessary to pass a bilí or sustain a veto.
Section III analyzes the frequency at which majority coalitions or coalitions
including the median party in congress are formed in each type of presidential
government. In section IV, the performance of the different forms of minority
presidential government is measured by an index on executive-legislative
conflicts and cases of premature termination of constitutional terms in Latin
America during the period 1979-2002. I conclude by indicating the lines of
research that this study suggests.
Presidentialism and Minority Government
The logic of separation of powers has inspired several hypotheses about the
comparative performance of presidential democracies. The most radical of
them was initially proposed by Linz (1987, 1990) and other 'critics' of
presidentialism (Valenzuela 1994; Skach and Stepan 1994; Linz and Stepan
1996), who argued that sepárate elections and fixed terms in office induce
inter-institutional conflict and make the resolution of political crises difficult,
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negret^o
if not impossible. According to this view, the 'fusión' of powers created by
parliamentary regimes is a much better formula to foster effective and stable
democracies.
In response to Linz and his colleagues, a new literature originated in the
work of Shugart and Carey (1992) and foUowed by a series of influential
studies (Mainwaring 1993; Jones 1995: Mainwahng and Shugart 1997a, 1997b)
proposed that not all presidenti'al regimes are equally problematic from the
point of view of democratic stability or good governance. In particular, the socalled 'defenders' of presidentialism proposed that presidents should be able
to govern effectively if they can count on the support of partisan majorities in
congress. This support, in turn, would emerge if presidential regimes adopt
the 'right' combination of electoral variables, namely, plurality rule to elect
presidents, party-Ust PR v>/ith modérate district magnitudes to elect
legislators, and concurrent electoral cycles.
For this line of research, the level of party fractionalization in congress,
measured by the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP), is a crucial
determinant of the performance of presidential regimes.^ Mainwaring and
Shugart (1997b: 466), for instance, argüe that presidential regimes cannot
work well when the ENLP is above 4. The logic behind this proposition is that
as party fractionalization increases the size of the president's party
decreases, thus making more difficult for the president to get legislation
passed. While one way to overeóme this situation is to rely on coalitions,
these authors argüe that the sepárate survival of presidents and assemblies
makes building and maintaining interparty coalitions more difficult as the
number of relevant parties in congress grows. What is problematic for good
democratic governance, then, is not presidentialism by itself but the
'difficult' combination of presidentialism and multipartism.
The idea that presidential regimes work better when the president's party
is a major party with significant legislative support found empirical support in
the experience of some of the most stable presidential democracies in Latin
America, like Costa Rica and Venezuela (until the early 1990s), which
combined restrictive electoral rules with two or two-and-one-half party
systems. This view, however, is at odds with recent institutional
developments in Latin America. Since 1979 the large majority of presidential
regimes in the región have shifted from plurality to either majority or
qualified plurality electoral formulas for presidential elections. This method
of electing presidents, combined with already existing PR formulas of
congressional elections, have made multipartism and minority presidential
government more the rule than the exception. Yet, in spite of wide variations
in quality and performance, minority presidential government did not lead to
the massive failure of democracies in the región.
ENLP results from the application of the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula: I divided by the sum of the
squared decimal shares of the seats won by each electoral party.
■ÍOÍ
Minority Presidents and Types of Covernmenf ¡n Latin America
These results seem somewhat more consistent with the findings of a new
series of statistical studies that show that while presidential regi'mes are
indeed more vulnerable than parliamentary ones to democratic breakdown,
the reason is not the lack of majority support of the president's party or the
level of legislative fractionalization per se (Przeworski ef al. 2000). However,
neither this study ñor those that foUowed from it (Cheibub 2002; Cheibub and
Limongi 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2002) have provided yet more
than a list of 'negative' findings to explain the relatively low survival of
presidential regimes.
Based on the findings of Przeworski ef al. (2000), Cheibub (2002)
challenges the conventional wisdom that presidentialism and multipartism is
the worst combination for democratic stability by showing that minority
presidencies, even when they present conditions for deadlock (the president's
party holds less than a legislative majority but is able to sustain a veto), do
not affect the survival of democracy. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2002),
in turn, argüe that single-party minority governments are not less effective
than (majority or minority) coalition governments and that the survival of
presidential democracies is not affected by whether or not presidents fail to
genérate coalitions. So far, the only exptanations advanced for the instability
of presidential democracy are based on three, rather disparate hypotheses:
the existence of three relatively equal political parties, the frequency of
presidential term limits, and decentralized decision-making processes
(Cheibub 2002; Cheibub and Limongi 2002).
In spite of the significant progress made during the last decade, the main
problem with the current research on presidential regimes is that it still uses
very blunt indicators to conceptualize different types of government in
presidential regimes and make predictions about their performance. To
illustrate this problem let us start with the notion of divided presidential
government.
According to almost all definitions, presidential government is 'unified'
when the president's party holds more and 'divided' when it holds less than
50 percent of the seats in congress (or in one of the chambers of a bicameral
assembly).^ This "arithmetical" definition is useful as a preliminary step to
distinguish between majority and minority presidents.^ But as a general
category it does not capture the number of substantially different situations
that may take place once presidents fail to obtain majority support in
congress.
^ Perhaps only Shugart (1995) departs from this conventional definition by restricting the term 'divided'
government to situations in which a party different from the president's controls more than 50 percent of the seats
in congress. This corresponds to the notion of 'congressional' government that I propose below.
See Elgie (2001) for the distinction between the arithmetical and the behavioral deifinition of divided
government.
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
B|
Gabriel L. Negretto
Even if the president's party falls short of a majohty of seats in congress
the parties in the opposition may be too fragmented and weak to form a solid
opposition block. In this situation, the party of the president could always find
partners to form alternative coalitions on different pieces of legislation. A
minority president may also have legislative powers to influence policy
making. A presidential veto, for instance, may be skillfuUy used to forge tacit
legislative coalitions on different pieces of legislation that neither the
president's ñor opposition parties have the power to approve on their own,
Finally, a minority president, even without effective legislative powers, may
still be able to legislate through a cabinet coalition integrated by parties
holding a majority of seats in congress. Obviously enough, one cannot use the
same category to denote these different forms of minority government.
Something similar happens with the attempt to explain the different
performance of minority presidents based on the level of legislative
fractionalization measured by the effective number of legislative parties. The
effective number of legislative parties does not indicate the share of seats of
the president's party vís-á-vis opposition parties, how many coalitions are
feasible, or what parties are critical in sustaining those coalitions. To see this,
compare two situations, one with two and another with three relevant
legislative parties.
In the first situation, the president's party holds 45 percent of the seats,
while the main opposition party holds 55 percent of the seats. The ENLP is
here 1.98. In the second situation, the party of the president holds 35 percent
of the seats, while two parties in the opposition hoid, respectively, 30 and 35
percent of the seats. The ENLP is here 2.98. In the first case there is only one
possible coalition, which the opposition party would have very few incentives
to join if it wants to differentiate itself from the government in coming
elections. In the second situation there are 3 possible coalitions, two of which
include the president's party. This means that inter-branch cooperation
should be more difficult in the first situation, even though the level of party
fractionalization is lower than in the second.
Moreover, if policy positions matter, one can reinforce the argument that
party fragmentation does not necessarily impair the ability of a minority
president to build majority legislative support. Suppose that with three
relevant parties the party of the president is a centrist party, while the 2
opposition parties are located one on the center-left and one on the right.
There are two possible coalitions here and both include the president's party.
A similar argument could be made with more than three relevant parties if
the party of the president is centrally located on the policy space and
opposition parties on either side of the policy spectrum do not hold together a
majority of seats to legislate on their own.
This analysis indicates that the classification of minority presidential
regimes and the possible hypotheses about their performance cannot be based
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Tyoes of Government m Latín America
on quantitative measures and mechanical associations alone. We need a
better sense of the distribution of preferences and institutional powers among
the relevant actors. I turn to this task in the next section.
Pivotaí Politics and Types of Presidentíal Government
Using a modified versión of Krehbiel's model of pivotal politics (1996, 1998),
it is possible to créate a typology of presidentíal governments according to
the particular location of three decisive actors: the president's party (PP), the
veto party (VP) and the median party (MP) in congress (Colomer and Negretto
2004). PP is the party that controls the executive office, VP is the party that
controls the legislator whose support allov/s the president to sustain a veto,
and MP is the party that controls the median legislator, that is, the legislator
whose proposals v/ill gather the support of a legislativa majority. The
assumptions of this model are 1) a unidimensional policy space, 2) singlepeaked preferences, and 3) disciplined parties.
