azu_etd_11015_sip1_m... - The University of Arizona Campus

LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO: MEXICAN-LATIN AMERICAN REALTIONS
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF LÁZARO CÁRDENAS, 1934-1940
by
Amelia Marie Kiddle
_____________________
Copyright © Amelia Marie Kiddle 2010
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
2010
2
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation
prepared by Amelia Marie Kiddle
entitled La Política del Buen Amigo: Mexican-Latin American Relations during the
Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940
and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: 05/03/2010
William H. Beezley
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: 05/03/2010
Kevin Gosner
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: 05/03/2010
Bert J. Barickman
Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s
submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and
recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
________________________________________________ Date: 05/03/2010
Dissertation Director: William H. Beezley
3
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an
advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library
to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided
that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended
quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by
the copyright holder.
SIGNED: Amelia Marie Kiddle
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The multi-country archival approach I employed in researching this dissertation made it
an expensive proposition, and I am grateful for the Foreign Government Award I
received from the Canadian Bureau for International Education, which provided funding
from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year in the Mexican archives. In
addition to the pre-dissertation research funding I received from the Tinker Foundation,
and the University of Arizona Department of History and Social and Behavioral Sciences
Research Institute, the latter two also provided timely assistance to support my forays
into the Cuban, Guatemalan, UK, US national archives. The Manuscript Society
provided essential funding for my research in the Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The
Herbert Taylor Barnes Foundation provided invaluable financial support throughout the
course of my graduate studies, and I am especially grateful for the assistance it has
provided.
My committee members have been a constant source of encouragement throughout the
research and writing of my dissertation. My advisor Bill Beezley’s good ideas, boundless
energy, and constant faith in this project have been a source of inspiration. Bert
Barickman shared his brilliance and friendship, as well as excellent, exhaustive, (and
exhausting) guidance in Brazil. Kevin Gosner provided steady guidance and a voice of
reason. David Ortiz shared his knowledge of Spanish history and his comments on these
chapters over drinks at The Shanty. Walter Brem has been a fount of archival
information and restaurant recommendations. In Mexico, I benefited from Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas’s continued interest in my progress, Guillermo Palacios’s guidance and
mentorship, Carmen Nava Nava’s knowledge and enthusiasm, and Cecilia Zuleta’s
friendship and collaboration. I am grateful for the assistance of more archivists and
librarians than I could possibly name here, but special mention must go to Alejandro
Padilla Nieto and the staff of the Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada. I am also glad to
have shared my time in the archives with such good friends; I thank Amanda López,
Steve Neufeld, Ryan Kashanipour, María Muñoz, Sophia Koutsoyannis, Claudia Carretta,
Erika Hosselkus, Joseph Lenti, and Steve Andes, for their interest in my work, and for
being such great fun. The constant support I received from my family made the trials and
tribulations of graduate school bearable, and even enjoyable. My parents, David and
Elizabeth Kiddle, have had more faith in me than I could ever have hoped. My sister
Jennie’s love and humour always helped me put things into perspective. Most of all, my
husband Jonathan Jucker—my travelling companion, copy editor, and best friend—has
been an invaluable partner in this long journey. Thank you.
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………….6
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….7
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...8
CHAPTER ONE. LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO IN LATIN AMERICA………..19
CHAPTER TWO. LA MINISTRO AND EL DUELISTA: GENDER AND THE
FOREIGN SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA…………………………………..43
CHAPTER THREE. REPÚBLICAS ROJAS: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND
MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA………………………….92
CHAPTER FOUR. SELLING THE OIL EXPROPRIATION OF 1938………………140
CHAPTER FIVE. A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES: THE III CONFERENCIA
INTERAMERICANA DE EDUCACIÓN AND THE PRIMER CONGRESO
INDIGENISTA INTERAMERICANO……………………………………..…186
CONCLUSION. THE VOYAGE OF THE DURANGO: FINAL THOUGHTS ON LA
POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO………………………………………………..263
APPENDIX A. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BY LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRY, 1934-1940…………….………………………………………….297
APPENDIX B. DIPLOMATS POSTED TO LATIN AMERICA, 1934-1940…..…….301
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………....304
6
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Annual Budget (Projected and Actual) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs…34
Figure 1.2 Annual Budget for Salaries and Other Expenses in the Foreign Ministry, the
Foreign Service, and the Consular Service, 1934-40……………………………35
Figure 2.1 Ambassadors and Ministers’ Years of Birth…………………………………48
Figure 2.2 Ambassadors and Ministers’ States of Origin………………………………..50
7
ABSTRACT
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) did more than any other president to fulfil the goals of the
Mexican Revolution of 1910, by nationalizing the oil industry, establishing rural schools,
distributing an unprecedented amount of land to peasants, and encouraging the
organization of workers. To gain international support for this domestic reform
programme, the Cárdenas government promoted these accomplishments to other Latin
American nations. I argue that Cárdenas attempted to attain a leadership position in
inter-American relations by virtue of his pursuit of social and economic justice in
domestic and foreign policy. I investigate the Cárdenas government’s projection of a
Revolutionary image of Mexico and evaluate its reception in Latin America. In doing so,
this dissertation expands the analysis of foreign policy to show that Mexico’s relations
with its Latin American neighbours were instrumental in shaping its foreign relations. I
argue that the intersections between culture and diplomacy were central to this process.
8
INTRODUCTION
Demonstrators rallying for domestic political reforms in Uruguay in 1938 carried
placards bearing the image of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas. Catholic Action
groups in Chile had held masses in 1935 to protest his government’s persecution of
Catholics and the threat this allegedly posed to Catholicism in Latin America. Clearly,
the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas held broad significance for Latin Americans during
the ideologically polarised decade of the 1930s. Cárdenas spearheaded a reform
programme that garnered both acclaim and censure in the region. This dissertation
examines Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America during the Cárdenas
presidency (1934-1940) and weighs his government’s efforts to lead the region on the
basis of the ideas contained in its domestic political reform programme.
Generally considered to have been the most Revolutionary of the presidents who
followed the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Cárdenas’s domestic political programme has
received significant attention in the literature. 1 Patterns of land tenure in the countryside
had remained largely unchanged until Cárdenas undertook a large-scale agrarian reform
programme, distributing an unprecedented amount of land to campesinos (rural workers).
He is also famous for the 1938 expropriation of US and Anglo-Dutch oil companies
1
The literature on cardenismo is vast: see especially Alan Knight, “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?”
Journal of Latin American Studies 26:1 (Feb., 1996): 73-107; Adolfo Gilly, El cardenismo, una utopia
mexicana (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1994); Marjorie Becker, Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lázaro
Cárdenas, Michoacán Peasants, and the Redemption of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995); Adrian Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the
Mexican Revolution (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1998); Ben W. Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised:
The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Luis
González y González, Los artífices del cardenismo. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. Vol. 14. (Mexico
City: El Colegio de México, 1979); Arnaldo Córdova, La pólitica de masas del cardenismo (Mexico City:
Ediciones Era, 1974); Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post Revolutionary Mexico
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
9
operating in Mexico, which resulted in the establishment of the national oil industry,
PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos). The expropriation had resulted from a protracted labour
dispute between workers and the foreign oil companies. Cárdenas championed the
organisation of workers in the CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores de México) and
rural workers in the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina) during his presidency.
To encourage their involvement in the political life of the nation, he restructured the
official party that had been established in 1929 (the Partido Nacional Revolucionario)—
which would later be reorganised again to become the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional). Scholarly criticism of Cárdenas stems in part from the fact that in
restructuring the ruling party he laid the groundwork for the seventy-year hegemony of
the PRI. Nevertheless, post-revisionist works on his presidency stress that this was an
unintended consequence of his reforms.
The domestic aspects of the Cárdenas presidency have been well-researched, but
there is only one major study of his government’s foreign policy, which deals with
Mexico’s relations with the United States and Europe, not Latin America.2 I argue that
by examining Mexico’s Política del Buen Amigo or “Good Friend Policy” toward Latin
America—the country’s answer to the US Good Neighbor Policy—and analysing social
and cultural aspects of Mexico’s foreign policy, new understandings of Mexican foreign
relations and their significance for the formation of Mexican national identity emerge.
Studies of Mexican foreign policy have most often focused on the nation’s bilateral
2
Friedrich E. Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro
Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998).
10
relations with the United States. 3 Although this tendency began to change with the
inclusion of European sources, the discussion of relations with Latin America remains
limited. 4 Few studies of the period have examined these relations, and those that have
tend to be political histories. 5 Cultural history, while bringing new approaches to bear on
diplomatic history, has tended to refocus attention on US-Mexican relations. 6 This
3
See, for example, John J. Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural
Land in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); María Emilia Paz Salinas,
Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development: The
United States and Mexico, 1938-1954 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1995); Gilbert M. Joseph,
Revolution from Without: Yucatan, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); Lorenzo Meyer, México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero (Mexico
City: El Colegio de México, 1968). Works on Mexico’s relations with Spain, which will be discussed in
Chapter Three, constitute an important exception to this trend.
4
Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Lorenzo Meyer, Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución
Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1991); Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico,
Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 1920s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Denis Rolland,
Vichy et la France Libre au Mexique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990); Rob Van Vuurde, Los Países Bajos, el
petróleo y la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950 (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 1997).
5
Exceptions to the relative dearth of scholarship on Mexican-Latin American relations include: Jürgen
Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy, 1876-1930
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996); Fabián Herrera León, La política mexicana en la
Sociedad de Naciones ante la Guerra del Chaco y el Conflicto de Leticia, 1932-1935 (Mexico City: SRE,
2009), and the works of Pablo Yankelevich, La revolución mexicana en América Latina: Intereses políticos
e itinerarios intelectuales (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2003); Miradas australes. Propaganda, cabildeo y
proyección de la Revolución Mexicana en el Río de la Plata, 1910-1930 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1997);
La Diplomacia Imaginaria: Argentina y la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1916 (Mexico City: SRE, 1994).
Indicative of new interest in the field is the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores’s excellent new Colección
Latinoamericana, which includes Guillermo Palacios, Intimidades, conflictos y reconciliaciones: México y
Brasil 1822-1993 (Mexico City: SRE, 2001); Salvador Morales, Relaciones interferidas: México y el
Caríbe, 1813-1982 (Mexico City: SRE, 2002); Mónica Toussaint Ribot, et al, Vecindad y Diplomacia:
Centroamérica en la política exterior mexicana, 1821-1988 (Mexico City: SRE, 2001); Salvador Méndez
Reyes, et al, Bajo el manto del libertador: Relaciones de México con Colombia, Panamá y Venezuela,
1921-2000 (Mexico City: SRE, 2004); Rubén Ruíz Guerra, Mas allá de la diplomacia: Relaciones de
México con Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú, 1821-1994 (Mexico City: SRE, 2007); and María Cecilia Zuleta, Los
extremos de Hispanoamérica: Relaciones, conflictos y armonías entre México y el Cono Sur, 1821-1990
(Mexico City: SRE, 2008).
6
See, for example, Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), Close
Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1998); Julio Moreno, Yankee Don’t Go Home!: Mexican Nationalism, American Business
Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2003); Helen Delpar, The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United
States and Mexico, 1920-1935 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992).
11
dissertation examines the ways in which self-representation as a Revolutionary nation
affected the nature of Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America, the definition of
the national patrimony, and the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. I argue that the
intersections between culture and diplomacy were central to this process.
In order to achieve this reinterpretation, this dissertation draws on Latin American
archival and periodical sources in addition to the Mexican sources that document the
formulation of La Política del Buen Amigo. The polarisation of international politics
during the 1930s meant that a range of reactions characterised Latin American reception
of the Cárdenas government’s foreign policy initiatives, as well as the image of the nation
and its Revolution that members of the Foreign Service promoted in the region. Analysis
of these diverse reactions, though not exhaustive, distinguishes this study and enables
greater understanding of both the patterns and distinguishing features of these complex
responses. The different reception given Cárdenas’s initiatives by Mexico’s two closest
neighbours, Cuba and Guatemala, demonstrate the diversity of these reactions as well as
the differences between domestic political processes among Latin American countries at
the time. While the government of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, which was characteristic
of the so-called Liberal dictatorships that dominated Central America in this period, was
openly hostile to the Revolutionary government of Mexico, the Cuban government,
which after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado in 1933 had embarked
upon a period of social reform under the influence of General Fulgencio Batista, was
cautiously sympathetic to the Cárdenas government. In the Southern Cone, the
reactionary presidents of Argentina’s “Infamous Decade” were wary of the influence of
12
Mexico’s Leftist politics, as well as its competition for leadership of the region. Whereas
the Chilean reaction initially mirrored that of Argentina during the early years of the
Cárdenas presidency when the Liberal oligarchic regime of Arturo Alessandri held sway,
the 1938 election of Popular Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda ensured that Mexico’s
initiatives would thereafter be received much more warmly. Against the background of
the Great Depression, Latin American governments struggled to find solutions to the
rising demands of urban and rural workers and the unravelling of the export-oriented
economic and political regimes that had dominated the region since the late nineteenth
century. The Cárdenas government’s policies presented to the region a possible way
forward, but the diverse reactions of Latin American governments depended upon
domestic political ideologies that held sway in each country. As the product of
negotiation among diverse interest groups in Mexico and within Latin America, Mexico’s
relations with the region were characterised by the ideological polarisation of the times.
In his relations with Latin America, Cárdenas cultivated the same charismatic
personal image that characterised his populist political style in domestic politics. 7
Members of the Mexican Foreign Service held up this image of the Mexican president in
the region, also promoting the populist politics he employed as a solution to Latin
America’s political, economic, and social ills. But more than promoting the image of
Cárdenas himself, they advanced the understanding of the Revolutionary ideals he
7
Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico,” Journal of Latin
American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 223-248. Jorge Basurto, “Populismo y movilización de masas en
México durante el régimen cardenista,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 3:4 (Oct.-Dec. 1969): 853-92;
Michael L. Conniff, ed. Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1999);
Amelia M. Kiddle and María L.O. Muñoz, (eds.), Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies
of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010).
13
personified. The success of this domestic policy hinged on his government’s freedom to
pursue domestic reform without fear of foreign intervention in its internal affairs. The
principle of non-intervention had long been one of the pillars of Mexican foreign policy.
Its emphasis during the Cárdenas era reflects his government’s need to secure its reform
program, ensuring that it remained a viable alternative for other Latin American
countries. In seeking increased friendly relations with Latin America and promoting
understanding of the government’s Revolutionary programme in the region, the Cárdenas
government was in effect both encouraging its adoption in Latin America and
safeguarding its achievements in Mexico by garnering support for the idea that his
government should be free to implement policies that represented a legitimate solution to
the pressing demands of the times.
In advancing understanding of Revolutionary Mexico in Latin America, the
Cárdenas government made extensive use of cultural diplomacy. In doing so, it
constructed an image of the nation for Latin American consumption that both reflected
and contributed to the definition of Mexican national identity, culture, and patrimony. 8
The rise of the Nation State and its designation in international affairs on the basis of
distinct cultural identities after the end of the First World War, and the establishment of
the League of Nations, necessitated the definition of national cultures. The canonisation
of national cultural patrimony therefore owed as much to this international exigency as
processes of identity formation within national boundaries. The construction and
8
On the construction of Mexican national identity see, for example, William H. Beezley, Mexican National
Identity: Memory, Innuendo, and Popular Culture (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2008); Ricardo
Pérez Montfort, Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano (Mexico City: CIESAS, 2003); Mary Kay
Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, (eds.), The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in
Mexico, 1920-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
14
presentation of a distinct national culture on the international stage legitimised
governments’ efforts to ensure their freedom to pursue the sovereign development of the
nation. The dissemination of Mexican national culture abroad supported the Cárdenas
government’s calls for respect for the principle of non-intervention in international
affairs. Cultural relations formed an essential part of the government’s foreign policy,
and the image of the nation that emerged in diplomats’ promotion of Mexican national
culture reflected the negotiation of foreign and domestic interests, both in the formulation
and reception of Mexican foreign policy, in this process.
Dissertation Structure
Culture is central to the understanding of Mexican relations with Latin America
during the Cárdenas presidency, both in terms of the cultural production of the
Revolution and the elements of national culture disseminated in the region, and as the set
of ideas and values that shaped collective action and intent in Mexican foreign relations.
In the chapters that follow, I examine popular, symbolic, and print culture from the
period, as well as the culture of diplomacy and how ideas of revolution, gender, and
nationalism shaped Mexico’s relations with Latin America.
Chapter One examines the articulation of the Política del Buen Amigo, its
formulation and implementation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previous works have
shown that a reorganisation of the Foreign Ministry between 1920 and 1940 created a
professional and effective organisation dedicated to the promotion of Mexico’s interests
abroad. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs withdrew most of its highest-
15
ranking diplomats from the Latin America when faced with financial crisis in 1937.
Budgetary constraints, combined with the fact that, despite the advent of the Política del
Buen Amigo, relations with Latin America were not a diplomatic priority when compared
to the importance of Mexico’s relations with the Great Powers, meant that diplomats
posted to Latin America operated with less oversight than their counterparts in the
political and cultural capitals of the world. Members of the Foreign Service used this
relative autonomy to adopt creative diplomatic strategies for the strengthening of
Mexico’s relations with Latin America, often under the direct supervision of President
Cárdenas, who maintained an active interest in the direction of Mexico’s foreign policy in
the region.
Chapter Two is an analysis of ideas of gender in the Mexican Foreign Service. A
collective biography of the diplomats who served in Latin America during the Cárdenas
period details the origin, education, and career of the diplomats posted to the region, and
reconstructs their shared understanding of the Revolution and its potential applicability to
the rest of Latin America. Through the analysis of two exceptional cases that
demonstrate the role of gender in Mexican foreign relations—the appointment of Palma
Guillén as the first female head of mission in Latin America and an incident that caused
Bernardo Reyes, Mexico’s chargé d’affaires in Paraguay, to challenge a detractor of the
Revolution to a duel—this chapter demonstrates existence of a culture of Revolutionary
masculinity that pervaded the Foreign Service and affected Mexico’s relations with Latin
America and the reception of the Cárdenas government’s foreign policy initiatives.
16
Chapter Three demonstrates the connections between the material and moral
support the Cárdenas government provided the Republic during the Spanish Civil War
and his government’s Latin American policy. Paying rapt attention to the news coming
out of Spain and Mexico, Leftist intellectual figures, pro-Republican Spanish immigrants,
and students and workers groups eulogised the Cárdenas government’s position. Often
working in tandem, intellectuals and activists raised money for Republican causes and
publicised what they believed were the twin causes of Mexico and Spain. Conversely, the
predominantly conservative governments of the region and organisations of the Right
reacted with apprehension; as well as censuring the activities of Leftists—Mexican
diplomats included—they were concerned mainly for the maintenance of the conservative
status quo within their own countries. As a result, the reception met by the Cárdenas
government’s initiatives served as a proxy for commentary on domestic politics in Latin
America, and Mexico’s Spanish policy affected not only its diplomatic relations with
Latin American governments, but the politics of an entire region polarised by the
ideological politics of the 1930s.
Chapter Four analyses Latin American reception of the Cárdenas government’s
oil expropriation of 1938. President Cárdenas’s announcement created the circumstances
for one of the most important tests of the diplomacy of Mexico’s representatives in Latin
America. Henceforth, much of their time, energy, and resources would be devoted to
supporting the president’s oil policy and justifying his decisions. These efforts entailed
“selling” the expropriation in two inter-related ways: first, through propaganda efforts in
the region; and second, through attempts to create a market in Latin America for the
17
newly-nationalised oil industry. The expropriation was particularly contentious because
it portended to some the rise of a workers’ republic, but more importantly it was
exemplary of the Cárdenas government’s approach to state intervention in the economy
which appealed to economic nationalists in the region who were reeling from the effects
of the disintegration of the export-oriented model of Latin American development.
Chapter Five investigates the Cárdenas government use of inter-American
meetings as propaganda tools in promoting its leadership of the region. The government
lobbied hard to host these conferences in the belief that they were excellent opportunities
to promote the accomplishments of the Revolution. Paying particular attention to the
Third Inter-American Meeting on Education (III CIE), held at Mexico City in 1937, and
the First Inter-American Congress of Indigenistas (PCII), held at Pátzcuaro in 1940, this
chapter examines the lengthy planning process of each event, the specific activities that
surrounded the conferences, and the perceptions of the Latin American delegates who
attended them. Although inter-American conferences on education, child welfare, and
indigenous issues have been the focus of studies that have examined their place in the
evolution of Latin American ideas regarding social welfare and indigenismo (the
movement for the incorporation of marginalised indigenous populations into the nation in
Latin America), analysis of the planning of these events results in new interpretations of
both the meetings themselves and their usefulness in the Cárdenas government’s pursuit
of a leadership role in Latin America.
Finally, the Conclusion examines the 1940 voyage to South America of a fivehundred-person artistic, military, commercial, and athletic mission of goodwill. This
18
special embassy, which travelled to Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Panama and Bolivia aboard the
Durango, epitomised the Cárdenas government’s cultural relations with Latin America,
and the image of the nation it presented to the region. The carefully-chosen members of
this mission represented the standardisation of Mexican culture, the country’s growing
industrial strength, its folkloric dances and typical music, the youth and vigour of its
military and naval cadets and athletes, and most importantly, its Revolutionary legacy.
The special embassy both superseded and reflected Mexican diplomats’ regular
diplomatic activities in the region, connecting their everyday promotion of the
understanding of Revolutionary Mexico to this extraordinary and memorable event,
thereby positively influencing the reception of Mexican foreign policy initiatives and the
sympathy that its domestic political policies found in Latin America. Although Mexico’s
Política del Buen Amigo met with mixed results, depending on the political ideologies
that held sway in Latin America and the negotiation of local and international interests,
Mexico’s cultural relations with Latin American advanced the Cárdenas government’s
goal to secure its domestic achievements through the cultivation of international support
for its right to pursue its reform programme.
19
CHAPTER ONE.
LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO IN LATIN AMERICA
The governing principle of the Mexican government’s foreign policy is
the Política del Buen Amigo. This policy bears a great purpose, one which
corresponds to sincere friendship and a profound interest in sharing the
triumphs and concerns of friendly nations. It also fundamentally
symbolises the proposition, as laid out by international ethics, of nonintervention—neither directly nor indirectly—in the internal affairs of
other nations, observed in letter and spirit; and demonstrates utmost
respect for their ways of life and internal organisation. 9
La Política del Buen Amigo guided Mexican relations with Latin America during
the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). Although this foreign policy originally
applied to his government’s relations with all of the countries with which Mexico had
diplomatic relations, it soon came to be associated primarily with the country’s relations
with its neighbours in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America in particular. This
relates to the fact that the policy’s name was an obvious play on that of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy for Latin America, announced during the US
President’s inaugural address in 1933. La Política del Buen Amigo was first articulated
by the Ministry of Foreign Relations in 1935. 10 It stated that more than just a good
neighbour, Mexico aimed to be a good friend, seeking to establish cordial relations with
other countries and uphold the principle of non-intervention that had characterised
Mexican diplomacy since the proclamation of the Estrada Doctrine in 1930. 11
Nevertheless, during the Cárdenas sexenio (six-year term) the policy’s emphasis on
9
Eduardo Hay, quoted in “Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, (Mexico City) April 27, 1936.
“Política Internacional de México,” El Universal (Mexico City), September 7, 1935.
11
On the Estrada Doctrine see, Genaro Estrada, La doctrina Estrada (Mexico City: Publicaciones del
Instituto Americano de Derecho y Legislación Comparada, 1930).
10
20
diplomatic recognition eventually gave way to a focus upon the principles of mutual
understanding that Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay described above as a “profound
interest in sharing spiritually with friendly nations in their triumphs and concerns.” 12 In
this pursuit of mutual understanding, cultural relations came to play an increasingly
significant role in the elaboration of Mexico’s foreign policy towards Latin America.
Upon his inauguration, Cárdenas appointed former president Emilio Portes Gil
Minister of Foreign Affairs. A strong supporter of Jefe Máximo Plutarco Elías Calles,
Portes Gil resigned from his position in June 1935 and took up the presidency of the
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) following president Cárdenas’s break with
Calles. The long-serving Fernando González Roa, whom Cárdenas had initially
appointed Ambassador to Guatemala, declined to accept the cabinet position when it was
offered due to ill-health (although not before some of his international collaborators sent
messages of congratulations). 13 Cárdenas decided to leave the position vacant for the
time being, but it was widely held in diplomatic circles that Portes Gil maintained control
of the Ministry behind the scenes through the undersecretary he had appointed, José
Ángel Ceniceros. 14 Ceniceros assumed the role of Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and it was he who made the first pronouncement on the Good Friend Policy that
September. John H. MacVeagh, second secretary of the US Embassy in Mexico,
reported to the State Department that through this pronouncement the international
12
Eduardo Hay, quoted in “Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, April 27, 1936.
Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo
Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, telegram from Saavedra Lamas to González Roa, June
19, 1935.
14
Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, Ambassador Leviller to
Saavedra Lamas, June 18, 1935.
13
21
community had been advised that Mexico’s object was to “maintain a close and
continuous contact with the countries of the American Continent, seeking with them the
peaceful solution of our common problems.” 15 The Chilean and Guatemalan
representatives in Mexico also reported Cenciceros’s announcement to their Ministries. 16
Although the Acting Foreign Minister first announced the policy, its clear
articulation awaited the appointment of Eduardo Hay as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hay
took up the position in December 1935—one year after Cárdenas entered office—and
remained Foreign Minister for the duration of the sexenio. 17 Hay took power on
December 2 at a ceremony attended by the diplomatic corps. The new minister stated
that he expected that his efforts would be aided by Ceniceros, who had agreed to stay on
as undersecretary. 18 Nevertheless, the two men did not see eye to eye on a number of
foreign policy issues and clashed over Portes Gil’s (and hence Calles’s) continued
influence over Ceniceros and the Ministry. Guatemalan Ambassador to Mexico Manuel
Echevarría y Vidaurre discussed in his reports the conflict between the two men, which
apparently broke out over their differences of opinion regarding Mexico’s participation in
15
United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box
4109, 712.00/45, MacVeagh to Hull, September 7, 1935.
16
Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ANA), Fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
(RREE), Volúmen 3551, Bianchi to Ministro, September 8, 1935; For the Foreign Minister’s
acknowledgement of the receipt of such a report, see Guatemala, Archivo General de Centro América
(AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner
Klée to Salazar, September 14, 1935.
17
The Argentinian chargé d’affaires reports the appointment to his government in Argentina, MRECIC,
Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, Calvo to Saavedra Lamas, December 1, 1935.
Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs Skinner Klée asked Ambassador Echevarría y Vidaurre to
congratulate Hay on his behalf, and was sceptical of the Ambassador’s warning that Hay and Ceniceros
were bound to clash over Portes Gil’s influence. Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo
4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner Klée to Echevarría y Vidaurre, December 5, 1935; Guatemala, AGCA,
RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner Klée to Echevarría y Vidaurre,
December 11, 1935.
18
“Toma de posesión del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Ingeniero Eduardo Hay,” Noticiero Semanal
1: 48 (December 6, 1935), 2.
22
the League of Nations, but according to El Hombre Libre, soon led to a screaming
match. 19 As Ceniceros stormed out of the building by one door to meet with Portes Gil,
Cárdenas’s long-time friend and Minister of Communications and Public Works
Francisco Múgica, who was known as one of the leaders of the radical wing of the PNR,
entered through another. This turned out to be symbolic of the changing balance of
power in the Ministry of Foreign relations and the increased influence of Cárdenas and
his collaborators over foreign affairs. On May 13, Ramón Beteta was appointed
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, replacing Ceniceros, who had resigned from the
position on April 30. Beteta was widely acknowledged to be a close friend of the
president: US Ambassador Josephus Daniels wrote that “he is believed to be closer to the
President than any other officials of the present administration with the exception of
Licenciado Rodríguez, the President’s private secretary, and possibly General Múgica,
Minister of Communications.” 20 Beteta and Cárdenas would remain intimate friends
throughout the presidency: in 1940 Chile’s new Ambassador to Mexico Manuel Hidalgo
reported that Beteta was one of Cárdenas’s most trusted advisors and that his words could
be considered a faithful expression of the president’s thinking on most matters. 21 This
turn-over in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1935-36 enabled the removal of the
influences of the Jefe Máximo from the chancellery and the pursuit of a foreign policy
that reflected the Cárdenas government’s priorities.
19
Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, B99-23-1 Legajo 6250, Echevarría y Vicaurre to Minister José González
Campo, April 27, 1936; “Portes Gil y sus amigos están siendo nulificados paulatinamente,” El Hombre
Libre (Mexico City), April 27, 1936.
20
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939,
Record Group 59, Reel 5, 812.00/30370, Daniels to Hull, May 13, 1936.
21
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico,
Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, February 20, 1940.
23
The break between Hay and Ceniceros coincided with Hay’s first pronouncements
on the theme of the Política del Buen Amigo. At a ceremony welcoming Panama’s
visiting Minister of Foreign Trade, José Isaac Fábrega, Hay announced that the
Government held as the standard of its foreign relations the Good Friend Policy. 22 This
reception occurred shortly before Pan-American Day, April 14, thereby beginning the
process whereby the Política del Buen Amigo became increasingly linked to Mexico’s
relations with Latin America, as opposed to the rest of the world. Guatemala’s
Ambassador, Manuel Echevarría y Vidaurre, who served as dean of the diplomatic corps,
had attended the ceremony. When invited to prepare remarks for the weekly broadcast of
the Ministry in which members of the diplomatic corps gave addresses to the country via
the Ministry’s own radio network XECR, he decided to speak on the topic of Hay’s
recent policy pronouncement. 23 He wrote to his Minister of Foreign Affairs that in doing
so, he aimed to make it known publicly that the Guatemalan government had taken note
of the policy, especially as it related to Mexico’s commitment not to intervene in the
affairs of other countries. Guatemala had long objected to the Mexican government’s
proclivity for intervening in Central American affairs in support of rebel groups aiming to
topple dictatorial regimes in the region. 24 As Echevarría y Vidaurre had anticipated, his
words met some criticism among those Central American and Cuban exiles and their
Mexican supporters who were working towards the overthrow of regimes in their home
22
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, Reel 5,
812.00/30368, Daniels to Hull, “Resumé of conditions in Mexico during April, 1936.”
23
Guatemala, AGCA, Signatura B99-23-1 Legajo 6260, Echevarría y Vidaurre to González Campo, April
27, 1936.
24
See Jürgen Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy,
1876-1930 (Tuscaloosa: Unversity of Alabama Press, 1996).
24
countries, but he was nevertheless pleased that he had had the opportunity to voice the
position of the Guatemalan government over Mexican airwaves. 25
The Ministry kept up the practice of inviting members of the diplomatic corps to
speak on its newly-inaugurated radio station on Sunday evenings from six to seven
o’clock throughout the Cárdenas era, and these early broadcasts set the tone for the style
that they would take. Ambassador Echeverría y Vidaurre’s speech was followed by a
cultural program featuring soprano Carmen Aguilar y Voos and the Orquesta Marimba de
los Hermanos Marín, after which Oficial Mayor Ernesto Hidalgo responded to the guest’s
remarks by praising the ambassador and further explaining the bases of Mexico’s foreign
policy. 26 On this occasion the musical numbers played were Mexican, but in the future
the Ministry would often take pains to present a musical tribute to the invited diplomat’s
home country. As in this case, these cultural presentations served as vehicles through
which diplomats could publicly (albeit mildly) voice their government’s responses to
Mexican foreign policy initiatives. Echeverría y Viduarre’s response to the
pronouncement of the Política del Buen Amigo was characteristic of his government’s
concerns regarding the potential “exportation” of revolution from Mexico during these
years. By participating in the radio programme, the Guatemalan Ambassador
nevertheless contributed to the sought-after creation of mutual understanding among
nations that underlay the policy. The Ministry’s use of new media such as radio was
important to the creation of this mutual understanding, just as more traditional forms of
25
Guatemala, AGCA, Signatura B99-23-1 Legajo 6260, Echevarría y Vidaurre to González Campo, April
28, 1936. Also see the editorial by Rafael Helodoro Valle, who Echevarría said was one of the firm
supporters of these exile groups. “El ‘Buen Amigo’” Ultimas Noticias de Excélsior (Mexico City), April
27, 1936.
26
“Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, April 27, 1936.
25
propaganda and a whole host of diplomatic tools played an essential role in the
implementation of Mexico’s foreign policy goals.
References to the Política del Buen Amigo are most frequent in Foreign Minister
Hay’s speeches celebrating the anniversary of Pan-American Day. 27 Nevertheless, the
term enjoyed wide currency and became the accepted description of Mexico’s Latin
American policy. Alfonso Cienfuegos y Camus wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to describe the presentation of his credentials as the new Ambassador to Guatemala in
October 1936. Of his meeting with President Ubico, Cienfuegos y Camus said that he
had discussed Cárdenas’s desire for improved relations Guatemala and explicitly stated
that he had described the bases of his government’s Good Friend Policy. 28 In February
1938, President Cárdenas discussed the Política del Buen Amigo in a speech he gave
welcoming Cuba’s new Ambassador to Mexico, José Manuel Carbonell. 29 Although
Cárdenas had not coined the term for his government’s Latin American policy, in the
years to come he came to employ it as a true description of his attitudes towards the
region. Likewise, within Latin American countries, the term became so recognised that
government officials and journalists alike used it in their analyses of the Mexican
government’s relations with the region as a whole, and their own countries in particular.
When news reached Managua that chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz had been
27
See Eduardo Hay, Discursos pronunciados en su carácter de secretario de relaciones exteriores (19361940) (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940).
28
Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
(SRE), Expediente 24-22-43, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, October 20, 1936.
29
Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 22-21-137, February 7, 1938. Also see Lázaro Cárdenas, Palabras y
documentos públicos (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979).
26
transferred to Santiago, the newspaper Novedades wrote that the departing diplomat had
been a true “good friend” to Nicaragua. 30
Although in its original conception La Política del Buen Amigo’s reference to the
principle of non-intervention primarily dealt with Mexico’s policy of diplomatic
recognition, Latin American diplomats and governments were quick to interpret it to
mean that Mexico would refrain from meddling in their internal affairs, a tendency
which, according to Miguel Cruchaga Ossa (Chile’s chargé d’affaires in Mexico City in
1938), was “habitual and frequent.” 31 Cruchaga Ossa cited incidents that had occurred in
Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador, as well as his own
country. He warned the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to forget that Mexican
diplomats were committed to spreading Marxist propaganda. A test of La Política del
Buen Amigo had occurred in 1936 when, in what appeared to many to be a contradiction
of the Estrada Doctrine, the Mexican government initially withdrew its diplomatic
representative from Nicaragua when National Guard leader and soon-to-be-dictator
Anastasio Somoza forced President Sacasa to resign: the Mexican government and its
representatives had clearly been in favour of the ousted Liberal president. For Novedades
to declare Campos Ortiz to have been such a good friend of the country in 1938, he must
have been extremely careful in his efforts to increase understanding within Nicaragua of
Mexico’s revolutionary process and government while refraining from interfering in the
internal politics of the nation to which he was accredited.
30
“Buenos Amigos,” Novedades (Managua), March 1, 1938. Clipping found in Campos Ortiz’s personnel
file, Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 8-4-1 (III).
31
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga Ossa to Ministro, June 14, 1938.
27
Because the generally Conservative governments of Latin America harboured
deep concerns about the Mexican government’s perceived desire to export revolution to
the region through its diplomatic representatives, the second aspect of the Política del
Buen Amigo—regarding the creation of mutual understanding among friendly nations—
took centre stage in the application of the policy in Latin America. The Cárdenas
government aimed to make its Revolution understood in the region, thereby diminishing
the fears that Mexican diplomats were Communist agents and increasing the likelihood
that the governments of the region would support Cárdenas’s domestic and international
policies.
Friedrich Schuler has written convincingly about the professionalisation of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1920 and 1940. He demonstrates that by the
Cárdenas era, the Foreign Ministry “had become an effective and valuable informationgathering tool that provided Mexican administrations with eyes and ears in the political
and economic centers of the world.” 32 While this is certainly true of the missions at
Berlin, London, Paris, and Washington that he discusses, it does not necessarily reflect
diplomatic practice in Latin America. Although the restructuring of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs increased the level of professionalism among Mexican diplomats
throughout the world, representatives in Latin America maintained a measure of
independence that resulted precisely from the fact that they were not in the political and
economic centres of the world. Despite the advent of the Política del Buen Amigo,
relations with Latin America were generally not as high a priority and the Ministry’s
32
Friedrich E. Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosvelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro
Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 17.
28
management of the diplomats there was not as heavy-handed as a result. Although the
relative autonomy of diplomats in the region had some positive results, unfortunately it
also meant that during critical junctures such as the Cárdenas government’s oil
expropriation of March 18, 1938, this arm of the Foreign Service was not as strong as it
might have been.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the heads of all of its embassies and
legations to write monthly reports detailing the major domestic political events and
international relations of the countries to which they were appointed, including analysis
of how these developments affected their relations with Mexico. These reports varied in
quality and length depending on the individual initiative of the representative in charge.
While a few analyses reached nearly one hundred pages in length and included hundreds
of newspaper clippings, others were cursory reports that barely scratched the surface of
the major political, economic, social, and cultural developments of the day. The reports
of Carlos A. Baumbach, who served as chargé d’affaires in Peru in 1938, were
particularly exhaustive. 33 He was rivalled by Minister Vicente Estrada Cajigal, whose
June 1938 report from Panama numbered 42 pages and included 131 newspaper
clippings. 34
By contrast, the report corresponding to April 1938 from the chargé
d’affaires in Costa Rica, Romeo Ortega, was six pages in length and accompanied by
only ten newspaper clippings. 35 In January 1938, the chargé d’affaires in Uruguay,
Salvador Pardo Bolland, sent a seven-page report to the Ministry and was appropriately
33
See AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-1 (9 partes).
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-3 (I), Estrada Cajigal to Hay, August 6, 1938.
35
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-1, Romeo Ortega to Hay, May 4, 1938.
34
29
chastised for its inadequacy. 36 Nevertheless, Anselmo Mena, then head of the
Diplomatic Department, excused him on the grounds that the chargé d’affaires had only
recently arrived in Montevideo. He commended him for having sent a report at all, given
that recent appointees were usually excused from the requirement to submit a monthly
report for the first two months of their posting. 37 The uneven quality of these monthly
reports caused the Ministry to have uneven information on the status of Mexican-Latin
American relations.
The reporting requirements of the Ministry were not taken very seriously, even by
some senior heads of mission. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Puig
Casauranc had been the moving force behind the reorganisation of the Ministry between
1932 and 1934. 38 At the beginning of the Cárdenas presidency he was named
Ambassador to Argentina, where he presented his credentials on May 21, 1935 [For a list
of diplomatic appointments see Appendix A and Appendix B]. Until his arrival, the
monthly reports from Argentina had been excellent, following closely the conventions
established during Puig’s own tenure as Minister. Thereafter, the Ministry received only
one monthly report from Buenos Aires, that of October 1935. Moreover, it was not in the
customary format; it arrived as a 21-page letter without the subheadings that were meant
to facilitate its analysis and distribution to other interested branches of the government. 39
Puig stayed in Argentina until May 1936, when he moved to Brazil and took over the
Embassy there from Alfonso Reyes, who switched with him and returned to Argentina,
36
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-6, Salvador Pardo Bolland to Hay, January 31, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-6, Mena to Bolland, March 12, 1938.
38
Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 13-15.
39
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-26-21.
37
30
where he had previously served as ambassador at the beginning of the decade. After
presenting his credentials on July 22, 1936 Reyes neglected to send monthly reports for
the rest of the year and the beginning of the next. In May, Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs Ramón Beteta wrote to Reyes to bring his attention to the fact that, further to the
instructions contained in a circular letter sent to all missions on August 14, 1936
describing the reporting requirements of the Ministry, and despite the fact that the
Ambassador’s supplementary reports were very useful, it was essential to the functioning
of the Ministry that he send monthly reports in the proper format. 40 Reyes quickly
replied that he had forwarded reports for April and May and would continue to comply
with the instructions of the Ministry in this regard. 41
One representative who received a similar letter in September 1938 actually
refused to comply with the Ministry’s directives. 42 Octavio Reyes Spíndola had been
serving as chargé d’affaires in Cuba since the withdrawal of Ambassador Alfonso
Cravioto at the beginning of the year. He acknowledged that he had not sent a monthly
report since taking charge of the embassy, but believed that he was justified in not having
done so because of the “intense and continuous” labour he had engaged in since his
arrival. In the past six months, he had resolved crises relating to the Manuel Arnus (a
Spanish ship commandeered by the Cuban government) and the oil taker Amolco,
organized the Homenaje México of June 12, 1938, negotiated a new commercial treaty,
attended to Mexico’s special goodwill embassy to Cuba, conducted an intense radio and
40
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-12, Beteta to Reyes, May 6, 1937.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-12, Reyes to Beteta, June 10, 1937.
42
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Mena to Reyes Spíndola, September 27, 1938.
41
31
newspaper campaign, and organised the Cuban naval and military mission to Mexico. 43
He had informed the Ministry on all of these matters, and had sent weekly reports to
Cárdenas, at President’s own suggestion. 44 Although he said he would take Mena’s
instructions under advisement, his subsequent reports corresponding to October and
November were only nine and four pages in length respectively and they did not conform
to the proper format. 45 In March of 1939 Mena again wrote to Reyes Spíndola to
reprimand him for the lack of monthly reports from Cuba, 46 apparently to no avail, as it
was not until well after arrival of the new ambassador, Rubén Romero, in June that the
Ministry once again began to receive regular monthly reports from Havana. 47
Alfonso Reyes regularly sent monthly reports from Argentina until his recall at
the end of 1937, as promised. Nevertheless, after his return to Mexico City, reporting
was once again interrupted, this time because of a lack of personnel. The chargé
d’affaires left in charge of the embassy, Salvador Martínez Mercado, forwarded reports
for January and February of 1938, but the latter was received very late, and Mena
mentioned this in his acknowledgement of its receipt. 48 Martínez Mercado responded
that he had been unwell, and that the diplomatic, consular, and social demands were too
much for him given that he only had the assistance of two staff members. 49 Pablo
Campos Ortiz, who had been appointed chargé d’affaires to Chile at the beginning of
43
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Mena, October 12, 1938.
Ibid.
45
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, November 8, 1938; AHGE, SRE, Expediente
30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, December 14, 1938.
46
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Mena to Reyes Spíndola, March 23, 1939.
47
Romero’s reports for 1939 are also found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5.
48
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-19, Mena to Martínez Mercado, May 3, 1938.
49
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-19, Martínez Mercado to Mena, June 27, 1938.
44
32
1938 following the withdrawal of Ambassador Manuel Pérez Treviño, complained of
similar difficulties. In response to a letter from Mena that chastised him for the fact that
the Ministry had not received a monthly report from the embassy in Santiago since
January, Campos Ortiz wrote that this was a direct result of the fact that the embassy staff
had been “reduced to the minimum.” 50 In his previous postings, he explained, diplomatic
missions had always had four staff members in addition to the head of the legation. Since
taking over the Embassy in April, he had been “entirely alone.” Although he had sent
various supplementary reports to the Ministry, it had been “absolutely impossible” to
submit regular monthly reports. The arrival of a new staff member earlier in the month
would, he hoped, enable him to begin to comply with the Ministry’s directives. The
excellent report corresponding to January 1938 that Campos Ortiz had sent to the
Ministry from his previous posting in Managua confirms his suggestion that whereas he
had been in the habit of sending complete monthly reports in the past, the measures of
economy that had led the Ministry to withdraw so many of its diplomatic representatives
from Latin America were making it impossible for him to meet the Ministry’s
expectations. 51
Campos Ortiz and Martínez Mercado’s complaints related to the drastic changes
to the budget for diplomatic representation that were decided upon at the end of 1937 and
instituted at the beginning of 1938. The economic crisis of 1937 necessitated deep cuts to
50
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-13, Campos Ortiz to Mena, November 16, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-2, Campos Ortiz to Hay, February 13, 1938. Following Campos Ortiz’s
departure from Nicaragua, the Ministry did not receive another monthly report from Managua for the rest
of the year.
51
33
the budget at all levels of government. 52 The success of many of the Cárdenas
government’s early reforms and infrastructure projects were predicated upon the
expansion of the economy, but when the market for credit dried up and the leveraged
agricultural harvests of redistributed lands did not meet their expected yields, economic
crisis resulted. 53 Granted, the reduced budget for diplomatic representation was only one
of a myriad austerity measures that went into effect at the beginning of the year, but the
uneven application of these measures within the Ministry is significant [Figure 1.1]. The
Cárdenas government’s decision to expropriate the US and Anglo-Dutch oil interests in
Mexico on March 18, 1938 was a daring but calculated risk that, along with the economic
skill of Minister of Hacienda Eduardo Suárez, saved the country from economic
collapse. 54 For it to succeed, a major propaganda campaign was needed, but
unfortunately this became necessary at a time when the Foreign Service was least able to
meet the challenge. Only enthusiasm, tireless effort, and genuine commitment to the
survival of the Cárdenas government would help its members to overcome this shortage
of manpower.
52
For a broad view of the Cárdenas government’s fiscal policy see, James W. Wilkie, The Mexican
Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1970).
53
Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 63-66, 71-74, 80-9.
54
Ibid., Chapter 5.
34
Figure 1.1 Annual Budget (Projected and Actual) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*
Budget
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
2.406,083.04
2.428,416.00
2.634,888.00
2.487.162.80
2.127,850.40
2.223.372.00
2.249,652.00
Projected–
Salaries
2.501,878.72 2.436,886.00 2.65,157.00
2.361,576.30 2.251,832.40 2.220,587.00
2,281,233.00
Actual–
Salaries
Projected– 2.093,916.38 1.810,942.00 2.165,112.00 2.208,639.20 2.222,149.40 2.126,628.00 1.975.348.00
Expenses
2.232,460.78 2.141,197.53 2.831,854.04 2.899,647.52 2.659,061.02 2.600,161.17
2.515,585.12
Actual–
Expenses
Projected– 4.499.999.42 4.239,358.00 4.800,000.00 4.695,802.00 4.350,000.00 4350,000.00 4225,000.00
Total
4.734,339.50 4.578,083.53 5.488.011.04 5.261,223.82 4.910,893.42 4.820,7548.17 4.796,818.12
Actual–
Total
* Source: Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
The general budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained fairly stable
throughout Cárdenas’s sexenio [Figure 1.1]. Although the projected budget for the
Ministry as a whole shrank from 4.499.999.42 pesos in 1934 to 4225,000.00 in 1940,
actual expenditures increased slightly from 4.734,339.50 to 4.796,818.12. However, the
Ministry’s budget came to represent a decreasing percentage of the Cárdenas
government’s overall spending. 55
The budget for 1938 shows a definite decrease from
previous years, but it is followed by a gradual recovery in spending on both salaries and
other expenses in 1939 and 1940. The most drastic change occurred in the uneven
application of these austerity measures within the Ministry in 1938 [Figure 1.2].
55
This is reflected in Wilkie’s analysis of administrative expenditures. Wilkie, Federal Expenditure, 120126.
35
Figure 1.2. Annual Budget for Salaries and Other Expenses in the Foreign
Ministry, the Foreign Service, and the Consular Service, 1934-40*
Budget
19341935
19351936
19361937
19371938
19381939
19391940
Ministry–
Salaries
Ministry–
Expenses
726,689.97
810,871.43
878,279.85
761,396.95
687,691.46
712,270.40
817,126,54
616,
012.55
922,742.74
946,288.35
667,330.80
471,711.59
Embassies
and
Legations–
Salaries
Embassies
and
Legations–
Expenses
Consulates–
Salaries
Consulates–
Expenses
821,779.17
839,263.98
845.341.38
653,138.23
425,125.00
529,623.67
670,906.17
759,278.80
826.455.36
743,817.57
618,866.38
679,634.75
831,540.73
817,725.00
813,815.00
773,971.50
799,570.00
796.047.50
546,285.20
625,498.02
612.672.61
566,700.86
540,340.90
547,711.14
* Source: Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
The budget for the salaries of diplomats posted abroad shrank to only 425,125.00
pesos, proportionally a far greater cut than those received by either the staff members at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City or the consular staff. In short, the
Ministry “was recalling Mexican ambassadors and ministers worldwide, replacing them
with lower-paid chargés d’affaires.” 56 At the end of 1937, many ambassadors and
ministers received notice that they were being called home to Mexico City and placed on
disponibilidad (availability), which meant that they were being suspended without pay
with the possibility that they might be re-appointed at a later date when economic
conditions improved. The decision to recall these high-ranking members of the Foreign
56
Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 87.
36
Service had important consequences for the quality of Mexico’s diplomatic
representation abroad, especially in Latin America. Staff members whose portfolios were
deemed essential to the recovery of the economy, those in the “political and economic
centers of the world,” were not recalled to Mexico: Ambassador Francisco Castillo
Nájera, the mastermind behind US-Mexican relations, stayed in Washington, DC;
Minister Juan F. Azcárate Pino remained in Berlin busily attempting to negotiate
commercial agreements; Minister Primo Villa Michel stayed in London until Cárdenas
broke relations with Great Britain because of the oil controversy. Only the legation in
Paris had its minister, Adalberto Tejeda, recalled and replaced with a chargé d’affaires.
In Latin America, on the other hand, the exodus of well-qualified personnel was swift and
nearly complete. This is not to suggest that many chargés d’affaires (generally
experienced career diplomats) were not able representatives of Mexican interests abroad,
but they lacked the standing of ambassadors and ministers. Furthermore, as Pablo
Campos Ortiz complained, they simply did not have the manpower to keep up with the
normal day-to-day operations of their missions and deal with the extraordinary
responsibilities that followed the oil expropriation. Moreover, the mass withdrawal of
high-ranking diplomatic representatives ruffled some feathers in Latin America.
Many of the practices of diplomacy are based upon the principle of reciprocity,
and the economically-motivated decision to withdraw Cárdenas’s ambassadors and
ministers from Latin America created some ill-will. In December of 1937, Alfonso
Reyes wrote from Buenos Aires to say that a newspaper article had recently appeared in a
local newspaper reporting on the reorganisation of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign
37
Affairs because of the 1938 budget. 57 He was afraid it would look quite suspicious that
both he and the Minister to Uruguay would both be announcing their departure for
vacations in Mexico on the same day. Moreover, he questioned the judgement of
recalling him prior to the inauguration of the new Argentine president Roberto Ortiz in
February. He feared that if a Mexican ambassador were not present, the Argentines
might take offence and make reprisals. 58 Despite this warning, he left Argentina at the
beginning of January. After taking advantage of his “availability” to take a trip to New
York, Reyes returned to Mexico only to be met with the foreign relations emergency
posed by the oil expropriation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon realised the error in
having withdrawn such a seasoned and well-regarded ambassador. Reyes was rather
hastily given a special mission to South America to negotiate the sale of Mexican oil.
His arrival in Brazil, where he had been posted from 1930-1936, was met with great
enthusiasm. 59 His mission surely contributed to the eventual sale of oil to South
America, which helped to guarantee the success of the expropriation. Had he and his
colleagues not been withdrawn shortly before Cárdenas’s March 18, 1938 announcement,
it is likely that both the propaganda campaign and sale of oil to Latin America would
have been more effective.
In November 1937 the Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Manuel Bianchi, reported
on the reorganization of the Ministry to his government. He speculated that the true
motivation for the changes was not economy, but rather politics. The Cárdenas
57
Noticias Gráficas (Buenos Aires), November 6, 1937.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Reyes to Hay, December 14, 1937.
59
“Alfonso Reyes e sua missão,” O Imparcial (Rio de Janeiro), June 11, 1938; “A revolução no Mexico
através ás [sic.] impressoes da embaixador Alfonso Reyes,” O Jornal (Rio de Janeiro), June 11, 1938;
Intercambio Comercial Mexicano-Brasileiro,” A Noite (Rio de Janeiro), June 10, 1938.
58
38
government, he suggested, wanted to be sure that only persons of “absolute confidence”
remained in the Foreign Service. 60 There were, he had heard, several ambassadors and
ministers who did not hold with the revolutionary government’s policies and programmes
and others who had personal differences with the president. He believed the
administrative shake-up was actually a cover designed to remove these detractors from
the Foreign Service. Bianchi mentioned specifically Alfonso Reyes, Rubén Romero,
Vicente Veloz, Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus, and then Ambassador to Chile, General
Manuel Pérez Treviño, who had also run as pre-candidate for the PNR nomination for the
presidency in 1933. 61 It is certainly possible that political concerns were involved in this
decision, but it seems that Bianchi was merely reporting rumours. Ambassador Reyes
was fairly apolitical, which may have been interpreted as his not being “addicted” to the
personality of Cárdenas, but the fact that Reyes was re-appointed to South America with
a special mission less than six months later suggests that he did, in fact, have the
confidence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president. Similarly, Vicente Veloz
returned to Mexico on disponibilidad, but was soon made Jefe del Ceremonial at the
Ministry in Mexico City. 62 Furthermore, the tenor of Ambassador Bianchi’s reports
changed in the New Year. When discussing the government’s decision to withdraw
Ambassador Pérez Treviño, he commented that the staff of the Ministry had made it clear
to him that the recall of ambassadors and ministers was a financial measure. He said he
had heard that ambassadors to only five countries would remain in their current posts,
60
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico,
Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, November 26, 1937.
61
Ibid.
62
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 23-1-78.
39
and even Mexico’s Minister to Great Britain would be recalled as soon as the oil
controversy were resolved. 63 Foreign Minister Hay had reminded Ambassador Bianchi
that the Chilean government had found it necessary to take similar measures in 1931 and
1932, and said he hoped that the Chilean government would understand the economic
necessity and not withdraw Bianchi as a result. Instead of recalling Bianchi, the Chilean
government gave him a temporary commission as Chile’s representative to the Chaco
Peace Conference at Buenos Aires, during which time he would maintain his status as
Ambassador to Mexico, but a chargé d’affaires would be left in charge of the office. 64
Several other governments withdrew their representatives from Mexico. 65 After his return
to Mexico at the end of the year, Bianchi wrote to report that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs would once again fill these vacant positions at the beginning of 1939. 66 He said
that Cárdenas had initially believed diplomacy to be “decorative, of little use, and against
the leftist tendency of his government,” but had soon realised his mistake. Mexican
diplomatic representation was left in the hands of persons of “inferior category,” and after
the oil expropriation, when the country was the object of harsh attacks abroad, they were
unable to adequately defend the government’s decision because they did not have
sufficient authority or prestige. 67 Of course, by the end of 1938, the economy had also
recovered to such an extent that the Cárdenas government could once again afford to
63
Had it not been for Cárdenas’s decision to recall Primo Villa Michel because of the offences of the
British government, he might have been recalled anyway. Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to
Ministro José Ramón Gutiérrez, March 12, 1938.
64
On the Chaco Peace Conference, see Leslie B. Rout Jr., The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970).
65
Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro José Ramón Gutiérrez, March 26, 1938.
66
The Argentine chargé d’affaires also reported home that these empty positions were to be refilled in the
New Year. Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3983, Expediente 5, Ricardo J.
Siri to Minister José María Cantilo, October 22, 1938.
67
Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro, December 26, 1938.
40
appoint diplomats abroad. However, given the uneven implementation of the austerity
measures outlined above, it seems that Ambassador Bianchi’s analysis had some truth to
it. Moreover, the new appointments that were made at the beginning of January mainly
seem to have been, if not “addicts” to the personality of Cárdenas, at least supportive of
the Revolution and the president’s social reform programme. Contrary to what Bianchi
wrote, however, an examination of the practices of the Ministry shows that this was
generally the case throughout this period. Members of the Foreign Service were
evaluated and promoted with reference to the extent to which they believed in the goals
of the Revolution.
When Minister to Bolivia Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz wrote to the Ministry to
evaluate the performance of Third Secretary Oscar Crespo y de la Serna in La Paz at the
beginning of 1937, his report was positively glowing. 68 Crespo followed his father’s
legacy in the Foreign Service: he was born in the Mexican legation at Havana in 1901,
where his father served as the first Minister to the newly-independent nation of Cuba. He
earned a degree in engineering in Vienna during another of his father’s postings and
eventually joined the diplomatic ranks after his father’s death. 69 Rosenzweig did not
mention these credentials in his report, focusing instead on his capacity, preparation,
conduct, and “political ideas,” which he said were of the Left. Rosenzweig estimated that
Crespo was a “vehement defender” of the Mexican Revolution. 70 As a strong
collaborator of the Revolution, Rosenzweig would have thought this a great compliment,
68
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10, Rosenzweig to Hay, January 2, 1937.
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10.
70
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10, Rosenzweig to Hay, January 2, 1937.
69
41
but it was also important information to be included in his performance review. The
personal convictions of diplomats were the subject of debate and could determine
diplomatic appointments. For example, in February 1936 Ambassador Alfonso
Cienfuegos y Camus wrote in a confidential memorandum from Santiago that he was
displeased with the news that First Secretary Fernández de la Regata had re-entered
diplomatic service and been posted to Chile, where he had previously been accredited
prior to the Ambassador’s arrival. 71 Not only had the Cienfuegos y Camus heard that
Fernández was a notorious dipsomaniac, but even worse, he was a practicing Catholic
who had established contacts with important members of the Roman Catholic Church in
Chile. By the time the Ambassador wrote the Ministry it was too late; Fernández was
scheduled to arrive only a few days later, and he did take up his position there despite the
ambassador’s protests. Nevertheless, Cienfuegos y Camus’s concerns demonstrate that,
in addition to political ideas, religious beliefs were the subject of scrutiny by diplomats’
superiors and peers. Although the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Latin
America at the beginning of 1938 seems to have been a matter of economic necessity, not
political and ideological expediency, the political and religious ideas of diplomats were
expected to mirror those of the Revolutionary government they represented.
Although irregular information gathering and uneven diplomatic representation
during budget crises resulted from the fact that Latin America did not have the same
diplomatic priority as the United States and Europe, this lack of oversight also gave
diplomats considerable flexibility in their efforts to improve Mexico’s relations with the
71
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 24-22-43 (I), Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, February 29, 1936.
42
region. Their activities were not as closely managed as they might have been, and they
used this freedom from supervision to be fairly creative in their diplomacy. Several of
the ambassadors and ministers corresponded directly with President Cárdenas regarding
their ideas for the implementation of his policies towards Latin America and
subsequently pursued these plans with relatively little input from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. This demonstrates that these members of the Foreign Service were allies of
Cárdenas and strong supporters of his domestic and international policies, but it also
demonstrates a certain amount of disregard for the authority of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, which was particularly true during the tenure of General Hay. In fact, Hay
appears to have had relatively little influence and sway, even within his own Ministry.
Eduardo Suárez, who became Secretary of Hacienda in the same cabinet shuffle that saw
Hay promoted to Minister, suggested that although Cárdenas was sure of Hay’s loyalty,
he did not have the same level of confidence in his abilities. 72 This would certainly have
been a factor in determining the extent of Cárdenas’s personal management of the
Foreign Relations portfolio, and the extent to which his representatives preferred to
correspond directly with the president, instead of a Minister in whose abilities they did
not trust. 73 As a result, although Hay frequently made pronouncements regarding La
Política del Buen Amigo in diplomatic ceremonies, Cárdenas and his allies in the
Ministry played an essential role in determining its shape and character.
72
Eduardo Suárez, Comentarios y Recuerdos, 1926-1946 (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1977), 221.
This dynamic also occurred in Mexican representation at the League of Nations. See Amelia M. Kiddle,
“Mexican Participation in the League of Nations during the Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940”
(Master’s thesis, University of Chicago, 2003).
73
43
CHAPTER TWO.
LA MINISTRO AND EL DUELISTA: GENDER
AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA
According to customary diplomatic practice, the ministers and ambassadors
appointed during the presidency of Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934) tendered their
resignations in the fall of 1934 before the inauguration of President Lázaro Cárdenas.
This gave the new president and his Foreign Minister, Emilio Portes Gil, the flexibility to
carefully choose Mexico’s representatives to Latin America, appointing new
representatives who shared Cárdenas’s priorities. A few of these letters of resignation
were not accepted by the president, who asked those diplomats to continue in their
appointed locations. In the case of Basilio Vadillo Ortega, Minister to Uruguay, the
decision may have been political. Vadillo had been one of the founders of the PNR in
1929, but he was soon forced out and given a diplomatic appointment because he was at
odds with Jefe Máximo Plutarco Elías Calles. 74 When he resigned from his post in 1934,
he hoped that he might be able to return to Mexico and find a new position in the
Cárdenas government. Vadillo did not get along with Portes Gil, who was an ardent
callista, and after learning that his resignation had not been accepted, he asked for three
months’ vacation during which time he hoped to secure a new position in Mexico City,
but he was ultimately unsuccessful and returned to Montevideo. 75 Perhaps he would have
been more successful in obtaining a position in Mexico City after Cárdenas’s break with
74
Pablo Serrano Álvarez, Basilio Vadillo Ortega: itinerario y desencuentro con la Revolución Mexicana,
1885-1935 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 2000), 369.
75
Ibid., 415-416.
44
Calles, but Vadillo was already back in Uruguay when the crisis erupted in June 1935 and
he died in Montevideo in July. 76
Other ministers seem to have remained in place more because of convenience
than political concerns. For example, Minister José Pérez Gil y Ortiz had only presented
his credentials in Haiti (a post of relatively little importance) on November 16, 1934; it
would have seemed a terrible waste of resources to move him so soon. 77 Both politics
and convenience would continue to play a role in the choice of diplomatic representatives
to Latin American countries throughout the Cárdenas presidency, but it is nevertheless
true that many of these representatives were chosen because they were supporters of
Cárdenas who would ably represent his government’s interests abroad. Even Vadillo had
proven, in his three years as minister to Uruguay that he was active in creating
understanding of the Revolution and its goals, and he may well have also been retained
for this reason. 78 A June 1935 interview he gave to La Mañana in Montevideo suggests
that he was committed to the Cárdenas government’s reform programme. 79 It is therefore
possible to analyse the characteristics of the ambassadors and ministers chosen to
represent the government’s interests in the region during this period and make
conclusions regarding both Cárdenas’s priorities and the culture of its diplomacy in Latin
America.
76
See his personnel file, Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente 36-2-17.
77
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-7-6. José Vázquez Schiaffino, who served as Minister
to Honduras from 1934-1936 also falls into this category. AHGE, SRE, Expedientes LE 1006 and LE 1007.
78
See Agustín Vaca, “Basilio Vadillo,” in Aporte diplomático de Jalisco (Mexico City: Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores, 1988), 143-271.
79
Serrano Álvarez, Basilio Vadillo, 419.
45
Between 1934 and 1940, thirty members of the Foreign Service were appointed to
head diplomatic missions in Latin American countries for varying periods. Acting as
either ministers or ambassadors, they were from far-flung parts of Mexico and had
diverse educational experiences and career paths. Nevertheless, they represent a
generation that shared the experience of both the combative and reconstructive phases of
the Revolution. Although sometimes embroiled in power struggles among Revolutionary
leaders or critical of specific aspects of government’s programmes, they believed in the
social goals of the Revolution and their transformative potential for Mexico and Latin
America. They worked to promote the Revolution’s accomplishments in Latin America
and present Cárdenas as a leader in the region. Moreover, Cárdenas expressed his
political programme through the appointments he made: as well as seasoned diplomats,
this group included celebrated authors, educators, engineers, and doctors, all of whose
expertise represented some of the president’s highest hopes for reform.
Cárdenas made some of his diplomatic and political priorities particularly evident
in the appointment of new ambassadors and ministers, as can be seen with the
appointment of Fernando González Roa as ambassador to Guatemala at the beginning of
1935. González Roa, a high-ranking diplomat, had served as ambassador to the United
States during the Rodríguez presidency, and his appointment indicated the importance
Cárdenas gave throughout his presidency to strengthening traditionally tense relations
with Guatemala. 80 His appointment seemed to bode well for the future. Guatemalans
were honoured that Cárdenas would choose as Ambassador someone who had previously
80
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14.
46
occupied the highest position in the Foreign Service: in an interview with the chargé
d’affaires of the embassy there, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister said that the
appointment was viewed as a “distinction and an honour for Guatemala.” 81 Usually
hostile to Mexico, the Guatemalan daily Nuestro Diario pronounced it to be an
announcement of brotherhood and harmony between the two nations.82 The chargé
d’affaires believed that the choice would influence the resolution of issues that plagued
the two countries’ relations. 83 While González Roa’s appointment represented one of
Cárdenas’s diplomatic priorities, his commitment to a domestic political goal—that of
women’s equality—was evident in the appointment of Latin America’s first female head
of mission, Palma Guillén. Like González Roa’s, her appointment to Colombia in
January of 1935 received extensive commentary by government officials and the press.
As a landmark in Mexican and Latin American history, the announcement received
substantial attention both domestically and abroad. The selection indicated that the
Cárdenas government would support the extension of suffrage to women and the broader
participation of women in national and international life. Nevertheless, it will become
clear that Guillén’s tenure in Colombia was fraught with difficulties. She met the ire of
the conservative Catholic press, which objected both to the fact that she was a woman
and to her representation of the Cárdenas government’s anti-clericalism.
Although Guillén exhibited in many ways the characteristics held by other
members of the Foreign Service posted to Latin America, her sex was one crucial
81
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto to Portes Gil, January 28, 1935.
Federico Hernández de León “Guatemala y Mexico,” Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City), January 26,
1935.
83
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto to Portes Gil, January 28, 1935.
82
47
difference. She had contributed to the Revolutionary reconstruction that followed the
combative phase of the Revolution through her work with the Ministry of Public
Education. Her gender excluded her from the culture of Revolutionary masculinity that
pervaded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though several male members had not
participated militarily in the Revolution. Men who had not fought could still participate in
the construction of these cultural norms by other means, as the chargé d’affaires in
Paraguay, Bernardo Reyes, did when he challenged a detractor of the Revolution to a
duel in 1936. His challenge is indicative of the patterns of behaviour that male diplomats
established through their representation of Mexico and promotion of the Cárdenas
government’s reform programme and achievements in Latin America.
Prosopography
The Ambassadors and Ministers appointed to Latin America during the Cárdenas
presidency formed a fairly diverse group, but shared some common characteristics. First,
and most important, the majority of the ambassadors and ministers were veterans of the
Revolution. Despite the political differences that resulted from their allegiance to
different Revolutionary factions, this shared experience gave them a fairly cohesive
understanding of the Revolution’s meanings and goals. The median year of birth for these
thirty individuals was 1889 [Figure 2.1]. Although a few were born as early as 1880 and
1881, these represented the elder statesmen of the Foreign Service and included Fernando
González Roa (b. 1880), who had been head of the Constitutionalist Army (Primer Jefe
del Ejército Constitucionalista), and former editor of El Universal Félix Palavicini (b.
48
1881), who was an early supporter of Madero. A minority born near the turn of the
century may still have participated, as many youths did, in the Revolution. Even one of
the youngest, Vicente Estrada Cajigal (b. 1898), had fought, reaching the rank of colonel
in the Constitutionalist Army. This provides one explanation for the fact that so many of
these diplomats came from the provinces outside of Mexico City.” 84
Figure 2.1 Ambassadors and Ministers’ Years of Birth*
Number
3
2
1
0
1899
1898
1897
1896
1895
1894
1893
1892
1891
1890
1889
1888
1887
1886
1885
1884
1883
1882
1881
1880
Year
* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 257-9, 42-25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13290, 26-25-6, 4-29-12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 356-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36-2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10
Twenty of the country’s thirty-six political jurisdictions were represented by these
ambassadors and ministers [Figure 2.2]. Hailing from states as distant from the centre of
power in Mexico City as Coahuila (Manuel Pérez Treviño) and Yucatán (Miguel Alonzo
84
Thomas Benjamin and Mark Wasserman, eds., Provinces of the Revolution: Essays on Regional Mexican
History, 1910-1929 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990).
