The Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy of Child

The Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy
of Child
By
DEAN
JORGE BOCOBO
I am in receipt of a letter addressed to me on your
by Secretary Primitivo San Agustin, enclosing a copy of
Bill No. 172 presented by Senator Belo and announcing a
hearing on this bill. In said letter my presence at the h
or my written comment on the bill, is asked.
Senate Bill No. 172 abolishes the conclusive persu
established in Section 333, par. 3, of the Code of Civil Proc
and Article 108 of the Civil Code, regarding the legiti
a child. It further provides for a disputable presumpti
legitimacy of a child born under certain conditions.
The undersigned is opposed to the suppression of the
clusive presumption of legitimacy of children for the folIo
reasons:
1. The law has from ancient times established such
sive presumption.
2. Every civilized nation has some sort of conclusive
sumption on this subject, although the requisites or eleme
such presumption slightly vary.
3. Such a conclusive presumption is necessary for the
ence and stability of the family which, in turn, is the b
society.
4. Medical jurisprudence has not advanced to such an
that the question of paternity may be safely entrusted
judgment of experts.
I shall now discuss each point in the order named.
1. The Historical
Law.
The principal basis of the conclusive presumption of
macy of children is found in the maxim of the Roman law.
ter est quem justae nuptiae demonstrant."
(Law 5, ti
Book II, Dig.) Under the Roman Law, not even the a
of the wife, or the statement of the mother contrary to
macy, was admissible. "Non utique crimen adulterii qu
lieri objicitur infanti praejudicat, cum possit et ilIa a
osse, et fmpubos deffunctum patrem habuisse." (Law 11,
title V, Book XLVIII, Dig) "Nee obsit professio a matt
facta."
(Law 29, par. 1, Title III, Book XXII, Dig.)
The law of the Partidas also laid down a conclusive preumption of legitimacy.
"Si pudiere ser provado que el fijo de
S Igl:lDamuger nasciere della, seyendo casada con aquel marido,
~ non aviendo el marido estado alongado delIa tanto tiempo que
pudiessen veraaderamente sospec~ar, segun natura, que el fijo
fuera de otri, non Ie empeco on nmguna manera 10 que el padre
6 la madre dixesson."
(Law 9, title 14 Partida III.)
This conslusive presumption is thus a time-honored legal
institution.
It has the sanction of the centuries.
A legal principle which has come down to us through the ages, respected
and unchanged, should not be discarded, unless clear and compelling reasons are shown. Law is not a sudden product, but
the result of gradual and orderly development, and is a heritage
of mankind. Precisely, the greatest contribution of Rome to
civilization is Roman law. We should not renounce any portion
of that legacy unless. it manifestly runs counter to the permanent interest of society. That the conclusive presumption is
demanded by the social order will be demonstrated later in this
discussion.
2. The Law in all Countries.
Every nation in the entire civilized world has some kind
of conclusive presumption of legitimacy of children, although
there are some slight variation as to the requisites or elements
of such conclusive presumption.
For instance, the French Civil
Code, which is the model of so many modern civil codes in
Europe, in Latin America and elsewhere, provides in Articles
312, 313 and 314 as follows:
"312. A child conceived by a married woman has for
its father her husband.
But the latter can repudiate the
child by proving that he was physically unable to cohabit
with his wife from the 300th day to the 180th day before
the child's birth, either because he was away or- because he
was suffering from the effects of an accident."
"313. A husband cannot, by alleging impotence, repudiate the child; he cannot repudiate it even by proving that
his wife has committed adultery, unless its birth has been
concealed from him; in which case he will be allowed to
prove any facts tending to show that he is not the father.
(P. 336 (Law, 6th December, 1850, modified by the Law
of 18th April, 1886). In case of a divorce, or even a petition for a divorce or judicial separation, the husband may
repudiate a child which is born 300 days after the sentence
which has authorized his wife to have a separate dw:
or which is born less than 180 days after either th
refusal of the petition or the reconciliation.
An
repudiating the child may not be entered if, as a ma;
fact, the parents have come together again."
"314. A child born within 180 days of marriage
be repudiated by the husband (1) if he knew of the
nancy before marriage; (2) if he was present wh
birth was being recorded and the record was signed b
or such record contains a statement that he cannot
(3) if the child is not declared viable."