Following this model, one can distinguish three basic forms of government
in separation-of-powers systems, which I propose to cali presidential, divided,
and congressional, respectively. 'Presidential' government occurs whenever
the president's party includes both the veto and the median legislator, as
shown in Figure 1. This form of government comprises two possible situations.
One, which can properly be defined as 'unified' presidential government,
derives from an election in which the president's party obtained more than 50
percent of the seats in the assembly. The other, which can be labeled
'median' presidential government, takes place whenever the president's
party, even with less than 50 percent of legislativa seats, is appropriately
located around the 'center' of the policy space.
FIGURE
1
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT
OUTCOME
1
PRESIDENT'S PARTY
PRESIDENT
VETO
LEGISLATOR
MEDIAN
LEGISLATO R
DIVISIÓN D£ ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. ^ieg^efto
While unified presidential government is usually the result of plurality
formulas to elect presidents and concurrent electoral cycles (Mainwaring and
Shugart 1997a), there is in principie no institutional variable guaranteeing
that the president's party, short of a legislative majority, will be the median
party in congress/
A president whose party controls a majority of legislators should have
more capacity than a minority president to implement most of his agenda
with very little cost in terms of inter-branch negotiation. Thus the allure of
unified presidential government among many scholars. Nevertheless, one
should expect a median minority president to be more effective and face less
executive-legislative conflict than any other minority president.
A median minority president may be in this sense equivalent to minority
governments in parliamentary regimes. A single-party minority government
can be a viable government in a parliamentary regime if there is no coalition
of opposition parties that can defeat its proposals by majority vote (Strom
1990; Laver and Schofield 1990). Using the same logic, one could argüe that a
single-party minority government in a presidential regime could achieve a
good record of legislative success and inter-branch cooperation if the
president's party controls the median legislator in congress.
What in strict sense I propose to cali 'divided' presidential government is
a situation where the president's party controls the veto legislator but a party
other than the president's has the support of the median legislator in
congress, as shov^n in Figure 2. The threshold required to override a
presidential veto determines the occurrence of divided government. In
particular, the probability of having a divided government is higher the higher
is the threshold required to override a presidential veto in congress, so, for
instance, divided government is more likely with a 2/3 than with a 1/2
override rule. Given the override rule, divided government is also more likely
when the threshold applies to each of the sepárate chambers of a bicameral
assembly than when it applies to the joint vote of a bicameral assembly or to
unicameral assemblies.
According to Colomer and Negretto (2004), majority runoff elections for president result in the selection of
median candidates in a higher proportion than in plurality elections. This does not mean, however, that the party of
the president would be in those cases the median party in congress. The reason is that there may be more parties
competing in the congressional election than parties presenting candidates in the presidential election so that the
median parties in both elections may not necessarily coincide.
CIDE
Vlinorífy Presidenfs and Types of Government in Latín America
FIGURE
2
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
GRIDLOCK INTERVAL
PRESIDENT'S PARTY
PRESIDEN!
MEDIAN PARTY
VETO
LEGISLATOR
MEDIAN
LEGISLATOR
This definition of divided government is closely associated to the notion of
'deadlock' that many authors use. This is so because in this type of
government congress can pass legislation and still be unable to change the
status quo if the president prefers the latter to the new policy and the
legislative nnajority lacks the necessary votes to override his veto. In other
words, neither the president (who lacks a majority) ñor the opposition parties
(who lack the votes to override a veto) are able to rule. The risk of a
stalemate, of course, is the reason why this type of presidential regime is
often supposed to constitute the most indecisive, costly, and conflictive form
of minority government.
However, the occurrence of gridlock under divided government depends,
first, on the location of the legislative status quo and on the policy
preferences of the pivotal actors (Krehbiel 1998). If the initial status-quo
policy is located in between the preferences of the median party and the
president with effective veto, policy changes may be, in effect, impossible.
The president will veto any change approaching the outcome to the median
party's preference and moving it away from the presidential one. It is for this
reason that the policy space between the two decisive actors defines the
'gridlock interval', that is, the set of policy decisions that v^ill be stable in
spite of the existence of a legislative majority favoring policy change -as
illustrated in Figure 2.
But policy change is possible if the legislative status quo is outside the
gridlock interval. For instance, when the legislative status quo is located at a
rather extreme position with respect to the ideal points of the decisive
actors, significant policy changes may occur at exactly the ideal point of the
median party. This is so because the president will not veto proposals made
by the median party if they are closer to his or her preferences than the
status quo is. Policy change, though only incremental, may also occur if the
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negrefto
Status quo is outside the gridlock interval but cióse to the ideal policy of
either the president's or the median party.
In other words, policy immobilism is not a structural trait of divided
government. From its definition we can only assume that gridlock may occur
from time to time, but not how often or when it will lead to inter-branch
conflict. This does not mean, however, that we should expect from divided
government the same level of legislative effectiveness and inter-branch
cooperation as we can expect from median presidential government. All
things being equal, a president whose party occupies a median position in
congress should be able to obtain more support from congress than a
president invested with just a veto.
A third possible category of government in a separation-of-powers system
exists when parties different from the president's control the median and the
veto legislator.^ We can cali this form of government 'congressional,' as
illustrated in Figure 3.
FIGURE
3.
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT
OUTCOME
PRESIDENT'S PARTY
PRESIDENT
MEDIAN PARTY
VETO
LEGISLATOR
MEDIAN
LEGISLATOR
Source: Colomer and Negretto (2004)
This is the most potentially conflictive form of minority presidential
government. Given his popular election, the president may feel he has a
popular mándate to implement a political platform, but only to find that he
has no institutional power to influence policy-making. In other words,
congressional government is an invitation to what Juan ünz rightly identified
as conflicts of "dual legitimacy."
In principie, one party may control both or different parties may control each one of these legislators.
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Tyoes of Government in Latin America
However, a non-median minority president without a veto has two basic
options: either to accept or to challenge congressional rule. Acquiescence to
congressional rule would usually take the form of a coalitional government in
which the president tries to overeóme her disadvantage in congress by
distributing cabinet positions among parties whose votes are necessary to
reach a legislative majority. Defiance to congressional rule, instead, would
usually take the form of unilateral presidential government, either by using
powers granted by the constitution, like decrees, or by extra-constitutional
actions, like the usurpation of legislative powers or the dissolution of
congress. In fact, it is only when this option is taken that one should expect
congressional government to produce the highest rate of executive-legislative
conflicts among all minority presidencies.
In Table 1 I have Usted the types of presidential government that,
following the classification proposed in this paper, have existed in 18 Latin
American countries since the last inauguration of a democratic regime until
2002.^ Within each country, presidencies are classified according to the policy
position of the president's party relative to the location of the median and
the veto party on a left-right scale. Parties, in turn, were located on this
scale on the basis of expert judgments.'' The table includes 98 cases, 33 of
which correspond to unified presidential government, 22 to median
presidential government, 20 to divided government and 23 to congressional
government.
* The beginning of the period varíes for each countt7. It starts with the year in which the Pirst democratically
elected government took office or with the year of the first democratic election: Argentina (1983), Bolivia, (1982),
Brazil (1985), Chile (1989), Colombia (1974), Costa Rica (1953), Dominican Republic (1986), Ecuador (1979), El
Salvador (1985), Guatemala (1986). Honduras (1982), México (1997); Nicaragua (1990), Panamá (1994), Paraguay
(1989), Perú (1980), Uruguay (1985), Venezuela (1958),
' Party policy positions were classified based on a comparison of the expert opinions gathered by Coppedge
(1997), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Alcántara and Freidenberg (2001).
DIVISIÓN
DE
ESTUDIOS
POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negrefto
TABLE
1
TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IN LATíN AMERICA
i
PRESIDENTIAL (UNIFIED)
1995-97 (MENEM II)
IARGENTINA
iCoLOMBiA 1974-78 (L. MICHELSEN)
JCOLOMBIA 1978-82 (TUR8AY)
jCoLOMBiA 1986-90 (BARCO)
ICoLOMBiA 1990-94 (GAVIRIA)
iCoLOMBiA 1994-98 (SAMPER)
ICosTA RICA í'953-58 ("FIGUERES I)
jCosTA RICA 1962-66 (ORLICH)
DIVIDED
CONGRESSIONAL (UNIFIED)
ÍARGENTINA
1983-89 (ALFONSIN)
COLOMBIA
IARGENTINA
1999-2001 (DE LA RúA)
COLOMBIA
1982-86 (BETANCOURT)
1998-2002 (PASTRANA)
1982-85 (S. SuAZO)
íCONGRESSIONAL (MEDIAN)
1989-94 (ALWYN)
JBOLIVIA 1989-93 (P. ZAMORA)
ÍCHILE 1994-2000 (FREí)
JBOLIVIA 1997-2001 (BáNZER)
iCosTA RICA 1966-70 (T. FERNANDEZ) IBRAZIL 1985-90 (SARNEY)
COSTA RICA 1978-82 (C. Óbiój
IBRAZÍL i990-92 (COLLOR)
COSTA RICA 2002-06 (PACHECO E.)