49
Romero), many had joined the Revolution in their communities of origin or participated
in the Revolutionary reconstruction of their states and, gaining prominence through these
efforts, moved to the Federal District (DF). Surprisingly, given the political importance
of the Sonoran Triangle and the División del Norte, only one of these diplomats hailed
from Sonora (Manuel Y. de Negri), and none from Chihuahua. In contrast, Jalisco—a
state radicalised by the strength of Catholic resistance—sent Juan Mauel Álvarez del
Castillo, Basilio Vadillo, José Vázquez Schiaffino, Vicente Veloz González, and Primo
Villa Michel; Michoacán supplied Salvador Martínez Mercado, Luis Padilla Nervo, José
Pérez Gil y Ortiz, and Rubén Romero. Michoacán, one of the cradles of Revolutionary
reform and the home state of President Cárdenas, and Jalisco were also extremely
populous states. Similarly, Félix Palavicini, and José Domingo Ramírez Garrido hailed
from Tabasco, one of the primary “laboratories of the Revolution,” (Garrido was the
cousin of the radical Governor of Tabasco, Tomás Garrido Canabal). 85 Also notable is
the fact that only two, Octavio Reyes Spíndola and Palma Guillén, came from the DF. As
Roderic Ai Camp has shown, in subsequent years the educational institutions of the DF
served as important recruiting sites for a new generation of power-brokers. 86 Instead of
the National Preparatory School or the Facultad de Derecho at the UNAM (Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México), these diplomats came mainly from outside Mexico City:
relationships were forged in the theatre of battle, not the lecture theatre.
85
Carlos R. Martínez Assad, El laboratorio de la Revolución: el Tabasco garridista (Mexico City: Siglo
Veintiuno, 1979).
86
Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1980). Also see Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
50
Figure 2.2 Ambassadors and Ministers’ States of Origin*
6
5
Number
4
3
2
ZAC
VER
TAB
SON
SIN
PUE
OAX
NLE
MOR
MIC
MEX
JAL
HID
GRO
GUA
DIF
COA
CHP
CAM
0
YUC
1
State
* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 257-9, 42-25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13290, 26-25-6, 4-29-12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 356-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36-2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10
Although they did not share a common educational experience, the diplomats
were, like the next generation of federal bureaucrats, well educated. Only two lacked
51
postsecondary education: Rubén Romero, who had only completed primary school, but
later taught as a Professor of Literature at the Universidad de Michoacán, 87 and Ramón P.
de Negri, who had only completed secondary school, describing himself as a tradesman
and farmer on his entrance questionnaire, but by the beginning of the Cárdenas
presidency, he had served twenty years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become an
experienced career diplomat. 88 Otherwise, all of the ministers and ambassadors posted to
Latin America had post-secondary experience in their home states, in the DF, or overseas.
Almost one third had studied abroad, whether as the recipients of scholarships from the
government, like Palma Guillén, or with the support of their families. In the US, they
attended universities such as St. Mary’s College of California, the Catholic University of
the Americas, Washington and Jefferson College, George Washington University, and
Columbia. Two studied at the London School of Economics and several studied at
universities in France including the Sorbonne and the Université de Bordeaux. The fact
that several of those who had studied abroad listed more than one international university
on their curricula suggests that they took advantage of opportunities presented by their
diplomatic or consular postings to further their educations in the countries to which they
were appointed by the Ministry. For example, when Octavio Reyes Spíndola entered the
Ministry in 1922, his entrance questionnaire stated that he did not have a professional
title, but by the time he was named Ambassador to Chile in 1939 he had studied in the
US and France to obtain the title of licenciado. 89 Their educational experiences within
87
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-6-30.
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-14-25.
89
See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7.
88
52
Mexico were similarly broad. Among the institutions outside Mexico City, they attended
the Escuela Oficial de Jurisprudencia in Guadalajara, the Universidad de San Nicolás de
Hidalgo in Michoacán, the Colegio del Estado de Guanajuato, the Escuela de
Jurisprudencia de Michoacán, the Instituto Juárez de Villahermosa, the Escuela
Farmaceutico in Guadalajara, and the Escuela Normal in Colima.
The diversity in the ambassadors and ministers’ alma maters also provides an
indication of the range of professions they exercised before (and after) their membership
in the Foreign Service. Although twelve held law degrees, this represents less than half of
the total. Among the five engineers and four doctors, Félix Palavicini was originally
trained as an engineer at the Instituto Juárez in Villahermosa before he found his vocation
as a journalist, and José Manuel Puig Casauranc was trained as a medical doctor at the
Escuela Nacional de Medicina, but was later inducted into the Academia Mexicana de la
Lengua, in addition to having served as Foreign Minister. Several others had degrees as
normal school teachers and later became professors. José Domingo Ramírez Garrido
served as a professor and director of the Colegio Militar, and Moisés Sáenz became a
professor of applied anthropology and a specialist in rural education. Although all but
five had held positions in the Foreign Ministry before the beginning of the Cárdenas era,
most could not be considered career diplomats. They moved in and out of the diplomatic
service over the years, serving in other ministries (such as Public Education), as state
representatives in the Congress or the Senate, and even as governors of their home states,
like Raymundo Enríquez Cruz (Chiapas), Manuel Pérez Treviño (Coahuila), Basilio
53
Vadillo (Jalisco), and Vicente Estrada Cajigal, the first Governor of Morelos following its
re-establishment after it was dissolved by Victoriano Huerta.
One of the most distinguished professions among members of the Foreign Service
has traditionally been that of writer. The appointment of writers and other intellectuals as
Ambassadors formed a long-established pattern in Mexican (and Latin American)
diplomatic history. 90 This served as an informal subsidy for cultural production, but also
enabled the government to show off its literary greats to the world and enhance its
prestige. Cárdenas’s predecessors had practiced this, and the appointments that took place
during his presidency followed this model. The most distinguished authors among these
diplomats were novelist Rubén Romero, poet Alfonso Cravioto, and literary master
Alfonso Reyes. The Chilean Ambassador to Mexico opined that Rubén Romero ranked
second only to Mariano Azuela, the best novelist of the Revolution. 91 He published his
first novel, Apuntes de un lugareño, while working at the consulate in Barcelona, and his
1938 novel La vida inútil de Pito Pérez achieved great popularity. 92 Alfonso Cravioto’s
poetry, especially El alma nueva de las cosas viejas, poesías and the posthumouslypublished Cantos de Anáhuac, earned him accolades throughout the Americas. 93 As a
noted orator, he frequently spoke on the topic of Mexican literature. 94 Alfonso Reyes was
90
See Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, ed., Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana 3 vols. (Mexico City:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998, 2002).
91
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico Diplomático (AGHD),
Fondo Histórico,Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro, December 26, 1938.
92
José Rubén Romero, Apuntes de un lugareño (Barcelona: Imprenta Núñez, 1933); José Rubén Romero,
La vida inútil de Pito Pérez 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1938).
93
Alfonso Cravioto, El alma nueva de las cosas viejas, poesías (Mexico City: Ediciones México Moderno,
1921); Alfonso Cravioto, Anáhuac y otros poemas (Mexico City: Nueva Voz, 1969).
94
Diccionario Porrúa, 6th ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1995), 994. Alfonso Cravioto, Aventuras
Intelectuales a través de los números. Plática sustentada en la Instutución Hispanocubana de Cultura de
La Habana, el día 12 de septiembre de 1937 (Havana: Institución Hispanocubana de Cultura, 1937);
54
prolific during his years in Spain, where he published Visión de Anáhuac in 1917. He
found it difficult to balance the work of a diplomat with his literary interests, 95 but
intermittently published the literary magazine Monterrey while he was Ambassador to
Brazil and Argentina. 96 His Las vísperas de España, published while he was Ambassador
to Argentina, was a triumph that was particularly warmly received by supporters of the
Spanish Republic. 97 Gabriela Mistral later led a campaign to award him the Nobel Prize
for literature in 1945, but perhaps because he is often described as a “writer’s writer,”
lacking the popular appeal of Mistral or Pablo Neruda, it failed. Nevertheless, he is
considered one of the most important Latin American authors of the twentieth century. 98
In addition to these three great men of letters, many of the other ambassadors and
ministers posted to Latin America had literary pretensions. All but twelve of the thirty
became published authors, either during their postings or later. Salvador Guzmán was a
playwright, 99 and Miguel Alonzo Romero wrote several books on travel, based mainly on
his experiences abroad with the diplomatic service, two of which he published while
Minister to Venezuela. 100 Several wrote their memoirs, usually based on their
Alfonso Cravioto, Día de la Américas. Discursos pronnciados en la Recepción Oficial de la Secretaría de
Estado de la República de Cuba, por los Excelentísmos Señores, Doctor Juan J. Remos, Secretario de
Estado y Licenciado Alfonso Cravioto, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático Americano acreditado en Cuba (Havana: Sociedad
Colombista Panamericana, 1937).
95
When Reyes was transferred back to Argentina, Gabriela Mistral said that “Me da mala espina ese
regreso a Buenos Aires donde le dejan escribir poco y le desvían con la horrible vida social. Me inquieta y
me duele.” Luis Vargas Saavedra, Tan de usted: epistolario de Gabriela Mistral con Alfonso Reyes
(Santiago: Universidad Católica, 1991), 109. Mistral to Reyes, July 14, 1937.
96
Alfonso Reyes, Monterrey (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980).
97
Alfonso Reyes, Las vísperas de España (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1937).
98
See Obras completas de Alfonso Reyes 26 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1955-).
99
Salvador R. Guzmán, El enemigo: comedia de costumbres populares (Mexico City, 1931).
100
Miguel Alonzo Romero, Algunos aspectos de la vida del Japón (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1936); Miguel
Alonzo Romero, Caricatura de un recorrido por la India (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1937).
55
experiences in the Revolution. 101 Especially interesting are those works they produced on
domestic social issues such as education and indigenous issues. The most prominent
diplomat involved in the resolution of indigenous issues in Mexico was Moisés Sáenz,
who also conducted studies of the indigenous populations in Ecuador and Peru and had
an instrumental role in organising the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano. 102
Romeo Ortega and José Manuel Puig Casauranc also gave speeches on the topic. 103 Puig
Casauranc’s address, given while he was Minister of Education, dealt with policies for
the indigenous population. Education became one of the most frequent topics of the
ambassadors and ministers’ published works. 104 Whether explaining and analysing the
separation of Church and State in education or the goals and achievements of rural
education initiatives, this aspect of the Revolutionary government’s reform programme
greatly interested these authors and gave them considerable pride. Their writings also
dealt with agrarian questions and labour reforms. 105 Although they expressed critiques of
some aspects of the government’s project, on the whole these works demonstrate their
strong commitment to the social Revolutionary goals of Cárdenas and his predecessors.
101
See, for example, Félix Palavicini, Mi vida Revolucionaria (Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1937).
Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano y su incorporación al medio nacional (Mexico City:
Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933); Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio peruano y su incorporación al medio
nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933).
103
José Manuel Puig Casauranc, El problema de la educación de la raza indígena: plática del Secretario
de Educación Pública Dr. J.M.Puig Casauranc, ante el segundo Congreso de Directores Federales de
Educación, el 28 de mayo de 1926 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1926); Romeo Ortega
Castillo de Lerín, Breves Consideraciones sobre la Población Indígena en México. Trabajo presentado por
el señor Licenciado Romeo Ortega, Ministro de México, ante la Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa
Rica 2nd ed. (San José: Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa Rica, 1941).
104
See, for example, José Manuel Puig Casauranc, La cuestión religiosa en relación con la educación
pública en México (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928); Moisés Sáenz, La educación rural
en México (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928).
105
Fernando González Roa and José Covarrubias, El problema rural de México (Mexico City: Secretaría de
la Hacienda, 1917); Fernando González Roa, El aspecto agrario de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City:
Talleres Gráficos, 1919); Ramón P. De Negri, Consideraciones sobre el Código del trabajo: como
producto de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: n.p., 1929).
102
56
The picture that emerges of these ambassadors and ministers depicts a generation
that, while diverse, had shared a great deal since the outbreak of the Revolution in 1910.
Many had fought with Madero and the Constitutionalists, and all had participated in the
Revolutionary reconstruction of the country that began when the fighting began to wind
down. Their diverse regional origins, educations, career paths, and experiences abroad
had broadened their horizons and enabled them to put into international context the
importance of the government’s social Revolutionary programme, and its potential
applicability to the Latin American countries in which they served. Although
occasionally critical of their government, and sometimes embroiled in petty political
struggles, they supported agrarian reform, education, the organisation of labour, and the
important role of culture in the transformation of society. They were loyal to Cárdenas
and his view of the Revolution
La Ministro, Palma Guillén
Palma Guillén became, in January 1935, the first woman appointed by a Latin
American government to the rank of Minister in the Foreign Service. A Professor of
Psychology and Literature at the UNAM, Guillén had contributed to the evolution of
education policy since the 1920s. She had studied at the Sorbonne and worked in a
technical capacity on a series of international commissions related to intellectual
cooperation in Europe. 106 She exhibited many of the characteristics that defined the
generation of ambassadors and ministers who served in Latin America in this period, with
106
See Palma Guillén’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (3 partes).
57
the crucial difference being her sex. A landmark in Latin American history, Guillén’s
appointment often serves as evidence of the Cárdenas government’s support for women’s
participation in domestic and international affairs. 107 Moreover, as Gabriela Cano has
argued, the appointment played a central role in the battle for women’s suffrage. 108
Although originally destined for Venezuela, in the diplomatic shuffling that occurred
after President Cárdenas took office, he soon decided that she would be appointed to
Colombia. 109 In many ways, the change was logical. Whereas Mexico had tense relations
with Venezuela, the Revolutionary government of Cárdenas had much in common with
the Liberal government of Alfonso López Pumarejo in Colombia which impelled the two
newly-elected presidents to pursue closer relations. As a result, the Cárdenas government
chose to use the good relations between the two countries to make a statement regarding
Mexico’s commitment to the equality of women through the appointment of Guillén.
Nevertheless, Colombia was a deeply Catholic country (more so than Venezuela) and its
church leaders severely criticised Mexican anticlericalism. The appointment of a female
diplomat went against conservative Catholic norms and was likely to meet resistance.
Cárdenas specifically chose Guillén as the first female Minister among several other
107
See, for example, Jocelyn Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2005), 162. On the women’s movement and suffrage in Mexico also see, Gabriela Cano,
“Revolución, femenismo y ciudadanía en México (1915-1940),” in Historia de las mujeres en Occidente,
ed. Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot (Madrid: Taurus, 1993), 685-695; Enriqueta Tuñon, ¡Por fin…ya
podremos elegir y ser electas! El sufragio femenino en México, 1935-1953 (Mexico City: CONACULTA,
2002); Esperanza Tuñón Pablos, Mujeres que se organizan: El Frente Único Pro-derechos de la
Mujer,1935-1938 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1992); Anna Macías, Against All Odds: The Feminist Movement
in Mexico to 1940 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); Ward M. Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962).
108
Gabriela Cano, “Una ciudadanía igualitaria: El presidente Lázaro Cárdenas y el sufragio femenino,”
Desdeldiez (1995): 85-86.
109
For the telegrams exchanged regarding possible appointment to Venezuela see AHGE, SRE, Expediente
26-25-4 (I), Foreign Minister Emilio Portes Gil to chargé d’affaires Mariano Armendáriz del Castillo,
January 8, 1935; Armendáriz to Portes Gil, January 18, 1935.
58
contenders for the honour precisely because she did not follow the extremism of Calles
and remained a practicing Catholic. 110 Nevertheless, as a diplomat, she represented the
Cárdenas government, which always endorsed Revolutionary policies in regards to
women’s rights, religion, and education. After she served in Colombia for just over a
year, the Ministry transferred Guillén to Denmark. As the first female ambassador in
Latin America, she did not have the glowing success Cárdenas and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had hoped. The ambiguous results of her mission resulted from both her
sex and her status as a representative of the Cárdenas government’s Revolutionary
policies.
Guillén’s appointment elicited great interest in diplomatic circles at the time. The
Argentine chargé d’affaires to Mexico commented on it to his government, 111 and a US
military intelligence report analysed her credentials, noting she was regarded as the most
prominent female intellectual in the nation. 112 Although a few other women served in
junior positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Josefina Arguelles, posted as
Third Secretary to the Mexican Embassy in Cuba, Guillén held the highest
appointment. 113 It came at a time when the employment of female diplomats had not yet
been accepted in Latin America (or anywhere else for that matter). The Brazilian
110
Cano, “Una ciudadanía igualitaria,” 75-7.
Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo
Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529-39, Expediente 5, Adolfo N. Calvo to Foreign Minister Carlos
Saavedra Llamas, February 11, 1935.
112
United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165 (RG 165),
Reel IX, Document 0147, G-2 Report: Diplomatic and Consular Services-Appointments, M.B. Pattin, May
29, 1935.
113
Josefina Arguelles’s case is interesting because she was recalled from Cuba in 1936 after having been
jailed twice in Havana because she was allegedly serving as a conduit for information between Cuban
exiles in Mexico and members of the opposition in Havana. See the report pertaining to her arrest in
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-1, and her personnel file AHGE, SRE, Expediente 24-23-53.
111
59
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), which studied the issue closely throughout the
1930s, saw that an increasing number of women received appointments at the rank of
third secretary, and in an Itamaraty memorandum argued that this practice should be
halted before these women began clamouring for promotions to higher diplomatic posts.
Few countries appointed women as ambassadors, and in many others receiving a female
ambassador would not be socially acceptable because of cultural norms. Women, it
concluded, were not suited to diplomatic careers. 114 Following the reorganization of the
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938, the Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso
Feminino charged that women’s exclusion from diplomatic careers violated the
Constitution of 1937. 115 Although Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha conceded in a letter
to President Getúlio Vargas that the policy did ignore the constitution, he stated that it
reflected both experience and the best interests of the diplomatic and consular service. 116
Oddly, women gained the vote in 1932 in Brazil, though excluded from positions held by
Mexican women, while the latter could not vote until 1953. 117 One other Latin American
country employed a famous female representative: Chile had appointed the celebrated
author Gabriela Mistral to a series of diplomatic posts (although not as Minister)
following her first experience abroad as a consultant to José Vasconcelos’s Ministry of
114
Brazil, Arquivo Nacional (AN), Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, 1930-1945, Lata
118, “Admissão das mulheres nos corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?].
115
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 120, Bertha Lutz to Getúlio
Vargas, December 17, 1938.
116
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 120, Aranha to Vargas, January 16,
1939.
117
Susan K. Besse, Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 19141940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Branca Moreira Alves, Ideologia e
feminismo: A luta da mulher pelo voto no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980); and June Edith Hahner,
Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women’s Rights in Brazil, 1850-1940 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1990).
60
Public Education in 1922. The Brazilian memorandum listed her as an example, but
mistakenly dismissed her as a cultural ambassador who did not exercise diplomatic
functions. 118 Despite her renown, even Mistral did not receive approbation from Brazil
or other countries. In 1939, Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala Salvador Martínez de
Alva reported that the Chilean government could not obtain “agreement” from the
Guatemalan government regarding the appointment of Mistral to Guatemala. The Ubico
régime did not welcome female diplomats, but Martínez de Alva also suspected this
might have been a convenient excuse. 119 Mistral had been to Guatemala in 1931 and
Martínez de Alva suggested that the government considered her comportment
unacceptable because officials charged she had a tendency to be rather loose-lipped when
she drank a lot, which, he insinuated, was often. 120 As a woman, her appointment was
undesirable in itself, but her unladylike behaviour did not warrant her acceptance in
conservative Guatemalan society. Moreover, rumours about her lesbianism swirled in
diplomatic circles, rumours that involved Palma Guillén. Guillén’s appointment
demonstrates that Mexico took the lead in the issue of women’s participation in the
diplomatic and consular service in Latin America, but her posting raised questions
regarding sexuality and gender in the Foreign Service.
118
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, “Admissão das mulheres nos
corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?].
119
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-12-11 (II), “Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de
junio de 1939,” Martínez de Alva to Hay, July 11, 1939, p. 50.
120
For information on Gabriela Mistral’s time in Guatemala with Palma Guillén in 1931, see AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 35-13-13, Eduardo Hay to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 17, 1931.
61
Palma Guillén remains a most enigmatic figure. 121 Her relationship with Gabriela
Mistral has been a source of controversy. Although often described as having been
Mistral’s secretary, in her prologue to the Mexican edition of Mistral’s Lecturas para
mujeres she rejects this characterisation of their relationship by identifying Mistral’s
secretary as Eloísa Jaso. 122 The two women are widely presumed by scholars to have
been lovers. They became companions after Gabriela Mistral first arrived in Mexico in
1922 at the invitation of Vasconcelos, travelled together for years thereafter, and coparented Mistral’s adopted child Juan Miguel Godoy. 123 The extent to which members of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognised their relationship remains unclear. In the
initial correspondence regarding her appointment, evidence of some concern regarding
Guillén’s marital status exists. After first inquiring about her interest in the position, the
Ministry then sent a second telegram to the Mexican Embassy in Madrid (where Guillén
resided with Mistral at the time) asking about the rumour that she might shortly marry a
Spaniard. 124 In response to the Embassy’s inquiry, Guillén responded that she had
decided not to marry at this time. 125 Eventually, Guillén did marry the prominent Catalan
intellectual Luis Nicolau d’Olwer, who served for a time after the Spanish Civil War as
Ambassador of the Spanish Republican Government in Exile in Mexico. This question
regarding her marital status may have been related to the concern expressed in the
121
Licia Fiol-Matta, A Queer Mother for the Nation: The State and Gabriela Mistral (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 105.
122
Gabriela Mistral, Lecturas para mujeres: Gabriela Mistral, 1922-1924, ed. Palma Guillén de Nicolau,
3rd ed. (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1971), x.
123
Very few letters between Guillén and Mistral have survived, but some have been published. See Magda
Arce and Gastón Von dem Bussche, Proyecto Preservación y Difusión del Legado literario de Gabriela
Mistral (Santiago: Organization of American States, 1993) and Luis Vargas Saavedra, El otro suicida de
Gabriela Mistral (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985).
124
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from the Portes Gil toArmendáriz, January 24, 1935.
125
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from Armendáriz to Portes Gil, February 5, 1935.
62
Brazilian memorandum about the suitability of women for diplomatic careers: because
they were subject to their husbands, married women faced conflicts between the authority
of their government and their husbands and could not be trusted to faithfully perform
their duties on behalf of the government. 126 This problem would have been compounded
by her impending marriage to a foreigner who would put the interests of his own nation
ahead of those of Mexico. Alternately, this correspondence could be evidence of rumours
regarding her sexual orientation, especially her response that for the moment she did not
intend to marry. 127 This wording left open the possibility that she would, at some point in
the future, marry Nicolau, thus allaying possible fears of her lesbianism. Questions
regarding Palma Guillén’s sexuality cloud the issue of her performance as Minister to
Colombia. On the one hand, if the extent of her relationship with Gabriela Mistral was
known, the reaction to her may have been a response to her lesbian relationship. On the
other hand, the poor treatment she received may simply have been the reaction of
conservative Catholics to a representative of the Mexican Revolution and its
anticlericalism, especially the socialist education programme.
The actual or rumoured details of her relationship with Mistral notwithstanding,
Guillén had superb qualifications to be named Mexico’s first female Minister. Given her
education credentials, her appointment was of particular interest in those circles. Even
before her arrival, the Rector of the Faculty of Education at the National University of
Colombia, Rafael Bernal Jiménez, wrote to the Mexican chargé d’affaires, Raymundo
126
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, “Admissão das mulheres nos
corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?].
127
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from Armendáriz to Portes Gil, February 5, 1935.
63
Cuervo Sánchez, to congratulate Mexico on the appointment of such an important
representative in the field of education. 128 Furthermore, she was honoured by the Free
University in Bogotá with an honorary doctorate on the same day that she presented her
credentials to President López. 129 Mistral introduced Guillén’s accomplishments to the
Colombian Republic in a glowing article that appeared in the newspaper El Tiempo,
owned and operated by her close friend Eduardo Santos (who was destined to become the
next Liberal President of Colombia, after López Pumarejo). 130 Several other newspapers
printed articles concerning her appointment and did interviews with the new Minister
upon her arrival. 131
Those in favour of Catholic education in Colombia saw her appointment rather
differently. The Catholic Social Action group prepared a silent protest against Mexico to
coincide with the presentation of her credentials, but their plan to disrupt the ceremony
failed because numerous workers’ and students’ groups placed themselves in front of the
National Palace and shouted ¡Vivas! to Guillén and the Mexican Revolution. 132 Her
appointment caused significant controversy in educational circles on opposing sides of
the domestic political debate around President Alfonso López’s proposed changes to the
128
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Cuervo Sánchez to Portes Gil, February 8, 1935.
“La señorita Palma Guillén presentó ayer credenciales,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), April 27, 1935.
130
Gabriela Mistral, “Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, April 7, 1935. Santos was one of Mistral’s confidants,
and it is possible that this is one of the reasons Guillén was posted to Colombia. See Otto Morales Benítez
(ed.), Gabriela Mistral: su prosa y poesía en Colombia 3 vols. (Bogotá: Convenio Andrés Bello, 2000).
131
Marzia de Lusignan, “Palma Guillén,” El País (Bogotá), April 5, 1935; “El Ministro,” Relator (Cali)
April 6, 1935; “La señorita Guillén va a Belalcazar,” El Espectador (Bogotá), April 6, 1935; “Grata Visita”
Relator, April 7, 1935; “Saludo a Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, April 7, 1935; “Doña Palma Guillén, quien
llegó ayer a la ciudad, habla para ‘El Diario Nacional,’” El Diario Nacional (Bogotá), April 8, 1935;
“Palma Guillén,” El País, April 8, 1935; “Lllegó anoche la señorita Guillén a nuestra ciudad,” El País,
April 8, 1935; “Cordial recibimiento se hizo a Palma Guillén a su llegada a la capital,” El Tiempo, April 8,
1935.
132
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Portes Gil, May 3, 1935; “Los Manzanillos vitorearon a
doña Palma Guillén,” El País, April 27, 1935.
129
64
Colombian education system. 133 These reforms, as Palma Guillén pointed out in a report
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took as their inspiration Mexican educational
reforms. 134 Shortly after her arrival in Bogotá, Guillén received notification that Cecilio
Zuleta and Manuel Sánchez, school inspectors from Pereira in the department of Caldas,
planned a three-month voyage to Mexico with the goal of studying the Revolution’s
socialist education movement, as the only example in the hemisphere.135 Guillén actively
encouraged their educational mission by writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask
that the Ministry of Public Education provide them with every assistance, going so far as
to suggest that they pay their train fare within Mexico so that they could travel more
easily throughout the republic witnessing educational advances in both urban and rural
areas. The Revolution provided a similar example in the area of organised labour, and
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán affirmed in the Congress on August 2, 1934 that the Revolution’s
spirit should be brought to Colombia. 136 Nevertheless, as an educator, Palma Guillén’s
proximity to the socialist education policy meant that she would be particularly
associated with this aspect of the Revolutionary programme.
Following President Cárdenas’s inauguration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent
telegrams on December 13, 1934 instructing all the government’s representatives in Latin
America to report on the reception of the religious question in Mexico in those
133
On the history of education in twentieth-century Colombia, see, as a starting point, Aline Helg, Civiliser
le peuple et former les élites (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984).
134
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Hay, June 25, 1936.
135
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-233-2, Guillén to Portes Gil, June 18, 1935.
136
Reported in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 34-7-15 (III), Oscar E. Duplán to Emilio Portes Gil, August 10,
1934.
65
countries. 137 Then Minister to Colombia Oscar E. Duplán reported that, although there
had been major protests against Mexican anticlericalism during the Cristero Rebellion, of
late the Colombian press had abstained from commenting on those Church-state
relations. 138 Less than six months later, this had begun to change in response to López’s
attacks on the Church. Palma Guillén reported at the end of April that the conservative
newspaper El País had published a protest from the Colombian Damas Católicas
(Association of Catholic Women) against the Minister. 139 Apparently alarmed by reports
of religious intolerance in Mexico and Palma Guillén’s statements in the Colombian press
regarding feminism, socialist education, and religion, the Damas Católicas demanded that
she refrain from interfering in Colombian Church-state relations. Reporters from El
Diario Nacional and El Espectador came to the legation to interview her, which gave her
an opportunity to clarify her position, but El País continued to print new lists of Catholic
women who had joined the protest. 140 On April 25, Guillén wrote to the editor of El País
to explain that she had only responded to reporters’ questions regarding the religious
question and did not intend to influence Colombia, but her tactic failed to prevent the
newspaper’s continued attack against her and Mexico. The editor stated that regardless of
whether she uttered her words in response to questions posed by reporters, the comments
caused alarm among Colombian Catholics, who continued to be worried about Mexico’s
137
Although references to the religious question are found throughout the monthly reports from Mexico’s
representatives in this period, the discrete set of documents that relates explicitly to this question begins
with Argentina, III-307-22, and includes most countries through Venezuela.
138
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-307-15, Duplán to Portes Gil, December 15, 1934.
139
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-307-15, Guillén to Portes Gil, April 27, 1935; “La señorita Palma Guillén
debe respetar a Colombia,” El País, April 12, 1935. Also see “El Asunto religioso en Mejico,” El
Espectador, April 8, 1935.
140
“La diplomática mexicana replica a las damas católicas de Bogotá,” El Diario Nacional, April 13, 1935.
66
supposedly pernicious influence. 141 The usual diplomatic tactic of requesting the
correction or retraction of an article deemed offensive to Mexico did not work, but rather
fanned the flames of Catholic rancour towards the Minister.
During the following year, Guillén withstood continued attacks against her
character and that of the Mexican Revolution. Minister Guillén certainly had her
supporters; the Departmental Assemblies of Cundinamarca, Tolima, Pasto, Santander,
and Caldas all passed resolutions expressing their support for her diplomatic mission. 142
However, after commenting favourably on these resolutions, the students of one class at
the Instituto de San Barnarda, a school run by the Church, were expelled on June 10,
1935. The newspaper El Espectador argued that this was a clear demonstration of why
the Church should not be involved in education and expressed the hope that the Ministry
of Education would soon intervene decisively in the matter. 143 Despite the fact that
Guillén had friends in high places in the Liberal government, she continued to serve as
the punching bag for the right-wing press. In early 1935, Gabriela Mistral wrote to her
friend and fellow author, Alfonso Reyes (then posted as Mexico’s Ambassador to Brazil),
about Guillén’s appointment: “Palmita left a month ago […] I know she will do a
wonderful job, that they will esteem her and love her, if only she would love them a
little.” 144 Mistral worried that one of her great failures was that she had been unable to
inspire a love of the Americas in Guillén, who had spent so much time in Europe. Her
141
“Una aclaración de la señora Palma Guillén,” El País, April 26, 1935; “Una declaración de la legación
de México,” El Tiempo, April 26, 1935.
142
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil, June 5, 1935; AHGE, SRE, Expediente
25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil, June 12; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil,
June 7, 1935.
143
“Un procedimiento incalificable,” El Espectador, June 11, 1935.
144
Vargas Saavedra, Tan de usted, 102. Mistral to Reyes, March 3, 1935.
67
experience in Colombia would hardly have won her over. Mistral was even more candid
when she described Guillén’s posting—“a turbid, violent, and medieval rain of
insidiousness from the clergy, who have had the good graces to declare her a Communist,
an atheist, an advocate of divorce, and other nasty comments”— to their mutual friend in
Argentina, Victoria Ocampo. She explained that, contrary to what was being said about
her, Guillén was a Catholic, and that she never engaged in politics. 145 The Janus-faced
nature of Colombian society must have been difficult to bear, and on March 10, 1936
Guillén requested removal to her beloved Europe. 146 Although President Cárdenas agreed
to the transfer right away, she remained in Colombia until August, when she finally left
for Copenhagen.
The final months of her posting were similarly filled with disagreeable run-ins
with the press. In June, Colombia’s most prominent Conservative, Laureano Gómez,
published in his recently-founded newspaper El Siglo an article that had originally
appeared in Mexico City’s El Universal, which repeated a rumour that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had begun an investigation into Guillén’s unsatisfactory performance in
Colombia. 147 It charged that because she was overly friendly with President López, she
had been accused by several newspapers in Bogotá of intervening in internal affairs by
exerting undue influence over him. In her report regarding the incident, Guillén stated
that the Liberal paper El Tiempo had “spontaneously” published an editorial in her
145
Elizabeth Horan and Doris Meyer, eds. and trans., This America of Ours: The Letters of Gabriela
Mistral and Victoria Ocampo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 33. Mistral to Ocampo, March 14,
1935.
146
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), memorandum of letter from Guillén, March 10, 1936.
147
“Actuación de la srta. Ministro de México en Bogotá” El Siglo (Bogotá), June 23, 1936. On El Siglo see,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Notes on the Latin American Press” Review of the Foreign Press,
1939-1945: Latin American Memoranda 1:1 (February 29, 1940): 7.
68
defence, which claimed that the accusation was completely false. 148 The attacks from
these “ultraconservative” groups, it stated, were directed not towards her irreproachable
character, but toward the government she represented with the utmost dignity and
decorum. These unfair articles did not respect her position as a foreign diplomat or the
fact that she was a woman, dignified in every respect. “For certain newspapers, every
weapon with which it is possible to fence with the Mexican regime is permissible.” 149
Her reputation had become another weapon in the domestic political battle waged
between Liberals and Conservatives; the Revolutionary example she provided provoked
conservative criticism of the Mexican government. Guillén seems not to have bothered to
ask for a retraction from El Siglo. Although Eduardo Santos’s paper defended her, and
she received a sympathetic letter of support from the Colombian Minister of Foreign
Relations, 150 she left Bogotá on August 18, 1936. 151
Palma Guillén’s mission to Colombia was not an abject failure. Between April
1935 and August 1936 she endeared herself to a large part of the Colombian population,
especially intellectuals, workers, and students, and encouraged better relations between
the Mexican and Colombian governments. 152 Nevertheless, after her departure, a member
of the Mexican colony in Colombia wrote to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
applaud her removal. J.A. Tamayo said that as an original supporter of Francisco Madero,
he would thank the government to name a “real interpreter” of the Revolution to
148
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Hay, June 25, 1936.
“La legación de México y doña Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, June 24, 1936.
150
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), Jorge Soto del Corral to Guillén, June 25, 1936.
151
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), telegram from Cuervo Sánchez to Hay, August 18, 1936.
152
For Guillén’s many accomplishments, see the monthly reports she wrote to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1935 and 1936. AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-26-28; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-17.
149
69
Bogotá. 153 His complaints about her “vacillations” suggest that he may have been critical
of her diplomatic skill. Nevertheless, Tamayo’s constant references to his participation in
the Revolution suggest that he was requesting that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fill the
post in Colombia with someone who, like he, had participated in the Revolution, or at
least with someone who understood the Revolution from his perspective—a male
perspective. This letter and Guillén’s apparent failure in Colombia therefore necessitates
a discussion not just of the performance of the first female Minister in Latin America, but
of masculinity in the Foreign Service, and in particular, ideas of Revolutionary
masculinity that pervaded its diplomacy.
El Duelista, Bernardo Reyes
At a dance held at the Brazilian Legation at Asunción, Paraguay on the night of
November 14, 1936, Captain Camilo Pérez Uribe, a veteran of the Chaco War and the
younger brother of Paraguay’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, allegedly “uttered
calumnies” against all things Mexican, especially its president and Revolution and
Bernardo Reyes, the chargé d’affaires at Asunción. He called Mexico a Communist
country and accused Reyes of interfering in the internal affairs of Paraguay. 154 Pérez
Uribe had allegedly called Reyes a derogatory name as the chargé d’affaires passed by
his group of friends at the party. When Reyes asked that he explain himself, the captain
153
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), J.A.Tamayo to Hay, August 18, 1936.
The parties involved published their correspondence regarding the incident in El Día (Asunción) and La
Hora (Asunción). These were translated and forwarded to the US Secretary of State by Glenn A. Abbey of
the US Legation in Asunción. See United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA),
Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to Nestor Martínez Fetes and Rocque
Gaona, 17 November, 1936.
154
70
claimed that the epithet had not been directed at him. He then declared that he knew
Reyes’s family, and among them only the chargé d’affaires was a Leftist and a
degenerate. 155 After a further exchange of words, the outraged Reyes issued a formal
challenge to Pérez Uribe, who laughed and said that he would meet him on any field,
despite that fact that there was no cause for a duel. Over the course of the next week, their
dispute played out in the press and in the capital.
Reyes’s challenge seems rather anachronistic, given that duelling is more
commonly associated with eighteenth-century French aristocrats than twentieth-century
Mexican diplomats. 156 Nevertheless, it demonstrates a code of honour and a particular
version of Revolutionary masculinity that predominated in the Mexican Foreign Service.
Although this code seems at odds with the Cárdenas government’s promotion of the
greater participation of women in national (and international) life, the two positions coexisted somewhat uneasily among the members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
were posted to Latin America. The place of duelling in Mexican and broader Latin
American history has received recent attention in the historiography and authors have
155
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to the Editor of El Día, November
20, 1936.
156
For general histories of duelling, especially in the more familiar European context, see Barbara Holland,
Gentlemen’s Blood: A History of Dueling From Swords at Dawn to Pistols at Dusk (New York:
Bloomsbury, 2003); Pieter Spierenburg, ed., Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern
Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998); Kevin McAleer, Dueling: The Cult of
Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert A. Nye,
Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Ute
Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel, trans. Anthony Williams (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1995); James Kelly, That Damn’d Thing Called Honour: Duelling in Ireland, 1570-1860
(Cork: Cork University Press, 1995); François Billaçois, The Duel: Its Rise and Fall in Early Modern
France, trans. Trista Selous (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Victor Gordon Kiernan, The Duel
in European History: Honor and the Reign of Aristocracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
71
examined both the juridical and socio-cultural norms that governed the practice.157
Analysis of attitudes towards duelling among Mexican diplomats and the events in
Asunción in particular reveals the role of gender in diplomats’ promotion of the Mexican
Revolution and the Cárdenas government abroad.
The morning after the dance at the Brazilian Legation, Reyes’s seconds, Captain
Néstor Martínez Fretes and Rocque Gaona, visited Camilo Pérez Uribe, who then
designated as seconds Major Oscar Echeguren Staunch and Linneo Insfrán. The four men
met to consider the gentlemanly question. Reyes’s seconds hoped that Pérez Uribe would
retract his statements, thereby giving satisfaction to Reyes so that a duel would not be
called, but the captain’s seconds maintained that Pérez Uribe had nothing to retract, as he
had only stated his opinion of the Mexican government and categorically denied injuring
Reyes’s honour. 158 The seconds believed the matter closed, but Reyes was not satisfied,
and his representatives met those of Pérez Uribe again the following day. Because the
two positions seemed irreconcilable, the seconds convoked a Tribunal of Honour,
composed of Major Basiliano Caballero Irala on behalf of Reyes, Colonel Francisco
Caballero Alvarez on behalf of Pérez Uribe, and Dr. Diógenes R. Ortúzar as a neutral. 159
After concluding that, according to witnesses to the incident at the Brazilian Legation,
there was no proof that Pérez Uribe had insulted Reyes or Mexico, the Tribunal of
157
See the articles by Sandra Gayol, David Parker, and Pablo Piccato in Anuario IEHS 14 (1999).
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Néstor Martínez Fetes and Rocque Gaona to
Bernardo Reyes, November 15, 1936.
159
On the emergence of Tribunals of Honour in Latin American duelling see David S. Parker, “Law,
Honor, and Impunity in Spanish America: The Debate over Dueling, 1870-1920,” Law and History Review
19:2 (Summer, 2001): 338-40.
158
72
Honour declared that there were no grounds for a duel. 160 Considering the case resolved,
Bernardo Reyes gave the letter his seconds sent him advising of the matter’s resolution
and a response to the editor of the newspaper of El Día, a periodical he knew to be
sympathetic to his activities in Paraguay, 161 who published them under the heading
“Incident Solved” on November 18, 1936.
Instead of concluding this matter, the publication of the letters merely stoked the
fires of the conflict and precipitated the duel that the parties’ representatives had
attempted to prevent. In the published letter to his seconds, Reyes quoted from a code of
honour compiled by Escipion A. Perretto, which stipulated that satisfaction even greater
than a retraction came from the denial of an offence. 162 A debate of semantics followed
when Pérez Uribe wrote a response, which appeared in El Día, in which he accused
Reyes of exhibitionism and objected to the insinuation that he had retracted his
comments. He reiterated that he had expressed his personal opinion concerning the
communist orientation of the Mexican government, an opinion he maintained. He added
that the Paraguayan Military’s code contained no mention of a negation being tantamount
to retraction. He pointed to his uniform and his service to the nation in the Chaco War as
160
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Basiliano Caballero Irala, Francisco Caballero
Alvarez, and Dr. Diógenes R. Ortúzar to Néstor Martínez Fretes, Rocque Gaona, Oscar Echeguren Staunch
and Linneo Insfrán, November 16, 1936.
161
See the clippings Reyes forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente
III-311-11, especially the editorial, “La Diplomacia de México,” El Día (Asunción), August 9, 1936.
162
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to Néstor Martínez Fretes and
Rocque Gaona, November 17, 1936.
73
proof of his honour and declared that if Reyes were not satisfied with the results of the
tribunal, he was prepared to meet him on the field of honour. 163
Reyes issued a response the following day in which the full details of the incident,
which until then had not been published, were outlined. He declared that although
retraction was grammatically impossible, for one could not revoke a statement when one
denied having said anything, the effect of a negation was nevertheless the same. 164 At the
same time, Reyes appointed two new seconds, Major Juan Martincich and Dr. Silvio
Lofruscio, to demand from Pérez Uribe a full retraction of his letter to the editor, or in its
absence a settlement by arms.
When a retraction was not forthcoming, the representatives of Reyes and Pérez
Uribe chose sabres to first blood at dawn. They appointed a duel director, surgeons, and
witnesses. The parties arrived at Campo Grande outside Asunción shortly after 4 am the
next day. Now a barrio of Asunción, at the time Campo Grande was a rural area near the
capital. The police arrived and broke up the duel. Duelling was illegal in Paraguay, as it
was in most of Latin America at this time (with the exception of Uruguay), and the
officials therefore dutifully attempted to prevent this criminal act. 165 Some unkind people
suggested that Reyes had alerted the police to the location in order to avoid coming to
any harm, but his subsequent actions suggest that he was intent on defending his
163
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19,
1936.
164
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to The Editor of El Día, November
20, 1936.
165
Whether they would, or could effectively intervene, on the other hand, was not a given. On the
enforcement of proscriptions against duelling see Parker, “Law, Honor, and Impunity,” 331-338.
74
honour. 166 After retreating to the capital, the seconds set a new time and place: 11 am at
Asunción’s main stadium. One of Pérez Uribe’s seconds did not arrive at the appointed
hour because he attempted divert the police, but the remaining participants witnessed
Reyes and Pérez Uribe take their places on the field. After the duel director, Major
Gregorio Fariña Sánchez, made one last attempt at reconciliation and explained the rules
to the two men, and just as the adversaries were about to draw their sabres, the Chief of
Police arrived. Reyes offered to give up his diplomatic immunity, if that would influence
him to allow the duel to proceed. When told that duelling was a crime regardless of his
status as a diplomat, Reyes suggested, over the objections of his seconds, that the chief
call President Rafael Franco and ask for an exception to the law. The police finally left,
having convinced the seconds that a duel would not be allowed to take place, and the duel
director again attempted reconciliation. Pérez Uribe responded that although he would
not retract his comments concerning the Mexican government’s communism, he would
promise to avoid future insults to Reyes. This did not satisfy the chargé d’affaires, who
suggested that they leave the country in order to fight the duel outside Paraguay’s
jurisdiction. When this was deemed impracticable, he suggested that it take place in the
Legation, stressing the extraterritoriality of diplomatic missions. This proposal too was
rejected as unfeasible, given the constant surveillance of the duellists by the police, who
would undoubtedly prevent Pérez Uribe from entering the Mexican Legation. After
exhausting Reyes’s ideas, the seconds discussed the matter and agreed that both men had
done their utmost to carry out the duel, constantly conducting themselves according to
166
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Glenn A. Abbey to the Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, November 25, 1936.
75
codes of honour. As a result, they decided to consider the duel as “effected” by the
opponents attempts to realise it. They further resolved that a complete summary of the
affair of honour would be published, without any comment whatsoever by either of the
parties, in the press. 167
The conflict between Reyes and Pérez Uribe was of great interest in Asunción,
where the young chargé d’affaires had been posted since 1935. Mexican Minister to
Paraguay Alfonso Rosenzweig Díaz resided in La Paz, where he was also appointed, and
Reyes had been in charge of the Legation in his absence since the early days of the
Cárdenas presidency. 168 Reyes had initiated a particularly active propaganda campaign in
favour of Cárdenas’s government, and he consistently promoted the Revolution as an
example for Paraguayan leftists to follow. In this manner, his activities mirrored those of
the Ministers and Ambassadors posted throughout Latin America. Although Reyes was a
unique character, his actions nevertheless demonstrated the code of Revolutionary
masculinity among members of the Foreign Service.
The grandson and namesake of Porfirian general and governor of Nuevo Léon
Bernardo Reyes, he was the eldest son of Rodolfo Reyes, a conservative professor of law.
Before the Revolution, Rodolfo had been a student at Lucien Mérignac’s Escuela
Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia in Mexico City. 169 Although the young Bernardo did
167
This summary, composed and published by the seconds, served as the outline of events discussed in this
paragraph. United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, La Hora (Asunción), November 25, 1936.
168
Unfortunately, I was unable to locate Bernardo Reyes’s personnel file. See Rosenzweig Díaz’s
personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1.
169
Ángel Escudero, El duelo en México. Recopilación de los desafíos habidos en nuestra república,
precedidos de la historia de la esgrima en México y de los duelos más famosos verificados en el mundo
desde los juicios de dios hasta nuestros días, prologue by Artemio de Valle-Arizpe (Mexico City: Imprenta
Mundial, 1936).p. 46.
76
not follow his father’s political convictions, he may have learned a thing or two from him
about duelling. The elder Bernardo, who had died during the Decena Trágica (the Tragic
Ten Days of rebellion against President Madero), and Rodolfo had been among the
primary conspirators against the government of Francisco Madero, along with Félix Díaz
and Victoriano Huerta. 170 Rodolfo had initially collaborated with the Huerta regime, but
was imprisoned at the end of 1913 and exiled in 1914. Rodolfo and his son Bernardo,
only eleven years old, departed Veracruz bound for Spain that February. 171 The father
remained in Spain for the next forty years, eventually becoming an ardent supporter of
Franco. 172 Alfonso Reyes, Rodolfo’s brother and just fifteen years older than his nephew
Bernardo, had left for Europe in 1913 to work at the Mexican Legation in Paris. After the
triumph of Venustiano Carranza, Alfonso lost his post and moved to Spain, where he
endured his exile until his burgeoning literary reputation and friendship with José
Vaconcelos eventually enabled his reintegration into the Mexican Foreign Service in
1920. This caused a rupture in the family, because Rodolfo remained opposed to the
Revolutionary government. 173 When the young Bernardo Reyes entered the Foreign
Service, his decision must have caused even worse resentment. Nevertheless, Bernardo
took up his first diplomatic post as third secretary of the Mexican Legation in Costa Rica
in 1925. 174 He dedicated himself to his work, climbing the ranks of the Foreign Service in
fairly short order until becoming chargé d’affaires at Asunción in 1935, and then at Lima
170
Diccionario Porrúa, 2942-3.
Rodolfo Reyes, De mi vida, v. 2 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929), 254.
172
Mario Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Turner Publications, 2004), 36-37,
112, 121-122.
173
Javier Garciadiego, “Alfonso Reyes: cosmopolitismo diplomático y universalismo literario,” in
Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998), 197.
174
Diccionario Porrúa, 2941.
171
77
in 1937, where in the absence of Moisés Sáenz he also took over Spanish representation
in Peru during the Spanish Civil War when the incumbent proved to be working on
behalf of Franco. 175
Despite his dedication to both his profession and the principles and aims of the
Revolution, he nevertheless remained suspect in the eyes of many because of his family’s
history of anti-Revolutionary activity. During the budget crisis of early 1938, Bernardo
Reyes, like his uncle Alfonso and several other Ambassadors and Ministers posted to
Latin America, was ordered home on disponibilidad. It seems that Bernardo’s recall was
politically motivated. Upon returning to Mexico City, he requested an audience with
President Cárdenas that does not appear to have been granted. 176 The matter he hoped to
raise in the meeting is made clear in a letter Alfonso Reyes sent to Cárdenas shortly
thereafter, asking that his nephew be re-instated in his position at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. 177 He said that Eduardo Hay and Ramón Beteta had stated orally and in writing
that Bernardo had been recalled on the direct orders of Cárdenas because he was the son
of Rodolfo Reyes, and therefore politically suspect. Whereas all of the other diplomats
who had been placed on disponibilidad as a cost-saving measure held the ranks of
Ambassador or Minister, thus necessitating the continued service as chargés d’affaires of
more junior members of the Foreign Service, Reyes was recalled despite the fact that he
was only paid at the rank of First Secretary. In an attached memorandum, Alfonso Reyes
detailed his nephew’s extensive activities in defence of the Revolution, and provided a
175
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-8.
Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río
(LCR), Caja 34, Expediente 111/2433. Telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Cárdenas, May 3, 1938.
177
AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Alfonso Reyes to Cárdenas, May 17, 1938.
176
78
list of references who could attest to his “genuine socialism” and “sincere leftism.” 178
Alfonso Reyes’s defence of his nephew’s Revolutionary activities must have been
sufficiently persuasive, as the young Bernardo was taken off disponibilidad and posted to
France shortly thereafter. 179 Both Alfonso and Bernardo sent Cárdenas letters of
thanks. 180 The prejudices he knew existed against his father among members of the
Revolutionary bureaucracy were quite likely yet another reason that a diplomatic career
was as appealing to Bernardo as it had been to his Uncle Alfonso.
During his first post in Costa Rica, Bernardo demonstrated that he had inherited a
literary bent from his uncle. The young diplomat’s first play, entitled ¡¡Mentira!!...,
debuted in San José on August 12, 1926. 181 Apparently deserving of no less than twentyseven curtain calls, it was very well received by the Costa Rican press.182 Showcasing his
progressive social views, the play, set in Spain, told the story of an aristocratic family
whose only daughter Luisa falls in love with a good but common man. When it becomes
apparent that she has become a “ruined” woman, her father, steeped in tradition, disowns
her. Older brother Gerardo, a corrupt conservative politician, suggests that he challenge
her suitor to a duel to defend her honour. Brother Antonio, a social-climbing priest who
ministers only to the rich, suggests the convent. Only her brother Fernando, a bohemian
anarchist with non-traditional views of society, suggests that she should marry the man
178
AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Memorandum by Alfonso Reyes, May 17, 1938.
Diccionario Porrúa, 2941.
180
AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Alfonso Reyes to Cárdenas, June 21, 1938; AGN, LCR,
Caja 34, Expediente 111/2433, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Cárdenas, May 25, 1938.
181
Bernardo Reyes, ¡¡Mentira!!... (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1928).
182
“Visión de verdad,” Nueva Prensa (San José), August 13, 1926. Several warm reviews are reprinted in
the above publication.
179
79
she loves. Fernando dismisses duelling as a barbarous anachronism. 183 Luisa’s parents
later forgive her and Fernando when it becomes clear, on their fiftieth wedding
anniversary, that while Gerardo and Antonio are only interested in inheriting their
parents’ fortune, Luisa and Fernando love and respect them.
The social lessons of the play were immediately apparent to reviewers, 184 who
commented on the author’s socialism and saw in Fernando’s character a true
representation of the author’s beliefs. 185 Reyes’s socialist views did not undermine the
masculine aura of the play: several reviewers commented on Reyes’s “manly style,” 186
and another said that his verbal audacity was reminiscent of the skill of an accomplished
duellist. 187 Reyes’s masculinity was evident in the vehemence and “virility” with which
he upheld the principles of social justice, 188 rather than traditional ideas regarding
women’s subjection to familial honour. While Reyes condemned duelling in defence of
feminine virtue, his subsequent use of the institution in Paraguay for the defence of his
own honour and that of the Revolution seems consistent with his early ideas of
Revolutionary masculinity. ¡¡Mentira!!... was also performed in Bogotá in 1927 during
his next diplomatic posting, 189 and he reportedly wrote and directed one other play, 190 but
thereafter seems to have devoted his considerable literary talents to the composition of
discourses on national history, politics, and culture prepared for foreign audiences to
183
Reyes, ¡¡Mentira!!..., 50.
“La obra de Bernardo Reyes,” Diario de Costa Rica (San José), August 25, 1926.
185
“¡Mentira!,” La Tribuna (San José), August 18, 1926.
186
“Visión de verdad,” Nueva Prensa, August 13, 1926.
187
Pío Tamayo, “Algunos juicios críticos sobre ¡Mentira!,” El Mundo (San José), August 12, 1926.
188
Ibid.
189
“El Estreno de Anoche,” El Espectador (Bogotá), March 3, 1927; Paco Miro, “Crónica de teatro. El
estreno de Mentira,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), March 4, 1927.
190
AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Memorandum by Alfonso Reyes, May 17, 1938.
184
80
promote and defend the Mexican Revolution during his various diplomatic
appointments. 191
Bernardo Reyes would certainly have been offended by Pérez Uribe’s jibe about
his family situation at the dance at the Brazilian Legation. Made in such a public venue,
at a social gathering of his social and diplomatic peers, the barb would have stung. 192
Taken together with the charge that the Mexican government, and Reyes himself, was
Communist, the captain’s insults threatened Reyes’s Revolutionary masculinity. Reyes
did not base his masculine ideal upon the defence of female virtue, but on the defence of
the social project of which he felt himself a part. Since arriving in Paraguay, Reyes had
reported that the Mexican Revolution was under attack in the conservative Catholic press,
and among members of the conservative elite who were critical of the alleged persecution
of Catholics in Mexico. 193 These attacks had only increased since the outbreak of the
Spanish Civil War a few months previous. 194 In this tense atmosphere, Pérez Uribe’s
insults must have caused him to reach the breaking point, leading him to seek to defend
his honour and that of the Revolution by issuing a formal challenge. Although he could
not convince Pérez Uribe to change his personal opinion regarding the character of the
Mexican government, or make him understand the differences among leftist regimes, 195
191
Diccionario Porrúa, 2942.
As Pablo Piccato points out, the majority of the duels discussed by Escudero in El duelo en México
occurred because of offences that took place at public functions, such as the theatre or a ball. Pablo Piccato,
“Politics and the Technology of Honor: Dueling in Turn-of-the-Century Mexico,” Journal of Social History
33:2 (Winter, 1999): 334.
193
Reyes’s reports on the so-called religious question in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11.
194
On Reyes’s defence of Mexico’s position in the Spanish Civil War see Chapter Three.
195
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to The Editor of El Día, November
20, 1936.
192
81
he could defend the Revolution, and his commitment to it, possibly to the death, in a duel.
Duelling could prove that he was not the “degenerate” Pérez Uribe had claimed.
In his prologue to the 1936 compendium, El duelo en México, former diplomat
and member of the Academia Mexicana de la Lengua Artemio de Valle-Arizpe wrote that
Ángel Escudero’s book painted a picture of a bygone era. 196 Although the number of
duels taking place each year had decreased steadily since the Porfiriato, the practice still
maintained an important role in diplomats’ conception of Revolutionary masculinity,
which Valle-Arizpe should have recognised. In his analysis of the “technology of honor”
in turn-of-the-century Mexico, Pablo Piccato argues that although the decline of duelling
coincided with the changing role of political violence in society during the combative
phase of the Revolution, it was nevertheless central to the creation of a modern public
sphere and the virility of national ruling groups. 197 This version of masculinity played a
central role in the promotion of the Revolution abroad and helps to explain the
ambiguous position of women in the Foreign Service.
Duelling swords and pistols served as particularly effective instruments in shaping
public opinion. David Parker has demonstrated the importance of the press in Latin
American duelling: most of the duels that took place in early twentieth-century Uruguay
played themselves out in, and generally resulted from, conflicts that were voiced in the
press. 198 The debate in which Bernardo Reyes and Camilo Pérez Uribe engaged in the
196
Escudero, El duelo en México.
Piccato, “Politics and the Technology of Honor,” 331-3, 345-6.
198
Parker, “Law, Honor, and Impunity,” 319; David S. Parker, “‘Gentlemanly Responsibility’ and ‘Insults
of a Woman’: Dueling and the Unwritten Rules of Public Life in Uruguay, 1860-1920,” in Gender,
Sexuality, and Power in Latin America since Independence, ed. William E. French and Katherine Elaine
Bliss (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 109-132.
197
82
pages of El Día gains significance in this regard. So too does Pérez Uribe’s charge that
by first publishing a report of the incident in the press, Bernardo Reyes was, in his
characteristic manner, resorting to crude “exhibitionism.” 199 Rather than a character flaw,
engaging in this type of public display was exactly what was expected of Cárdenas’s
diplomats in Latin America. This behaviour was characteristic of the way in which
members of the Foreign Service demonstrated their Revolutionary masculinity. Shortly
after arriving in Asunción, Reyes had written the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring to
what extent he should publicise the bases of the socialist education programme contained
in the six-year plan in the face of the campaign against Mexico in the conservative
Catholic press. 200 Luis Garrido, then head of the Diplomatic Department, responded that
determining the advisability of a vocal propaganda campaign was Reyes’s own
responsibility and up to his judgement. 201 Reyes and his counterparts throughout Latin
America were generally left to their own devices in creating positive propaganda and
defending the attitudes and policies of the Cárdenas government in the countries to which
they were appointed. Reyes and most of his colleagues took to these directives with gusto
and published myriad articles about the Revolution and its tenets in the press. One of the
most popular strategies they employed was the retraction. When an article denigrating
Mexico appeared in the press, more often than not the ranking Mexican diplomat in the
country would immediately write a letter to the editor of the newspaper in which it
appeared, explaining the offending article’s errors. They usually gained a retraction from
199
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19,
1936.
200
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11, Bernaro Reyes to SRE, September 1, 1936.
201
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11, Garrido to Bernardo Reyes, September 23, 1936.
83
the editor and a host of articles about the incident in the press. As the old adage has it,
there is no such thing as bad publicity, and as a result of this tactic members of the public
became better informed about the Revolutionary government and its programmes. The
retraction provided a tool by which Mexican diplomats attempted to shape public opinion
and was intimately tied to the ideas of Revolutionary masculinity and the practice of
duelling.
By publishing the news of the resolution of the incident that took place at the
Brazilian Legation, Bernardo Reyes was following a practice that had deep roots in both
Mexican journalism and diplomacy. One of the most prominent duellists eulogised in
Escudero’s tome is Rafael Reyes Spíndola, the Oaxacan editor of the newspaper El
Universal, founded in 1888, and El Imparcial, founded in 1896. 202 In nineteenth-century
character, the founder of modern journalism was prone to challenging his detractors to
meet him on the field of honour. 203 Reyes Spíndola’s son Octavio, who also considered
himself a journalist, joined the Foreign Service in 1922. 204 By the Cárdenas era, he was
considered by foreign correspondent Betty Kirk to be the “Red Knight of the Foreign
Office”—the diplomat who did the most to promote the Revolution in Latin America. 205
In 1939, Cárdenas appointed him Ambassador to Chile following the election of Popular
Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda, but until then, much like Reyes, he had served as
202
Diccionario Porrúa, 2943. On his contribution to the foundation of modern journalism in Mexico see,
Clara Guadalupe García, El Imparcial: primer periódico moderno de México (Mexico City: Centro de
Estdios Históricos del Porfiriato, 2003); Antonio Saborit, El mundo ilustrado de Rafael Reyes Spíndola
(Mexico City: Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, 2003).
203
See, for example, Rafael Reyes Spíndola vs. José Ferrel. Escudero, El duelo en México, 175.
204
See Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7.
205
Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of Europe versus America (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1942), 200. The reference to Kirk’s impressions of Reyes Spíndola was found in, Roderic
Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1981 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 251.
84
chargé d’affaires to several Latin American countries, including Panama, Nicaragua, and
Cuba, where he gained a reputation for demanding retractions of articles he deemed
denigrating toward the Revolution. Even more significant in this regard was the duel
Escudero recounted between General José Domingo Ramírez Garrido and José Rivero
that took place in Cuba in 1926. 206 One of Lucien Mérignac’s disciples at the Escuela
Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia, José Domingo Ramírez Garrido, a personal friend of
Escudero’s and a fellow professor at the school, fled to Cuba after the de la Huerta
rebellion. 207 On May 3, 1926, the newspaper El Diario de la Marina published an article
denigrating the Mexican Revolution and its generals. Incensed, Ramírez Garrido
immediately named as seconds Manuel Márquez Sterling and Miguel A. Riva, who
visited the offices of the prominent Cuban daily and met with its editor José Rivero to
explain that the offended General demanded satisfaction. Fortunately, as Escudero
recounts, the editor realised the error of his ways, and promised to print a retraction in the
following day’s paper. 208 A contest of arms did not result. The Revolutionary was able to
use the procedures outlined in duelling codes to defend his honour, that of the
Revolution, and of the military. This demonstrates the underlying point of all retractions
demanded of newspaper editors by Mexican diplomats. According to the gentlemanly
code of honour, a demand for a retraction was tantamount to a challenge.
When a critic of the Revolution, or its representatives, uttered a statement
believed to be harmful to Mexico, the diplomats who asked for satisfaction were drawing
206
Escudero, El duelo en México, 261-262.
Jesús Ezequiel de Dios, José Domingo, el idealista (Villahermosa: Instituto de Cultura de Tabasco,
1989).
208
Escudero, El duelo en México, 261-262.
207
85
on their ideas of Revolutionary masculinity, which reflected their attitudes towards
duelling. Mexican diplomats learned this behaviour through their participation in the
Revolution, as well as in the Escuela Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia and from their
fathers. Although Reyes and his adversary referred to two alternate printed codes of
honour, Reyes challenged Pérez Uribe on common terms. The parties’ use of different
codes highlights the multiplicity of definitions of honour, even among men who clearly
accepted the institution’s validity. 209 Nevertheless, they sought common ground by
defining what they meant by honour in the press through their references to the military.
In the letters they published, both adversaries heaped praise on the uniform Pérez Uribe
wore and the Paraguayan military’s honourable participation in the Chaco War. Reyes’s
rhetoric suggests that he was attempting to draw a comparison between the honourable
nature of the Mexican and Paraguayan militaries, where duelling was an acknowledged
and codified masculine practice.210 Given the prevalence of men who had participated in
the Revolution among Cárdenas’s diplomats in Latin America, this appeal to the uniform
was particularly characteristic of the ideas of Revolutionary masculinity prevalent in the
Foreign Service. Fourteen of the thirty diplomats posted to Latin America during the
Cárdenas presidency played identifiable military roles in the combative phase of the
Revolution. Although handed down to Reyes from father to son, the practice of duelling
209
Sandra Gayol discusses the multiplicity of definitions of honour invoked by opposing social actors in
her analysis of the role of duelling in late-nineteenth-century Argentina. See “Honor Moderno”: The
Significance of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Argentina,” Hispanic American Historical Review 84:3 (2004): 485.
On honour in Paraguay see, Juan Vicente Soto Estigarribia, Delito contra el honor: Calumnia, difamación
e injuria (Aunción: Editora Litocolor, 2005).
210
On duelling in the Porfirian military see, Stephen Neufeld, “Servants of the Nation: The Military in the
Making of Modern Mexico, 1876-1911,” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2009).
86
and the attitudes that surrounded it were accepted among his fellow members of the
Foreign Service.
The code of honour upon which diplomats’ actions were based helps to explain
the apparent paradox between the Cárdenas government’s promotion of the advancement
of women and the exclusionary practice of Revolutionary masculinity that pervaded the
Foreign Service. As one of three generals appointed as representatives to Latin America
during the Cárdenas era, José Domingo Ramírez Garrido successfully used the code of
honour to extract an apology from the editor of the Diario de la Marina in 1926. His first
diplomatic appointment was as Minister to Colombia, where he replaced Palma Guillén
in 1937. After arriving in Bogotá, Ramírez Garrido consistently demanded retractions of
denigrating articles that appeared in the very same papers that had attacked La Ministro
during her tenure in the Andes. When accused of interfering in the internal affairs of
Colombia by Laureano Gómez’s El Siglo for holding a meeting of prominent leftists at
the Mexican Legation following Mexico’s oil expropriation, Ramírez Garrido went on
the offensive. He demanded a retraction and secured the support of the Colombian
Foreign Minister for his actions. A storm of coverage explaining the rationale behind the
oil expropriation and the legal bases of President Cárdenas’s decision followed in the
press. 211 Ramírez Garrido secured greater coverage of Mexican events, influencing
public opinion regarding the expropriation—one of the primary goals of diplomats posted
to Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency. He did so by employing the code of
honour that had served him well in Cuba eleven years earlier: he denounced false reports
211
For further discussion of this incident, and the Colombian reaction to the Mexican oil expropriation, see
Chapter Four.
87
and demanded satisfaction as though he were issuing a challenge to a duel. Ramírez
Garrido used this tactic throughout his tenure as Minister to Colombia. Palma Guillén did
not. Although she was maligned in the conservative press and portrayed as a radical
communist, despite her Catholicism, unlike her male colleagues she did not make
extensive use of the tactic of retraction. When attacked, her protector and friend Eduardo
Santos came to her defence in El Tiempo. She did not—could not—employ the
gentlemanly code of honour, and inherent threat of violence, that underlay the actions of
her male colleagues. The implications of demanding a retraction, because they were
rooted in the practice of duelling that had special significance for members of the
Mexican military and the sons of the students of Lucien Mérignac, effectively prevented
her from employing the same tactics as her male colleagues.
Conclusion
President Cárdenas, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and many members of the
Foreign Serivice who were posted to Latin America were committed to the advancement
of women in society, but diplomatic practice, underwritten by the cultural code of honour
that was based on Revolutionary masculinity, nevertheless limited women’s participation
in Cárdenas’s diplomatic project. Before challenging the director of the Diario de la
Marina to a duel in Cuba in 1926 and his appointment to Colombia in 1937, Ramírez
Garrido published a small book in 1918 entitled Al margen del feminismo. 212 As Director
212
José Domingo Ramírez Garrido, Al margen del feminismo (Mérida: Talleres Pluma y Lápiz, 1918). This
book is available through the Women in History microfilm collection (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research
Publications, 1975), no. 7696.
88
of the Department of Public Education in the Yucatán under Governor Salvador
Alvarado, Ramírez Garrido was involved in both Mexico’s First Pedagogical Congress,
held in Mérida in September 1915, and the First Feminist Congress of Mexico, held in
Mérida in 1916. 213 His 1918 study reflects his involvement with the cause of women’s
rights in the Yucatán and his firm conviction that women should get the vote. 214 In it, he
compares women’s exclusion from contemporary politics to the exclusion from national
political life of the indigenous masses during the Porfiriato and argued that just as the
Revolution had concerned itself with the “elevation” of indigenous groups, so too should
it fulfil the social Revolutionary goal of equality for women. Ramírez Garrido was a
feminist who would undoubtedly have chafed at the suggestion that his attitudes and
behaviour may have effectively limited women’s participation in the Foreign Service.