The Spanish Civil Code provides in Article 108 an
thus:
"Art. 108. Se presumiran hijos legitimos 10s n
despues de los ciento ochenta dias siguie'ntes al de la
braci6n del matrimonio, y antes de los trescientos dl
guientes a su disoluci6n 6 a la separaci6n de los con
"Contra esta presunci6n no se admitira otra p
que la de la imposibilidad fisica del marido para
acceso con su mujer en los primeros ciento veinte
de los trescientos que hubiesen precedido al naci
del hijo."
"Contra esta presunci6n no se admitira otra p
que la de la imposibilidad fisica del marido para ten
ceso con su mujer en los primeros ciento veinte dias
trescientos que hubiesen precedido al nacimento del
Art. 109. El hijo se presumira legitimo, aunque
dre hubiese declarado contra su legitimidad 6 hubi
condenada como adultera."
The Civil Code of Argentina in Articles 240, 241
243 and 244 provides:
"La ley supone concebidos durante el matrimom
los hijos que nacieren despues de ciento ochenta di
casamiento valido 6 putativo de la madre, y (a) 10
tumos que nacieren dentro de los trescientos dias c
desde el dia en que el matrimonio valido 6 putativ
disuelto pOl' muerte del marido 6 POl' que fuese an
(Art. 240)
'Si disuelto 6 anulado el matrimonio, la madre c
jere otro en el plazo prohibido POl'el art. 236 (art. 93
Mtr. Civ.), el hijo que naciere antes de los ciento
dias del segundo matrimonio, se presume concebido
primero, siempre que naciere dentro de los trescientolif
de disuelto 6 anulado el primer matrimonio." (Art.
"Se presume concebido en el segundo, el hij 0 que naciere despues de los ciento ochenta dias de su celebraci6n,
aunque se este dentro de los trescientos dias posteriores a
la disoluci6n del primer matrimonio."
(Art. 242)
"El hijo nacido dentro de los trescientos dias posteriores a ia disoluci6n (6 anulaci6n) del matrimonio de la ma·
dre, se presume concebido durante el matrimonio de ella.
aun cuando la madre 11 otro que se diga su padre, Ie reconozcan pOl' hijo natural." (Art. 243)
'Las presunciones de la ley expresadas en los articulos
anteriores no admiten prueba en contra." (Art. 244)
"Art. 184. Presumed Paternity of Hu,sbcwd. The law
considers the husband of the mother as the father of all
children conceived during the marriage."
"Art. 185. Disowner of Husband for Impotence
or
Adultery.
The husband can not, by alleging his natural
impotence, disown the child; he can not disown it even for
cause of adultery, unless its birth has been concealed from
him, in which case he will be permitted to prove that he is
not its father."
"Art. 190. Contestation
of Paternity
of 180 Days
Child. The husband can not contest the legitimacy of the
child born previous to the one hundred and eightieth day of
marriage, in the following cases:
"1. If he was acquainted with the circumstances of his
wife being pregnant previously to the marriage.
"2. If he was present at the registering of the birth or
baptism of the child and signed the same, or if not knowing how to sign, he put his ordinary mark to It in the presence of two witnesses."
In this connection, for the purpose of showing that the
codes of various countries have a conclusive presumption, I wish
to quote the following extract from the work "Tratado de Derecho Civil Espanol" by Prof. Calixto Valverde y Valverde of
the University of Valladolid, Vol. IV, pp. 405 and 406:
"A la sociedad, a la ley y al Estado, los interesa que
la paternidad no sea incierta, porque como dice Bigot, pOl'
medio de ella se perpetuan las familias y se distinguen las
unas de las otras, pOl' 10 cual se hace preciso acudir a hechos
exteriores que la justifiquen.
Claro es que cuando
de hijos nacidos de uniones legales, tales hechos so
rios; el matrimonio es base para presumir la legiti
es natural, por tanto, que la legislaci6n de antigU
establecido esta presunci6n juridica de canicter g
pater is est qu.em justae nuptiae clemonstrant.
Con
cia de esta regIa es que las legislaciones civiles haya
que el hljo nacido dentro de los 180 dias siguientes
trimonio, y antes de los 300 siguientes a su disoluc
considere como concebido dentro del matrimonio,
suma legitimo, y se aplique esta otra presunci6n:
marido es padre del hijo concebido durante el matri
And as Benito Gutierrez Fernandez in his well knowm
on "Estudios Fundamentales sobre El Derecho Civil Es
Vol. I, page 493, said, the presumption of legitimacy of ch
"rouno dos caracteres de verdad igualmente atendibles:
toridad de los siglos y el ejemplo de todos los pueblos."