JBRAZIL 1992-94 (FRANCO)
íBOLIVIA
JCHILE
ICosTA RICA 1970-74 (FIGUERES II)
iCosTA RICA 1982-86 (MONGE A.)
ICOSTA RICA 1986-90 (ARIAS S.)
iCosTA RICA 1990-94 (CALDERóN F.)
iCosTA RICA 1998-2002 (RODRíGUEZ)
jDoM. REP. 2000-02 (HIPóLITO M.D.)
EL SALVADOR 1985-88 (DUARTE)
EL SALVADOR 1989-91 (CRISTIANI)
;GuATEMALa> 1986-91 (CEREZO)
DOM. REP. 1986-90 (BAU>>GUER)
pOM. REP. 1990-94 (BAUS>GUER)
pOM. REP. 1994-96 (BALOIGUER)
poM. REP. 1998-2000 (F. REYNA)
POM. REP. 2002-04 (H. MEJíA)
ECUADOR 1998-2000 (MAHUAD)
EL SALVADOR 1988-89 (DUARTE)
EL SALVADOR 1991-94 (CRISTIANI)
EL SALVADOR 1994-99 (CALDERóN)
jGuATEMALA 1995-99 (ARZü)
:
jGuATEMALA 1999-2003 (PORTILLO)
HONDURAS 1981-85 (SuAZO CóRDOBA)
MéXICO 2000-20Ó3 (Fox)
PANAMá 1999-2004 (Moscoso)
EL SALVADOR
1999-2002 (FLORES)
1994-98 (CARDOZO I)
1998-2002 (CARDOZO II)
ICHILE 2000-06 (U\GOS)
JECUADOR 1984-88 (F. CORDERO)
ECUADOR 1990-1992 (BORJA)
1
1
i
i
;
ECUADOR 1992-96(DURáN-BALLéN) I
IGUATEMALA 1991-95 (SERRANO)
I
íPARAGUAY 1993-98 (WASMOSY)
i
ÍPERú 1990-92 (FUJIMORI I)
i
íBRAZIL
IPERú
2000 (FUJIMORI III)
i
ÍURUGUAY
1989-94 (LACALLE)
:
i
1993-98 (CALDERA II)
1998-2000 (CHáVEZ I)
[VENEZUELA 2000-2006 (CHáVEZ II)
TOTAL coNGRESsioNAL=23
:
1989-93 (CALLEJAS)
1993-97 (REINA)
[HONDURAS 1997-2001 (FLORES)
í
VENEZUELA
[HONDURAS
I
[VENEZUELA
1990-96 (BARRIOS)
[NICARAGUA 2001-06 (BOIAñOS)
[
I
[PARAGUAY
1989-93 (RODRíGUEZ)
1998-2002 (CUBAS/ G. M)
|
i
[
[PERü 1985-90 (Au\N GARCíA)
[PERú
1995-2000 (FUJIMORI II)
IVENEZUELA
j
1
j
1968-73 (CALDERA 1)
1978-83 (H. CAMPINS)
íVENEZUELA
[HONDURAS
[PARAGUAY
j
i
IBRAZIL
VENEZUELA
[NICARAGUA
j
froxAL DIVIDED=20
1985-89 (AZCONA)
ÍHONDURAS
I
1958-63 (BETANCOURT)
K/ENEZUEUv 1973-78 (ANDRéS PéREZ I)
[VENEZUELA 1983-88 (LUSINCHI)
[TOTAL UNIFIED=33
CIDE
Mínority Presidents and Types of Governmenf in Latín America
Table I (cont.)
PRESIDENTIAL (MEDIAN)
JARGENTiNA 1989-95 (MENEM I)
IBOLIVIA
!
1997-99 (MENEM II)
\
1985-89 (P- ESTENSSORO)
I
IARGENTINA
jBoLiviA 1993-97 (S. DE LOZADA)
jCosTA RICA 1958-62 (ECHANDI)
i
jCosTA RICA 1974-78 (ODUBER Q.)
j
¡COSTA RICA
1994-98 (FiGUERAS)
;
jDoM. REP. 1996-98 (F. REYNA)
ECUADOR
_i
1979-84 (ROLDóS/HURTADO) i
jEcuADOR 1988-90 (R. BORJA)
j
jEcuADOR 1992-96 (A. BUCARAM)
I
jHoNDURAS 2001-05 (MADURO)
IMéXICO
[NICARAGUA
IPANAMá
|
1997-2000 (ZEDILLO)
|
1996-2001 (ALEMáN)
j
1994-99 (P. BALLADARES)
:
1980-85 (BELAüNDE)
\
2000-05 rroLEpo)
ÍURUGUAY 1984-89 (SANGUINETTI)
IURUGUAY 1994-99 (SANGUINETTI)
|
i
j
IPERú
[PERú
IURUGUAY 1999-2004(BATTLE)
k/ENEZUELA 1963-68 (LEONI)
IVENEZUELA
1988-93 (ANDRéS PéREZ II)J
jTOTAL MEDIAN = 22
rrOTAL PRESIDENTIAL= 55
Source: Áutíior, based on "Élections around the world" (URL:http://www.electionworld.org), Nohlen (1993), and
Jorge Schiavon (URL:http://www.cide.edu/investigadores/jorge schiavon/electoral.html), for electoral data, and
Coppedge (1997), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Alcántara and Freidenberg (2001), for party poUcy positions.
Minoríty Presidents and Coalition Making
I have argued that one cannot predict the performance of a minority
presidential government without knowing whether the president's party
includes the median and/or the veto legislator in congress. We also need to
consider the impact of coalitions, particularly when minority presidents, as it
happens in congressional government, have no institutional means to
influence policy outcomes.^
On cabinet coalitions in presidential reglmes, see Deheza (1998), Amorlm Neto (1998, 2002), AItman (2001)
and Chasquetti (2001).
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretto
The sepárate origin and survival of presidents and assemblies creates
several structural differences between the process of coalition nnaking in
multiparty presidential and multlparty parliamentary regimes. In the first
place, whereas in a presidential regime the constitution establishes that the
president is the formateur regardless of the representation of his party in
congress and its policy location, in a parliamentary regime the formateur is
usually the largest and/or the median legislative party (Laver and Schofield
1990). In addition, while the autonomy of presidents in terms of government
formation is subject to variations, in a parliamentary regime cabinets are
strictly dependent on legislative support to obtain investiture and win
confidence votes. These differences, should and do make coalition
governments a more frequent event under parliamentarism than under
presidentialism (Samuels and Eaton 2002; Cheibub, Przev^orski, and Saiegh
2002).
Within presidential regimes, however, one should expect variations in the
frequency and nature of coalitions depending on the type of government.
Table 2 shows these variations according to whether an executive coalition is
formed, whether the party members of the coalition hold together a majority
of seats in congress, and whether a minority coalition includes the median
party in congress.^ An executive coalition is defined here as the set of
iegislators belonging to parties that hold cabinet positions. This coalition is
considered to be a majority coalition only if the parties holding cabinet posts
gather a majority of seats in a unicameral assembly or in both chambers of a
bicameral assembly.
TABLE
2
FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF EXECUTIVE COALITIONS
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT
i
UNIFIED
PRESIDENTIAL
MEDIAN PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE COAUTIONS
.21
.52
.28
.87
MAJORITY
COAUTIONS
MEDIAN COAUTIONS
-
i
-
;
:38
i
-
i
DiVIDED
.00
1
.i i
.39
.04
CONGRESSiONAL
Source: Author, based on Cha;iquetti (2001), Zueco (2002), anci Fundación CIDOB (http://www.cidob.org/bios/Cidob.com)
As one could expect, Table 2 shows that the frequency of executive coalition
formation is the iowest in unified presidential government (22 percent). The
reason is that in this category presidents do not need outside support to
accomplish their agendas. From this perspective, one possible explanation
The presídencies of Pérez Balladares and Hoscoso in Panamá were excluded due to the absence of Information.