Nor was he the only representative in Latin America to hold strong views in favour of the
equality of women. For example, Minister to Bolivia and Paraguay (1935-1938) and
Panama (1938-1941), Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, included a chapter on women’s
contributions to the independence movement in his magnum opus, Mexicanidad de
México. 215 Clearly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its male representatives did not
213
On the First Pedagogical Congress see, Stephanie J. Smith “Educating the Mothers of the Nation: The
Project of Revolutionary Education in Yucatán,” in The Women’s Revolution in Mexico, 1910-1953, ed.
Stephanie Mitchell and Patience A. Schell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 41. On the First
Feminist Congress see, Stephanie J. Smith, Gender and the Mexican Revolution: Yucatán Women and the
Realities of Patriarchy (Chaptel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 29-32. On women and the
Revolution in the Yucatán also see, by the same author, “‘If Love Enslaves…Love Be Damned!’: Divorce
and Revolutionary State Formation in Yucatán,” in Sex in Revolution: Gender, Politics, and Power in
Modern Mexico, ed. Jocelyn Olcott, Mary Kay Vaughan, and Gabriela Cano (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2006), 99-111; “Salvador Alvarado of Yucatán: Revolutionary Reforms, Revolutionary Women,” in
State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1952: Portraits in Conflict, Courage and Corruption, ed.
Jürgen Buchenau and William H. Beezley (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 43-57.
214
Ramírez Garrido, Al margen del feminismo, Chapter 7.
215
Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, Mexicanidad de México v. 3 (Oxford: Dolphin, 1959), 421-424.
89
purposely act to restrict opportunities for women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
impede the success of Palma Guillén’s posting in Colombia. Nevertheless, the culture of
Revolutionary masculinity that underlay their actions worked to do just this. In his
analysis of the apparent paradox of the expansion of opportunities for women in
Uruguayan society and the importance of duelling, David Parker concluded that because
Uruguayans could not imagine women as duellists, they could not imagine them as
participants in national politics.216 Unable to guarantee, by threat of a duel, a challenge to
her character or that of the Mexican Revolution, Palma Guillén could not effectively
defend herself as Reyes had done in Paraguay. Latin American diplomats throughout the
region defended their countries vehemently, often employing the retraction as a
diplomatic tool; Mexico’s culture of Revolutionary masculinity made its representatives
particularly adept at this practice, but as a woman Guillén was excluded from its effective
use. As a result, her much-lauded appointment to Colombia, the Latin American country
that at the time had seemed most likely to accept her, ended in failure, and she was
transferred to Denmark, where a different cultural context prevailed.
Far from “crude exhibitionism,” Bernardo Reyes’s challenge to Camilo Pérez
Uribe and his publication of the incident that took place at the Brazilian Legation in the
Paraguayan press had indeed been characteristic of his diplomatic style. 217 Moreover, his
actions, although apparently exceptional, were actually broadly representative of the
ideas of Revolutionary masculinity that were held by members of the Foreign Service
216
Parker, “‘Gentlemanly Responsibility,’”126.
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19,
1936.
217
90
posted to Latin America in these years. Reyes and his colleagues defended the virtue of
the Revolution. Drawing on gentlemanly codes of honour, they shaped public opinion
using newspapers as skilfully as a duellist uses his sword. Revolutionary masculinity
characterised their attitudes towards the promotion of the Revolution abroad, and as a
result, Reyes’s otherwise anachronistic call to arms provides considerable insight in to
the practice of diplomacy during the Cárdenas era. Although women’s participation in the
Foreign Service, like women’s suffrage, was actively encouraged by the Cárdenas
government and promoted by the high-profile appointment of Palma Guillén, the culture
of diplomatic practice worked against her.
The generation of ambassadors and ministers who served in Latin America during
the Cárdenas presidency were shaped by their experience of the Revolution and their
participation in the Revolutionary reconstruction that followed. Although diverse in their
educational experiences, places of origin, and career paths, they shared a belief in the
social goals of the Revolution and their potential applicability to the countries to which
they were posted. They promoted Cárdenas’s achievements and presented Mexico as an
example for other countries to follow, especially in the fields of labour organisation,
agrarian reform, indigenismo, and education. They also supported the Cárdenas
government’s commitment to the greater participation of women in national and
international life, but somewhat paradoxically the same shared experiences that made
them a cohesive group and led them to support the Revolution and its tenets engendered
in them a culture of Revolutionary masculinity that, in practice, undermined the position
of women in the Foreign Service. The propaganda campaigns they led and activities they
91
performed as representatives of Mexico and the Revolution should be understood as
gendered acts. Although this is most clear in the incidents described in this chapter, it is
also true of the major campaigns they launched in support of the expropriation of British,
Dutch, and US oil companies in March 1938, Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil
War, and Mexico’s leadership in inter-American conferences.
92
CHAPTER THREE.
REPÚBLICAS ROJAS: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
AND MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
España, nuevo Méjico; Méjico, nueva España;
Iguales han sufrido por una misma gloria;
La República Roja, roja como la entraña,
Que palpita en las grandes jornadas de la Historia.
Spain, new Mexico; Mexico, new Spain
Together they have suffered for the same glory;
The Red Republic, red like a heard,
That beats in the great annals of History . 218
After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Chile’s Ambassador to
Mexico reported that “the general commentary among the members of the diplomatic
corps was that it seemed strange that Cárdenas would boast of his support for the
government of Azaña at a time when all of the European Great Powers have agreed to
maintain strict neutrality in the Spanish conflict.” 219 Latin American diplomats continued
to be surprised by the depths of Mexico’s support for the Spanish Republic during the
bloody war in Spain and the dictatorship that followed. When Franco finally defeated the
Republic in 1939, only the Mexican government refused to recognise his victory, and
only after the dictator’s death in 1975 did the Mexican government re-establish relations
with Spain. 220 Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil War became one of the most
218
Pablo Hannibal Vela, “Méjico y España.” Poem found in Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático
Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente III-767-10.
219
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico,
Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, September 1, 1936.
220
Mexico continued to recognise the Republican government in exile, although it would later establish
limited commercial relations with the Franco dictatorship. Clara E. Lida (ed.), Mexico y España en el
primer franquismo, 1939-1950: Rupturas formales, relaciones oficiosas (Mexico City: El Colegio de
93
recognised features of the government’s foreign policy during his sexenio; the two causes
became inextricably linked.
In the 1937 poem “Méjico y España,” which Ecuadorian writer Pablo Hannibal
Vela dedicated to Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Azaña, the causes of Spain
and Mexico appear as one. A noted poet and journalist who had run for president in 1932,
his sympathies were laid bare in the poem he wrote about Mexico’s support of the
Spanish Republic. 221 He was not alone in linking the two countries’ fates. Latin
Americans on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum identified Mexico with
the Spanish Republican cause throughout the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath. With
each pronouncement Cárdenas and his diplomats made on the world stage, this
identification deepened. Throughout the region, members of the Left and the Right
differentiated themselves on the basis of whether they sympathised with the military
insurgency of Franco or the Republican government of Spain.
Mexican Ambassador to Argentina Alfonso Reyes reported from Buenos Aires in
August 1936 that the Spanish Civil War had quickly become a domestic question in
Argentina. 222 The Right, Reyes explained, aimed to present the insurgents as the
inheritors of Christian civilization and the government as the harbingers of Ibero-
México, 2001); Lorenzo Meyer, El cactus y el olivo: relaciones hispano mexicanas en el siglo XX (Mexico
City: Oceano, 2001).
221
The poem also appeared in the book of poetry Vela published the following year, Arca Sonora (Quito:
Talleres Gráficos de Educación, 1938). This volume includes poems entitled “Ave España” (dedicated to
Gabriela Mistral), “Pan” (dedicated to the campesinos and workers of Ecuador), and “Estudiantes de
América” (dedicated to the Ecuadorian activist and indigenista Gonzalo Oleas), which provide further
indication of his ideas about Spain and its relationship to the Americas.
222
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, August 27, 1936. Also see Sandra McGee
Deutsch, Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999).
94
America’s communist future. 223 Drawing on the long history of hispanismo, they
associated the Spanish Republic, like the Mexican Revolution, with anti-clericalism and
an attack on the conservative social values that they believed bound Spain and its former
colonies in the Americas together. 224 They became inseparable, like two halves of a
beating Red heart. By contrast, following the establishment of the Second Republic in
Spain, members of the Latin American Left hoped that the motherland need no longer
represent the forces that aimed to maintain the conservative status quo. Just as they had
seen the Mexican Revolution as a source of hope, in Spain’s experiment in democracy
they saw a new and “glorious” way forward for their own societies. 225 By loudly
supporting the beleaguered Spanish government during the war, Cárdenas tied Mexico
more firmly to these ideals, until they seemed almost indivisible to most Latin Americans
and their governments. As a result, Cárdenas’s Spanish policy profoundly influenced his
government’s relations with Latin America.
This chapter evaluates the role that this central aspect of Mexico’s foreign policy
played in shaping the Cárdenas government’s relations with Latin America. The sources
and evolution of Cárdenas’s support of the Spanish Republic, and his acceptance of tens
223
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, August 27, 1936.
Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Hispanismo y Falange: Los sueños imperiales de la derecha española (Mexico
City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992); Breve antología de documentos hispanistas, 1931-1948
(Mexico City: CIESAS, 1990); and “Notas sobre el falangismo en México (1930-1940),” in Facismo y
antifascismo en América Latina y México, eds. Brígida Von Mentz, Ricardo Pérez Montfort and Verena
Radkau (México City: CIESAS, 1984); Fredrick B. Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives
and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971).
225
On the reception of the Mexican Revolution in Latin America, and the Rio de la Plata region in
particular, see Pablo Yanklevich, La revolución mexicana en América Latina: Intereses políticos e
itinerarios intelectuales (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2003); Miradas australes. Propaganda, cabildeo y
proyección de la Revolución Mexicana en el Río de la Plata, 1910-1930 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1997);
La Diplomacia Imaginaria: Argentina y la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1916 (Mexico City: Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores, 1994).
224
95
of thousands of Spanish Republican exiles, have been examined in detail elsewhere. 226
Instead of treading these well-worn paths, this chapter explores unexamined aspects of
this diplomacy by demonstrating the connections between Cárdenas’s Spanish and Latin
American policies. Even in the widely-known case of Republican refugees, the Latin
American dimensions of this policy have received little attention in the literature. By
analysing the issues that Cárdenas’s support for the Republic brought to the fore from this
angle, the resonance it had throughout the region becomes apparent. This is particularly
true in the enthusiasm with which many intellectual figures took up the causes of Spain,
and the activities of the hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local organisations that leftist
Spaniards who had immigrated to Latin America before the war, and their allies, founded
in these years. 227 Paying rapt attention to the news coming out of Spain and Mexico, they
eulogised the Cárdenas government’s position in verse and song and chanted slogans in
meeting halls and the streets. Often working in tandem, intellectuals and activists raised
money for Republican causes and publicised the twin causes of Mexico and Spain.
Conversely, Latin American members of the Spanish Falange and other organisations of
226
Mario Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Turner Publications, 2004); José
Antonio Matesanz, Las raíces del exilio: México antes la Guerra Civil Española, 1936-1939 (Mexico City:
El Colegio de México, 1999); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), México y España: solidaridad y asilo político,
1936-1942. Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990; T.G. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil
War (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981); Lynn Hollingsworth Leverty, “The Spanish
Question in Mexico: Lázaro Cárdenas and the Spanish Republicans,” (Ph.D. diss., The American
University, 1983); Lois Elwyn Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1955); Patricia Fagen, Exiles and Citizens: Spanish Republicans in Mexico (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1973); Clara Lida, Inmigración y exilio: Reflexiones sobre el caso español
(Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores/El Colegio de México, 1997).
227
The president of the Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de la República Democrática Española wrote to
Mexico’s Minister to Uruguay following Uruguay’s recognition of Franco to thank the Mexican
government for opening its doors to the Republican refugees. He stated that the committee represented
more than 250 humanitarian aid organisations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Edmundo Castillo to
Manuel Y. De Negri, March 22, 1939. Although there would have been fewer such organisations in smaller
countries or those with smaller numbers of Spanish immigrants, there may have been thousands of
humanitarian aid organisations throughout Latin America.
96
the Right were alarmed by these initiatives and organised their own demonstrations in
defence of Christian civilization. The overwhelmingly conservative governments of the
region also reacted with apprehension, but as well as censuring the activities of leftists—
Mexican diplomats included—they were concerned mainly for the maintenance of the
peace and their own positions within the conservative status quo, and they sometimes
suppressed the activities of the Right. Under these circumstances, the reception met by
renowned authors’ writings and initiatives could serve as a proxy for commentary on
domestic politics in Latin America. In this way, Mexico’s Spanish policy affected not
only its diplomatic relations with Latin American governments, but the politics of the
entire region.
Because of the Franco regime’s iron-clad control of the Spanish archives, the
historiography of the Spanish Civil War was long divided between nationalist
interpretations and accounts based on foreign documentation generally sympathetic to the
Republican cause. 228 In recent years there has been effervescence in the literature as a
new generation of scholars has undertaken detailed regional analyses of the conflict using
newly-accessible national and local sources.229 The established line of investigation into
228
Paul Preston, “War of Words” in Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939, ed. Paul Preston (London:
Methuen & Co., 1984): 1-13. Nationalist tracts often presented the rebellion as part of a crusade to save
Spanish civilization. Joaquín Arrarás, Historia de la cruzada española, 8 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones
españolas, 1939-1943). Foreign works, on the other hand, tended to be wrapped up in the analysis of
Communist involvement in the conflict. Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and
Couterrevolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Also see Pierre Broué and Emile
Témime, The Revolution and Civil War in Spain, translated by Tony White (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972);
Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1977); Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965); Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
229
George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert (eds.), Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 19311939 (London: Longman, 1995); Adrian Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of
Asturias, 1860-1934 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987)
97
the international reactions of the war has also surged forward through recently-gained
access to Spanish and Soviet archives, 230 as well as the application of new theoretical
perspectives such as gender analysis. 231 However, these studies generally tend to deal
separately with international diplomacy surrounding the conflict, 232 foreign intellectuals’
support for the Republic, 233 and the international labour movement. 234 This chapter
demonstrates that, at least in the Mexican and broader Latin American cases, the
diplomatic, intellectual, and social responses to the Spanish Civil War were intimately
related. 235
Latin American reactions to the Mexican government’s Spanish policy ebbed and
flowed according to the course of the conflict in Spain. Significant moments in the
history of the Spanish Civil War framed perceptions of Cárdenas’s unflagging support for
the Republic. 236 During the early days of the conflict, when international newswires
buzzed with reports of the retributive killings of Spanish clerics, the Mexican
230
In particular, Gerald Howson demystified Soviet aid to the Republic in Arms for Spain: The Untold
Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray, 1998).
231
Laurence Brown, “‘Pour Aider Nos Frères d’Espagne’: Humanitarian Aid, French Women, and Popular
Mobilization during the Front Populaire,” French Politics, Culture & Society, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 2007):
30-48; Angela Jackson, British Women and the Spanish Civil War (London: Routledge, 2002).
232
Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004); Enrique Moradiellos, “The Allies and the Spanish Civil War,” in Spain and the Great
Powers in the Twentieth Century, eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (London: Routledge, 1999): 96126; Enrique Moradiellos, La perfidia del Albión: El gobierno británico y la guerra civil española
(Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1996); Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2007).
233
Frederick R. Benson, Writers in Arms: The Literary Impact of the Spanish Civil War (New York: New
York University Press, 1967).
234
Tom Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); Lewis A. Mates, The Spanish Civil War and the British Left (New York: Palgrave,
2007).
235
Tom Buchanan also attempts such a synthesis in Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
236
For brief overviews of the Spanish Civil War see Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Paul Preston, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil
War (London: Fontana, 1996).
98
government’s defence of the Republic was hard to swallow for many in overwhelmingly
Catholic Latin America. Nevertheless, the execution of Federico García Lorca in Granada
by Franco’s forces foreshadowed for many intellectuals the repression and devastation
that would meet Republican supporters in Franco’s Spain. 237 The insurgents’ quick
advance through the south in the fall of 1936 convinced many international observers that
the Republic was doomed, but the destruction inflicted upon Guernica in April 1937 and
the rebels’ subsequent aerial bombing of open cities drew some supporters to the
beleaguered Republican cause. The increasing prominence of Communists in the
Republican war effort simply confirmed the fears of conservative critics of Mexico and
the Republic, but the plight of the displaced civilian population that moved across the
peninsula made Mexico’s humanitarian defence of the Republic more palatable in
international circles as the war wore on. International aid organisations, intellectuals, and
even some governments praised Mexican assistance to these helpless victims of war.
Nevertheless, each movement of refugees signified another town taken by the rebel
forces and the insurgents’ increasing strength. Franco split the Republican zone in two
when he reached Vinaroz in April 1938, and by November of that year the loyalist army
retreated from the Battle of Ebro after the British and French governments’ appeasement
of Hitler at Munich had demonstrated to the Republicans that they would never abandon
the policy of Non-Intervention. Britain and France recognised the Franco regime in
February of 1939 after the fall of Barcelona that January, and the Latin American
governments that had not already recognised his regime because of ideological affinity
237
Michael Richards, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 19361945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
99
soon followed the Great Powers’ diplomatic suit. That the Mexican government remained
intransigent in its continued recognition of the Republican government in exile seemed
laudable to some, but in diplomatic circles, where it hampered the rescue of Mexican
nationals who remained in Spain and the Republican refugees who had crossed the
Pyrenees to France, it bemused. To the chagrin of conservative Mexicans and the relief of
Latin American governments that did not want “Red” Spanish migrants stirring up
trouble in their own countries, Mexico eventually welcomed approximately 30,000
Republican refugees—the most lasting proof of the Cárdenas government’s Spanish
policy. 238 During the course of the war, foreign public opinion evolved in response to the
events unfolding in Spain, and as a result the initiatives that intellectuals, activists, and
the Mexican government devised to respond to these changing conditions met with
varying responses.
Latin American reactions to the Spanish Civil War, their own governments’
responses to the conflict, and Mexico’s Spanish policy cause a shifting of locations. The
geographical focus moves from Mexico City to Spain, and to the capital cities of Latin
America, shifting from Mexican embassies and legations in Latin America and Europe to
the hallways of the League of Nations and Latin American embassies and legations in
Mexico, demonstrating that these became contested spaces with the expression of the
varied reactions to the conflict. From literary salons and concert halls to meeting halls,
the streets, and even the living rooms where radio listeners keenly tuned in for news of
the war and Mexico’s reaction to it, the reactions of intellectuals and workers were
238
Fagen, Exiles and Citizens, 39.
100
likewise formed and debated in many arenas. The Mexican sale of arms to the Republic,
Latin American governments’ decisions of whether and when to recognise the ultimately
successful Franco rebellion, Cárdenas’s condemnation of the rebels’ use of aerial
bombardments of civilian targets, and the Mexican decision to help the youngest victims
of the civil war and then to throw its doors open to thousands of Republican refugees
were all scrutinised in Latin America by members of both the Right and the Left, who
saw in these decisions potential reverberations in their own countries.
Mexican Bullets
In August and September of 1936, Bernardo Reyes, Mexico’s chargé d’affaires in
Asunción, Paraguay, reported on the increasingly hostile attitude of the Paraguayan press
towards Mexico. Catholic newspapers and weeklies attacked the Cárdenas government,
claiming that Mexico was intervening in the recently-commenced Spanish Civil War in
clear contravention of the Estrada Doctrine and the Política del Buen Amigo. 239 The
attacks became so vehement that in September, Paraguayan President Rafael Franco
closed the Catholic daily newspaper Rumbos because of its “injurious” articles on the
Mexican sale of arms to Republican Spain. 240 Rafael Franco had come to power as head
of the Partido Revolucionario Febrerista earlier that year, and US Minister to Paraguay,
Findley B. Howard, commented that prior to the overthrow of the Liberal government of
Eusebio Ayala, the young Bernardo Reyes’s description of his nation’s Revolutionary
doctrines and procedures became so pointed that Paraguayan authorities considered
239
240
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, August 23, 1936.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, September 19, 1936.
101
requesting his recall. Apparently, Rafael Franco’s insurrection, in part attributable to the
effects of the Revolutionary propaganda disseminated by Reyes, prevented this action. 241
The Argentine Minister to Paraguay, Rodolfo Freyre, was a critic of Reyes’s activities,
claiming in a confidential letter to Argentine President Agustín P. Justo that the Mexican
Minister was a notorious Communist, who aided his Paraguayan “coreligionaries” in
indoctrinating and mobilising the youth of that country. 242
Grandson of the Porfirian Governor of the State of Nuevo León, nephew of the
renowned writer and diplomat Alfonso Reyes, and the eldest son of Rodolfo Reyes (who
was in exile in Spain), the young Bernardo took after his distinguished uncle rather than
his more conservative grandfather and father. 243 He was intensely active in Asunción,
founding the Asociación Cultural Paraguay-México, the Asociación de Prensa
Revolucionaria, and the Asociación Amigos de la Revolución Mexicana. He made radio
broadcasts, and distributed propaganda to workers’ and students’ groups. Minister
Howard reported these activities at first with amusement, but then amazement. 244
Bernardo Reyes became associated in diplomatic circles and the popular mind with the
new Rafael Franco government, and Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil War gave
Paraguayan opposition groups an avenue by which to criticise both the Mexican envoy
and the Leftist policies he represented, as well as the Rafael Franco regime itself.
241
United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box
4110, 712.34/2, Howard to Secretary of State, May 14, 1936.
242
Argentina, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Sala VII, Fondo Agustín P. Justo, Volúmen 3253,
Expediente 1936, Rodolfo Freyre to Justo, August 27, 1936.
243
Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil, 36-37, 112, 121-122. Rodolfo Reyes became an ardent
franquista, a thorn in the side of the Mexican Embassy until the end of the Spanish Civil War, and
eventually a member of the intelligentsia in Franco’s Spain.
244
United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/2, Howard to Secretary of State, May 14, 1936. He was
truly amazed by Bernardo Reyes’s challenge of Camilo Pérez Uribe to a duel (see Chapter Two).
102
Following the establishment by the Spanish Republic of the First Basque
Autonomous Government in Bilbao in October, reports reached the Americas that
Republican supporters in the city had scheduled the Paraguayan Consul for execution
following the discovery of correspondence with the insurgents in the diplomatic
pouch. 245 Reyes immediately cabled the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
Asunción to ask that the Mexican Consul in Bilbao intercede on behalf of his ill-fated
Paraguayan counterpart and ask the Republicans for clemency. 246 These efforts were in
vain, and Consul Martínez Arias was executed on November 20, precipitating a storm of
controversy in Asunción.
Despite the Mexican attempt to save the consul, its association with the
Republican cause was such that it too met the ire of Paraguayans. Reyes reported that
reactionary forces in Paraguay claimed that because the Mexican government had sold
arms to Spain, it was in effect Mexican bullets that had killed him. 247 These opposition
groups planned a protest against Mexico and its Spanish policy and Leftist groups
planned to answer this attack on Mexico with counter-protests. Reyes feared the duelling
protests would lead to violence between the opposing forces in the streets of Asunción. 248
Mexican Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay counselled him to do everything in his power to
prevent both of the protests from occurring. He suggested that Reyes attempt to convince
245
The Austrian Consul was similarly charged. New York Times, November 21, 1936, 2. Also see, “Claim 2
Consuls Slain as Rebel Spies in Spain,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 30, 1936, 1.
246
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 18, 1936.
247
T.G. Powell describes a similar rhetorical link in Portugal, from whence Daniel Cosío Villegas sent
home a political cartoon showing “a hydrophobic-looking Spanish ‘Red’ murdering several noncombatants with a gun marked ‘from Mexico.’” T.G. Powell, “Mexico,” in The Spanish Civil War, 193639: American Hemispheric Perspectives, eds. Mark Falcoff and Fredrick B. Pike (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1982), 62.
248
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 25, 1936.
103
the Paraguayan government that, aside from harming Mexico’s reputation, the
demonstrations might lead to the intensification of fascism in Asunción, and that
suspending the acts would be in Paraguay’s interest, more than in that of Mexico itself. 249
The mobilisations were accordingly suppressed by Rafael Franco’s government, which
Reyes reported maintained the utmost admiration for President Cárdenas, and was
categorically against allowing any attacks against Mexico. 250
Prevented from demonstrating against the Cárdenas government in the streets, the
Paraguayan opposition took their case to the press. The vitriolic articles they produced
even reached Argentina, where a number of Paraguayan exiles, including the ousted
President Ayala, had fled after the February uprising. The attacks met ready reception in
Catholic newspapers of Buenos Aires such as Crisol, and Ambassador Alfonso Reyes
was forced to defend both his nephew and Mexico’s Spanish policy in the Argentinean
press. 251 Both nephew and uncle periodically rectified articles that appeared in the two
nations’ newspapers, and the Paraguayan Foreign Ministry continued to support Bernardo
Reyes’s position. Nevertheless, subsequent reports from US Minister Howard suggest
that the young chargé d’affaires’s activities, and the policies he represented, continued to
serve as a lightning rod in Asunción. 252
The Paraguayan case provides an indication of the extent to which the Spanish
Civil War and Mexico’s support for the Spanish Republic became a part of the political
249
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Hay to Bernardo Reyes, November 26, 1936.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 18, 1936.
251
For examples from Crisol (Buenos Aires) and Ahora (Buenos Aires), see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III766-3; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10.
252
See United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/3, Howard to Secretary of State, October 29, 1936;
RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Howard to Secretary of State, November 25, 1936.
250
104
landscape of Latin America, shaping Mexico’s relations with governments and
individuals in the region. 253 Members of the Left and the Right clearly associated the
Republican cause with the Mexican Revolution and Cárdenas, and the actions of his
diplomats served to enhance these popular links. The Paraguayan example also
demonstrates how these issues crossed national boundaries in the region. With the
influence of the media, events in one place could easily affect domestic political opinion
in a neighbouring country. It is within this context that the government’s diplomacy
surrounding the Spanish Civil War must be seen. One of Cárdenas’s principal goals in
supporting the Spanish Republic and loudly imploring the rest of the international
community to do the same was to enshrine in the international system the principle of
non-intervention. This would help his own cause if domestic political opponents
attempted a comparable uprising in Mexico. 254 The story of his government’s relations
with Latin America sheds light on one of the ways he and his diplomats attempted to
achieve this—by garnering support from Latin America and Latin Americans.
Attack of the Exiles
While Mexican diplomacy was assailed verbally in Paraguay, in a startling
counter-example that underscores the shifting locations of Latin American reactions to
the Spanish Civil War, the diplomatic missions of Guatemala and El Salvador in the
253
For more on the Paraguayan reaction to the Spanish Civil War and the participation of Paraguayans in
the conflict, see Víctor M. Martínez and Tomás Vera, Milicianos paraguayos en la España republicana y
en la lucha contra la ocupación nazi de Francia (Asunción: QR Producciónes Gráficas, 2002).
254
Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil, 23.
105
Mexican capital were physically assaulted. 255 The Liberal regimes Shortly after midnight
on November 11, 1936, four Salvadoran students in Mexico City—Pedro Geoffrey Rivas,
Ricardo Jiménez Castillo, Julio Fausto Fernández, and Antonio Afura—and a Cuban
student named Antonio Mirán Dopicio boarded a taxi at the corner of Calle Cuba and Av.
Brasil heading for Av. Berlín, the location of the Salvadoran legation. While the taxi
driver waited for them at the corner, the young men threw an explosive through the
window of the legation at Berlin 19. Rather than allow them back in his taxi, Desiderio
Rivera Vásquez delayed their escape until the police arrived to investigate, whereupon
the four Salvadoran men were arrested for the crime. Half an hour later, the Guatemalan
Embassy at Salamanca 55 was also attacked by a group of men who arrived by car and
threw an explosive through the window. In this case the vandals sped away, delaying
their capture. Neither assault caused extensive damage, but the staffs of the diplomatic
missions (and the rest of the diplomatic corps) were shaken by the incidents. Octavio
Reyes Spíndola, in his capacity as Head of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
arrived at the missions in the middle of the night to assure Salvadoran Minister Antonio
Álvarez Vidaurre and Guatemalan Ambassador Manuel Echeverría y Viduarre that the
attacks were being taken seriously by the Mexican government, which would prosecute
the perpetrators of the attacks to the full extent of the law, and Mexican Foreign Minister
Hay visited the diplomatic missions the following day to reiterate this message. Reports
of the incidents quickly filled the pages of newspapers throughout Mexico, Guatemala,
and El Salvador and the initial flurry of coverage was extended when, on November 18,
255
The following summary is based upon the reports and relevant newspaper clippings contained in AHGE,
SRE, Expediente III-333-8.
106
the police arrested a Guatemalan exile named Luis Sánchez Romero and charged him
with the attack on his country’s embassy.
The first newspaper articles on the attacks reported that the Salvadoran
perpetrators had confessed that they committed the crime to protest their government’s
recognition of Franco’s rebel government at Burgos. 256 The dictatorial regimes of
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez and Jorge Ubico had wasted no time in recognising the
Spanish insurgency, drawing the ire of Leftist citizens of El Salvador and Guatemala who
had already fled the repression of their native countries and immigrated to Mexico as
political refugees. Reactions to this incident from the Guatemalan and Salvadoran press,
as well as the diplomatic corps, are indicative of transnational Latin American reactions
to the Spanish conflict and the Mexican government’s position on the war.
The majority of the newspaper articles that appeared in the Salvadoran press
immediately after the attacks on the missions were based on information supplied by the
Mexican Minister to El Salvador (also accredited to Nicaragua), Manuel Y. De Negri,
who had flown to San Salvador with copies of Mexican newspaper articles on the
events. 257 The Salvadoran papers gave full coverage of the story as it unfolded and
openly discussed the fact that the young men arrested for the crime purported to be
making a political statement about their government’s recognition of Franco. In his
telegram to the Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Antonio Álvarez
256
“Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino (San
Salvador), November 14, 1936.
257
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, De Negri to Hay, November 17, 1936.
107
Vidaurre stated that all of the men were communists, 258 and the newspapers revealed that
two of the four Salvadoran youths had recently been in Spain and carried safe conduct
documents issued by the Generalitat de Catalunya. 259 Guatemalan Ambassador Manuel
Echeverría y Viduarre initially assumed that the four Salvadoran youths had also been
responsible for the attack on the Guatemalan Embassy, going so far as to say that he
believed neither Mexicans nor Guatemalans could have been responsible for the act; the
Mexican people had demonstrated nothing but sympathy for his country, and although
some of the Guatemalans resident in Mexico were estranged from their government, they
were all honourable. 260 Beginning November 12, Guatemalan newspapers ran United
Press stories on the attacks, the perpetrators of which, it was reported, were all members
of the Frente Popular Español. 261 El Liberal Progresista editorialised that the attacks
served as a warning that, if they failed in Spain (as appeared imminent), communist
agitators would attempt to implant their ideas in Latin America. 262 El Imparcial
published an article that originally appeared in Excélsior that stated that the Salvadoran
youths were members of a foreign organisation called the Federación Anarquista Ibérica,
which counted no less than 200 members in Mexico, and called for the expulsion of
258
“Los Edificios De La Embajada De Guatemala Y De La Legación De El Salvador En México Sufrieron
Atentados,” La Prensa (San Salvador), November 14, 1936, 1.
259
“Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino,
November 14, 1936; “El Atentado Anarquista,” Diario Nuevo (San Salvador), November 14, 1936.
260
“Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino,
November 14, 1936; “Primeros Detalles Gráficos del Atentado Contra la Embajada de Guatemala y el
Salvador,” El Imparcial (Guatemala City), November 16, 1936, 1.
261
“Nuestra Embajada y la Legación Salvadoreña en México, Sufren Atropello,” El Liberal Progresista
(Guatemala City), November 12, 1936.
262
“Lamentable Incidente en México,” El Liberal Progresista, November 12, 1936.
108
foreign agitators from the country. 263 Upon the arrest of the José Luis Sánchez Romero,
the Guatemalan papers immediately began impugning his character. Although he too had
confessed to attacking the mission to protest the recognition of Franco by his
government, this was not highlighted by the Guatemalan press, which after delving into
public records, portrayed him as a common criminal who had stolen from and abused his
grandmother. El Imparcial concluded that he had fled his dishonourable life in
Guatemala for Mexico, where he was now passing himself off as a persecuted idealist. 264
Although it was reported that Sánchez Romero claimed to have suffered persecution in
Guatemala because he was a communist and a member of an organisation called the
Unión de las Repúblicas Centroamericanas, 265 the papers seemed to delight instead in
recounting his alleged relationship with a prostitute named Blanca Clondesa, whom he
had abandoned at a brothel in Guatemala when he quit the country. 266
Although the Salvadoran newspapers also published photographs and were
critical of the perpetrators of the damage to their country’s legation, the Guatemalan press
clearly outdid them in their discrediting José Luis Sánchez Romero. Government control
of the media in Guatemala was particularly tight, and the newspapers were considered by
Mexican representatives there to be government mouthpieces. 267 It was essential to the
Ubico regime that they discredit Sánchez Romero and, by association, his cause. The
263
“Extranjeros perniciosos en México, Un editorial de Excelsior sobre el atentado contra la embajada,” El
Imparcial, November 20, 1936. Also see the editorial from El Universal (Mexico City), which was
published in Guatemala under the title “Extranjeros Perniciosos,” El Imparcial, November 21, 1936.
264
“Complicado en el atentado a la embajada,” El Imparcial, November 23, 1936.
265
“Como fue atrapado en México el terrorista Sánchez Baten,” El Imparcial, November 25, 1936.
266
“Personalidad delincuente de Sánchez Romero,” Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City), November 23, 1936,
9.
267
AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada de México en Guatemala (AEMGUA), Legajo 13, Expediente 6,
Eduardo Espinosa to Emilio Portes Gil, January 4, 1935.
109
implication was that only social degenerates would question the dictator’s decision to
recognise the equally tyrannical Franco regime at Burgos. In the wake of the incident,
Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus had reported to the
Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Guatemalan coverage of the attack had not
been unfriendly towards the Cárdenas government. 268 Nevertheless, by linking the cause
of the Republic with anti-social behaviour, the articles would have served to further
discredit the Mexican government’s Spanish policy in the neighbouring country.
Foreign Minister Hay emphasised in his comments to the press, and in his official
communications with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan foreign ministries and missions,
that none of the perpetrators were Mexican citizens, and that he was pained by the fact
that individuals to whom the Mexican government had extended its hospitality would
abuse it by perpetrating these crimes against the diplomatic missions of friendly
nations. 269 His statement suggests that he was trying to shift the blame for the incidents
onto the foreign governments that had been attacked and absolve the Mexican
government of responsibility for the actions of the unruly political émigrés who, it might
be implied, were responding to the reactionary policies of their own governments. The
members of the diplomatic corps, on the other hand, felt that regardless of the men’s
political motives or their governments’ policies, the perpetrators had to be severely
268
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, November 30, 1936.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, telegram from Hay to Salvadoran Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Araujo, November 12, 1936; “Hubo un atentado contra a Legación salvadoreña en México,” Diario Nuevo,
November 14, 1936; “Secretario de RR.EE. de México lamenta el atentado contra la Legación
Salvadoreña,” El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador), November 14, 1936; “Mensaje del Ministro de Relaciones
de México Sr. Hay,” Diario Latino, November 14, 1936; “El Gobierno de México Manifiesta Su
Sentimiento Por el Atentado a Las Legaciones de Guatemala y El Salv.”, Patria (San Salvador), November
14, 1936.
269
110
punished to prevent future attacks on foreign missions, and believed the Mexican
government had not prosecuted the men to the full extent of the law as Reyes Spíndola
had promised Echeverría y Vidaurre and Álvarez Vidaurre in the wee hours of the
morning on November 11. Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Manuel Bianchi, was
outraged when, days after their arrest, the convicted men were fined 500 pesos and
released from jail. 270 He suggested to the dean of the diplomatic corps, who happened to
be Guatemalan Ambassador Echeverría y Vidaurre, that they meet to discuss the
“impunity” they believed the attackers had received in the Mexican courts. Presenting a
united front, the diplomatic corps nominated US Ambassador Josephus Daniels to present
their concerns to Foreign Minister Hay. 271 A month later, Bianchi reported that the
presiding judge in the case, David Pastrana Jaime, who had made comments to the press
to the effect that the attack on the Salvadoran Legation had been “a symbolic act,” was
transferred to Baja California, apparently on the direct orders of President Cárdenas.
Nevertheless, the perpetrators remained on the streets of Mexico City, and Bianchi stated
that Foreign Minister Hay had suspended meetings with members of the diplomatic corps
for two weeks in a demonstration of his displeasure at its members’ intervention in the
matter. 272
The Mexican judge’s comments to the press suggest that he may have
sympathised with the men who had attempted to set fire to the Salvadoran Legation and
the Guatemalan Embassy to protest their governments’ recognition of Franco, and his
270
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, November 28, 1936.
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Copia del acta de la sesión celebrada por el curpo
diplomático el día veinticuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos treinta y seis.
272
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, December 19, 1936.
271
111
statements legitimised their violent form of protest. The members of the diplomatic corps,
on the other hand, were concerned with the rule of law in the city and their own safety.
By exiling the judge to Baja California, Cárdenas demonstrated his support for the
diplomatic representatives resident in Mexico, but Hay’s pettiness suggests that he would
brook no criticism of the Foreign Ministry’s handling of the affair. Implicit in his refusal
to meet with diplomatic representatives was Hay’s agreement with the judge that the
“symbolic acts” of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan exiles were a result of their own
governments’ misguided policies; his condemnation of the Spanish policies of Jorge
Ubico and Maximiliano Hernández Martínez was understood in his reaction.
The attacks on the Salvadoran Legation and the Guatemalan Embassy and the
responses they met in the press of El Salvador and Guatemala, the Mexican government,
and the Mexican diplomatic corps demonstrate the range of reactions the Spanish Civil
War prompted in Latin America. That Central American exiles in Mexico City would
attack their own diplomatic missions to protest their governments’ recognition of Franco
with near impunity, creating conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic
corps, suggests the transnational reverberations of Cárdenas’s policies. While the violent
reactions of these “degenerate” émigrés only strengthened the Guatemalan and
Salvadoran governments’ belief in the righteousness of their attitudes towards the
Spanish conflict and further isolated the Mexican government from its neighbours, it
bound more tightly the causes of Spain and Mexico in the popular and diplomatic mind.
Furthermore, the incident demonstrates that diplomatic missions were spaces of
112
contestation, where the Latin American reactions to Mexican diplomacy would continue
play out throughout the Spanish Civil War.
Representing the Republic
Spanish Republican organisations sometimes met at Mexican embassies and
legations in Latin America, thereby presenting their conservative critics with further
evidence of the communist conspiracies they imagined. As Bernardo Reyes and other
Mexican diplomats discovered, they walked a fine between supporting the legitimately
constituted government of Spain and its allies and risking accusations of interference in
the internal affairs of the countries to which they were accredited. In their official
capacities, members of the Mexican Foreign Service did all they could to support the
Republican government, often taking charge of the archives of Spanish embassies and
legations. Following the outbreak of hostilities, many Spanish diplomats who were
sympathetic to the insurgency resigned in order to show their support, while others
remained in their posts and undermined the government they ostensibly represented. As a
result, the Republican government asked Mexican diplomats to represent Spanish
interests, sometimes for extended periods, in Panama, Peru, and several other Latin
American countries. 273 In February 1937, Ambassador Alfonso Reyes telegraphed
273
Mexican diplomatic reports indicate that “traitorous” Spanish diplomats operated in Panama and Peru,
among other locations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-6; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-8. On the
Peruvian reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Thomas M. Davies, Jr., “Peru,” in The Spanish Civil War,
1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 203-244; Willy Pinto Gamboa, Sobre fascismo y literatura:
La Guerra Civil española en La Prensa, El Comercio y La Crónica, 1936-1939 (Lima: Editorial Cibeles,
1983); Gerold Gino Bauman, Extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española: los peruanos (Lima: Industrial
Gráfica, 1979).
113
Foreign Minister Hay to inform him that the Spanish Ambassador in Buenos Aires had
asked him to request that the Mexican government take charge of the archives of the
Spanish legation at Montevideo, Uruguay. 274 Since the Uruguayan government’s
September 22, 1936 suspension of relations with the Republican government following
the violent deaths of the sisters of Uruguay’s Vice-consul in Madrid, 275 the legation’s
archives had been in the charge of “fascist diplomats.” 276 The Republicans intended to
send a representative loyal to their cause to Montevideo and wanted to prevent the
archives from going directly from fascist to loyalist hands, and proposed that Mexico’s
Minister Luis Padilla Nervo transfer the documents from one group to the other. 277
Assured of Mexican diplomats’ support, this was the type of delicate diplomatic mission
the Republican government entrusted to its closest allies, but in fact Padilla Nervo’s
assignment became much greater: he and his successors at Montevideo represented
Spanish interests there until the Uruguayan government’s recognition of Franco in
February 1939. 278
Like their government, members of the Spanish colony in Latin America also
believed that the Mexican government should represent their interests when their own
274
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, 19 February, 1937.
Both the Mexican chargé d’affaires in Montevideo, Antonio Méndez Fernández, and the Uruguayan
Minister to Mexico, Hugo V. de Pena, informed Foreign Minister Hay of the suspension of relations.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Méndez to Hay, 22 September, 1936; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III769-1, de Pena to Hay, September 30, 1936. By contrast, eight Colombian nationals were killed by
Republicans in October 1936, but the Liberal government of Alfonso López Pumarejo did not break
relations with the Republican government, undoubtedly because it was much more sympathetic to the
Republic than its Uruguayan counterpart. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-4. On the Colombian reaction to
the Spanish Civil War, see David Bushnell, “Colombia,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American
Hemispheric Perspectives, 159-202.
276
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, 19 February, 1937.
277
Luis Padilla Nervo went on to become Foreign Minister during the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
(1952-1958). For his personnel file see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-6.
278
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Minister Manuel Y. De Negri to Hay, March 5, 1939.
275
114
diplomats failed them. In November 1936, several members of the Spanish colony in San
José, Costa Rica presented themselves confidentially at the Mexican legation, following
the resignation of Spain’s Minister Gonzalo de Ojeda y Brooke, to ask chargé d’affaires
Salvador Martínez de Alva to take over their representation. 279 Although Martínez de
Alva did not take over Spanish interests in the country, it is significant that these
members of the Frente Popular Español would immediately think to ask the Mexican
legation for assistance. When Antonio de la Villa Gutiérrez arrived in October 1937 to
take up the post of Consul General in San José at the direction of the Republican
government, the Costa Rican government did not accept his credentials, preferring to
recognise neither the Republic nor the insurgency, thereby maintaining “strict neutrality”
in the conflict and calm in the Spanish colony in San José. 280 As a result, the Mexican
legation became an unofficial representative of Republican interests in the country. 281 On
April 14, 1937, the Anniversary of the Second Spanish Republic, another group of
Spanish Leftists visited Martínez de Alva, this time to express their gratitude for Mexican
Minister to the League of Nations Isidro Fabela’s defence of the Spanish Republic in that
forum. 282 Fabela’s note to the Non-Intervention Committee was reprinted in newspapers
throughout the world, and it elicited substantial comment in the Latin American press. 283
279
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Martínez de Alva to Hay, November 4, 1936.
“El Gobierno no reconocerá las letras patentes ni extendera el exequatur al nuevo Consul General del
Gobierno de Valencia,” Diario de Costa Rica (San José), October 26, 1937.
281
On the Costa Rican reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Angel María Ríos Esparíz, Costa Rica y la
Guerra Civil Española (San José: Editorial Porvenir, 1997).
282
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Martínez de Alva to Hay, April 15, 1937.
283
Also in celebration of Fabela’s pronouncement, the Comité de Amigos de México en el Uruguay was
formed at a meeting of the Círculo Republicano Español in Montevideo. “Amigos de Mejico en el
Uruguay,” La Tarde (Montevideo) May 4, 1937. On Isidro Fabela and Mexico’s defence of Spain in the
League of Nations, see Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cárdenas (Mexico City: Altamira, 1947); Isidro
Fabela, La Política Internacional del Presidente Cárdenas 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1975);
280
115
On this occasion, Martínez de Alva offered the Spaniards cocktails and talked with them
for several hours. Given the space devoted in the press to Fabela’s pronouncements, there
may have been a shared sense of excitement at this social gathering, where the likeminded expatriates celebrated the cause that brought them together. Nevertheless, when
members of the Spanish colony next met at the Mexican legation in December 1938, the
war seemed almost lost. As winter approached, their thoughts turned to providing relief
to the civilian population, and they aimed to organise a fundraising campaign. Before
allowing them to hold the meeting at the legation, the new chargé d’affaires, Romeo
Ortega, was careful to ask permission of the Costa Rican President, who sent a delegate
to watch over the proceedings, presumably to ensure that the Mexican representative was
not stepping outside the bounds of diplomatic protocol. 284 After Franco’s victory in April
1939, the Grupo Pro-República Española of San José gave Ortega a letter thanking
President Cárdenas for his “exemplary and tireless aid to Spain.” 285 The Mexican
government’s assistance had not prevented the fall of the legally constituted government
of Spain; Cárdenas’s representatives throughout Latin America shared with the Spanish
colony the triumphs and the eventual defeat of the Republic.
By associating themselves so closely with Leftist members of the Spanish colony,
Mexican representatives often opened themselves up to criticism in conservative circles
and in the press. Not all were as careful or as diplomatic as Romeo Ortega. In Venezuela,
the conservative regime of Eleazar López Contreras had requested the recall of chargé
Fedro Guillén, Fabela y su tiempo (Mexico City: UNAM, 1989); Fernando Serrano Migallón (ed.), Con
certera visión: Isidro Fabela y su tiempo (Mexico City: FCE, 2000); Fernando Serrano Migallón, Isidro
Fabela y la diplomacia mexicana (Mexico City: SEP, 1981).
284
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Ortega to Hay, December 8, 1938.
285
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Isidro Perera and Ricardo Nimo to Cárdenas, May 15, 1939.
116
d’affaires José Rendón y Ponce after he published a letter in April 1938 that criticised the
Venezuelan government for both recognising Franco and inviting his representative to a
celebration in honour of Simón Bolívar. Although his ejection was related more to the
Venezuelan government’s reaction to Mexico’s oil expropriation, the representative’s
incautious public condemnation of Venezuela’s Spanish policy assured his prompt
removal. 286
Most diplomats knew better than to openly criticise the governments to which
they were accredited, but it was often difficult to draw the line between supporting the
Spanish Republic and running the risk of being accused of interference in internal affairs,
especially given the polarising effect the Civil War had on Latin American society. In
July 1937, Mexico’s representative in Managua, Nicaragua, Pablo Campos Ortiz, was
instructed not to distribute pro-Republican propaganda, including the book No pasarán,
without the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book’s authorship
is not mentioned, but given the date, it may have been by Octavio Paz, Upton Sinclair, or
another pro-Republican author. 287 This may have been overly cautious, but his
predecessor, Carlos Baumbach, had been transferred to Santiago after the Nicaraguan
government complained about his distribution of “Leftist” propaganda in the capital,
which he claimed had all been supplied to him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Mexico, but which the Nicaraguans nevertheless found objectionable. 288 The propaganda
286
See Chapter Four. November 20, 1937 marked the founding in Venezuela of the Sociedad de Amigos de
España y México. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-2.
287
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-5, SRE to Campos Ortiz, July 9, 1937.
288
Upton Sinclair, ¡No pasarán! (They Shall Not Pass): A Story of the Battle of Madrid (Mexico City:
Editorial Masas, 1937); Octavio Paz, ¡No pasaran! (Mexico City: Simbad, 1936). See Baumbach’s
117
distributed by Baumbach and other diplomats usually included pamphlets and books on
the Mexican Revolution, its ideological bases, and its accomplishments, as well as
information on the Cárdenas government’s defence of Spain. 289 As Bernardo Reyes had
discovered in Paraguay, these were tracts thought in some circles to spread revolution in
Latin America. Moreover, because domestic political groups differentiated themselves on
the basis of their positions on the Spanish Civil War, non-Spanish members of proRepublican groups sometimes spoke out against their governments at their meetings.
Mexican diplomats could not be seen to be encouraging criticism of the governments to
which they were accredited, and on the instruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs they
often had to decline invitations to these festivals, banquets, and meetings. Padilla Nervo
reported from Montevideo in August 1937 that at a thousand-strong ceremony of the
Comité de Comerciantes e Industriales Pro Ayuda al Gobierno Democrático Español,
which he had declined to attend, invited speakers who were members of the Uruguayan
opposition had criticised the Uruguayan government. 290 For Padilla, this underscored the
importance of maintaining some distance from pro-Republican groups, despite his
obvious sympathy for their cause and, he implies, the Uruguayan opposition. As Alfonso
Reyes had predicted, the Spanish question soon became a matter of domestic politics, not
only in Argentina, but throughout the region.
personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-3-1 (III), Baumbach to Hay, December 8, 1936. Baumbach’s
radio broadcasts, entitled “Noche Mexicana,” were also suppressed.
289
See for example the first issue in the Cuadernos Populares series, México y la Guerra de España
(Mexico City: Verdad de España, n.d. [1938?]). Reproduction of original in the University of California,
San Diego Library, Spanish Civil War Collection, microfilm reel 23, item 935.
290
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Padilla Nervo to Hay, August 19, 1937. Padilla Nervo’s report
includes related newspaper clippings and a copy of a memorandum by a member of the Spanish legation in
Montevideo who attended the event.
118
Culture as Politics
By praising the Spanish Republic—or Mexico’s efforts to support it—domestic
political groups in countries with more conservative governments were in effect
criticising their own governments. These conflicts were often played out in both elite and
popular culture during this period. In everything from elite book launches to
sensationalist radio plays, Latin American reactions to Mexico’s Spanish policy were at
issue. After attending Alberto Vaccarezza’s play Lo que pasó a Reynoso at the National
Theatre in Buenos Aires in the company of the Spanish Ambassador to Argentina, 291
Alfonso Reyes feared repercussions when, during his ovation, the playwright thanked in
the same breath both former President and Radical Party leader Marcelo T. de Alvear and
Reyes for their attendance. Associating his name with that of the head of the Argentine
opposition might give the impression of his support for Alvear and lead to accusations of
his interference in domestic politics. 292 No wonder, then, that Reyes avoided mixing too
much in society; even when attending cultural events that fed his intellectual pursuits he
ran the risk of embroiling himself in domestic Argentine concerns. In his memorandum
on the heads of foreign missions at Buenos Aires for 1937, British Ambassador Sir
Esmond Ovey described Reyes as an amicable individual who rarely attended official
entertainments because of his studious nature. As for Reyes’s politics, Ovey said that he
was not sure: “I should imagine that his communism, if it exists, is rather of an
intellectual than violent character.” 293
291
The Argentine poet and playwright’s production was later adapted for the screen (directed by Leopoldo
Torres Ríos, 1937 and directed by Leopoldo Torres Ríos, 1955).
292
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, July 13, 1936.
293
United Kingdom, National Archives, Foreign Office (FO) 371/21412, Ovey to Eden, February 3, 1938.
119
Ambassador Reyes certainly wished the demands of the Foreign Service were
fewer, in order that he might dedicate himself more completely to literature, but he also
avoided some events for political reasons; Reyes was prevented from attending several
meetings on Spanish themes and conferences organised in favour of Mexico during 1936.
In one example, the Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas para la Defensa de la Cultura
paid homage to Cárdenas’s Spanish policy at the Teatro Rivera Indarte in Córdoba on
November 20, 1936. Reyes was concerned that the invited speakers—including
prominent individuals such as former Ecuadorean president José María Velasco Ibarra,
Benito Marianetti, José Peco, Arturo Orzábal Quintana, Deodoro Roca, Reginaldo
Manubens Calvet, Gregorio Bermann, Juan Lazarte, Sergio Bagú, and José María
Lunazzi—would openly criticise the Justo government, so in order to avoid prejudicing
Mexico’s relations with Argentina he declined to attend, using as a plausible excuse his
preparations for the upcoming Conferencia Interamericana para la Consolidación de la
Paz. 294 Even if the event did not include any overt attacks against the government, he
reasoned, it in itself could be taken as a critique of the Justo regime. Although the police
did not close down the huge meeting, Reyes’s fears were confirmed when Gregorio
Bermann, a tenured professor of psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine at Córdoba, was
fired after helping to organise the event. 295 This followed the expulsion of Professors
Orzábal Quintana and Aníbal Ponce for their participation in an event commemorating
294
AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada Mexicana en Argentina (AEMARG), Legajo 46, Expediente 4,
Alfonso Reyes to Hay, November 4, 1936; AHGE, SRE, AEMARG, Legajo 46, Expediente 4, Hay to
Alfonso Reyes, November 17, 1936. For clippings from Córdoba and Buenos Aires on the event, see
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10.
295
AHGE, SRE, AEMARG, Legajo 46, Expediente 4, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 22, 1936. “Desde
las Sacristías de San Ignacio se Mueve la Campaña Reaccionaria,” Crítica (Buenos Aires), December 21,
1936. For clippings see AHGE, SRE, III-766-3.
120
the death of García Lorca. 296 The police in the capital subsequently prohibited all public
meetings in favour of Spain and Mexico. 297 Even the organisers of the proposed
Argentine-Mexican Cultural Institute decided to delay the commencement of their
activities for fear of reprisals. 298
Eventually, however, Alfonso Reyes’s own intellectual pursuits provided the
Spanish community with an opportunity to tie the Mexican ambassador to their cause.
Upon the publication of Reyes’s book Las vísperas de España by Victoria Ocampo’s
press SUR in 1937, the Spanish colony in Buenos Aires organised a great celebration of
his work. 299 Many Spanish expatriate organisations joined together to form a special
organising committee for the banquet they held in his honour on December 26, 1937 at
the Salón Casablanca. 300 Attended by an audience of nearly three thousand—including
representatives of Argentina’s Congress, intelligentsia, labour movement, and press—the
celebration, presided over by Spain’s chargé d’affaires Felipe Jiménez de Asúa and
Consul General Manuel Blasco Garzón, was a huge success. Although Las vísperas de
España dealt with Reyes’s experiences in Spain from 1914-1924 and did not specifically
address the Spanish Civil War, his sympathies were clear in the names of the people he
296
AHGE, SRE, III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, October 30, 1936.
“Se prohibe todo homenaje a España y a Méjico en la República Argentina,” La Nueva España (Buenos
Aires), November 28, 1936.
298
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, November 13, 1936.
299
Alfonso Reyes, Las vísperas de España (Buenos Aires: SUR, 1937). Also see Hector Perea (ed.) España
en la obra de Alfonso Reyes (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1990).
300
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV). Publicity for the event dated December 1937 found in Alfonso
Reyes’s personnel file states that it was organised by the Comisión Organizadora del Homenaje al Sr.
Embajador de México Dr. Alfonso Reyes, which comprised the following organisations: Centro
Republicano Español, Amigos de la República Española, Casa Catalá, Federación de Sociedades Gallegas,
Agrupación Vasca Amigos República Española, Patronato Español de Ayuda a Víctimas Antifascistas,
Sociedad Regional Valenciana “El Micalet”, Agrupación Asturiana de Ayuda al Gobierno Leal,
Agrupación Portuguesa de Amigos de la República Española, Círculo Extremeño, Agrupación Soriana,
Agrupación Leonesa, Casa de Galicia.
297
121
acknowledged in the preface: Manuel Azaña, Enrique Díez-Canedo, Juan Ramón
Jiménez, and others. Reyes said that the publication of his book was merely a “a grand
explosion of love, enthusiasm, gratitude, and applause for Mexico’s international
conduct.” His arrival and his speech met with ¡Vivas! to Mexico from the entire
auditorium. 301 Although he may have put the banquet in this light out of modesty (or to
please Foreign Minister Hay), the suppressed homages to Spain and Mexico of the
previous year suggest that Buenos Aires’s leftists had found a way around these bans by
lauding Alfonso Reyes’s writing. Moreover, it seems that the banquet had the desired
effect of celebrating Mexico’s support of the Spanish Republic, thereby contrasting it to
the attitude of the Argentine government and implicitly criticising the conservative
regime. 302 Only four blocks away, a pro-fascist banquet was being held in honour of
Franco’s representative in Buenos Aires, Eugenio Montes, the conservative Catholic
Spanish writer who had helped found the Falange. Mounted police and forty additional
officers on foot were stationed outside the Casablanca to ensure that the duelling literary
events did not disturb the peace. 303 Although hostilities did not break out, the politically-
301
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 27, 1937. Several newspaper
clippings accompany this report.
302
On the Argentine reaction to the Civil War, see Mark Falcoff, “Argentina,” in The Spanish Civil War,
1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 291-348; Academy of Sciences of the USSR, “Argentina,”
in International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975),
31-39; Beatriz J. Figallo, Diplomáticos y marinos argentinos durante la crisis española: los asilos de la
Guerra Civil (Buenos Aires: Histórica, 2007); Beatriz J. Figallo, La Argentina ante la Guerra Civil
Española: el asilo diplomático y el asilo naval (Rosario: Pontifica Universidad Católica Argentina, 1996);
Ernesto Goldar, Los argentinos y la guerra civil española (Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto, 1986);
Víctor Trifone and Gustavo Svarzman, La repercusión de la guerra civil española en la Argentina (19361939) (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1993); Dora Schwarzstein, “Actores sociales y
política inmigratoria en la Argentina. La llegada de los republicanos españoles,” Estudios Migratorios
Latinoamericanos 12:37 (Dec., 1997): 423-445; Dora Schwarzstein, Entre Franco y Peron: Memoria e
Identidad del Exilio Republicano Española en Argentina (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001).
303
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 27, 1937.
122
charged atmosphere created by the celebration of Alfonso Reyes’s work demonstrates the
extent to which the homage was indeed a proxy for the commemoration of the Spanish
Republic, and the role that Reyes, as a representative of the Cárdenas government, had
played in supporting it. 304 By extension, the participants also criticised outgoing
President Justo’s hostility to the Republic and the ideas that it and the Mexican
Revolution stood for.
Although the example of the reception given in honour of the publication of Las
vísperas de España is particularly salient, the Republic’s supporters did not confine
themselves to the use of literature in promoting their cause and celebrating Mexico’s
support. Intellectuals and activists also used a broad range of media, including radio, to
get their message across to working people throughout the Americas. President Cárdenas
had condemned Nationalist aerial bombardments of civilian populations in his address to
the first congress of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM), held in
Mexico City in February of 1938. 305 He called upon the workers of the world to unite in
their condemnation of these atrocities and his words were reprinted in newspapers and
broadcast on radios throughout the region. Sympathetic intellectuals, including Cuba’s
Nicolás Guillén and Alejo Carpentier, immediately cabled their support of Cárdenas’s
304
See Victor Díaz Arciniega (ed.), Misión diplomática, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, 2001); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Alfonso Reyes y el llanto de España en Buenos Aires
(Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998); Eduardo Robledo Rincón, Alfonso Reyes en
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Embajada de México, 1998); María Cecilia Zuleta Miranda, “Alfonso Reyes y
las relaciones México-Argentina: proyectos y realidades, 1926-1936,” Historia Mexicana XLV:4 (1996):
867-904. Also see Fred P. Ellison (ed.), Alfonso Reyes en Brasil (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 2000);
Francisco Valdés Teviño, La diplomacia mexicana: cancilleres y embajadores de Nuevo León (Monterrey:
Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, 2001).
305
“Discurso del Presidente de la República ante el Primer Congreso Nacional de la Confederación de
Trabajadores de México. México, D.F., 24 de febrero de 1938,” Palabras y Documentos Públicos de
Lázaro Cárdenas vol. 1 (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1978), 277-281.
123
pronouncement, and the reactions of organised labour throughout the region were also
particularly strong. 306 One of the reasons that this support reached such heights, despite
Latin American governments’ disinclination to support Cárdenas’s statement, was the
dissemination of the message in popular culture.
Many governments were reticent to support Cárdenas’s declaration because of his
call for the unification of Latin American workers. The Ministry of Foreign Relations
forwarded copies of the speech to Ambassadors and Ministers in Latin America with
instructions that it be given “maximum publicity” in each country. 307 In Guatemala,
owing to government control of the press, Ambassador Cienfuegos y Camus had great
difficulty fulfilling this request. He met with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Skinner Klée
to obtain his permission to publish the speech, but the Minister refused. Although the
government and the citizenry as a whole were opposed to attacks on civilian populations,
he reasoned that encouraging Guatemalan workers as a group to censure the aerial
bombardments might “provoke class war” by elevating one sector of society against
others. Guatemala did not have a significant working class such as that of Mexico, he
reminded the Ambassador; its workers did not have the same needs or importance to
society. 308 Workers in similarly unindustrialised Nicaragua, on the other hand,
306
Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo Presidentes, Fondo LCR (AGN, LCR), Caja 456,
Expediente 433/178, telegram to Cárdenas from members of the Liga de Escritores y Artistas
Revolucionarios (LEAR) then resident in Paris, February 26, 1938.
307
AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 11, Expediente 1, telegram from Hay to Cienfuegos y Camus,
February 24, 1938.
308
AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 11, Expediente 1, memorandum by Skinner Klée, February 28, 1938.
124
immediately supported Cárdenas’s proposal following its publication in their country. 309
They offered their unqualified cooperation to Mexican workers, declaring that in a time
of such brutality and universal catastrophe, Cárdenas’s declaration filled them with
pride. 310 When faced with official intransigence, supporters of Cárdenas and the Republic
disseminated the message among workers and other members of the public as best they
could, securing space in the publications of workers and the Spanish colony when they
could not get printed in large daily newspapers. Another innovative strategy they
employed, at least in one interesting case, was radio drama.
.
The Mexican Minister in La Paz, Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, forwarded a copy
of a Bolivian radio play written both to laud and publicise Cárdenas’s condemnation of
aerial bombardments to the foreign ministry. 311 Written by René Carrasco Bustillo, the
play told a fictional story of a Spanish family’s experience of the bombardment of their
small town in Spain. As the grandfather of the family and his cronies listened to
Cárdenas’s speech to the CTM over Spanish radio and discussed politics, Nationalist
bombers approached the town. The mother of the family was out doing the shopping and
was caught in the street during the bombardment. In an emotional portrayal of the
Spanish tragedy, the grandfather and the woman’s four children cry in anguish when they
see her lifeless body on the sidewalk as they run for the town’s bomb shelter. The play
309
“El discurso trascendental del Presidente Cárdenas,” La Prensa (Managua), February 27, 1938;
“Propone El Presidente Cárdenas Un Congreso Mundial De Trabajadores,” Novedades (Managua),
February 26, 1938; “Grandes Voces del Día,” La Noticia (Managua), February 26, 1938.
310
AGN, LCR, Caja 456, Expediente 433/178, Nacional Sindicalismo Nicaragüence to Cárdenas, February
28, 1938.
311
AGN, LCR, Caja 458, Expediente 433/280. Ernesto Hidalgo forwarded a copy of the play, which had
been received by the Mexican Legation in Bolivia, to the Office of the President on June 1, 1938.
125
ends with the question “In times such as these, what civilised man will not join in
President Cárdenas’s humanitarian protest?”
Highly pathetic in tone and rather sensationalist in nature, the radio play aimed to
entertain. Its message also rang clear and true, and on March 7, 1938, the Confederación
Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia and the Bolivian Partido Obrero resolved to support
Cárdenas’s declaration. When he forwarded a copy of the resolution to President
Cárdenas, the secretary of the Bolivian legation in Mexico, Carlos Dorado Chopitea,
informed him that Mexico’s voice could be heard by all of Latin America. 312
Re-broadcasts of Cárdenas’s speech, and Carrasco Bustillo’s radio play were
examples of how new media could disseminate the news so that it reached workers and
other members of the public who might not have attended a literary event such as that
offered in honour of Alfonso Reyes. At both ends of the cultural spectrum, supporters of
the Republic and Mexico deployed culture in their battle to defend the loyalist
government of Spain. Intellectuals and activists’ efforts in this regard also influenced the
diplomatic stage as workers helped keep the issue of aerial bombardments on the agenda.
Cárdenas condemned aerial bombardments again at the inauguration of the September
1938 Congreso Internacional Contra La Guerra, 313 and at the VIII Pan American
Conference held in Lima, Peru, the Mexican government proposed a Convention Relating
to the Prohibition of Aerial Bombardments. Prior to the meeting, and in order to make
sure the convention would pass, Mexican diplomats throughout the region were charged
312
AGN, LCR, Caja 458, Expediente 433/280, Carlos Dorado Chopitea to Cárdenas, April 26, 1938.
“Discurso del Presidente de la República en el Acto de Inauguración del Congreso Internacional Contra
la Guerra. México, D.F., 10 de septiembre de 1938,” Palabras y Documentos Públicos, 321-326.
313
126
with the responsibility of sounding out the governments to which they were accredited.
The Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago solicited and received the unwavering support
of the Chilean government. 314 In this way, the efforts of diplomats dovetailed with those
of activists and workers who had kept this humanitarian issue on the agenda through the
use of the culture.
Niños de España
The classic example of Mexico’s humanitarian aid in the Civil War is certainly
Cárdenas’s celebrated acceptance of tens of thousands of Spanish Republican refugees.
Although the emphasis has been on the intellectual contributions that the more prominent
refugees made to Mexican society, 315 this policy also had a significant effect on Mexico’s
relations with Latin America, particularly as it related to Mexico’s reputation among
intellectuals, Leftists, and Spanish immigrants in the region. The coordinated effort to
find asylum for thousands of Republicans had roots in Mexico’s earlier acceptance of
Spaniards fleeing their war-torn society, including the famous niños de Morelia, and by
the end of the war the Mexican government played an established role in co-ordinating
the evacuation of refugees that raised its reputation among sympathetic individuals and
groups throughout the region.
314
Chile, MRE, AGHD, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1698 A, Memorandum No. E 9/173.
Sebastiaan Faber, Exile and Cultural Hegemony: Spanish Intellectuals in Mexico, 1939-1975 (Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 2002). See especially the literature on the founding of the Casa de España en
México, which became El Colegio de México. Clara E. Lida, José Antonio Matesanz, Josefina Zoraida
Vázquez, La Casa de España y el Colegio de México: memoria, 1938-2000 (Mexico City: El Colegio de
México, 2000); Clara E. Lida and José Antonio Matsanz, El Colegio de México: una hazaña cultural,
1940-1962 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1990); Clara E. Lida, La Casa de España en México
(Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988).
315
127
Gabriela Mistral expressed admiration of the Cárdenas government’s
humanitarian assistance to Spain. The illustrious Chilean author, who went on to win the
Nobel Prize in literature in 1945, was heart-broken by what she deemed “the shameful
deafness” of both Latin American and European governments toward the tragedy taking
place in Spain. 316 Mistral, “the teacher from the Valley of Elqui,” began her career as an
educator and wrote extensively on this theme, as well as composing poetry and lullabies
for children. 317 She wrote that the Mexican government’s assistance to victims of the
Civil War “soothed her American conscience,” and was thankful that Daniel Cosío
Villegas, then Mexico’s Minister to Portugal, had arranged for ten Spanish teachers to
leave for Mexico. 318 She wished her own country were as generous, and was particularly
concerned about the fate of the many children affected by the conflict. 319 After the fall of
Bilbao in June 1937, Mistral wrote to celebrated Argentine author Victoria Ocampo to
propose that SUR, the press Ocampo had recently founded, publish the manuscript of
verse she had just completed. 320 Mistral explained that she wanted the proceeds of the
316
Reprinted in Elizabeth Horan and Doris Meyer (eds.), This America of Ours: The Letters of Gabriela
Mistral and Victoria Ocampo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 45. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria
Ocampo, July or early August, 1937.