Therefore, in my opinion, there is no valid reason w
Philippine Islands should deviate from the path which ha
taken by other countries.
There is no justification that
see for such a unique reform, unless we want to give t
pression to the legal profession in other countries that the
ippines is peculiarly confronted with the problem of illegi
children, which impression would be an injustice to our
The suppression of the conclusive presumption on thO
ject w~uld admit any kind of proof that the law of evide
cognizes. For instance, a child born in wedlock of paren
ing together could be held adulterous by hearsay evidence
statement of a deceased person or of an absentee or by
mony as to common reputation.
(Sees. 281, 298, Nos. 4 a
Act 190). Should this be allowed, when false testimony is
everyday in the courts? Do we not realize that one-h
witnesses in all cases are wrong, either maliciously or in
faith?
3. Social Reasons for the Conclusive
PTesumption.
The family is the basis of society. Public policy de
that the family should be surrounded with safeguards so
it may always stand firm, safe from all attacks.
The
macy of a child should be inviolate, for it is dearer th
life, dearer than the life of his parents.
On this point, I
b tter than
to quote from leading jurists who have made
pronouncements
which stoutly maintain
clear 'sdom and socIal
. need of s.ome conc 1USIve
.
presump t'IOn on
the WI
.
he legitimacy of chIldren.
.
t
Laurent, who stands among the foremost jurists of all time,
has the following to say in his work on "Principles of French
Civil Law", Vol. III, pp. 502, 503, 506 and 507:
nO .eand convincing
"Y bien, la paternidad se establece en 1tna presunci6n
tan vieja como el matrimonio, tan fuerte como la moralidad.
Los autores del C6digo Civil han tornado la f6rmula del derecho romano:
El hijo concebido durante el matrimonio,
dice el art. 312, tiene por padre al marido.
Es esta una
simple verosimilitud,
una probabilidad
dudosa?
Ciertamente que no, porque tiene por base el sentimiento del deber
que Dios ha gravado en nuestra conciencia.
La mujer debe
fidelidad a su marido, y ella no puede violarla por un crimen. Es la fidelidad la que forma la regIa casi universal,
6 es el adulterio'?
Nosotros no planteamos la cuesti6n sino
para oir la protesta de la conciencia que se rebela contra
la sola suposici6n de que- el crimen reine como soberano
en el seno de las familias.
N 6, es el afecto, y a falta de
este el deber.
Esta base es tan s61ida como las escrituras
autenticas.
El padre es, pues, tan cierto como la madre.
Escuchemos un momento a d' Aguesseau : 'N ada tan fuerte como esta presunci6n.
La ley nunca presume el crimen:
favorable siempre para la inocencia cuando un mismo efecto puede tener dos causas, una injusta y otra justa y legitima, rechaza absolutamente
la primera para atenerse unicamente a la ultima."
"Pudiendo estar las pres unci ones en desacuerdo con la
realidad nace la cuesti6n de saber si las que establecen la
duraci6n de la preiiez pueden ser combatidas por la prueba
contra ria.
"En principio hay que contestar negativamente.
El
principio resulta del motivo mismo por el cual la ley ha
establecido sus presunciones .. Ella ha querido asegurar el
estado de los hombres poniendolo al abrigo de las incertidumbres de la ciencia; y desde el momento en que habia
la posibilidad de una duda la ha interpretado
a favor de la
legitimidad.
Los oradores del Gobierno y del Tribunado
estan unanimes en este pun to, por 10 menos en cuanto a
la regIa, si bien se separan en su aplicaci6n.
Por el mo-
\
mento tnitase de la regIa. La antigua jurisprudencia
donaba a la prudencia de los tribunales la decision de
dificiles discusiones.
Que resulta de ello? Bigotmeneu nos 10 dice: 'Los jueces no podian adquiri
ninguna acera del hecho particular (supuesto que la
cia es impotente) y cada tribunal se formaba un si
diferente ace rea de la extension y limitacion que deb'
mitir en el curso normal de la Naturaleza.