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Types of Government ín Latín America
explanation why presidents may form coalitions in spite of the fact that their
parties have majohties in congress is the intention to intégrate a 'National
Unity' government in the context of power-sharing agreements, such as the
Punto Fijo pact in Venezuela (1958-63) and the National Front agreement in
Colombia (1958-74)/°
Among the different categories of 'minority' presidents, the lowest
percentage of coalitions in general (28 percent) and of majority coalitions in
particular (O percent) corresponds to divided governments.^^ In median
presidential governments executive coalitions have been formed at a
relatively high frequency of 52 percent for coalitions in general and 38
percent for majority coalitions. Congressional government, finally, is the
minority government with the highest frequency of executive coalitions.
In 20 out 23 cases (87 percent) presidents in a congressional government
situation ruled through executive coalitions. This result clearly shov^s that,
against a previously held belief in the literature, coalitions are a common
event in certain types minority presidential governments.^^ The incentives of
presidents to form executive coalitions seem clear in the case of congressional
government: neither their parties have a pivotal role in policy-making ñor
they have an instrument, like the veto, to shape legislation.
Yet, although most presidents in this category managed to incorpórate
outside parties in the cabinet, not all them forged coalitions that would make
congressional government viable in policy terms. Of the 23 cases, only 9 (39
percent) presidents managed to form a majority coalition.^^ The question,
then, is why some presidents in congressional government did while others did
not form executive coalitions holding a majority of seats in congress.
One possible answer is that not all presidents in this situation have the
same incentives to rely on outside support to govern. One implicit assumption
of the pivotal model of decision-making outlined above is that no player has
special agenda-setting powers. In reality, however, many presidents do have
these powers and they can use them to change legislation without sufficient
legislative support. This is the case, in particular, with the capacity of
presidents to issue decrees of legislative content. These powers may allow
non-median minority presidents to change the legislative status quo and
impose a new policy if the median party in congress prefers the latter to the
reverslonary outcome, that is, the outcome that would result from rejecting
the decree after it produced effects (Figueiredo and Limongi 1998; Negretto
2004). If this is the case, then, a president invested with these powers may
'° On this point. see Deheza (1998)
' ' In 2 out of 18 cases (I I percent), the presidencies of Alwyn (1989-94) and Frei (1994-200) in Chile, nnlnority
coalitions included the median party, but only for the Chamber of Deputies.
Cheibub, Przewroski and Saiegh (2002) show a similar finding.
' ^ In I case, the presidency of Lagos (2000-06) in Chile, a minority coalition included the median party, but only
in the Chamber of Deputies.
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negrefto
not feel the need to rely on a majority coalition as much as a president
without them.
At the same time, the incentives of presidents to build majority coalitions
may also be determined by their degree of autonomy in terms of cabinet
formation and change. In spite of the sepárate origin of presidents and
assemblies that characterizes presidential regimes, there is a wide range of
variation in terms of congressional control over cabinets (Shugart and Carey
1992; Colomer and Negretto 2004). A president who has the formal power to
appoint and remove cabinet members may be in fact restricted in his degree
of autonomy if legislators are able to vote a binding censure or impeach
cabinet ministers. The same could happen if in the absence of majority
winners in a presidential election, congress regularly intervenes in the final
selection of presidents, somewhat resembling the investiture vote in a
parliamentary system.
With these elements in mind, we can make sense of the cholee that
minority presidents in a congressional form of government have. The
incentives to accept congressional rule by building a portfolio coalition large
enough to muster majority support in congress should be greater when
presidents are subject to congressional control and have no decree powers
than when they face no congressional control and/or have decree powersJ'*
Table 3 lists the information about coalition making in congressional
government along with the relevant institutional variables for each case. A
president was considered to have decree powers if the constitution explicitly
grants him the authority to initiate policy by decree (constitutional decree
authority or CDA) or when general emergency provisions include the capacity
of presidents to make law and regúlate rights by decree. A congress was
considered to have control over cabinets when presidents are selected by
congress or when legislators from opposition parties actually had the
necessary votes established by the constitution to propose and decide a
binding censure and/or impeach ministers.^^
''* Amorim Neto and Tafner (2002) and Anriorim Neto (2002) show that there is a relation between the use and
existence of decree powers and coalition-making strategies.
Opposition parties usually reach the necessary votes to control cabinets when the constitution requires a vote
by absolute majority in congress. But congressional control could also exist with a requirement of two-thirds if the
president lacks the support of more than one-third of legislators.
CIDE
Minority "residents and Types of Covernmenf ín Latín America
TABLE
3
COALITION-MAKING IN CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENTS
PRESIDENCY
;
i DE LA RúA
i PAZ ZAMORA
i BáNZER
COALmON j
i
MEDIAN
DECREE POWERS
j
YES
Yñ
]
No
No
No
YES (CDA)
YES
No
Yi¿
YES
YES
YES
YES (CDA)
No
YES
YES
YES
YES
: SUAREZ
1
i SARNEY
i
! COLLOR
YES
i FRANCO
j CARDOSOI
i CARDOSO II
:LAGOS
i BETANCOURT
i PASTRANA
i PEBRES
; CORDERO
j RODRIGO
; BoRJA
j DURáN-BALLéN
: SERRANO
i WASMOSY
: FUJIMORI i
: LACALLE
: CALDERA I
: H. CAMPINS
i CALDERA II
i CHáVEZ I
YES
íCHáVEZII
i
i
YES
i
j
YiS
\
YES
i
i
i
i
i
1
No
1
Yis
1
i
Ño
YES
i
i
i
No
No
'ZJKIJ
Ño
YÉs
No
YES
NO
YES
No
i
YES
i
!
i
YES
YES
No
YES
YES
i
Yis
Yis
No
i
YES
i
j
i
\
j'
i
NO
i
i
Ño
No
No
i
j
i
Ño
Yis
Ño
i
:: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
i
No
No
No
Yis
Yi¿
Yñ
YES
YES
Yis
i
j
MAJORITY
(CDA)
(CDA)
YES (CDA)
YES (CDÁj
No*
YES (CDA)
YES (CDA)
YES (CDA)
YES
YES
YES
YES
No
No
NO
NO
\
i
i
1
(CiiJÁ)
YES (CDA)
YES (EMERGENCY) i
i
No
i' YES (EMERGENCY) íi
i\
Ño
i
YES (EMERGENCY) i
;: YES (EMERGENCY) ;
Ño
No
NO
YES
i
YES
YES
i
YES
YES
:
NO
Yis
YÜ
i
i
YES
NO
No
No
No
No
YES (EMERGENCY)
YES
YES (EMERGENCY)
YES
YES
YES
i YES (EMERGENCY) i
No
Source: Author, based on Chasquetti (2001), Zueco (2002) and Fundación CIDOB (http://www,cidob.org/bios/Cidob.com)
for coalitions, and Política! Data Base of the Americas (http://www.georgetown.edu/Ddba/spanish.html) for decree
powers and congressional control.
*CDA restricted to budget
Totalcases=23
Cases with executive coalition= 20
Cases with majority or median minority coalition=10
According to this table, a large majority of 18 out of 23 presidencies in the
category of congressional government had the capacity to issue decrees of
legislative content. For this reason, it was rare to find presidents subject to
congressional control and without decree powers. Of the 13 presidents that
were subject to congressional control, only 3 (2 in Bolivia and 1 in Uruguay)
also lacked decree powers. In these three cases presidents did form majority
coalitions.
A simple analysis of conditional probabilities shows that having decrees is
in itself a relevant factor to predict whether or not a minority president
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
i
i
i
i
1
Gabriel L. Negretto
would form a majority coalition. Table 4 shows that the probability of keeping
a minority government given decree powers is 12/18 or 67 percent while the
probability of forming a majority coalition given the same condition is only
6/18 or 33 percent. This may explain why if the number of coalitions is so high
in congressional government so few of them hold a majority of seats in
congress or have the support of the median party in congress. Using a chi
square significance test, we can reject the nuil hypothesis that no relationship
exists between decree powers and coalition making strategies with the
probability of making a false rejection of 0.0626.
TABLE
4
COALITION MAKING AND DECREE POWER
DECREE POWERS
S*í^ V
YES
6
YES
No
4
MAJORITY COALITION
No
I
12
CHI-SQR
= 3.4677
1
P-VALUE = 0.0626
To sum up, not all minority presidents inevitably need a majority coalition to
influence policy and secure a minimum of inter-branch cooperation. Some
minority presidents may compénsate their lack of majority support with their
control over the median legislator in congress or with their veto power.