317
Marie-Lise Gazarian-Gautier, Gabriela Mistral: La maestra de Elqui (Buenos Aires: Crespillo, 1973),
translated as Gabriela Mistral, the teacher from the Valley of Elqui (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1975). Gabriela Mistral’s Ternura (Madrid: Saturnino Calleja, 1924) is the most famous example of her
writing for children.
318
Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 44. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, January 24, 1937.
Although Mistral does not mention Cosío Villegas by name in this passage, it seems clear that he is the
“friendly minister” to whom she referred. She is even more explicit in her praise of Cosío Villegas in her
letters to Alfonso Reyes. Luis Vargas Saavedra (ed.), Tan de usted: epistolario de Gabriela Mistral con
Alfonso Reyes (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1991). Also see Alberto Enríquez Perea
(ed.), Daniel Cosío Villegas y su misión en Portugal, 1936-1937 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, 1998); Enrique Krauze, Daniel Cosío Villegas, una biografía intelectual (Mexico City:
Tusquets, 2001); Daniel Cosío Villegas, Memorias (Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz, 1976).
319
On the Chilean reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Paul W. Drake, “Chile,” in The Spanish Civil
War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 245-290.
320
Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 48. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, August 4, 1937.
128
book to go to the Basque refugee children in the Residencia Pedralbes in Barcelona.
Scathing in her critique of the indifference with which Latin America met the plight of
these children, Mistral aimed to do her own small part to help them.
Our America, blinded by political fanaticism, has crossed its arms.
Except Mexico, which has accepted 6,000 and is going to receive
more. My Basque Chile, Hispanophile Peru, and the rest of our
people have pretended to not know what’s going on. 321
Although she would have preferred for the children to be able to stay in Spain, the social
dislocations of the war were tremendous, and after the book’s publication in 1938, she
wrote to Ocampo that, although she had intended the proceeds for a Spanish orphanage,
she believed the money had to go to those children wandering in the Pyrenees.” 322 The
fall of Barcelona in January 1939 had forced the children to move once again.
The book of poems Gabriela Mistral published with SUR in 1938 was Tala, a
collection that is clearly rooted in the experiences she had travelling in the Americas and
Europe. 323 In the front matter, Mistral acknowledges the shame she felt on behalf of the
passive Latin American governments that refused to aid in the plight of the Spanish
children who had been “scattered to the four winds.” She confessed shame at the inaction
of the Latin American nations. 324 Coming from the moral den mother of Latin America,
this was strong criticism indeed. By contrast, Mistral dedicates the book to Mexico. She
had begun her journeys there in 1922 at the invitation of Minister of Education José
321
Ibid.
Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 88. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, early February 1939.
323
I thank Gordon Brotherston, who suggested Tala to me as source for this chapter. Gabriela Mistral, Tala
(Buenos Aires: SUR, 1938).
324
Ibid.
322
129
Vasconcelos, and the influence the country and its Revolutionary process had on her is
most appreciable in the poem “El maíz,” but references to Mexico and its pre-Hispanic
past pervade the American section of the collection. 325 Mistral was clearly moved by the
example Mexico had set for the rest of Latin America, and her words surely touched her
many readers, particularly her ardent followers in Latin American educational circles
who, like her, were concerned for the youngest victims of fascist aggression in Spain.
Mistral’s decision to use the profits from Tala to help Spanish children in this way was
undoubtedly influenced by the example Cárdenas had set by welcoming the niños de
Morelia to Mexico. These homeless and orphaned children arrived in Veracruz in June of
1937, two months before Mistral wrote to propose that Ocampo publish Tala. 326 The
Latin American press’s celebration of the arrival of nearly five hundred Spanish children
in Mexico and the welcome they received in President Cárdenas’s home state of
Michoacán is evidence of the positive propaganda such humanitarian initiatives created.
Before arriving at Veracruz, Mexique, the ship that carried the children, docked in
Havana, where it met with a huge demonstration of support for the Republic and for
Mexico’s Spanish policy. In his monthly report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
325
See Guillermo Lagos Carmona (ed.) Gabriela Mistral en México (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación
Pública, 1945); Luis Mario Schneider, Gabriela Mistral: itinerario veracruzano (Xalapa: Biblioteca
Universidad Veracruzana, 1991); and Puebla y otras acuarelas Mexicanas (Puebla: Secretaría de Cultura:
Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 2002). Tala also includes “Mar Caribe” about Puerto Rico, and “Dos
himnos a don Eduardo Santos” entitled “Sol del trópico” and “Cordillera.” Mistral was a correspondent for
many Latin American newspapers, including Eduardo Santos’s El Tiempo. Santos was one of Mistral’s
confidants, and it is likely that this is one of the reasons that her long-time friend and companion Palma
Guillén was posted to Colombia at the beginning of 1935 (see Chapter Two). Santos was elected and
inaugurated as President of Colombia while Tala was in production. See Otto Morales Benítez (ed.),
Gabriela Mistral: su prosa y poesía en Colombia 3 vols. (Bogotá: Convenio Andrés Bello, 2000).
326
Dolores Pla Brugat, Los niños de Morelia: Un estudio sobre los primeros refugiados españoles en
México 2nd ed. (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999); Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children of the
Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2008), 267283.
130
Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto said that the local radio station La Voz
de las Antillas organised a collection for the Spanish children. The Cuban government
prohibited the disembarkation of the children to protect them from the masses of people
who had gathered to welcome them, but civil and military authorities sent numerous gifts
aboard, and La Voz de las Antillas entrusted Cravioto with a truck-load full of provisions
and a cheque for four hundred dollars, which he delivered to the head of the expedition in
the presence of the Spanish chargé d’affaires in Cuba. 327 The comments in the Cuban
press were also overwhelmingly positive. When José Ignacio Rivero Alonso, the Second
Conde del Rivero and director of Havana’s most important newspaper, El Diario de la
Marina, ran an editorial criticising the Mexican gesture as an example of “Bolshevik”
propaganda, claiming that the children were orphans of non-combatant and Nationalist
parents who had been murdered in Madrid by the Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists
who now used them in their publicity stunt, the rest of the country’s dailies jumped to
Mexico’s defence. 328 Cravioto wrote to the paper asking for a retraction, and although he
received one that stated that the Diario de la Marina had nothing but sympathy for the
Spanish children and Mexico’s noble gesture, the controversy signals that members of the
Right attributed Mexico’s support for the Republic to Communism. 329 Nevertheless,
sympathetic Cuban papers continued to report on the journey of the niños de Morelia
after their brief stop at the port of Havana, feeding the public’s interest in their welfare. 330
Ceferino Cago González, a worker from Cayo Mambí in the Province of Oriente, sent a
327
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Cravioto to Hay, July 3, 1937. This report includes clippings on the
niños de Morelia from Cuban newspapers.
328
“Insidia Bolsheviki,” Diario de la Marina (Havana), June 4, 1937.
329
“La inmunda propaganda roja y los huerfanitos españoles,” Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1937.
330
See for example, “¡Bendito sea México!,” Federación (Santa Clara), June 26, 1937.
131
lottery ticket to the Embassy in the hope that if it paid out the winnings could contribute
to the children’s maintenance in Morelia. 331 At a lecture Eugenio Tena Ruiz of the
Mexican Embassy gave at the Centro Republicano Español, the diplomat returned a
cheque for two thousand dollars its members had given the Embassy to send to Mexico
because, as Tena explained, the Mexican government had already committed to provide
for the children, but there were thousands of orphans still in Spain who needed their
assistance. 332 The Mexican initiative was so well received that the Asociación Auxilio al
Niño del Pueblo Español was formed in Havana in November of 1937, with the express
aim of following the Mexican example and bringing a similar group of children to Cuba.
The Association gave up this goal after the outbreak of war in Europe, but continued
raising money to provide humanitarian assistance to Spanish children thereafter. 333 Just
as the Cárdenas government’s actions had influenced Gabriela Mistral, they encouraged
groups of Leftists and Spanish immigrants in Cuba and throughout the Americas to
organise on behalf of the defenceless children who suffered because of the Civil War. 334
The membership of the Cuban Asociación Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español
overlapped significantly with that of another group, the Amigos del Pueblo Mexicano,
and several prominent members of Cuban society, including Emilio Roig de Leuschering,
who published the literary magazine Social and corresponded with Mexican intellectuals
331
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Cravioto to Hay, July 3, 1937.
Ibid.
333
The committee’s articles of association were filed with the Cuban government that November. Cuba,
Archivo Nacional Cubano (ANC), Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00209, Expediente 004948.
334
On the Cuban reaction to the Civil War, see Alistair Hennessy, “Cuba,” in The Spanish Civil War, 193639: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 101-158; Academy of Sciences of the USSR, “Cuba,” in
International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.
332
132
such as Alfonso Reyes, were members. 335 In his virulent attack against the Mexico in the
case of the niños de Morelia, Conde del Rivero had charged that the Comité de Auxilio al
Niño del Pueblo Español excluded from its definition of the pueblo all non-Marxists and
anarchists. 336 The conflict between pro-Republican groups and organisations of the Right
became so intense in the Cuban capital that both the Centro Republicano Español and the
Falange Española, which comprised Havana’s franquistas, were suppressed by
presidential decree in December 1937. 337 Rivero would have known that the Comité de
Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español, as well as the Centro Republicano Español and other
Leftist organisations, shared membership with the Mexican cultural society, confirming
his suspicions regarding the Mexican government’s “Bolshevist” tendencies. This pattern
played out time and again in the rest of Latin America, where the connections between
the Mexican government’s Spanish policy, the writings of prominent authors, and the
activities of citizens groups were equally clear. These links encouraged far-reaching
335
Fernando Ortíz and Eddy Chibás were also members of the Asociación Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo
Español. On the incorporation of the Amigos del Pueblo Mexicano, of which Cuban Minister of Education
Salvador Massip was also a member, see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00331, Expediente
009782. Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-1 (I), Cravioto to Hay, 2 April 1936. Ironically, in this
report Cravioto also informed the department of a recent trip Rivero took to Mexico and the series of
“enthusiastic” articles he wrote for the Diario de la Marina, and called him “an excellent friend of our
country.” For the Círculo Republicano Español see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00302,
Expedientes 8761-8763. For the Ateneo Socialista Español see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo
00250, Expediente 006740. For the Amigos de la República Española see Cuba, ANC, Fondo
Asociaciones, Legajo 00278, Expediente 007805. For Roig’s correspondence with Alfonso Reyes see
Cuba, Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, Fondo Emilio Roig de Leuchsering, Legajo 472,
Expediente 109 – Alfonso Reyes (México).
336
“La inmunda propaganda roja y los huerfanitos españoles,” Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1937.
337
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00302, Expedientes 8761-8763. Presidential decree No. 3411,
December 3, 1937. The Brazilian government also closed Spanish Republican centres in Rio de Janeiro in
November 1937, but this may have been part of Getúlio Vargas’s far-reaching crack-down on foreign
organisations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-3, Ambassador José Rubén Romero González to Hay,
November 30, 1937. On the Brazilian reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Ismara Izepe de Souza,
Inventário DEOPS, Módulo IV, espanhóis. República Espanhola: uma modelo a ser evitado (São Paulo:
Imprensa Oficial São Paulo, 2001); José Gay da Cunha, Um brasileiro na guerra espanhola (Rio de
Janeiro: Livraria do Globo, 1946).
133
support for the Spanish Republic and Mexico’s Revolutionary government among Leftist
intellectuals and citizens of the Americas, and drew the hostility of the Right.
Conclusion
After returning to Mexico City at the beginning of 1938 upon the conclusion of
his diplomatic post in Argentina, Alfonso Reyes became the first president of the Casa de
España en México, which Daniel Cosío Villegas founded to house the exiled Spanish
Republican academics that he hoped would go on to contribute so much to Mexico’s
intellectual development. 338 Reyes played the male equivalent of Gabriela Mistral’s role
as mother in absentia; they fulfilled these functions for the writers, teachers, students,
workers, and Republican exiles of Latin America. When Gabriela Mistral’s Chile
eventually uncrossed its arms and opened them to Spanish Republican exiles, it was a
result of the diplomatic efforts of Pablo Neruda: a boat-load of refugees aboard the
Winnipeg found asylum in the native land of these two Latin American Nobel Prize
laureates. Ultimately, the Latin American reactions to the Mexican Spanish policy
changed not only in response to the course of the war in Spain, but also in relation to
developments in the domestic political conditions of each country.
The mass migration of Republican exiles was co-ordinated with the help of
representatives from several other Latin American countries, and the Mexican
338
Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Ayuda a los republicanos españoles: correspondencia entre AlfonsoReyes
y José Puche, 1939-1940 (Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2004); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Alfonso
Reyes en la Casa de España en México (1939 y 1940) (Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2005). Alfonso
Reyes published two volumes of Spanish literary criticism in these years. Alfonso Reyes, Capítulos de
literatura española 1a serie (Mexico City: La Casa de España en México, 1939); Alfonso Reyes, Capítulos
de literatura española 2a serie (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1945).
134
government made overtures to each of them, asking that they too accept refugees from
Spain. 339 Not surprisingly, some governments rejected Cárdenas’s calls for help in
resettling the refugees. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Guatemala explained why his
country would not accept Spanish Republican refugees or aid the Mexican government in
pressuring Roosevelt to provide for their transportation to Mexico in November 1940.
Ubico did not oppose humanitarian assistance per se; he only declined to support this
particular initiative regarding the Republican refugees because it might harm his relations
with the United States, or create a “labour problem” in his own country. 340 This last
comment had paramount importance because it indicated that domestic political
considerations regarding the organisation of labour—that forces on the Latin American
Right identified with the Spanish Republic and the Mexican Revolution—continued to
influence Mexico’s relations with the region after the conclusion of the Civil War and
until the end of the Cárdenas presidency in December 1940. The Republican refugees
were considered by conservatives to be “Red Spaniards” who would agitate workers in
the region. Cárdenas’s adversaries within Mexico voiced the same concerns, but the
clamouring of conservative critics did not move the president. These fears did prevent
many Latin American governments from joining his cause, except in cases where the
Spaniards’ labour was desperately needed, or when governments accepted Spanish
339
On Guatemala’s rejection of the proposal, see AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 12, Expediente 1,
Martínez de Alva to Hay, June 25, 1940. The response from most governments in the region was rather
tepid, and despite the notable exceptions of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, and
Venezuela, where some Republicans emigrated, the vast majority settled in Mexico. Fagen, Exiles and
Citizens, 39.
340
AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 12, Expediente 1, Gorostiza to Hay, November 22, 1940.
135
Republican exiles in pursuit of blanquismo. 341 In the case of Chile, the evolution of
domestic politics influenced a change in policy towards the Spanish Civil War and its
aftermath.
The Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago, Pablo Campos Ortiz, reported to Hay
in March of 1939 that the Chilean Foreign Minister Abraham Ortega had assured him that
Chile would be “the last of the last” to recognise Franco. 342 Ortega even consulted with
Campos Ortiz about whether it might be possible for Chile and Mexico to issue a joint
recognition of the defacto Spanish government; intransigent, the Cárdenas government
refused. 343 The Chileans resolved to recognise Franco on April 5. 344 One of the main
reasons the Chilean government took this action was because seventeen Republicans had
taken refuge in the Chilean embassy in Madrid and the Ministry of Foreign Relations had
thought it would be easier to guarantee their safety if they established official relations
with Franco. These hopes soon turned out to be unfounded; the government at Burgos
rejected Chilean claims to the rights of asylum and refused to concede agreement for a
new Chilean representative to the Spanish government until they emptied their
embassy—an action that would have led to the near certain deaths of the refugees who
341
Blanquismo, or the desire to “whiten” the population with an influx of Spanish immigrants, apparently
motivated the Dominican Republic’s Trujillo dictatorship, and caused the Panamanian government to
express interest in the Republican refugees. Powell, “Mexico,” 85.
342
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, March 8, 1939. The Cuban government had
initially stated that it would never recognise Franco either, and on February 10, 1939 Col. Fulgencio Batista
made a statement to that effect in the Mexican Congress, during his 1939 visit to Mexico. AHGE, SRE,
Expediente III-172-25. Nevertheless, Cuba recognised Franco before Chile. See the Informes Políticos
Suplementarios of the Mexican Embassy in Havana for 1939, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-4 and
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-6. For the Cuban government’s justification see the Libro Gris it
published upon recognising Franco.
343
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 1, 1938.
344
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 6, 1938.
136
had claimed asylum. 345 In the days following the outbreak of the military insurgency, the
Chilean embassy had harboured multitudes of Nationalist sympathisers, and neither
Ortega, the Chilean press, nor the diplomatic corps could believe that the Franco
government would not guarantee the Republicans’ safe passage in return. Although
Ortega confidentially told the new Mexican Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes
Spíndola, that he had resolved to break relations with Spain, 346 Franco beat him to the
punch, ostensibly to protest insults to the Spanish government that were spoken at a rally
of the Frente Popular in July. 347 Nevertheless, Latin American support for Chile on the
issue was nearly unanimous, and the Franco regime finally backed down in October
1940, freeing the refugees and renewing relations with Chile. 348
Three months previous to the normalisation of Chilean-Spanish relations, Pablo
Neruda had arrived in the Mexican capital. Neruda had been stationed in Spain during the
Civil War, where he had been involved in the Liga de Escritores y Artistas
Revolucionarias (LEAR) to which many Leftist Spaniards and Latin Americans had
belonged. Neruda had befriended García Lorca and other prominent intellectuals and his
support for the Republic following the outbreak of the war is evident in his 1937 volume
España en el corazón. Neruda returned to Chile in 1937, but after the 1938 election
which swept Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the Frente Popular to power, the new president
sent him to France where he was responsible for the Chilean government’s effort to aid
the Republican refugees. Aguirre Cerda’s policy towards Spain differed markedly from
345
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, memorandum by Ortega, May 27, 1939.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, August 9, 1939.
347
Drake, “Chile,” 275.
348
See AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2400-17.
346
137
that of his predecessor Arturo Alessandri, and the Radical Party president counted
Gabriela Mistral as a personal friend. Second only to the Mexican government’s dramatic
efforts on behalf of Republican refugees, the voyage of the Winnipeg, by which 2,000
émigrés escaped the hardships of exile in France, has obtained mythic status in the
history of Spanish Republican exile in the Americas. 349 Relations between Mexico and
Chile had warmed considerably since Aguirre Cerda’s election, and it is not surprising
that Neruda’s next diplomatic post was as Consul General to Mexico, an appointment he
held between 1940 and 1943. 350 The position was not only intellectually enriching for
Neruda, who benefited from his associations with Mexican intellectuals and muralists and
the Spanish exiles at the Casa de España, 351 but it also provided him further opportunity
to work with Mexican officials in forming a more united response to the Republican
defeat. It is possible that the Franco government had broken relations with Aguirre
Cerda’s government in an attempt to isolate Chile and Mexico from their Latin American
neighbours, 352 but his actions actually had the opposite effect, legitimising Chilean—and
by association Mexican—attitudes towards his government. Chile and Mexico’s
acceptance of Republican refugees gained favour in diplomatic, intellectual, and popular
circles as a result.
349
On the voyage of the Winnipeg see, Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración, Fondo Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, Volúmen 4179.
350
Alfonso Reyes mentioned in a letter to Gabriela Mistral that he and Neruda remembered her often.
Vargas Saavedra, Tan de Usted, 128. Reyes to Mistral, October 11, 1940. On Neruda’s time in Mexico, see
Fundación Pablo Neruda, Cuadernos “México en el Corazón,” no. 39 (1999); Manuel Lerín, Neruda y
México (Mexico City: B. Costa y Amic, 1973); Hugo Méndez-Ramírez, Nueruda’s Ekphrastic Experience:
Mural Art and Canto general (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1999); Vicente Quirate (ed.), Pablo
Neruda en el corazón de México (Mexico City: UNAM, 2006).
351
On Neruda’s assistance to Davíd Alfaro Siqueiros following his attempted assassination of Leon
Trotsky, see MRE, AGHD, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1918 A.
352
Drake, “Chile,” 276.
138
The Montevideo newspaper Uruguay published on March 4, 1937 an image
representing the material and moral support Cárdenas’s Mexico offered the Spanish
Republican government during the Spanish Civil War. Standing on either side of the
Atlantic, a sombrero and serape-clad Mexican campesino offers his hand to a Spanish
worker. Published under the heading “De América Llega,” it leaves open to interpretation
what it was that was arriving from México…bullets, international volunteers, or perhaps
boats to take to safety the victims of the war. The stereotypical picture of the campesino
may have made the image of Mexico recognisable to South American audiences, but it
caricatures and hence simplifies the complex methods by which the Mexican government
supported the Republic. Nevertheless, that such an image would even appear in a
Uruguayan newspaper, long after the country had suspended relations with the
Republican government over the atrocities committed behind its lines after the beginning
of the military insurgency, speaks to one of the ways in which the Cárdenas government
sought to aid the loyalist government of Spain. Mexican diplomats worked to keep the
cause alive for Spanish expatriates and Latin American Leftists during and after the
Spanish Civil War. Working together in diplomatic missions, cultural associations, and
meeting halls throughout the region they employed a variety of media in furthering their
aims. And although the Latin American reaction to the conflict, and Mexico’s response to
it, varied over time in accordance with events on the military front in Spain and the
political battlefield in Latin America, their efforts had a lasting effect on those who had
participated in the effort. The Cárdenas government became firmly tied to the Spanish
Republican cause in the region, which influenced the way that people throughout Latin
139
America responded to the Mexican government and the Revolutionary goals and
programmes it promoted as solutions to Latin America’s ills.
140
CHAPTER FOUR.
SELLING THE OIL EXPROPRIATION OF 1938
By nationalising the oil industry, Cárdenas has reaffirmed, once again, his
position as the true leader of the workers of the American continent. I am
sure that, as has already occurred in Chile, the revolutionary organisations
of South America are parading the image of our president in the streets, in
spite of dictatorships that there prevail, to the cry of: “Cárdenas, precursor
of the American Social Revolution!” 353
Following a protracted labour conflict between Mexico’s petroleum workers and
the US and Anglo-Dutch oil companies then operating in Mexico, President Lázaro
Cárdenas decreed the expropriation of these companies’ interests and created the national
oil industry on March 18, 1938. Representatives of the expropriated companies
immediately called foul and demanded the return of their properties. Cárdenas refused,
instead offering indemnification. A national “redemption” campaign galvanised
Cárdenas’s supporters, even bringing some traditional adversaries such as the Catholic
Church into the fold. In the weeks and months that followed, the US government
eventually recognised Mexico’s right to expropriation, much to the chagrin of Standard
Oil. Relations with Great Britain were, on the other hand, broken off by the Cárdenas
government in May 1938 in response to His Majesty’s government’s intransigence. Faced
with a boycott of Mexican petroleum products organised by the expropriated companies
and enforced by US and British diplomats around the world, the newly-established
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) fought to sell its oil in international markets so that it
353
Alberto Morales Jiménez, quoted in “El magisterio aplaude y apoya la política del Sr. Presidente,” El
Nacional (Mexico City), March 23, 1938, 8.
141
could, in turn, finance the indemnification for which the expropriated companies
clamoured.
Cárdenas’s announcement of the expropriation was greeted with overwhelming
enthusiasm by workers, students, and members of Leftist political parties as far away as
the southern cone: the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile forwarded their
congratulations to President Cárdenas on March 22. Three days later, the Chilean Partido
Socialista wrote to Cárdenas, stating that his decision carried transcendent importance for
all of Latin America. On March 29, a delegation from the Federación de Estudiantes de
Chile presented Mexican chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz with letters of support for
the president and the Federación de Estudiantes de México. 354 In the days and months
that followed, these sectors of the Chilean population continued to laud the Mexican
example, both through acts of solidarity organised to commemorate the expropriation and
within the context of their own struggles. Students marched carrying images of the
Mexican president, workers shouted ¡Vivas! to Cárdenas at rallies, and, during his
campaign for leadership of Chile’s Frente Popular, Socialist Party leader Marmaduke
Grove stated that the party should adopt solutions to Chile’s problems based on examples
provided by the Mexican Revolution. 355 The newly-formed Asociación Amigos de
México paid homage to Mexico on March 30, attended by workers, students, politicians,
and diplomats. When over a thousand people gathered on April 13 to commemorate the
anniversary of the Spanish Republic, the ovations for Cárdenas were so long and loud
354
Copies of these letters from the Chilean Confederation of Workers, the Socialist Party, and the
Federation of Chilean students are found in Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada
(AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente LE 557.
355
“El pueblo conquistará hoy el poder municipal” Claridad (Santiago), April 3, 1938, 1-2.
142
that Campos Ortiz thought they could only have been superseded in Mexico itself. More
than sympathy, he believed that the intense and spontaneous response of the Chilean
people demonstrated a real enthusiasm for the Mexican cause that was not limited to the
popular classes. 356 In the midst of an electoral campaign that ended with President Arturo
Alessandri unseated by the Leftist Popular Front coalition, the Chilean reaction to the
expropriation was particularly strong, and indicative of the overwhelmingly positive
response of popular groups throughout the Americas.
During the latter part of Cárdenas’s presidency, the expropriation and its
associated events served as a lightning rod for debates regarding the legitimacy of the
Cárdenas presidency’s claim to leadership in Latin America. Throughout the region—
which shared Mexico’s long history of economic exploitation, first at the hands of Iberian
colonisation and then through the economic imperialism of Great Britain and the US—
Mexico’s oil expropriation seemed to offer hope that Latin American nations could
reclaim their resources for the benefit their peoples. While workers, students, and
political parties hoped that it was the harbinger of social revolution, economic
nationalists saw Cárdenas’s action as an important and possibly exemplary act.
Conservatives and business interests challenged this broad consensus and declared the
illegality of the expropriation, echoing the fury of the expropriated oil companies.
The oil expropriation received a great deal of attention in the press of the time,
and in its aftermath became the focus of longer works in English and Spanish either
condemning or defending Cárdenas’s act. Although some of these early works were
356
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Ramón Beteta, April 20, 1938.
143
propaganda efforts by either the expropriated oil interests or the Mexican government, 357
the literature soon began to include less propagandistic accounts. 358 Merrill Rippy, in the
front matter of Oil and the Mexican Revolution, quoted one of the perpetrators of the
early propagandistic tracts: Evelyn Waugh had gone to Mexico commissioned by Clive
Pearson (son of Weetman Pearson, Lord Cowdray) to complete a damning study of the
expropriation. He wrote that the expropriation may be examined through the analysis of
the conflicting propaganda issued by the two sides of the dispute. 359 Although Waugh
claimed to have used this method of analysis in composing his own propagandistic work,
a subsequent generation of authors instead used his study, as well as those of the Mexican
government and the Standard Oil Company, as evidence of the attitudes and behaviours
357
See for example, William E. McMahon, Two Strikes and Out (Garden City: Country Life Press
Corporation, 1939), which was written by the head of the legal department of the Huasteca Petroleum
Company. Standard Oil published The Present Status of the Mexican Oil “Expropriations” (New York:
Standard Oil Company, 1940), which was countered by the defence of the expropriation produced by the
Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP), La verdad sobre la expropiación de los bienes
delas empresas petroleras [published in English as The True Facts About the Expropriation of the Oil
Companies’ Properties in Mexico] (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940). Standard Oil then
responded with The Reply to Mexico (New York: Standard Oil Company, 1940). These works appeared
along with a host of pamphlets and brochures with such titles as “The Illegality of the Executive
Expropriation Decree of March 18, 1938.” The Mexican government also published in English and Spanish
several speeches made in defence of the expropriation. See “The Mexican People and the Oil Companies,”
from the 1938 speech delivered by Alejandro Carrillo at University of Virgina. Related to these are works
by the former director of the PEMEX, Jesús Silva Herzog: Mexican expropriation (New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1938); Petróleo mexicano, historia de un problema (Mexico City:
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941); México y su petróleo, una lección para América (Buenos Aires:
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1959).; La expropiación del petróleo en México (Mexico City: Cuadernos
Americanos, 1963).
358
Harlow S. Person, Mexican Oil: Symbol of Recent Trends in International Relations (New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 1942).
359
Evelyn Waugh, Robbery under Law: The Mexican Object-Lesson (London: Chapman and Hall, 1939).
Quoted in Merrill Rippy, Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), v. This volume was
first published in Spanish as “El petróleo y la revolución mexicana,” Problemas agrícolas e industriales de
Méico 6:3 (Jul.-Sep., 1954). It was re-issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la
Revolución Mexicana in 2003. The 1954 edition included a translation of Waugh’s quotation.
144
of the actors. 360 With time, even the laudatory publications PEMEX edited to
commemorate successive anniversaries of the expropriation became more academic and
less like nationalistic tracts. 361 The subject of Mexico’s oil industry before and after
expropriation became the object of study, and it is in this context that important works
examining the international aspects of the expropriation emerged. The first, and standard,
treatment of US-Mexican relations surrounding the oil expropriation was that of Lorenzo
Meyer, who later added a study of Mexican relations with Great Britain. 362 Recent works
have expanded the discussion of the international dimension of the oil expropriation, but
most have followed Meyer’s tendency to focus upon Mexico’s relations with Great
Britain and the United States. 363 Friedrich Schuler made a significant contribution to the
literature by demonstrating the deftness with which the Mexican Foreign Service
360
See for example, Francisco Alonso González, Historia y petróleo: México en su lucha por la
independencia económico. El problema del petróleo (Mexico City: Ediciones “El Caballito”, 1972);
Miguel Alemán Valez, La Verdad del Petróleo en México 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Biografías Gandesa,
1977); José Domingo Lavín, Petróleo: Pasado, presente y futuro de una industria mexicana (Mexico City:
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976). For an early example on the development of the oil industry after the
expropriation see, J. Richard Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 1938-1950 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1956).
361
In 1958, PEMEX issued Los veinte años de la industria petrolera nacional: Informes del 18 de Marzo,
1938-1958, among other publications. To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the expropriation,
PEMEX issued no less than twenty-five publications, including both original historical works and reprints.
See for example, Lourdes Celis Salgado, La Inustria Petrolera en México. Una Crónica. 3 vols. (Mexico
City: PEMEX, 1988). They also published the colouring book El Petróleo (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988).
362
Lorenzo Meyer, México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-1942 (Mexico City: El
Colegio de México, 1968); Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950: El fin de un
imperio informal (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1991). Also see, Lorenzo Meyer and Isidro
Morales, Petróleo y nación (1900-1987). La política petrolera en México (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1990).
363
Catherine E. Jayne, Oil, War, and Anglo-American Relations: American and British Reactions to
Mexico’s Expropriation of Foreign Oil Properties, 1937-1941 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000);
Clayton R. Koppes, “The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A
Reinterpretation,” The Journal of American History 69:1 (Jun., 1982): 62-81; María Emilia Paz Salinas,
“La expropiación petrolera y el contexto internacional,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 50:3 (Jul.-Sep.,
1988): 75-96; and for the period after the expropriation, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S.
as Allies in World War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
145
responded to the boycott by exploiting the Italian, German, and Japanese oil markets. 364
Nevertheless, there remains little comment in the literature on either the reception of the
expropriation in Latin America or the Mexican attempt to open this market to
expropriated oil.
In recent years, the development of Mexico’s oil industry has received renewed
interest from historians. 365 Some have studied the topic from entirely new perspectives,
notably Myrna Santiago, whose environmental focus enabled her to re-examine the
origins of the expropriation and the meaning it held for oil workers. 366 Similarly,
analysing the international dimensions of the expropriation from a different perspective
sheds new light on these aspects of the expropriation. By examining the decree of March
1938 with reference to attempts to sell the expropriation to and in Latin America, the
multiple meanings the oil controversy come into focus. Moreover, an analysis of the
Mexican press shows that these Latin American reactions in turn influenced domestic
understandings of the expropriation.
364
Friedrich Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of
Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997). Also significant are
those studies that examine the place of the expropriation in Mexico’s relations with France and the
Netherlands: Denis Rolland, Vichy et la France Libre au Mexique (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1990);
Rob van Vuurde, Los Países Bajos, el petróleo y la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950 (Amsterdam, Thela
Publishers, 1997).
365
Jonathan C. Brown, Oil and Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Ana
María Serna, “Oil, revolution, and agrarian society in northern Veracruz: Manuel Peláez and rural life in
the “Golden Lane”, 1910-1928” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2004); Joel Álvarez de la Borda, Los
orígenes de la industria petrolera en México, 1900-1925 (Mexico City: PEMEX, 2005). Articles in the
Boletín of the Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos, also provide some indication of where the
scholarship may be headed, and they also demonstrate the wealth of documentation available in this underutilized archive. My thanks go to the director, Alberto García López for giving me a full run of the Boletín,
and to the helpful staff who facilitated my research there.
366
Myrna Santiago, The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 7.
146
President Cárdenas’s announcement created the circumstances for one of the most
important tests of the diplomacy of Mexico’s representatives in Latin America.
Henceforth, much of their time, energy, and resources would be devoted to supporting the
president’s oil policy and justifying his decisions to their host governments. These efforts
entailed selling the expropriation in two inter-related ways: first, through propaganda
efforts in the region, and second, through attempts to create a market in Latin America
for the newly-nationalized oil industry. This chapter analyses their attempts to explain the
expropriation, first by examining the reception it received in the Latin American press;
second, by discussing the reaction of Latin American governments and some of the
difficult situations created by diplomats’ attempts to promote the expropriation; and third,
by arguing that one of the strongest ways Latin American governments could support
Cárdenas’s decision was by purchasing “expropriated” oil. In some cases, oil contracts
were indeed politically motivated, but in others the decision to purchase Mexican oil was
made for economic reasons. In the latter, the effectiveness of the agents responsible for
selling oil in the region made the crucial difference as to whether an expansion of the
Latin American market for oil would support the development of the industry Cárdenas
created following the expropriation decree. Finally, the chapter examines the reflection of
these Latin American reactions in the Mexican press and argues that Latin America’s
response influenced domestic reception of the expropriation, creating points of unity
among divergent factions on both ends of the political spectrum.
Selling the Expropriation to Latin America
147
The network of international newswires, radio broadcasts, and telegraph services
throughout the region ensured that news of the expropriation, announced the evening of
March 18, spread very quickly. Some Latin American papers carried stories on the events
as early as March 19. That day, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduardo Hay cabled
Mexico’s representatives abroad the full text of the expropriation decree and President
Cárdenas’s message to the nation, with instructions to publicise them as much as
possible, thereby launching the propaganda campaign in favour of Mexico’s oil
expropriation. 367
Assisted by the recently-created (and short-lived) Departamento Autónomo de
Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP), Mexican diplomats waged a battle that varied in difficulty
according to the political climate of the countries to which they were posted. While some
efforts were eagerly encouraged, as in Chile, elsewhere they were met with ambivalence
or outright hostility. In general, students, workers, and politicians on the Left supported
Mexican diplomats in their propagandistic endeavours, but governments were much more
reticent, at times suppressing expressions of support of the expropriation, 368 and in the
extreme example of Venezuela, requesting the recall of Mexico’s representative for his
alleged interference in the internal affairs of the nation.
The telegrams that Mexico’s representatives received March 19 were
characteristic of the propaganda strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: whenever
367
Some Latin American newspapers had carried articles on the dispute between the oil workers and the
soon-to-be expropriated companies, but the expropriation nevertheless came as a huge surprise. See
“Trabajadores mexicanos piden apoyo para su lucha contra las empresas petroleras” El Frente Popular
(Santiago), March 16, 1938, 4.
368
See for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 557, Martínez Mercado to Hay, June 14, 1938, on the
cancellation by Argentine authorities of a conference organised by the magazine Correspondencia
Indoamericana in Buenos Aires.
148
Cárdenas made a major pronouncement on the expropriation or an exchange of notes
occurred between Cárdenas and the US and British governments, diplomats were
expected to secure publication of these documents, in their entirety, in the major
newspapers of the countries to which they were accredited. This was also true of
Cárdenas’s other major policy pronouncements. In several cases, the expropriation decree
appeared alongside an article that printed Cárdenas’s strong condemnation of the March
12 German annexation of Austria, giving his foreign and domestic policies congruence.
Although coverage of the expropriation in the Mexican, English, and US press has
been analysed in detail by Alicia G. de Backal, there exists no comparable study of the
Latin American press. 369 A thorough survey of the reports and clippings forwarded to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mexican diplomats in the region, as well as full runs of
several newspapers of identified importance in the region, indicates that on balance the
reaction was overwhelmingly positive. Editorialists for papers of diverse political
viewpoints from Costa Rica to Argentina mused on the transcendent importance of the
expropriation, 370 while—as might be expected—Catholic weeklies and conservative
papers such as Crisol condemned it as an example of Mexican communism. 371
Censorship of the press in some countries meant that diplomats were not free to
editorialise on the expropriation and sometimes had difficulty getting fair treatment of
369
Alicia G. de Backal, La expropiación petrolera vista por la prensa mexicana, norteamericana e inglesa
(1936-1940) (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988).
370
“A México y al Presidente Cárdenas les daremos siempre nuestro apoyo moral,” Diario de Costa Rica
(San José), March 29, 1938; “Méjico Está Señalando a América el Camino de su Independencia
Económica,” Fastrás (Buenos Aires), March 21, 1938.
371
“Actividades comunistas en México,” Crisol (Guatemala City), May 8, 1938; “Técnicas comunistas en
México,” Crisol, June 19, 1938. This Guatemalan paper was linked to the paper of the same name in
Buenos Aires, providing evidence of the network of Catholic conservative opponents to the Cárdenas
regime in Latin America.
149
Mexican news. For example, Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus
reported that Cárdenas’s presidential message, the expropriation decree, and the British
and Mexican notes were published under headings that indicated that they were bulletins
from the Mexican Embassy, thereby disassociating the newspapers from the opinions
expressed therein. 372 Similarly, the chargé d’affaires in Honduras, Eduardo Espinosa,
charged that because the newspapers all had some “secret link” to the interests of the
United Fruit Company that prevented them from reporting freely on Mexican events, they
printed only official bulletins from the legation to satisfy those who pulled the strings of
the Honduran press. 373 Even in Chile, Campos Ortiz had difficulty securing the
publication of these statements: engulfed in a hotly contested electoral campaign, the
directors of Santiago’s dailies simply did not have space to publish the texts, despite their
sympathy. 374
As a result, diplomats deployed the multi-pronged strategy that they had
developed in dealing with criticism of alleged persecution of Catholics in the early years
of the Cárdenas presidency. They distributed literature explaining the government’s
position, such as La verdad sobre la expropiación de los bienes de las empresas
petroleras. 375 They gave innumerable speeches to a wide variety of public audiences on
the theme of the expropriation. They arranged goodwill flights by Mexican pilots
372
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 27, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Espinosa to Hay, April 30, 1938.
374
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 565, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 16, 1938.
375
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Ernesto Hidalgo to the chargé d’affaires in Lima, June 12, 1940. A
copy of this book was also found in Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio
Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3984, Expediente 3, Tomo III.
373
150
throughout Latin America. 376 They encouraged the organisation of cultural associations
such as the Sociedad Cuauhtémoc of Guatemala and the Cuban group Amigos del Pueblo
Mexicano. 377
Diplomats made extensive use of the new mass media, using transmissions of
both commercial and public radio broadcasts throughout the region. Mexico’s new
Ambassador to Guatemala reported in December of 1938 that because the major dailies
in Guatemala City were published in the evening, most people had already heard the
news on their radios at least twenty-four hours before events received comment in the
press. 378 As Mexico’s neighbours, Guatemalans and Cubans could hear broadcasts
directly from Mexico, so in addition to Mexican music and soap operas, they may have
heard propaganda meant for domestic consumption, such as the radio spots on “The Oil
Question” produced for the weekly national broadcast, the Hora Nacional. 379 In addition,
diplomats organised series of concerts and lectures for broadcast on Latin American radio
stations. 380
376
On the goodwill flight of Antonio Cárdenas and his reception in Buenos Aires see AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 4-29-12.
377
On the incorporation of this association, which included such distinguished members as Emilio Roig de
Leuschering see, Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00331, Expediente
009782. Interestingly, the membership of this organisation overlapped significantly with Spanish
Republican associations.
378
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 20-2-13 (II), “Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de
diciembre de 1938,” Salvador Martínez de Alva to Hay.
379
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Alfonso Pulido Islas of the DAPP to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
August 22, 1939. On the development of radio in Mexico see Joy Elizabeth Hayes, Radio Nation:
Communication, Popular Culture and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920-1950 (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 2000); and Philip L. Barbour, “Commercial and Cultural Broadcasting in Mexico,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political Social Science 208 (March 1940): 94-102. Also see, James Schwoch, The
American Radio Industry and Its Latin American Activities, 1900-1939 (Urbana, University of Illinois
Press, 1990).
380
“Dos Grandes Conciertos de las Radio Emisoras TGWA y XEW,” Acción (Guatemala City), September
4, 1938, 3.
151
Film also played an important role in disseminating ideas about the expropriation.
Campos Ortiz reported in April that Santiago’s cinemas had begun to exhibit United
States newsreels showing the demonstrations that had occurred in Mexico in support of
the expropriation and audience members of all classes shouted ¡Vivas! when Cárdenas
appeared on the balcony of the National Palace. 381
The chargé d’affaires also made full use of the series of films produced by the
DAPP promoting the accomplishments of the Mexican Revolution and the Cárdenas
government. In the act of homage held by the Asociación Amigos de México in Santiago
on March 30, the meeting began with a showing of the DAPP film La Construcción
Socialista en México, and when Cárdenas appeared on the screen the entire audience
burst out in spontaneous applause. 382 Shortly after the expropriation, the DAPP produced
two films entitled La Nacionalización del Petróleo and México y su Petróleo, copies of
which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to its diplomats. 383 Unfortunately, like
previous DAPP productions, these films were sent on a diplomatic circuit, where
Ministers and Ambassadors would show them as propaganda and then forward them to a
neighbouring country for exhibition. This caused chargé d’affaires in Argentina Salvador
Martínez Mercado to complain that he had not been able to exhibit the films widely
because he had received them five months after they had left Mexico, by which time most
cinemas in Buenos Aires considered them out of date, having already shown newsreels
381
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Beteta, April 20, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 6, 1938. “Los trabajadores de Chile
saludaron ayer a la Revolución Mexicana,” Claridad (Santiago), March 31, 1938, 1.
383
Chargé d’affaires in Cuba Octavio Reyes Spíndola asked for funds from the DAPP to film the act of
homage to Mexico held in Havana June 12, 1938. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-1248-8, telegram from
Reyes Spíndola to Hay, June 9, 1938.
382
152
covering the expropriation. 384 Nevertheless, his complaint makes clear that images of the
expropriation circulated widely throughout Latin America.
Latin Americans and their governments were inundated with Mexican propaganda
supporting the oil expropriation. Workers, student groups, and Leftist politicians
embraced the message, while their governments generally did not. Cárdenas might prove
himself the legitimate leader of the working people of the Americas, but he aimed to
solidify the accomplishments of the Revolution and translate his moral authority into a
leadership position in Latin America.
Government Reactions: Interference in the internal affairs of the nation?
Only the Bolivian government made an official declaration of its support for the
Mexican expropriation. In the wake of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the
Bolivians had seized the properties of Standard Oil in the war-torn border region, and
when Germán Busch dispensed with the military junta that had governed the country
since 1936, he announced his government’s refusal to return the properties and stated his
support for Cárdenas’s nationalisation. 385 Bolivia’s Minister to Mexico Alfredo Sanjinés
decorated Cárdenas with the Cross of the Condor of the Andes on June 6, giving a speech
384
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Martínez Mercado to Hay, January 31, 1939. These films were still
making their rounds in 1940, when the Venezuelan Legation reported that it was unable to secure their
exhibition because of official censorship. Quoted in a letter dated April 30, 1940 from Luis G. Inzunza of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605.
385
One Bolivian paper carried the headline “México sigue los pasos de Bolivia nacionalizando sus
petroleos,” a theme that was sometimes repeated in the South American press. A clipping of the article was
found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 563. In Mexico, on the other hand, the papers reported that Bolivia
was following the example of Mexico when, in March 1939 the Supreme Court confirmed the seizure of
Standard Oil’s properties there. “Confirma la Suprema Corte de Justicia de Bolivia el fallo de la
expropiación del petróleo,” Excélsior (Mexico City), 1; “Bolivia adopta nuestras ideas,” Excélsior March
14, 1939, 3. This is evidence of the tendency within the Mexican press to claim that whenever another
Latin American country amended its oil legislation, it was following the Mexican example.
153
that US Ambassador Josephus Daniels described as “unusually effusive and
laudatory.” 386 For the remainder of the Cárdenas presidency, Mexican-Bolivian relations
intensified, leading to missions of Mexican educational and irrigation experts who
strengthened the ties between the two countries. The “Military Socialism” championed by
Busch had similar goals to the Revolution that Cárdenas’s diplomats expounded upon in
La Paz. Given the mutual policies on oil, it is not surprising that the Bolivian government
came out in favour of Cárdenas’s action. The question remains why so many other Latin
American governments did not.
Governments in the region either did not support the expropriation or were
unwilling to make their support public. Even among those governments that were
sympathetic to Cárdenas’s decision, the wave of propaganda unleashed by Mexican
diplomats created tensions in domestic politics that made it difficult to officially sanction
Mexico’s oil expropriation. Confidentially, several heads of state expressed their
sympathy and support to Mexico’s diplomatic representatives, but they generally did not
make their adherence public. 387 Although Cárdenas’s diplomats reported that some of the
governments to which they were accredited had been pressured overtly by US and British
oil interests to withhold support, in most cases concerns regarding the maintenance of the
delicate political balance between governments and their opposition held the most sway.
When conservative forces in Venezuela and Colombia accused the Mexican
representatives in their countries of interfering in their internal affairs through overtly
386
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 19301939, Record Group 59 (RG 59), Reel 6, 812.00/30593, Josephus Daniels, “Resume of Conditions in
Mexico During June, 1938,” July 15, 1938.
387
The new Ambassador to Argentina so reported in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 4-29-12, Félix Palavicini to
Hay, April 4, 1939.
154
political statements and activities, both governments had to consider whether they valued
their diplomatic relations with Mexico more than their own political survival. Both were
also oil producers and economic decisions weighed into their policy decisions.
Venezuelan and Colombian oil production came up in a September 1938 report by
US Consul in Mexico James Stewart to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on a meeting of
the Communist Party of Mexico that was attended by representatives from Cuba, Chile,
Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, Colombia, and Venezuela. He referred to the speech
of the Colombian delegate, Jorge Regueros Peralta, who called for a united front of Latin
American workers to support Mexico and its expropriation. Regueros Peralta stated that it
was a well-known fact that Venezuelan and Colombian oil was replacing Mexican oil in
international markets at the behest of the companies whose interests had been
expropriated. 388 Be that as it may, the governments of Colombia and Venezuela seem to
have taken different approaches in their responses to the expropriation. While the
Venezuelan government of Eleazar López Contreras was clearly hostile to Mexico and its
representatives, the Liberal Colombian government seems to have had more sympathy for
Cárdenas’s act. Similarly constrained by oil interests in the country and a vocal
Conservative opposition, the Colombian government nevertheless took a much more
measured approach to the events and their potential ramifications in South America.
As South America’s largest oil producer, the government of López Contreras had
a particular stake in demonstrating Venezuela’s opposition to the expropriation.
Following the decree of March 18, Mexican chargé d’affaires José Rendón y Ponce
388
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 19301939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30616, Stewart to Hull, September 17, 1938.
155
published President Cárdenas’s message in the Venezuelan press and began a propaganda
campaign in favour of the expropriation. His efforts received a positive response from
students and workers in Venezuela. The Federación de Estudiantes de Venezuela sent
their congratulations to the Mexico City headquarters of the Confederación de
Estudiantes Antiimperialistas de América, which were published in the major Mexico
City dailies. 389 Leftists in Venezuela greeted the news of the defence of Mexico’s
constitution, workers, and national resources with great enthusiasm. The Venezuelan
government and the foreign-owned oil companies operating in the country, on the other
hand, saw the potentially radicalising effects the announcement could have on the local
labour movement.
The publication of the students’ message of support coincided with a major
propaganda effort on the part of the Mexican newspaper Excélsior to promote Venezuela.
The newspaper published a special edition on April 19, 1938 dedicated to Latin
America’s other major oil-producing nation on the first anniversary of its Constitutional
Congress. Through the private initiative of Director Rodrigo de Llano, Managing
Director Gilberto Figueroa, and the paper’s travelling representative Dr. Rafael G. Rosas
and special envoy Luis Guillermo Villegas Blanco, the special issue’s stated aim was to
support the Cárdenas government’s efforts to increase ties with Latin America, and
Venezuela in particular, by helping Mexicans and Venezuelans learn the reality of each
389
“Otra Felicitación al Señor Presidente,” Excélsior, April 21, 1938, 3.
156
other’s countries more fully, something Rosas believed needed to be achieved outside the
usual diplomatic channels. 390
The special edition carried glossy photos, tourist information, descriptions of the
Venezuelan states, articles on social conditions and industrial development, and editorials
on the state of Mexican-Venezuelan relations, and its publication was greeted with some
fanfare. That day, Excélsior organised a reception featuring music, poetry, and speeches,
broadcast on XEW, La voz de América Latina desde México (The Voice of Latin
America from Mexico). 391 To reciprocate, the newly-inaugurated Venezuelan radio
station Universo broadcast a special homage to Mexico, which could also be heard in
both countries. 392 The same day as this broadcast, the Venezuelan chargé d’affaires in
Mexico City, Diego Córdoba, and his wife held a banquet in honour of the newspaper at
their residence, attended by several members of the Latin American diplomatic corps. 393
What should have been propitious for the strengthening of ties between the two countries
was instead overshadowed by growing tensions in Mexican-Venezuelan relations.
Two Venezuelans wrote a response to Excélsior’s special issue, correcting what
they believed were inaccuracies, especially those pertaining to the activities of Standard
Oil in Venezuela. They detailed conditions of “slavery” in the oil fields of Venezuela:
390
“Como se preparó esta edición de Excélsior,” Excélsior, Edición especial dedicada a la República de
Venezuela, April 19, 1938, 2nd section, 2. This private initiative, although apparently altruistic,
undoubtedly sold a lot of newspapers as well. This idea is examined by Rick López, who describes that in
the case of the India Bonita Contest of 1921, then director of El Universal Félix Palavicini, who went on to
be posted as Ambassador to Argentina from early 1939 to late 1940, was behind the idea of the contest.
Rick A. López, “La India Bonita Contest of 1921 and the Ethnicization of Mexican National Culture”
Hispanic American Historical Review 82:2 (May 2002): 297-299.
391
“Gran homenaje de Excélsior para la Rep. de Venezuela,” Excélsior, April 20, 1938, 2.
392
“Un homenaje de Venezuela para nuestra patria,” Excélsior, May 8, 1938, 2.
393
“La Legación de Venezuela en México dió ayer una comida en honor de Excélsior,” Excélsior, May 7,
1938, 2nd section, 3.
157
poor living conditions, and the threats of violence they had faced when attempting to
organise workers, which had led to their expulsion from the country. They hoped that
Excélsior’s readers were not deceived by what they believed was a piece of propaganda
with the goal of painting Venezuela as a capitalist Arcadia. 394 By implication, the idyllic
picture the newspaper painted contrasted with the chaos that seemed to be reigning in the
Mexican oil fields and in the halls of its National Palace. This is not surprising given that
Excélsior had a reputation as an instrument of the conservative elite. 395 The exiles’ letter
reveals the conservatism of the message contained in Excélsior’s special issue on
Venezuela, and suggests that the newspaper’s private initiative was designed to undercut
Cárdenas’s oil policy and attempts to seek better relations with Latin American countries.
Because exiled Venezuelan Leftists and perceived radical groups within the
country, such as the Federación de Estudiantes de Venezuela, were in favour of the
expropriation, the López Contreras government needed to prevent President Cárdenas’s
act from gaining widespread approval in Venezuelan society and contributing to the
mounting objections to Standard Oil’s practices in the country. He could not tolerate the
activities of a Mexican diplomat who seemed to be stoking the fires of discontent.
On the same day that Excélsior published its special issue, La Prensa reported
that the Venezuelan government had demanded the recall of José Rendón y Ponce, who
had served in Caracas since late 1937. As chargé d’affaires he had proven to be a great
supporter of the Cárdenas government’s international policies: as well as publicising the
394
“El esclavismo del petróleo en Venezuela,” El Nacional, April 22, 1938, 8.
Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Notes on the Latin American Press” Review of the Foreign
Press, 1939-1945: Latin American Memoranda 1:1 (February 29, 1940):10.
395
158
expropriation and rallying progressive groups in the country behind the cause, Rendón y
Ponce took a hard line on other issues that were at the heart of Cárdenas’s foreign policy.
When he criticized the López Contreras government, in a letter to the press, for
recognizing the Franco regime and inviting its representative to attend a diplomatic
ceremony paying tribute to Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelans found the excuse they had
been looking for and immediately requested his recall. 396 Such criticism, they argued, did
not befit a foreign representative accredited to the Venezuelan government. This incident
demonstrates not only the interconnectedness of Cárdenas’s foreign policy objectives in
Spain and Latin America, but also the lengths to which governments opposed to his
policies would go in order to temper his influence.
Criticism of Mexican domestic and foreign policy did not end with the expulsion
of Rendón y Ponce. When his replacement, Salvador R. Guzmán, arrived in May 1938 he
met the same kind of opposition. The problem had not been the diplomat, but the
threatening ideas he represented. In September, Guzmán wrote to Foreign Minister Hay
concerning the propaganda campaign against Mexico. 397 Given the dominance that
foreign oil companies exercised over the Venezuelan press, Guzmán had been waging an
uphill battle since his arrival. He attempted to counter the attacks, but his efforts met with
little success. A free daily called La Esfera had reprinted from The Atlantic an article by a
Venezuelan banker in New York who accused Mexican diplomats in Latin America of
396
“Venezuela pidió el retiro de un representante de nuestro país,” La Prensa (Mexico City), April 19,
1938, 3, 18.
397
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-3, Guzmán to Hay, September 9, 1938.
159
spreading the epidemic of communism throughout the region. 398 Originally written for a
US audience, Henrique Pérez Dupuy’s goal seems to have been to promote US
investment in Venezuela by showing the country to be a haven of stability and capitalist
development in comparison with Mexico. Once translated and published in Venezuela, it
constituted a direct attack on Mexico’s diplomatic representative. Guzmán immediately
requested a meeting with Foreign Minister Esteban Gil Borges and asked that the
allegations be rectified. The subdecano (second to the dean) of the diplomatic corps,
Chilean Minister to Venezuela Enrique Gallardo Nieto, spoke to the directors and
“pseudo-owners” of La Esfera. As a result of Gallardo Nieto’s intervention, director
Ramón Davíd León agreed to flatter Guzmán in the newspaper’s coverage of the
upcoming Mexican Independence celebrations. 399 Gil Borges, on the other hand, waffled
because of his desire not to anger the representatives of Standard Oil.
Guzmán’s problems did not end there. A delegation from the Federación Sindical
de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal (FST) went to the Mexican legation in Caracas in
March 1939 to give the minister copies of several documents they had submitted to the
Venezuelan press for publication, congratulating Cárdenas on the first anniversary of the
expropriation and detailing a commemorative meeting they had held in honour of
Mexican oil workers. The three documents were published together on the first page of
the Venezuelan daily Ahora, where the unionists vowed to follow the Mexican example
398
Henrique Pérez Dupuy, “La Situación Actual de Venezuela,” La Esfera (Caracas), September 6, 1938,
1.
399
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-3, Gallardo Nieto to Guzmán, September 8, 1938.
160
and work toward the liberation of their own oil industry. 400 The following day the
government dissolved the unions involved for inciting class conflict through the spread of
Marxist ideas. 401 When Guzmán met with Gil Borges a few days later and mentioned that
copies of the letters were destined for the diplomatic pouch, the Foreign Minister broke
with protocol and asked him for the offending documents. It was not appropriate, he
argued, for the Mexican legation to maintain contact and correspondence with entities
other than the Venezuelan government. 402 Guzmán suggested that since the letters had
already been published in Venezuela, and had probably been picked up by Mexican
newspapers as well, he would be criticized if he did not ensure their delivery to those to
whom they had been addressed: President Cárdenas and the Mexican working class. 403
Mexican Foreign Minister Hay wrote to Guzmán, wishing him to express to Gil Borges
in a friendly but energetic manner that his request was completely against diplomatic
practice and could be considered harmful to relations with Venezuela. 404 The matter
seems to have ended there, but Standard Oil’s campaign against Mexico in Venezuela
continued. 405 Despite the support and encouragement they received from some social
groups, the experience of Mexican diplomats in Venezuela seems to have been one of
almost continual harassment by the Venezuelan government officials, who disapproved
of the expropriation and the foreign and domestic policies it represented.
400
“Los trabajadores venezolanos y el aniversario de la Expropiación Petrolera de México,” Ahora
(Caracas), March 24, 1939, 1.
401
“Disolución official de la FST y la UGT,” Ahora, March 25, 1939, 1.
402
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Memorandum by Gil Borges, March 30, 1939.
403
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Guzmán to Hay, April 10, 1939.
404
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Hay to Guzmán, April 15, 1939.
405
See for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Peón del Valle to Ernesto Padilla, February 6, 1941.
161
Mexico’s Minister to Colombia faced similar allegations of interference in the
internal affairs of the nation, but the Colombian government’s attitude differed markedly
from that of Venezuela. Relations between Colombia and Mexico were close during the
period of Colombia’s Liberal Republic. Alfonso López Pumarejo broke onto the national
scene in 1934, the same year as Cárdenas, with his self-styled Revolución en Marcha.
Although Eduardo Santos’s election campaign and inauguration as president in August
1938 represented a tempering of the radical rhetoric emanating from the Colombian
presidency, both Liberal presidents had much in common with their Mexican counterpart.
Because Colombia was seen in Mexico as a natural ally, special care seems to have been
taken in the choice of Ministers to Colombia. In early 1937 José Domingo Ramírez
Garrido replaced Palma Guillén (Mexico’s first female Minister) in Bogotá. This former
director of the Mexican Military School was an ardent Revolutionary general who had
fought in his native Tabasco. This was his first diplomatic post, and he wrote to Foreign
Minister Hay in December 1937 to explain what he believed were the difficulties inherent
in his new position. He had to walk a fine line between promoting the accomplishments
of the Mexican Revolution and attempting to influence the internal politics of his host
nation. 406 Ramírez Garrido seems to have maintained this balance until March 1938.
Following the oil expropriation, he held a meeting at the Mexican Legation of the most
important members of the Leftist wing of the Liberal Party that included the firebrand
radical Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. He also invited the directors of Bogotá’s two Leftist
newspapers, Acción Liberal and El Diario Nacional. In a letter to Cárdenas, Ramírez
406
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-19, Ramírez Garrido to Hay, December 4, 1937.
162
Garrido explained that he had little faith in the Good Neighbor Policy of President
Roosevelt, and he anticipated that a propaganda campaign emanating from the US would
follow in the wake the expropriation decree. At the confidential meeting, the leaders of
Colombia’s radical Left pledged their support to help Ramírez Garrido defend the
expropriation in the Colombian press and, if necessary, in the streets. 407 El Diario
Nacional published a report of the meeting that did not mention this commitment, 408 but
both Conservatives and moderate Liberals seized on the meeting as an example of
Ramírez Garrido’s interference in the internal affairs and called for his immediate
expulsion. 409 El Diario Nacional responded with an article claiming that the meeting had
a purely social character, and attacked the Conservatives for making something out of
nothing. 410 Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Turbay agreed and assured
Ramírez Garrido of his support. 411
Given the delicate political atmosphere in Bogotá, the incident must have shaken
the government’s confidence in the viability of an alliance with Mexico. López Pumarejo
and his successor Santos were beholden to Colombia’s strong political tradition, which in
this period meant a Liberal party that had been divided along radical and moderate lines,
and an extremely vocal opposition embodied in the personality of Laureano Gómez and
his Conservative newspaper El Siglo. Closer relations with Cárdenas’s Mexico threatened
407
Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Archivo Particular Lázaro Cárdenas (APLC), Rollo 14,
Expediente 72, Ramírez Garrido to Cárdenas, March 29, 1938.
408
“Los jefes izquierdistas fueron agasajados en la Legación de México el Sábado,” El Diario Nacional
(Bogotá), March 28, 1938, 1.
409
Interestingly, their cause was taken up in the conservative Catholic press of Latin America. “Labores
siniestras de un embajador mexicano en Colombia,” Crisol (Guatemala City), May 29, 1938.
410
“Mala fé de El Siglo y La Razón,” El Diario Nacional, March 30, 1938, 1.
411
AGN, APLC, Rollo 14, Expediente 72, Ramírez Garrido to Cárdenas, March 30, 1938.
163
to upset the delicate balance these Liberal presidents needed to maintain in order to
achieve their domestic and international goals. Ramírez Garrido reported to Hay in May
that the situation was so difficult that he had only been able to secure publication in El
Diario Nacional of Great Britain’s most recent note and the Mexican response. The
Liberal paper El Tiempo, run by Eduardo Santos’s brother, had agreed to publish the
notes but then withdrew this commitment at the last minute. According to Ramírez
Garrido’s sources, the Liberal and Conservative papers had come under pressure from US
oil companies, who claimed that the publication of the notes would have been contrary to
their interests. 412
The press, like Colombian society, was sharply divided on the question of
Mexico’s oil expropriation, and the government could not afford to come out in favour of
Cárdenas’s action. The fact that Turbay, unlike Venezuelan Foreign Minister Gil Borges,
smoothed things over following this incident does show that the Colombian government
was more inclined to be sympathetic. Even in the sensitive area of oil policy, Colombian
contacts with Mexico continued. Colombia had reformed its own oil industry through the
petroleum law of 1936, which allowed for an increase in the activity of US oil
companies. The Colombian government nevertheless remained open to learning about the
Mexican expropriation. Turbay actually visited the Mexican oil fields in June 1938. US
Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels reported that Turbay had stated that “Colombia
was satisfied with her own petroleum laws and indicated that his country would not
412
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-17, Ramírez Garrido to Hay, May 13, 1938.
164
follow Mexico's example in expropriating the oil.” 413 Nevertheless, his visit signalled
that the Colombian government was still willing to engage Mexico on the question of oil
and had not given in completely to the pressures of the US oil companies. 414 Because of
the growing polarization of Colombian society, the government had to steer a difficult
course, reflected in the reception of the expropriation in the press and the government’s
measured response to the accusations of Ramírez Garrido’s interference. Mexican and
Colombian governments continued to co-operate on a number of symbolic
demonstrations of their affinity. A few months after the conflict over the meeting
Ramírez Garrido hosted at the Mexican Legation, he unveiled a statue of Benito Juárez
on the commemoration of the four hundredth anniversary of the founding of Bogotá.
Although sympathetic to Cárdenas’s action, the Colombian government, like other
friendly governments in the region, could not afford to support him publicly.
Selling Expropriated Oil in Latin America
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Colombia, like Mexico, numbered among the few oilproducing countries of Latin America, and as a result, their reactions to the expropriation,
in addition to responding to domestic political considerations, reflected their positions in
the oil industry. The responses to the expropriation in countries that were importers, on
the other hand, were influenced by their need to purchase oil and other petroleum
413
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 19301939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30593, “Resume of the Conditions in Mexico during June, 1938,” Daniels to
Hull, July 15, 1938.
414
The Chilean chargé d’affaires wrote that his visit was “un gesto de solidaridad en la política de
entendimiento que viene acercando a estos países en los últimos años.” Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Vol. 1658, Miguel Cruchaga Ossa
to Ministro, September 23, 1938.
165
products from abroad. This afforded them more options when reacting to the
expropriation. Although declining to approve openly of Cárdenas’s action, governments
could purchase “expropriated” oil, thereby giving their unspoken approval to the Mexican
measure and contributing to the success of the expropriation. In some cases, it appears
that these decisions were indeed politically-motivated demonstrations of sympathy. In
addition, PEMEX was also able to sign contracts with some rather unlikely customers,
who were otherwise quite vocal in their opposition to the Revolutionary social and
economic policies of the Cárdenas government. The effectiveness of PEMEX’s
representatives in the region was therefore of the utmost importance in securing the Latin
American market. Regardless of their allegiances, sympathetic governments were
unwilling to pay a higher price for Mexican oil, just as critical governments were
reluctant to pass up a good deal simply because of their opposition to the expropriation.
On June 10, 1938, a Norwegian ship called the Vinga departed Veracruz for
Uruguay carrying 2,900 barrels of diesel and 67,950 barrels of fuel oil with a total weight
of 10,900 tonnes. 415 El Nacional reported that the sale demonstrated that the newlynationalised oil industry was prosperous in spite of the conflict with the expropriated
companies. 416 This first shipment represents the opening of the Latin American market
for oil, which was important both to Mexico’s relations with the region and the survival
of PEMEX. 417
415
“El Primer Petróleo que Vende México al Uruguay,” El Universal (Mexico City), June 11, 1938, 9.
“80,000 barriles de petróleo salieron ayer de Minatitlán,” El Nacional (Mexico City), June 11, 1938, 8.
417
On sales to Uruguay, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 596.
416
166
Throughout the remaining years of the Cárdenas presidency, and until Mexico’s
entrance into the Second World War effectively ended the boycott against Mexican oil,
representatives in Latin America worked feverishly to cultivate this market, with some
significant success. Their efforts were overshadowed at the time, and in the subsequent
literature on the expropriation, by Cárdenas’s controversial decision to sell oil to the Axis
and the Mexican government’s negotiations with the expropriated oil interests. 418 Given
the Cárdenas government’s criticism of the fascist powers’ intervention in Spain,
Abyssinia, Manchuria, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, when the Chilean chargé d’affaires
in Mexico Miguel Cruchaga Ossa wrote home to report on the proposed sale of oil to the
Axis, whoever read his report at the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote “words,
words, words” incredulously in the margin. 419 These were turbulent times, and the
interest with which these developments were met obscured the somewhat less dramatic
work undertaken in Latin America.
Amid his description of the tense aftermath of the expropriation, Jesús Silva
Herzog briefly mentions in his Historia de la Expropiación de las Empresas Petroleras
that as manager of the Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos he also oversaw sales to
Latin America—which he deemed only a minimal success, with sales to Brazil,
418
For analysis see Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt, Chapter 5.
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Oficio confidencial recibido de la Embajada de
Chile en México, April 6, 1938. Latin American diplomats posted in Mexico sent home a steady stream of
information on the expropriation. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Salazar thanked his Ambassador
Antonio Nájera Cabrera for the analysis and news clippings he had forwarded the Ministry, Guatemala,
Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Signatura B99-6,
Legajo 4398, Expediente 93342, 235, Salazar to Nájera Cabrera, March 23, 1938.
419
167
Argentina, Uruguay, and Guatemala. 420 This dismissive attitude would have been a shock
to the agents and diplomats who worked so hard to secure the existence of a market for
Mexican oil in Latin America after the expropriation. Although sales to the region in
1938, 1939, and 1940 were less than half of what they had been in 1937 under the
management of the foreign oil companies,421 these small victories were won against great
odds through the tremendous efforts of Mexico’s diplomats and PEMEX’s agents.
Soon after the announcement of the expropriation, PEMEX arranged for its agents
to travel to Latin America to begin negotiations for the sale of oil. As well as working
with the Mexican representatives to begin bidding on oil contracts, they were charged
with establishing relationships with local companies and contracting them to become the
official distributors of Mexican oil in each country. In early May 1938, Jacinto
Hernández Barragán departed for Cuba and Antonio Rivero Osuna left for Central
America. 422 Alfonso Reyes headed up a special delegation for the establishment of oil
purchases in Brazil. Reyes had served as Ambassador to Brazil from 1930 to 1936 and
had innumerable contacts in Rio de Janeiro and significant goodwill in the capital that
derived from his status as a celebrated writer. 423 Although Reyes was assisted in his
undertakings in Brazil and the other South American countries by Fernando Saldaña
Galván of PEMEX, his title of Special Ambassador demonstrated that the Ministry of
420
Jesús Silva Herzog, Historia de la Expropiación de las Empresas Petroleras (Mexico City: PEMEX,
1988), 101. The first of many editions of this classic was published in 1947, but it drew extensively on his
1941 publication. PEMEX issued the edition I consulted to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the
expropriation.