La jur'
dencia no tenia ninguna uniformidad POI' el motivo
de que no podia ser mas que arbitraria."
Florencio Garcia Goyena, commenting on the pro
Spanish Civil Code of 1851 which in Art. 101 establishes a
elusive presumption on the legitimacy of children, has exp
himself as follows:
"La sola naturaleza no puede servirnos de guia en
materia, la mas interesante del Codigo civil, ella mis
cubierto con un velo misterioso e impenetrable la tr
sion de nuestra existencia: el secreto de la paternid
tal vez el unico que asusta y desconcierta todos los e
zos del saber y del orgullo humano.
"Mas a pesar de esto, no podia dejarse en incerti
bre la paternidad, porque siendo el principia y base
familias, 10 es POl' necesidad de todo el orden 0 edifici
cial.
"En la imposibilidad de tomar de la naturaleza
no material, evidente e infalible de la paternidad, Y
necesidad de tener uno para la exacta division de las
lias, y la sucesion cierta de los individuos y biene ,
recurrido a la presuncion mas cercana a la prueba
una fuerza casi igual a la evidencia.
"Todos los pueblos, antiguos y modern os, han
tado como pOI' un acuerdo la famosa regIa 0 axioma.
tel' est quem justae nuptiae demonstrant: este es el
social y legal de la paternidad.
La presuncion en
funda es tan natural y decorosa, tan uti I y justa, Y
todo tan necesaria, que fuera de ella no seria posi
sociedad; y pOI' estas mismas consideraciones no se
en contra otra prueba que la especialisima de este art
(Concordancias, Motivos y Comentarios del Codigo
Espanol, Vol. I, p. 111).
Sanchez Ramon, in Vol. V, pp. 956 and 957 of his cl.assical
wo rk , entitled "Derecho Civil", has the following to say:
"En cuanto al sistema, el Codigo no ha vacilado en
elegir el que hace derivar la legitimidad de una presuncion cuyo fundamento esta en el matrimonio, prefiriendole
a aquel otro que, en todo caso, entrega la cuestion de legitimidad alas depuraciones de una peritacion especial suministrada pOl' los conocimientos fisiologicos y de embriologia, unidos a los demas antecedentes de hecho que, prestando un supuesto racional a la aplicacion de sus reglas,
determinen en cada nacimiento de hijos la cualidad de paternidad y de filiacion legitimas.
A favor de este ultimo
sistema estara la mayor probabilidad de acierto, segun la
eficacia y recta estimacion de la prueba de filiacion legit ima, suponiendo la suficiencia de los recursos cientificos, y
la precision de los antecedentes de hecho para su aplicacion par la ciencia y conciencia de los peritos.
Pero no parece temerario anticipar que los recursos de la ciencia, a
pesar de sus diarios progresos, y segun opinion general de
los que la cultivan en esta interesante rama, no podran ir
mas alIa en sus testimonios periciales de los limites de la viabilidad y de la edad del feto 6 de la prole ya nacida; mas de
modo alguno seran eficaces para determinar clara y precisamente la imputacion de la filiacion y de la paternidad.
Y
nada se dira de la inmensa dificultad, sino verdadera imposibilidad, de poner en claro los momentos de la copula y de
la concepcion que dieran lugar a la generacion de la prole
cuya legitimidad fuese el problema sometido a la prueba
pericial, la cual, POl' esta circunstancia, no podria ir precedida pi acompafiada de aquella precision de antecedentes de
hecho que, reunidos al elemento tecnico y al informativo,
pudieran servir. de legitimos fundamentos para una deduccion 0 induccion racionales, verosimiles y, a 10 sumo, probabIes.
"POl' ultimo, no es la cuestion siquiera que la ciencia
en si misma haya alcanzado 6 no progresos tales que la
permitieran prestar recursos de la mayor eficacia para la
depuracion en esa delicada materia, sino que seria necesario suponer que todos 10s peritos la poseian en el ultimo
grado de su perfeccion y adelanto, y aplicaban sus reglas
en todos 10s casos sin error y sin malicia.
"Todo esto, aparte los peligros racionales de entregar tan grave asunto a los influjos de una prueba pericial,
cuyos riesgos y deficiencias no se sabe cuando son
res, si cuando se acatan las opiniones de los peritos
decision judicial, 6 cuando esta mantiene su derec
critica y de apreciaci6n sobre el testimonio mismo d
peritos, y la ocasi6n, en fin, que tal sistema ofreceria
rig ores, escandalos, dispendios y dilaciones de litigi
mejantes."