Coalition-making, however, may be crucial for minority presidents in
congressional government and those who fail to do so are expected to be the
most problematic of all minority presidencies.
Executive-Legislative Confíicts and Premature Termination of
Constifutional Terms
The conventional view on the performance of minority presidencies is that
they are associated with high levéis of executive-legislative conflict and
democratic instability. One way to challenge this view is to show that these
effects vary according to the factors indicated above: whether the president's
party includes the median and/or the veto legislator and whether a majority
executive coalition is formed. I have relied on two indicators to pursue this
CIDE
Minority Presidenfs and Types of Covernment in Laün c^'^e'-ica
test: the frequency of executive-legislative conflicts and the cases of
premature termination of constitutional terms in Latín America from 1979 to
2002.
FoUowing a methodology proposed by Jones (1995), I have constructed an
Índex of executive-legislative conflicts based on the Latin American Weekly
Report (l_AWR) from 1979 to 2002. In particular, the Índex reflects the number
of articles per year that reported executive-legislative conflicts out of the
total number of articles that had politics as its main or secondary theme. The
conflicts reported are either reiated to ordinary legislation (rejection of
presidential proposals, presidential vetoes, etc.) or to political measures of
congressional control, such as censure of cabinet ministers or impeachments.
My unit of analysis is each presidency classified according to the typology
proposed in this article. I have excluded presidencies before 1979 and current
presidencies with less than two complete years by 2002.^^ The sample covers
18 countries with a total number of 82 presidencies, 26 of which are unified,
17 median, 17 divided and 22 congressional. The latter were in turn
disaggregated between those that did (10) and those that did not form (12)
executive coalitions holding a majority of seats in congress or including the
median legislative party.
Using the same universe of cases, I also made a sepárate analysis of those
presidencies that ended their terms prematurely. A constitutional term was
considered to end prematurely when presidents were ousted from office after
a successful impeachment process, when they legally or illegally decided to
dissolve congress, when they were forced to resign after the emergence of
social mobilizations against the government, and when their governments
were overthrown by a military coup. I gathered a total of 14 presidencies
whose terms ended prematurely according to this definition.
The mean frequency of executive-legislative conflict for each presidency
supports the central hypothesis of this paper, namely, that the most
conflictive form of government in a presidential regime is that in which the
presidenfs party does not control the median legislator, the president lacks
effective veto power, and no majority or median minority executive coalition
is formed. As shown in Table 5, the mean frequency of conflict for
congressional governments without majority or median minority coalitions is
the highest among all types of government. The analysis also confirms that
whether or not presidents in a congressional government form a cabinet
coalition with sufficient legislative support makes a crucial difference in
terms of performance. The mean frequency of conflict in congressional
'° Unlike Jones (1995), who uses each presidential year as a unit of analysis, I did not exelude from the counting
those years where the number of articles was below 6. This means that in some cases my Índex on the frequency of
conflicts is lower (when no conflicts were reported that year) and In some other cases higher (when conflicts were
reported) than Jones'.
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretto
governments without coalition support is twice as high
congressional governments with coalition support.
TABLE
as that of
5
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT INDEX
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT
UNIFIED PRESIDENTIAL
i
MEDIAN PRESIDENTIAL
i
DiVIDED
i COAUTIONAL CONGRESSIONAL i
i
MlNORlTY CONGRESSIONAL
N
26
17
17
10
12
i
i
MEAN FREQUENCY
STANDARD
DEVIATION
0.05482272
0.09317715
0.05850569
0.09146600
0.18152583
0.07
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.09
INTERVAL
Low
MéDIUM
Low
MéDIUM
HIGH
i
Source: Author, based on latín American Weekly Report, 1979-2002. Countries and years: Argentina, 19832001; Bolivia, 1982-2001; Brazil, 1985-2002; Chile, 1989-2001; Colombia, 1979-2001; Costa Rica,1979-2001;
Dominican Republic, 1986-2001; Ecuador, 1979-1999; El Salvador, 1985-2001; Guatemala, 1986-2002;
Honduras, 1982-2001; México, 1997-2002; Nicaragua, 1990-2001; Panamá, 1994-1999; Paraguay, 1989-1998;
Perú, 1980-2000; Uruguay, 1985-2001; Venezuela, 1979-2001.
Whüe the same analysis also supports the hypothesis that unified presidential
government is the least conflictive type of government, it contradicts the
hypothesis that one should expect a higher level of executive-legislative
conflict in divided than in unified presidential government. The difference
between the mean frequency of conflict for each type of government is
minimal and both are located within the same interval of low conflict for the
whole sample. Moreover, divided government also outperforms median
presidential government, which, in fact, shows a mean frequency of médium
conflict almost identical to that of coalitional congressional government. This
means that the hypothesis that one should expect a similar level of interbranch cooperation in unified and median presidential government is not
confirmed either.
The relatively low level of inter-branch conflict observed in divided
government may be due to the fact that in the majority of cases the most
relevant proposals of legislative change affected a status quo policy located
outside the ghdlock interval. In this situation, either the median party had an
incentive to accept presidential proposals of legislative change or the median
party had an incentive to modérate its proposals for the sake of reaching an
agreement with the president's party. Whatever the case, this finding
confirms the need to revise the widely held belief that divided government is
the most conflictive form of minority presidential government.
The standard deviation for the frequency of inter-branch conflict in
median presidential government suggests that this category includes
presidencies with widely different performances. These differences are not
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Types of Government in Latin America
related to the size of the president's party in congress. The highest frequency
of executive-legislative conflict in the median presidential category for the
whole sample corresponds to the presidency of Roídos (1979-1981) in Ecuador,
whose party had 44 percent of the seats in congress. Meanwhile, the
presidency of Sanguinetti II (1994-1999) in Uruguay had the lowest frequency
of executive-legislative conflict in the category in spite of the fact that his
party had only 32 percent of the seats in the chamber of deputies.
The most plausible explanation for the relatively poor performance of
median presidential governments is that the assumption that parties are
disciplined and legislators care mostly about policy does not hold equally well
for all the counthes under consideration. From this perspective, the different
performance of the presidencies of Roídos, on the one hand, and Sanguinetti,
on the other, may be due to the fact that in Ecuador parties are less
disciplined and less programmatic than in Uruguay. This calis for an analysis,
which I cannot pursue in this paper, of how well partisan policy positions
allow us to predict the behavior of legislators in each country.
The cases of presidencies terminated before the end of the constitutional
term deserve a sepárate analysis. Table 6 provides a list of these presidencies
since 1979 indicating the president, year and reason for termination.
TABLE
6
PREMATURE TERMINATION OF PRESIDENCIES IN LATíN AMERICA
PRESIDENT
MONTH/YEAR
1980-2001
MOTIVE
i SILES SUAZO
NOVEMBER/1984
FORCEO RESIGNATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ECONOMIC
CRISIS, SOCIAL UPHEAVAL, THREAT OF A COUP, AND
EXECUTIVE-LEGISU^TIVE CONFLICTS, INCLUDING A THREAT
OF IMPEACHMENT
: ALFONSíN
JuLY/1989
FORCEO RESIGNATION IN THE MIOST OF AN ECONOMIC
CRISIS ANO SOCIAL UPHEAVAL
j
i GAVIRIA
DECEMBER/1990
IRREGULAR CONVOCATIONOF A CONSTITUENTASSEMBLY
WHICH REPIACED THE EXISTING CONGRESS
i
i FUJIMORI I
APRIL/1992
ÁÜGÜST/Í992
I
i
DiSSOLUTION OF CONGRESS BY PRESIDENT WITH SUPPORT j
OF THE MILITARY AFTER A SERIES OF EXECUTIVE;
LEGISLATIVE CONFLICTS ON THE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT TO RULE BY DECREE ON THE ÁREAS OF
i CÓLLOR
j
i
i
|
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND TERRORISM
i
IMPEACHMENT BY CONGRESS DUE TO CHARGES OF
CORRUPTION IN THE MIOST OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS,
SOCIAL UPHEAVAL AND A LONG SERIES OF EXECUTIVE-
i
:
LEGISLATIVE CONFLICTS
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
>
i
<•í
Gabriel L. Negretto
Table 6 (Cont.)