421
Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 114-116.
422
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Espinosa Mireles to Hay, May 6, 1938.
423
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588, Espinosa Mireles to Hay, May 24, 1938. For an indication of Reyes’s
popularity in Brazil, see his personnel file AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70.
168
Foreign Affairs was bringing out the big guns for an assignment it regarded as being of
vital importance. As a result of these efforts, the firm Corrêa e Castro & Companhia
Limitada became the authorized agents for PEMEX in Brazil. 424 Many other such
agreements followed: with Salvador Altamirano in Argentina and Uruguay, Arturo
Aguirre Matheu in Guatemala, the firm Castro y Quesada y Compañía in Costa Rica, and
Felipe Mantica y Compañía of Nicaragua, among others. 425 Thereafter, these companies
and individuals worked closely with the Mexican diplomats in the region to secure a
market in Latin America for Mexican oil.
The representatives of PEMEX who fanned out throughout the region were
somewhat successful in establishing a number of distribution agreements, but
nevertheless their efforts were sometimes hindered by the interference of US and British
oil interests. Antonio Rivero Osuna’s activities in Central America were closely
monitored by US diplomats and military attachés in the region. Alex A. Cohen wrote a
series of confidential military intelligence reports on Rivero Osuna’s efforts in Costa
Rica. 426 He reported that because US oil companies were so long-established in Central
America, it would be difficult for Mexico enter the market. Moreover, his sources told
him that “all of the oil companies doing business in this territory have pledged
themselves to prevent Mexico from making sales” of its “hot oil” in the region. 427 In his
424
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588, telegram from Mireles to Correa Castro, November 14, 1938.
Argentina: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588; Uruguay: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 596; Guatemala:
AHD SRE, LE 587 and AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592; Costa Rica: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589;
Nicaragua: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 594.
426
United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165 (RG 165),
Reel IX, Document 0989, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, June 16, 1938.
427
United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document
0995, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 14, 1938.
425
169
estimation, the chances that Rivero Osuna would meet with success in Central America
were slim to none. Indeed, Mexico’s first bid in Costa Rica was unsuccessful, despite the
fact that the price Rivero Osuna offered was substantially lower than that of the US
company that won the bid, suggesting that there may have been some undue pressure on
the Costa Rican government. 428 Nevertheless, he and the firm Castro and Quesada, which
set up the Costa-Mex Distribuidora de Petróleos, got back into the fray and by October
1938 they had won a contract to provide 500 tons of asphalt to the municipality of San
José. 429 Mexico’s cut-rate prices eventually won over the Costa Rican government,
despite the obstruction of the US oil representatives who had previously maintained a
near monopoly in the region.
Cohen, in his military intelligence reports of July 1940, analysed the attitudes of
the governments of Central America towards Rivero Osuna’s visit. He believed that in
Costa Rica, as in El Salvador, there was “unquestionably a certain amount of proMexican sentiment.” 430 Although the Costa Rican government never publicly came out in
favour of the expropriation, they supported it through their purchase of Mexican
petroleum products. As difficult as it is to trace the “sentiments” of governments
throughout the region, the ideologies upon which they based their domestic political
programmes make it clear that some were more likely to support the expropriation than
others. One case that provides an interesting opportunity to analyse the importance of
428
United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document
1000, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 20, 1938. Also see Mexico’s chargé
d’affaires’s report on the failed bid. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Ortega to Hay, July 19, 1938.
429
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Ortega to Hay, October 15, 1938.
430
United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document
0995, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 14, 1938.
170
“sentiment” in these purchases is that of Chile. When the expropriation occurred in
March 1938, Chilean President Arturo Alessandri was on the verge of losing an election
campaign to the Leftist coalition of the Frente Popular. The outgoing Conservative
government had no ideological affinity with the Mexican Revolution, but president-elect
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a member of the Radical Party, made common cause with
Cárdenas. Once he was inaugurated in December 1938, a pronounced policy shift took
place. Responsive to popular support for the expropriation among the social groups that
had helped elect him, his government substantially increased relations with Mexico.
Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago Pablo Campos Ortiz began exploring the
possibility of exporting oil to Chile shortly after the expropriation. His inquiries led him
to the Chilean navy, which he happily reported in July of 1938 might be interested
provided the price was right. 431 Campos Ortiz entered into negotiations, and in
September, Salvador Altamirano came from Uruguay to assist him in the process. Still,
by November, a deal had not yet been reached and he suggested that the delay might be
related to the transmission of power in Chile. 432 Given that Aguirre Cerda’s election had
taken place on October 25, 1938, it seemed likely that once the position of the Frente
Popular was secure it would only be a matter of time before the negotiations were
complete. He knew the contract was within reach and believed that while the first
shipment would not amount to much in commercial terms, it would have great symbolic
value: “while some governments are discussing Mexico’s right to expropriate its oil, one
foreign government, that of Chile, will acquire Mexican oil for the consumption of its
431
432
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, telegram from Campos Ortiz to Hay, July 4, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Campos Ortiz to Hay, November 14, 1938.
171
navy, giving us preference over the oil companies of other countries,” he stated
triumphantly. 433 By December, the Mexican and US press reported on the sale, which
seemed sure to go through shortly after Aguirre Cerda’s inauguration. 434
In fact, the first shipment of Mexican oil to Chile took on even greater symbolic
importance than Campos Ortiz originally imagined. On January 24, 1939, Chile suffered
an 8.3 magnitude earthquake that left more than 50,000 people dead and another 60,000
injured. The recently-named Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes Spíndola, immediately
created a relief committee in Mexico City. Campos Ortiz had telegraphed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs with details of the donations other governments had announced they
would make in early February 1938. In addition to medicine and other provisions, several
governments pledged to contribute cash. For example, the US promised one million
dollars, Brazil $150,000, Venezuela $16,000, and Peru $60,000. 435 If it were not possible
for the Mexican government to give money, he suggested, it might offer oil instead.
Because the Cárdenas government was completely cash-strapped, this seemed like an
ideal plan. The oil was valued at approximately $25,000.00 and, in addition to the money
that was being raised by subscription throughout Mexico, it would constitute a
respectable donation. 436 With the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
PEMEX the new Ambassador announced that, as part of its contribution to the recovery
433
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Campos Ortiz to Espinosa Mireles, November 14, 1938.
“Se pronone la venta de Petróleo de México a Chile,” El Universal, December 11, 1938, 9; “Mexico
Busy in Chile,” New York Times, December 11, 1938, 20.
435
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77, telegram from Campos Ortiz to SRE, February 4, 1938.
436
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77, telegram from Campos Ortiz to SRE, February 3, 1938.
434
172
effort, Mexico would make a donation of oil. 437 In May 1939, the Chilean tanker
Rancagua docked in Tampico to collect the donation. 438 Ever diligent in their efforts to
discredit the Mexican expropriation, Ambassador Manuel Bianchi reported that British
representatives of the expropriated El Águila delivered a protest note to the commander
of the Rancagua condemning the Chilean government’s acceptance of stolen goods. 439
The letter must have seemed petty to the Chileans, who were grateful for this generous
contribution to their recovery, which strengthened the ties between the Cárdenas and
Aguirre Cerda governments. By donating oil instead of money, the Mexican government
could solve a cash-flow problem and increase goodwill at the same time. This was a
remarkable propaganda opportunity, and Campos Ortiz and Reyes Spíndola took full
advantage of it. In his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the presentation of his
credentials in Santiago that July, Reyes Spíndola said President Aguirre Cerda had given
his enthusiastic approval of purchases of Mexican oil, 440 and 1939 and 1940, the
Rancagua and the Maipo made several visits to Mexican waters to pick up subsequent
shipments of Mexican oil for the Chilean armada. 441
Chilean purchases of Mexican oil represented a political statement made by the
Leftist government of Aguirre Cerda of its support for Mexico and its expropriation.
437
On the Mexican response to the earthquake see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-19-59 (XII partes); AHGE,
SRE, Expediente III-399-2; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-387-2; and
Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-26-7 (VII). Also see the corresponding
documents in the Chilean archives, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1736.
438
“El primer barco chileno ha llegado a Tampico para cargar petróleo de México,” El Nacional, May 28,
1938, 8.
439
MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Bianchi to Ministro, May 24, 1939.
440
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7 (VII), Reyes Spíndola to Hildago, July 29, 1939.
441
The great advantage presented by purchases by the Chilean navy was that they could transport the oil
themselves. Given PEMEX’s lack of oil tankers, this was ideal. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, telegram
from Campos Ortiz to Hay, July 4, 1938.
173
Mexican-Chilean relations had already been cordial under Arturo Alessandri, but
following the election and inauguration of a more like-minded head of state, they
improved markedly. Although he did not state publicly that he approved of the
expropriation, his allegiances were clear. Purchasing Mexican oil provided him another
avenue through which to voice his adherence to the Cárdenas government’s
Revolutionary social and economic policies. The Chilean case provides an example of
politically-motivated oil sales, but the small number of governments in Latin America
that agreed with Cárdenas ideologically were not enough to guarantee the market for oil,
and interestingly, some governments that were otherwise opposed to Cárdenas’s policies
made purchases from PEMEX.
Heavily dependent upon the US not only for oil but also for investment through
the United Fruit Co., Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico had long found the Revolutionary
social and economic policies of Mexico to be a thorn in his side. Moreover, his tight
control of the press was such that Mexican diplomats found it difficult to undertake
effective propaganda campaigns. Nevertheless, Guatemala was one of the Latin
American countries that purchased Mexican petroleum products. This apparent
contradiction suggests that while for some governments buying Mexican oil may have
been a matter of principle, for others it was one of the many economic decisions made on
the basis of price.
Writing at the beginning of the Cárdenas sexenio with reference to the
Guatemalan reaction to socialist education and the religious question in Mexico, chargé
d’affaires Eduardo Espinosa said that the defining characteristic of Guatemalan
174
newspapers was their total and complete submission to the government. He followed by
providing an analysis of the directors and editorial policies of the major dailies which,
although they had some differences, shared in strict government censorship. He did not
recommend a vigorous propaganda campaign regarding the religious question, because it
would have little chance of success in this atmosphere. 442 Little had changed by 1938
when Cárdenas announced the expropriation of US and Anglo-Dutch oil interests.
Ambassador Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus wrote that the Guatemalan press generally
published news service items regardless of bias, 443 and the Embassy’s press releases
appeared without editorial comment. 444 The exception to this rule was the coverage in
Nuestro Diario. Criticism of the Cárdenas government in editorials by director Federico
Hernández de León and columnist Carlos Bauer Avilés had come to be expected by
members of the Mexican Foreign Service in Guatemala. Cienfuegos y Camus considered
Nuestro Diario to be a government mouthpiece. 445 Its criticism waxed and waned,
mirroring in general the Ubico regime’s mercurial attitudes towards its neighbour to the
north. 446
442
AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada de México en Guatemala (AEMGUA), Legajo 13, Expediente 6,
Espinosa to Portes Gil, January 4, 1935. He describes El Imparcial, El Liberal Progresista, Nuestro Diario,
El Diario de Centro América, as well as less important papers such as Éxito, La Epoca, Ideas y Noticias,
and El Occidental.
443
The Embassy’s secretary, Enrique Solórzano, reported that the four major Guatemalan dailies received
news from the UP and AP news services, and occasionally directly from Radiomex. “Las tendencias de la
AP y UP son ampliamente conocidas del Gobierno de México, que ha sido en los últimos años una de sus
víctimas favoritas.” AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-13 (I), Enrique Solórzano, “Prensa,” Informes
confidenciales preparados por el personal de esta mission y Consulado General, September 28, 1838.
444
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938.
445
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938.
446
Enrique Solórzano, reported that “Los directores de todos los periódicos de Guatemala se presentan
todos los días en la oficina del Presidente de la República, quien les imparte sus órdenes acerca de lo quer
deben o no publicar… Algunas veces, en editorials, se flirtea con la democracia, para dar la impression de
que hay “libertad de prensa, pero este ardid es ya bastante conocido del pueblo de Guetemala.” Enrique
Solórzano, “Prensa.”
175
In his column “Acotaciones,” Carlos Bauer Avilés repeatedly criticised the
expropriation. 447 Nevertheless, the paper’s capacity to influence the Guatemalan people
was extremely limited, with a circulation of only 1200. The paper was outweighed in
importance by El Liberal Progresista and El Imparcial, both with a circulation of five
thousand. Furthermore, the new Ambassador to Guatemala, Salvador Martínez de Alva,
stated in December 1938 that Nuestro Diario’s editorials were so vague and confused
that the attacks on Mexico would be missed by the majority of readers, who generally did
not even read them because of their poor quality. 448 This may explain why, despite the
ambiguous if not hostile reception to the expropriation by the Guatemalan press and the
Ubico regime, Cienfuegos y Camus had nevertheless believed that most Guatemalans
who we aware of the controversy were actually sympathetic to the Mexican
expropriation. 449
Because of Mexico and Guatemala’s traditionally contentious border relations, the
two governments had to deal with another potentially explosive issue that seems to have
had a constant presence in the two countries’ relations during this period. Shortly after
the expropriation, in response to rumours in the Mexican press that an army of 60,000
revolutionaries was organising south of the border and preparing an insurgency against
the Cárdenas government, Excelsiór published a letter from the Guatemalan Ambassador
to Mexico, Antonio Nájera Cabrera, describing the reports as absurd and claiming
447
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574. See for example, Carlos Bauer Avilés, “El petróleo y la política,”
Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City) March 23, 1938; and “La situación petrolera de México como
precedente,” Nuestro Diario April 21, 1938.
448
Salvador Martínez de Alva’s credentials were accepted August 26, 1938. He discussed the situation of
the Guatemalan press, with particular reference to Nuestro Diario’s attacks at great length in AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 30-2-13 (II), Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de diciembre de 1938.
449
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938.
176
absolute neutrality regarding the internal affairs of Mexico. 450 Guatemalan Foreign
Minister Carlos Salazar instructed Nájera Cabrera to quell the reports, and he complained
that in popular opinion, Guatemala was always believed to harbour revolutionaries ready
to mount insurgencies against the Mexican government. 451 Inaccuracies in the Mexican
press relating to supposed revolutionary activities taking place in Guatemala were so
numerous that the Guatemalan government did not attempt to counter every rumour that
surfaced. 452 On the other hand, the coincidence of the reports of March 1938 with the oil
expropriation, the transcendent importance of which Nájera Cabrera had reported to the
Minister, meant that the reports had to be taken seriously and refuted immediately.
Ironically, the fact that both Nájera Cabrera and Foreign Minister Hay made official
declarations to that effect caused US Ambassador Josephus Daniels to suspect that there
may have been something to the rumours after all. 453
If the border between the two countries presented special problems for the
governments of Cárdenas and Ubico, it also presented opportunities. Despite the Ubico
regime’s opposition to the so-called communist government of México, it became one of
the first Latin American governments to purchase petroleum products from Mexico.
Efforts to create a market in Guatemala for Mexican oil had been underway for several
450
“Guatemala será siempre leal a nuestra patria,” Excélsior March 29, 1938, 6.
Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4398, Expediente 93342, 241-243, Salazar to
Nájera Cabrera, March 25, 1938.
452
Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4399, Expediente 93343, 108-109, Salazar to
Nájera Cabrera, May 21, 1938.
453
United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 19301939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30593, “Monthly resume for June 1938,” Daniels to Hull, July 15, 1938. The
incident was also reported in Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,
1930-1939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30583, “Monthly resume for May 1938,” Boal to Hull, June 14, 1938.
451
177
years before the expropriation, 454 and immediately after the expropriation, Guatemalans
began to inquire about the possibility of importing petroleum products. 455 The first
representative of Petróleos Mexicanos, Antonio Rivero Osuna, arrived in Guatemala in
May 1938. Although Ubico initially argued that the Guatemalan government was obliged
to decline Rivero Osuna’s offer because it might be interpreted as a hostile act by the
British government, with which Guatemala was in a dispute over its boundary with
British Honduras, he subsequently authorized him to deal with Guatemala City’s
municipal authorities, who contracted to purchase asphalt from Mexico. Asphalt came to
comprise a large portion of the petroleum-based products Mexico exported, especially to
Central America. The high demand was likely a result of the fact that road construction
projects were of particular importance in Central America, as they were in Mexico. 456 In
September, the Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos contracted Ing. Arturo Aguirre
Matheu to be the company’s agent in Guatemala City.
Unfortunately, the first shipment of oil was detained at the Guatemalan border.
Mexican Consul Bernardo Blanco reported that the delay was a result of interference
454
See AHGE, SRE, Expediente IV-603-3. The early efforts of PETROMEX to create a market in Latin
America for Mexican oil lend support to the hypothesis that Mexico’s oil industry was well on its way to
becoming “nationalised” before the expropriation. Jonathan C. Brown states that “Quedó entonces para el
gobierno del presidente Cárdenas solamente la etapa final de un largo proceso de nacionalización, que llegó
a su cúspide con la expropiación del 18 de marzo de 1938, y la fundación de PEMEX.” Jonathan C. Brown,
“Los archivos del petróleo y la revolución mexicana,” Boletín del Archivo Histórico de Petróleos
Mexicanos 5 (Dec., 2004): 67. On PETROMEX’s attempts to sell oil in South America see, Mexico,
Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos (AHPM), Caja 2699, Expediente 71493; AHPM, Caja 2720,
Expediente 71998; AHPM, Caja 2744, Expediente 72550.
455
AHPM, Caja 2419, Expediente 66331, 31.
456
See Wendy Waters, “Remapping Identities: Road Construction and Nation Building in
Postrevolutionary Mexico,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 19201940, eds. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 221-242;
and “Re-mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in Post-revolutionary Mexico” (PhD diss.,
University of Arizona, 1999).
178
from representatives of the expropriated El Águila, but Ambassador Martínez de Alva
wrote that it was a result of Aguirre Matheu’s own incompetence. 457 The shipment
eventually entered the country October 23, but subsequent events proved Martínez de
Alva right. After even greater mismanagement, the Petróleos Mexicanos eventually sued
Aguirre Matheu for his debts and the rights to the name PEMEX in Guatemala. 458 Efforts
to export petroleum-based products to Guatemala continued, but like the first shipment,
they too were plagued with difficulties. 459 Although these efforts were not particularly
successful, they are interesting given the Ubico regime’s ambiguous relations with the
Cárdenas government. Despite the dictator’s cosy relationship with the US and his
reluctance to antagonize the British, with whom he had pressing disagreements,
Guatemala became a fairly regular client of PEMEX. The criticism of Cárdenas found in
the pages of Nuestro Diario only served to obscure the fact that the Guatemalan
government supported the oil expropriation, if not in thought then in deed, through the
purchase of “expropriated” oil. If Cienfuegos y Camus was correct in his judgement that
the majority of Guatemalans were sympathetic to the expropriation, and we find that the
Guatemalan government pragmatically decided to purchase oil after the expropriation, we
might conclude that the Guatemalan press’s reception of the oil expropriation neither
reflected nor influenced Guatemalans’ perceptions or actions.
457
AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592, Blanco to Hay, October 18, 1938; AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592,
Martínez de Alva to Hay, October 19, 1938.
458
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2419-2. References to conflicts with Aguirre Matheu are found throughout
the Mexican embassy’s monthly reports for the next several years. See for example, AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 31-1-30; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, 30-12-11; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, 31-1-21; AHGE, SRE,
Expediente, III-1909-1; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, LE 587; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, LE 606.
459
The 1940 sale of gasoline to Guatemala encountered quality control and transportation problems. See
the reports found in AHPM, Caja 2420, Expediente 66363; AHPM, Caja 2420, 66364.
179
Decisions were not always based on political support for the expropriation; the
effectiveness of PEMEX’s agents in Latin America was of primary importance in
securing oil contracts. As well as their general competence (or lack thereof in the case of
Aguirre Matheu), their political sympathies were at issue. Mexican Ambassador to
Argentina Félix Palavicini reported in February 1940 an incident that occurred a farewell
dinner held at the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires for Consul Jorge C. Altamirano.
José Figueroa, President of the Compañía Comercial Sudamericana, of which Jorge
Altamirano had been manager, exclaimed that he himself would not return to Mexico so
long as the government did not guarantee private property. As the representative of the
Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos in Argentina, the Compañía Comercial
Sudamericana had an important role negotiating oil contracts, and Palavicini was worried
that they might not put in the necessary effort because Figueroa had been one of the large
landholders whom Cárdenas had expropriated in La Laguna. He maintained a large
fortune, but needless to say he was not ideologically supportive of the Cárdenas
government. 460 This example suggests that the agents PEMEX contracted to sell oil in
Latin America were generally in it for the money, not because of their loyalty to
Cárdenas’s Revolutionary social and economic policies. Perhaps Palavicini need not have
worried, as Jorge Altamirano’s brother Salvador was instrumental in negotiating oil
contracts in both Argentina and Uruguay and was one of the most effective and tireless
agents in Latin America. Nevertheless, Figueroa’s remarks serve as a reminder that just
460
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 4-29-12, Palavicini to Hay, 2 February 1940.
180
as these sales were generally not altruistic acts of support for Cárdenas’s expropriation on
the part of the purchasing countries, the agents involved were not entirely selfless.
Shortly after the end of the Cárdenas presidency, Foreign Minister Ezequiel
Padilla wrote to Mexico’s representatives in Latin America asking that they complete
studies of the market for Mexican oil in the countries to which they were posted. In
writing these reports, the diplomats took stock of their efforts over the past three years to
open the Latin American market. 461 They reported on their successes and analysed the
reasons for their failures and proposed methods by which the PEMEX could increase its
sales to Latin America. Nevertheless, as early as 1940 the United States had regained its
position as the largest importer of Mexican oil, taking approximately seventy-five percent
of Mexican exports in 1940 and eighty-five percent in 1941. 462 The crisis in the Mexican
export market that had followed the expropriation was clearly over, and as shipping
became more dangerous because of German attacks on merchant vessels, it became
increasingly impractical to risk PEMEX’s small fleet of tankers by sending them to ports
of call that were far from home. Although Cuba remained an important customer
throughout the war years, and the odd sale was made to other Latin American countries,
the seemingly inevitable integration of the North American market had begun, and the
role that Latin American countries’ purchases had played in helping PEMEX survive the
boycott was soon forgotten. Despite the fact that most Latin American governments had
not publicly come out in favour of Mexico’s oil expropriation, many of them helped
Mexico weather the economic storm it had created by making purchases of petroleum
461
462
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-602-9.
Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 114-116.
181
products. Their share of Mexican exports was not large, but it was significant, both to the
diplomats and agents in the region, and to the Latin American social groups that may
have felt that their vocal support of the expropriation contributed to their governments’
decisions to purchase Mexican oil.
Reflections in and on the Mexican Press
The mobilizations that took place in Latin America in support of the oil
expropriation were reported in the Mexican press, reflecting and in turn influencing the
Mexican reception of the expropriation. 463 Given that most Latin American governments
remained silent on the issue compared to the workers, students’ groups, and Leftist
political parties in the region that made their approval of Cárdenas’s gesture well known,
it follows that the majority of articles describing the Latin American reaction focused on
the response of these progressive social groups. Reports of these events were received
with interest in Mexico. In a front-page article that hailed Mexico as the vanguard of the
autonomy of America, Excélsior described a meeting the Juventud Universitaria de Chile
held in support of the expropriation. 464 Even more common, however, were articles that
described the letters of adhesion and sympathy received from individuals and unions
throughout the region. Whereas some were re-printed from Latin American newspapers,
the majority were forwarded through diplomatic channels to the Mexican government,
often addressed to President Cárdenas himself. In one noteworthy example, Cuban author
463
These conclusions are based on the clippings collection at the Mexican Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de
Tejada (BMLT), Archivos Económicos (AE), Petróleo – Expropiación (O08075-O08145), as well as the
excellent selection of clippings found at PEMEX in the Hemerografía de la Expropiación Petrolera.
464
“México, poderosa vanguardia de la autonomía de América,” Excélsior, April 10, 1938, 1.
182
Juan Marinello congratulated the Mexican President. 465 Even more commonly, however,
these messages were sent to the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM).
Vicente Lombardo Toledano was famous (and in some circles infamous) among workers’
groups throughout Latin America, where he had long been involved in supporting the
organisation of labour. Out of solidarity with Mexican workers—oil workers in
particular—several unions forwarded him their congratulations. In articles such as “Los
obreros zapateros de Cuba nos felicitan por el caso petrolero,” (The shoe workers of
Cuba congratulate us for the oil case) “Los obreros argentinos y el caso petrolero,”
(Argentine workers and the oil case) and “Los trabajadores peruanos opinan de la
expropación,” (The workers of Peru speak out on the oil expropriation), Mexican readers
learned that the expropriation had widespread support from workers in the rest of Latin
America. 466 La Prensa reported that not a single day went by in which the CTM did not
receive letters or telegrams regarding this historic event. 467 These articles were so
numerous that instead of publishing them individually, the Mexican papers began to run
articles that printed the messages of several organizations together at one time. 468 These
letters served to shore up support for the expropriation among workers and other
465
“Felicitación al Sr. Presidente Cárdenas,” El Universal (Mexico City), March 29, 1938, 9. Also see
“Una felicitación al Presidente de la República,” El Universal, April 19, 1938, 9; “Felicitación al gobierno
del Sr. Gral. Cárdenas,” El Nacional, April 19, 1938, 8.
466
La Prensa, April 7, 1938, 12; La Prensa, May 1, 1938, 3; El Nacional, May 20, 1938, 8.
467
“Felicitaciones de los obreros extranjeros por la expropiación,” La Prensa, May 23, 1938, 18.
468
“La CTM sigue recibiendo adhesiones de todo el mundo por la expropiación del petróleo,” La Prensa,
April 17, 1938, 19. This article mentions letters the CTM received from Crítica in Argentina, the Sindicato
de Choferes Particulares in Cuba and the Confederación de Trabajadores Chilenos. These letters of
sympathy were also reported in “Mensajes a la CTM del proletariado del mundo,” La Nacional, April 17,
1938, 8. The support of the Federación de Trabajadores Textiles del Perú, the Sociedad de Auxilios Mutuos
de Motoristas y Conductores de Lima, Peru, and the Federación Local del Trabajo de la Ciudad de Tulúa,
Departamento del Valle del Cauca, Colombia was reported in “Colombia y Perú respaldan al gobierno,” El
Universal, May 20, 1938, 9.
183
progressive social groups that needed and wanted reassurance from abroad regarding
Mexico’s expropriation. Conversely, they may also have caused concern among business
groups and conservatives, who would have seen that this support came not from Latin
American governments, but from groups that, in their eyes, were suspect due to their
radical tendencies. Alan Knight has argued that the expropriation divided Mexico’s
already fractured Left, leaving it prey to conservative attack. 469 I would suggest that, on
the contrary, the domestic reception of the Latin American reaction to the expropriation
served to create points of unity for those on both the Left and the Right of the political
spectrum. 470
When examining these articles as a group, it would seem that the Latin American
reaction to the expropriation was covered extensively in the Mexican press. Although it is
important to understand the broad characteristics of this body of sources, it is equally
important to recognize that articles dealing with the reaction in Latin America were
consistently outnumbered by articles describing the reaction to the expropriation in the
United States, and to some extent Europe and Great Britain. 471 For example, in March
1938, Excélsior printed three full analyses of the US reaction to the expropriation, but did
not publish a comparable analysis of the Latin American press. Here then may be one of
469
Alan Knight, “The Politics of the Expropriation,” in The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth
Century, eds. Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 117.
470
Likewise, in Latin America, the expropriation served to unify divergent political factions around the
issues it brought to the fore.
471
That is why, in addition to making extensive use of the Archivos Económicos at the Biblioteca Miguel
Lerdo de Tejada, I conducted thorough surveys of the newspapers Excélsior and La Prensa in order to
understand the relative weight given to articles on the Latin American reception of the expropriation in
these papers. It should be noted that Vicente Lombardo Toledano was traveling in Europe at the time and
sent regular dispatches to the Mexican press regarding his speaking engagements and the responses of
European workers to the expropriation.
184
the reasons for the fact that the Latin American reception of the oil expropriation has
been neglected in the historiography.
This suggests that Latin American reactions were considered less important at the
time. Mexicans devoured articles describing the responses of the United States and
British governments because of the role these principal actors would play in influencing
the outcome of the expropriation. In doing so, they did not recognise an essential element
of Cárdenas’s foreign policy: he aimed to secure his accomplishments with support from
Latin America. It was recognized at the time that one of the most important ways in
which the Mexican government could ensure the success of the nationalised oil industry
would be by guaranteeing that there would be a market for Mexican oil. As a result, the
number of articles on oil in the Mexican press relating to Latin America surged whenever
PEMEX signed contracts with Latin American countries. 472 Nevertheless, these
purchases were consistently overshadowed by articles on the controversial sales to Japan,
Italy, and Germany. The literature on the expropriation followed suit, giving primacy to
the reactions of the US and Great Britain and seeking explanations for the apparently
contradictory sale of oil to the undemocratic powers that Cárdenas repeatedly chastised
on the world stage.
Conclusion
The oil expropriation of 1938 had great resonance in Latin America, where
workers, students, Leftist politicians, and economic nationalists all found inspiration in
472
BMLT, AE, Petróleo - Exportación (O07136 -O07149).
185
the events that transpired in Mexico. Although Cárdenas’s diplomatic representatives in
the region were extremely successful in firing their passions, more often than not they
were unable to persuade the governments to which they were accredited to publicly
support the expropriation. Some presidents demonstrated their sympathies by shielding
Mexican diplomats from the wrath of their Conservative detractors; others merely gave
confidential assurances of adhesion that could not be acted upon. Some governments
expanded their cooperation with Mexico either through symbolic gestures or in practical
areas such as education; others effectively contributed to the survival of Mexico’s oil
industry by purchasing “expropriated” petroleum products. In each case, the governments
of the region calculated the political risks of their involvement with the nation that,
depending upon their perspective, was seen either as the pariah of the Americas or the
true leader of the region. Although this may not have been enough to secure Cárdenas’s
unqualified leadership of Latin America, each of these instances was essential to
maintaining Mexico’s good relations with its Latin American neighbours and in securing
the eventual outcome of the expropriation. Moreover, his actions, and those of Mexican
diplomats in Latin America, and the responses they met, galvanized his supporters in
Mexico and abroad, enhancing the moral authority of his government and its policies.
186
CHAPTER FIVE
A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES: THE III CONFERENCIA
INTERAMERICANA DE EDUCACIÓN AND THE PRIMER CONGRESO
INDIGENISTA INTERAMERICANO
In August 1937 the students of the Escuela Normal in Mexico City prepared a
performance entitled Revolución for the entertainment of the delegates to the III
Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, held in the capital. Performed on the main
stage of the Palacio de Bellas Artes, the show consisted of three acts that represented the
Revolutionary awakening of the masses in song and dance. At the climax, the students,
bathed in red stage-lighting, raised their fists and sang “The Internationale.” After the
applause, the orchestra began the Communist anthem again and most spectators—
including Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez Vela, Undersecretary of Education
Luis Chávez Orozco, and other high government officials—stood, raised their fists, and
sang along. By contrast, the foreign diplomats attending the performance as part of their
duties in representing their nations at the conference remained seated and did not sing or
clap. Brazilian delegate Afonso Barbosa de Almeida Portugal commented that the
impression caused by the spectacle would remain with him and the other international
delegates for all their days. 473 He reported to his government that many of the foreign
representatives thought it a great discourtesy and resented that the Mexican delegates had
insisted upon referring to them as “comrade” and “compañero” during the conference’s
473
Brazil, Arquivo Nacional (AN), Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, 1930-1945, Lata
118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 1. This twelve-page memorandum, marked secret, is neither signed,
addressed, nor dated, but because Almeida Portugal was the only Brazilian delegate to the conference listed
(erroneously as Alfonso instead of Afonso) in its Memoria, it can be assumed he wrote it for the Itamaraty,
or perhaps, given its location in the Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Getúlio Vargas.
187
proceedings. 474 The Marxist language and Revolutionary symbols the Mexicans
employed rankled, so much so that even the entertainments prepared for the delegates
seemed completely inappropriate and objectionable, diminishing his already low opinion
of the Mexican government, its programme, and officials.
Almeida Portugal’s description of the III Conferencia Interamericana de
Educación provides an opening for analysis of the Mexican government’s use of interAmerican conferences as propaganda tools during the Cárdenas presidency. It numbered
among a long series of special technical meetings at which representatives of the Pan
American Union’s member states debated and made policy suggestions that the
governments of the region could use in their attempts to address common problems.
During the Cárdenas era, the Mexican government participated extensively in the Pan
American Union and other multinational organisations such as the League of Nations and
the International Labour Organisation, often playing host to conferences affiliated with
the inter-American System. 475 In addition to the III Conferencia Interamericana de
Educación, these included the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño, the VII Congreso
Científico Americano; the XXVII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas; the Primer
Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatura Iberoamericana; the XVI
Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación; and the Primer Congreso
Indigenista Interamericano, among many others. Analysis of these meetings demonstrates
the role Cárdenas believed his government could play in multilateral organisations, as
474
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 5.
On Mexican participation in the Pan American Union and its special technical conferences see Carlos
Marichal (ed.), México y las conferencias panamericanas, 1889-1938 (México: Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, 2002).
475
188
well as its use of international conferences in putting the achievements of the Mexican
Revolution on display. The government intended these political, social, and cultural
events to reinforce the image of Mexico as a leader in social policy, and hence interAmerican affairs. As such, they formed an integral part of the government’s efforts to
convince delegates from the rest of the Americas and their governments that Mexico
should be a hemispheric leader by virtue of the achievements of the Revolution in areas
as diverse as maternal and child welfare, educational policy, the organisation of labour,
the construction of rural housing, the teaching of Ibero-American literature, and the
resolution of the so-called indigenous problem. Their descriptions in the press and the
reports of the diplomats and intellectuals who attended them offer an account of the
results of the government’s attempt to shape international opinion and achieve a
leadership position in the region.
The primary responsibilities of Mexican ministers and ambassadors as they
related to the hosting of inter-American conferences included securing the meaningful
participation of American governments in the conferences held in Mexico in these years.
The question of representation directly affected a conference’s chances of success, both
in technical and propagandistic terms. In an era of tight budgets and competing claims to
national expenditures, many governments could not afford to send special representatives
with relevant expertise to every international conference to which they received an
invitation. As a result, ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d’affaires resident in the
country often served as many governments’ official delegates. The trick, from the
perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to demonstrate that a conference was
189
of such importance that it necessitated representation of each country in the region by
experts in the field. To this end, the activities of the Ministry’s ambassadors and ministers
provided an essential service. Whereas diplomats demonstrated themselves to be fairly
reluctant students of the Revolutionary propaganda they met with, technical delegates
proved much more receptive. Because the members of the government ministries and
departments involved in the resolution of the social issues under consideration hoped to
work with their Latin American colleagues into the future, their participation in these
conferences benefited from and led to increased cooperation. Conference organisers
learned through experience that the importance of many international technical
conferences was not self-evident; governments needed to be convinced of their individual
merits. The planning that went into the organisation of conferences could therefore be as
important to a conference’s chances for success as the symbology the organisers
employed once the delegates convened. Similarly, the ambassadors’ and ministers’
efforts to ensure the ratification of conventions passed and intellectual cooperation on the
issues discussed consolidated the conferences’ gains, helping to promote Mexican
leadership in inter-American relations. Although the Cárdenas government’s practice of
using technical meetings as propaganda tools sometimes had ambiguous results, when
supported by the pre- and post-conference activities of diplomats and intellectuals they
could help secure a leadership position for the Mexican government in inter-American
affairs.
190
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación
Building upon the success of the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño 476 and the
programme of intellectual cooperation that supported the government’s efforts to increase
its profile in the region, the Cárdenas government hosted the III Conferencia
Interamericana de Educación (CIE) in 1937 with the goal of showcasing the educational
advances it had achieved through its socialist education programme. 477 The second such
conference had taken place in Santiago de Chile in September 1934, before Cárdenas’s
476
On the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño and the Pan-American Child Congresses, see Mexico,
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR), Caja 454,
Expediente 433/83; Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expedientes III-199-1 and AHGE, SRE, III-13-3; Nichole Sanders,
“Protecting Mothers in Order to Protect Children’: The Seventh Pan-American Child Congress and the
Latin American ‘Civlizing Mission,’” in Maternalism Reconsidered: Social Welfare in Twentieth Century
History, ed. Rebecca Plant et al (Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming); Nichole Sanders, “Gender,
Welfare, and the ‘Mexican Miracle’: The Politics of Modernization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 19371958,” (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2003), Chapter 4; Donna J. Guy, “The Politics of PanAmerican Cooperation: Maternalist Feminism and the Child Rights Movement, 1913-1960,” Gender &
History 10:3 (November 1998): 449-469; Donna J. Guy, “The Pan American Child Congresses, 1916-1942:
Pan Americanism, Child Reform, and the Welfare State in Latin America,” Journal of Family History 23:3
(July 1998): 272-291.
477
On educational policy and the socialist education programme, see Museo Casa Estudio Diego Rivera y
Frida Kahlo, Misiones Culturales: los años utópicos, 1920-1938 (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999);
Isidro Castillo, México y su revolucón educativa 2 vols. (Mexico City: Academia Mexicana de la
Educación, 1966); Jorge Rafael Mora Forero, Historia de una Reforma Educativa Socialista (Tunja:
Ediciones CUPENAL, 1982); Victoria Lerner, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana v. 17 La educación
socialista (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979); John A. Britton, Educación y radicalismo en
México v. 2 Los años de Cárdenas (Mexico City: SEP, 1976); Guadalupe Monroy Huitron, Política
educativa de la Revolución (Mexico City: SEP, 19750; Augsto Santiago Sierra, Las misiones culturales
(1923-1973) (Mexico City: SEP, 1973); Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers,
Peasants and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997); Susana
Quintanilla and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds., Escuela y sociedad en el período cardenista (Mexico City:
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997); Mary Kay Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside: Schools and
Rural Communities in the 1930s,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico,
1920-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 157-175; Elsie Rockwell, “Schools of the Revolution:
Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala, 1910-1930,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation:
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Moodern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 170-208; Elsie Rockwell, Hacer escuela, hacer estado: la
eduación posrevolucionaria vista desde Tlaxcala (Mexico City: CIESAS, 2007); María Candelaria Valdés
Silva, Una sociedad en busca de alternativas: la educación socialista en La Laguna (Saltillo: Secretaría de
Educación Pública de Coahuila, 1999); Juan Alfonseca, “Escuela y sociedad en los distritos de Texcoco y
Chalco, 1923-40,” in Miradas en torno a la educación de ayer, ed. Luz E. Galván (Mexico City: COMIE,
1997); Salvador Camacho Sandoval, Controversia educativa entre la ideología y la fe: La educación
socialista en la historia de Aguascalientes (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1991).
191
inauguration. The Mexican delegation at that meeting had included Ambassador Adolfo
Cienfuegos y Camus and two educational delegates: Elena Torres, who gave a paper on
the education of women, and Rafael Ramírez, who presented on the topic of rural
education. 478 Fernando Murtinho Braga of the Brazilian delegation to that conference
acknowledged the importance of the Mexicans’ participation and their government’s
success in the realm of education when he suggested that the next meeting be held in
Mexico City. 479 The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education began planning the
conference, which the Santiago delegates had resolved would take place in 1937,
approximately one year in advance, appointing Manuel Palacios president of the
organising committee. Although Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez Vela served as
the committee’s honorary president, Palacios took charge of the local arrangements. In
February, the Ministry of Education asked for information on the state of education in
each country, which the ambassadors and ministers then requested of the governments to
which they were accredited. 480 Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled all
communication with foreign governments, the Ministry and its ambassadors and
ministers in the Americas played an instrumental role in the organisation of the
conference.
478
Elena Torres’s paper was entitled “Educación femenina, con el fin de obtener que la mujer conserve sus
características, sin disminuir el rol que desempeña en la vida moderna,” and Rafael Ramírez’s paper was
entitled “La Educación Rural en México.” Cienfuegos y Camus responded to the Chilean Minister of
Education’s speech at the opening ceremony. III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Memoria de la
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación (Mexico City: DAPP, 1938), 7. Hereafter this source will be
referred to as Memoria de la III CIE.
479
Ibid., 8.
480
See, for example, Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-70-3, Cravioto to Montalvo, February 10, 1937.
192
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged its ambassadors and ministers throughout
Latin America with the task of securing effective participation in the conference by each
country. The Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP) published the
official announcement and internal regulations of the conference in pamphlet form, and
in April 1937 the Ministry instructed the ambassadors and ministers to distribute these
and issue formal invitations to the governments of the region. 481 The diplomats began
propaganda campaigns promoting the conference that both encouraged the governments
to name delegates in a timely manner and raised public interest in the conference and its
expected results.
When reporting in March 1935 on the invitation to participate in the XII Congreso
Panamericano del Niño, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Carlos García Vélez had written
that the conference represented an excellent opportunity for his government to study both
scientific advances in children’s health and welfare and the programmes and institutions
charged with these responsibilities that had been established by the Mexican
government. 482 Correspondence between the Cuban foreign minister and other
government departments followed regarding the naming of delegates, but Ambassador
García Vélez nevertheless served as Cuba’s official delegate. Two years later, Cuban
relations with Mexico had strengthened greatly, and whether due to genuine interest in
the conference, its relative geographical proximity, or the desire to increase ties between
481
See, for example, the official invitation to the Cuban government. Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba
(ANC), Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 514, Expediente 11838, Cravioto to Remos, April 21, 1937.
The convocatoria and reglamento interior were published as the first issue of the Boletín de la III
Conferencia Interamericana de Educación (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937).
482
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009692, García Vélez to Barnet,
March 22, 1935.
193
the two countries, the Cuban government chose as head of its delegation Minister of
Education Dr. Fernando Sirgo. Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto
expressed great satisfaction with the decision; he considered arranging for a sitting
Minister of Education to attend the conference quite a diplomatic coup. He suggested that
the organising committee should ensure a special reception for Sirgo upon his arrival in
Veracruz, in recognition of the distinction his appointment represented for the Mexican
government. 483
The night before Sirgo’s departure, Cravito hosted a banquet attended by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the newly-appointed Ambassador to Mexico, the President of
the Academia Nacional de Artes y Ciencias, and several other diplomats and intellectuals.
Cravioto also invited noted Mexican violinist Celia Treviño, who had stopped in Cuba on
her way to perform in the United States. 484 Special delegates Dr. Matilde Cruz Planas of
the Amigos de la Escuela Nueva and the Associación Pedagógica Universitaria, Aurora
García de Rodríguez of the Universidad de la Habana, Esther Fernández de Beltrán of the
Escuela Normal de la Habana, Dr. Joaquín Añorga of the Escuela Profesional de
Comercio, and Manuela Fonseca de García of the Escuela Normal de Santiago de Cuba
rounded out the Cuban delegation, serving as technical representatives to the conference.
As a result, Cuba held the position as the country with the most representatives to the
conference, after Mexico and the United States, demonstrating both the Cuban
government’s interest and growing expertise in educational matters and the effectiveness
483
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XIX), telegram from Cravioto to SRE, August 11, 1937.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for August 1937, Cravioto to SRE, September 11,
1937.
484
194
of Cravioto’s campaign in favour of the III CIE. 485 Upon his return, Sirgo hosted a
reception at the Hotel Nacional in honour of Cravioto, in recognition of the hospitality he
had received at the conference, or perhaps, as we shall see, to calm the diplomatic waters
after an unfortunate incident marred his time as head of the Cuban delegation to the III
Conferencia Interamericana de Educación. 486
The campaigns of most of the other Mexican ambassadors and ministers to Latin
America did not succeed nearly as well, despite their best efforts. The chargé d’affaires in
Paraguay, Domingo Trapani, publicised the conference in Asunción’s dailies, El Día and
La Nación, in hopes of pressuring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to name a delegate, but
in the end only the Paraguayan Minister to Mexico, Anselmo Jover, attended the
conference. 487 The Honduran government originally resolved not to send any
representatives to the conference, but chargé d’affaires Salvador Brom Rojas eventually
convinced them to name their Minister to Mexico, Edgardo Valenzuela. 488 The
Venezuelan government named Professor Luis Padrino, who was already in Mexico,
commissioned to study the rural education programme by his government. Perhaps
because Mexican chargé d’affaires Salvador Navarro Aceves intimated that the
Venezuelan government rarely sent delegates to Mexico while often sending
representatives to other, often much more distant, conferences, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs eventually also named Drs. Juan Jones Parra and Antonio Domingo Narváez as
485
Memoria de la III CIE, 30-42.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for September 1937, Cravioto to SRE, October 2,
1937.
487
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (VI), Trapani to Hay, 26 May 1937.
488
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (X), Brom Rojas to Hay, June 19, 1937
486
195
delegates. 489 Nevertheless, at the last minute, both cancelled their participation, the first
because of illness and the second because he found himself unable to abandon his
responsibilities as Minister of Public Works. 490
In the face of low projected attendance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs secured a
reduced rate of 50 percent on national railways for delegates to the conference in the
hope that this would help offset the high cost of attendance and encourage more countries
to send educational delegates. Ambassadors and ministers to Latin America duly
forwarded this information to the governments to which they were accredited, but it had
little effect. The Ecuadorian chargé d’affaires in Mexico City, César Coloma, wrote that
this gesture typified the hospitality that foreign representatives received from the
Mexican government, but in the end he remained the only delegate from Ecuador at the
III CIE. 491 Three delegates from Chile took advantage of the special rate, but this does
not seem to have been the deciding factor in their participation, as the several Chilean
delegates had been named well in advance of the announcement of this financial
assistance, not surprising given that the last conference had been held in Santiago. 492 The
subvention did help two representatives from the Costa Rican organisation Maestros
Unidos to attend the conference. Jesús Vega of Maestros Unidos had written to the
Mexican chargé d’affaires in San José regarding the availability of financial support for
Latin American delegates, and in response the Ministry of Education resolved to pay for
489
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (I), Navarro Aceves to Hay, July 6, 1937.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (I), Navarro Aceves to Hay, August 18, 1937.
491
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XV), Coloma to Hay, August 14, 1937.
492
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XVIII), Bianchi to Hay, September 9, 1937.
490
196
the expenses of two delegates from Maestros Unidos during the conference. 493 Coupled
with the 50 percent reduction in travel within Mexico, this must surely have helped the
organisation send representatives. 494 Nevertheless, they did not form part of the official
Costa Rican delegation or have voting rights at the III CIE. In the first plenary session of
the conference, Raúl Cordero Amador of the organisation made clear his allegiance to
Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Perhaps his organisation’s politics had influenced the
Ministry of Education’s decision to help him financially and the Costa Rican
government’s reluctance to fund his travels. 495 In all, thirteen Latin American
governments merely named members of their diplomatic missions as official delegates to
the conference; only Cuba, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti,
and the United States sent special educational representatives.
Interested parties who wanted to see the III Conferencia Interamericana de
Educación succeed supplemented the efforts of Mexican diplomats to encourage the
meaningful representation of each country. The Salvadoran government initially named
only its Minister to Mexico, Dr. Héctor Escobar Serrano, as delegate, but the Salvadoran
Consul General in Mexico City, Francisco Osegueda, sent a letter to the editor of La
Prensa (San Salvador) exhorting the government to appoint technical delegates instead of
diplomats unfamiliar with the field of education. 496 In response to his appeal, Gustavo
Solano and Cristóbal Colíndres represented the Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias
493
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), Vega to Martínez de Alva, May 27, 1937; AHGE, SRE,
Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), Palacios to Hay, July 16, 1937.
494
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), González Rojas to Vega, August 3, 1937.
495
Memoria de la III CIE, 61.
496
Agrarian and educational themes interested Osegueda. See Francisco Osegueda “La vida del campesino
salvadoreño de otros tiempos y la del campesino actual,” Revista del Ateneo de El Salvador 20 (1932).
197
Sociales and the Facultad de Ingeniería of the Universidad de El Salvador at the III
CIE. 497 Haiti’s representation at the conference, on the other hand, seems almost
accidental. The diplomatic correspondence between José Vázquez Schiaffino, Mexico’s
minister in Santo Domingo, and the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that
the Haitian government resolved not to send a delegate. 498 Nevertheless, the Memoria of
the conference lists Madeleine Sylvain as their representative. Sylvain had received a
scholarship to study at Bryn Mawr and would later go on to write L’éducation des
femmes en Haïti and work for the United Nations. 499 She also represented the Pan
American Union’s Inter-American Commission of Women at the conference and,
because of the PAU’s vested interest in its success, she surely travelled to Mexico on
their funds and not those of the Haitian government.
Sylvain numbered among the many women who participated in the conference.
The delegation from Chile included Gertrudis Muñoz de Ebensperger and Dr. Martha
Arcaya Vargas of the Escuela Normal in Santiago. Many Mexican women also
participated, though they were in the minority. The official delegation of sixty-four
included five women; the delegations from the states of Campeche, Durango, and Sinaloa
each included one woman; and twenty-four of the eighty-seven representatives from
government departments and institutions were female, including Elena Torres, who
represented the Asociación Universitaria Mexicana. Elena Picazo de Murray of the
497
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (III), chargé d’affaires Federico Cáceres to Hay, June 18, 1937;
Memoria de la III CIE, 32.
498
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XI).
499
Madeleine Sylvain Bouchereau, L’education des femmes en Haïti (Port-au-Prince: Impr. De l’Etat,
1944); Haïti et ses femmes: une étude d’évolution culturelle (Port-au-Prince: Les Presses libres, 1957).
Memoria de la III CIE, 33.
198
Departamento de Secundarias served as secretary of the third section of the conference,
which dealt with secondary education. 500 Female representation at the conference
demonstrates nominal government recognition of the important role that women played
in the field of education in Revolutionary Mexico. 501 The increasing preponderance of
women in educational circles also held true for the rest of the hemisphere. Katherine M.
Cook headed the US delegation to the III CIE. She gave a salutary address at the
inauguration and in the first plenary session the delegate from Nicaragua nominated her
president of the first section of the conference, dealing with maternal and pre-school
education. Although Cook initially demurred because she did not speak Spanish,
Palacios, as head of the Mexican delegation, seconded the nomination given the
availability of interpreters, and the vote met with unanimous approval.502 Unfortunately,
only three papers had been submitted in advance of the conference for the consideration
of her section, as opposed to the thirty-four papers that had been submitted for the ninth
section on general topics headed by the delegate from Brazil, Afonso Barbosa de
Almeida Almeida Portugal. Nevertheless, Cook’s influence and that of her colleagues
assured them an important role in the conference’s deliberations. US representation also
included Esther J. Crooks of the American Council on Education, Dorothy Epplen of the
University of Oregon, Katherine Briggs and Guadalupe Ramírez of the National Board of
500
Memoria de la III CIE, passim.
See Mary Kay Vaughan, “Women School Teachers in the Mexican Revolution: The Story of Reyna’s
Braids,” Journal of Women’s History 2:1 (Spring 1990): 143-168; Mary Kay Vaughan, “Rural Women’s
Literacy and Educaion during the Mexican Revolution: Subverting a Patriarchal Event?” in Women of the
Mexican Countryside, 1850-1990, ed. Heather Fowler-Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1992); Stephanie J. Smith, “Educating the Mothers of the Nation: The Project
of Revolutionary Education in Yucatán,” in The Women’s Revolution in Mexico, 1910-1953, ed. Stephanie
Mitchell and Patience A. Schell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 37-51.
502
Memoria de la III CIE, 77.
501
199
Young Women’s Christian Associations, Mary Helen McCrea of the American Library
Association in Chicago, Mrs. Charner M. Perry of the University of Chicago’s
International Journal of Ethics and, in addition to Madeleine Sylvain, five women from
the Inter American Commission of Women. Concha Romero James of the Pan American
Union presented on the topic of intellectual cooperation in the Americas. 503 The
prevalence of female representatives from Washington D.C. certainly derived from the
PAU’s headquarters there.
The relatively large number of delegates from Chicago may have been due to the
fact that Robert Redfield represented the American Sociological Society at the
conference. Redfield numbered among the many distinguished delegates to the
conference who presented papers in the nine sections into which the delegates divided
their work. The eminent Colombian writer Jorge Zalamea, who had studied in Mexico
and was then serving as President Alfonso López Pumarejo’s Secretario Particular
(Private Secretary), gave a paper, as did exiled Peruvian intellectual José Antonio
Encinas, who had previously served as rector of the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San
Marcos. The Bolivian government had originally proposed naming Encinas as one of
their delegates, but decided against it so as not to ruffle any diplomatic feathers among
the Peruvians. Encinas therefore attended as an observer only, but nonetheless
participated actively in the conference’s deliberations. 504
503
Concha Romero James, “La cooperación intelectual en América, 1933-1936,” Trabajo presentado a la
Tercera Conferencia Interamericana de Eduación, México, D.F., Agosoto 22-29, 1937.
504
See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXIII), telegram from Rosenzweig Díaz to SRE, August 17,
1937.
200
It seems clear that among the primary goals of the Cárdenas government in
hosting the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, propaganda ranked highest.
Undersecretary of Education Luis Chávez Orozco’s opening address, which he delivered
in the absence of President Cárdenas and Minister Vela, set the tone for the conference in
this regard. 505 Although Chávez Orozco said he was well aware of the protocol that
limited his responsibilities to greeting the delegates on behalf of the host nation, he
decided to abandon that practice and launch instead into a thorough explanation of the
socialist education programme. 506 He described socialist education’s evolution, aiming to
demonstrate that it did not arise from the imposition of foreign ideologies but rather
socio-economic circumstances. Beginning with the colonial era, he analysed the class
struggle, culminating in an explanation of the Revolution and its educational aims, which
he said aimed to further the broader goal of transforming the relations of production in
society. 507 During the following week, teeming groups of Mexican delegates expounded
upon the Cárdenas government’s progress in achieving this transformation of society by
giving presentations to the relevant working groups on advances in areas such as
agricultural education, primary education, secondary education, the organisation of rural
schools, and the education of workers and their children. 508 The organising committee
505
The organising committee invited Cárdenas to preside over the inaugural session of the conference, but
the President was in the Yucatán on one of his frequent giras. See AGN, LCR, Caja 453, Expediente
433/35, telegram from Palacios to Cárdenas, August 17, 1937.
506
“Discurso pronunciado por el señor Luis Chávez Orozco, Subsecretario de Educacíon Pública de
México, en la sesión solemne inaugural celebrada el domingo 22 de agosot de 1937,” Memoria de la III
CIE, 45.
507
Ibid., 49.
508
See III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Delegación oficial del Gobierno mexicano, (Mexico
City: DAPP, 1937), which includes pamphlets of Mexican papers entitled “La educación agrícola y normal
rural,” “La Educación Primaria en el Distrito Federal,” “La Enseñanza Secundaria en México,” “La
201
also arranged for the delegates to participate in daily field trips to model schools in the
Federal District in order to showcase the facilities and methods they promoted in their
conference papers. Delegates visited the Escuela Nacional de Maestros, the Centro
Escolar “Revolución,” the Escuela Industrial “Hijos del Ejército,” the Escuela Secundaria
No. 1, and the Parque Lira, which housed schools for malnourished, developmentally
delayed, and disabled children. 509 All these activities had been designed with the goal of
impressing upon the delegates that Mexico provided excellent guidance to governments
struggling to overcome similar socio-economic problems in their own countries.
Shortly before the beginning of the conference, Jorge Zalamea gave an interview
to the Mexico City daily El Universal that suggested that this propaganda campaign
might be successful. He considered Mexico’s socialist education exemplary for Colombia
and the rest of the Americas, where the implementation of reforms to Article 3 of the
Constitution of 1917 had been observed with great interest. 510 He expressed particular
interest in the rural education programme that promised to incorporate the indigenous
population into the nation and said he hoped to have the opportunity to visit educational
institutions in the capital and beyond. Zalamea had great optimism at the beginning of the
conference, but the reports of several delegates written after the fact suggest that, for
many, it did not meet these high hopes.
Many of the foreign representatives did not take kindly to the heavy-handed
propaganda techniques the government employed at the III Conferencia Interamericana
organización de las escuelas rurales,” and “Síntesis de Labores del Departamento de Educación Obrera.”
Also see the ponencias found in AGN, LCR, Caja 453, Expediente 433/35.
509
Memoria de la III CIE, 23-4.
510
“La Escuela Socialista,” El Universal (Mexico City), August 21, 1937, 1.
202
de Educación. Chilean Ambassador Manuel Bianchi believed that the government’s
objective had been to take advantage of the conference to increase the prestige of the
socialist education programme. He complained to his government that Mexicans had
outnumbered the international delegates in most sessions ten to one. 511 Although the
internal regulations of the conference had stipulated that voting would take place by
country, not by delegate, many sections dispensed with this rule and on occasion, fifteen
to twenty Mexicans out-voted the few foreign delegates in attendance who had
reservations about the resolutions. 512
The Brazilian delegate’s critique of the conference and the methods of the
Mexican government were even more pointed. In his confidential report on the III CIE,
Afonso Barbosa de Almeida Portugal railed to his government about the objectionable
nature of the conference. It became apparent to him from the first plenary session that the
politics of the Cárdenas government and its most vocal adherents would interfere with the
smooth functioning of the III CIE. 513 Instead of beginning by electing the conference’s
president, the verbose labour leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano took the stage and
proposed a resolution condemning the removal from their positions of tenured professors
who held revolutionary ideals, a practice that had become common in the polemical
political atmosphere of most Latin American countries. 514 Although Lombardo Toledano
511
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico,
Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, September 21, 1937.
512
Ibid.
513
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 9.
514
The Memoria of the conference states that this debate occurred after the election of Palacios as President
and the choice of presidents of the sections, but Portugal states that because of “some confusion” or
perhaps on purpose, Lombardo Toledano spoke before any of this business had been conducted. Memoria
de la III CIE, passim.
203
served as Rector of the Universidad Obrera and an educational delegate to the
conference, he spoke in the name of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México
(CTM) and the 83,000 educational workers in Mexico. 515 Most of the diplomats thought
of him as the red labour leader whose machinations in the Latin American labour
movement had been a thorn in their governments’ sides. 516 They considered his
suggestions an anathema to the goals and attitudes of the generally conservative
governments they represented. Several diplomatic representatives attempted to find some
common ground on the resolution, while hoping to prevent offence being taken by the
delegates whose governments had engaged in politically-motivated dismissals. Jorge
Zalamea suggested a friendly amendment to the resolution, declaring instead la cátedra
libre, freedom of expression for tenured university professors. 517 While several diplomats
supported this suggestion, many educational delegates, such as Raúl Cordero Amador of
the Maestros Unidos de Costa Rica, resisted the change in wording because it would not
have specifically chastised the repressive practices of right-wing governments in the
region. Fernando Sirgo had himself been forced out of the professoriate in the past, but he
attempted to diffuse the situation by suggesting that the resolution be forwarded for study
to the appropriate section of the conference for consideration. 518 The long and divisive
debate raged on. When the voting finally took place, Rosa Pastora Leclerc, one of the
members of the Cuban delegation who had been fired from her position in 1935 and only
515
See Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Obra educativa 3 vols. (Mexico City: Instituto Politécnico
Nacional/Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Políticos y Sociales Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 2002).
516
See Daniela Spenser, “Vicente Lombardo Toledano envuelto en antagonismos internacionales,” Revista
Izquierdas 3:4 (2009): 1-19.
517
Memoria de la III CIE, 61.
518
Memoria de la III CIE, 86.
204
reinstated in January 1937, broke ranks with Sirgo and said that as a result of this
experience, she urged her delegation to support Lombardo Toledano’s resolution in the
name of persecuted Cuban teachers. 519 In the end, the resolution passed, with Chile,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El
Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela in favour, and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba,
Guatemala, and the United States abstaining (the Bolivian and Peruvian delegates had not
been present during the vote).
The ideological lines had been drawn. As the delegates discussed the resolution at
great length it became clear that sharp differences of opinion would fuel the debates in
the coming week. Brazilian representative Almeida Portugal had abstained entirely from
the debate during the first plenary session and he reported that it had left many delegates
who simultaneously exercised diplomatic functions in Mexico with the impression that
the government had attempted to impose its ideas upon the delegates. 520 In his opinion,
this created a “hostile environment” not conducive to the discussion of the simplest of
issues. Whenever a proposal unfriendly to its position came up, an immediate chill,
provoked by the numerosíssima Mexican delegation, came over the assembly. At one
point, their intransigent attitude threatened to derail the entire conference, an eventuality
only avoided by the timely intervention of Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez
Vela. 521
519
520
Memoria de la III CIE, 97.
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 1-
5.
521
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 5.
205
“Mexico no se propone imponer sus sistemas,” proclaimed the headline of a frontpage article in El Universal, but the editors of the daily and the foreign delegates alike
remained unconvinced. 522 Vázquez Vela’s speech to the delegates upon his return from
the Yucatán, where he had been on a tour with President Cárdenas, recognised that each
delegate should vote according to the instructions he had received from his government.
Mexico’s educational system resulted from its particular historical evolution, and
likewise, each country in the Americas should pursue educational reform pursuant to its
own unique circumstances. He remained confident that the overall result of the
conference would be to contribute to the betterment of education throughout the
continent. 523 His calming words and presence did not diminish the often heated debate
that raged in the sessions at the Palacio de Bellas Artes and in the press. Alfonso Junco of
El Universal took the opportunity to editorialise on the idea of socialist education, which
he remained certain was being held up as an example for the rest of the continent to
follow. 524 He found it ironic that the fiery discussion of the situation of persecuted
professors would have turned to a discussion of educational freedom, which he argued
did not exist in Mexico. Although Lombardo Toledano had said in the course of the
debate that only conservative governments had a history of persecuting teachers, Junco
argued that the imposition of socialist education, which did not permit parents to educate
their children according to their own ideas and beliefs, demonstrated that religious
education met the same persecution in Mexico that socialist education met in other
522
“Mexico no se propone imponer sus sistemas,” El Univeral, August 28, 1937, 1.
Ibid.
524
Alfonso Junco, “La Conferencia Interamericana y la Educación Socialista,” El Universal, August 28,
1937, 3.
523
206
countries. 525 Junco’s critique of the government’s position at the conference exemplified
what many delegates already understood from the international propaganda campaign
that had followed the announcement of socialist education in 1934: its implementation
met great resistance in many quarters. The task of the Mexican government then was to
demonstrate that, despite this resistance, the socialist education programme had made
great strides and deserved to be emulated.
Once again, the Brazilian delegate remained unimpressed, and if his experiences
were at all typical, the visits of delegates to schools in the D.F. may have actually
backfired. 526 During a visit to the Escuela República de Brasil, Almeida Portugal was
appalled when one of the students who could not answer a question his teacher had posed
received the immediate assistance of one of his classmates, who gave him the answer so
that he could respond correctly. He believed that the collective impulse of the Mexican
educational system had removed the necessary stimulus to individual student
performance. 527 To his horror, the 5th year students he visited performed a rendition of
“The Internationale,” although the effect this caused was mediated somewhat when the
4th year students sang the Brazilian national hymn and one little girl, in excellent
Portuguese, delivered a short speech asking him to extend a greeting to the children of
Brazil. 528 When the school’s director, Loredo Ortega, suggested an educational exchange
525
Memoria de la III CIE, 93; Junco, “La Conferencia Interamericana,” 3.
For a newspaper report of one such visit, see “Escuela Modelo,” El Universal, August 28, 1937, 2nd
section, 1.
527
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?],
10. Also on the Escuela República de Brasil see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-342-24.
528
For other examples of the use of children as cultural ambassadors see Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children
of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2008),
Chapter 6.
526
207
between five of his teachers and five Brazilian educators, Almeida Portugal avoided
responding. He believed that Brazilian teachers had nothing to learn from their Mexican
counterparts because of the absolute disparity in the methods they employed. 529
Almeida Portugal’s report on the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación
remained confidential and his outspoken critique of the Mexican delegation and
educational system did not come to the attention of his hosts. The criticism of Fernando
Sirgo, the star guest at the conference, by contrast, became public, much to the dismay of
the conference’s organisers. After the conference’s closing, the Mexico City weekly Hoy
printed an interview with Sirgo, in which he stated that the III CIE had been a complete
and utter failure. 530 Sirgo had agreed to give the magazine an interview on August 28, but
had arrived late to the meeting because the afternoon’s session had run long. When
giving his excuses, he explained in a humorous manner that the proceedings had no fixed
schedule and anyone who wanted to speak was given an opportunity, which several
speakers chose to do by deviating from the topics under discussion. He concluded by
saying that he had never seen a bigger waste of time and there was nothing he could do
but put up with it. 531 Sirgo’s comments must have come as a shock to the organisers, who
counted him as one of their most faithful collaborators. Palacios immediately issued a
statement from the Ministry of Education that contrasted the comments attributed to
Sirgo with the solemn words he had spoken at the conference. Referring to the shorthand
version of the proceedings and debates of the III CIE, Palacios quoted Sirgo as having
529
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?],
10.
530
Hoy (Mexico City), no. 29, September 11, 1937, 17.
531
Ibid.
208
said in the closing session that all of the delegates should feel proud of their contribution
to the solution of educational problems that affected the whole continent, and that their
hard work had been rewarded by the conference’s real achievements. 532 Nevertheless, as
El Universal editorialised, the words spoken by Sirgo while wearing his diplomatic hat at
the conference could not be compared to the off-hand remarks he made to the reporter. 533
Given the prevailing characteristics of the ruling governments in Latin America, Mexico
seemed to the delegates an alarmingly radical country, and whether they approved of the
conference’s more controversial resolutions out of politeness, knowing full well that their
governments could reject them after the fact, made fun of the earnestness of the Mexican
delegates’ soliloquies, or pronounced their reservations “with a Portuguese accent,” the
government could be assured that many of the representatives of the American republics
would seek to err on the side of caution by downplaying the importance of the
conference. 534 Although certainly correct, El Universal’s editorial underestimated the
objections of some of the delegates.
Chilean Ambassador Bianchi, who discussed Sirgo’s declarations in his report on
the conference, said that the Cuban Minister’s estimation of the conference’s failings
contained more than a grain of truth, and reflected the real difficulties that met the foreign
delegates who faced an overwhelming Mexican propaganda effort. 535 The Cuban chargé
d’affaires wrote home about the incident and explained that Sirgo officially denied
having made the remarks. Nevertheless, the damage had been done. After the publication
532
“Aseversaciones Atribuídas al Miistro Doctor Sirgo,” El Universal, September 11, 1937, 2nd section, 4.
“Por el ojo de la llave,” El Universal, September 14, 1937, 3.
534
Ibid.
535
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, September 21, 1937.
533
209
of Sirgo’s comments in Hoy, representatives of the Liga de Escritores y Artistas
Revolucionarios (LEAR) protested in the government newspaper El Nacional, calling his
outburst offensive to the progressive spirit that had inspired the conference participants.
La Prensa, on the other hand, agreed that the conference had been a waste of time. 536 His
comments, whether taken out of context or a true representation of his feelings about the
conference, created a public and diplomatic debate regarding the results of the III CIE
and the Mexican government’s use of technical conferences as propaganda tools.