Finally, Prof. Clemente de Diego of the Universidad
tral de Madrid, foremost living civilian in Spain, declar
his work on Derecho Civil Espanol Comun y Foral, Vol.
pp. 260-61:
"La epoca de concepci6n y la filiaci6n paterna no
susceptibles de prueba directa pOl' el velo que las cub
como no pueden permanecer inciertos tales hechos, ba
distinci6n de familias de aqui el recurrir a pruebas in
tas. La declaraci6n de los mismos procreantes, sabre se
ligrosa es incierta, y la convicci6n de los Tribunales no
varia a aquellas teorias de embarazos de tres anos, em
zos POl' imaginaci6n voluntaria, etc. De aqui que se
TENIDO QUE RECURRIR A PRESUNCIONES."
4. Medical
Jur2sprudence N at Yet Sufficiently
advanced
Finally, medical jurisprudence has not yet advanc
such an extent that the question of paternity may be
entrusted to the judgment of experts.
It is true that Manresa in commenting on Art. 108 of
Spanish Civil Code has this to say:
"El precepto del C6digo es terminante en esto pun
la razon bien conocida: el deseo de no promover cuesti
dudosas en un as unto que, dadas nuestras "ideas soci
incita siempre al escandalo. Mas no hay duda que pudi
fijarse otras prueba,s ent"re las cuales la de raza tiene
pertinencia para las naciones que poseen colonia
este observaba muy bien un comentarista, en la epo
la publicaci6n de nuestro C6digo, en que aun teniamos
nias, que debiendo extenderse el nuevo cuerpo legal 'a
torios en que hay millares de negros y milliones de ind
c6mo no se ha pensado 'que el precepto de la ley puede
muchas veces en oposici6n con la evidencia de los hee
With regard to the case cited by Manresa where a child
pears to be of a race different from that of the husband of the
~i1d'S mother, the following observations are offered:
1. In many cases, inasmuch as races are intermingled,
ould be difficult to judge even by this test.
it
2. If the author of the bill has this case principally in mind,
his bill should deal solely and exclusively with this specific
question. That is to say, his bill should not entirely suppress
the conclusive presumption but should merely provide that in
case a child is manifestly of a different race from that of the
husband of the child's mother, this fact may be introduced in
evidence. However, the uldersigned believes that such an exception would in many cases be dangerous on account of the difficulty of distinguishing the various races.
With regard to other proofs on which expert,s on legal medicine may give an opinion, it is a fact that the science of medical
jurisprudence has not been able to dispel, the mystery of paternity and conception. There are so many complicated factors to
be reckoned with, and so many scientific questions unsettled.
For example, the duration of pregnancy and the time of conception cannot be scientifically determined.
Dr. R. L. Emerson,
in his book on Legal Medicine, page 171, says:
"The popular idea that the time of conception may be
determined by signs on the part of the woman is a popular
fallacy without any good grounds for its acceptance.
As
a rule, it is pure conjecture on the part of the parents as
to when conception took place. If, on the other hand,
there has been but one intercourse, the duration of pregnancy can easily be calculated. But even here there may be
wide divergence as is reported by one author of three cases
where labor came on in 260, 264, and 276 days; and another author cites a case of 293 days after a single interCOl1rse. But a comparison of this latter case with the one
first mentioned shows a difference of thirty-three days in
calculating the normal period of gestation.
"Ma,ny a,uthor8 ha,ve published va,riousviews
on this
subject, a,nd it is impossible to fix a,ny definite limits for
the period of gesta,tion."
Dr. L. Thoinot, Professor of Legal Medicine of the
versity of Paris, in his work on Legal Medicine says:
"La duracion cientifica del embarazo---es decir ,
tiempo transcurrido desde la concepcion al parto-no p
precisarse, ni de un modo general, ni para un caso d
minado."
If medical jurisprudence cannot furnish safe tests on
question of paternity, then the proposal to do away with
conclusive presumption is unwarranted.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recomm
that Senate Bill No. 172 abolishing the conclusive presump
on the legitimacy of children be disapproved.
Manila, Sept. 20, 1932
0.