MONTH/YEAR
PRESIDENT
SERRANO
ANDRéS PéREZ
'BALAGUER
;BucARÁM
.
i
i
I
fCÜBAS
MOTIVE
i MAY/ 1993
i FORCEO RESIGNATION AFTER A FAíLED ATTEMPTTO
i
j
i DISSOLVECONGRESSANDRULEWITHSUPPORTOFTHE
; MIUTARY
j
I
íÁUGUST/1993
| DESTITÜTION BY CONGRESS DUE
I
i
j
[ÁÜGlJsf7l994
\
i
i FEBRIJARY/Í997
j
j
i
!
i CORRUPTIONINITIATED AFTER A VI0LENT SOCIAL
i UPHEAVALAGAINSTTHEPRESIDENT'SECONOMICPOUCY
IANDAFAILEDCOUP
lÁNTICIPAfEDCALLTOR ELECTIONSDÜETÓINTERNALAND
I INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AFTER ALLEGATIONSOF
\ FRAUD IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1994
i DESTITÜTION BY CONGRESS UNDER THE CHARGESÓF
i MENTAL INCAPACITYINITIATED AFTER SOCIAL
i MOBILIZATIONSAGAINSTTHE PRESIDENT'SECONOMIC
j POLICYANDTHEALLEGEDCORRUPTIONOFTHE
i GOVERNMENT
_
TRESÍGNATION AFTER IMPÍACHMENf PROCESS INITIATED BY
: THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
Í'MARC'H7Í'999
fo CHARGÉS OF
\
i
\
I
j
i
i
j
i CHáVEZ í
f ÁPRÍL/Í999
:
i CONVOCATION OF AN IRREGULAR CONSTITUENTASSEMBLY i
: THAT TERMINATED THE PREVIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD j
i AND REPI^CED EXISTIMO CONGRESS
i
rMAHUAD
Í'JANÜARY/2ÓWSÓ6
.r'FuJiMORI iií
i DE LA RúA
i
TlQOÓ
j
rDÉCEMBER/izbÓi
j
SOCIAL ÜPHEAVAL
j AND AN ATTEMPTED COUP
T'DESTITÜfl'oN OF'PRESIDENT BY CONGRESS AFTÉR
: CORRUPTION SCANOAL
I FÓRCED RESIGNATION DOETO SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
I AGAINST DéLA RÚA'SECONOMICPOLICY AND AFTER THE
i
i
I OPPOSITIONINCONGRESSREJECTEDTHEPOSSIBILITYOFA i
I
i
I NATIONAL UNION COALITION TO SUPPORT THE
I
Soürce;
Áutfior,
T ÁBANDONMENT ÓF PRESIDENCY ÁFTER
I
i GOVERNMENT
based on' lofi'n ' Jmer^^^
Repórt,
í'979-2d02,
i
i
\
j
and Fundación CTDOB
(http://www.cidob.org/bios/Cidob.com)
In 4 cases (CoUor, Pérez, Bucaram, and Cubas), presidencies were terminated
in the context of a process of impeachment, and in 1 case (Suazo) in the
context of a series of executive-legislative conflicts that included the threat
of impeachment. In 4 cases presidents resigned or abandoned the office, 2
times (Alfonsín and De la Rúa) due to social mobilizations against the
government, 1 time (Mahuad) due to an attempted coup, and 1 time (Fujimori
III) due to a corruption scandal. In one case (Balaguer III) the president
decided to anticípate elections due to internal and international pressures.
Finally, in 4 cases (Gaviría, Fujimori I, Serrano and Chávez) presidents
terminated their terms by their decisión to dissolve the existing congress and
cali a constituent congress, although in 1 case (Serrano) the president failed
in his attempt.
In spite of these variations, the premature termination of the presidential
term signáis, in its most extreme form, the breakdown of cooperation and the
CIDE
Minority Presidents and íypes of Covernmer.* 'n Lafin America
emergence of an open conflict between presidents and congresses. Whatever
the nature of the crisis that presidents and legislators had to face, it seems
clear that in most cases either congress or the president saw its potential
solution in the elimination of the other. From this perspective, the forced
resignation or impeachment of presidents, on the one hand, and the
dissolution of congress by presidents, on the other, can be seen as symmetric
non-cooperative outcomes.
If we divide the cases per type of government, one can observe that
unified presidential government has the lowest (8 percent), while
congressional government without the support of a majority executive
coalition has the highest frequency (50 percent) of premature termination of
constitutional terms. Median presidential governments (12 percent) and
divided governments (23 percent) present intermediate categories, while
coalitional congressional governments have no cases of interruption of
presidential terms. These frequencies are shov^n in Table 7.
TABLE
7
PREMATURE TERMINATION OF PRESIDENCIES PER TYPE OF GOVERNMENT
N
TYPE
:
i
i
:
:
:
UNIFIED PRESIDENTIAL
MEDIAN PRESIDENTIAL
DIVIDED
COALITIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL
PREMATURE TERMINATION
26
17
17
10
i
i
2
2
4
0
12
i
6
PERCENTAGE
■
.08
:í2
i
1
.23
.00
i
.50
i
^
MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL
\
i
As v/e know from the previous analysis of executive-legislative conflicts, this
result does not mean that coalitional congressional government is free from
conflicts but, again, it indicates that the difference between having or not the
support of a majority or median minority cabinet coalition is crucial when the
president does not have a veto and an opposition party is located at a median
position in congress. So crucial, indeed, that in some cases it may entail a
difference between ending or not a constitutional term.
It is also interesting to note that if one looks at the substance of actual
conflicts, most congressional governments that did end their terms without
sufficient support from coalitions could have very well ended prematurely.
The presidencies of Pebres Cordero, Borja (for the period 1990-92), and
Durán-Ballén in Ecuador provide perhaps the clearest illustration.
All these presidents intended to alleviate Ecuador's fiscal crisis and debt
problems by means of austerity policies that were paralyzed or watered-down
DIVISIÓN
DE
ESTUDIOS
POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretto
in congress. In addition, and as a demonstration of congressional reaction to
massive social protests generated by those policies, opposition legisiators
continuously harassed the president through the impeachment of his ministers
(Conaghan 1995: 452-53; Isaacs 1996). In fact, in the last year of Borja's
presidency, congress formally requested the Supreme Court to initiate
impeachment procedures against the president himself and in 1995 (after the
censure of several of his ministers) congress impeached Durán-Ballén's vicepresident. Durán-Ballén, in turn, responded with a failed attempt to cali a
constituent assembly and reform the constitution to strengthen the powers of
the president vis-á-vis the congress.
Other presidencies in this category also present similar indicators of
extreme conflict. President Pastrana, á la Chávez, intended but failed to cali
a referendum on constitutional reform that included cutting the number of
congressional seats by half and calling new congressional elections. During
Wasmosy's presidency in Paraguay, president and legisiators were engaged in
a bitter conflict that included a threat by congress to impeach the president.
Finally, both terms of Caldera became a symbol of problematic presidencies in
Venezuela. During his first presidency, Caldera faced permanent obstruction
from congress and institutional attacks that eventually led to a constitutional
crisis when the opposition approved a law depriving the president from his
participation in the nomination of judges (Coppedge 1994: 339).^'' In his
second presidency, Caldera decided to face the deep economic crisis affecting
the country by suspending economic rights and implementing economic
measures by decree (Crisp 2000). Once congress attempted to restore those
rights, it was forced to back down by Caldera's threat to cali a referendum on
a proposal of constitutional reform, which would have enabled him to dissolve
congress. ^^
In other words, individual case studies for the presidencies included in the
category of congressional government without majority coalition would
probably confirm the finding of both the comparative analysis of the
frequency of conflicts and the special case of interrupted presidencies. The
probability that minority presidencies lead to high levéis of executivelegislative conflict and to the interruption of constitutional terms increases
when the president's party has no control over the median and yeto legislator
and the parties that include them are not part of the presidential cabinet.
'^ According to Coppedge (1994, 339), those institutional attacl<s included at one point ADs attempt to change
the presidential regime into a parliamentary one.
'8 See Latin America Weekly Report, I 1/08/94.
■IDE
Minority Pres/dents and Types of Government ¡n Latín America
Conclusions
Since the early 1990's, the idea that presidential regimes are inherently
unstable has been replaced by the hypothesis that it is not presidentialism per
se but the combination of presidentialism and multipartism what affects
government's effectiveness and democratic survival in separation-of-powers
systems. As a consequence, research on presidentialism has focused on the
electoral variables that are supposed to limit party fragmentation and secure
substantive congressional support for presidents.
The 'difficult combination' hypothesis is today under attack by a series of
studies that question the correlation betv^een multipartism, legislative
effectiveness and democratic survival and point out to other variables, such
as presidential term limits, the distribution of strength among parties, or the
degree of centralization of decision-making to explain the performance of
presidential regimes. To date, however, no study has provided a plausible and
theoretically grounded explanation of the causal mechanisms that foster or
hinder cooperation between executives and legislators in minority presidential
governments.