Although Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto’s report on the banquet Sirgo
offered in honour of the Mexican Embassy at the Hotel Nacional September 22 following
his return to the island did not include many details, the reception must have been rather
tense, given the stir he had left behind in Mexican capital. 537
Despite the general depreciation of the conference among its foreign delegates
and the controversy Sirgo’s comments caused, the delegates to the III Conferencia
Interamericana de Educación did pass a total of seventy-four resolutions on the topic of
educational policy and intellectual cooperation in the Americas, some of which had
important consequences. 538 The fifteenth gave explicit support to the movement in favour
of the civil and political rights of women throughout the hemisphere and the sixteenth
536
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 514, Expediente 11838, García Mesa to Remos,
September 14, 1937.
537
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for August 1937, Cravioto to SRE, September 11,
1937. The newspaper report he included is similarly silent on the matter. “En el Hotel Nacional.” El
Mundo (Havana), September 30, 1937.
538
Conferencias Internacionales Americanas: Primer Suplmento, 1938-1942 (Mexico City: Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores, 1990 [Washington, DC: Dotación Carnegie para la paz internacional, 1943]), 281;
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Resoluciones Aprobadas (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937).
210
commended President Cárdenas for his declarations in favour of women’s suffrage. 539 As
Francesca Miller has demonstrated, Latin American feminists made great strides at interAmerican conferences by pushing for resolutions that bound their governments to
promote the equality of women in their home countries, and their success in doing so at
III CIE lends support to her conclusions. 540 The sense of optimism these resolutions
created must have been heightened by the fact that the political situation of women, and
the proposed amendment to the Constitution of 1917 allowing female suffrage, received
significant positive attention in the Mexican press during the conference. 541 Although the
amendment eventually succumbed to Cárdenas’s opposition, this outcome could not have
been foreseen during the heady atmosphere of the III CIE.
Indigenous issues received even greater attention. The new Bolivian minister to
Mexico, Alfredo Sanjinés, ably represented his government at the conference, giving an
important speech on the topic of indigenous education and serving as president of the
section that dealt with that topic. 542 The III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación
numbered in a long line of congresses that passed resolutions in support of holding an
inter-American meeting devoted specifically to the status of the indigenous peoples of the
Americas. First proposed at the VII Pan American Conference in Montevideo (1933) and
seconded by the VII Congreso Científico Americano held in Mexico in 1935, after the III
539
Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 7-
8.
540
Francesca Miller, “Latin American Feminism and the Transnational Arena,” in Women, Culture, and
Politics in Latin America, ed. Emilie L. Bergmann et al, 10-26 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990).
541
See, for example, “Tendrán las mujeres, como los hombres, derechos políticos,” El Universal, August
27, 1937, 1.
542
See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (IX), “Discurso del Exmo, Sr. Dr. Don Alfredo Sanjinéz,
presidente de la sección octava de Educación Indígena de grupos socialmente retrasados, y delegado de
Bolivia.”
211
CIE the idea also received the explicit support of the VIII Pan American Conference in
Lima (1938). 543 During the speech he gave in the section he directed, Sanjinés discussed
the proposed congress and called for the restitution of lands to indigenous communities
throughout the Americas. 544 Upon reporting to the general assembly on the work of his
section, he discussed the many papers presented by delegates of diverse national origins,
and described Mexico as a continental example in the field of indigenous education. 545
He also described the efforts of the Bolivian government in addressing the so-called
indigenous problem, the participants in which were so busy, he noted, that they had been
unable to abandon their work to come to Mexico for the conference. 546 In recognition of
Bolivian advances, and Sanjinés’s own contribution to the III CIE, the assembly resolved
unanimously that the first inter-American conference on indigenous issues should meet in
La Paz on August 6 (Bolivian Independence Day) the following year. 547 Despite the
sincere interest and enthusiasm that indigenous issues had found at the III CIE, this plan
met with frustration and the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano eventually
convened at Pátzcuaro, Michoacán in April 1940. At first glance, the change in locale
seems surprising given the fallout of the public and diplomatic discussion caused by the
Mexican government’s hosting of the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación.
543
Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, 297; Marichal, México y las Conferencias Panamericanas,
171-173.
544
“Estudio de los problemas del indígena,” El Universal, August 25, 1937, 5.
545
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (IX), “Discurso del Exmo, Sr. Dr. Don Alfredo Sanjinéz,
presidente de la sección octava de Educación Indígena de grupos socialmente retrasados, y delegado de
Bolivia,” 2.
546
Ibid.
547
“Trece resolucioes tomó la conferencia,” El Universal, August 29, 1937, 12.
212
Regardless of the achievements of the conference in the fields of women’s rights
and indigenous education, the overall impression left by the Mexican government’s effort
to spearhead educational change in the Americas had been fairly negative. The theatrics
that representative Almeida Portugal of Brazil so abhorred and the interminable speeches
that irked Sirgo of Cuba certainly played a role in leaving a bad taste in the delegates’
mouths. Frequent articles in the press that detailed labour unrest in the education sector
must also have caused delegates to suspect that all was not well in the Mexican education
system. 548 Most shocking of all may have been the news of the death by electrocution of
one of the famous niños de Morelia at the special school allocated for the education of
the exiled children of Spain in Michoacán. 549 The Mexican government’s acceptance of
the young refugees had been the cause of widespread acclaim among Leftist intellectuals,
workers, and Spanish expatriate groups throughout the Americas. News that even these
most favoured students of Cárdenas were not receiving the model education and
upbringing that the Mexican government claimed existed for children throughout the
republic may have given even those sympathetic to Cárdenas and his programmes reason
to pause before accepting wholesale the leadership of the Mexican government in the
realm of education. 550 A general sense emerged that the Mexican government used
conferences as propaganda tools in an unfair and heavy-handed manner for the promotion
548
See for example, “Huelga del profesorado,” El Universal, August 23, 1937, 1. “Manifiesto a los
meastros,” El Universal, August 28, 1937, 11; “Maestros inconformes con los descuentos,” El Universal,
August 29, 1937, 12; Un Intento más Para Unificar al Magisterio en Jalisco,” El Universal, August 30,
1937, 5.
549
“Murió uno de los niños traídos de España,” El Universal, August 21, 1937, 2nd section, 1; “Fué
Inhumado el Niño Español Muerto en Trágico Accidente,” El Universal, August 22, 1937, 13. Also see,
“El Problema de los Niños Españoles Continúa: Actos de Indisciplina,” El Universal, August 31, 1937, 1.
550
On the niños de Morelia see Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution,” 267-283.
213
of its ideology and programmes. Dr. Glen Levin Swiggett, organiser of the First InterAmerican Conference on Education held in Atlanta in 1929 in conjunction with the 67th
meeting of the National Education Association, deplored the Mexican government’s
organisation of the conference, which he said took on an excessively local character. 551
On the whole, the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación seems to have been a
failure, particularly as it related to the Cárdenas government’s goal of presenting Mexico
as an example to follow in social questions and a leader in inter-American relations.
The Politics of Inter-American Conference Locations
Between the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación of August 1937 and the
Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano of April 1940 the Mexican government’s
uses and abuses of technical conferences remained the subject of discussion and debate.
Although countries continued to send delegates to the conferences held in Mexico on a
case-by-case basis, depending upon their interest in the matters under discussion (for
example, the Cuban government enthusiastically sent delegates to the XVI Congreso
Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación held in Mexico in January 1938),
international participation in the conferences held in Mexico decreased drastically. 552
This garnered severe comment in the press and in diplomatic circles. In one important
instance, it cost the Mexican government the chance to host an international conference
that its representatives felt it deserved to hold in recognition of the advances the Cárdenas
551
Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, 412.
On Cuban participation in the XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitaciónn see
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 476, Expediente 10739.
552
214
government had made in organisation of workers: the Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo
de los Estados de América, Miembros de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. In
the intervening years between the III CIE and the PCII, the Cárdenas government
suffered from this poor record in its handling of inter-American meetings. When the
arrangements for the first inter-American indigenous conference, originally scheduled for
La Paz, fell through, this necessitated the redoubling of efforts to ensure the success of
the conference in its Mexican venue.
Chilean chargé d’affaires Miguel Cruchaga Ossa, commenting on the poor
projected attendance for the Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la
Literatura Iberoamericana scheduled to be held in Mexico City in August 1938, said that
it seemed curious to many that the United States had demonstrated more interest in the
conference—as evidenced by the large number of US delegates—than Latin American
countries. 553 Aside from Mexico and Cuba (and a large delegation from Puerto Rico), the
remaining Latin American governments delegated members of their diplomatic missions
instead of the authors and intellectuals the Mexican government had invited, something
Cruchaga said had become typical. 554 The majority apparently feared that the conference
would devolve into political controversies that would undermine the productivity of the
meeting. Cruchaga, whose reports generally exhibited fairly unrestrained criticism of the
Cárdenas government, suggested that the general feeling among his colleagues was that
the Mexican government’s abuse of technical conferences had lowered the prestige of
553
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga to Ministro, July 23, 1938.
See the call for papers, Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatra Iberoamericana,
Convocatoria y Reglamento Interior (Mexico City: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937).
554
215
such events, resulting in a distinct lack of interest on the part of most Latin American
governments. In August alone, eleven congresses on various topics had apparently been
scheduled. Moreover, because the Cárdenas government used these congresses for
propaganda and encouraged the adoption of Mexican ideas and policies, they were rarely
productive. Cruchaga explicitly mentioned the III CIE as an example of one such
conference that, in the opinion of the Chilean delegates, had resulted in few practical
outcomes because of this tendency. 555 Although Cruchaga’s observations could be
interpreted as the remarks of an opponent of Revolutionary change, his concerns echoed
in more sympathetic circles as well, suggesting that this perception had become a
problem for the Cárdenas government.
Shortly before the Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatura
Iberoamericana, Mexico’s delegate to the twenty-fourth meeting of the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), Primo Villa Michel, wrote to Foreign Minister Hay from
Geneva to report that it had been suggested that a second meeting of the American
members of the ILO be held to follow up on that which had occurred in Santiago de Chile
in 1936. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who happened to be in Geneva during his trip to
Europe following the oil expropriation that March, immediately suggested that this
meeting be held in Mexico City. 556 Hay telegraphed Ramón Beteta, who had travelled to
Tampico with President Cárdenas on another of his famous tours, to ascertain the
President’s opinion on the matter. 557 He should not have bothered. Primo Villa Michel
555
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga to Ministro, July 23, 1938.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, telegram from Villa Michel to Hay, June 9, 1938.
557
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, telegram from Hay to Beteta, June 10, 1938.
556
216
soon reported that the director of the ILO, Harold B. Butler, could foresee several
obstacles to choosing Mexico as the host for such a conference. At the meeting’s end, the
Minister in Geneva wrote home with more details. In a private meeting with Butler, Villa
Michel had asked for the director’s thoughts on the possible choice of Mexico for the
conference. The director said that, although he would have supported the idea personally,
he doubted it would be warmly received by the other American delegates. Mexico had
played host to a series of recent conferences, including the Congreso Obrero
Latinoamericano that Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the CTM had called for that
September, to which the ILO had been invited. Moreover, he feared that because of the
Cárdenas government’s Leftist orientation, some Latin American governments would not
attend or might even try to sabotage the conference were it to be held in Mexico.
Although Butler had received no firm invitations, rumours circulated that either Brazil or
Cuba would be chosen. The director responded that he hoped it would be held in Havana
because he believed Brazil (during Vargas’s Estado Novo) to be unfriendly to the cause
of organised labour. 558 Villa Michel also hoped for Cuba; Havana’s proximity would put
the Cárdenas government in a good position to obtain the “desired result” from the
conference. 559
This desired result of which Primo Villa Michel spoke was the consolidation of
Mexico’s leadership position in the Latin American labour movement. The Cárdenas
government and Lombardo Toledano in particular saw Mexico as the natural leader of
Latin America in matters relating to the organisation of labour. Although his efforts to
558
559
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, Villamichel to Hay, June 29, 1938.
Ibid.
217
encourage the organisation of workers met with the approval of a many labour leaders
and workers, the more conservative governments of the region resented his interference.
As early as 1935, Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfredo Skinner Klée had
written to his Ambassador in Mexico, Manuel Echeverría y Vidaurre, that it was high
time that Mexican functionaries should leave their neighbours in peace and cease their
attempts to impose upon them the theories of the Lombardo Toledanos of the world. 560
Nevertheless, that is exactly what the Mexican government continued to do throughout
the Cárdenas presidency through its diplomatic representatives in Latin America, the
inter-American labour conferences it held in Mexico City, and its participation in the ILO
and its meetings in the Americas. In his comments on the founding of the Confederación
de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL) at the Congreso Obrero Latinoamericano in
1938, the acting British Consul-General in Mexico expressed his doubts that the rest of
Latin America would welcome Mexican leadership of the new organisation. 561
Nevertheless, Lombardo Toledano became the CTAL’s first president and
maintained a prominent position in the Latin American labour movement. Lombardo
Toledano enjoyed particularly strong influence in Cuba, where it was eventually decided
that the Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América, Miembros de la
Organización Internacional del Trabajo would be held in November 1939. Lombardo
Toledano had been extremely helpful during the founding of the Confederación de
Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) in January of that year, and the Cuban organisation became
560
Guatemala, Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), B9923-1, Legajo 6250, Skinner Klée to Echeverría y Vidaurre, December 14, 1935.
561
United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 371/21480, Cleugh to Halifax, September 5, 1938.
218
one the firmest supporters of Lombardo Toledano and the CTAL, which he represented at
Havana. When, during the conference, Lombaro Toledano found it necessary to publicly
defend the oil expropriation, the Cubans jumped to Mexico’s defence. 562 Wilfredo H.
Brito, one of the Cuban business delegates, had openly attacked Mexico, causing
Lombardo Toledano to expose the delegate as a lawyer for the Sinclair Oil Company. 563
The exchange received wide coverage in the Cuban press and struck a chord throughout
Latin America. Carlos Fernández of the CTC stated that he considered the attack against
the Mexican people an attack against all of the workers of the continent and called Brito a
servant of imperialist interests and an enemy of the independence of the Americas. 564
Lombardo Toledano seemed to be the star of the show at Havana. The fact that Mexico’s
permanent delegate to the League of Nations (and hence the ILO) Isidro Fabela had been
562
Argentine chargé d’affaires in Mexico Ricardo Siri had noted in August 1939 that Lombardo Toledano
used the network of the CTAL to generate international support for the Mexican government following the
expropriation. Siri suggested that the Argentine Confederación General de Trabajadores would probably
heed Lombardo Toledano’s call for letters of support written to US President Roosevelt by virtue of its
membership in the CTAL. Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
(MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3983, Expediente 3, Tomo II, Siri to Cantilo, August
21, 1939. Also see “Los obreros de México piden el más amplio apoyo para el Gobierno de nuestro país en
su actitud frente a las Cías. Petroleras expropiadas,” El Universal (Mexico City), August 19, 1939.
563
For Mexican chargé d’affaires Fernando Lagarde y Vigil’s report of the incident see AHGE, SRE,
Expediente III-396-10, Lagarde to Hay, November 30, 1939. Clippings regarding the controversy are found
in the same file, and in Cuba, Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, Fondo Vicente Lombardo
Toledano, Legajo 448, Expediente 3. Although Lagarde y Vigil’s report identifies Brito as a representative
of Sinclair, the Cuban newspaper article cited below describes him as Standard Oil man. In the ILO’s
record of the proceedings, Lombardo Toledano states that he was a representative of Royal Dutch Shell.
Despite this discrepancy, his allegiances are clear. Second Labour Conference of the American States
Which Are Members of the International Labour Organisation, Record of the Proceedings (Montreal:
International Labour Office, 1941),
564
“Toledano Ridiculiza al Agente de la Standard en la Conferencia de Trabajo,” Hoy (Havana), November
26, 1939.
219
chosen as an official representative of the ILO at the meeting was also a source of
pride. 565
The Mexican delegation, of which Antonio Villalobos of the Department of
Labour, was head, clearly dominated the meeting. Perhaps in recognition of this, or as an
expression of support for the Mexican oil expropriation and Lombardo Toledano’s
trouncing of the oilman, the delegates reportedly passed a motion congratulating
Lombardo Toledano on Mexico having the most advanced social legislation in the
Americas. 566 Such obvious showmanship had its detractors. In his December 1939 report
to the Chilean Foreign Minister on the Havana meeting, the recently-appointed
Ambassador to Mexico Manuel Hidalgo criticised the resolution in favour of Lombardo
Toledano and unleashed a stream of vitriol against Mexico’s purported leadership in the
organisation of labour and other social issues. 567 He argued that Chile was advanced in
social issues, much more so than Mexico. He thought that Latin Americans had been far
too dazzled by Mexican propaganda and believed that Chilean democracy and its
advanced political parties did not need to come looking for shining examples of social
progress in Mexico. Instead, Chile’s civil and democratic tradition should serve as an
example to its continental neighbours. 568 Ironically, Hidalgo’s appointment had been
565
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-396-10, telegram from Fabela to Hay, February 6, 1939. For copies of the
speeches delivered by Fabela at the conference see, Mexico, Centro Cultural Isidro Fabela, Archivo
Personal Isidro Fabela, IF/II.4-007.
566
For Villalobos’s speech see, AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, Segunda Conferencia del
Trabajo de los Estados de América Miembros de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, “Discurso del
Lic. Antonio Villalobos, Jefe del Departamento del Trabajo y Delegado de México a la Conferencia,” La
Habana, Cuba, 28 de noviembre de 1939.
567
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, 1939, Vol. 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18,
1939.
568
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, 1939, Vol. 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18,
1939.
220
greeted with great enthusiasm in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the new ambassador
was actually a harsher critic of Lombardo Toledano and Mexican diplomacy than his
predecessor, Manuel Bianchi. 569 Whereas Bianchi’s reports to the Chilean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs demonstrated the careful objectivity of a career diplomat, Hidalgo’s
reports exhibited the pride of one who had participated directly in the Leftward
movement of Chilean politics. Appointed by the new Popular Front government of Pedro
Aguirre Cerda, Hidalgo had been a prominent labour organiser in Chile since 1905 when
he was only 23. A former Senator and a member of the Socialist Party, Hidalgo had been
condemned as a Trotskyite by the Communist Party, which opposed his appointment to
Mexico. He may have been chosen for this diplomatic post in order to remove him from
domestic politics, but he was probably also chosen because it was thought that he would
be a sympathetic representative to Cárdenas’s Mexico. 570 Nevertheless, his reports of
October and November of 1939 on the Mexican education system suggested that he did
not see Mexico as a potential leader in this area either.571 In Hidalgo’s mind, Lombardo
Toledano was merely a self-important blowhard who travelled the continent spreading
false news of Mexico’s advances.
Despite Hidalgo’s harsh critique, the climate at the Havana meeting had been
highly favourable to Mexico, and on November 23, Antonio Villalobos, as head of the
Mexican delegation, telegraphed for permission to propose that the next meeting of the
569
For the new Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s reports on Hidalgo’s appointment see,
AGN, LCR, Caja 1071, Expediente 574.4/37.
570
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-13, chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz to Hay, February 18, 1939;
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-13, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 22, 1939.
571
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, October 19, 1939
and November 28, 1939.
221
American member states of the ILO be held in Mexico. 572 Hay duly sent word to
Cárdenas to ascertain his opinion on the matter, explaining that the costs of holding the
conference would be far outweighed by the propaganda value such an event would
hold. 573 Hay gave Villalobos permission to propose Mexico as the next host country a
few days later. This time, Villalobos reported that Mexico’s offer had been warmly
received by the delegates and that after the closing of the conference the ILO intended to
accept the offer. 574 Although the third American Regional Conference of the ILO did not
occur until 1946 after the conclusion of the Second World War, the Mexican government
did play host to the event. The diplomatic memory of the Cárdenas government’s overuse of technical conferences as propaganda tools may have faded by that time. In the
immediate wake of the conference, Lombardo Toledano’s antics at the meeting in
Havana had undoubtedly rankled more than just Ambassador Hidalgo, and as a result, the
Cárdenas government’s reputation for the sensational use of conferences did not abate.
The commitment made at Havana in 1939 surely resulted in part from Mexican
propaganda activities, but the fact that the meeting was held in Mexico City so many
years later also attests to the efficacy of long-standing Mexican participation in the ILO.
Similarly, the Mexican government’s international activities in the sphere of indigenous
issues continued unabated, and the Cárdenas government’s hosting of the Primer
Congreso Indigenista Interamericano in 1940 spoke to the efficacy of this intellectual
cooperation.
572
AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Villalobos to Cárdenas, November 23, 1939.
AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Hay to Cárdenas, November 24, 1939
574
AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Villalobos to Cárdenas, December 2, 1939.
573
222
When the arrangements for the first inter-American conference on indigenous
issues—originally scheduled to be held in Bolivia—fell through, another of the reasons
for Hidalgo’s depreciation of the Cárdenas government may also have worked in the
Mexican government’s favour. As Bolivian Minister Sanjinés had stated at the III
Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, the Mexican government truly played a
leadership role in this arena. Notwithstanding the Cárdenas government’s activities,
indigenous issues were also an area of leadership that many other diplomats and their
governments willingly gave up. In his scathing report on Mexican participation in the
Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América, Miembros de la
Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Ambassador Hidalgo crowed about the
superiority of Chilean social legislation over the simplicity of that of Mexico. The
majority of the Mexican population was indigenous and therefore ill-equipped to work
rationally toward social and political change, he explained. 575 Hidalgo’s comment
indicates the prejudiced views of indigenous populations held by many Latin American
diplomats. While the Mexican government celebrated the nation’s indigenous roots,
albeit in a manner that had negative consequences for its indigenous population, many
other Latin American governments continued to denigrate indigenous inhabitants and
their ancestors. Even several countries with sizable indigenous populations, such as
Chile, did not consider the resolution of issues central to their wellbeing of vital
importance. They did not want to be considered indigenous nations, or to be associated
primarily with their indigenous populations. A famous case in point is the reception the
575
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18,
1939.
223
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the first issue of magazine Araucanía, which
Consul General Pablo Neruda produced in Mexico City near the end of the Cárdenas
presidency. A stark and beautiful image of a Mapuche woman graced the cover of the
first issue of Neruda’s literary and cultural magazine, which aimed to augment Chile’s
contribution to inter-American cultural relations and serve as a vehicle for Chilean
propaganda. Neruda had independently published the magazine, but hoped that the
interest it had generated would enable him to secure funding from the government. 576
Nevertheless, Neruda received a rather terse note explaining that, for reasons of
economy, the government could not support an initiative that had not been previously
approved by the Ministry. 577 The Chilean government did not approve of Neruda’s title,
cover art, nor the explicit association they created between Chile and the indigenous
peoples of the Americas. For lack of funding, the magazine met a quiet end. 578 Taken in
this context, Ambassador Hidalgo’s comments on the negative relationship between
Mexico’s indigenous population and the government’s potential for leadership in social
issues represent a prevailing Chilean opinion. Racial prejudice against Mexico’s
predominantly mestizo and indigenous population had long played a role in Mexico’s
relations with the rest of Latin America. The politics surrounding the decision to hold the
meeting on indigenous issues originally planned for Bolivia at Pátzcuaro instead were
576
Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ANA), Fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
(RREE), Volúmen 4372, Ricardo Reyes [Neruda] to Ministro, January 8, 1941.
577
Chile, ANA, RREE, Volúmen 4372, Marcelo Ruiz to Reyes, March 3, 1941.
578
On this incident, and the importance of Neruda’s experience in Mexico in his literary development see,
Fundación Pablo Neruda, Cuadernos no. 39, Hugo Méndez-Ramírez, Neruda’s Ekphrastic Experience:
Mural Art and Canto general (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1999); Vicente Quirarte et al, Pablo
Neruda en el corazón de México: en el centenario de su nacimiento (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México, 2006); Manuel Lerín, ed., Neruda y México (Mexcio City: B. Costa-AMIC Editor,
1973).
224
naturally affected by these ideas, as were several governments’ desires not to be
associated with indigenous issues by taking a leadership role on this inter-American
issue. When the Bolivian arrangements fell through, the way for the Mexican
government’s initiatives had been cleared and Cárdenas and his collaborators and
representatives began to work towards the establishment of Mexican leadership on this
inter-American issue.
The heavy-handed nature of Mexican diplomacy, international politics, and ideas
of racial prejudice all influenced the debate that had emerged following the III
Conferencia Interamericana de Educación on the Mexican government’s use of interAmerican meetings as propaganda tools. While attendance at the myriad technical
meetings held in Mexico City dwindled between 1937 and 1940, diplomatic
representatives and indigenistas began working tirelessly towards the agreed-upon goal
of an inter-American meeting devoted specifically to problems of the indigenous peoples
of the Americas. Although a certain sense of entitlement to the hosting of meetings on
education and labour held in the Americas had been evident in the Mexican government’s
attitudes towards earlier congresses, the fact that its labours had not been rewarded with
the great success anticipated surely caused a redoubling of efforts during the preparations
for the first inter-American congress on indigenous issues.
Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano
The landmark Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, held at the end of the
Cárdenas sexenio in 1940 in the president’s home state of Michoacán, represents the
225
energy that Mexican indigenistas poured into the resolution of the so-called Indian
problem during the Cárdenas presidency. 579 The first inter-American meeting to deal
specifically with indigenous issues also demonstrates a rare successful use of interAmerican conferences as propaganda tools by the Cárdenas government. In many ways,
the methods employed by the Mexican government at this meeting represented a
continuation of previously-established practices. The Mexican delegation outnumbered
every other country, and its members presented the vast majority of papers at the
congress. These presentations, and the entertainments prepared for the delegates,
contained a heavy dose of Marxist rhetoric. Moreover, the social and cultural events the
government hosted aimed to reinforce the image of Mexico as a leader in indigenous
policy, and hence, inter-American affairs that the government hoped to solidify through
579
On Indian policy and indigenismo more generally, see Alexander S. Dawson, Indian and Nation in
Revolutionary Mexico (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004); Alexander S. Dawson, “From Models
for the Ntion to Model Citizens: Indigenismo and the ‘Revindication’ of the Mexican Indian, 1920-1940”
Journal of Latin American Studies 30 (1998): 279-308; Alexander S. Dawson, “‘Wild Indians,’ ‘Mexican
Gentlement,’ and the Lessons Learned in the Casa del Estudiante Indígena, 1926-1932,” The Americas 57:
3 (January 2001): 329-361; Stephen E. Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in
Mexico, 1920-1940,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940,
ed. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 176-195; Stephen
E. Lewis, “A Window to the Recent Past in Chiapas: Federal Education and Indigenismo in the Highlands,
1921-1940,” Journal of Latin American Anthropology 6:1 (2001): ; Ben W. Fallaw, “Cárdenas and the
Caste War That Wasn’t: State Power and Indigenismo in Post-Revolutionary Yucatán,” The Americas 53:4
(1997): 551-577; Engracia Loyo, “Los centros de educación indígena y su papel en el medio rural (19301940),” In Educación rural e indígena en Iberoamérica, ed. Pilar Gonzalbo Aizpuru (Mexico City: El
Colegio de México: 1996); Engracia Loyo, “La empresa redentora. La Casa del Estudiante Indígena,”
Historia Mexicana 46:1 (1996):99-131; Ricardo Pérez Montfort, “Indigenismo, Hispanismo, y
panamericanismo en la cultura popular mexicana de 1920 s 1940,” in Cultura e identidad nacional, ed.
Roberto Blancarte (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994); Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution
and Indigenismo: México, 1910-1940,” in The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, ed. Richard
Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); David A. Brading, “Manuel Gamio and Official
Indigenismo in Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 7:1 (1988): 75-89; Guillermo Palacios,
“Postrevolutionary Intellectuals, Rural Readings and the Shaping of the ‘Peasant Problem’ in Mexico: El
Maestro Rural, 1932-34,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 309-339; Guillermo de la
Peña, “Social and Cultural Policies Toward Indigenous Peoples: Perspectives from Latin America,” Annual
Review of Anthropology 34 (2005); Juan Comas, La antropología social aplicada en México, trayectoría y
antología (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1964).
226
the conference. Unwilling to rely solely upon the positive impression it hoped to promote
among the often recalcitrant members of diplomatic missions who usually attended these
sorts of events, the government did everything in its power to ensure that sympathetic
indigenistas attended the conference.
By building upon a strong history of intellectual cooperation in indigenous issues,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas (which took
care of the local arrangements) engaged in an unprecedented level of pre-conference
planning to ensure its success. Ambassador and indigenista Moisés Sáenz led members of
the Foreign Service in working to encourage meaningful participation in the conference
of all American nations, and their indigenous inhabitants. Although many of the same
issues regarding overbearing and verbose Mexican delegates surfaced and some of the
cracks in the government’s indigenous policy began to show when an armed group of
protesters threatened to derail one of the ceremonies, by and large Sáenz’s efforts
succeded. One of the most important outcomes of the Congress was the resolution calling
for the creation of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III), which officially opened
its doors in Mexico City 1942 under the direction of Manuel Gamio. With the publication
of América Indígena and the Boletín Indigenista, the III and the Mexican indigenistas
who controlled it continued to influence inter-American indigenous policy well into the
future. In this area of inter-American relations, which the Mexican government deemed
important, Cárdenas succeeded in achieving leadership in the region. In and of
themselves, the hosting of inter-American conferences and their use as propaganda tools
did not secure the Cárdenas government a leadership position, but when based upon
227
substantial intellectual cooperation and held with a specific goal—one that would deepen
Mexico’s influence—in mind, they could be tremendously successful.
The eyes of Latin American diplomats, their governments, and their indigenous
populations had long been on Mexico’s indigenous policies. The Argentine chargé
d’affaires in Mexico City reported to his government on Cárdenas’s intention to found
the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas (DAI) days after the president’s inauguration. 580
His interest in the matter and that of other diplomats continued unabated throughout the
presidency. Some indigenous groups also demonstrated great interest in the Cárdenas
government’s activities. In November 1936, Cárdenas received a greeting in Quechua
from an indigenous group in Peru that admired the president’s work. 581 Similarly, in 1938
Cárdenas received a message of appreciation from members of the Araucanian
indigenous group, as the Mapuche were then known, sent through the Chilean chargé
d’affaires in Mexico City. 582 Members of the Foreign Service encouraged this interest
and appreciation through their efforts at intellectual cooperation on indigenous matters. In
1936 Minister Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz attended the first Bolivian conference on the
topic of indigenous education, and became an instrumental and active collaborator of the
group of Bolivian educators and indigenistas then at work on the altiplano. 583 When
Rosenzweig spearheaded the establishment of a new series of publications funded by the
Mexican mission in La Paz, the first book his Biblioteca de la Revista México published,
entitled Siembra: Lecturas Escolares para los Niños del Campo, was intended for use by
580
Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3415, Expediente 1, Adolfo N. Calvo to
Carlos Saavedra Lamas, December 3, 1934.
581
AGN, LCR, Caja 1073, Expediente 577/10, Ricardo Olivera to Cárdenas, November 11, 1936.
582
Chile, ANA, RREE, Volúmen 4047, Miguel Cruchaga Ossa to Ministro, July 23, 1938.
583
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-332-17, telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, October 31, 1936.
228
indigenous children in the schools that had recently been established for their
education. 584 Rosenzweig facilitated the travels to Mexico of Bolivian indigenista
Elizardo Pérez, Director General de Educación Indígena y Campesina, and the trip of a
mission of Mexican educators who in 1939 visited the Escuela Warisata that Pérez had
founded for indigenous children in 1931. 585 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently
expressed interest in other Latin American countries’ indigenous policies, hoping that the
DAI could learn from the reports it commissioned on their programmes. 586 Essential to
this aim were the educational missions undertaken by Mexican representatives to Latin
American countries, such as the visit to the Escuela Warisata, where indigenous policies
of neighbouring countries could be observed and analysed by Mexican indigenistas.
The diplomatic career of Moisés Sáenz began in part as a result of such
experiences. After serving as Undersecretary of Education, Sáenz had been
commissioned in 1931 by that ministry to undertake studies of the indigenous populations
of the Americas. He completed thorough studies of Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru, the
latter two of which he published in 1933. 587 His visits generated much interest and in the
course of his travels he gained long-lasting professional contacts among those working
toward the betterment of the indigenous population in the Americas, and established his
own reputation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an able representative of Mexico
584
A copy can be found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1 (IV).
See the study written by one of the Mexican members of the mission, which was published by the DAI
on the occasion of the PCII: Adolfo Velasco, La Escula Indigenal de Warisata (Mexico City:
Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas/Editorial Mundo Nuevo, 1940).
586
For example, Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1543, Cruchaga Tocornal to Cienfuegos y
Camus, March 27, 1936.
587
Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano y su integración al medio nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría
de Educación Pública, 1933); and Sobre el indio peruano y su integración al medio nacional (Mexico
City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933).
585
229
and its intellectual priorities. 588 In Peru, José Antonio Encinas, who then served as rector
of the Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, paid him special attention, inviting him to give
two well-attended lectures, one on the topic of rural education, and the second on
Mexican society. 589 During a meeting with President Ubico in Guatemala, Sáenz
reportedly discussed the idea of convening an inter-American congress on indigenous
issues, which he said would be of particular interest to the Guatemalan government
because of its large indigenous population. Ubico initially expressed interest in the idea,
but his enthusiasm for such a conference flagged considerably over the years. Sáenz
almost certainly proposed the idea to the government officials he met in Ecuador and
Peru as well, and with the cooperation of other indigenistas in the Americas, he continued
his efforts on behalf of such a meeting for the next ten years.590
The phenomenal success of Sáenz’s study-tour undoubtedly led to his first
diplomatic posting as minister to Ecuador in 1934. In the diplomatic juggling that
occurred at the beginning of the Cárdenas presidency, the Ministry appointed Sáenz to
Denmark, but when Palma Guillén requested a new position due to the difficulties she
faced in Colombia, the Ministry decided to send her to Copenhagen and return Sáenz to
Latin America. In May 1936 Sáenz arrived in Lima as minister to the country that had
welcomed him so warmly in 1931. Although he returned to Mexico several times during
588
For comment on his 1931 visit to Guatemala see Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B80.23, Legajo
5985. For comment on his visit to Ecuador see, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I), Federico Rocha y
Margáin to SRE, November 26, 1931.
589
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I), Juan G. Cabral to SRE, n.d. [January 1936].
590
See the clipping from El Liberal Progresista on the banquet offered Sáenz by the Guatemalan Ministry
of Education (at which Gabriela Mistral and Palma Guillén were also in attendance), and the report on his
visit by then Ambassador to Guatemala Eduardo Hay found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I).
“Banquete a un funcionario de México, D.F.,” El Liberal Progresista (Guatemala), October 15, 1931; Hay
to Ministro, October 17, 1931.
230
the next few years because of his work with the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, he
became ambassador to Peru in July 1937 when the Mexican and Peruvian governments
agreed to elevate their missions to the rank of Embassy. He vacated his post at the
beginning of 1938 because of the measures of economy undertaken by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, but returned to Peru in November to facilitate Mexican participation in
the VIII Inter-American meeting in Lima. Sáenz left Peru once again in order to
spearhead the organisation of the PCII, but retained his position there and returned after
the conference to his second home, where he unexpectedly died in October of 1941. 591
Minister Rosenzweig also provided essential services to the planning process, as
well as the larger project of intellectual cooperation on indigenous matters that led up to
the conference. After the III CIE resolved that the meeting would be held in Bolivia,
Rosenzweig’s position as Mexico’s minister in La Paz enabled him to do his utmost to
ensure the meeting’s success. Manuel Palacios reported the substance of the III CIE’s
resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which asked Rosenzweig to communicate it
officially to the government of Bolivia in December 1937. 592 Rosenzweig immediately
contacted Bolivia’s foreign minister and met with the minister of education, after which
he sought an interview with President Germán Busch because, in an indication of the
difficulties to come, the minister of education initially vetoed Bolivia’s acceptance of the
591
See the obituaries in his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (III).
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Palacios to Hay, December 11, 1937; Beteta to Rosenzweig,
December 16, 1937.
592
231
invitation for reasons of economy. 593 Although the Bolivian government eventually
accepted the invitation, the planning of the conference continued to be turbulent.594
The organising committee formed in Mexico City after the III CIE consisted of
Sáenz, Encinas, Minister Sanjinés, Mexico’s Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo
Cienfuegos y Camus, and John Collier of the United States. Their activities preparing
recommendations for the conference’s convocatoria and the publication of Angel M.
Corzo’s Ideario del maestro indoamericano continued independent of the difficulties
Rosenzweig experienced in Bolivia. 595 The Bolivian Minister of Education named an
organizing committee and decided that the conference should coincide not with the
anniversary of Bolivian independence, but the anniversary of the founding of the Escuela
Warisata on August 2, and that the inter-American meeting would be held on the
premises of the school. Rosenzweig doubted the wisdom of this idea because
construction of the school’s Pabellón Mexico, where the Minister proposed to hold the
assembly, had not yet been completed. 596 The Bolivian organising committee first met in
February of 1938 and named Rosenzweig president, an honorary position that did not
enable him to impose his wishes or those of the Mexican government upon the Bolivians,
593
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, December 29, 1937.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, January 17, 1938.
595
“Mexico en el 1er Congreso Continental Indigenista que se Celebrará en Bolivia,” El Nacional (Mexico
City), November 5, 1937; Angel M. Corzo, Ideario del maestro indoamericano (Mexico City: DAPP,
1938). In October 1938, the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to his ambassador in Mexico
City that Minister Sanjinés, President of the Comité Organizador del Congreso Indigenista, had announced
the publication of the volume, which included a prologue by President Cárdenas, and that 300 copies would
be sent to the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City. Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo
4399, Skinnner Klée to Nájera Cabrera, October 1, 1938.
596
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, Feburary 9, 1938.
594
232
but underscored his role as a liaison between the two groups of organisers. 597 In the midst
of these early activities, Rosenzweig telegraphed the Ministry to report in March on a
proposal to hold the hold the meeting in 1939 instead of 1938. 598
This change received the positive endorsement of (and perhaps even emanated
from) Leo S. Rowe, Director of the Pan American Union, who argued that because five
other Panamerican meetings, including the VIII inter-American meeting in Lima, had
been scheduled for 1938, he deemed it preferable to hold the indigenous conference in
1939. 599 Moreover, neither Minister Sanjinés in Mexico nor Rosenzweig in Bolivia
believed that either the Mexican or Bolivian organising committees would be ready in
time for August 1938. 600 The postponement seemed a good solution to these difficulties
and the Busch government approved the change in May. 601 Rosenzweig thought the
postponement would have the added advantage of enabling the Bolivian organising
committee to prepare the convocatoria for the conference more carefully and allow them
to counter the negative propaganda that had begun to emerge in Bolivia against the
conference. The one firm supporter upon whom Rosenzweig felt he could count during
this process was Elizardo Pérez, whom he referred to as the soul of the movement in
favour of indigenous issues in Bolivia. Together they faced a fierce campaign mounted
by members of the Bolivian Roman Catholic Church who objected strongly to close
597
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Ministro de Educación y Asuntos Indígenas Alfredo Peñaranda to
Rosenzweig, February 7, 1938.
598
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, March 17, 1938.
599
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938.
600
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938
601
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, May 5, 1938.
233
cooperation with the “Marxist” Cárdenas government. 602 By deciding to hold the
conference at a later date, this propaganda campaign could be neutralised effectively by
the time the conference was actually held. Moreover, Rosenzweig felt that by heeding the
suggestions of Rowe and the Pan American Union, more effective participation on behalf
of the United States might be secured. This would be an advantage in securing the
meaningful representation at the congress of more the conservative governments of the
region, such as Guatemala, which had firm ties to the United States, but had so far
exhibited little interest in the conference. 603
Acutely aware of Rosenzweig’s concern that all governments of the Americas
participate effectively in the conference, Moisés Sáenz operated in tandem with him to
ensure the congress’s success. At the express wish of President Cárdenas, Sáenz once
again insisted on the importance of the indigenous meeting at the VIII inter-American
meeting in Lima, tabling a motion in favour of the La Paz meeting. 604 Nevertheless,
shortly thereafter, and despite his best efforts and those of Rosenzweig, Sáenz wrote to
Foreign Minister Hay that he held serious concerns regarding the Bolivian organising
committee’s work. 605 Principally, he felt that, despite the extra time they received, the
convocatoria proposed did not adequately represent the intellectual goals he and the other
members of the Mexican organising committee had set for the conference, particularly as
602
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, Feburary 9, 1938. For later examples of the
conservative Catholic campaign against indigenous education in Bolivia, and the government’s links with
Mexico see, AHGE, SRE, 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, August 26, 1938; “Se tomó el ejemplo de México
para combatir los esfuerzos de Bolivia por la educación indigenal,” La Noche (La Paz), August 29, 1938.
603
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938.
604
His motion elicited a contradictory and unsuccessful proposal from the Argentine delegation that Sáenz
described as paternalistic in character. Sáenz reported to President Cárdenas on the Argentine proposal and
his own successful resolution in AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 4,
1939.
605
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (II), Sáenz to Hay, March 4, 1939.
234
they related to the founding of an Inter-American Indigenous Institute. The Bolivian
government issued invitations to the conference in February of 1939, after which Sáenz
undertook a brief trip to La Paz to voice his concerns. 606 Sáenz met with Pérez as well as
President Busch, who assured him of the Bolivian government’s commitment to the
success of the conference. 607 In his meetings with the organising committee, Sáenz made
a number of concrete suggestions regarding the programme, and received designation as
the committee’s representative in Peru and Ecuador, charged with drumming up support
for the conference. Sáenz commended the work of Minister Rosenzweig, particularly in
his efforts to help Pérez and the administrators of the Escuela Warisata complete the
Pabellón México in time for the conference. Rosenzweig had recently learned that the
Ministry had decided to transfer him to Panama, and Sáenz lamented the loss of his
energy on behalf of the organising committee. 608
After Rosenzweig’s departure, it seems that the preparations underway in La Paz
suffered. In particular, a flurry of correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, and Sáenz indicates that few countries
named delegates to the conference. Several contradictory proposals regarding the further
postponement of the conference surfaced, engendering their share of ill feelings: Pérez
became increasingly pessimistic about the conference’s chances of success in Bolivia and
Sáenz and Mexico’s new minister to Bolivia, Alfonso Cravioto, had several cool
606
See, for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sanjinés to Hay, February 20, 1939. A
preliminary version of the covocatoria and the internal regulations of the conference are attached to the
invitation.
607
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sáenz to Hay, March 16, 1939.
608
For information on the transfer see Rosenzweig’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1.
235
exchanges. 609 By September 1939, President Cárdenas authorised Cravioto to suggest
that the conference be moved to Mexico in April 1940. Sáenz immediately wrote to
President Cárdenas with his suggestions regarding the steps that needed to be taken in
order to ensure its success. Primary among these suggestions were that he be recalled to
Mexico to assist in its organisation, and that he travel via air instead of sail, making stops
in the principal capital cities along the way, engaging in each country in an extensive
propaganda campaign in favour of the conference in order to secure meaningful
representation in the long-awaited inter-American meeting on indigenous issues. 610
President Cárdenas immediately authorised Sáenz’s return to Mexico and the
plans he had laid out for generating enthusiasm for “their” conference. 611 Sáenz called it
their conference because, as he explained in a letter to President Cárdenas, he considered
it the president’s, his, and Mexico’s. 612 Sáenz planned to stop in the capitals of Ecuador,
Colombia, Panama, Honduras and Guatemala—the usual stops for an airline flight to
Mexico from Peru at this time—and stay approximately three days in each country,
meeting with prominent indigenistas and government officials in order to support the
propaganda campaigns already underway in each locale by the Mexican representatives
there, then catch the next flight onwards. At an additional cost of only $100.00 USD, the
value of his activities would prove immeasurable. 613 Before leaving, Sáenz wrote to
Cárdenas with another proposition: the president had previously authorised funds for the
ambassador to bring celebrated intellectuals such as Alfonso Caso and noted cultural
609
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sáenz to Hay, May 20, 1939.
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, September 27, 1939.
611
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to Sáenz, October 5, 1939.
612
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940.
613
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (II), Sáenz to Hay, December 22, 1939.
610
236
representatives such as Carlos Chávez to Peru to encourage intellectual and artistic
cooperation between the two countries, but Sáenz suggested that the funds could be better
used to invite special Latin American delegates to attend the PCII with the financial
support of the Mexican government. He proposed inviting hand-picked representatives
from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panma, and Guatemala, in addition to the delegates each
country named to the conference. 614 Sáenz argued that, in terms of propaganda, this
$1,900.00 USD plan would be worth more and cost less than many other forms of
publicity because the special delegates would make important contributions to the
conference and in turn influence the resolution of indigenous issues in their home
countries by applying what they had learned of the Mexican example. 615
Sáenz’s stopovers in Latin America proved instrumental in securing the
meaningful participation of Latin American countries in the Primer Congreso Indigenista
Interamericano. For instance, upon receipt of the original Bolivian convocatoria for the
PCII in 1939, the Guatemalan government initially declined the invitation to attend, but
due to the interventions of Sáenz, Guatemala was well represented at Pátzcuaro in
1940. 616 Although Mexico’s Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus had
been named to the Mexican organising committee after the III CIE in 1937, his posting to
Guatemala City ended in July of 1938 and Salvador Martínez de Alva took over the
Embassy. The new ambassador reported on Sáenz’s visit to Guatemala in February of
1940. Before the Ambassador to Peru’s arrival, Martínez de Alva had met with Ubico
614
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940.
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940.
616
Guteamala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4400, Expediente 99346, Secretario to Ambassador
Hernández Polanco, March 7, 1939.
615
237
who warned that once he made his mind up about something, he did not tend to change it.
Moreover, in an allusion to the Mexican government’s over-use of inter-American
conferences as propaganda tools, he concluded that he believed that the only tangible
results of most such conferences were the waste of time and money. 617 Nevertheless,
Martínez de Alva announced Sáenz’s impending visit and asked the Guatemalan
president to reconsider his position on the indigenous conference. Sáenz arrived on
February 28 and as a result of his intervention, Ubico did indeed change his mind.
Moreover, Sáenz’s special invitation for a Guatemalan delegate to the conference resulted
in the attendance of David Vela, who contributed greatly to the PCII. Vela published an
extensive series of articles in the Guatemalan daily El Imparcial about his participation in
the conference, contributing to the dispersion of the indigenista ideas in the neighbouring
country. 618 Martínez de Alva noted that in addition to the visit of Sáenz, the fact that so
many indigenistas from points south stopped in Guatemala on their way to Mexico also
encouraged the discussion of indigenous affairs in the Guatemalan capital, which the
ambassador had previously thought impervious to Mexican thinking on the matter of the
incorporation of the indigenous population of the Americas into national life. 619 In
617
The report of this meeting of Feburary 12, 1940 is found in Martínez de Alva’s monthly report
corresponding to the month of February. AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay,
“Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de febrero de 1940,” p. 22.
618
The organising committee for the fourth inter-American indigenous conference collected and published
Vela’s columns prior to the meeting held in Guatemala in 1959. David Vela, Orientación y
recomendaciones del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (Guatemala: Publicaciones del Comité
Organizador del IV Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, 1959). Vela’s collaboration was so effective that
he was initially named to the organising committee of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, only to be
substituted by Guatemala’s Consul General in Mexico City Carlos Girón Cerna. See, AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al mes de julio de
1940,” 10.
619
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al
termino del 15 de marzo al 25 de mayo de 1940,” 37-39.
238
additon to Vela, special representatives to the conference whose attendance was
supported financially by the Mexican government included Elipidio Arce Laurerio and
Alipio Valencia of Bolivia, Antonio García of Colombia, Jorge Icaza and Victor Gabriel
Garcés of Ecuador, Hildebrando Castro Pozo and José María Arguedas of Peru, as well as
the sole representative of Panama’s indigenous population, Rubén Pérez Kantule. 620
Although President Ubico eventually relented and permitted Guatemalan
representation at the meeting, Sáenz and all of the other indigenistas who traversed
Guatemala were unable to convince the dictator of the need to delegate indigenous
representatives to the conference. This suggestion surfaced as soon as the conference’s
move to Mexico became official, but Foreign Minister Hay also proved rather hostile to
the idea, telegraphing in November 1939 President Cárdenas (then absent from the
capital on another tour of the Yucatán) to question the wisdom of the suggestion. 621 He
doubted that the indigenous peoples of the Americas in general were sufficiently well
prepared for participation and asked for permission to remove the directive from the
official invitation he was preparing to circulate to the governments of the region. Luis
Chávez Orozco, who accompanied the president during his trip to the Yucatán,
immediately informed Hay that President Cárdenas definitely desired that each country
be represented by two indigenous representatives, in addition to the diplomatic and
620
AHGE, SER, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), “Lista de las personas que han sio invitadas por conducto del
gobierno mexicano para tomar parte en el congreso indigenista,” n.d. [1940]. This list is consistent with
those described as “invitados especiales” in the Boletín of the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano.
Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia (BNAH), E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista
Interamericano, Boletín, No. 1.
621
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Hay to Cárdenas, November 25, 1939.
239
technical representatives named to the conference. 622 President Cárdenas stood firm, also
telegraphing Hay himself to emphasise the point. 623 The majority of Latin American
governments agreed with Hay, not Cárdenas. 624 Guatemalan Minister of Education
Villacorta reportedly told Ambassador Martínez de Alva that not one indigenous
Guatemalan possessed the necessary preparation to attend such a meeting. 625
Nevertheless, some countries did take the directive to heart.626 Naturally, the Mexican
contingent of indigenous representatives proved to be quite strong, but in addition
Minister Rosenzweig, from his new position in Panama, secured the participation of
Kantule, an indigenous representative of the Kuna Indians, who took active part in the
conference. Although the Canadian government was not officially represented at the
conference, Moisés Sáenz read a greeting from Jasper Hill, Chief Big White Owl, to the
delegates. The US delegation included representatives of the Apache, Hopi, Pueblo,
Papago, Nez Perce, and Taos nations. Moreover, the conference’s daily bulletin also
mentions the participation of an indigenous representative from Chile, although he is not
included in the official list of delegates to the conference. 627
From Moisés Sáenz’s first mention of the idea of an inter-American indigenous
conference to President Ubico in 1931, its subsequent proposal in the inter-American
622
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Chávez Orozco to Hay, November 27, 1939.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Cárdenas to Hay, 28 November 1939.
624
Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Martínez de Alva to Hay, March 6, 1940.
625
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al
mes de febrero de 1940,” 15.
626
The proposal was also unusual enough to have warranted comment by the US military attaché to
Mexico. See, United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165
(RG 165), Reel V, Document 0528, MA Report: Current Events, April 26, 1940. In this report Gordon H.
McCoy mentioned that whereas the remarks of English-speaking delegates were translated for the Spanishspeaking delegates, two Apache delegates from Arizona abandoned the congress after the opening session
because they could not understand Spanish, the official language of the congress.
627
BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boltetín, No. 2, 7.
623
240
conference system, and throughout the tumultuous initial planning that had taken place in
Bolivia, the Mexican government and its representatives had spearheaded the initiative.
The government supported these activities through its broader programme of intellectual
cooperation on indigenous matters. Once it had been decided that the conference would
move to Pátzcuaro, it remained for Mexican indigenistas and government officials to
seize this momentum and ensure the conference’s success, securing Mexico’s leadership
in inter-American affairs on this issue. An unprecedented amount of pre-conference
planning ensured that scores of indigenous, intellectual, and diplomatic representatives
from Mexico and the rest of the Americas would converge on this small town in April of
1940. There, the Cárdenas government sought to make effective use of this conference as
a propaganda tool to support its inter-American aims.
At Pátzcuaro, Mexican delegates and organisers portrayed their government as a
hemispheric leader in the formulation of indigenous policy. Although the government’s
indigenous policies were foremost among the accomplishments it put on display, the
Mexicans also aimed to show that their government’s achievements were wide-ranging
and resulted from their successful social Revolution. Members of the Foreign Service
throughout the region continuously attempted to convince their host governments of the
virtues of the Mexican Revolution, but the Pátzcuaro conference represented a unique
opportunity to make a concerted effort to prove to the representatives of other Latin
American nations that Mexico deserved a leadership role in Inter-American relations by
virtue of the Revolution’s achievements. The coordinators of the congress took charge of
creating the impression that Mexico was the natural leader of Latin America. They
241
attempted to achieve this through their choice of venue for the conference, the symbolic
ceremonies they enacted, and the program of social events and lectures that they planned
for the delegates. Although their plans did not always go off without incident, and each of
these aspects of the conference was open to the interpretation of both the delegates and
the media, the Mexican government did its best to guide them in forming positive
conclusions regarding the state of Mexican society, and the suitability of its government
for leadership.
The Mexican government made a strategic decision in choosing Pátzcuaro as the
location of the PCII. The region was home to a large P’urhépecha indigenous population
that had participated extensively in government projects designed for their betterment. As
the home state of President Cárdenas, their involvement in such projects had been strong
since the days of his governorship of Michoacán. 628 The organisers of the conference
could therefore be reasonably sure that the 174 delegates and the legions of aides and
bureaucrats who converged on the lakeside community would receive a fairly warm
welcome. Nevertheless, they took special efforts to make sure that the population had
been adequately prepared for their arrival. Excelsiór reported that a brigade of doctors
and nurses had descended on the region prior to the conference, undertaking a massive
sanitary campaign in Pátzcuaro and the surrounding area. Armed with phonograph
recordings in P’urhépecha , they readied the indigenous population for the national and
international scrutiny they would undergo. 629 The small town, which had a population of
628
For contrasting views of this process see Marjorie Becker, Setting the Virgin on Fire (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995) and Christopher Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
629
Excélsior, April 14, 1940, 13.
242
8,150 at the time of the 1930 census, had been long recognised for its beautiful climate
and colonial architecture. 630 A PEMEX travel guide published the same year that the
congress occurred recommended it for vacations because of the picturesque character of
the town and its landscape. 631 Ideal for a motoring party perhaps, but the hundreds of
visitors who arrived for the congress put an obvious strain on the small town’s resources.
A housing shortage resulted, and when all of the hotels and pensions were full, some
important guests were apparently forced to stay in small rooms better suited to manual
workers. 632 To accommodate the three hundred guests at a luncheon served on the
penultimate day of the congress, it was necessary to borrow cutlery from all of the hotels
in town. 633 In another exposé of the conditions that met the delegates in Pátzcuaro,
Excelsiór reported that the employees working in the town’s small post and telegraph
office were unable to keep up with the extra demand imposed by the congress. They
called for additional workers, newer equipment, and a more suitable location to
accommodate the delegates’ needs. 634 The same article stated that, by all accounts, the
delegates were nevertheless satisfied with the consideration they had received from the
townsfolk and the civil and military authorities of Pátzcuaro, but the dislocations caused
by their arrival could not help but be felt in the small town. It seems that the media
delighted in informing its readers of inconveniences such as these, but it is not clear that
these incidents affected the delegates’ impressions of the town or the nation that hosted
630
Justino Fernández, Pátzcuaro (México: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1936), 15.
PEMEX Travel Club, Mexico’s Western Highways, including the cities of Toluca, Morelia, Pátzcuaro,
Uruapan, Guadalajara (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940), 60.
632
Excélsior, April 15, 1930, 1.
633
Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 1.
634
Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 1.
631
243
them. No doubt, Chávez Orozco and Sáenz hoped that the delegates would admire the
level of development that the small town had attained and be so charmed by the lovely
architecture and the numerous ceremonies and entertainments organised by the DAI that
they would overlook some of the problems that resulted from being in a rather out-of-theway location.
The DAI organised a full calendar of social events to divert the attendees from the
work of the conference, but these often had didactic purposes. Following the inauguration
of the Congress on the evening of April 14, a musical group from the island of Tarácuaro
on Lake Pátzcuaro, under the direction of the indigenous composer Nicolás B. Juárez,
serenaded the delegates with a program of sones isleños. 635 This musical program set the
tone for the social and cultural events that followed by featuring the accomplishments of
Indians and demonstrating the foundational position that the indigenous population
occupied in the formation of national identity. On April 17, Procurador General de la
República Jenaro Vázquez opened an exhibit of indigenous art from his native state of
Oaxaca. The exhibit, which the delegates received warmly, demonstrated the artistic
accomplishments of Mexico’s indigenous population. 636 The delegates were further
reminded of this when, at one of the receptions held in their honour, the meal was served
on glass- and stoneware made by the indigenous craftspeople of the Pátzcuaro area. 637
Instead of deciding to adorn the tables with the expensive crystal and china place settings
more characteristic of diplomatic ceremonies, the organisers chose instead to demonstrate
635
Vela, Orientación y recomendaciones del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, 26.
Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 1.
637
Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 1.
636
244
the positive value they placed upon indigenous artistic production. On two separate
occasions the delegates were invited to view films documenting the progress of the
Mexican government in dealing with indigenous issues, one on the Valley of Mexico and
the second on the Otomí. 638 More often than not, the delegates spent their free time
strolling along the historic streets of Pátzcuaro, or fishing on the lake. 639 The author of
the gossip column Cosmópolis suggested that delegates from Cuba and Guatemala,
Oswaldo Morales Patiño and Carlos Girón Cerna, even skipped some of the conference
sessions to go duck hunting, but Luis Chávez Orozco quickly issued a press release
denying that the delegates had been shirking their duties. 640 In fact, most of the delegates
seem to have taken their work so seriously that several outings planned by the DAI,
including a boating excursion and a day trip to Uruapan, were cancelled so that the
delegates would have time to read the more than two hundred papers that were presented
at the congress. 641 Nevertheless, several social events, both before and after the
temporary suspension of entertainments, afforded them the opportunity to enjoy the
company of their fellow delegates and see some of the aspects of Mexican culture that the
congress organisers believed would leave them with a favourable impression.
Central to this goal were the conference organisers’ consistent efforts to connect
the activities underway in Pátzcuaro to the town’s illustrious history. Steeped in the
Pátzcuaro’s symbolic past, the delegates were guided in their interpretation of the
meaning these symbols held for the present by the organisers of the congress. The
638
Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3; Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 10.
Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3
640
“Cosmópolis”, Excelsior, April 22, 1940, 2nd section, 1; Excélsior, April 23, 1940, 12.
641
El Universal, April 19, 1940, 1; Excélsior, April 21, 1940, 10.
639
245
conference came in an auspicious year in the small town of Pátzcuaro, as it marked the
four hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Colegio de San Nicolás, the famous
university established by the Spanish humanist Vasco de Quiroga, the first Bishop of
Michoacán, and then moved to Valladolid later in the sixteenth century. This anniversary
established the town as a recognised centre of learning, and the fact that the Colegio de
San Nicolás’s founder had been a noted defender of New Spain’s indigenous population
in the sixteenth century linked the activities of the delegates to his goals. The
inauguration of the congress and many of its plenary sessions were held in the renovated
remains of the Augustine complex located on the north side of town’s plaza chica. In
1936, the convent had been converted into the Teatro Emperador Caltzontzin, named for
the last P’urhépecha leader, Tangaxoán II, whom the brutal conquistador Nuño Beltrán de
Guzman ordered tortured and executed on the banks of the Rio Lerma in 1529. In 1938,
the adjoining church was converted into the Biblioteca Gertrudis Bocanegra, named in
honour of the Heroine of Pátzcuaro, who fought in the struggle for independence and
died at the hands of a royalist firing squad in 1817. 642 Statues, plaques, street names, and
other memorials in honour of Vasco de Quiroga, Tangaxoán, and Gertrudis Bocanegra
surrounded the delegates as they went about their daily activities at the congress, but the
DAI also sought to link the congress more explicitly to Vasco de Quiroga and Tangaxoán
in order the substantiate the impressions they hoped to create among the delegates.
642
This description of the conversion of these buildings and their original uses is based on Manuel
Toussaint, Pátzcuaro (Mexico City: UNAM/Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas y Escuela de
Arquitectura, 1942).
246
Don Vasco de Quiroga arrived in Michoacán in 1536 to reverse the damage that
Nuño Beltrán de Guzman had caused in the area around Lake Pátzcuaro. He initially
based his operations in nearby Tzintzuntzan, but relocated to Pátzcuaro in 1540. Famous
for the founding of mission-hospitals throughout the region, he also sought to make the
villages surrounding the lake self-sufficient through their concentration upon a variety of
crafts, many of which survive as regional specialties to this day. Influenced by the
utopian ideals of Thomas More, he founded the towns of Santa Fe de México, Santa Fe
de la Laguna, and Santa Fe del Río. Widely revered by the indigenous population of the
area, many of whom came to call him Tata Vasco, he was the principal agent of
evangelisation and Spanish dominance in the region.643 He wrote two principal works
expounding his views regarding the good government of indigenous Mexico during his
time in Michoacán, La utopia en América and the Reglas y ordenanzas para el gobierno
de los hospitals de Santa Fe de México, y Michoacán. The Secretaría de la Economía
Nacional issued a new edition of the latter in honour of the PCII, and gave a copy to each
of the delegates in attendance. 644 A tall statue of the bishop dominates Pátzcuaro’s plaza
grande, and the meeting of the indigenous representatives to the congress, which took
place on April 21, was held in an inn named for Vasco de Quiroga. His memory loomed
large over both the congress and the indigenous inhabitants of the region.
The parallels between the sixteenth century bishop and President Lázaro Cárdenas
were clear. Similarly revered by the indigenous population, Cárdenas came to be known
643
Bernardino Verástique, Michoacán and Eden: Vasco de Quiroga and the Evangelization of Western
Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), Chapter 6.
644
Vasco de Quiroga, Reglas y ordenanzas para el gobierno de los hospitals de Santa Fe de México, y
Michoacán (Mexico City: Secretaría de Economía Nacional/Talleres Gráficos de la Nacion, 1940).
247
as Tata Lázaro among the poor Indians and campesinos whose lives he had touched.
Following his inauguration of the PCII on April 14, Cárdenas spent the next day visiting
the island of Janitzio on Lake Pátzcuaro, where he ate with the indigenous community of
the island. Cárdenas had recently overseen the construction of an impressive statue of
José María Morelos y Pavón on Janitzio that could be seen from Pátzcuaro and had
already become a significant tourist attraction for the area.645 Later that day, he received
a medal and a certificate awarded to him by a commission of representatives of the town
of Pátzcuaro in recognition of all he had done to further the development of the town. In
response, he announced the construction of a new hospital to meet the community’s
growing needs. On his way back to Mexico City the following day, he stopped in a
number of other villages in Michoacán, making similar announcements and receiving
commensurate thanks. 646 Both Tata Vasco and Tata Lázaro had earned the gratitude of
the population around Lake Pátzcuaro. Like Vasco de Quiroga, Cárdenas and his
representatives in the DAI also served, for good or ill, as the principal agents of the
incorporation of the indigenous people of Michoacán into the Mexican nation.
These historical connections were performed symbolically during the ceremonies
held on April 23. Mexican delegate Luis Alvarez Barret had suggested that the speeches
made by President Cárdenas, John Collier, and Bolivian Ambassador to Mexico Enrique
Finot at the inauguration of the congress be deposited in an urn and symbolically buried
at the foot of the nearby statue of Tangaxoán. 647 The delegates approved Alvarez Barret’s
645
Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 3.
Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 1, 9.
647
El Universal, April 19, 1940, 1; “Cosmópolis”, Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 2nd section, 1.
646
248
idea enthusiastically, and the congress organisers decided that the symbolic event would
follow a luncheon at the Museo de Artes Populares given in honour of the delegates by
the President. As it turned out, pressing business kept the Cárdenas from attending the
ceremony, but he was represented by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ramón Beteta.
The day’s events began at eleven in the morning at the museum, which occupies the
original building of the Colegio de San Nicolás near the Basílica de Nuestra Señora de la
Salud, where the bishop’s sacred remains are contained in the Mausoleo de Don Vasco.
Historian and biographer of Morelos, Alfonso Teja Zabre, gave an address honouring
Vasco de Quiroga, and Ramón Beteta spoke on the president’s behalf. 648 Before the three
hundred guests had finished their lunch, a crowd nearly as large as the guest list amassed
outside the museum. 649 Armed with knives and daggers, they believed that the remains of
Vasco de Quiroga had been removed from the mausoleum and were to be buried beneath
the statue of Tangaxoán. Fiercely protective of Tata Vasco, and suspicious of the motives
of the three hundred indigenistas in their midst, the group, said to be composed of
militant Catholics, aimed forcibly to prevent the transfer of the bishop’s earthly remains
by the Bolsheviks within. Employees of the museum were reportedly injured in the
scuffle that ensued before the abbot, Rafael Méndez, arrived to calm his parishioners.
Méndez offered his own life as a guarantee that no harm would come to Vasco de
Qurioga’s remains, and attempted to explain that the delegates only intended to pay
homage to the bishop. Not convinced, representatives of the angry mob asked to see the
648
El Universal, April 24, 1940, 1.
The following account is based upon the descriptions found in Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 4 and El
Universal, April 24, 1940, 11.
649
249
undisturbed remains of Don Vasco for themselves and stood guard at his tomb while the
rest of the afternoon’s events unfolded as planned. Ramón Beteta presided over the
interment of the inaugural addresses, and Argentine Ambassador to Mexico Juan C.
Valenzuela made a speech commemorating the symbolic act and recognising the
Mexican government for its efforts in hosting the conference. The descriptions of the
incident do not detail the ethnic backgrounds of the members of the group that had
threatened the ceremony, but if the protestors were members of Pátzcuaro’s sizable
indigenous population, the disturbance may have reminded the delegates of the
recalcitrance and scepticism with which many indigenous people had met the civilising
projects of the state from the time of Vasco de Quiroga forward.
The demonstration hinted at some of the religious tensions caused by the
introduction into indigenous communities of projects led by indigenistas who held to
their anticlericalism as tightly as they held to their belief that Indians were capable of full
citizenship in the nation. This was, of course, not news to most of the representatives
from abroad, who had read of the Church-State conflict in their own papers.
Nevertheless, it may also have given them pause to consider whether to emulate Mexican
indigenous policies in their own countries. The Mexicans at the congress maintained that
their nation’s indigenous policies stemmed directly from the social Revolution the
country had undergone, and used them as proof positive that the Revolution had been a
success. If the adoption of policies rooted in the Revolution created increased social
tensions, perhaps they were not worth the risk.
250
The officials who organised the PCII had attempted to convince the delegates to
the conference of Mexico’s rightful position as a leader in Inter-American relations by
choosing a symbolically charged location, organising a series of social and cultural
events that demonstrated their social and economic achievements, and orchestrating
symbolic ceremonies that linked the Cárdenas government and the Revolution to the
pursuit of justice for the nation’s indigenous population. A further indication that
propaganda numbered among the primary goals of the conference is that Lombardo
Toledano also played a prominent role in this congress despite the fact that he had few
indigenista pretensions. The firebrand leader, who could always be counted on to make a
strong defence of the Revolution, attended the conference at the explicit instructions of
the President. 650 Luis Chávez Orozco lunched with Lombardo Toledano at the beginning
of April and telegraphed the president thereafter that he should be asked to attend both to
enhance the presence of organised labour at the conference and because of his
international reputation. 651 The narrative Lombardo Toledano constructed of the history
of the Revolution in the speech he gave to the delegates on 16 April placed President
Cárdenas at the apex of an immense social movement that had made significant gains in
the realms of social and economic justice since its beginnings in 1910. 652 Although he
ruffled some feathers by downplaying the contributions of previous Revolutionary
presidents, he made clear that the Cárdenas presidency represented the fulfilment of the
650
Excélsior, April 7, 1940, 10.
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Chávez Orozco to Cárdenas, April 4, 1940.
652
Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 1, 12. Lombardo Toledano’s remarks, along with Cárdenas’s inaugural
speech, were also published in pamphlet form after the conference. Confederación de Trabajadores de
América Latina, Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (Mexico City: Departamento de Asuntos
Indígenas, 1940).