This paper is a first attempt to elabórate such an explanation. I have
argued that different forms of presidential government should be
distinguished by taking into account not only the size of the president's party
in congress but also its location in the policy space and its relation with two
pivotal actors: the median and the veto legislators. FoUowing this logic, I
proposed that different degrees of cooperation between presidents and
assemblies could be expected depending on whether the government is
unified, median, divided or congressional. I have also proposed that
congressional government is the most conflictive form of minority government
when presidents fail or do not attempt to build executive coalitions holding a
majority of legislative seats or including the median party in congress.
This hypothesis is supported by both the frequency of executive-legislative
conflicts and the premature termination of constitutional terms in Latin
America during the period 1979-2002. Both indicators also suggest that the
difference between congressional governments with or without executive
coalitions able to gather a majority of seats in congress is quite significant.
The mean frequency of inter-branch conflict goes from a médium to a high
level when no majority or median minority executive coalition is formed. In
addition, while half of the presidencies that did not form a majority or
median minority executive coalition failed to reach the end of their
constitutional terms, no presidency ended prematurely when presidents in
congressional government managed to forge a majority or median minority
executive coalition.
DIVISIÓN
DE
ESTUDIOS
POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretfo
The hypothesis that divided govemment is more confUctive than median
presidential government was not confirmed by the frequency of executivelegisiative confUcts under each type. While divided government presents a
level of inter-branch conflict cióse to unified presidential government, the
levéis are almost identical in median presidential and in coalitional
congressional government. This calis for a comparative analysis of party
discipline and cohesión for all the countries considered in the median
presidential category and for a better understanding of the way in which
divided government actually works.
The analysis provided in this paper suggests that research on presidential
democracies should shift from its exclusive focus on electoral variables
affecting the effective number of parties to the electoral and institutional
variables that make cooperation between branches possible in the absence of
a legislative majority supporting the president in congress. In this respect, a
new research agenda should pay attention to the electoral formulas that make
more likely than others the selection of presidents whose parties occupy a
median position in congress, the influence of presidential vetoes on policy
output, and the interaction between the proactive legislative powers of
presidents and congressional control over cabinets over the likelihood of
majority coalition formation.
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Types of Government in Latín America
Bibliography
Alcántara, Manuel and Flavia Freidenberg, eds. 2001. Partidos Políticos de América
Latina: Países Andinos. Biblioteca de América Series 18, Salamanca: Ediciones
Universidad de Salamanca.
eds. 2001. Partidos Políticos de América Latina: Países Andinos.
Biblioteca de América Series I'', Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de
Salamanca.
eds. 2001. Partidos Políticos de América Latina: Centroomérica, México
y República Dominicana. Biblioteca de América Series 20, Salamanca:
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
Amorim Neto, Octavio. 1998. Of Presidents, Parties and Ministers: Cabinet Formation
and Legislative Decision-Making Under Separation of Powers. Ph.D. diss.,
University of California, San Diego.
Amorim Neto, Octavio y Paulo Tafner. 2002. Governos de Coalizao e Mecanismos de
Alarme e Incendio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisorias. Dados 45
(1):5-38.
Amorim Mete, Octavio. 2002. Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles and Coalition
Discipline in Brazil. In Legislative Politics in Latín America, edited by Scott
Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press):
48-78.
Cameron, Charles M. 2000. Veto Barsainins- Presidents and the Politics of Negative
Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, John and Matthew S. Shugart. 1998 eds. Executive Decree Auttiority. Nev/
York: Cambridge University Press.
Chasquetti, Daniel. 2001. Democracia, Multipartidismo, y Coaliciones en América
Latina: Evaluando la Difícil Combinación. In Tipos de Presidencialismo y
Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina, edited by Jorge Lanzare (Buenos
Aires: CLACSO).
Cheibub, José Antonio. 2002. Minority Presidents, Deadlock Situations, and the
Survival of Presidential Democracies. Unpublished manuscript, Yale
University.
Cheibub, José Antonio, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2002. Government
Coalitions and Legislative Effectiveness Under Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism. Unpublished manuscript.
Cheibub, José Antonio, and Fernando Limongi. 2002. Democratic Institutions and
Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered.
Annual Review of Political Science 5: 151-179
Colomer, Josep and Gabriel Negretto. 2004. Can Presidentialism Work Like
Parliamentarism?. Government and Oppositíon.
Conaghan, Catherine M. 1995. Politicians Against Parties: Discord and Disconnection
in Ecuador's Party System. In Buildins Democratic institutions: Party Systems
in Latín America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford:
Stanford University Press).
DIVISIÓN
DE
ESTUDIOS
POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretto
Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Venezuela: Democratic despite Presidentialism. In The
Failure of Presidential Democracy, edited by Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela
(Baltinnore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).
. 1997. A Classification of Latín American Political Parties. Working Paper
#244, Kellog Institute, University of Notre Dame.
Crisp, Brian. 2000, Democratic Institutionai Desisn: The Powers and Incentives of
Venezuelan PoUticians and Interest Groups. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Deheza, Grace Ivana. 1998. Gobiernos de coalición en el sistema presidencial:
América del Sur. In El presidencialismo renovado: Institucionalismo y cambio
político en América Latina, edited by Dieter Nohlen and Mario Fernández
(Caracas: Nueva Sociedad): 151-169.
Elgie, Robert (ed.). 2001. Divided Government in Comparative Perspective. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Figueiredo, Argelina Chebub, y Fernando Limongi. 1998. Institutionai Legacies and
Accountability: Executive Decrees in Brazil and Italy. Paper presented at the
Conference on Institutionai Legacies, Buenos Aires.
Haggard, Stephan, and Mathev^/ MacCubbins (eds.) 2001. Presidents, Parliaments and
Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Isaacs, Anita. 1996. Ecuador: Democracy Standing the Test of Time?. In Constructing
Democratic Governance: South America in the 1990s, edited by Jorge
Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press).
Jones, Mark P. 1995. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies.
Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Institutionai and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of
Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics 8: 7-40.
. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure
with Appplication to West Europe." Comparative Political Studies, pp. 3-27.
Lanzaro, Jorge ed. 2001. Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América
Latina. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government. The Politics of
Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Laver, Michael and Kenneth Shepsle. 1991. Divided Government: America Is Not
Exceptional. Governance 4 (3): 250-69.
Linz, Juan J. 1990a. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy 1 (1): 5169.
. 1990b. The Virtues or Parliamentarism. Journal of Democracy 1 (4): 8491.
Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela eds. 1994. The Failure of Presidential Democracy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Linz, Juan and Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
CIDE
Minority Presidents and Tyoes of Govemmenf ín Latin America
Mainwahng, Scott. 1993. Presidentialism, Mutipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult
Combination. Comparative Political Studies 26: 198- 228.
Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scuüy (eds.). 1995. 6u/7d;ng Democratic Institutions:
Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew S. Shugart eds. 1997a. Presidentialism and
Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
. 1997b. "Juan Linz, Presidentialisnn, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal." Comparative Poiitics, 29, 4: 449-471.
Morgenstern, Scott, and Benito Nacif. 2002. Lesislative Poiitics in Latin America.
Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Nacif, Benito. 2000. La lógica de la parálisis y el cambio bajo gobiernos sin mayoría.
México: CIDE. Working Paper 126.
Negretto, Gabriel. 2004. Government Capacities and Policy-Making by Decree in
Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina. Comparative Political
Studies.
Nohlen, Dieter and Mario Fernández B. eds. 1998. El presidencialismo renovado.
Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 1993. Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del Caribe. San
José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de derechos Humanos.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub and Fernando Limogi. 2000.
Democracy and Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, Mattthew. 1995. The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided
Government. American Political Science Review 89 (2): 327-43.
Samuels, David, and Kent Eaton. Presidentialism And, Or, and Versus
Parliamentarism: The State of the Literature and an Agenda for Future
Research. Paper presented at the Conference on Consequences of Political
Institutions in Democracy, Duke University, April-5-7, 2002.
Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies.
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Shugar, Matthew. 1998. The Inverse Relation Between Party Strength and Executive
Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices. British Journal of
Political Science 28: 1-29.
Shugart, Matthew. The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided
Presidential Government. American Political Science Rev/ew 89 (2): 327-43.
Shugart, Matthew and Stephan Haggard. 2001. Institutions and Public Policy in
Presidential Systems. In Presidents, Parliaments and Policy, edtied by
Stephen Haggard and Mathew MacCubbins (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge
University Press): 64-102.
Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. 1994. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in
Comparative Perspective. In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, edited by
Juan Linz Juan and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press), Vol. 1: 119-36.
Strom, Kaare. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge University Press.
Valenzuela, Arturo. 1994. Party Poiitics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A
Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government. In The Failure of
DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS
Gabriel L. Negretto
Presídentíal Democracy, edited by Juan Linz Juan and Arturo Valenzuela
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), Vol. 1: 91-150.
Zueco, César. 2002. Datábase on Cabinet Coalitions in Latín America. Department of
Political Science, UCLA, unpublished.
CIDE
Novedades
DIVISIóN DE ADMINISTRACIóN PúBLICA
Cabrero Mendoza,
Enrique, Políticas de modernización de la
administración municipal. Viejas y nuevas estrategias para transformar a los
gobiernos locales. AP-128
Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique, Los cambios en la agenda de políticas públicas
en el ámbito municipal: Una visión introductoria. AP-129
Areüano Gault, David & J. Ramón Gil García. Public Management PoUcy
and Accountability in Latín America: Performance-Oriented Budget ín
Colombia, México and Venezuela. AP-130
Graizbord, Boris, Allison Rowland £t Adrián Guillermo Aguilar, Spatial and
Dístributive Impacts of Globalizatíon on México C/ty. AP-131
Cárter, Nicole, Water Conflíct and Covernance in the Río Bravo Basin.
AP-132
Rivera Urrutia, Eugenio, Teorías de la regulación. Un análisis desde la
perspectiva de las políticas públicas. AP-133
Del Castillo, Arturo y Manuel Alejandro Guerrero, Percepciones de la
corrupción en la Ciudad de México ¿ Predisposición al acto corrupto ?. AP-134
Mariscal, Judith, Digital Divide in México. AP-135
Kossick, Robert & Judith Mariscal, Citizen Participation in the Digital
Age: The ínitíal Experience of México. AP-136
Bracho González, Teresa, Administración centrada en la escuela. AP-137
DIVISIóN DE ECONOMíA
Hernández Trillo, Fausto, Primero lo primero:¿Cómo financiar el desarrollo
económico mexicano?. E-275
Rosellón, Juan & Kristiansen T., A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity
Transmission Expansión. E-276
Scott, John, Decentralization of Social Spending in México. E-277
Unger, Kurt, Los Clusters industriales en México: especializacíones
regionales y la política industrial. E-278
Gómez Galvarriato Aurora y Gabriela Recio, El nacimiento de la sociedad
anónima y la evolución de las organizaciones empresariales en México: 18861910. E-279
Ávalos Bracho , Marco & José Carlos Ramírez Sánchez, International Trade
and Merger Policy. E-280
Hernández Trillo, Fausto y Héctor Iturribarría, Tres Trampas del
federalismo fiscal mexicano. E-281
Ramírez, José Carlos, Usos y limitaciones de los procesos estocásticos en el
tratamiento de distribuciones de rendimientos con colas gordas. E-282
Antón, Arturo, On the Welfare ¡mplications of the Optimal Monetary
Policy. E-283
Torres Rojo, Juan M., y Arturo G. Valles Gándara, Crecimiento poblacional
de rodales puros y mezclados de coniferas y latifóUdas. E-284
DIVISIóN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES
Schiavon, Jorge A., Bicameralismo en América Latina:¿Hace alguna
diferencia? El-91
Jones, Adam, Paramilitarism, Death and Squads and Covernance in Latin
America. El-92
Ortiz Mena, Antonio, México s Trade Policy: Improvisation and Vision.
EI-93.
Mahon, James, Fiscal Contracts, International Capital and the Quest for a
Liberal. El-94
Kahhat, Farid, Democracy as a Collective Problem In the Western
Hemisphere: The Case of Perú Dunng the 1990s. EI-95
Ortiz Mena, Antonio, México in the Multilateral Tradins System. EI-96
Minushkin, Susan, De Banqueros a Bolseros: La transformación estructural
del sector financiero mexicano. EI-97
Schiavon, Jorge Alberto, Cohabitando en el Consejo de Sesuridad: México
y Estados Unidos ante la Guerra contra Irak. EI-98
Jones, Adam, The Politics of United Nations Reform. El-99
Kahhat, Jones, Los estudios de seguridad tras el fin de la Guerra Fría.
EI-100
DIVISIóN DE ESTUDIOS JURíDICOS
Magaloni, Ana Laura y Layda Negrete, El poder Judicial federal y su
política de decidir sin resolver. EJ-1
Pazos, María Inés, Derrotabilidad sin indeterminación. EJ-2
Pasara Pazos, Luis, Reforma y desafíos de la justicia en Guatemala. EJ-3
Bergman S., Marcelo, Confianza y Estado de Derecho. EJ-4
Bergman S., Marcelo, Compliance with norms: The Case of Tax Compliance
in Latin America. EJ-5
DIVISIóN DE ESTUDIOS POLíTICOS
Benton, Allyson, Dissatisfied Democrats or Restrospective Voters?
Economic Hardship, Political Institutions and Votins Behavior in Latin America.
EP-153
Colomer M., Josep, Tamins the Tiser: Votins RiS^ts and Political
tnstability in Latin America. EP-154
Colomer M., Josep, Votins in Latín America: Low Benefits, Hi^h Costs.
EP-155
Colomer M., Josep, Policy Making ín Divided Government: A Pivotal Actors
Model with Party Discipline. EP-156
Dion, Michelle, México's Welfare Resime befare and after the Debt Crisis:
Orsanized Labor and the Effects of Clobalization. EP-157
Nacif, Benito, Instituciones políticas y transición a la democracia en
México. EP-158
Langston, Joy, Senate Recruitment and Party Orsanizational Chance in
México sPRL EP-159
Langston, Joy & Alberto Díaz- Cayeros, The Consequences of Competition:
Cubernatorial Nominations in México 1994-2000. EP-160
Crespo, José Antonio, México: El fin de la hesemonía partidista. EP-161
Beltrán Ugarte, Ulises, The Combined Effect of Advertisement and News
Coverage in the Mexican Presidential Campaign of 2000. EP-162
DIVISIóN DE HISTORIA
Meyer, Jean, Guerra, relisión y violencia, el contexto salvadoreño de la
muerte de Monseñor Romero. H-17
Pipitone, Ugo, Caos y Globalización. H-18
Barrón, Luis, Un civil en busca del poder: La carrera política de José
Vasconcelos 1910-1924. H-19
Barrón, Luis, La tercera muerte de la Revolución Mexicana: Historiografía
reciente y futuro en el estudio de la revolución. H-20
García Ayluardo, Clara, De tesoreros y tesoros. La administración
financiera y la intervención de las cofradías novohispanas. H-21
Medina Peña, Luis, Porfirio Díaz y la creación del sistema político. H-22
Sauter J., Michael, Visions of the Enlightenment: Johann Christoph
Woellner and Prussia's Edict on Relision of 1788. H-23
Sauter J., Michael, Preachers, Ponytoils and Enthusiasm: On the Limits of
Publicness in Enlightenment Prussia. H-24
Bataillon, Gilíes, Guatemala: de L'instauration du terrorisme d'état au
réasencement du pouvoir militaire. H-25
Ventas
DIRECTAS:
57-27-98-00 Ext. 2906 y 2417
Fax: 57-27-98-85
INTERNET:
[email protected]
www.cide.edu
LIBRERíAS DONDE SE ENCUENTRAN DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO:
. LIBRERÍA SALVADOR ALLENDE TeL 56-58-91 -48
• EL JUGLAR PRODUCCIONES S.A. DE C.V. TeL 56-60-79-00
. FCE ALFONSO REYES TeL 52-27-46-72
. INAP TeL 55-70-16-11
. ARCHIVO GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN TeL 51-33-99-00
. SIGLO XXI EDITORES S.A. DE C.V. TeL 56-58-75-55
. UAM AZCAPOTZALCO Jel. 53-18-92-81
. UAM IZTAPAUPA TeL 58-04-48-72
m
O
o 1- >
<_) ;
O
Q
www.cide.edu
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DOCENCIA ECONÓMICAS
CARRETERA MÉXICO-TOLUCA 3655, COL. LOMAS DE SANTA f£, 01210, MÉXICO, D.F.
CONMUTADOR: 5727'9800
EXIS.: 2202, 2203 Y 2417
FAX: 5727'9885 v 5292'1304
CORREO ELECTRóNICO: [email protected]
9789990176025