651
251
promises of the Revolution. 653 Moreover, he stated that he believed that the people would
be able to count upon a powerful ally in their struggle: that Mexico would serve as the
conscience of America, leading Latin America in the pursuit of social and economic
justice in inter-American relations. 654
The Mexican government carried out an extensive propaganda campaign at
Pátzcuaro, distributing pamphlets and books on the country’s history and governing
practices. 655 Even more effective than this propaganda in demonstrating their ability to
lead Latin America in Inter-American relations were the experiences of the delegates who
participated in the congress and witnessed the energy and resources that had gone into the
solution of indigenous issues in Mexico. When the establishment of a permanent
organisation dealing with American indigenous policy came up for discussion, there
appears to have been no question that its headquarters would be located in Mexico City.
In many ways, the Mexican delegates to the Pátzcuaro congress were preaching to the
choir. Indigenistas from throughout the Americas had been in contact for years, keeping
abreast of each other’s writings and activities. The delegation that presented the most
papers at the congress after Mexico and the United States was Ecuador, one of the
countries where Sáenz had spent time as a researcher and as a diplomat. Sáenz had
dedicated his 1933 volume on indigenous policy in Ecuador to Pío Jaramillo Alvarado,
the head of the Ecuadorian delegation to the PCII, and had maintained significant contact
653
José Angel Ceniceros came out in defence of Emilio Portes Gil, who he pointed out had also distributed
significant amounts of land to campesinos. Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3. In an interview with Excélsior the
following day, Lombardo Toledano reaffirmed his position that Cárdenas had distributed more land, and
accomplished more than all previous Revolutionary presidents. Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 11.
654
Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 12.
655
Excélsior, April 27, 1940, 3.
252
with his fellow indigenista over the years. 656 By the time that the Primer Congreso
Indigenista Interamericano took place in 1940, indigenistas and indigenous groups alike
already acknowledged the Mexican government as the leader in the formulation of
indigenous policy in the Americas. The Mexican delegates to the congress, as well as the
organisers from the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas and President Cárdenas himself,
performed this leadership role to a tee at Pátzcuaro, helping to convince Latin American
governments of what their collaborators had long known.
The founding of an inter-American institute charged with the responsibility of
studying and developing indigenous policy in the Americas had been an explicit goal of
the PCII at least since the passage of the motion Moisés Sáenz proposed at the VIII Pan
American Meeting in Lima. Although the institution’s headquarters in Mexico City do
not seem to have been a matter of debate at Páztcuaro, the Mexican government’s
methods of promoting its leadership continued to arouse some concern in diplomatic
circles. Heavy-handed as always, the proposed membership of the III’s executive
committee once again reflected its efforts to dominate the diplomatic and organisational
stage. Ramón Beteta wrote urgently to President Cárdenas on April 26, 1940 to let him
know that Pierre de L. Boal of the US Embassy had confidentially informed him that the
Latin American delegates to the conference had expressed to him their dissatisfaction
with the fact that all of the members of the proposed committee were Mexican, except for
John Collier of the US and a Guatemalan alternate. 657 It was rumoured that Luis Chávez
656
Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano, xi.
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 26, 1940. I thank Guillermo
Palacios for bringing this memorandum to my attention.
657
253
Orozco had suggested this composition in order to secure for himself leadership of the
III. As a result, the Latin American delegates to the congress feared that the Institute
would serve Mexican interests, rather than attending to the problems of the continent as a
whole. Boal warned that Collier would resign rather than be part of an inter-American
committee that had only Mexican members. Beteta estimated that this would cause the
stillbirth of the institute and suggested that the Mexican representatives should be limited
to Chávez Orozco and Sáenz and Latin American membership extended to include
representatives from both Central and South America. Cárdenas immediately sent Chávez
Orozco a telegram asking him to ensure broad Latin American representation on the
executive committee, and the diplomatic crisis seems to have been averted when he
followed the president’s instructions. 658 The resignation of Alfonso Caso, Miguel Othón
de Mendizábal and Gilberto Loyo, announced by Chávez Orozco, enabled the integration
of representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Peru. Broad Latin American
representation on the committee not only served to prevent diplomatic scandal, but also
helped to ensure that stakeholders throughout the region would work to promote the
organisation of the new Institute. Yet again, the heavy-handed methods of Mexican
delegations to Latin American conferences had elicited comment and stirred up some
resentment, but once alerted to this poor diplomacy, the Cárdenas government acted
quickly to neutralise the issue and prevent Chávez Orozco’s attempted manipulation of
the committee’s composition to cause the III to begin its efforts amidst a storm of
controversy.
658
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to Chávez Orozco, April 26, 1940.
254
When Cuban Ambassador José Manuel Carbonnel reported on the conference to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he stated that without doubt, the most important
resolution of the conference had been that which mandated the creation of the InterAmerican Institute. 659 He commented with interest on the controversy Lombardo
Toledano’s declarations had created and in subsequent reports he discussed the flap
surrounding the executive committee’s membership. 660 He surmised that the controversy
related to domestic politics, not any overt desire to minimise Latin American
involvement in the congress or the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. 661
In general, the responses of Latin American diplomats and delegates mirrored
those of Carbonell, who considered the congress a great success. The Peruvian delegates
to the congress made an official deposition to the Congress in Lima in September of 1940
that highlighted the depth of their participation in the proceedings at Pátzcuaro and gave a
very favourable impression of the importance of the conference and its resolutions. 662
The report took place within the context of an ongoing legislative debate on Peru’s new
Ley Orgánica de Enseñanza, and representative Escalante, who had headed the Peruvian
delegation to Pátzcuaro, explicitly stated that they could learn from Mexico to solve
“identical problems” in Peru. 663 An excellent student of Mexican propaganda, Escalante
described Mexico’s Revolutionary process and even explained the importance of the
659
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, April
26, 1940.
660
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, April
17 and April 20, 1940.
661
Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, May
3 and May 4, 1940.
662
La Cámara de Diputaos del Peru, Exposición ante la Cámara, del señor Diputado por Espinar Doctor
José Angel Escalante, Presidente de la Delegación Peruana al Congreso Indigenista (Lima Librería e
Imprenta Gil, 1940).
663
Ibid., 7.
255
meeting’s location at Pátzcuaro and the humanist example provided by Vasco de
Quiroga. 664 His remarks also echoed some of the internal inconsistencies of the ideas
presented at the congress. Although he insisted upon the importance of bilingual
indigenous education, he also paraphrased President Cárdenas’s opening address
declaring that their goal should be the “peruvianisation of the Indian.” 665 He reported
with great satisfaction that Cuzco had been chosen as the location of the II Congreso
Indigenista Interamericano, an equally symbolically-charged location. 666 In addition to
Escalante’s report to the Peruvian Congress, Manuel T. Calle Escajadillo also published
the paper he had delivered at Pátzcuaro that summarised the situation of Peruvian
indigenous peoples and the government’s efforts to improve their conditions. 667 Escalante
and the other Peruvian delegates to the congress clearly looked forward to effective
cooperation with the indigenistas of the Americas in the III, in the preparations for the
second congress, and in their own attempts to address the marginalisation of Peru’s
indigenous population.
The delegation from El Salvador presented a similar report to the Salvadoran
government upon its return from the PCII. Minister Hector Escobar Serrano had also
attended the III CIE and he was joined by José Andrés Orantes, undersecretary of
education in San Salvador. 668 Much more expository than the Peruvian delegation’s
deposition, the report written by Orantes included a complete transcript of President
664
Ibid., 23-26, 12-13.
Ibid., 52.
666
Ibid., 16.
667
Manuel T. Calle Escajadillo, Ponencia presentada al Primer Congreso Indigenista de México (Lima:
Imprenta Moderna, 1940).
668
José Andrés Orantes, Informe presentado al gobierno de El Savador por la Delegación Salvadoreña al
Primer Congreso Interamericano de Indigenistas (San Salvador, 1940).
665
256
Cárdenas’s inaugural speech as well as the delegate’s own submission, summaries of the
resolutions, and reports on the social events the Salvadoran delegation had attended.
Orantes too discussed the history of the lakeside town of Pátzcuaro and its illustrious
founder. 669
Ambassador Hidalgo’s reports to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign of Foreign
Affairs during the conference exhibited some of his usual scepticism. He reported that the
PCII’s opening had been rather frosty because it followed so closely on the receipt of the
critical US oil note of April 1940.670 He drew upon Cárdenas’s speech at the opening of
the congress to criticise again Mexico’s “inert” indigenous subproletariat, which he said
weighed heavily on national life. 671 Nevertheless, in his annual report for 1940, Hidalgo
commented favourably upon the PCII, which he said had been exceptional, not only
because of the number and quality of the delegations, but also because of the quantity and
importance of the scientific papers presented and the importance of its resolutions.672
Even Hidalgo had been convinced.
The popular reaction to the conference likewise demonstrated the positive results
of the Mexican government’s propaganda efforts. On April 18, the PCII had approved a
motion proclaiming President Cárdenas Benemérito de los Indios de América. Although
Cárdenas declined the honour as inappropriate during his lifetime, the significance of the
resolution remained clear. 673 Cárdenas’s decision not to accept the honour met with
669
Ibid., 73-75, 99-100.
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, April 17, 1940.
671
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, April 23, 1940.
672
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1918 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, January 11, 1941, 19.
673
El Universal, 20 April 1940, 16; AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to
Chávez Orozco, April 19, 1940.
670
257
approval from Costa Rica. Attaching a clipping from La Tribuna, Rafael Noe Fuentes
wrote to the president to congratulate him on providing “An Example Worthy of
Imitation.” 674 Ambassador Rubén Romero sent Cárdenas a series of favourable clippings
from Havana, one of which stated that Mexico could be considered the only country of
the Americas that had undertaken a methodical campaign to improve the conditions of its
indigenous population. 675 Cárdenas also received a congratulatory message from Augusto
Charnaud MacDonald of Guatemala City, who had visited Mexico the year before and
witnessed the government’s efforts to incorproate the Indian into national life first
hand. 676 Charnaud MacDonald had long followed Mexican indigenous policy and no
doubt kept abreast of the events at Páztcuaro with the benefit of David Vela’s columns in
El Imparcial. He hoped to visit Mexico again the following year and gauge the
government’s progress in implementing the congress’s resolutions. Charnaud
MacDonald’s letter must have been particularly encouraging because of the Ubico
government’s initial disinclination to participate in the PCII. Despite governmental lack
of interest, Guatemalan citizens followed Mexican government programmes and hoped
for collaboration between the two governments and the growing community of
indigenistas in Guatemala.
Notwithstanding the positive propaganda created by the PCII itself, the Mexican
government and Moisés Sáenz, who had been chosen to serve as director of the new III,
did not cease their tireless efforts to ensure Mexican leadership on this inter-American
674
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Fuentes to Cárdenas, April 26, 1940; “Un ejemplo digno de
imitarse,” La Tribuna (San José), April 21, 1940, 2.
675
Jesús González Scarpetta, El Mundo (Havana), April 27, 1940; AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente
533.4/1, Romero to Cárdenas, May 6, 1940.
676
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Charnaud MacDonald to Cárdenas, May 8, 1940.
258
issue. Most pressing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed to secure ratification of the
convention creating the III by governments throughout the region. 677 Ambassador Sáenz
once again took advantage of the stops between legs of his journey back to Peru to drum
up support for indigenous issues. Before he left, Ramón Beteta wrote to the ambassadors
and ministers resident in each of the countries he proposed to visit, explaining the
importance of his trip and the Institute. 678 Sáenz arrived back in Lima at the beginning of
October, whereupon he wrote directly to Cárdenas to describe his success. 679 He met with
the presidents of Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador, who assured him of their intention to
expedite ratification of the convention, but in Guatemala, he had been unable to secure an
audience with President Ubico. The Guatemalans were full of suspicions and jealousies,
he reported, but he nevertheless had been able to help to gather a small group of
interested citizens who he felt confident would help to ensure the continued influence of
indigenismo. 680 Negotiations for ratification by Peru continued apace, and he suggested
that once this had been secured, he would undertake to visit Bolivia and Chile in order to
ensure that the III received the attention it deserved in La Paz and Santiago. Sánez also
mentioned that he had requested of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorisation to
confer upon Peruvian President Prado and his vice president the Order of the Aztec
677
For a copy of the convention see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (I).
See, for example, Beteta’s letter to the Minister to Colombia. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II),
Beteta to Ojeda, August 26, 1940.
679
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940. See Sáenz’s report to
the Ministry from Bogotá, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Sáenz to Hay, September 26, 1940.
Minister Ojeda sent a favourable report of Sáenz’s visit. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Ojeda to
Hay, October 4, 1940. Also see Sáenz’s report on his visit to Quito and the clippings surrounding his visit,
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Sáenz to Hay, October 2, 1940.
680
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940. Also see the report on
his visit to Guatemala City, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2401 (III), Herrera Frimont to Hay, September 18,
1940.
678
259
Eagle, believing that it would be fitting to decorate them as soon as Peru ratified the
convention, thereby creating a positive association between the order of merit and
commitment to indigenismo. 681 Moisés Sáenz died only one year later, but in that time he
did indeed succeed in securing Peruvian ratification and the decorations he requested.
By the time of Sáenz’s death in Lima in October of 1941, the organisation of the
III had been placed on firm footing by the executive committee of which the Ambassador
to Peru formed a part. Although several governments had reservations about their annual
quotas—Costa Rica, and more remarkably Chile, among others, claimed that they should
be designated lower contributions because of the lack of indigenous peoples within their
national territories—ratifications continued apace, and remained on the diplomatic
agenda of those ambassadors and ministers appointed to countries that did not
immediately ratify the convention.682 By June of 1941 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru had all
ratified, and the ambassadors and ministers in those countries had not yet ratified had
been asked to inform the governments of this fact, thus applying a bit of peer pressure to
the recalcitrant. 683 In addition to providing for the organisation of the III, the convention
suggested that each country found or affiliate national indigenous institutes to the III.
Although the Argentine government had proven particularly slow to ratify the
convention, the chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires, Manuel de Negri, reported to the
681
AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Romeo Ortega to Hay, September 30, 1940; AHGE, SRE,
Expediente III-2402-1 (II), telegram from Reyes Spíndola to Hay, December 18, 1940.
683
See, for example, Ambassador Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s letter confirming that he had informed the
Chilean government. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Reyes Spíndola to SRE, June 3, 1941. The
Dominican Republic also objected to its quota, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Juan Manuel
Alcaraz Tornel to SRE, January 21, 1941.
682
260
Ministry in 1943 that Argentina’s Comisión Indigenista Argentina intended to affiliate
with the III, and had also complied with another of the resolutions passed at Pátzcuaro,
the celebration of the Día del Indio. Held at the Parque de los Andes at the base of the
monument to the Indio Argentino by sculptor Luis Perlotti, de Negri had been invited to
speak at the April 18 event. 684 The newspaper coverage of the commemoration noted that
indigenous costumes of Argentina and Mexico and folkloric music of the two nations
graced the event. 685 This resolution in favour of the Día del Indio had been one of the few
motions proposed by the indigenous attendees at the PCII. 686 A similar event took place
in Asunción. 687 Paraguay had been the only Latin American country not represented at
the PCII. In the flurry of correspondence that followed the conference, one of the
suggestions Sáenz had taken up was the creation of a directory of indigenistas, but the
chargé d’affaires in Asunción regrettably wrote in response that there were effectively no
indigenistas in Paraguay to list. 688 Nevertheless, three years later, the celebration of the
Día del Indio had taken root. Although the members of Paraguay’s Guaraní had not been
among those indigenous representatives who helped to create the celebration at Pátzcuaro
in 1940, they and a growing number of intellectuals in Asunción benefited from their
subsequent collaboration with the III, operating under Mexican leadership. That the
684
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (III), de Negri to SRE, April 21, 1943.
“Se Celebrará Hoy El Día del Indio,” La Prensa (Buenos Aires), April 18, 1940; “Se celebró hoy El Día
del Indio,” La Razón (Buenos Aires), April 18, 1943; “En el Parque de los Andes Fué Celebrado Ayer el
Día del Indio,” La Prensa, April 19, 1943.
686
BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boletín, No. 3, 13. Another of the
indigenous section’s initiatives was the recommendation that the indigenous peoples of the Americas
prepare artistic and folkloric exhibits for the Second Inter-American Tourism Conference, scheduled to be
held in Mexico City in 1941. BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boletín, No. 4, 910. On this conference see, Dina Berger, The Development of Mexico’s Tourism Industry: Pyramids by
Day, Martinis by Night (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
687
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (III), Gamio to SRE, June 3, 1943.
688
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2403-1 (VI), Aceves Navarro to Sáenz, July 30, 1940.
685
261
celebration of this day had been taken up in Argentina and Paraguay demonstrated one of
the enduring achievements of the congress, and the lasting association between the
Mexican government and indigenous issues held well into the future.
Conclusion
The Cárdenas government’s extensive use of inter-American meetings as
propaganda tools met with ambiguous results. The sheer number of meetings hosted—
and the heavy-handed methods and Revolutionary symbols employed by the organisers
and delegates—detracted, in some instances, from the conferences. They also diminished
the Cárdenas government’s opportunities to use the meetings to secure the leadership
position in inter-American relations it believed Mexico deserved. The delegates’
experiences of these conferences related closely to their perceptions of the Cárdenas
government and whether its policies were anathema to the philosophies that guided their
own governments, but also to their personal experiences of the domestic processes under
way in their own countries. As a result, the broader projects of intellectual cooperation
and development assistance that the Mexican government engaged in could play a
decisive role in preconditioning the reception of technical delegates who had worked
personally with representatives of the Mexican government to resolve social problems in
the Americas. The activities of the ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d’affaires who
undertook propaganda campaigns on behalf of these inter-American meetings, attempted
to secure the meaningful participation of Latin American countries through the
appointment of diplomatic and technical delegates, and ensured the ratification of
262
conventions that institutionalised future cooperation between Latin American countries,
played a decisive role in determining the effectiveness of the hosting of inter-American
meetings in creating the possibilities for Mexican leadership in hemispheric relations.
263
CONCLUSION.
THE VOYAGE OF THE DURANGO: FINAL THOUGHTS
ON LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO
In summary, and in a word, the voyage of the Durango to South America
has been a complete triumph. The success obtained leaves nothing to be
desired and could not have been bettered in any way or in any sense. It
has been, without a doubt, the most effective propaganda that Mexico
could have undertaken; but it is also, and above all, something much more
important and transcendental: through its projections abroad, the visit of
the Durango represents a concrete realisation of the Americanist policy of
the government of General Cárdenas. 689
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a farewell banquet on February 27, 1940, in
honour of Col. Ignacio Beteta’s impending departure for South America as head of an
extraordinary three-month-long artistic, military, commercial, and athletic mission of
goodwill aboard the destroyer Durango. 690 At the luncheon, attended by members of the
diplomatic corps and officials of the government ministries represented among the
special embassy’s nearly five hundred members, the goodwill ambassador’s brother,
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ramón Beteta, wished him well on behalf of the
Ministry. El Universal reported that the objectives of the mission, in addition to
extending fraternal greetings to the governments of the region, included the
demonstration of the country’s industrial and commercial capacity, its advances in the
fields of physical and military education, and the beauty of its folklore. 691 Nevertheless,
the goals of Beteta’s floating goodwill embassy were much more complex than those
described in the capital’s daily, and its results much more significant, as indicated by the
689
Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
(SRE), Expediente III-415-14 (I), Pablo Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 10, 1940.
690
“Banquete en honor del Coronel Beteta,” El Universal (Mexico City), February 28, 1940.
691
Ibid.
264
comments of Mexico’s Minister to Ecuador, Pablo Campos Ortiz quoted above. The
voyage of the Durango epitomised the cultural aspects of the Cárdenas government’s
Política del Buen Amigo. Undertaken at the end of the sexenio, it represents the
accumulation of knowledge and experience the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had gained in
pursuing its foreign policy aims in the region during the previous years.
Like so many of Cárdenas’s firm collaborators, Beteta had served militarily
during the Revolution and participated in the cultural effervescence associated with its
reconstructive phase. A noted watercolourist, later in life his oeuvre would be exhibited
in the United States, as well as in special exhibitions at the Museo de San Carlos. 692
During the Cárdenas presidency, Beteta published an historical and social analysis of the
Revolutionary Army, 693 but he also served as head of the Departamento Autónomo de
Educación Física until its dissolution at the beginning of 1940. 694 The Autonomous
Department of Physical Education had been created in 1935 alongside the Departamento
Autónomo Forestal y de Caza y Pesca and the Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y
692
See the catalogue of the exhibition held October 5-20, 1964 produced by the Pan American Union,
Ignacio M. Beteta (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), and Alfonso de Neuvillate y Ortiz and Raúl
Salinas de Gortari, Gral Ignacio M. Beteta: XXV aniversario de acuarelista, Museo de San Carlos, Instituto
Nacional de Bellas Artes octubre 25-noveimbre 27 1977, México, D.F. (Mexico City: Museo de San
Carlos/INBA, 1977). Also see Jaime Torres Bodet, The artist, gral. Ignacio María Beteta (Mexico City:
s/n, 1964).
693
Ignacio M. Beteta, El ejército revolucionario: visión histórica y social (Mexico City: PNR, 1936). Also
see Ignacio M. Beteta, Mensaje al ejercito nacional (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937).
694
This history of the short-lived Departamento Autónomo de Educación Física has yet to be written, but
the materials for its study are abundant. See the Memoria del Departamento de Educación Física, and the
agency’s magazine, Educación física, both published by the DAPP, as well as Departamento de Educación
Física, Programa de trabajos que desarrollará el propio departamento durante el año 1937 tanto en su
acción directa como en la que efectuará ligada con las demás secretarías y departamentos de estado
(Mexico City: DAPP, 1937); Departamento de Educación Física, Compendio de ejercicios de orden
cerrado tomados del reglamentario del arma de infantería (Mexico City: DAPP, 1939).
265
Publicidad, all of which represented new priorities of the Cárdenas government. 695
Nevertheless, the president disbanded the three autonomous departments at the beginning
of 1940, apparently due to economy measures, and their functions were subsumed into
lager government agencies following a generous banquet Cárdenas gave at the beginning
of 1940 to thank department heads Beteta, Agustín Arroyo Ch, and Miguel Ángel de
Quevedo for their service. 696 Even before the end of Beteta’s term as head of Physical
Education, he and Cárdenas had begun plans for the colonel’s next project, the voyage of
the Durango, which would enable him to contribute his expertise in the arts, the military,
and physical education to the furtherance of Cárdenas’s diplomatic goals in Latin
America. Beteta wrote to Cárdenas in December 1939 outlining a fairly modest proposal
for a voyage to Chile. 697 He expected the financial outlay to be quite minimal because
the costs could be divided among the ministries represented in the delegation, and the
members of the special embassy would be treated as guests of honour in Chile during
their stay there. 698 In the coming months the embassy’s itinerary would expand to
include Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Colombia, and so would its budget, but it is
nevertheless significant that the idea began as a demonstration of affinity between the
Mexican and Chilean governments that originated with Beteta, Cárdenas, and one of the
695
On the Departamento Autónomo Forestal y de Casa y Pesca see Emily Wakild, “Resources,
Communities, and Conservation: The Creation of National Parks in Revolutionary Mexico under President
Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2007). On the Departamento Autónomo
de Prensa y Publicidad see Rafael López González, “Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad
(DAPP). La experiencia del Estado cardenista en políticas estatales de comunicación, 1937-1939” (Tesis de
licenciatura, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, 2002).
696
On the dissolution of the departments and this banquet, see Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación
(AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR), Expediente 545.3/252.
697
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta, “Memorandum para el Señor Presidente de la República
relativo al envío de una delegación mexicana a la República de Chile,” December 14, 1939.
698
Ibid.
266
president’s most trusted diplomats, Octavio Reyes Spíndola, who had recently been
appointed Ambassador to President Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Chile. 699
Beteta was a natural choice for the appointment as head of the Durango, not only
because of his unique combination of interests, but because he had headed a similar
mission to Cuba in 1938. While Octavio Reyes Spíndola served as chargé d’affaires in
Havana, he had arranged for an enormous goodwill mission to coincide with the
Homenaje México held in favour of the Cárdenas’s oil expropriation, organised in large
part by segments of the Spanish colony in Cuba, which had occurred at the stadium El
Polar on June 12, 1938. 700 The mission included a Brigada Artística Popular Mexicana,
organised by the Ministry of Education, that travelled to Havana by sea, an exhibit of the
Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios (LEAR), and a military mission under the
direction of Col. Beteta that arrived as part of the goodwill flight of three military
airplanes. 701 Reyes Spíndola received funding from the DAPP to produce a short film
about the event. The homage represented the cross-germination of support for Mexico’s
Spanish Civil War policy, its oil expropriation, its Revolutionary philosophy, and interest
in its artistic and military achievements. The special embassy had been very well
received in Havana, and its activities were widely reported throughout the Americas,
699
See Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7. On these ideological ties, see
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Aguirre Cerda, June 5, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31,
Cárdenas to Marmaduke Grove, March 1, 1940.
700
For documents relating to the homage and an album of signatures of those Cubans who supported the
expropriation, see AGN, LCR, Caja 1073, Expediente 577.1/7.
701
See Beteta’s letter of thanks to Cuban President Federico Laredo Bru, Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba
(ANC), Fondo Presidencia, Caja 98, Número 35, Beteta to Laredo Bru, June 19, 1938.
267
increasing the positive propaganda value of the mission. 702 Beteta had performed the role
of enlightened military officer in Havana, earning him the friendship of General
Fulgencio Batista, who repaid Beteta’s visit by heading a Cuban military mission to
Mexico in early 1939. 703 The special embassy of which Beteta had been a part proved
particularly effective in strengthening relations between Mexico and Cuba, and this
success undoubtedly motivated Reyes Spíndola to suggest a similar mission at the
beginning of his new posting to Chile, a country that had become a foreign policy priority
for the Cárdenas government after the election of the Frente Popular.
Reyes Spíndola wrote to President Cárdenas in January 1940 that the proposed
goodwill mission to Chile would be worth ten years of active diplomatic labour, and
would achieve more practical results because it would reach the entire pueblo. 704 The
anticipation with which the Chilean population awaited the mission’s arrival is evident in
newspaper coverage that began with rumours of the visit nearly six months before the
Durango docked at Valparaíso. 705 Indeed, while the initial idea had been to symbolically
demonstrate the ideological ties that bound Chile and Mexico, the announcement of the
special embassy met with such great enthusiasm from so many quarters, and had been
reported so widely through the services of the United Press, that President Cárdenas was
702
See the SRE’s file on the mission, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-1248-8, which contains correspondence
from El Salvador and Panama responding to newspaper and radio coverage of the homage and the special
embassy.
703
For US Ambassador Josephus Daniels’s report of Ignacio Beteta’s speech welcoming Batista to Mexico
in 1939, see United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59),
033.372/13, Daniels to Hull, February 3, 1939.
704
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, January 13, 1940.
705
See, for example, “Embajada Mexicana,” La Opinión (Santiago), November 15, 1939; “El Deporte en
México,” Qué Hubo (Santiago), November 28, 1939. Also see “La embajada mexicana de arte y deporte es
esperada en Chile con vivo interés,” La Crítica (Santiago), February 3, 1940; “Sólo Campeones Traerán los
Mexicanos,” La Crítica, February 10, 1940; “Rescientos cuarenta Mexicanos nos envia el Pdte. Cárdenas,”
La Opinión, February 10, 1940.
268
soon convinced that it would indeed outweigh regular diplomatic activities and
accordingly agreed that the Durango should also make official visits to other Latin
American ports of call during its return trip from Chile. 706 Nevertheless, Mexico’s
Minister to Panama, Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, only received official word on
February 29 from Foreign Minister Hay that Cárdenas had determined that the Durango
should also visit Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. 707 The decision to visit Colombia came
even later, long after the Durango had set sail and in response to an explicit invitation
from President Eduardo Santos. 708 Beteta and Mexico’s Minister to Colombia Carlos
Darío Ojeda debated the merits of ascending to Bogotá from Cali or Barranquilla,
eventually deciding upon the latter, which meant that the visit to Colombia would occur
after crossing the Panama Canal and be the last stop on the Durango’s tour. 709 The
diplomats in these countries had much less time in which to prepare for the embassy’s
arrival than Reyes Spíndola, but these visits were also of much shorter duration (typically
three to four days) than the mission to Chile, which lasted a full three weeks. Regardless
of duration and level of planning, the embassy’s activities in the five countries visited had
broad similarities, and the Durango and its head of mission Beteta met a similarly
enthusiastic response in each port of call.
In the draft budget Beteta submitted to Cárdenas in January 1940, the contingent
of delegates he proposed to take on the Durango numbered 352, including eighteen
administrators, ninety-six athletes and five coaches, eighty-one students each from the
706
Ibid.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940.
708
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Zawadsky to Beteta, April 9, 1940.
709
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Carlos Darío Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de
1940 rinde la legación de México en Colombia.”
707
269
Escuela Militar and the Escuela Naval, and fifty-two members of the Orquesta Típica
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada. 710 The membership, like the itinerary, soon expanded greatly.
Cárdenas received petitions from interested individuals who hoped to join the expedition.
Fernando de la Llave wrote to Cárdenas’s personal secretary, Agustín Leñero, in January
1940, enclosing an article he had written celebrating the Durango’s mission for the
newspaper they had once worked on together, Guadalajara’s Las Noticias. He asked
whether Leñero thought a poet and firm admirer of the work of the “greatest President
our country has ever had” (such as himself) should perhaps be aboard. 711 Although de la
Llave’s offer does not seem to have been taken up, his suggestion anticipated Cárdenas’s
desire to hand-pick journalists to join the embassy. Travelling correspondent and
reporter Roberto Moya S. sent his calling card to the president to remind him of the
authorisation he had given him to travel with the Durango to Chile as a reporter for both
El Universal (the newspaper with which he was normally affiliated) and, to his “utmost
pleasure,” the government’s El Nacional. 712 Leñero wrote to Beteta informing him of the
president’s decision, which he said was based upon Moya’s exemplary services during
Cárdenas’s recent tour of Guerrero. 713 By exemplary services, he surely meant that he
had written articles favourable to Cárdenas, portraying the tour in the light desired by the
government. As a result, a large contingent of journalists accompanied the Durango, but
the publicity they provided was invaluable. The number of other delegates began to
710
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, “Personal que formará parte de la delegación dportiva mexicana y
elementos militares que visitarán la República de Chile,” January 11, 1940.
711
AGN, LCR, Caja 454, Expediente 433/85, de la Llave to Leñero, January 12, 1940; Fernando de la
Llave, “El Viaje del ‘Durango’ a Chile,” Las Noticias (Guadalajara), January 12, 1940.
712
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Moya to Cárdenas, February 2, 1940.
713
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Beteta, March 2, 1940.
270
creep up too; the Orquesta Típica eventually sent sixty-five musicians, in addition to
director Mario Talavera (who replaced Miguel Lerdo de Tejada because of his ill health),
instead of the originally-projected fifty-two. 714 Moreover, as the length of the mission
increased to accommodate the invitation of President Santos, the represented government
ministries had to increase the stipends of their delegates, which led to a panicked flurry of
correspondence between Beteta, Cárdenas, and Raúl Castellano, head of the
Departamento del Distrito Federal, which paid for the Orquesta Típica’s participation in
the mission. Beteta sent word that its members’ situation had become “desperate” and he
called upon the president to impress upon Castellano the immediate need to send
additional funds to the musicians. 715 Despite the ballooning membership and expenses of
the special embassy, the value of the mission far outweighed its costs, and the number
and variety of participants were one of the keys to the mission’s success.
The special embassy Durango included track and field athletes, tennis stars, a
basketball team, boxers, cyclists, swimmers, shooting and fencing experts, an eighteenmember football team, an equal number of acrobatic motorcyclists, charros and polo
714
The Orquesta Típica had a long history of cultural diplomacy, having formed part of the 1922 mission to
Rio de Janeiro in honour of the centenary of Brazil’s independence. “Sobre folk-lore mexicano hizo
importante exposición el Licdo. Alfredo B. Cuéllar,” La Estrella de Panamá (Panama City), May 11, 1940.
In February 1940, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada had requested that given his advanced age and propensity for
seasickness, he be permitted to travel on a steamer with greater comforts to Santiago instead of
accompanying the Orquesta Típica on the Durango, but rather than taking up what would have been an
expensive and difficult proposition, especially given the extension of the mission to other South American
countries, it seems that Mario Talavera was sent in his stead. AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to
Beteta, February 20, 1940.
715
Beteta requested an extra dollar per day for each member of the embassy for the duration of the mission.
See, AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 9, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31,
Cárdenas to Castellano, May 10, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Miembros Típica
Mexicana, May 10, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Castellano, May 13, 1940AGN, LCR,
Expediente 570/31, Ernesto Corono Resga to Leñero, May 15, 1940. By contrast, the military members of
the mission received an additional month’s worth of pay in good time.
271
players (along with twenty horses), as well as the military and naval cadets, commercial
representatives, orchestra members, and other popular artists. 716 In each port of call,
Beteta and the local diplomats arranged for commercial exhibits, conferences on the
history of the Mexican Revolution, military parades, concert series, athletic exhibitions,
and competitions between Mexican and local athletes, as well as numerous receptions
and diplomatic ceremonies. In Panama and Peru, the proximity of the port to the centres
of government enabled the members of the mission to stay in one spot for the duration of
the visit. In Chile the mission as a whole travelled by train the short distance to Santiago
and participated in such events in the capital and beyond. In Ecuador and Colombia, the
embassy docked at port, where many members of the mission remained while Beteta and
selected participants travelled to the Andean capitals. Organising the embassy’s
movements and activities called for a tremendous amount of coordination, and its
members—particularly Beteta, whose presence was demanded at nearly every event in
which the embassy took part—required a remarkable amount of stamina. In a letter to
Cárdenas after the completion of the Chilean and Peruvian legs of the tour, Beteta wrote
that only the training he had received at the side of the president during the many tours of
the Mexican countryside upon which he had accompanied Cárdenas had prepared him for
the demands of attending all the events held in their honour, giving several speeches
daily, and eating and drinking in abundance at up to four receptions per day. 717
716
For the list of participants Reyes Spíndola provided to the Chilean government, see AHGE, SRE,
Expediente III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Cristóbal Sáenz, February 27, 1940.
717
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 29, 1940.
272
As well as comparing the Durango’s mission to Cárdenas’s frequent travels to
remote corners of the republic, Beteta stated that the enthusiasm provoked by the special
embassy’s arrival in Santiago most reminded him of celebrations of Mexican
independence. 718 Delayed by one day because of bad weather off of Valparaíso, they did
not delay at the port city, despite the magnificent welcome reception that had been
prepared for their arrival. 719 They left for Santiago by rail immediately after lunch, but
despite their best efforts did not arrive in the capital until late at night, because at each
train station they passed through they were obliged to stop for a short while to greet the
crowds that had assembled to welcome them. They finally arrived in the capital at nearly
eleven o’clock, much later than planned. Although many of those who had gathered to
await their arrival had by then returned home, more than 60,000 people still lined the
streets. Military and civil authorities, cadets from the Chilean military school, various
police contingents, as well as groups of workers, campesinos, and athletes joined the
special embassy in a procession from the train station to the Casa de la Moneda. Reyes
Spíndola declared it the warmest reception ever to have occurred in the capital, and
President Aguirre Cerda expressed to the Ambassador his great pleasure and surprise at
seeing this demonstration of the pueblo’s affection for Mexico. 720 Beteta described the
abundance of placards bearing slogans such “Viva México, faro de América,” “Viva
Lázaro Cárdenas, abanderado de la libertad en el continente,” and “Viva Lázaro
Cárdenas, líder de la organización proletaria de América.” The streets were filled with
718
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, telegram from Beteta to Cárdenas, March 26, 1940.
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940.
720
Ibid.
719
273
such a multitude, and Beteta heard “Viva México” so many times that he said it bore
striking similarity to commemorations of the Grito de Dolores held in the Mexican
capital. 721
The ambassadors and ministers resident in Latin America celebrated
Independence each year by organising propaganda campaigns, conferences, and banquets
for the Mexican colony, the diplomatic corps, and government officials in the countries to
which they were posted, the lavishness of which depended upon the states of their
budgets. As well as varying according to the resources at their disposal, they also
differed depending upon the international context and the extent to which Mexico’s most
recent foreign and domestic policies received approbation in each country. The
celebrations of 1938, the first after the oil expropriation, had been particularly large and
well-coordinated in most countries, but they had never reached the level of popular
participation seen in the welcome of the Durango that Reyes Spíndola and Beteta
described. In this sense, the Durango’s mission more than outweighed the regular
activities of Mexican diplomats, just as Reyes Spíndola had prophesised.
Beteta’s comparison of the Durango’s reception in Chile to celebrations of
Independence is especially significant because it signals the similarities in purpose and
methods of the special embassy and the celebrations organised by Revolutionary
governments, including that of Lázaro Cárdenas, in honour of both September 16, and
Revolution Day, which was November 20 in this era. Although September 16
maintained pre-eminence as a celebration of Mexico abroad, within the republic
721
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 3, 1940.
274
Revolutionary governments paid increasing attention to the celebration of Madero’s Plan
de San Luis Potosí and the beginning of the Revolution of 1910. 722 Whereas
Independence celebrations continued to maintain their martial character, including a
military procession on September 16—as well as the popular participation of the rather
unruly masses the evening of September 15—Revolution Day came to include a parade
of the country’s athletes, linking the Revolutionary government to the youth, vigour, and
discipline on display. The Durango’s mission included all of these elements, as well as
the celebration of Mexican industry and popular arts, unifying the multifaceted image of
the nation the government aimed to present abroad.
Although military missions had strong precedent in the region—one of the
reasons the Mexican government decided to expand the Durango’s mission to include
Peru was to reciprocate the visit to Mexico of Peruvian cadets in 1939 aboard the
Almirante Grau—the use of athleticism in cultural diplomacy had long been debated
among members of the Foreign Service. 723 It was particularly effective during the
Durango’s tour, both in generating interest in the mission and goodwill towards Mexico,
but also in portraying the youthful vigour of the Revolutionary government and the
Mexican nation. Sports teams and individual athletes had participated in friendly
exhibitions, as well as organised athletic competitions such as the Juegos
722
See David E. Lorey, “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day: The ‘Problem’ of Order and
the Invention of Revolution Day, 1920s-1940s,” in ¡Viva México! ¡Viva la Independencia!: Celebrations of
September 16, ed. William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 233248; Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2000). Also see, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at the World’s Fairs:
Crafting a Modern Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
723
On reciprocity for the 1939 visit of Peruvian cadets, see AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (II), Anselmo Mena to
Sáenz, January 29, 1940.
275
Centroamericanos for years, sometimes to the consternation of diplomats who warned of
the negative consequences these could have for Mexico’s relations with Latin America.
In 1935, Ambassador González Roa had commented on the positive impression in
Guatemala City of the Mexican athletes who had travelled through the country on their
way to the III Juegos Centroamericanos in El Salvador. 724 Notwithstanding this praise, on
this occasion Mexican athletes had only paraded before President Ubico, instead of
competing against their Guatemalan neighbours. A few years later, newly-appointed
Ambassador to Guatemala Martínez de Alva issued a strong warning to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs following the arrival of a large contingent of Mexican athletes in 1938 as
part of the enormous delegation Mexico sent to the Féria Centroamericana that Ubico
held to coincide with his birthday in November of each year. He discussed an incident
that had occurred at a football game between Guatemala and Salvador, which resulted in
a Salvadoran protest against the Guatemalan referee. He counselled emphatically that
Mexico, despite its eagerness to pursue closer relations with Guatemala, should not use
sports in this endeavour. He warned that all of the gains made by diplomats and consular
officials over the course of years of patient activity under the direction of the Ministry
could be lost in the course of one afternoon’s competition. 725 Nevertheless, he proudly
reported in January 1940 that school children in Totonicapán were copying, using
bicycles, the acrobatics of the Mexican motorcyclists who had formed part of the
724
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-28-13, González Roa to Portes Gil, “Informe de la Embajada
correspondiente al mes de marzo de 1935,” April 23, 1935.
725
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-13 (II), Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe Reglamentario de esta
Embajada, correspondiente al mes de noviembre de 1938,” December 15, 1938.
276
delegation to the Féria. 726 Athletic exhibitions could be positive, but they were still quite
risky as far as cultural diplomacy went. The Mexican government did not send a
delegation to the Féria in November 1940, and their absence was widely remarked upon
in Guatemalan society. Regardless, the Guatemalan organising committee had paid for
the Mexican football team Atlante to play three friendlies that coincided with the Féria,
and Martínez de Alva’s fears became reality when in the second game the Guatemalan
referee’s actions led to a disagreeable protest by the Mexican players. All was not lost, as
the Mexican coach smoothed things over, but once again it became necessary to warn
that sports might not be the most effective method of strengthening relations between two
countries, particularly if one or both lacked a strong tradition of good sportsmanship. 727
One of the difficulties faced by the Durango was that similarly disagreeable
incidents had stained Mexican participation in the IV Juegos Centroamericanos held in
Panama in February 1938. 728 At the beginning of the games, the Mexican athletes had
been the most applauded of all, but their success on the field soon gave the impression
that they could not be beaten. The crowd turned against them and became violent,
causing the police to intervene in a particularly brutal manner. The rest of the games
were marred by negative attitudes towards the Mexican delegation and inflammatory
726
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe mensual reglamentario que rinde
la Embajada de México en Guatemala, C.A., correspondiente al mes de Enero de 1940,” February 10, 1940.
727
The monthly report for November 1940 was actually submitted by chargé d’affaires José Gorostiza
owing to the Ambassador’s return to Mexico to attend the inauguration of President Ávila Camacho, but
the absent ambassador’s opinions are nevertheless mirrored in his subordinate’s report. AHGE, SRE,
Expediente 31-1-21, Gorostiza to Hay, “Informe mensual reglamentario que rinde la Embajada de México
en Guatemala, C.A., correspondiente al mes de noviembre de 1940,” December 10, 1940.
728
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 15, 1940.
277
articles about its athletes in the press. 729 Two years later, Minister Rosenzweig and Col.
Beteta both worried that these incidents would cause the Durango to be met with a lack
of enthusiasm in Panama City. 730 Nevertheless, after the special embassy’s stay on the
isthmus, Rosenzweig concluded that the mission had actually done much to repair the
damage done to Mexican-Panamanian relations during the Juegos; the mission had been a
real success that would long be remembered by the people of Panama. 731 Moreover,
while prejudicial to Mexico’s relations with Panama, the 1938 Juegos had positively
affected relations with Colombia. The municipality of Barranquilla, which Mexico had
supported at Panama City in its bid to host the next Central American and Caribbean
Games, paid special attention to the Durango and its representatives as a result of this
support, and considered the athletic competitions and exhibitions of the special embassy
good practice for its upcoming responsibilities. Barranquilla’s Asamblea Departamental
del Atlántico declared Beteta and the embassy he presided over as guests of honour of the
city, and the welcome they received there was particularly warm. 732
The athletic contingent of the Durango also contributed greatly to the success of
the mission in Lima, helping it to overcome great odds. More than any of the other
countries visited, some resistance to the idea of the special embassy had been evident in
Peru. Prior to the Durango’s arrival, one conservative weekly warned that Peruvians
729
For details, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-3 (VIII), Estrada Cajigal to Hay, “Reseña política de
Panamá por los meses de enero y frebrero de 1938,” March 10, 1940.
730
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 15, 1940.
731
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Rosenzweig to Hay, “Memorandum Reservado: Anexo al
informe de la legación en Panamá sobre la visita hecha a este país por la misión presidida por el Coronel
Don Ignacio M. Beteta,” June, 1940.
732
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Carlos Martín Leyes, Presidente de la Asamblea Departamental, to
Cárdenas, May 16, 1940. The V Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe were eventually held in
Barranquilla in March of 1946 after the conclusion of the Second World War.
278
should not forget that in addition to being athletes, artists, and cadets, the members of the
mission were also representatives of the Revolutionary government of Mexico and its
“bloody persecution” of the Roman Catholic Church. 733 An enemy of Western Christian
Civilisation, the Mexican government sought to exercise ideological hegemony over the
Americas, and Peru and Bolivia in particular. On the one hand, the embassy brought a
message of goodwill, while on the other it brought the political ideology it aimed to
spread through the demonstration of Mexico’s artistic, athletic, and military prowess. 734
The Mexican government had indeed pursued closer relations with Bolivia, and had the
Andean nation not been land-locked it would surely have been included on the maritime
embassy’s itinerary. It is also true that the Cárdenas government and its representatives
played a rather delicate role in internal Peruvian politics because of the affinity of the
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance
with the Revolution. In fact, Baumbach reported that APRA leader Víctor Raúl Haya de
la Torre had visited him to say that APRA wanted to organise a demonstration of
sympathy for Mexico, but that the chargé d’affaires had advised against it. 735 The
Ministry approved of his response, saying that the aims of the mission were purely
“apolitical.” 736 Chargé d’affaires Baumbach had intended to organise a procession of all
of the members of the Durango before Peruvian President Manuel Prado upon the
mission’s arrival in Lima, but Prado had declined the honour. Baumbach knew
immediately that the idea had been refused because the president feared that members of
733
“La Embajada Mexicana del ‘Durango,’” Verdades (Lima), April 6, 1940.
Ibid.
735
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from Baumbach to SRE, April 10, 1940.
736
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to Baumbach, April 11, 1940.
734
279
APRA would take the opportunity to demonstrate against the government, and in favour
of Mexico. 737 The Peruvian government met the arrival of the Durango with trepidation,
but both the President and the people were won over by the mission. Prado
spontaneously suspended a cabinet meeting so that he could preside personally over the
polo match held between the Mexicans and the Peruvian military’s equestrian team. At
Lima’s country club he resolved to decorate Beteta later that evening with the Orden
Militar Peruana de Ayacucho, a high honour only rarely bestowed upon foreigners. 738
After the Durango’s departure, Oscar N. Torres V., President of the Peruvian Comité
Nacional de Deportes, wrote to the chargé d’affaires praising the athletes who had formed
part of the mission. He believed that the visit had planted a seed that would grow into
strong ties between their two countries. 739 The sports contingent of the Durango proved
very effective in establishing strong links with the pueblos of South America, on some
occasions helping the embassy to overcome obstacles to the establishment of closer
relations between Mexico and Latin America.
During the Durango’s short stop in Callao on the way to Santiago, Jesús E. Ferrer
Gamboa (one of the Mexican journalists aboard the special embassy) had given an
interview to Lima’s La Prensa, in which he had stated that the Mexican government
considered sports the most democratic medium through which to unify disparate peoples
because athletics were not influenced by racial or nationalist prejudices. 740 Nevertheless,
737
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940
Ibid; “Magnífica Exhibición de Equitación Hicieron los Jinetes Aztecas y Peruanos,” La Prensa (Lima),
April 27, 1940; “El Embajador Coronel Beteta fué condecorado por el Mandatario de la Nación con la
Orden Militar de Ayacucho,” Universal (Lima), April 27, 1940.
739
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Baumbach to Hay, May 14, 1940.
740
“Notable Progreso ha Alcanzado en Méjico la Educación Física,” La Prensa, March 19, 1940.
738
280
the athletic exhibitions and competitions they engaged in exemplified the racial and
nationalist goals of the mission of the Durango, and those of the Revolutionary
government. As in the rest of Latin America, education specialists, public health
advocates, and eugenicists alike championed physical education as a way to improve
Mexico’s “backward” and predominantly rural population during the Cárdenas era. 741
The exhibition of Mexican athletes through the voyage of the Durango represented the
apparently positive results of this nationalist project to the region, and the Latin American
press seems to have accepted the image they presented wholeheartedly. La Crónica of
Lima declared that never before had a delegation so large and bursting with the strength
of youth arrived on Peruvian shores. 742 Reports of this tenor reflected Beteta’s
declarations to the effect that the athletic delegation represented the youth of Mexico’s
march towards perfection and “racial improvement.” 743 Physical education, he
continued, when practiced scientifically, enabled the pursuit of physical perfection,
intellectual growth, and the development of moral and spiritual solidarity among its
practitioners. 744 La Crónica echoed these remarks when it described the athletes as
representatives of the youthful Mexican “race,” full of optimism and the faith that the
physical and spiritual strength gained through sport afforded them. 745 The inclusion of
the Mexican fencing team in the embassy is significant in this regard. Echoing the ideas
741
On the eugenics movement in Mexico, see Nancy Leys Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender,
and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
742
“Le Delegación Cultural y Deportiva de México partió ayer rumbo al Norte,” La Crónica (Lima), April
28, 1940.
743
“El Coronel Ignacio Beteta, presidente de la Embajada de México, nos hizo interesantes declaraciones
antes de su partida,” La Crónica, April 28, 1940.
744
Ibid.
745
“Recuentro de la actuación de la Embajada Cultural Deportiva Mexicana en Lima,” La Crónica, April
29, 1940.
281
of the duelling diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, El Comercio opined that,
above all other sports, the ancient practice of duellists evidenced the moral and spiritual
heights reached by the Mexican nation. 746 References to their youthful masculine
vigour—and by extension that of the Mexican nation and “race”—abounded in the
coverage of the embassy’s activities throughout the region. The embassy was
overwhelmingly male, and only five women were included: songstress Mercedes Caroza,
and four women who performed national dances and sang at performances of the
Orquesta Típica. 747 Carlos González served as the artistic director of the mission, 748
which had rather different goals than the athletic component, which indeed sought to
display the young men’s physical strengths and “racial improvement” as one of the
accomplishments of the Revolution. The artistic mission also sought to demonstrate the
accomplishments of the Revolution, but in the very different field of popular arts and
national folklore. Nevertheless, as Eric Zolov has convincingly argued in relation to
cultural presentations of the Mexican nation at the 1968 Olympics, “stage-managed
displays of ‘folklore’ were also an implicit response to the racialized assumptions of
Mexican backwardness.” 749
Perhaps only the Orquesta Típica, which sometimes played up to five times per
day during the special embassy’s visit to Chile, created a more popular impression of
746
“Con una enorme concurrencia se realizó la exhibición de lorete con los esgrimistas visitantes,” El
Comercio (Lima), April 25, 1940.
747
“Mexican Good Will Mission Going to Chile,” La Estrella de Panamá, March 12, 1940.
748
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Cristóbal Sáenz, February 27, 1940.
749
Eric Zolov, “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,” The Americas 61:2
(October 2004): 159-188. Also see, Amelia M. Kiddle, “Cabaretistas and Indias Bonitas: Gender and
Representations of Mexico in the Americas during the Cárdenas Era.” Journal of Latin American Studies
42:2 (May, 2010).
282
Mexico than the athletic mission during the Durango’s voyage. 750 Members of the
Orquesta Típica played at nearly every event organised for the mission; dancers
performed the jarabe tapatío at the Olympic pool in Panama City and the barrios
populares of Santiago. 751 They performed to acclaim for elite audiences at Panama’s
Teatro Nacional and Quito’s Teatro Sucre, reinforcing among these circles the prestige
that Mexican music already enjoyed in the region. 752 Even more significant were the
popular concerts that enabled thousands of common people to enjoy Mexican music and
dance. These popular concerts presented the canon of Revolutionary folklore to the
assembled audiences. 753 The performance at the American Park in Guayaquil was
typical: thousands of people gathered to hear, among other musical numbers, the “Marcha
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada,” “Lindo Michoacán,” “Sobre las Olas,” and the title song from
the blockbuster film Allá en el Rancho Grande (directed by Fernando de Fuentes, 1936),
which had been a huge hit in Latin America. 754 Afterwards a pair of dancers treated the
crowd to demonstrations of Mexico’s national dances. 755 In addition to performing at the
Teatro Sucre in Quito, the Orqesta Típica agreed to also give a much larger concert at
Quito’s bull ring. Popular disappointment resulted when rain caused the cancellation of
the open-air concert. In response, Beteta decided to put off the Durango’s return from
750
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940.
“Una noche de arte tuvo lugar en la Piscina Olímpica,” La Estrella de Panamá, May12, 1940; AGN,
LCR, Expediente 570.31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 3, 1940.
752
“Sobre folk-lore mexicano hizo importante exposición el Licdo. Alfredo B. Buéllar,” La Estrella de
Panamá, May 11, 1940; “La gran velada azteca,” El Día (Quito), May 2, 1940.
753
On the establishment of this canon, see Alex Saragoza, ‘The Selling of Mexico, Tourism and the State’,
in Gilbert M. Joseph et al (eds.), Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico since 1940
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 91-115.
754
For example, on the exhibition of Allá en el Rancho Grande in Buenos Aires, see AHGE, SRE, Archivo
de la Embajada Mexicana en Argentina (AEMARG), Legajo 48, Expediente 1.
755
“El concierto de la delegación artística musical en el American Park,” El Telégrafo (Guayaquil), May 1,
1940; “Cálida recepción a la brillante Embajada,” El Universo (Guayaquil), May 1, 1940.
751
283
Quito to Guayaquil by one day and add a second performance to the itinerary. The
proceeds from the concerts went to a local orphanage and the society of Saint Vincent de
Paul in the capital. 756 The Plaza de Toros “Arenas de Quito” was nearly full to capacity
the following day, as Quito’s popular classes—who had been unable to attend the concert
held at the Teatro Sucre, attended by Acting President Andrés F. Córdova—ringed the
Mexican orchestra that played on a stage raised on the sand below. 757 Minister Campos
Ortiz concluded in his report on the visit of the Durango that he simply could not
describe the success of these popular concerts, they had been so exceptional. 758
Likewise, the Orquesta Típica had performed two concerts in Lima at the Teatro
Municipal for members of the elite, and a popular concert on April 26 at the auditorium
of the Campo del Marte. 759 More than 20,000 people attended the free event, which
Baumbach characterised as the pueblo’s opportunity to demonstrate its sincere affection
for Mexico, thereby contrasting it sharply to the Peruvian government’s initially chilly
welcome. 760 He reported that a long-time resident of Lima, not directly interested in the
mission, with whom he had spoken said that a greater reception had not been seen since
the time of the viceroys. 761 The Orquesta Típica extended its programme due to the
crowd’s insistent calls for an encore. Beteta mounted the stage and gave an impromptu
speech, after which the Orquesta Típica played the Mexican national anthem, to which
756
“Delegación mexicana aplaza su regreso al Puerto hasta mañana para poder ofrecer nuevas audiciones
del Conjunto Típico,” El Comercio (Quito), May 4, 1940.
757
“Ruidoso éxito de la Orquesta Típica Mexicana,” El Comercio (Quito), May 5, 1940; “El
conjuntoorquestral mejicano alcanzo todo un éxicot en la capital de la repúblic con su actuación la que fue
aplaudida por distinguidos elementos de esa urbe,” El Telégrafo (Guayaquil), May 5, 1940.
758
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortíz to Hay, May 10, 1940.
759
“Festival Mejicano en el Municipal,” La Prensa, April 26, 1940; “La Orquesta Típica Mejicana Ofrece
Hoy 2 Conciertos en el T. Municipal,” La Prensa, April 25, 1940.
760
AHGE, SRE, III-415, 14 (I), Confidential report from Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940.
761
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Non-confidential report Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940.
284
the assembled crowd paid reverent respect. Upon the concert’s conclusion, the cheering
continued and Col. Beteta had difficulty exiting the auditorium as the crowd of admirers
that enveloped him attempted to hoist him onto their shoulders to the cry of “¡Viva
México!” This extraordinary event demonstrated for chargé d’affaires Baumbach the
true sympathy of the Peruvian people for Mexico. 762 Lima’s La Crónica called music
“the soul of Mexico,” in its review of special embassy’s mission. 763 Seeing up close
Mexico’s charros and trajes típicos had transported this Peruvian journalist to the
“picturesque and beautiful” country to the north. The Durango’s musicians, as well as
the other goodwill ambassadors on board, encouraged the development of empathy and
understanding among peoples of the Americas. This was precisely the mission’s goal,
just as it also underlay the Política del Buen Amigo. Mutual understanding bred
cooperation and mutual protection, which the Cárdenas government sought in both its
domestic and international policies.
Reyes Spíndola had argued that the activities of the Durango mission would be
worth ten years of regular diplomatic labour, but in addition to the many extraordinary
events its members participated in, they also connected the excitement and enthusiasm
they brought with them to standard diplomatic activities, thereby imbuing them with
increased meaning and demonstrating that these activities were comparable tools to be
used in the pursuit of the Política del Buen Amigo. In addition to the smaller military,
educational, and technical exchanges and more modest musical and cultural
762
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Confidential report from Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940.
“La Delegación Cultural y Dportiva de México partió ayer rumbo al Norte,” La Crónica (Lima), April
28, 1940.
763
285
performances they supported over the years, ambassadors and ministers to Latin America
made significant use of the gift of statues of national heroes and the decoration of high
government officials with the Orden del Águila Azteca, the highest honour bestowed by
the Mexican government upon foreigners. 764 By undertaking these same activities under
the special embassy’s auspices, the visit of the Durango reinforced the use of these
diplomatic devices in solidifying Mexican-Latin American relations.
After the Durango’s arrival in Guayaquil, Beteta visited the governor of the
province, Enrique Baquerizo Moreno, and offered a wreath at the base of the statue of
Vicente Rocafuerte, whom he called a true “citizen of America,” giving a speech that
recognised the illustrious Ecuadorian for his labour on behalf of Mexico as its minister to
Great Britain after Independence. 765 The governor responded that the nineteenth century
hero was a symbol of the need for better knowledge of the common destiny of the region
and understanding and fraternity among Latin American countries. 766 The members of
the Durango performed similar wreath-laying ceremonies in the other countries,
honouring the national heroes of each nation. Even more significantly, the embassy also
supported Mexican diplomats’ efforts to commemorate Mexican heroes and promote
them as meaningful figures for Latin America as a whole. In Bogotá, Beteta and Minister
Ojeda made sure to include in their itinerary a stop in El Nogal, the neighbourhood where
764
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, La Orden Mexicana del Águila Azteca; ley y reglamento (Mexico
City: DAPP, 1936). On national decorations, see John D. Clarke, Gallantry Medals and Decorations of the
World (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001).
765
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, telegram from Ferrer Gamboa to Cárdenas, April 30, 1940.
766
Ibid. On Vicente Rocafuerte see, Jaime E. Rodríguez O., The Emergence of Spanish America: Vicente
Rocafuerte and Spanish Americanism, 1808-1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Jaime
E. Rodríguez O., “Rocafuerte y el empréstito a Colombia,” Historia Mexicana 18:4 (April-June, 1969):
485-515.
286
stood a statue of Benemérito de las Américas Benito Juárez that the Mexican government
had given to Colombia in 1938 in honour of the four hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the city of Bogotá. 767 The delegation, in the company of members of the
Mexican colony, placed a laurel wreath at the foot of the statue, connecting the special
embassy to the unveiling that had taken place in 1938, thus keeping alive the memory of
this diplomatic ceremony and past activities of the legation associated with its
inauguration. 768 A similar monument of Independence hero José María Morelos had
been earmarked for donation to Panama, and Minister Rosenzweig thought the visit of the
Durango a propitious opportunity to symbolically lay the cornerstone of the statue. 769
This ceremony, which was well-attended by government functionaries and the diplomatic
corps, had the effect of taking some of the spotlight off of the somewhat contentious
presence of Mexican athletes in Panama and focusing it instead on diplomatic ceremony.
Moreover, the attendance of the Mexican military and naval cadets enabled the
presentation of a much more elaborate ceremony than could have been prepared by the
Minister without the special embassy’s presence. President Augusto Boyd of Panama
explicitly thanked Cárdenas for the permanent reminder of the mission Beteta had left, by
laying the cornerstone of the statue, in the telegram he sent the Mexican president to
express his appreciation of the special embassy’s visit.770 Henceforth, when inaugurating
the statue of Morelos, the Minister would be able to build on the symbolic capital the
767
On the donation of the statue of Juárez, see AGN, Archivo Particular Lázaro Cárdenas, Rollo 14,
Expediente 72; AGN, LCR, Caja 978, Expediente 562.2/61.
768
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la
legación de México en Colombia.”
769
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940.
770
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Boyd to Cárdenas, May 14, 1940.
287
numerical presence and grandeur of the mission had created to once again increase the
significance of the gift and the friendly relations between Mexico and Panama. 771
The mutual decoration of members of the Durango mission and officials of the
countries visited played a similar role in reinforcing both the importance of the special
embassy and the regular diplomatic practice of conferring national honours upon
representatives of friendly governments. Peruvian President Prado’s spontaneous
decision to confer upon Beteta the Orden de Ayacucho described above was noteworthy
because it represented the about-face of the Peruvian government in its reception of the
Durango. Nevertheless these decorations played an essential role in each of the countries
visited. In the early stages of making arrangements for the Durango to visit other Latin
American countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had telegraphed Minister Campos
Ortiz in Quito to inquire whether Ecuador’s minister of foreign affairs Julio Tobar
Donoso would be able to travel down to Guayaquil so that Beteta could bestow the Orden
del Águila Azteca upon him there, as the special embassy’s tight schedule would prevent
the mission from ascending to Quito. 772 Campos Ortiz responded that it would be
impossible for the minister to go to Guayaquil at that time and said that the government
was prepared instead to put at the mission’s disposal a special train to facilitate their trip
to the capital. 773 The suggestion of the decoration had such symbolic power that it
encouraged the Ecuadorian government to extend its hospitality to Beteta’s mission, thus
771
On the Morelos statue, also see AGN, LCR, Caja 978, Expediente 562.2/61.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to Campos Ortiz, February 14, 1940.
773
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from Campos Oritz to SRE, February 22, 1940. The
Mexican government accepted the offer in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to
Campos Ortiz, February 26, 1940.
772
288
enlarging the significance of his visit by including Quito on the mission’s itinerary. 774
Similarly, in Colombia, the government paid for a special airplane to take Beteta and a
few other members of the mission to Bogotá, where they were fêted. Upon their arrival
in the capital on May 15, and after presenting the embassy’s credentials to President
Santos and attending a presidential banquet held in the embassy’s honour, Beteta
decorated Foreign Minister Luis López de Mesa with the Orden del Águila Azteca. Two
days later, during a visit to Colombia’s Escuela Militar, Beteta received the Orden de
Boyacá in return. 775 In Panama, Beteta received the Gran Cruz de la Orden de Vasco
Núñez de Balboa, its highest grade, while two other members of the mission were
decorated at the level of Caballero in recognition of their contribution to the
strengthening of relations between the two countries. Minister Rosenzweig reported that
during the ceremony, Foreign Minister Narciso Garay also made reference to his own
labours in pursuit of that goal in the speech he gave following the presentation of the
honours. 776
Although the mutual decoration of ambassadors and government officials may
seem to be empty diplomatic ceremonies, the extreme concern Ambassador Reyes
Spíndola exhibited concerning the honours he wished to bestow upon those Chileans who
had been instrumental to the success of the Durango in Chile suggests how essential
these rituals were to the pursuit of friendly diplomatic relations between countries. Reyes
Spíndola wrote to President Cárdenas to report on the success of the Durango’s mission
774
On the decoration of Tobar Donoso, see III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 9, 1940.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la
legación de México en Colombia.”
776
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to SRE, May 13, 1940; AHGE,
SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940.
775
289
in Chile on May 1, 1940 and attached a list of individuals he wished to decorate with the
Orden del Águila Azteca. He explained that although the request may have seemed
excessive, all were deserving of the honour, which would be a fitting token of the
Mexican government’s appreciation of their efforts on behalf of the special embassy. 777
Reyes Spíndola suggested that no less than thirty nine individuals receive varying degrees
of the highest national honour bestowed on foreigners. On May 31, Cárdenas responded
to Reyes Spíndola that he had recommended to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the
order be conferred upon all of the individuals named by the Ambassador. 778 The
decoration of the Chilean officials later that year would help to solidify through regular
diplomatic practice the increased ties between the two countries created by the visit of the
Durango.
Reyes Spíndola had a keen appreciation of the reciprocity necessary in diplomatic
relations. As early as January 1940, Reyes Spíndola had alerted the president to the fact
that a group of Chilean marines would be arriving at the ports of Tampico and Veracruz
on a practice mission during the Chilean navy’s second voyage to collect the Mexican oil
it had contracted to purchase. 779 He wrote again in May to suggest that the twenty-seven
marines and thirteen officials be invited to the capital in order to return in part the
multiple attentions paid to the members of the Durango. 780 Steps were immediately
taken to prepare a welcome for the members of the Maipu who would arrive at the end of
777
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940.
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Reyes Spíndola, May 31, 1940. Also see, AGN, LCR,
Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Hay, May 30, 1940.
779
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, January 13, 1940.
780
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Leñero, May 8, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente
570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, May 8, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Cárdenas, May
15, 1940. Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-429-5.
778
290
that month. 781 The Departamento del Distrito Federal quickly organised a gala function
at Bellas Artes for May 31 and a visit to the ruins of Teotihuacan, followed by a special
comida campestre given in their honour. 782 Unfortunately, Chile’s Ambassador to
Mexico Manuel Hidalgo was not impressed by these attentions, or those paid by the
Mexican government to subsequent groups of Chilean visitors. He repeatedly
complained to his Ministry that his countrymen were not as well received in the Mexican
capital as the Durango had been in Chile. 783 He commended Col. Beteta for arranging a
special reception for General Beguño, who had come to Mexico as part of the special
embassy attending the inauguration of President Ávila Camacho in December 1940, but
remained generally nonplussed by the Mexican government’s attitudes towards visiting
Chileans. 784 The Ambassador’s comments, though they should be taken with a grain of
salt, underscore the importance of reciprocity in diplomatic relations. Ambassador Reyes
Spíndola and Col. Beteta both seem to have been attuned to this, seeking to solidify the
gains made by the mission of the Durango through regular diplomatic practice.
Few receptions could have equalled the outpouring of goodwill met by the
Durango’s special embassy to Chile, but it is nevertheless a representative indication of
the bases of the Cárdenas government’s Política del Buen Amigo. Despite Ambassador
Hidalgo’s negative perception of the Durango, it only served to strengthen relations
between Mexico and Latin America into the future. In July 1940, Ambassador Reyes
781
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Castellano, May 21, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31,
Leñero to Reyes Spíndola, May 21, 1940.
782
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Ernesto Corona Ruesga to Leñero, June 17, 1940.
783
Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico,
Volúmen 1848 B, Hidalgo to Ministro, August 28, 1940.
784
Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 B, Hidalgo to Ministro, December 7, 1940.
291
Spíndola reported that the mission of the Durango had provoked interest among a group
of Chilean teachers, who then sought to organise an educational exchange with
Mexico. 785 The results were felt even outside the countries visited by the special
embassy. Also in 1940, the chargé d’affaires in Brazil forwarded the Ministry an inquiry
from the Conferação Universitária Brasileira do Desporto Universitário regarding a
proposed trip to Mexico. 786 Even before the Durango had returned to Mexico, the Cuban
representatives of Rotary International had written of the Orquesta Típica’s phenomenal
triumph in South America to their counterparts in Mexico and requested that they appeal
to the Mexican government for an agreement that the celebrated musicians could play at
their international convention that June. 787 Unfortunately for the Rotary Club, their
request was declined because the musicians did not return to the Mexican capital until
May 26 and were unable to go abroad again so soon. 788
The reverberations of the Durango in cultural and diplomatic circles are clear and
would continue to influence Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America well into
the future, but the special embassy even improved the reception of Mexican policies in
previously hostile quarters. Reyes Spíndola had reported to Cárdenas that the mission
had done much to counter the negative propaganda Mexico had suffered in Chile in the
past; the delegates had demonstrated the speciousness of the harmful image of Mexico
and its Revolution that had been implanted in Chile by the reactionary press and the
international press agencies that were sustained by the power of “international
785
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2401-4, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, July 24, 1940.
See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-429-7.
787
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Rafael Oriol to Luis G. Águilar, April 29, 1940; AGN, LCR,
Expediente 570/31, Águilar to Cárdenas, May 22, 1940.
788
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Águilar, May 30, 1940.
786
292
imperialism.” 789 In a concrete example of how the Durango had served to counteract
these ideas, Minister Ojeda wrote that he believed the visit of the special embassy and the
positive impression it had created in Bogotá was instrumental in causing the hard-line
leader of Colombia’s Conservative Party Laureano Gómez to soften his approach to
Mexico. 790 In the coverage Gómez’s newspaper El Siglo gave to Mexico’s response to
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s oil note of April 3, the Conservative stalwart took a
decidedly pro-Mexico position, outlining the Cárdenas government’s reasons for
rejecting the arbitration suggested by the US government, and going so far as to say that
all of the republics of South America should demonstrate their solidarity with Mexico. 791
Gómez’s attacks against Mexico had in the past been quite vociferous, but these had
recently begun to diminish, and Ojeda believed that this change in attitude had resulted in
part from the legation’s successful efforts to provide him with a more positive
understanding of Mexico, of which the mission of the Durango had been the prime
example. 792 President Santos had offered a banquet in honour of Beteta on May 16, to
which members of his cabinet and the editors of the capital’s newspapers had been
invited. 793 Quite out of character, Gómez had attended the reception. His presence was
so unusual that Ojeda had made a special point of greeting him and thanking him for his
attendance. 794 The Minister believed that these attentions and the positive image of
789
AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940.
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940.
791
“Razones del gobierno de México para rechazar el arbitraje de los EE. UU.,” El Siglo (Bogotá), June 13,
1940.
792
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940.
793
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la
legación de México en Colombia.”
794
AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940.
790
293
Mexico Beteta had left in the Colombian capital had begun to bear fruit. Even in the
realm of oil policy, cultural diplomacy such as that Beteta engaged in could have positive
results for the Mexican government.
Final Thoughts
Mexico, breaking the mould of traditional diplomacy, brings together on a
warship an Embassy composed of everything that is distinctively and
characteristically hers: her Army, product of social revolution, whose sole
purpose is sustaining the institutions that guarantee that which the people,
at the expense of blood and life, have achieved for their mutual and
concrete betterment; her popular art, which embodies the aesthetic
tradition created by our ancestors, despite their exhaustion from the
struggle for independence, and which bursts forth from the present
generation and its similar outlook on life. Finally, her athletes,
representing not the fleeting invigoration of a few transitory events
limited to stadiums and fields, but rather the physical improvement of our
nation, to prepare the people for our daily labour and strengthen them for
the great tasks to come, in America’s brilliant future! 795
In his report on the success of Beteta’s mission in Ecuador, Minister Campos
Ortiz had stated that the overwhelmingly positive reception the Durango had met
demonstrated that the Mexican Revolution was not only understood, but admired for its
achievements, in the Andean nation. 796 The admiration of the Durango’s athletic,
cultural, and military contingents enabled the greater understanding of the Revolutionary
government of Cárdenas. At the performance of the Orquesta Típica at the Teatro Sucre
in Quito, noted pianist and musical critic Juan Pablo Muñoz Sanz stated that the embassy
represented three characteristics of the Mexican national personality: art, nationalism, and
795
Ignacio Beteta, quoted in “Urge unificar los anhelos de progreso,” La Estrella de Panamá, May 13,
1940.
796
AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 10, 1940.
294
revolution. 797 Focusing on popular music as an example of how these three dimensions
informed each other, he argued that Mexican culture provided a prototype of
americanidad for the Latin America. One Ecuadorian editorialist averred that the essence
of the Mexican nation lay not in its trajes típicos, the beauty of its art, sculpture, music,
or literature; these only elicited excitement because they were expressions of its
Revolution. 798 These observers saw the cultural presentations of the Durango as
representative of the Revolution, and made conclusions regarding its popular character,
and the potential applicability of Mexican approaches to domestic and international
politics through their analysis of the special embassy’s cultural programme. Ambassador
Reyes Spíndola had argued that the visit of the Durango would serve to make Mexico
known to the countries it visited and demonstrate, in an objective and eloquent form, the
great progress achieved by its “much discussed” Revolution. Art and sports would serve
as the “currency” offered to their Latin American neighbours as proof of these
achievements. 799 Though certainly not objective, the cultural message of the Durango
was eloquent. Overcoming considerable opposition, the special embassy—and the
Política del Buen Amigo of which it was a part—increased mutual understanding and
affinity between Mexico and the countries it visited, and by making the character and
aims of the Revolutionary government comprehensible and even admirable in popular,
797
“Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Juan Pablo Muñoz S. presentando a la orquesta típica mexicana en el
Sucre,” El Comercio (Quito), May 4, 1940. Juan Pablo Muñoz Sanz would later found Ecuador’s Orquesta
Sinfónica Nacional. Also see his contemporary works, La música ecuatoriana (Quito: Universidad
Central, 1938); Nacionalismo y americanismo musical (Quito: Imprenta del Ministerio del Gobierno,
1938).
798
“Charlas del día,” El Comercio, May 5, 1940.
799
AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Hay, February 16, 1940.
295
political, and diplomatic circles, it contributed to Cárdenas’s efforts to obtain support for
his domestic and international policies.
An editorial that appeared in El Comercio after the embassy’s departure for
Guayaquil suggested that a new era in inter-American relations had been inaugurated
with the Durango’s visit; it represented the desire to increase mutual understanding of the
pueblos of the Americas. 800 One Panamanian journalist agreed that the Durango had
made great strides towards achieving this aim. He argued that the day that such missions
took place throughout the continent, Latin Americans would have done more to achieve
rapprochement and mutual understanding than could be achieved through all of the
conferences they organised and the tomes they published. 801 Nevertheless, although the
mission of the Durango epitomised the Política del Buen Amigo and the Cárdenas
government’s attempts to increase mutual understanding, the numerous conferences and
publications the Mexican government sponsored, like the statues it unveiled and the
national medals it bestowed, formed part of the same strategy for increased cultural
relations between the governments of the Americas. The voyage of the Durango was
certainly more successful than many of the other aspects of this programme of cultural
relations; it represented the accumulated expertise gained through six years of promoting
the Cárdenas government and its domestic and international policies in the region.
800
801
“Despues de la visita,” El Comercio, May 5, 1940.
“La Delegación Mexicana,” La Estrella de Panamá, March 12, 1940.
296
The voyage of the Durango was part of what Ecuadorian journalist Julián Sorel
had called diplomacia de la escuela moderna, diplomacy of the “modern school.” 802 He
believed Beteta to be an embodiment of Mexican diplomacy, that undertaken by men of
high scientific and artistic cultural standing, such as Alfonso Reyes and Jaime Torres
Bodet. No longer the preserve of private drawing rooms, intense cultural activity
characterised this modern form of diplomatic activity. 803 Mexico’s diplomats were
cultural representatives of the Revolutionary regime as much as they were political
representatives of the Cárdenas government. Moreover, their cultural pursuits facilitated
the political objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cárdenas himself. Beteta
described the voyage of the Durango as breaking with the moulds of traditional
diplomacy. 804 Although continuities certainly connected the diplomacy of the Cárdenas
era to that of both his predecessors and successors, the purposeful use of cultural relations
in furthering mutual understanding among Latin American countries was one of the main
characteristic of the government’s Política del Buen Amigo. As a military man, artist,
and bureaucrat, Beteta had much in common with the regular ambassadors and ministers
posted to Latin America; likewise, the activities of the Durango both mirrored and
supplemented those everyday cultural and political efforts the special embassy supported.
802
This was most likely a pen name – Julien Sorel is the main character in Stendahl’s Le Rouge et le Noir.
Julián Sorel, “El Embajador de México en misión especial, habla para ‘El Día,’” El Día (Quito), May 4,
1940.
803
Ibid.
804
“Urge unificar los anhelos de progreso,” La Estrella de Panamá, May 13, 1940.
297
APPENDIX A. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BY LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRY, 1934-1940*
Country
Name
Rank
Date of
Appointment
ARGENTINA
Puig
Casauranc,
José Manuel
Reyes,
Alfonso
Martínez
Mercado,
Salvador
Palavicini,
Félix
Fulgencio
Rosenzweig
Díaz, José
Maxilimiliano
Alfonso de
Cravioto
Mejorada,
Alfonso
Reyes,
Alfonso
Puig
Casauranc,
José Manuel
Romero
González,
José Rubén
Veloz
González,
Vicente
Cienfuegos y
Camus,
Alfonso
De Negri,
Ramón P.
Pérez Treviño,
Manuel
Reyes
Spíndola,
Octavio
Guillén,
Palma
Ambassador
April 1, 1935
Ambassador
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
Presentation
of
Credentials
May 21,
1935
End of
Mission
May 21, 1936
July 22, 1936
Ambassador
January 1,
1938
NA
January 1,
1938
March 15,
1939
Ambassador
February 1,
1939
March 31,
1939
November
30, 1940
Minister
January 1,
1935
April 17,
1935
March 4,
1939
Ambassador
January 1,
1939
April 5, 1939
May 1, 1944
Ambassador
May 6, 1930
Ambassador
February 16,
1930
May 21 1936
August 4,
1936
May 21,
1936
June 22,
1937
Ambassador
July 1, 1937
September
21, 1937
February 28,
1938
Ambassador
February 1,
1939
May 2, 1939
December
29, 1939
Ambassador
January 17,
1934
May 16,
1934
January 9,
1936
Ambassador
January 8,
1936
January 1,
1937
February 1,
1939
April 23,
1936
March 20,
1937
July 8, 1939
September
14, 1936
May 1, 1938
February 16,
1935
April 26,
1935
Ambassador
Ambassador
Minister
May 21,
1936
February 27,
1942
September
1, 1936
298
Ramírez
Garrido, José
Domingo
Ojeda Rovira,
Carlos Darío
COSTA RICA Padilla Nervo,
Luis
Estrada
Cajigal
Ortega
Castillo de
Lerín, Romeo
CUBA
Cravioto
Mejorada,
Alfonso
Romero
González,
José Rubén
DOMINICAN
Pérez Gil y
REPUBLIC
Ortiz, José
Álvarez del
Castillo, Juan
Manuel
Romero
González,
José Rubén
ECUADOR
Enríquez
Cruz,
Raymundo
EL
De Negri,
SALVADOR
Manuel Y.
Estrada
Cajigal,
Vicente
GUATEMALA González Roa,
Fernando
Cienfuegos y
Camus,
Adolfo
Martínez de
Alva,
Salvador
HAITI
Pérez Gil y
Ortiz, José
Vázquez
Schiaffino
Romero
Minister
January 16,
1937
March 17,
1937
February 1,
1939
Minister
February 1,
1939
January 1,
1934
January 1,
1937
February 1,
1939
May 17,
1939
August 13,
1934
March 2,
1937
April 21,
1939
September
15, 1941
Feburary 16,
1937
January 1,
1939
August 1,
1943
Ambassador
December 8,
1933
February 8,
1934
January 1,
1938
Ambassador
January 1,
1939
June 39 1939
November
1, 1944
Minister
January 1,
1934
February 29,
1936
February 14,
1934
April 13,
1936
March 1,
1936
May 31,
1937
Minister
March 11,
1940
June 5, 1940
March 5,
1941
Minister
February 1,
1935
March 7,
1935
January 1,
1938
Minister
January 1,
1935
January 1,
1940
May 4, 1935
1 January
1940
January 1,
1941
February 1,
1935
January 9,
1936
March 13,
1935
October 6,
1936
January 1,
1936
July 1, 1938
Ambassador
January 1,
1938
August 26,
1938
September
6, 1941
Minister
Septebmer
28, 1934
March 1,
1936
March 11,
November
16, 1934
April 30,
1936
June 11,
March 1,
1936
January 1,
1937
November
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Ambassador
Ambassador
Minister
Minister
February 22,
1940
299
HONDUAS
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
González,
José Rubén
Vázquez
Schiaffino,
José
De Negri,
Manuel Y.
Estrada
Cajigal,
Vicente
De Negri,
Manuel Y.
Ortega
Castillo de
Lerín, Romeo
Padilla Nervo,
Luis
Estrada
Cajigal,
Vicente
Rosenzweig
Díaz, José
Maximiliano
Alfonso de
Rosenzweig
Díaz, José
Maximiliano
Alfonso de
Padilla Nervo,
Luis
Álvarez del
Castillo, Juan
Manuel
Sáenz Garza,
Moisés
Sáenz Garza,
Moisés
Vadillo,
Basilio
Villa Michel,
Primo
Padilla Nervo,
Luis
De Negri,
Manuel Y.
Alonzo
Romero,
1940
1940
29, 1945
Minister
January 1,
1934
February 13,
1934
March 1,
1936
Minister
Feburary 3,
1937
September
20, 1940
May 12,
1937
October 11,
1940
September
24, 1940
January 1,
1941
September 1,
1935
February 1,
1939
April 18,
1937
July 24, 1939
December 6,
1937
January 1,
1941
Minister
April 1, 1935
Minister
September 1,
1936
April 26,
1935
October 14,
1936
June 15,
1936
January 1,
1939
Minister
December 23,
1938
May 6, 1939
January 1,
1941
Minister
January 1,
1935
April 17,
1935
November
10, 1936
Minister
October 3,
1936
June 16, 1933
January 12,
1937
July 24, 1933
December 2,
1937
December 3,
1935
January 1,
1936
October 1,
1938
January 1,
1932
September 1,
1935
September 1,
1936
March 31,
1939
February 6,
1935
May 14,
1936
November 7,
1938
February 26,
1932
November
12, 1935
January 11,
1937
June 1, 1939
March 22,
1937
October 24,
1941
July 26,
1935
December
15, 1936
January 8,
1938
September
17, 1940
April 8,
1937
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Ambassador
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
April 23,
1935
300
Miguel
Guzmán
Esparza,
Salvador
Minister
February 1,
1939
April 27,
1939
March 15,
1941
* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25-7-9, 4225-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13-290, 26-25-6, 4-2912, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35-6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 362-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10
301
APPENDIX B. DIPLOMATS POSTED TO LATIN AMERICA, 1934-1940*
Name
Country
Rank
Alonzo
Romero,
Miguel
Álvarez del
Castillo, Juan
Manuel
Venezuela
Minister
Peru
Cienfuegos y
Camus,
Alfonso
Cravioto
Mejorada,
Alfonso
De Negri,
Manuel Y.
De Negri,
Ramón P.
Enríquez
Cruz,
Raymundo
Efraín
Estrada
Cajigal,
Vicente
González
Roa,
Fernando
Guillén,
Date of
Appointment
February 6,
1935
Presentation
of Credentials
April 23,
1935
End of
Mission
April 8, 1937
Minister
June 16, 1933
July 24, 1933
December 3,
1935
Dominican
Republic
Chile
Minister
February 29,
1936
January 17,
1934
April 13,
1936
May 16, 1934
May 31,
1937
January 9,
1936
Guatemala
Ambassador
Ambassador
October 6,
1936
February 8,
1934
July 1, 1938
Cuba
January 9,
1936
December 8,
1933
Bolivia
Ambassador
April 5, 1939
May 1, 1944
El Salvador
Minister
May 4, 1935
Nicaragua
Minister
Honduras
Minister
Uruguay
Minister
Chile
Ambassador
Ecuador
Minister
January 1,
1939
January 1,
1935
September 1,
1935
Feburary 3,
1937
March 31,
1939
January 8,
1936
February 1,
1935
April 23,
1936
March 7,
1935
January 1,
1940
December 6,
1937
September
24, 1940
September
17, 1940
September
14, 1936
January 1,
1938
Panama
Minister
September 1,
1936
October 14,
1936
January 1,
1939
Honduras
Minister
El Salvador
Minister
Guatemala
Ambassador
September 20,
1940
January 1,
1940
February 1,
1935
October 11,
1940
February 22,
1940
March 13,
1935
January 1,
1941
January 1,
1941
January 1,
1936
Colombia
Minister
February 16,
April 26,
September 1,
Ambassador
April 18,
1937
May 12, 1937
June 1, 1939
January 1,
1938
302
Palma
Guzmán
Esparza,
Salvador R.
Martínez de
Alva,
Salvador
Martínez
Mercado,
Salvador
Ojeda, Carlos
Darío
Ortega
Castillo de
Lerín, Romeo
Padilla Nervo,
Luis
Palavicini,
Félix
Fulgencio
Pérez Gil y
Ortiz, José
Pérez
Treviño,
Manuel
Puig
Casauranc,
José Manuel
Ramírez
Garrido, José
Domingo
Reyes,
Alfonso
1935
February 1,
1939
1935
April 27,
1939
1936
March 15,
1941
Ambassador
January 1,
1938
August 26,
1938
September 6,
1941
Argentina
Ambassador
January 1,
1938
NA
March 15,
1939
Colombia
Minister
May 17, 1939
Nicaragua
Minister
February 1,
1939
February 1,
1939
September
15, 1941
January 1,
1941
Costa Rica
Minister
Costa Rica
Minister
El Salvador
Minister
Minister
Paraguay
Minister
Uruguay
Minister
Argentina
Ambassador
October 3,
1936
September 1,
1936
February 1,
1939
April 21,
1939
August 13,
1934
April 30,
1934
April 26,
1935
January 12,
1937
January 11,
1937
March 31,
1939
August 1,
1943
Feburary 16,
1937
April 1, 1935
Panama
February 1,
1939
January 1,
1934
January 1,
1934
April 1, 1935
Dominican
Republic
Haiti
Minister
Chile
Ambassador
January 1,
1934
Septebmer 28,
1934
January 1,
1937
February 14,
1934
November 16,
1934
March 20,
1937
March 1,
1936
March 1,
1936
May 1, 1938
Argentina
Ambassador
April 1, 1935
May 21, 1935
May 21,
1936
Brazil
Ambassador
May 21 1936
Colombia
Minister
January 16,
1937
August 4,
1936
March 17,
1937
June 22,
1937
February 1,
1939
Brazil
Ambassador
February 16,
1930
May 6, 1930
May 21,
1936
Venezuela
Minister
Guatemala
Minister
July 24, 1939
June 15,
1936
December 2,
1937
January 8,
1938
November
30, 1940
303
Reyes
Spíndola,
Octavio
Romero
González,
José Rubén
Rosenzweig
Díaz, José
Maximiliano
Alfonso de
Sáenz, Moisés
Argentina
Ambassador
May 21, 1936
July 22, 1936
Chile
Ambassador
February 1,
1939
July 8, 1939
Brazil
Ambassador
July 1, 1937
September
21, 1937
February 28,
1938
Cuba
Ambassador
June 39 1939
Dominican
Republic
Haiti
Minister
Bolivia
Minister
January 1,
1939
March 11,
1940
March 11,
1940
January 1,
1935
November 1,
1944
March 5,
1941
November
29, 1945
March 4,
1939
Paraguay
Minister
Panama
Minister
April 17,
1935
May 6, 1939
Peru
Minister
January 1,
1935
December 23,
1938
January 1,
1936
October 1,
1938
January 1,
1932
January 1,
1934
Minister
Ambassador
Vadillo,
Basilio
Vázquez
Schiaffino,
José
Veloz
González,
Vicente
Villa Michel,
Primo
June 5, 1940
June 11, 1940
April 17,
1935
May 14, 1936
November 7,
1938
February 26,
1932
February 13,
1934
January 1,
1938
February 27,
1942
November
10, 1936
January 1,
1941
March 22,
1937
October 24,
1941
July 26, 1935
Uruguay
Minister
Honduras
Minister
Brazil
Ambassador
February 1,
1939
May 2, 1939
December
29, 1939
Uruguay
Minister
September 1,
1935
November 12,
1935
December
15, 1936
March 1,
1936
* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25-7-9, 4225-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13-290, 26-25-6, 4-2912, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35-6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 362-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10
304
REFERENCES
ARCHIVES CONSULTED
Argentina
Archivo General de la Nación
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, Archivo
Histórico de Cancillería
Brazil
Arquivo Nacional
Biblioteca Nacional
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História
Contemporânea do Brasil
Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro
Chile
Archivo Nacional de la Administración
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo General Histórico
Cuba
Archivo Nacional de Cuba
Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana
Guatemala
Archivo General de Centro América
Biblioteca Nacional
Mexico
Archivo General de la Nación
Archivo Histórico del Agua
Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos
Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada
Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia
Centro Cultural Isidro Fabela
Centro de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana “Lázaro Cárdenas”
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada
United Kingdom
National Archives
United States
Library of Congress
National Archives and Records Administration
Organization of American States
NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, AND BULLETINS
Acción (Guatemala City)
Ahora (Buenos Aires)
Ahora (Caracas)
305
América Indígena (Mexico City)
A Noite (Rio de Janeiro)
Boletín del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (Pátzcuaro, Mexico)
Boletín de la III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación (Mexico City)
Boletín Indigenista (Mexico City)
Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City)
Chicago Daily Tribune
Claridad (Santiago, Chile)
Correspondencia Indoamericana (Buenos Aires)
Crisol (Buenos Aires)
Crisol (Guatemala City)
Crítica (Buenos Aires)
Diario de Costa Rica (San José)
Diario Latino (San Salvador)
Diario de la Marina (Havana)
Diario Nuevo (San Salvador)
Educación Física (Mexico City)
El Comercio (Lima)
El Comercio (Quito)
El Día (Asunción)
El Día (Quito)
El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador)
El Diario Nacional (Bogotá)
El Espectador (Bogotá)
El Frente Popular (Santiago, Chile)
El Hombre Libre (Mexico City)
El Imparcial (Guatemala City)
El Liberal Progresista (Guatemala City)
El Maestro Rural (Mexico City)
El Mundo (Havana)
El Mundo (San José)
El Nacional (Mexico City)
El País (Bogotá)
El Siglo (Bogotá)
El Telégrafo (Guayaquil, Ecuador)
El Tiempo (Bogotá)
El Universal (Mexico City)
El Universo (Guayaquil, Ecuador)
Excélsior (Mexico City)
Fastrás (Buenos Aires)
Federación (Santa Clara, Cuba)
Hoy (Havana)
Hoy (Mexico City)
La Crítica (Santiago, Chile)
306
La Crónica (Lima)
La Esfera (Caracas)
La Estrella de Panamá (Panama City)
La Hora (Asunción)
La Noche (La Paz)
La Noticia (Managua)
Las Noticias (Guadalajara)
La Nueva España (Buenos Aires)
La Opinión (Santiago, Chile)
La Prensa (Mexico City)
La Prensa (Buenos Aires)
La Prensa (Lima)
La Prensa (Managua)
La Prensa (San Salvador)
La Razón (Buenos Aires)
La Tarde (Montevideo)
La Tribuna (San José)
Memoria del Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (Mexico City)
Memoria del Departamento de Educación Física (Mexico City)
Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City)
New York Times
Noticiero Semanal (Mexico City)
Noticias Gráficas (Buenos Aires)
Novedades (Managua)
Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City)
Nueva Prensa (San José)
O Imparcial (Rio de Janeiro)
O Jornal (Rio de Janeiro)
Patria (San Salvador)
Qué Hubo (Santiago, Chile)
Relator (Cali, Colombia)
Últimas Noticias (Mexico City)
Universal (Lima)
Uruguay (Montevideo)
Verdades (Lima)
DISSERTATIONS AND UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS
Albarrán, Elena Jackson. “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen,
1920-1940.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2008.
Hollingsworth Leverty, Lynn. “The Spanish Question in Mexico: Lázaro Cárdenas and
the Spanish Republicans.” Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1983.
307
Kiddle, Amelia M. “Mexican Participation in the League of Nations during the
Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940.” Master’s thesis, University of
Chicago, 2003.
Legorreta Martínez, Omar. “Actuación de Mexico en la Liga de las Naciones: El caso de
España.” Tesis de licenciatura, Sciencias Diplomáticas, UNAM, 1962.
López González, Rafael. “Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP). La
experiencia del Estado cardenista en políticas estatales de comunicación, 19371939.” Tesis de licenciatura, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM,
2002.
Mulligan, Donald Willard. “Background of Contemporary Mexican Relations with
Spain.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1950.
Neufeld, Stephen. “Servants of the Nation: The Military in the Making of Modern
Mexico, 1876-1911.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2009.
Sanders, Nichole. “Gender, Welfare, and the ‘Mexican Miracle’: The Politics of
Modernization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1937-1958.” PhD diss., University
of California, Irvine, 2003.
Schuler, Friedrich E. “Cardenismo Revisited: The International Dimensions of the PostReform Cárdenas Era, 1937-1940.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago,
1990.
Serna, Ana María. “Oil, revolution, and agrarian society in northern Veracruz: Manuel
Peláez and rural life in the “Golden Lane”, 1910-1928.” Ph.D. diss., University
of Chicago, 2004.
Wakild, Emily. “Resources, Communities, and Conservation: The Creation of National
Parks in Revolutionary Mexico under President Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940.”
PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2007.
Waters, Wendy. “Re-mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 1999.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Academy of Sciences of the USSR. International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic,
1936-1939. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.
Alemán Valez, Miguel. La Verdad del Petróleo en México. 2nd ed. Mexico City:
Biografías Gandesa, 1977.
308
Alfonseca, Juan. “Escuela y sociedad en los distritos de Texcoco y Chalco, 1923-40.” In
Miradas en torno a la educación de ayer, edited by Luz E. Galván. Mexico City:
Consejo Mexicano de Investigación Educativa, 1997.
Alonso González, Francisco. Historia y petróleo: México en su lucha por la
independencia económico. El problema del petróleo. Mexico City: Ediciones “El
Caballito,” 1972.
Alpert, Michael. A New International History of the Spanish Civil War. 2nd ed.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Álvarez de la Borda, Joel. Los orígenes de la industria petrolera en México, 1900-1925.
Mexico City: PEMEX, 2005.
Álvarez del Castillo, Juan Manuel. Memorias. Guadalajara, 1960.
———. México y el Perú. Lima: Sanmartí, 1934.
———. México y el Perú, segundo año. Lima: Sanmartí, 1935.
Alves, Branca Moreira. Ideologia e feminismo: A luta da mulher pelo voto no Brasil.
Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980.
Arce, Magda and Gastón Von dem Bussche. Proyecto Preservación y Difusión del
Legado literario de Gabriela Mistral. Santiago, Chile: Organization of American
States, 1993.
Arrarás, Joaquín. Historia de la cruzada española. 8 vols. Madrid: Ediciones españolas,
1939-1943.
Bantjes, Adrian. As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican
Revolution. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1998.
Barbour, Philip L. “Commercial and Cultural Broadcasting in Mexico.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political Social Science 208 (March, 1940): 94-102.
Bauman, Gerold Gino. Extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española: Los peruanos. Lima:
Industrial Gráfica, 1979.
Becker, Marjorie. Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán Peasants,
and the Redemption of the Mexican Revolution. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995.
309
Beezley, William H. Mexican National Identity: Memory, Innuendo, and Popular
Culture. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2008.
Benjamin, Thomas. La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and
History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.
Benjamin, Thomas and Mark Wasserman, eds. Provinces of the Revolution: Essays on
Regional Mexican History, 1910-1929. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1990.
Benson, Frederick R. Writers in Arms: The Literary Impact of the Spanish Civil War.
New York: New York University Press, 1967.
Berger, Dina. The Development of Mexico’s Tourism Industry: Pyramids by Day,
Martinis by Night. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Besse, Susan K. Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in
Brazil, 1914-1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Beteta, Ignacio M. El ejército revolucionario: visión histórica y social. Mexico City:
PNR, 1936.
———. Mensaje al ejercito nacional. Mexico City: DAPP, 1937.
Billaçois, François. The Duel: Its Rise and Fall in Early Modern France. Translated by
Trista Selous. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
Bolloten, Burnett. The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Couterrevolution. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
Boyer, Christopher. Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in
Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003.
Brading, David A. “Manuel Gamio and Official Indigenismo in Mexico.” Bulletin of
Latin American Research 7:1 (1988): 75-89.
Britton, John A. Educación y radicalismo en México. Vol. 2. Los años de Cárdenas.
Mexico City: SEP, 1976.
Broué, Pierre and Emile Témime. The Revolution and Civil War in Spain. Translated by
Tony White. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972.
310
Brown, Jonathan C. “Los archivos del petróleo y la revolución mexicana,” Boletín del
Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos 5 (Dec., 2004).
———. Oil and Revolution in Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Brown, Laurence. “‘Pour Aider Nos Frères d’Espagne’: Humanitarian Aid, French
Women, and Popular Mobilization during the Front Populaire,” French Politics,
Culture & Society 25:1 (Spring, 2007): 30-48.
Buchanan, Tom. The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Buchanan, Tom. Britain and the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997.
Buchenau, Jürgen. In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America
Policy, 1876-1930. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996.
Calle Escajadillo, Manuel T. Ponencia presentada al Primer Congreso Indigenista de
México. Lima: Imprenta Moderna, 1940.
Camacho Sandoval, Salvador. Controversia educativa entre la ideología y la fe: La
educación socialista en la historia de Aguascalientes. Mexico City:
CONACULTA, 1991.
Camp, Roderic Ai. Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First
Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
———. Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1981. Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 1982.
———. Mexico’s Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment. Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1980.
Cano, Gabriela. “Una ciudadanía igualitaria: El presidente Lázaro Cárdenas y el sufragio
femenino.” Desdeldiez (1995): 69-116.
———. “Revolución, femenismo y ciudadanía en México (1915-1940).” In Historia de
las mujeres en Occidente, edited by Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot, 685-695.
Madrid: Taurus, 1993.
Cárdenas, Lázaro. Palabras y documentos públicos de Lázaro Cárdenas, 1928-1970.
Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1978.
311
———. Apuntes. Mexico City: UNAM, 1972.
———. Epistolario de Lázaro Cárdenas. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1975.
Carr, Raymond. The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.
Castillo, Isidro. México y su revolucón educativa. 2 vols. Mexico City: Academia
Mexicana de la Educación, 1966.
Clarke, John D. Gallantry Medals and Decorations of the World. Barnsley: Leo Cooper,
2001.
Comas, Juan. La antropología social aplicada en México, trayectoría y antología.
Mexico City: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1964.
Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina. Primer Congreso Indigenista
Interamericano. Mexico City: Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, 1940.
Conferencias Internacionales Americanas: Primer Suplemento, 1938-1942. Mexico
City: SRE, 1990.
Conniff, Michael L., ed. Populism in Latin America. Tuscaloosa: The University of
Alabama Press, 1999.
Córdova, Arnaldo. La pólitica de masas del cardenismo. Mexico City: Ediciones Era,
1974.
Corzo, Angel M. Ideario del maestro indoamericano. Mexico City: DAPP, 1938.
Cosío Villegas, Daniel. Memorias. Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz, 1976.
Cravioto, Alfonso. Poesias completas, 1904-1944. Pachuca: Gobierno del Estado de
Hidalgo, 1984.
———. Anáhuac y otros poemas. Mexico City: Nueva Voz, 1969.
———. Aventuras Intelectuales a través de los números. Plática sustentada en la
Instutución Hispanocubana de Cultura de La Habana, el día 12 de septiembre de
1937. Havana: Institución Hispanocubana de Cultura, 1937.
———. Día de la Américas. Discursos pronnciados en la Recepción Oficial de la
Secretaría de Estado de la República de Cuba, por los Excelentísmos Señores,
Doctor Juan J. Remos, Secretario de Estado y Licenciado Alfonso Cravioto,
312
Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático Americano acreditado en Cuba. Havana:
Sociedad Colombista Panamericana, 1937.
———. El alma nueva de las cosas viejas, poesías. Mexico City: Ediciones México
Moderno, 1921.
Cuadernos Populares. México y la Guerra de España. Mexico City: Verdad de España,
n.d. [1938?].
Da Cunha, José Gay. Um brasileiro na guerra espanhola. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria do
Globo, 1946.
Daniels, Josephus. Shirt Sleeve Diplomat. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1947.
Dawson, Alexander S. Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico. Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 2004.
———. “‘Wild Indians,’ ‘Mexican Gentlemen,’ and the Lessons Learned in the Casa
del Estudiante Indígena, 1926-1932.” The Americas 57: 3 (January 2001): 329361.
———. “From Models for the Nation to Model Citizens: Indigenismo and the
‘Revindication’ of the Mexican Indian, 1920-1940.” Journal of Latin American
Studies 30 (1998): 279-308.
De Backal, Alicia G. La expropiación petrolera vista por la prensa mexicana,
norteamericana e inglesa (1936-1940). Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988.
De Dios, Jesús Ezequiel. José Domingo, el idealista. Villahermosa: Instituto de Cultura
de Tabasco, 1989.
De la Peña, Guillermo. “Social and Cultural Policies Toward Indigenous Peoples:
Perspectives from Latin America.” Annual Review of Anthropology 34 (2005):
717-739.
De Negri, Ramón P. Consideraciones sobre el Código del trabajo: como producto de la
Revolución Mexicana. Mexico City: n.p., 1929.
———. Panorama social, político y militar de España desde la rebellión de julio hasta
la fecha. México: Editorial México Nuevo, 1937.
313
De Neuvillate y Ortiz, Alfonso and Raúl Salinas de Gortari. Gral Ignacio M. Beteta:
XXV aniversario de acuarelista, Museo de San Carlos, Instituto Nacional de
Bellas Artes octubre 25-noviembre 27 1977, México, D.F. Mexico City: Museo
de San Carlos/INBA, 1977.
De Quiroga, Vasco. Reglas y ordenanzas para el gobierno de los hospitals de Santa Fe
de México, y Michoacán. Mexico City: Secretaría de Economía
Nacional/Talleres Gráficos de la Nacion, 1940.
De Souza, Ismara Izepe. Inventário DEOPS, Módulo IV, espanhóis. República
Espanhola: uma modelo a ser evitado. São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial São Paulo,
2001.
Delpar, Helen. The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the
United States and Mexico, 1920-1935. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1992.
Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad, La verdad sobre la expropiación de los
bienes delas empresas petroleras. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación,
1940.
Departamento de Educación Física. Programa de trabajos que desarrollará el propio
departamento durante el año 1937 tanto en su acción directa como en la que
efectuará ligada con las demás secretarías y departamentos de estado. Mexico
City: DAPP, 1937.
———. Compendio de ejercicios de orden cerrado tomados del reglamentario del arma
de infantería. Mexico City: DAPP, 1939.
Díaz Arciniega, Victor, ed. Misión diplomática. 2 vols. Mexico City: SRE, 2001.
Díaz, Luis Miguel and Jaime G. Martini, eds. Relaciones diplomáticas México-España
(1821-1977). Mexico, 1977.
Diccionario Porrúa. 6th ed. Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1995.
Dwyer, John J. The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural
Land in Postrevolutionary Mexico. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
Ellison, Fred P., ed. Alfonso Reyes en Brasil. Mexico City: CONACULTA, 2000.
Enríquez Perea, Alberto, ed. Alfonso Reyes en la Casa de España en México (1939 y
1940). Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2005.
314
———. Ayuda a los republicanos españoles: correspondencia entre Alfonso Reyes y
José Puche, 1939-1940. Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2004.
———. Daniel Cosío Villegas y su misión en Portugal, 1936-1937. Mexico City: SRE,
1998.
———. Alfonso Reyes y el llanto de España en Buenos Aires. Mexico City: SRE, 1998.
———. México y España: solidaridad y asilo político, 1936-1942. Mexico: SRE, 1990.
Escudero, Ángel. El duelo en México. Recopilación de los desafíos habidos en nuestra
república, precedidos de la historia de la esgrima en México y de los duelos más
famosos verificados en el mundo desde los juicios de dios hasta nuestros días.
Prologue by Artemio de Valle-Arizpe. Mexico City: Imprenta Mundial, 1936.
Esenwein, George and Adrian Shubert, eds. Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in
Context, 1931-1939. London: Longman, 1995.
Estrada, Genaro. La doctrina Estrada. Mexico City: Publicaciones del Instituto
Americano de Derecho y Legislación Comparada, 1930
Fabela, Isidro. La Política Internacional del Presidente Cárdenas. 2nd ed. Mexico City:
Editorial Jus, 1975.
———. Cartas al Presidente Cárdenas. Mexico City: Altamira, 1947.
Faber, Sebastiaan. Exile and Cultural Hegemony: Spanish Intellectuals in Mexico, 19391975. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002.
Fagen, Patricia. Exiles and Citizens: Spanish Republicans in Mexico. Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1973.
Falcoff, Mark and Fredrick B. Pike, eds. The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American
Hemispheric Perspectives. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
Fallaw, Ben W. Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary
Yucatán. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
———. “Cárdenas and the Caste War That Wasn’t: State Power and Indigenismo in
Post-Revolutionary Yucatán.” The Americas 53:4 (1997): 551-577.
Fernández, Justino. Pátzcuaro. México: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1936.
315
Figallo, Beatriz J. Diplomáticos y marinos argentinos durante la crisis española: los
asilos de la Guerra Civil. Buenos Aires: Histórica, 2007.
———. La Argentina ante la Guerra Civil Española: el asilo diplomático y el asilo
naval. Rosario: Pontifica Universidad Católica Argentina, 1996.
Fiol-Matta, Licia. A Queer Mother for the Nation: The State and Gabriela Mistral.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Frevert, Ute. Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel. Translated by
Anthony Williams. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
Fundación Pablo Neruda, Cuadernos. “México en el Corazón.” No. 39 (1999).
Garciadiego, Javier. “Alfonso Reyes: cosmopolitismo diplomático y universalismo
literario.” In Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana, 191-223. Mexico City: SRE,
1998.
Gayol, Sandra. “Honor Moderno”: The Significance of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle
Argentina,” Hispanic American Historical Review 84:3 (2004): 475-498.
Gazarian-Gautier, Marie-Lise. Gabriela Mistral: La maestra de Elqui. Buenos Aires:
Crespillo, 1973.
Gilly, Adolfo. El cardenismo, una utopía Mexicana. Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1994.
Goldar, Ernesto. Los argentinos y la guerra civil española. Buenos Aires: Editorial
Contrapunto, 1986.
González y González, Luis. Los artífices del cardenismo. Historia de la Revolución
Mexicana. Vol. 14. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979.
González Roa, Fernando. El carácter de la legislación colonial española en América.
Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1933.
———. Las cuestiones fundamentales de actualidad en México. Mexico City: Secretaría
de Relaciones Exteriores, 1927.
———. El aspecto agrario de la Revolución Mexicana. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos,
1919.
González Roa, Fernando and José Covarrubias. El problema rural de México. Mexico
City: Secretaría de la Hacienda, 1917.
316
Gordón Ordás, F. Mi política fuera de España. Mexico City: n.p., 1965.
Graham, Helen. The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Guadalupe García, Clara. El Imparcial: primer periódico moderno de México. Mexico
City: Centro de Estdios Históricos del Porfiriato, 2003.
Guillén, Fedro. Fabela y su tiempo. Mexico City: UNAM, 1989.
Guy, Donna J. “The Politics of Pan-American Cooperation: Maternalist Feminism and
the Child Rights Movement, 1913-1960,” Gender & History 10:3 (November
1998): 449-469.
———. “The Pan American Child Congresses, 1916-1942: Pan Americanism, Child
Reform, and the Welfare State in Latin America,” Journal of Family History 23:3
(July 1998): 272-291.
Guzmán, Salvador R. El enemigo: comedia de costumbres populares. Mexico City: n.p.,
1931.
Hahner, June Edith. Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women’s Rights in
Brazil, 1850-1940. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.
Hamilton, Nora. The Limits of State Autonomy: Post Revolutionary Mexico. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982.
Hay, Eduardo. Discursos pronunciados en su carácter de secretario de relaciones
exteriores (1936-1940). Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940.
Hayes, Joy Elizabeth. Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture and Nationalism
in Mexico, 1920-1950. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000.
Helg, Aline. Civiliser le peuple et former les élites. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984.
Herrera León, Fabián. La política mexicana en la Sociedad de Naciones ante la Guerra
del Chaco y el Conflicto de Leticia, 1932-1935. Mexico City: SRE, 2009.
Holland, Barbara. Gentlemen’s Blood: A History of Dueling From Swords at Dawn to
Pistols at Dusk. New York: Bloomsbury, 2003.
Horan, Elizabeth and Doris Meyer, eds. and trans. This America of Ours: The Letters of
Gabriela Mistral and Victoria Ocampo. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003.
317
Howson, Gerald. Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War. London:
John Murray, 1998.
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación. Memoria de la III Conferencia
Interamericana de Educación. Mexico City: DAPP, 1938.
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación. Resoluciones Aprobadas. Mexico City:
DAPP, 1937.
III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación. Delegación oficial del Gobierno mexicano.
Mexico City: DAPP, 1937.
Jackson, Angela. British Women and the Spanish Civil War. London: Routledge, 2002.
Jackson, Gabriel. The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Jayne, Catherine E. Oil, War, and Anglo-American Relations: American and British
Reactions to Mexico’s Expropriation of Foreign Oil Properties, 1937-1941.
Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
Joseph, Gilbert M. Revolution from Without: Yucatan, Mexico, and the United States,
1880-1924. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Joseph, Gilbert M., Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds. Close Encounters
of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Koppes, Clayton R. “The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil:
A Reinterpretation.” The Journal of American History 69:1 (Jun., 1982): 62-81.
Kaplan, Marcos. México frente al anschluss. Mexico City: SRE, 1988.
Katz, Friedrich. Ensayos mexicanos. Mexico City: Alianza Editorial, 1994.
———. The Secret War in Mexico. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Kelly, James. That Damn’d Thing Called Honour: Duelling in Ireland, 1570-1860.
Cork: Cork University Press, 1995.
Kiddle, Amelia M. “Cabaretistas and Indias Bonitas: Gender and Representations of
Mexico in the Americas during the Cárdenas Era.” Journal of Latin American
Studies 42:2 (May, 2010).
318
Kiddle, Amelia M. and María L.O. Muñoz, eds. Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico:
The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría. Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 2010.
Kiernan, Victor Gordon. The Duel in European History: Honor and the Reign of
Aristocracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Kirk, Betty. Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of Europe versus America.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942.
Knight, Alan. “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, especially Mexico,”
Journal of Latin American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 223-248.
———. “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?” Journal of Latin American Studies 26:1
(Feb., 1996): 73-107.
———. “The Politics of the Expropriation.” In The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the
Twentieth Century, edited by Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1992.
———. “Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo: México, 1910-1940.” In The Idea of
Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, edited by Richard Graham. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1990.
Krauze, Enrique. Daniel Cosío Villegas, una biografía intelectual. Mexico City:
Tusquets, 2001.
La Cámara de Diputaos del Peru, Exposición ante la Cámara, del señor Diputado por
Espinar Doctor José Angel Escalante, Presidente de la Delegación Peruana al
Congreso Indigenista. Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1940.
Lagos Carmona, Guillermo, ed. Gabriela Mistral en México. Mexico City: SEP, 1945.
Lavín, José Domingo. Petróleo: Pasado, presente y futuro de una industria mexicana.
Mexico City: FCE, 1976.
Lerín, Manuel. Neruda y México. Mexico City: B. Costa y Amic, 1973.
Lerner, Victoria. La educación socialista. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. Vol. 17.
Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979.
Lewis, Stephen E. “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico, 19201940.” In The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico,
319
1920-1940, edited by Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, 176-195.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
———. “A Window to the Recent Past in Chiapas: Federal Education and Indigenismo
in the Highlands, 1921-1940,” Journal of Latin American Anthropology 6:1
(2001).
.
Lida, Clara E. Mexico y España en el primer franquismo, 1939-1950: Rupturas
formales, relaciones oficiosas. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2001.
———. Inmigración y exilio: Reflexiones sobre el caso español. Mexico City: Siglo
Veintiuno Editores/El Colegio de México, 1997.
———. La Casa de España en México. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988.
Lida, Clara E. and José Antonio Matsanz, El Colegio de México: una hazaña cultural,
1940-1962. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1990.
Lida, Clara E., José Antonio Matesanz, and Josefina Zoraida Vázquez. La Casa de
España y el Colegio de México: Memoria, 1938-2000. Mexico City: El Colegio
de México, 2000.
Lombardo Toledano, Vicente. Obra educativa. 3 vols. Mexico City: Instituto
Politécnico Nacional/Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Políticos y Sociales Vicente
Lombardo Toledano, 2002.
López, Rick A. “La India Bonita Contest of 1921 and the Ethnicization of Mexican
National Culture.” Hispanic American Historical Review 82:2 (May 2002): 297299.
Lorey, David E. “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day: The ‘Problem’ of
Order and the Invention of Revolution Day, 1920s-1940s.” In ¡Viva México!
¡Viva la Independencia!: Celebrations of September 16, edited by William H.
Beezley and David E. Lorey, 233-248. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001.
Loyo, Engracia. “Los centros de educación indígena y su papel en el medio rural (19301940).” In Educación rural e indígena en Iberoamérica, edited by Pilar Gonzalbo
Aizpuru. Mexico City: El Colegio de México: 1996.
———. “La empresa redentora. La Casa del Estudiante Indígena.” Historia Mexicana
46:1 (1996): 99-131.
320
Macías, Anna. Against All Odds: The Feminist Movement in Mexico to 1940. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1982.
Marichal, Carlos, ed. México y las conferencias panamericanas, 1889-1938. México:
SRE, 2002.
Martínez Assad, Carlos R. El laboratorio de la Revolución: el Tabasco garridista.
Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979.
Martínez, Víctor M. and Tomás Vera. Milicianos paraguayos en la España republicana
y en la lucha contra la ocupación nazi de Francia. Asunción: QR Producciónes
Gráficas, 2002.
Mates, Lewis A. The Spanish Civil War and the British Left. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007.
Matesanz, José Antonio. Las raíces del exilio: México antes la Guerra Civil Española,
1936-1939. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1999.
McAleer, Kevin. Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994.
McGee Deutsch, Sandra. Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, 1890-1939. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
McMahon, William E. Two Strikes and Out. Garden City: Country Life Press
Corporation, 1939.
Méndez-Ramírez, Hugo. Nueruda’s Ekphrastic Experience: Mural Art and Canto
general. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1999.
Méndez Reyes, Salvador, et al. Bajo el manto del libertador: Relaciones de México con
Colombia, Panamá y Venezuela, 1921-2000. Mexico City: SRE, 2004.
Meyer, Lorenzo. El cactus y el olivo: relaciones hispano mexicanas en el siglo XX.
Mexico City: Oceano, 2001.
———. Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950: El fin de un
imperio informal. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1991.
———. Los grupos de presión extranjeros en el México Revolucionario, 1910-1940.
Mexico City: SRE, 1973.
321
———. México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-1942. Mexico
City: El Colegio de México, 1968.
Meyer, Lorenzo and Isidro Morales, Petróleo y nación (1900-1987). La política petrolera
en México. Mexico City: FCE, 1990.
Miller, Francesca. “Latin American Feminism and the Transnational Arena.” In Women,
Culture, and Politics in Latin America, edited by Emilie L. Bergmann et al, 1026. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
Mistral, Gabriela. Puebla y otras acuarelas Mexicanas. Puebla: Secretaría de Cultura:
Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 2002.
———. Lecturas para mujeres: Gabriela Mistral, 1922-1924. Edited by Palma Guillén
de Nicolau. 3rd ed. Mexico City: Porrúa, 1971.
———. Tala. Buenos Aires: SUR, 1938.
———. Ternura. Madrid: Saturnino Calleja, 1924.
Mitchell, Stephanie and Patience A. Schell, eds. The Women’s Revolution in Mexico,
1910-1953. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
Monroy Huitron, Guadalupe. Política educativa de la Revolución. Mexico City: SEP,
1975.
Mora Forero, Jorge Rafael . Historia de una Reforma Educativa Socialista. Tunja:
Ediciones CUPENAL, 1982.
Moradiellos, Enrique. “The Allies and the Spanish Civil War.” In Spain and the Great
Powers in the Twentieth Century, edited by Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston,
96-126. London: Routledge, 1999.
———. La perfidia del Albión: El gobierno británico y la guerra civil española.
Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1996. .
Morales Benítez, Otto, ed. Gabriela Mistral: su prosa y poesía en Colombia. 3 vols.
Bogotá: Convenio Andrés Bello, 2000.
Morales, Salvador. Relaciones interferidas: México y el Caríbe, 1813-1982. Mexico
City: SRE, 2002.
322
Moreno, Julio. Yankee Don’t Go Home!: Mexican Nationalism, American Business
Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Morton, Ward M. Woman Suffrage in Mexico. Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
1962.
Museo Casa Estudio Diego Rivera y Frida Kahlo. Misiones Culturales: los años
utópicos, 1920-1938. Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999.
Niblo, Stephen R. War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico,
1938-1954. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1995.
Nye, Robert A. Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ojeda, Carlos Darío. Cantos rodados. Veracruz: Instituto Veracruzano de Cultura, 2006.
———. Lealtad a la revolución mexicana. Mexico City: Novaro Editores-Impresores,
1962.
Ojeda Revah, Mario. México y la Guerra Civil Española. Madrid: Turner Publications,
2004.
Olcott, Jocelyn. Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2005.
Olcott, Jocelyn, Mary Kay Vaughan, and Gabriela Cano, eds. Sex in Revolution: Gender,
Politics, and Power in Modern Mexico. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Orantes, José Andrés. Informe presentado al gobierno de El Savador por la Delegación
Salvadoreña al Primer Congreso Interamericano de Indigenistas. San Salvador:
n.p., 1940.
Ortega Castillo de Lerín, Romeo. Breves Consideraciones sobre la Población Indígena
en México. Trabajo presentado por el señor Licenciado Romeo Ortega, Ministro
de México, ante la Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa Rica. 2nd ed. San
José: Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa Rica, 1941.
———. Morelos. Mexico City: Imprenta Universal, 1941.
Osegueda, Francisco. “La vida del campesino salvadoreño de otros tiempos y la del
campesino actual,” Revista del Ateneo de El Salvador 20 (1932).
323
Palacios, Guillermo. Intimidades, conflictos y reconciliaciones: México y Brasil 18221993. Mexico City: SRE, 2001.
———. “Postrevolutionary Intellectuals, Rural Readings and the Shaping of the
‘Peasant Problem’ in Mexico: El Maestro Rural, 1932-34.” Journal of Latin
American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 309-339.
Palavicini, Félix. México, historia de su evolución constructiva. Mexico City, 1945.
———. Democracias mestizas. Mexico City: Cardenal, 1941.
———. El arte de amar y ser amado. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1940.
———. Libertad y demagogia. México: Ediciones Botas, 1938.
———. Mi vida Revolucionaria. Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1937.
———. Epistolario del amor. Mexico City: Andrés Botas, 1934.
———. Estética de la tregedia mexicana. Mexico City: Imprenta Modelo, 1933.
Pan American Union. Ignacio M. Beteta. Washington: Pan American Union, 1964.
Parker, David S. “‘Gentlemanly Responsibility’ and ‘Insults of a Woman’: Dueling and
the Unwritten Rules of Public Life in Uruguay, 1860-1920.” In Gender,
Sexuality, and Power in Latin America since Independence, edited by William E.
French and Katherine Elaine Bliss, 109-132. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2007.
———. “Law, Honor, and Impunity in Spanish America: The Debate over Dueling,
1870-1920.” Law and History Review 19:2 (Summer, 2001): 338-40.
Paz Salinas, María Emilia. Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in
World War II. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
———. “La expropiación petrolera y el contexto internacional.” Revista Mexicana de
Sociología 50:3 (Jul.-Sep., 1988): 75-96.
Paz, Octavio. ¡No pasaran! Mexico City: Simbad, 1936.
PEMEX Travel Club. Mexico’s Western Highways, including the cities of Toluca,
Morelia, Pátzcuaro, Uruapan, Guadalajara. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de
la Nación, 1940.
324
PEMEX. Los veinte años de la industria petrolera nacional: Informes del 18 de Marzo,
1938-1958. Mexico City: PEMEX, 1958.
PEMEX. El Petróleo. Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988.
Perea, Hector, ed. España en la obra de Alfonso Reyes. Mexico City: FCE, 1990.
Pérez Montfort, Ricardo. Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano. Mexico City:
CIESAS, 2003.
———. “Indigenismo, Hispanismo, y panamericanismo en la cultura popular mexicana
de 1920 s 1940.” In Cultura e identidad nacional, edited by Roberto Blancarte.
Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994.
———. Hispanismo y Falange: Los sueños imperiales de la derecha española. Mexico
City: FCE, 1992.
———. Breve antología de documentos hispanistas, 1931-1948. Mexico City: CIESAS,
1990.
———. “Notas sobre el falangismo en México (1930-1940).” In Facismo y antifascismo
en América Latina y México, edited by Brígida Von Mentz, Ricardo Pérez
Montfort and Verena Radkau. Mexico City: CIESAS, 1984.
Person, Harlow S. Mexican Oil: Symbol of Recent Trends in International Relations.
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1942.
Piccato, Pablo. “Politics and the Technology of Honor: Dueling in Turn-of-the-Century
Mexico,” Journal of Social History 33:2 (Winter, 1999): 331-354.
Pike, Fredrick B. Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their
Relations with Spanish America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971.
Pinto Gamboa, Willy. Sobre fascismo y literatura: La Guerra Civil española en La
Prensa, El Comercio y La Crónica, 1936-1939. Lima: Editorial Cibeles, 1983.
Pla Brugat, Dolores. Los niños de Morelia: Un estudio sobre los primeros refugiados
españoles en México. 2nd ed. Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999.
Powell, J. Richard. The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 1938-1950. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1956.
325
Powell, T.G. Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1981.
Preston, Paul. A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War. London: Fontana, 1996.
———. “War of Words.” In Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939, edited by Paul
Preston, 1-13. London: Methuen & Co., 1984.
Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatra Iberoamericana.
Convocatoria y Reglamento Interior. Mexico City: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937.
Puig Casauranc, José Manuel. Galatea rebelde a varios pigmaliones: de Obregón a
Cárdenas: antecedentes del fenómeno mexicano actual. México: Impresores
Unidos, 1938.
———. Los errores de satanás: farsa dialogada en tres jornadas y un epílogo. Rio de
Janeiro: Editorial Alba Limitada, 1937.
———. El sentido social del proceso histórico de México (un ensayo de interpretación).
Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1936.
———. Los Juan López Sánchez López y López de Sánchez. Mexico City, 1933.
———. La cuestión religiosa en relación con la educación pública en México. Mexico
City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928.
———. El problema de la educación de la raza indígena: plática del Secretario de
Educación Pública Dr. J.M.Puig Casauranc, ante el segundo Congreso de
Directores Federales de Educación, el 28 de mayo de 1926. Mexico City:
Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1926.
———. Páginas viejas con ideas actuales. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la
Nación, 1925.
———. Poemas de espíritu y de carne. Mexico City: Editorial Cultura, 1925.
Quintanilla, Susana and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds. Escuela y sociedad en el período
cardenista. Mexico City: FCE, 1997.
Quirate, Vicente, ed. Pablo Neruda en el corazón de México. Mexico City: UNAM,
2006.
Ramírez Garrido, José Domingo. Así fue. Mexico City: Imprenta Nigromante, 1943.
326
———. Al correr de la pluma. Mexico City: Editorial Andrés Botas, 1921.
———. Al margen del feminismo. Mérida: Talleres Pluma y Lápiz, 1918.
———. Desde la tribuna roja. Mexico City: Editorial Andrés Botas, 1916.
Reyes, Alfonso. Monterrey. Mexico City: FCE, 1980.
———. Obras completas de Alfonso Reyes. 26 vols. Mexico City: FCE, 1955.
———. Capítulos de literatura española 2a serie. Mexico City: El Colegio de México,
1945.
———. Capítulos de literatura española 1a serie. Mexico City: La Casa de España en
México, 1939.
———. Las vísperas de España. Buenos Aires: Sur, 1937.
———. Visión de Anáhuac. Madrid, 1917.
Reyes, Bernardo. ¡¡Mentira!!... Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Universitaria, 1928.
Reyes, Rodolfo. De mi vida. 2 vols. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929.
Reyes Spíndola, Octavio. Alma de México. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena Argentina,
1943.
Richards, Michael. A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in
Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ríos Esparíz, Ángel María. Costa Rica y la Guerra Civil Española. San José: Editorial
Porvenir, 1997.
Rippy, Merrill. Oil and the Mexican Revolution. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972.
Robledo Rincón, Eduardo. Alfonso Reyes en Argentina. Buenos Aires: Embajada de
México, 1998.
Rockwell, Elsie. Hacer escuela, hacer estado: la eduación posrevolucionaria vista desde
Tlaxcala. Mexico City: CIESAS, 2007.
———. “Schools of the Revolution: Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala,
1910-1930.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the
327
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel
Nugent, 170-208. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.
Rodríguez O., Jaime E. The Emergence of Spanish America: Vicente Rocafuerte and
Spanish Americanism, 1808-1932. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1975.
———. “Rocafuerte y el empréstito a Colombia,” Historia Mexicana 18:4 (April-June,
1969): 485-515.
Rolland, Denis. Vichy et la France Libre au Mexique. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990.
Romero James, Concha. “La cooperación intelectual en América, 1933-1936.” Trabajo
presentado a la Tercera Conferencia Interamericana de Eduación, México, D.F.,
Agosoto 22-29, 1937.
Romero, José Rubén. Rosenda. 2nd ed. México City: Porrúa, 1946.
———. La vida inútil de Pito Pérez. 2nd ed. Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1938.
———. Mi caballo, mi perro y mi rifle. Barcelona: Imprenta Núñez, 1936.
———. Apuntes de un lugareño. Barcelona: Imprenta Núñez, 1933.
Romero, Miguel Alonzo. En el cielo de los Rojos: (de mis alforjas de viajero). Mexico
City: Beatriz de Silva 1949.
———. Helas: quien visita a Grecia y la comprende, la recuerda siempre. Mexico
City: S. Makris, 1941.
———. Caricatura de un recorrido por la India. Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1937.
———. Algunos aspectos de la vida del Japón. Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1936.
———. Un año de sitio en la presidencia municipal. Crónica y comentarios de una
labor accidentada. Mexico City: Editorial Hispano-Mexicana, 1923.
Rosenzweig Díaz, Alfonso de. Mexicanidad de México. 3 vols. Oxford: Dolphin, 1959.
Rout Jr., Leslie B. The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1970.
328
Royal Institute of International Affairs. “Notes on the Latin American Press.” Review of
the Foreign Press, 1939-1945: Latin American Memoranda. München : Kraus
International Publications, 1980
Ruíz Guerra, Rubén. Mas allá de la diplomacia: Relaciones de México con Bolivia,
Ecuador y Perú, 1821-1994. Mexico City: SRE, 2007.
Saborit, Antonio. El mundo ilustrado de Rafael Reyes Spíndola. Mexico City: Centro de
Estudios de Historia de México, 2003.
Sáenz, Moisés. Antología de Moisés Sáenz. México: Ediciones Oasis, 1970.
———. Perú joyas, telas, cerámicas: colección popular del profesor Moisés Sáenz.
México, 1947.
———. The Indian, citizen of America. Washington: Pan American Union, 1946.
———. México íntegro. Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1939.
———. Carapan: bosquejo de una experiencia. Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1936.
———. Sobre el indio ecuatoriano y su incorporación al medio nacional. Mexico
City: SEP, 1933.
———. Sobre el indio peruano y su incorporación al medio nacional. Mexico City:
SEP, 1933.
———. La educación rural en México. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación,
1928.
Salgado, Lourdes Celis. La Inustria Petrolera en México. Una Crónica. 3 vols. Mexico
City: PEMEX, 1988.
Sanders, Nichole. “‘Protecting Mothers in Order to Protect Children’: The Seventh PanAmerican Child Congress and the Latin American ‘Civlizing Mission.’” In
Maternalism Reconsidered: Social Welfare in Twentieth Century History, edited
by Rebecca Plant et al. Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming.
Santiago, Myrna I. The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican
Revolution, 1900-1938. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Schneider, Luis Mario. Gabriela Mistral: Itinerario veracruzano. Xalapa: Biblioteca
Universidad Veracruzana, 1991.
329
Schuler, Friedrich E. Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the
Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1998.
Schwarzstein, Dora. Entre Franco y Peron: Memoria e Identidad del Exilio Republicano
Española en Argentina. Barcelona: Crítica, 2001.
———. “Actores sociales y política inmigratoria en la Argentina. La llegada de los
republicanos españoles.” Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos 12:37 (Dec.,
1997): 423-445.
Schwoch, James. The American Radio Industry and Its Latin American Activities, 19001939. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1990.
Second Labour Conference of the American States Which Are Members of the
International Labour Organisation. Record of the Proceedings. Montreal:
International Labour Office, 1941.
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana. 3 vols.
Mexico City: SRE, 1998, 2002.
———. La Orden Mexicana del Águila Azteca, ley y reglamento. Mexico City: DAPP,
1936.
Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América Miembros de la
Organización Internacional del Trabajo. “Discurso del Lic. Antonio Villalobos,
Jefe del Departamento del Trabajo y Delegado de México a la Conferencia.” La
Habana, Cuba, 28 de noviembre de 1939.
Serrano Álvarez, Pablo. Basilio Vadillo Ortega: itinerario y desencuentro con la
Revolución Mexicana, 1885-1935. Mexico City: INEHRM, 2000.
Serrano Migallón, Fernando, ed. Con certera visión: Isidro Fabela y su tiempo. Mexico
City: FCE, 2000.
———. Isidro Fabela y la diplomacia mexicana. Mexico City: SEP, 1981.
Shubert, Adrian. The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 18601934. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
Sierra, Augusto Santiago. Las misiones culturales (1923-1973). Mexico City: SEP,
1973.
330
Silva Herzog, Jesús. Historia de la Expropiación de las Empresas Petroleras. Mexico
City: PEMEX, 1988.
———. La expropiación del petróleo en México. Mexico City: Cuadernos Americanos,
1963.
———. México y su petróleo, una lección para América. Buenos Aires: Universidad de
Buenos Aires, 1959.
———. Petróleo mexicano, historia de un problema. Mexico City: FCE, 1941.
———. Mexican expropriation. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1938.
Sinclair, Upton. ¡No pasarán! (They Shall Not Pass): A Story of the Battle of Madrid.
Mexico City: Editorial Masas, 1937.
Smith, Lois Elwyn. Mexico and the Spanish Republicans. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1955.
Smith, Stephanie J. Gender and the Mexican Revolution: Yucatán Women and the
Realities of Patriarchy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
———. “Salvador Alvarado of Yucatán: Revolutionary Reforms, Revolutionary
Women.” In State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1952: Portraits in
Conflict, Courage and Corruption, edited by Jürgen Buchenau and William H.
Beezley, 43-57. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
Soto Estigarribia, Juan Vicente. Delito contra el honor: Calumnia, difamación e injuria.
Aunción: Editora Litocolor, 2005.
Spenser, Daniela. “Vicente Lombardo Toledano envuelto en antagonismos
internacionales,” Revista Izquierdas 3:4 (2009): 1-19.
———. The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, the United States and Soviet Russia in the
1920s. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
Spierenburg, Pieter, ed. Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern
Europe and America. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998.
Standard Oil. The Present Status of the Mexican Oil “Expropriations.” New York:
Standard Oil Company, 1940.
———. The Reply to Mexico. New York: Standard Oil Company, 1940.
331
Stepan, Nancy Leys. “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin
America. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Suárez, Eduardo. Comentarios y Recuerdos, 1926-1946. Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa,
1977.
Sylvain Bouchereau, Madeleine. Haïti et ses femmes: une étude d’évolution culturelle.
Port-au-Prince: Les Presses libres, 1957.
———. L’éducation des femmes en Haïti. Port-au-Prince: Impr. De l’Etat, 1944.
Tenorio-Trillo, Mauricio. Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
Tierney, Dominic. FDR and the Spanish Civil War. Durham: Duke University Press,
2007.
Torres Bodet, Jaime. The artist, gral. Ignacio María Beteta. Mexico City: n.p. 1964.
Toussaint, Manuel. Pátzcuaro. Mexico City: UNAM/Instituto de Investigaciones
Estéticas y Escuela de Arquitectura, 1942.
Toussaint Ribot, Monica, et al. Vecindad y Diplomacia: Centroamérica en la política
exterior mexicana, 1821-1988. Mexico City: SRE, 2001.
Trifone, Víctor and Gustavo Svarzman. La repercusión de la guerra civil española en la
Argentina (1936-1939). Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1993.
Tuñón Pablos, Esperanza. Mujeres que se organizan: El Frente Único Pro-derechos de
la Mujer, 1935-1938. Mexico City: UNAM, 1992.
Tuñón, Enriqueta. ¡Por fin…ya podremos elegir y ser electas! El sufragio femenino en
México, 1935-1953. Mexico City: CONACULTA, 2002.
Vaca, Agustín. “Basilio Vadillo.” In Aporte diplomático de Jalisco, 143-271. Mexico
City: SRE, 1988.
Vadillo, Basilio. El campanario. Mexico City: Plaza y Janés, 1985.
Valdés Silva, María Candelaria. Una sociedad en busca de alternativas: la educación
socialista en La Laguna. Saltillo: Secretaría de Educación Pública de Coahuila,
332
1999.
Valdés Teviño, Francisco. La diplomacia mexicana: cancilleres y embajadores de Nuevo
León. Monterrey: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, 2001.
Vargas Saavedra, Luis, ed. Tan de usted: epistolario de Gabriela Mistral con Alfonso
Reyes. Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1991.
———. El otro suicida de Gabriela Mistral. Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile,
1985.
Vaughan, Mary Kay. Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants and Schools in
Mexico, 1930-1940. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997.
———. “Rural Women’s Literacy and Educaion during the Mexican Revolution:
Subverting a Patriarchal Event?” In Women of the Mexican Countryside, 18501990, edited by Heather Fowler-Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1992.
———. “Women School Teachers in the Mexican Revolution: The Story of Reyna’s
Braids,” Journal of Women’s History 2:1 (Spring 1990): 143-168.
Vaughan, Mary Kay and Stephen E. Lewis, eds. The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and
Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940. Durham: Duke University Press,
2006.
Vela, Davied. Orientación y recomendaciones del Primer Congreso Indigenista
Interamericano. Guatemala: Publicaciones del Comité Organizador del IV
Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, 1959.
Vela, Pablo Hannibal. Arca Sonora. Quito: Talleres Gráficos de Educación, 1938.
Velasco, Adolfo. La Escula Indigenal de Warisata. Mexico City: Departamento de
Asuntos Indígenas/Editorial Mundo Nuevo, 1940.
Verástique, Bernardino. Michoacán and Eden: Vasco de Quiroga and the Evangelization
of Western Mexico. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.
Waugh, Evelyn. Robbery under Law: The Mexican Object-Lesson. London: Chapman
and Hall, 1939.
Wilkie, James W. The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change
since 1910. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
333
Yanklevich, Pablo. La revolución mexicana en América Latina: Intereses políticos e
itinerarios intelectuales. Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2003.
———. Miradas australes. Propaganda, cabildeo y proyección de la Revolución
Mexicana en el Río de la Plata, 1910-1930. Mexico City: INEHRM, 1997.
———. La Diplomacia Imaginaria: Argentina y la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1916.
Mexico City: SRE, 1994.
Van Vuurde, Rob. Los Países Bajos, el petróleo y la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950.
Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 1997.
Zuleta, María Cecilia. Los extremos de Hispanoamérica: Relaciones, conflictos y
armonías entre México y el Cono Sur, 1821-1990. Mexico City: SRE, 2008.
———. “Alfonso Reyes y las relaciones México-Argentina: proyectos y realidades,
1926-1936.” Historia Mexicana 45:4 (1996): 867-904.
Zolov, Eric. “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,”
The Americas 61:2 (October 2004): 159-188.